A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union by Cooley, Thomas M.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Books Faculty Scholarship 
1874 
A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the 
Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 
Thomas M. Cooley 
University of Michigan Law School 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/books/52 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/books 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the 
Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cooley, Thomas M. A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of 
the States of the American Union. 3rd ed. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1874. 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Books by an authorized administrator of 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
A treatise on the constitutional limitations which rest upon the legislative
power of the states of the American union. By Thomas M. Cooley
...
Cooley, Thomas McIntyre, 1824-1898.
Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1874.
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081766804
Public Domain, Google-digitized
http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
This work is in the Public Domain, meaning that it is
not subject to copyright. Users are free to copy, use,
and redistribute the work in part or in whole. It is possible
that heirs or the estate of the authors of individual portions
of the work, such as illustrations, assert copyrights over
these portions. Depending on the nature of subsequent
use that is made, additional rights may need to be obtained
independently of anything we can address. The digital
images and OCR of this work were produced by Google,
Inc. (indicated by a watermark on each page in the
PageTurner). Google requests that the images and OCR
not be re-hosted, redistributed or used commercially.
 The images are provided for educational, scholarly,
non-commercial purposes.
A treatise on the constitutional limitations which rest upon the legislative power of the states of the American unionThomas McIntyre Cooley
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
IG
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
iG
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
1G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
ATREATISE
I
ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES
OF THE AMERICAN UNION.
BY
THOMAS M. COOLEY, LL.D.,
I
OS» Or THE JUSTICES Or TUI SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, AND JAT PROFESSOR
op law a the totversitt OP MICHIGAN.
TfflRD EDITION,
WITH CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONS, GIVING THE RESULTS OF THE TECE>T CASES.
BOSTON:
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY.
1874.
Cheeked
May, 1913
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1674, by
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
CAMBRIDGE:
PHESS OF JOHN WILSON AND SON.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
In the Preface to the first edition of this work, the author stated
its purpose to be, to furnish to the practitioner and the student of
the law such a presentation of elementary constitutional principles
as should serve, with the aid of its references to judicial decisions,
legal treatises, and historical events, as a convenient guide in the
examination of questions respecting the constitutional limitations
which rest upon the power of the several State legislatures. In
the accomplishment of that purpose, the author further stated that
he had faithfully endeavored to give the law as it had been settled
by the authorities, rather than to present his own views. At the
same time, he did not attempt to deny — what he supposed would
be sufficiently apparent — that he had written in full sympathy
with all those restraints which the caution of the fathers had im-
posed upon the exercise of the powers of government, and with
faith in the checks and balances of our republican system, and in
correct conclusions by the general public sentiment, rather than
in reliance upon a judicious, prudent, and just exercise of authority,
when confided without restriction to any one man or body of men,
whether sitting in legislative capacity or judicial. In this sympa-
thy and faith he had written of jury trials and the other safeguards
to personal liberty, of liberty of the press and of vested rights;
and he had also endeavored to point out that there are on all sides
definite limitations which circumscribe the legislative authority,
independent of the specific restrictions which the people impose by
their State constitutions. But while not predisposed to discover
in any part of our system the rightful existence of any unlimited
power, created by the Constitution, neither on the other hand had
he designed to advance new doctrines, or to do more than state
clearly and with reasonable conciseness the principles to be de-
duced from the judicial decisions.
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PREFACE.
The unexpected favor with which the work has been received
having made a new edition necessary, the author has reviewed
every part of it with care, but without finding occasion to change
in any important particular the conclusions before given. Further
reflection has only tended to confirm him in his previous views of
the need of constitutional restraints at every point where agents
are to exercise the delegated authority of the people; and he is
gratified to observe that in the judicial tribunals the tendency is
not in the direction of a disregard of these restraints. The reader
will find numerous additional references to new cases and other
authorities; and some modifications have been made in the
phraseology of the text, with a view to clearer and more accurate
expression of his views. Trusting that these modifications and
additions will be found not without value, he again submits his
work "to the judgment of an enlightened and generous pro-
fession."
THOiMAS M. COOLEY.
University of Michigan, 1
Ann Abbob, July, 1871. J
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.
The second edition being exhausted, the author, in preparing a
third, has endeavored to give full references to such decisions as
have recently been made or reported, having a bearing upon the
points discussed. It will be seen on consulting the notes that
the number of such decisions is large, and that some of them are
of no little importance.
THOMAS M. COOLEY.
University of Michigan )
Ann Abbob, December, 1873. J
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
CHAPTER I.
DEFINITIONS.
A State is a body politic, or society of men, united together for
the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by the
joint efforts of their combined strength.1 The terms nation and
Slate are frequently employed, not only in the law of nations, but
in common parlance, as importing the same thing;2 but the term
nation is more strictly synonymous with people, and while a single
State may embrace different nations or peoples, a single nation will
sometimes be so divided politically as to constitute several States.
In American constitutional law the word State is applied to the
several members of the American Union, while the word nation is
applied to the whole body of the people embraced within the juris-
diction of the Federal government.
Sovereignty, as applied to States, imports the supreme, absolute,
uncontrollable power by which any State is governed.3 A State is
called a sovereign State when this supreme power resides within
itself, whether resting in a single individual, or in a number of
individuals, or in the whole body of the people.4 In the view of
1 Vattel, b. 1, p. 1, § 1; Story pn Const. § 207; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1,
c. 2, § 2; Halleck, Int. Law, 63; Bouv. Law Diet. " State." "A multitude of
people united together by a communion of interest, and by common laws, to
which they submit with one accord." Burlamaqui, Politic Law, p. 5.
'Thompson, J., in Cheiokee Nation o. Georgia, 5 Pet. 52; Chase, Ch. J.,
in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 720; Vattel, supra.
3 Story on Const. § 207; 1 Black. Com. 49; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1, p. 2,
§5; Halleck, Int. Law, 63, 64; Austin, Province of Jurisprudence, Lep. VI.;
Chipman on Government, 137. "The right of commanding finally in civil soci-
ety." Burlamaqui, Politic Law, p. 5.
4 Vattel, b. 1, p. 1, § 2; Story on Const. § 207; Halleck, Int. Law, 65. In
other words, when it is an independent State. Chipman on Government, 137.
1 [1]
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* 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. I.
\
international law, all sovereign States are and must be
[* 2] equal in rights, * because, from the very definition of sover-
eign State, it is impossible that there should be, in respect
to it, any political superior.
The sovereignty of a State commonly extends to all the subjects
of government within the territorial limits occupied by the asso-
ciated people which compose it;' and, except upon the high seas,
which belong equally to all men, like the air, and no part of which
can rightfully be appropriated by any nation,1 the dividing line
between sovereignties is usually a territorial line. In American
constitutional law, however, there is a division of the powers of
sovereignty between the national and State governments by sub-
jects: the former being possessed of supreme, absolute, and uncon-
trollable power over certain subjects throughout all the States and
territories, while the States have the like complete power, within
their respective territorial limits, over other subjects.2 In regard
to certain other subjects, the States possess powers of regulation
which are not sovereign powers, inasmuch as they are liable to be
controlled, or for the time being to become altogether dormant by
the exercise of a superior power vested in the general government
in respect to the same subjects.
A Constitution is sometimes defined as the fundamental law of
a State, containing the principles upon which the government is
-founded, regulating the division of the sovereign powers, and
directing to what persons each of these powers is to be confided,
and the manner in which it is to be exercised.8 Perhaps an
equally complete and accurate definition would be, that body of
rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sover-
eignty are habitually exercised.
In a much qualified and very imperfect sense every State may
be said to possess a constitution; that is to say, some leading
1 Vattel, b. 1, c. 23, § 281; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 4, § 10.
2 McLean, J., in License Cases, 5 How. 588. "The powers of the* general
government and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the
fame territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting sepa-
rately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. And the
O sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of
/ the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the Hue of
division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye." Taney,
Cb. J., in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 516. See Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 406.
3 1 Bouv. Inst. 9; Uuer, Const. Juris. 26.
[2] •
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ch. I.]
* 2
DEFINITIONS.
principle has prevailed in the administration of its government,
until it lias become an understood part, of its system, to
which obedience * is expected and habitually yielded; like [* 3]
the hereditary principle in most monarchies, and the
custom of choosing the chieftain by the body of the people which
prevails among some barbarous tribes. But the term constitio-
tional government is applied only to those whose fundamental rules
or maxims not only locate the sovereign power in individuals or
bodies designated or chosen in some prescribed manner, but also
define the limits of its exercise so as to protect individual rights,
and shield them against the assumption of arbitrary power. The
number of these is not great, and the protection they afford to
individual rights is far from being uniform.1
In American constitutional law, the word Constitution is used in
a restricted sense, as implying the written instrument agreed upon
by the people of the Union, or of any one of the States, as the
absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and officers
of the government, in respect to all the points covered by it, which
must control until it shall be changed by the authority which
established it, and in opposition to which any act or regulation of
any such department or officer, or even of the people themselves,
will be altogether void.
The term unconstitutional law must vary in its meaning in differ-
ent States, according as the powers of sovereignty are or are not
possessed by the individual or body which exercises the powers of
ordinary legislation. Where the law-making department of a State
is restricted in its powers by a written fundamental law, as in the
American States, we understand by unconstitutional law one which,
being opposed to the fundamental law, is therefore in excess of
legislative authority, and void. Indeed, the term unconstitutional
1 Absolute monarchs, under a pressure of necessity, or to win the favor of
their people, sometimes grant them what is called a constitution; but this, so
long as the power of the monarch is recognized as supreme, can be no more than
his promise that he will observe its provisions, and conduct the government ac-
cordingly. The mere grant of a constitution does not make the government a
constitutional government, until the monarch is deprived of power to set it aside
at will. The mere grant of Magna Charta did not make the English a constitu-
tional monarchy; it was only after repeated violations and confirmations of that
instrument, and when a further disregard of its provisions had become dangerous
to the Crown, that fundamental rights could be said to have constitutional guar-
anties, and the government to be constitutional.
'[3]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[CH. I.
law, as employed in American jurisprudence, is a misnomer, and
implies a contradiction; that enactment which is opposed to the
Constitution being in fact no law at all. But where, by the theory
of the government, the exercise of complete sovereignty is vested in
the same individual or body which enacts the ordinary laws, any
law, being an exercise of power by the sovereign authority, must be
obligatory, and, if it varies from or conflicts with any existing con-
stitutional principle, must have the effect to modify or abrogate such
principle, instead of being nullified by it. This must be so in Great
Britain witli every law not in harmony with pre-existing constitu-
tional principles ; since, by the theory of its government, Parliament
exercises sovereign authority, and may even change the
[* 4] Constitution * at any time, as in many instances it has done,
by declaring its will to that effect.1 And when thus the
power to control and modify the Constitution resides in the ordi-
nary law-making power of the State, the term unconstitutio?ial law
can mean no more than this: a law which, being opposed to the
settled maxims upon which the government has habitually been
conducted, ought not to be, or to have been, adopted.2 It follows,
therefore, that in Great Britain constitutional questions are for the
most part to be discussed before the people or the Parliament, since
the declared will of the Parliament is the final law; but in America,
after a constitutional question has been passed upon by the legis-
lature, there is generally a right of appeal to the courts when it is
attempted to put the will of the legislature in force. For the will
of the people, as declared in the Constitution, is the final law; and
thejitill of the legislature is only law when it is in^harmony with,
or at least is not opposed to, that controlling instrument which
governs the legislative body equally with the private citizen.3 —
1 1 Black. Coin. 161; De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, c. 6; Broom,
Const. Law, 795.
* Mr. Austin, in his Province of Jurisprudence, Lec. VI., explains and enlarges
upon this idea, and gives illustrations to show that in England, and indeed under
most governments, a rule prescribed by the law-making authority may be uncon-
stitutional, and yet legal and obligatory.
3 See Chapter VII. pott.
[4]
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CH. n.] THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES.
*5
♦CHAPTER II.- [*5]
THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES.
The government of the United States is the existing represent-
ative of the national government which has always in some form
existed over the American States. Before the Revolution, the
powers of government, which were exercised over all the colonies
in common, were so exercised as pertaining either to the Crown of
Great Britain or to the Parliament; but the extent of those powers,
and how far vested in the Crown and how far in the Parliament, were
questions never definitely settled, and which constituted subjects
of dispute between the mother country and the people of the colo-
nies, finally resulting in hostilities.1 That the power over peace
and war, the general direction of commercial intercourse with other
nations, and the general control of such subjects as fall within the
province of international law, were vested in the home government,
and that the colonies were not, therefore, sovereign States in the
full and proper sense of that term, were propositions never seriously
disputed in America, and indeed were often formally conceded;
and the disputes related to questions as to what were or were not
matters of internal regulation, the control of which the colonists
insisted should be left exclusively to themselves.
Besides the tie uniting the several colonies through the crown
of Great Britain, there had always been a strong tendency to a
more intimate and voluntary union, whenever circumstances of
danger threatened them; and this tendency led to the New Eng-
land Confederacy of 1643, to the temporary Congress of 1690, to
the plan of union agreed upon in Convention of 1754, but rejected
by the Colonies as well as the Crown, to the Stamp Act Congress
of 1765, and finally to the Continental Congress of 1774. When
the difficulties with Great Britain culminated in actual war, the
1 1 Pitkin's Hist. TJ. S. c. 6; Life and Works of John Adams, Vol. I. pp.
122, 161; Vol. II. p. 311; Works of Jefferson, Vol. IX. p. 294; 2 Marshall's
Washington, c. 2; Declaration of Rights by Colonial Congress of 1765; Ram-
say":) Revolution in South Carolina, pp. 6-11; 5 Bancroft's U. S. c. 18; 1
Webster's Works, 128; Story on Const. § 183, et teq.
[5]
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[CH. II.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
Congress of 1775 assumed to itself those powers of external con-
trol which before had been conceded to the Crown or to
[* 6] the * Parliament, together with such other powers of sov-
ereignty as it seemed essential a general government
should exercise, and thus became the national government of the
United Colonies. By this body, war was conducted, independence
declared, treaties formed, and admiralty jurisdiction exercised. It
is evident, therefore, that the States, though declared to be "sov-
ereign and independent," were never strictly so in their individual
character, but that they were always, in respect to the higher powers
of sovereignty, subject to the control of a central power, and were
never separately known as members of the family of nations.1
1 "All the country now possessed by the United States was [prior to the
Revolution] a part of the dominions appertaining to the Crown of Great Britain.
Every acre of land in this country was then held, mediately or immediately, by
grants from that crown. All the people of this country were then subjects of the
king of Great Britain, and owed allegiance to him; and all the civil authority
then existing or exercised here flowed from the head of the British empire. They
were in a strict sense fellow-aubjeets, and in a variety of respects one people.
When the Revolution commenced, the patriots did not assert that only the same
affinity and social connection subsisted between the people of the colonies, which
subsisted between the people of Gaul, Britain, and Spain while Roman provinces,
namely, only that affinity and social connection which result from the mere cir-
cumstance of being governed by one prince; different ideas prevailed, and gave
occasion to the Congress of 177-1 and 1775.
"The Revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people
already united for general purposes, and at the same time providing for their
more domestic concerns by State conventions and other temporary arrangements.
From the Crown of Great Britain the sovereignty of their country passed to the
people of it; and it was not then an uncommon opinion that the unappropriated
lands which belonged to the Crown passed, not to the people of the colony or
State within whose limits they were situated, but to the whole people. On what-
ever principles this opinion rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen
sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the Revolution,
combined with local convenience and considerations; the people, nevertheless,
continued to consider themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and
they continued without interruption to manage their national concerns accord-
ingly. Afterwards, in the hurry of the war, and in the warmth of mutual confi-
dence, they made a confederation of the States the basis of a general government.
Experience disappointed the expectations they had formed from it; and then the
people, in their collective capacity, established the present Constitution." Per
Jay, Ch. J., in Chi.^holm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 470. See this point forcibly put
and elaborated by Mr. A. tT. Dallas, in his Life and Writings, by G. it. Dallas,
200-207. Also in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 724.
[6]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. II.] THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
The Declaration of Independence made them sovereign and
independent States, by altogether abolishing the foreign juris-
diction, and substituting a national government of their own
creation.
But while national powers were assumed by and conceded
to * the Congress of 1775-76, that body was nevertheless [* 7]
strictly revolutionary in its character, and, like all revolu-
tionary bodies, its authority was undefined, and could be limited
only, first, by instructions to individual delegates by the States
choosing them; second, by the will of the Congress; and third, by
the power to enforce that will.1 As in the latter particular it was
essentially feeble, the necessity for a clear specification of powers
which should be exercised by the national government became
speedily apparent, and led to the adoption of the Articles of Con-
federation. But those articles did not concede the full measure of
power essential to the efficiency of a national government at bome,
the enforcement of respect abroad, or the preservation of the public
faith or public credit; and the difficulties experienced induced the
election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held in 1787,
by which a Constitution was formed which was put into operation
hi 1789. As much larger powers were vested by this instrument
in the general government than had ever been exercised in this
country, by either the Crown, the Parliament, or the Revolutionary
Congress, and larger than those conceded to the Congress under
the Articles of Confederation, the assent of the people of the sev-
eral States was essential to its acceptance, and a provision
was inserted in the Constitution that the ratification * of [* 8]
the conventions of nine States should be sufficient for the
establishment of the Constitution between the States so ratifying
the same. In fact, the Constitution was ratified by conventions of
delegates chosen by the people in eleven of the States, before the
new government was organized under it; and the remaining two,
North Carolina and Rhode Island, by their rgfusal to accept, and k
by the action of the others in proceeding separately, were excluded w
altogether from that national jurisdiction which before had embraced
them. This exclusion was not warranted by any thing contained
in the Articles of Confederation, which purported to be articles of
1 See remarks of Iredell, J., in Pcnhallow v. Doane's Adm'r, 3 Dall. 91, and
of Blair, J., in tbe same case, p. 111. The true doctrine on this subject is very
clearly explained by Chase, J., in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 231.
[7]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[ch. n.
"perpetual union"; and the action of the eleven States in making
radical revision of the Constitution, and excluding their associates
for refusal to assent, was really revolutionary in character,1 and
only to be defended on the same ground of necessity on which all
revolutionary action is justified, and which in this case was the
absolute need, fully demonstrated by experience, of a more efficient
general government.2
1 Mr. Van Buren has said of it that it was "an heroic, though perhaps a
lawless act." Political Parties, p. 50.
* "Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occa-
sion: 1. On what principle the confederation, which stands in the form of a
solemn compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous con-
sent of the parties to it; 2. What relation is to subsist between the nine or more
States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become
parties to it. The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute
necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the tran-
scendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and
happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and
to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. Perhaps, also, an answer may be
found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been
heretofore noted, among the defects of the confederation, that in many of the
States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification.
The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other
States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent
sovereigns, founded on acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher
validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doc-
trine on the subject of treaties, that all of the articles are mutually conditions of
each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and
that a breach committed by either of the parties absolves the others, and author-
izes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should
it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for
dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal
pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the multi-
plied and important infractions with which they may be confronted? The time
has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph
exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives
dictate. The second question is not less delicate, and the flattering prospect of
its being merely hypothetical forbids an over-curious discussion of it. It is one
of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general it may he
observed, that although no political relation can subsist between the assenting
and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The
claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force and must be
fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected;
whilst considerations of a common interest, and above all the remembrance of
the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a speedy triumph
[8]
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CH. n.] THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES. * 9
* Left at liberty now to assume complete powers of sover- [* 9]
eignty as independent governments, these two States saw
fit soon to resume their place in the American family, under a per-
mission contained in the Constitution ; and new States have since
been added from time to time, all of them, with the exception of
one, organized by the consent of the general government and em-
bracing territory previously under its control. The exception was
Texas, which had previously been an independent sovereign State,
but which, by the conjoint action of its government and that of the
United States, was received into the Union on an equal footing
with the other States.
Without therefore discussing, or even designing to allude to
any abstract theories as to the precise position and actual power
of the several States at the time of forming the present Constitu-
tion,1 it may be said of them generally that they have at all times
been subject to some common national government, which has
exercised control over the subjects of war and peace, and other
matters pertaining to external sovereignty; and that when the
only three States which ever exercised complete sovereignty
accepted the Constitution and came into the Union, on an equal
footing with all the other States, they thereby accepted the same
relative position to the general government, and divested them-
selves permanently of those national powers which the others had
never exercised.
The government of the United States is one of enumerated
powers; the national Constitution being the instrument which
specifies them, and in which authority should be found for the
exercise of any power which the national government assumes
to possess.2 In this respect it differs from the constitutions of
over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain moderation on
one side, and prudence on the othep." Federalist, No. 43 (by Madison).
1 See this subject discussed in Gibbons v. Ogdcn, 9 Wheat. 1.
'"The government of the United States can claim no powers which are not
granted to it by the Constitution; and the powers actually granted must be such
as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication." Per Marshall, Ch.
J., in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 326. "This instrument contains an
enumeration of the powers expressly granted by the people to their government."
Marshall, Cb. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 187. See Calder v. Bull, 3
Ball. 386; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Gilman v. Philadelphia,
3 Wall. 713; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 477. The tenth amendment to the
Constitution provides that " the powers not delegated to the United States by
[9]
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[* 10] the * several States, which are not grants of powers to
the States, but which apportion and impose restrictions
upon the powers which the States inherently possess. The gen-
eral purpose of the Constitution of the United States is declared
by its founders to be, " to form a more perfect union, establish
justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common
defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity." To accomplish these
purposes, the Congress is empowered by the eighth section of
article one: —
1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to
pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general
welfare of the United States. But all duties, imposts, and excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States.
2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.
3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes.
4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcy, throughout the United States.
5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign
coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures.
6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities
and current coin of the United States.
7. To establish post-offices and postrroads.
8. To promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by
securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.
9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. To
define and punish piracies and felonies committed upon the high
seas, and offences against the law of nations.
10. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and
make rules concerning captures on land and water.
11. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money
to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.
12. To provide and maintain a navy.
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." No power is conferred by the Constitution upon
Congress to establish mere police regulations within the States. United States
v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41.
[10]
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CH. II.] THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES.
* 10
13. To make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces.
* 14. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute [* 11]
the laws of the nation, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions.
15. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed
in the service of the United States, reserving to the States re-
spectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of
training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.
16. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,
over such district not exceeding ten miles square as may, by ces-
sion of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become
the seat of government of the United States; and to exercise like
authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legis-
lature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of
forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.
17. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States,
or in any department or officer thereof.
Congress is also empowered by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth - amendments to the Constitution to enforce the same
by appropriate legislation. The thirteenth amendment abolishes
slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime,, throughout the United States and all places subject to
their jurisdiction. The fourteenth amendment has several objects.
1. It declares all persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to be citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside; and it forbids any,
State to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
or to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws. 2. It provides that when the right to vote at
any election for the choice of electors for president or vice-presi-
dent of the United States, representatives in Congress, the ex-
ecutive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
I
[H]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation ir
rebellion or other crime, the basis of Congressional representat.bn
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the, number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State. 3. It disqualifies from
holding federal or State offices certain persons who shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. 4. It declares the
inviolability of the public debt of the United States, and forbids
the United States or any State assuming or paying any debt or
obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any
slave. The fifteenth amendment declares that the right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State, on account of race, color, or pre-
vious condition of servitude.1
The executive power, is vested in a president, who is made
commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of
the several States when called into the service of the United
States; and who has power, by and with the consent of the Senate,
to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate concur, and,
with the same advice and consent, to appoint ambassadors and
other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court,
and other officers of the United States, whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for.2
The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in
law and equity arising under the national Constitution, the laws
of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and mar-
itime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States
shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States;
between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens
1 See these amendments construed in the recent cases of Live Stock Dealers
and Butchers' Association v. The Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaugh-
ter House Co., and Bradwell v. Illinois, decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1878, and to appear in 15 Wallace. See also Story on Const.
4th ed. c. 46, 47, 48, and App. to Vol. II.
2 U. S. Const, art. 2.
[12]
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CH. II.] THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES. * 11
of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming
lands under grants of different States; and between a
* State or citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens [* 12]
or subjects.1 But a State is not subject to be sued in
the courts of the United States by the citizens of another State,
or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.2
The Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of
the United States, are declared to be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges of every State are to be bound thereby,
any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.3
It is essential to the protection of the national jurisdiction, and
to prevent collision between State and national authority, that the
final decision upon all questions arising iu regard thereto should
rest with the courts of the Union;4 and as such questions must
frequently arise first in the State courts, provision is made by the
Judiciary Act of 1789 for removing to the Supreme Court of the
United States the final judgment or decree in any suit, rendered in
the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision
could be had, in which was drawn in question the validity of a
treaty, or statute of, or authority exercised under the United States,
and the decision was against their validity; or where was drawn in
question the validity of a statute of, or au authority exercised un-
der any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Con-
1 U.a Const, art. 3, § 2. * U. S. Const. 11th Amendment.
1 D. S. Const, art. 6; Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 348; McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314; Cook v.
Moffat, 5 How. 295; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331. When a treaty has been
ratified by the proper formalities, it is, by the Constitution, the supreme law of
the land, and the courts have no power to inquire into the authority of the per-
sons by whom it was entered into on behalf of the foreign nation: Doe v. Braden,
16 How. 635, 657; or the powers or rights recognized by it in the nation with
which it was made: Maiden v. Ingersoll, 6 Mich. 373. A State law in conflict
with it must give way to its superior authority. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 99;
Teaker v. Yeaker, 4 Met. Ky. 33. See, further, United States p. Aredondo,
6 Pet. 691; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511;
Ropes p. Clinch, 8 Blatch. 304; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616.
4 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 334; Cohens v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 264; Bank of United States v. Norton, 3 Marsh. 423; Braynard v.
Marshall, 8 Pick. 196, per Parker, Ch. J.; Spangler's Case, 11 Mich. 298;
Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397.
[13]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
stitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision
was in favor of such their validity; or where was drawn in quo-
tion the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a
treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United
[* 13] States, and the decision was against the right, * title,
privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either
party under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or
commission.1
But to authorize the removal under that act, it must appear by
the record, either expressly or by clear and necessary intendment,
that some one of the enumerated questions did arise in the State
court, and was there passed upon. It is not sufficient that it
might have arisen or been applicable.2 And if the decision of the
State court is in favor of the right, title, privilege, or exemption
so claimed, the Judiciary Act does not authorize such removal.3
Neither does it where the validity of the State law is drawn in
question, and the decision of the State court is against its validity.4
But the same reasons which require that the final decision upon
all questions of national jurisdiction should be left to the national
courts will also hold the national courts bound to respect the
decisions of the State courts upon all questions arising under the
State constitutions and laws, where no question of national au-
1 1 Statutes at Large, 83; Brightly's Digest, 259.
* Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 344; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
1 Wheat. 304; Inglee v. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363; Miller v. NichoUs, 4 Wheat.
311; Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117; Hickie v. Starke, 1 Pet. 98; Harris v.
Dennie, 3 Pet. 292; Fisher's Lessee v. Cockerell, 5 Pet. 256; New Orleans v.
De Armas, 9 Pet. 223, 234; Keene v. Clarke, 10 Pet. 291; Crowell v. Randell,
10 Pet. 368; MeKinny v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 66; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540;
Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343; Smith v. Hunter, 7 How. 738; Williams v. Oliver,
12 How. Ill; Calcote v. Stanton, 18 How. 243; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 How.
511; Hoyt v. Shelden, 1 Black, 518; Farney v. Towle, 1 Black, 350; Day ».
Gallup, 2 Wall. 97. It is not sufficient that the presiding judge of the State
court certifies that a right claimed under the national authority was brought in
question. Railroad Co. e. Rock, 4 Wall. 177.
■ Gordon v. Caldcleuj-h, 3 Cranch, 268 ; McDonough v. Millaudon, 3 How.
G93; Fulton v. McAffee, 16 Pet. 149; Linton v. Stanton, 12 How. 423; Burke
r. Gaines, 19 How. 388; Reddall v. Bryan, 24 How. 420; Roosevelt v. Meyer,
1 Wall. 512 ; Ryan v. Thomas, 4 Wall. 603.
4 Commonwealth Bank v. Griffith, 14 Pet. 56; Walker t>. Taylor, 5 How. 64.
We take no notice here of the statutes for the removal of causes from the State
to the Federal courts for the purposes of original trial, as they are not impor-
tant to any discussion we shall have occasion to enter upon in this work.
[14]
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THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES.
thority is involved, and to accept those decisions as correct, and
to follow them whenever the same questions arise in the national
courts.1 With the power to revise the decisions of the State
'In Beauregard p. New Orleans, 18 How. 502, Mp. Justice Campbell says:
"The constitution of this court requires it to follow the laws of the several
States as rules of decision wherever they apply. And the habit of the court
has been to defer to the decisions of their judicial tribunals upon questions
arising out of the common law of the State, especially when applied to the title
of lands." In Bank of Hamilton p. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet. 524, it was con-
tended that the exclusive power of State courts to construe legislative acts did
not extend to the paramount law, so as to enable them to give eificacy to an act
which was contrary to the State constitution; but Marshall, Ch. J., said: "We
cannot admit this distinction. The judicial department of every government is
the rightful expositor of its laws, and emphatically of its supreme law." Again
in Elmendorf p. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 159, the same eminent judge says: "The
judicial department of every government, where such department exists, is the
appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government. Thus
no court in the universe which proposed to be governed by principle would, we
presume, undertake to say that the courts of Great Britain or France, or of any
other nation, had misunderstood their own statutes, and therefore erect itself into
a tribunal which should correct such misunderstanding. We receive the construc-
tion given by the courts of the nation as the true sense of the law, and feel our-
selves no more at liberty to depart from that construction than to depart from
the words of the statute. On this principle, the construction given by this court
to the Constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the true
construction; and on the same principle the construction given by the courts of
the several States to the legislative acts of those States is received as true,
unless they come in conflict with the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." And in Green p. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 298, it is said by McLean, J.:
"The decision of the highest judicial tribunal of a State should be considered
as final by this court, not because the State tribunal in such a case has any
power to bind this court, but because, in the language of the court iu Shelby p.
Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, a fixed and received construction by a State, in its own
courts, makes a part of the statute law." And see Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat.
16:.', per Thompson, J.; also the following cases: Sims v. Irvine, 3 Dall. 425;
McKeen p. Delancy, 5 Cranch, 22; Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87;
Preston p. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115; Mutual Assurance Co. v. Watts, ib. 279;
Shipp p. Miller, 2 Wheat. 316; Thatcher p. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119; Bell v.
Morrison, 1 Pet. 351; Waring v. Jackson, ib. 570; DeWoIf v. Rabaud, ib.
476; Fulli-rton p. Bank of United States, t'6. 604; Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet.
58; Beach v. Viles, 2 Pet. 675; Inglis p. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99;
United States p. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124; Henderson p. Griffin, 5 Pet. 151;
Hinde p. Vattier, ib. 398; Ross p. McLung, 6 Pet. 283; Marlatt p. Silk, 11
Pet. 1; Bank of United States p. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32; Clarke p. Smith, 13 Pet.
195; Ross p. Duval, ib. 45; Wilcox p. Jackson, ib. 498; Harpending p.
Reformed Church, 16 Pet. 445; Martin v. Waddell, ib. 367; Amis p. Smith,
[15]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[* 14] * courts in the cases already pointed out, the due observ-
ance of this rule will prevent those collisions of judicial
ib. 303; Porterfield v. Clark, 2 How. 76; Lane ». Vick, 3 How. 464; Jbx-
croft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103; Rowan t. Run-
nels, ib. 134; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297; Pease v. Peck, 18
How. 595; Fisher v. Haldcman, 20 How. 186; Parker v. Kane, 22 How. 1;
Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427; Sumner v. Hicks, 2 Black, 532; Chicago
t>. Robbins, ib. 418; Miles v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 35; Williams v. Kirkland, 13
Wall. 300; Springer v. Foster, 2 Story C. C. 383; Neal v. Green, 1 McLean,
18; Paine v. Wright, 6 McLean, 395 ; Boyle v. Arledge, Hemp. 620; Grilling r.
Gibb, McAll. 212; Bayerque v. Cohen, ib. 113; Wick v. The Samuel Strong,
Newb. 187; N. F. Screw Co. v. Bliven, 3 Blatch. 240 ; Bronson v. Wallace, 4
Blatch. 465; Van Bokelen v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 5 Blatch. 379; United
States v. Mann, 1 Gall. 5; Society, &c. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105; Coatcs r.
Muse, Brock. 539; Meade v. Bcale, Taney, 339; Parker v. Phetteplace, 2
Cliff. 70; King v. Wilson, 1 Dill. 555. In Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 291,
an important question was presented as to the proper course to be pursued by
the Supreme Court of the United States under somewhat embarrassing circum-
stances. That court had been called upon to put a construction upon a State
statute of limitations, and had done so. Afterwards the same question had
been before the Supreme Court of the State, and in repeated cases had been
decided otherwise. The question now was whether the Supreme Court would
follow its own decision, or reverse that, in order to put itself in harmony with the
State decisions. The subject is considered at length by McLean, J., who justly
concludes that "adherence by the federal to the exposition of the local law,
as given by the courts of the State, will greatly tend to preserve harmony in the
exercise of the judicial power in the State and federal tribunals. This rule is
not only recommended by strong considerations of propriety, growing out of our
system of jurisprudence, but it is sustained by principle and authority." The
court accordingly reversed its rulings to make them conform to those of the State
court. See also Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427; Leffingwell v. Warren,
2 Black, 599; lilossburg, &c, R.R. Co. v. Tioga R.R. Co., 5 Blatch. 387;
Smith v. Shriver, 3 Wall. Jr. 219. It is of course immaterial that the court may
still be of opinion that the State court has erred, or that the decisions elsewhere
are different. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 300. But where the Supreme Court had
held that certain contracts for the price of slaves were not made void by the
State constitution, and afterward the State court held otherwise, the Supreme
Court, regarding this decision wrong, declined to reverse their own ruling.
Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134. Compare this with Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7
How. 812, in which the court followed, without examination or question, the
State decision, that a State general banking law was in violation of the consti-
tution of the State. The United States Circuit Court had held otherwise pre-
vious to the State decision. Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean, 195.
This doctrine does not apply to questions not at all dependent upon local
statutes or usages; as, for instance, to contracts and other instruments of a com-
mercial and general nature, like bills of exchange; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1;
and insurance contracts; Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 3 Sum. 220.
[16]
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THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES.
authority which would otherwise be inevitable, and which,
besides being unseemly, * would be dangerous to the peace, [* 15]
harmony, and stability of the Union under our peculiar
system.
Besides conferring specified powers upon the national govern-
ment, the Constitution contains also certain restrictions upon the
action of the States, a portion of them designed to prevent en-
croachments upon the natioual authority, and another portion to
protect individual rights against possible abuse of State powep.
Of the first class are the following: No State shall enter into any
treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque or re-
prisal, coin money, emit bills of credit,1 or make any thing but gold
and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. No State shall,
without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties upon
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties
and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for
the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws
shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress. No State
shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage,
And see Reimsdyke v. Kane, 1 Gall. 376; Austen p. Miller, 5 McLean, 153;
Glouster Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt. C. C. 322; Bragg v. Meyer, 1 McAll.
408. And of course cases presenting questions of conflict with the Constitution
of the United States cannot be within it. State Bank v. Knoup, 16 How. 369;
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black, 436. And where a contract had
been made under a settled construction of the State constitution by its highest
court, the Supreme Court sustained it, notwithstanding the State court had
since overruled its former decision. Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 176. Of late
it has seemed that new and doubtful grounds were being taken for disregarding
State decisions, and in several cases nearly one half the members of the federal
Supreme Court have deemed it necessary to protest against an abandonment of
the sound and safe doctrine of the earlier decisions.
1 To constitute a bill of credit within the meaning of the Constitution, it must
be issued by a State, involve the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate
as money on the credit of the State in the ordinary uses of business. Briscoe v.
Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 209. The
facts that a State owns the entire capital stock of a bank, elects the directors,
makes its bills receivable for the public dues, and pledges its faith for their
redemption, do not make the bills of such bank " bills of credit" in the constitu-
tional sense. Darrington p. State Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12. See, further,
Craig p. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Byrne p. Missouri, 8 Pet. 40; Curran v. Arkan-
sas, 15 How. 317; Moreau v. Detchamendy, 41 Mo. 431; Bailey v. Milner, 35
Geo. 330; City National Bank p. Mahan, 21 La. Ann. 751.
2 [ 17 ]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agree-
ment or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or
engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
danger as will not admit of delay. Of the second class are the
following: No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto
law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,1 or make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws,2 nor base discriminations in suffrage on race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.3
Other provisions have for their object to prevent discriminations
by the several States against the citizens and public authority and
proceedings of other States. Of this class are the provisions that
the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States;4 that fugitives
1 Const, of U. S. art. 1, § 10; Story on Const, c. 33, 34.
* Const, of U. S. 14th Amendment; Story on Const. 4th ed. c. 47.
'Const, of U. S. loth Amendment; Story on Const. 4th ed. c. 48.
4 Const, of U. S. art. 4. "What are the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions
to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which
belong of right to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all
times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this
Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What
those fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult
to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following
general heads: protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and lib-
erty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right
of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other State, for
purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the
benefit of- the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every
kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either
real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are
paid by the citizens of the other State, may be mentioned as some of the particu-
lar privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the
general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be
added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitu-
tion of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which
might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and tb,e
enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State in every other State wr.s mani-
[ 18 ]
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CH. II.] THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES. * 15
from justice shall * be delivered up,1 and that full faith [* 16]
festly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding
provision in the old Articles of Confederation) 'the better to secure and perpet-
uate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States
of the Union.'" Washington, J., in Corfield r. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380.
The Supreme Court will not describe and define those privileges and immunities,
in a general classification; preferring to decide each case as it may come up. ■
Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418. For discus-
sions upon this subject, see Murray t>. McCarty, 2 Munf. 398; Lemmon v. Peo-
ple, 26 Barb. 270, and 20 N. Y. 562; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & M'H. 554;
Amy v. Smith, 1 Lit. 326; Crandall t>. State, 10 Conn. 840; Butler v. Farns-
worth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101; Commonwealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743; Haney
r. Marshall, 9 Md. 194; Slaughter r>. Commonwealth, 13 Grat. 767; State v.
Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; People v. Coleman, 4
Cal. 46; People v. Thurber, 13 111. 544; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Common-
wealth, 5 Bush, 68; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 111. 172; Fire Department v. Noble,
3 E. 1). Smith, 441; Same v. Wright, t'6. 453; Same v. Holfenstein, 16 Wis.
136; Sears v. Commissioners of Warren Co., 36 Ind. 267 ; Cincinnati Health
Association v. Rosenthal, 55 111. 85; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. Ann. 434. The
constitutional provision does not apply to corporations. Warren Manuf. Co. v.
£tna Ins. Co., 2 Paine, 501; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. A discrimination
between local freight on railroads and that which is extra;territorial is not per-
sonal, and therefore not forbidden by this clause of the Constitution. Shipper v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 338. A State cannot impose, for the priv-
ilege of doing business within its limits, a heavier license tax upon non-residents
than is required of residents. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418.
1 For decisions under this clause, see Ex paiie Joseph Smith, 3 McLean, 133;
Dow's Case, 18 Penn. St. 89; State v. HufFord, 28 Iowa, 391; Kingsbury's Case,
106 Mass. 223; Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 221; Johnson v. Riley, 13 Geo. 97;
Matter of Fetter, 3 Zab. 311. The three cases last cited decide that the alleged
offence need not be an offence at the common law; it is sufficient that it be a
crime against the State from which the accused has fled. But it must have been
actually committed within the State reclaiming the alleged offender, and he must
have been an actual fugitive therefrom. Ex parte Smith, supra. The whole
subject was considered in Commonwealth of Kentucky v, Dennison, 24 How. 66.
One Lago was indicted in Kentucky for enticing and assisting a slave to escape
from his master, and a requisition was made upon the governor of Ohio for his
surrender to the Kentucky authorities as a fugitive from justice. The governor
of Ohio refused to surrender him, on the ground that the act with which he was
charged was not an offence known to the laws of Ohio, and not an act affecting
the public safety, or regarded as malum in se by the general judgment and con-
science of civilized nations. Application was then made to the Supreme Court of
the United States for a mandamus to compel the governor of Ohio to perform
this duty. The application was denied, on the ground that, although the gov-
ernor erred in his refusal, no power was delegated to the general government,
either through the judicial or any other department, to employ any coercive
means to compel him. See Matter of Voorhies, 32 N. J. 141.
[19]
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[* 17] and credit shall be given in * each State to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.1
The last provisions that we shall here notice are that the United
States shall guarantee to every State a republican form of govern-
ment,2 and that no State shall grant any title of nobility.3 The
purpose of these is to protect a Union founded on republi-
[* 18] can principles, and composed entirely of * republican mem-
bers against aristocratic and monarchial innovations.4
1 Const, of U. S. art. 4. This clause of the Constitution has been the sub-
ject of a good deal of discussion in the courts. It is well settled that if the record
of a judgment shows that it was rendered without service of process or appear-
ance of the defendant, or if that fact can be shown without contradicting the reci-
tals of the record, it will be treated as void in any other State, notwithstanding
this constitutional provision. Benton v. Burbot, 10 S. & R. 242; Thurber v.
Blnckbournc, 1 N. H. 242; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Aldrich v. Kinney,
4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Robinson v. Ward's Execu-
tors, 8 Johns. 86; Fenton v. Garlick, ib. 194; Kilbourn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns.
37; Pawling v. Bird's Executors, 13 Johns. 192; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend.
161; Noyes v. Butler, C Barb. 613; Woodward v. Tremere, 6 Pick. 354; Lin-
coln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473; Westervelt v. Lewis, t'6. 511; Bimelar v. Daw-
son, 4 Scam. 536; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Warren u. M'Carthy, 25 111.
95; Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500; Norwood
v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551; McLaurine v. Monroe, 30 Mo. 462; Commonwealth v.
Blood, 97 Mass. 538. But whether it would be competent to show, in opposi-
tion to the recitals of the record, that a judgment of another State was rendered
without jurisdiction having been obtained of the person of the defendant, is not
settled by the authorities. Many cases hold not. Field v. Gibbs, 1 Pet. C. C.
156; Green v. Sarmiento, ib. 76; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473; Wester-
velt v. Lewis, ib. 511; Roberts v. Caldwell, 5 Dana, 512; Hensley v. Force, 7
Eng. 756; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt. 2G3; New-
comb o. Peck, 17 Vt. 302; Willcox r. Kassick, 2 Mich. 165; Bimelar v. Dawson,
4 Seam. 536; Welch v. Sykes, 3 Gil. 197; Harbin v. Chiles, 20 Mo. 314;
Wetherell v. Stillman, 65 Penn. St. 105. Other cases admit such evidence.
Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148; Holbrook v. Murray, ib. 161; Shumway v.
Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Hall v. Williams, 6
Pick. 232.; Aldrich ». Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407;
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Kane r.
Cook, 8 Cal. 449; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551. The same defences may
be made to a judgment when sued in another State which could have been made
to it in the State where rendered. Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234; Mills
v. Duryea, 7 Cranch, 484; Steele v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447; Bank of the State
r. Dalton, 9 How. 528. But no others: Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139;
Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108; People e.
Dawell, 25 Mich. 247.
« Const, of U. S. art. 4, § 4. 3 Const, of U. S. art. 1, § 10.
* Federalist, Nos. 43 and 44. It does not fall within our province to discuss
[20]
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* 18
/
So far as a particular consideration of the foregoing provisions
falls within the plan of our present work, it will be more convenient
to treat of them in another place, especially as all of them which
have for their object the protection of person or property are
usually repeated in the bills of rights contained in the State con-
stitutions, and will require some notice at our hands as a part of
State constitutional law.
Where powers are conferred upon the general government, the
exercise of the same powers by the States is impliedly prohibited,
wherever the intent of the grant to the national government would
be defeated by such exercise. On this ground it is held that the
States cannot tax the agencies or loans of the general government;
since the power to tax, if possessed by the States in regard to these
objects, might be so exercised as altogether to destroy such agen-
cies and impair or even destroy the national credit.1 And where by
the national Constitution jurisdiction is given to the national courts
with a view to the more efficient and harmonious working of the
system organized under it, it is competent for Congress in its wis-
dom to make that jurisdiction exclusive of the State courts.2 On
some other subjects State laws may be valid until the power of
Congress is exercised, when they become superseded, either wholly,
or so far as they are found inconsistent. The States may legislate
on the subject of bankruptcy if there be no law of Congress which
will conflict.3 State laws for organizing and disciplining the mili-
tia are valid except as they may conflict with national legislation ;4
and the States may constitutionally provide for punishing the coun-
terfeiting of coin5 and the passing of counterfeit money,0 since
these provisions. They have been much discussed in Congress within a few
years, but in a party, rather than a judicial spirit. See Story on Const. 4th ed. -
p. 41 and notes.
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet.
449. See cases collected, post, p. 482.
1 Martin p. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 334; The Moses Taylor p. Hammons,
4 Wall. 411; The Ad Hine v. Trevor, ib. bob. And see note to these cases in
the Western Jurist, Vol. I. p. 241.
* Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; McMillan v. McNeill, ib. 209.
And see past, pp. 293-94.
4 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 51.
* Harlan v. People, 1 Doug. Mich. 207.
6 Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560. And
see Hendrick's Case, 5 Leigh, 707; Jett v. Commonwealth, 18 Grat. 933; Moore
e. People, 14 How. 13.
[21]
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* 18 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. II.
these acts are offences against the State, notwithstanding they my
be offences against the nation also.
[* 19] * The tenth amendment to the Constitution provides that
the powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people. And it is to be observed of
this instrument, that being framed for the establishment of a na-
tional government, it is a settled rule of construction that the limi-
tations it imposes upon the powers of government are in all cases
to be understood as limitations upon the government of the Union
only, except where the States are expressly mentioned.1
With other rules for the construction of the national Constitu-
tion, we shall have little occasion to deal. They have been tlie
subject of elaborate treatises, judicial opinions, and legislative de-
bates, which are familiar alike to the legal profession and to the
public at large. So far as that instrument apportions powers to
the national judiciary, it must be understood, for the most part, as
simply authorizing Congress to pass the necessary legislation for
the exercise of those powers by the federal courts, and not as
directly, of its own force, vesting them with that authority. The
Constitution does not, of its own force, give to national courts
jurisdiction of the several cases which it enumerates, but an act
of Congress is essential, first, to create courts, and afterwards to
apportion the jurisdiction among them. The exceptions are of
those few cases of which the Constitution confers jurisdiction
upon the Supreme Court by name. And although the courts of
the United States administer the common law in many cases, they
do not derive authority from the common law to take cognizance
of and punish offences against the government. Offences against
1 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet. 551;
Fox !•. Ohio, 5 How. 432; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71; Buonaparte v. Cam-
den & Amboy R.R. Co., Baldw. 220; James v. Commonwealth, 12 S. & R. 221;
Barker v. People, 3 Cow. G86; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; Jane v. Common-
wealth, 3 Met. (Ky.) 18; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 336; Matter of Smith, 10
Wend. 449; State v. Barnett, 3 Kansas, 250; Reed v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh. 45;
North. Mo. R.R. Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490; Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5
Wall. 475; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321. For instance, though the
right of trial by jury is preserved by the Constitution of the> United States, the
States may, nevertheless, if they choose, provide for the trial of all offences
against the States, as well as the trial of civil cases in the State courts, without
the intervention of a jury.
[22]
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'CH. II.] THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES. * 19
the nation are defined and their punishment prescribed by acts of
Congress.1
1 Demurrer to an indictment for a libel upon the President and Congress. By
the court: "The only question which this case presents is, whether the circuit
courts can exercise a common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases. . . . The gen-
eral acquiescence of legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the
negative of the proposition. The course of reasoning which leads to this con-
clusion is simple, obvious, and admits of but little illustration. The powers of
the general government are made up of concessions from the several States;
whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve. The
judicial power of the United States is a constitutional part of these concessions:
that power is to be exercised by courts organized for the purpose, and brought
into existence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the
courts which the United States may, under their general powers, constitute, one
only, the Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the
Constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other
courts, created by the general government, possess no jurisdiction but what is
given them by the power that created them, and can be vested with none but
what the power ceded to the general government will authorize them to confer.
It is not necessary to inquire whether the general government, in any and what
extent, possesses the power of conferring on its courts a jurisdiction in cases
similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction has not been conferred
by any legislative act, if it does not result to those courts as a consequence of
their creation." United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, .'32. See United States v.
Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415. "It is clear there can be no common law of the United
States. The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and
independent States, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and com-
mon law. There is no principle which pervades the Union, and has the authority
of law, that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the Union. The com-
mon law could be made a part of our federal system only by legislative adop-
tion." Per McLean, J., in Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 658. See also Kendall
v. United States, 12 Pet. 524; Lorman v. Clarke, 2 McLean, 568; U. S. v. Lan-
caster, ib. 433; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 435; U. S. v. Wil-
son, 3 Blatch. 435. As to the adoption of the common law by the States, see
Van Nest v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 144, per Story, J.; post, p. 23, and cases cited in
notes.
[23]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[*21] 'CHAPTER III.
THE FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
The Constitution of the United States assumes the existence
of thirteen distinct State governments, over whose people its au-
thority was to be extended if ratified by conventions chosen for
the purpose. Each of these States was then exercising the powers
of government under some form of written constitution, and that
instrument would remain unaffected by the adoption of the national
Constitution, except in those particulars in which the two would
come in conflict; and as to those, the latter would modify and
control the former.1 But besides this fundamental law, every State
had also a body of laws, prescribing the rights, duties, and obli-
gations of persons within its jurisdiction, and establishing those
minute rules for the various relations of life which cannot be prop-
erly incorporated in a constitution, but must be left to the regula-
tion of the ordinary law-making power.
By far the larger and more valuable portion of that body of laws
consisted of the common law of England, which had been trans-
planted in the American wilderness, and which the colonists, now
become an independent nation, had found a shelter of protection
during all the long contest with the mother country, brought at
last to so fortunate a conclusion.
The common law of England consisted of those maxims of
freedom, order, enterprise, and thrift which had prevailed in the
conduct of public affairs, the management of private business, the-
regulation of the domestic institutions, and the acquisition, con-
trol, and transfer of property from time immemorial. It was the
outgrowth of the habits of thought and action of the people, and
was modified gradually and insensibly from time to time as those
1 State v. Cape Girardeau, &c. R.R. Co., 48 Mo. 468; Mayor, &c. of Mobile
v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310.
[24]
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J
habits became modified, and as civilization advanced, and new in-
ventions introduced new wants and conveniences,, and new modes
of business. Springing from the very nature of the people them-
selves, and developed in their own experience, it was obviously the
body of laws best adapted to their needs, and as they took with
them their nature, so also they would take with them these laws
whenever they should transfer their domicile from one country to
another.
* To eulogize the common law is no part of our pres- [* 22]
ent purpose. Many of its features were exceedingly harsh
and repulsive, and gave unmistakable proofs that they had their
origin in times of profound ignorance, superstition, and barbarism.
The feudal system, which was essentially a system of violence, dis-
order, and rapine,1 gave birth to many of the maxims of the com-
mon law; and some of these, long after that system has passed
away, may still be traced in our law, especially in the rules which
govern the acquisition, control, and enjoyment of real estate. The
criminal code was also marked by cruel and absurd features, some
of which have clung to it with wonderful tenacity, even after the
most stupid could perceive their inconsistency with justice and
civilization. But, on the whole, the system was the best foundation
on which to erect an enduring structure of civil liberty which the
world has ever known. It was the peculiar excellence of the com-
mon law of England that it recognized the worth, and sought es-
pecially to protect the rights and privileges of the individual man.
Its maxims were those of a sturdy and independent race, accus-
tomed in an unusual degree to freedom of thought and action, and
to a share in the administration of public affairs; and arbitrary
power and uncontrolled authority were not recognized in its prin-
ciples. Awe surrounded, and majesty clothed the king, but the
humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him,
and defend from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the
kingly prerogatives.2 The system was the opposite of servile; its
1 "A feudal kingdom was a confederacy of a numerous body, who lived in a
state of war against each other, and of rapine towards all mankind, in which the
king, according to his ability and vigor, was either a cipher or a tyrant, and a
great portion of the people were reduced to personal slavery." Mackintosh,
History of England, p. 3.
*&eepost, p. 299.
[ 25 y
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 22
[CH. III.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
features implied boldness, and independent self-reliance on the part
of the people; and if the criminal code was harsh, it at least
escaped the inquisitorial features which fastened themselves upon
criminal procedure in other civilized countries, and have ever been
fruitful of injustice, oppression, and terror.
For several hundred years, however, changes had from time to
time been made in the common law by means of statutes. Origi-
nally the purpose of general statutes was mainly to declare and
re-affirm such common-law principles as, by reason of usurpations
and abuses, had come to be of doubtful force, and which,
[* 23] therefore, * needed to be authoritatively announced, that
king and subject alike might understand and observe
them. Such was the purpose of the first great statute, promul-
gated at a time when the legislative power was exercised by the
king alone, and which is still known as the Magna Charta of King
John.1 Such also was the purpose of the several confirmations of
that charter, as well as of the Petition of Right,2 and the Bill of
Rights,3 each of which became necessary by reason of usurpations.
But further statutes also became needful because old customs and
modes of business were unsuited to new conditions of things, when
property had become more valuable, wealth greater, commerce more
extended, and when all these changes had brought with them new
desires and necessities, and also new dangers against which society
as well as the individual subject needed protection. For this Teason
the Statute of Wills,4 and the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries6 be-
came important; and the Habeas Corpus Act6 was also found
necessary, not so much to change the law,7 as to secure existing
principles of the common law against being habitually set aside
and violated by those in power.
1 It is justly observed by Sidney that " Magna Charta was not made to restrain
the absolute authority, for no such thing was in being or pretended (the folly of
such visions seeming to have been reserved to complete the misfortunes and
ignominy of our age), but it was to assert the native and original liberties of our
nation by the confession of the king then being, that neither he nor his successors
should any way encroach upon them." Sidney on Government, c. 3, sec. 27.
! 1 Charles I. c. 1.
3 1 William & Man-, Sess. 2, c. 2.
4 32 Henry VIII. c. 7, and 34 and 35 Henry Vin. c. 5.
5 29 Charles II. c. 3.
8 31 Charles n. c 2.
7 "I dare not advise to cast the laws into a new mould. The work which I
[26]
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From the first the colonists in America claimed the benefit and
protection of the common law. In some particulars, however, the
common law as then existing in England was not suited to their
condition and circumstances in the new country, and those partic-
ulars they omitted as it was put in practice by them.1 They
also claimed the benefit of * such statutes as from time to [* 24]
time had been enacted in modification of this body of
rules.2 And when the difficulties with the home government sprung
propound tendeth to the pruning and grafting of the law, and not the plowing
up anil planting it again, for such a remove I should hold for a perilous innova-
tion." Bacon's Works, Vol. II. p. 281, Phil. Ed. 1852.
1 " The common law of England is not to be taken, in all respects, to be that
of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and
claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that
portion which was applicable to their condition." Story, J., in Van Nest v.
Packard, 2 Pet. 144. "The settlers of colonies in America did not carry with
them the laws of the land as being bound by them wherever they should settle.
They left the realm to avoid the inconveniences and hardships they were under,
where some of these laws were in force; particularly ecclesiastical laws, those
for payment of tithes and others. Had it been understood that they were to
carry these laws with them, they had better have stayed at home among their
friends, unexposed to the risks and toils of a new settlement. They carried with
them a right to such parts of laws of the land as they should judge advantageous
or useful to them; a fight to be free from those they thought hurtful, and a right
to make such others as they should think necessary, not infringing the general
rights of Englishmen; and such new laws they were to form as agreeable as
might be to the laws of England." Franklin, Works by Sparks, Vol. IV. p. 271.
See, also, Cbisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 435; Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2
Mass. 534; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 122; Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N. H: 58;
Houghton i!. Page, 2 N. H. 44; State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550; State v. Buchanan,
5 H. & J. 356 ; Lindsey ». Coats, 1 Ohio, 245; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 390;
Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R. 330; Craft v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 219; Dawson v.
Coffman, 28 Ind. 220; Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 757; Morgan
v. King, 30 Barb. 9 ; Lansing v. Stone, 37 Barb. 15; Simpson v. State, 5 Yerg.
350; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. Mich. 184; Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18; Pier-
son t;. State, 12 Cal. 149; Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226; Hamilton v. Kneeland,
1 Nev. 40. The courts of one State will presume the common law of a sister
State to be the same as their own in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Abell v. Douglass, 4 Denio, 305; Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181; Schurman v.
Marley, 29 Ind. 458.
2 The acts of Parliament passed after the settlement of a colony were not in
force therein, unless made so by express words, or by adoption. Commonwealth
r. Lodge, 2 Grat. 579; Pemble v. Clifford, 2 McCord, 31. See Swift v. Tousey,
a Ind. 196; Baker v. Mattocks, Quincy, 72; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 280.
Those amendatory of the common law, if suited to the condition of things in
[27]
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up, it was a source of immense moral power to the colonists Jiat
they were able to show that the rights they claimed were conferred
by the common law, and that the king and Parliament were seeking
to deprive them of the common birthright of Englishmen. Did
Parliament attempt to levy taxes in America, the people demanded
the benefit of that maxim with which for many generations every
intelligent subject had been familiar, that those must vote the tax
who are to pay it.1 Did Parliament order offenders against the laws
in America to be sent to England for trial, every American was
roused to indignation, and protested against the trampling under
foot of that time-honored principle that trials for crime must be by
a jury of the vicinage. Contending thus behind the bulwarks of
the common law, Englishmen would appreciate and sympathize
with their position, and Americans would feel doubly strong in a
cause that was right not only, but the justice of which must be
confirmed by an appeal to the consciousness of their enemies them-
selves.
The evidence of the common law consisted in part of the declar-
atory statutes we have mentioned,2 in part of the commentaries of
such men learned in the law as had been accepted as authority,
but mainly in the decisions of the courts applying tbe
[* 25] * law to actual controversies. While .colonization con-
America, were generally adopted by tacit consent. For the differing views taken
by English and American statesmen upon the general questions here discussed,
see the observations by Governor Pownall, and the comments of Franklin
thereon, 4 Works of Franklin, by Sparks, 271.
'" The blessing of Judah and Issachar will never meet; that the same people
or nation should be both the lion's whelp and the ass between burdens; neither
will it be that a people overlaid with taxes should ever become valiant and mar-
tial. It is true that taxes levied by consent of the State do abate men's courage
less, as it hath been seen notably in the exercise of the Low Countries, and in
some degree in the subsidies of England, for you must note that we speak now
of the heart and not of the purse; so that although the same tribute or tax laid
by consent or by imposing be all one to the purse; yet it works diversely upon
the courage. So that you may conclude that no people overcharged with tribute
is fit for empire." Lord Bacon on the True Greatness of Kingdoms.
* These statutes upon the points which are covered by them are the best
evidence possible. They are the living charters of English liberty, to the present
day; and as the forerunners of the American constitutions and the source from
which have been derived many of the most important articles in their bills of
rights, they are constantly appealed to when personal liberty or private rights
are placed in apparent antagonism to the claims of government.
[28]
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tinued, — that is to say, until the war of the Revolution actually
commenced,— these decisions were authority in the colonies, and
the changes made in the common law up to the same period were
operative in America also if suited to the condition of things here.
The opening of the war of the Revolution is the point of time at
which the continuous stream of the common law hecame divided,
and that portion which had been adopted in America flowed on by
itself, no longer subject to changes from across the ocean, but
liable still to be gradually modified through changes in the modes
of thought and of business among the people, as well as through
statutory enactments.
The colonies also had legislatures of their own, by which laws
had been passed which were in force at the time of the separation,
and which remained unaffected thereby. When, therefore, they
emerged from the colonial condition into that of independence, the
laws which governed them consisted, first, of the common law of
England, so far as they had tacitly adopted it as suited to their
condition; second, of the statutes of England, or of Great Britain,
amendatory of the common law, which they had in like manner
adopted; and third, of the colonial statutes.1 The first and second
constituted the American common law, and by this in great part
are rights adjudged and wrongs redressed in the American States
to this day.2
* Every colony had also its charter, emanating from the [* 26]
'The like condition of things is found to exist in the new States formed and
admitted to the Union since the Constitution was adopted. Congress creates
territorial governments of different grades, but generally with plenary legislative
power either in the governor and judges, a territorial council, or a territorial
legislature chosen by the people, and the authority of this body extends to all
rightful subjects of legislation, subject, however, to the disapproval of Congress.
Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 273; Miners' Bank v. Iowa, 12
How. 1. The legislation, of course, must not be in conflict with the law of
Congress conferring the power to legislate, but a variance from it may be sup-
posed approved by that body, if suffered to remain without disapproval for a
series of years after being duly reported to it. Clinton v. Englebrect, 13 Wall.
446.
'A few of the States, to get rid of confusion in the law, deemed it desirable
to repeal the acts of Parliament, and to re-enact such portions of them as were
regarded important here. See the Michigan repealing statue, copied from that
of Virginia, in Code of 1820, p. 459. In some of the new States there were
also other laws in force than those to which we have above alluded. Although it
[29]
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1
Crown, and constituting its colonial constitution. All but t»
of these were swept away by the whirlwind of revolution, and
has been said in La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co. v. The City of Monroe, Wal.
Ch. 155, and Depew v. Trustees of Wabash & Erie Canal, 5 Ind. 8, that the
ordinance of 1787 was superseded in each of the States formed out of the
North-VVest Territory by the adoption of a State constitution, and admission to
the Union, yet the weight of judicial authority is probably the other way. In
Hogg v. The Zanesville Canal Manufacturing Co., 5 Ohio, 410, it was held that
the provision of the ordinance that the navigable waters of the territory, and the
carrying-places between should be common highways and for ever free, was per-
manent in its obligation, and could not be altered without the consent both of the
people of the State, and of the United States, given througli their representatives.
"It is an article of compact; and until we assume the principle that the sover-
eign power of a State is not bound by compact, this clause must be considered
obligatory." Justices McLean and Leavilt, in Spooner r. McConnell, 1 Mc-
Lean, 337, examine this subject at considerable length, and both arrive at the
same conclusion with the Ohio court. The view taken of the ordinance in that
case was, that such parts of it as were designed temporarily to regulate the gov-
ernment of the territory were abolished by the change from a territorial to a
State government, while the other parts, which were designed to be permanent,
are unalterable except by common consent. Some of these, however, being
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, afterwards adopted, may be regarded
as practically annulled, while any others which are opposed to the constitution of
any State formed out of the territory must also be considered as annulled by
common consent; the people of the State assenting in forming their constitution,
and Congress in admitting the State into the Union under it. The article in
regard to navigable waters is therefore still in force. The same was also said in
regard to the article prohibiting slavery, though that also may now be regarded
as practically annulled by the amendment to the federal Constitution covering
the same ground. The like opinion was subsequently expressed in Palmer v.
Commissioners of Cuyahoga Co., 3 McLean, 226, and in Jolly v. Terre Haute
Drawbridge Co., 6 McLean, 23?. See also Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82;
Doe ii. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 12; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, 18
Wis. 109; Milwaukee Gaslight Co. v. Schooner Gamecock, 23 Wis. 141; Wis-
consin River Improvement Co. v. Lyons, 30 Wis. 61. Compare Woodburn v.
Kilbourn Manuf. Co., 1 Abb. U. S. 158. In the cases in the first and third Mc-
Lean, however, the opinion was expressed that the States might lawfully improve
the navigable waters and the carrying-places between, and charge tolls upon the
use of the improvement to obtain reimbursement of their expenditures.
In some of the States formed out of the territory acquired by the United States
from foreign powers, traces will be found of the laws existing before the change
of government. Louisiana has a code peculiar to itself, based upon the civil law.
Much of Mexican law, and especially as regards lands and land titles, is retained
in the systems of Texas and California. In Michigan, when the acts of Parlia-
ment were repealed, it was also deemed important to repeal all laws derived from
[30]
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. III.] FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OP CONSTITUTIONS. * 26
hers substituted which had been framed by the people themselves,
through the agency of conventions which they had chosen. The
exceptions were the States of Connecticut and Rhode Island, each
of which had continued its government as a State under the colo-
nial charter, finding it sufficient aud satisfactory for the time being,
and accepting it as the constitution for the State.1
New States have since, from time * to time, formed con- [* 27]
stitutions either regularly in pursuance of enabling acts
passed by Congress, or irregularly by the spontaneous action of
the people, or under the direction of the legislative or executive
authority of the Territory to which the State succeeded. Where
irregularities existed, they must be regarded as having been cured
by the subsequent admission of the State into the Union by Con-
gress; and there were not wanting in the case of some States
plausible reasons for insisting that such admission * had [* 28]
become a matter of right, and that the necessity for an
enabling act by Congress was dispensed with by the previous stip-
ulations of the national government in acquiring the Territory from
which sucIi States were formed.2 Some of these constitutions
pointed out the mode for their own modification; others were
silent on that subject; but it has been assumed that in such cases
France, through the connection with the Canadian provinces, including the
Contume de Paris, or ancient French common law. In the mining States and
Territories a peculiar species of common law, relating to mining rights and titles,
his sprung up, having its origin among the miners, but recognized and enforced
by the courts.
1 It is worthy of note, that the first case in which a legislative enactment was
declared unconstitutional and void, on the ground of incompatibility with the
constitution of the State, was decided under one of these royal charters. The
case was that of Trevett p. Weeden, decided by the Superior Court of Rhode
Island in 1786. See Arnold's History of Rhode Island, Vol. II. p. 24. The
case is further referred to, post, p. 160, n.
* This was the claim made on behalf of Michigan; it being insisted that the
citizens, under the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, whenever the 'Territory
acquired the requisite population, had an absolute right to form a constitution
and be admitted to the Union under it. See Scott v. Detroit Young Men's
Society's Lessee, 1 Doug. Mich. 119, and the contrary opinion in Myers v. Man-
hattan Bank, 20 Ohio, 283. The debates in the Senate of the United States on
the admission of Michigan to the Union go fully into this question. See Benton's
Abridgment of Congressional Debates, Vol. XHI. pp. 69-72. And as to the
right of the .people of a Territory to originate measures looking to an application
for admission to the Union, see Opinions of Attorneys-General, Vol. II. p. 726.
[31]
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[CH. III.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
the power to originate proceedings for that purpose rested with
the legislature of the State, as the department most nearly repre-
senting its general sovereignty; and this is doubtless the correct
. view to take of this subject.1
The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sover-
eignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate author-
ity.2 The people of the Union created a national constitution, and
conferred upon it powers of sovereignty over certain subjects, and
the people of each State created a State government, to exercise
the remaining powers of sovereignty so far as they were disposed
to allow them to be exercised at all. By the constitution which
they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official
agencies, but their own hands as well, and neither the officers of
the State, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty
to take action in opposition to this fundamental law. But in
every State, although all persons are under the protection of the
government, and obliged to conform their action to its laws, there
are always some who are altogether excluded from participation
in the government, and are compelled- to submit to be ruled by
an authority in the creation of which they have no choice. The
political maxim, that government rests upon the consent of the
governed, appears, therefore, to be practically subject to many
exceptions; and when we say the sovereignty of the State is
vested in the people, the question very naturally presents itselT,
What are we to understand by The People as used in this con-
nection?
[* 29] * What should be the correct rule upon this subject, it
does not fall within our province to consider. Upon this
men will theorize; but the practical question lies back of the for-
mation of the Constitution, and is addressed to the people them-
selves. As a practical fact, the sovereignty is vested in those
persons who are permitted by the constitution of the State to
exercise the elective franchise. These persons may have been
designated by description in the enabling act of Congress permit-
ting the formation of the constitution, if any such there were, or
the convention which framed the constitution may have determined
1 See Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, c. 8.
1 McLean, J., in Spooner e. McConnell, 1 McLean, 347; Potter's Dwarru
on Stat. c. 1.
[32]
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CH. in. I. m.] FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. * 29
1 <rithflie qualifications of electors without external dictation. In either
rec° case, however, it was essential to subsequent good order and satis-
faction with the government, that those classes in general should
be admitted to a voice in its administration, whose exclusion
on the ground of want of capacity or of moral fitness could not
reasonably and to the general satisfaction be defended.
Certain classes have been almost universally excluded, — the
slave, because he is assumed to be wanting alike in the intelligence
and the freedom of will essential to the proper exercise of the
right; the woman, from mixed motives, but mainly perhaps, be-
cause, in the natural relation of marriage, she was supposed to be
under the influence of her husband, and, where the common law
prevailed, actually was in a condition of dependence upon and
subjection to him; the infant, for reasons similar to those which
exclude the slave; the idiot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious
grounds; and sometimes other classes for whose exclusion it is
difficult to assign reasons so generally satisfactory.
The theory in these cases we take to be that classes are ex-
cluded because they lack either the intelligence, the virtue, or the
liberty of action essential to the proper exercise of the elective
franchise. But the rule by which the presence or absence of these
qualifications is to be determined, it is not easy to establish on
grounds the reason and propriety of which shall be accepted by
all. It must be one that is definite and easy of application, and
it must be made permanent, or an accidental majority may at any
time change it, so as to usurp all power to themselves. But to be
definite and easy of application, it must also be arbitrary. The
infant of tender years is wanting in competency, but he is daily
acquiring it, and a period is fixed at which he shall conclusively
be presumed to possess what is requisite. The alien may know
nothing of our political system and laws, and he is
excluded until * he has been domiciled in the country [* 30]
for a period judged to be sufficiently long to make him
familiar with its institutions; races are sometimes excluded
arbitrarily; and there have been times when in somo of the
States the possession of a certain amount of property, or the
capacity to read, were regarded as essential to satisfactory proof
of sufficient freedom of action and intelligence.1
1 State e. Woodruff, 2 Day, 504; Catlin v. Smith, 2 S. & R. 267 ; Opinions of
3 [ 33 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 30 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. III.
Whatever the rule that is once established, it must remain fixed
until those who by means of it have the power of the State put
into their hands see fit to invite others to participate with them in
its exercise. Any attempt of the excluded classes to assert their
right to a share in the government, otherwise than by operating
upon the public opinion of those who possess the right of suffrage,
would be regarded as an attempt at revolution, to be put down
by the strong arm of the government of the State, assisted, if need
be, by the military power of the Union.1
In regard to the formation and amendment of State constitu-
tions, the following appear to be settled principles of American
constitutional law: —
I. The people of the several Territories may form for them-
selves State constitutions whenever enabling acts for that purpose
are passed by Congress, but only in the manner allowed by such
enabling acts, and through the action of such persons as the en-
abling acts shall clothe with the elective franchise to that end.
If the people of a Territory shall, of their own motion, without
such enabling act, meet in convention, frame and adopt a consti-
tution, and demand admission to the Union under it, such action
does not entitle them, as matter of right, to be recognized as
a State; but the power that can admit can also refuse, and the
territorial status must be continued until Congress shall be satis-
fied to suffer the Territory to become a State. There are always
in these cases questions of policy as well as of constitutional law
to be determined by the Congress before admission becomes a
matter of right, — whether the constitution formed is republi-
can; whether the proper State boundaries have been fixed upon;
whether the population is sufficient; whether the proper qualifi-
cations for the exercise of the elective franchise have been agreed
to; whether any inveterate evil exist in the Territory which is
Judges, 18 Pick. 575. For some local elections it is quite common still to require
property qualification or the payment of taxes in the voter; but statutes of this
description are generally construed liberally. See Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb.
504. Many special statutes, referring to the people of a municipality the ques-
tion of voting aid to internal improvements, have confined the right of voting on
the question to tax-payers.
1 The case of Rhode Island and the "Dorr Rebellion," so popularly known,
will be fresh in the minds of all. For a discussion of some of the legal aspects
of the case, see Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.
[34]
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CH. HI.] FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OP CONSTITUTIONS. * 30
now subject to control, but wbich might be perpetuated under a
State government, — these and the like questions, in which the
wliole country is interested, cannot be finally solved by the people
of the Territory for themselves, but the final decision must rest
with Congress, and the judgment must be favorable before admis-
sion can be claimed or expected.
II. In the original States, and all others subsequently admitted
to the Union, the power to amend or revise their constitutions
resides in the great body of the people as an organized body poli-
tic, who, being vested with ultimate sovereignty, and the source
of all State authority, have power to control and alter the law
which they have m.ade at their will. But the people, in the legal
sense, must be understood to be those who, by the existing consti-
tution, are clothed with political rights, and who, while that in-
strument remains, will be the sole organs through which the will
of the body politic can be expressed.
III. But the will of the people to this end can only be expressed
in the legitimate modes by which such a body politic can act, and
which must either be prescribed by the constitution whose revision
or amendment is sought, or by an act of the legislative department
of the State, which alone would be authorized to speak for the
people upon this subject, and to point out a mode for the expres-
sion of their will in the absence of any provision for amendment
or revision contained in the constitution itself.1
1 Opinions of the Judges, 6 Cush. 573; Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100. The
first constitution of New York contained no provision for its own amendment,
and Mr. Hammond, in his Political History of New York, Vol. I. c. 26, gives a
very interesting account of the controversy before the legislature and in the coun-
cil of revision as to the power of the legislature to call a convention for revision,
and as to the mode of submitting its work to the people. In Collier v. Frierson,
24 Ala. 108, it appeared that the legislature had proposed eight different amend-
ments to be submitted to the people at the same time; the people had approved
them, and all the requisite proceedings to make them a part of the constitution
had been had, except that in the subsequent legislature the resolution for their
ratification bad by mistake omitted to recite one of them. On the question
whether this one had been adopted, we quote from the opinion of the court:
"The constitution can be amended in but two ways; either by the people who
originally framed it, or in the mode prescribed by the instrument itself. If the
last mode is pursued, the amendments must be proposed by two-thirds of each
house of the General Assembly; they must be published in print, at least three
months before the next general election for representatives; it must appear from
the returns made to the Secretary of State that a majority of those voting for
[35]
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[CH. III.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[* 32] * IV. In accordance with universal practice, and from
the very necessity of the case, amendments to an ex-
isting constitution, or entire revisions of it, must be prepared
and matured by some body of representatives chosen for the pur-
pose. It is obviously impossible for the whole people to meet,
prepare, and discuss the proposed alterations, and there seems
to be'no feasible mode by which an expression of their will can
be obtained, except by asking it upon the single point of assent
or disapproval. But no body of representatives, unless specially
clothed with power for that purpose by the people when choosing
them, can rightfully take definitive action upon amendments or
revisions; they must submit the result of their deliberations to
the people — who alone are competent to exercise the powers of
sovereignty in, framing the fundamental law — for ratification or
rejection. The constitutional convention is the representative of
sovereignty only in a very qualified sense, and for the specific
purpose, and witli the restricted authority to put in proper form
the questions of amendment upon which the people are to
[* 33] pass; but the changes in the * fundamental law of the
State must be enacted by the people themselves.1
representatives have voted in favor of the proposed amendments, and they must
be ratified by two-thirds of each house of the next General Assembly after such
election, voting by yeas and nays, the proposed amendments having been read at
each session three times on three several days in each house. We entertain no
doubt that to change the constitution in any other mode than by a convention,
every requisition which is demanded by the instrument itself must be observed,
and the omission of any one is fatal to the amendment. We scarcely deem any
argument necessary to enforce this proposition. The constitution is the supreme
and paramount law. The mode by which amendments are to be made under it
is clearly defined. It has been said that certain acts are to be done, certain
requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected. But to what
purpose are those acts required or those requisitions enjoined, if the legislature or
any department of the government can dispense with them? To do so would be
to violate the instrument which they are sworn to support, and every principle of
public law and sound constitutional policy requires the courts to pronounce against
any amendment which is not shown to have been made in accordance with the
rules prescribed by the fundamental law." See also State v. McBride, 4 Mo.
803.
1 See upon this subject Jameson on the Constitutional Convention, §§ 415-418,
and 47i'-o^O. This work is so complete and satisfactory in its treatment of the
general subject, as to leave little to be said by one who shall afterwards attempt
to cover the same ground. The Supreme Court of Missouri have expressed the
opinion that it was competent for a convention to put a new constitution in force
I 36]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. III.] FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OP CONSTITUTIONS. * 33
V. The power of the people to amend or revise their constitu-
tions is limited by the Constitution of the United States in the
following particulars: —
1. It must not abolish the republican form of government, since
such act would be revolutionary in its character, and would call
for and demand direct intervention on the part of the government
of the United States.1
2. It must not provide for titles of nobility, or assume to violate
the obligation of any contract, or attaint persons of crime, or pro-
vide ex post facto for the punishment of acts by the courts which
were innocent when committed, or contain any other provision
which would, in effect, amount to the exercise of any power ex-
pressly or impliedly prohibited to the States by the Constitution
of the Union. For while such provisions would not call for the
direct and forcible intervention of the government of the Union,
it would be the duty of the courts, both State and national, to
refuse to enforce them, and to declare them altogether void, as
much when enacted by the people in their primary capacity as
makers of the fundamental law, as when enacted in the form of
statutes through the delegated power of their legislatures.2
VI. Subject to the foregoing principles and limitations, each
State must judge for itself what provisions shall be inserted in its
constitution; how the powers of government shall be apportioned
in order to their proper exercise; what protection shall be thrown
around the person or property of the citizen; and to what extent
private rights shall be required to yield to the general
good.3 * And the courts of the State, still more the [* 34]
courts of the Union, would be precluded from inquiring
without submitting it to the people. State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119. But this was
obiter.
1 Const, of U. S. art. 4, § 4; Federalist, No. 43.
'Cummings p. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1
Black, 436; State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140; Jackoway p. Denton, 25 Ark. 525;
Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg. 490; Girdner v. Stephens, 1 Heis. 280; Railroad
Co. p. McClure, 10 Wall. 511; White p. Hart, 13 Wall. 649.
'Matter of the Reciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y. 9; McMullen v. Hodge, 5 Texas,
34; Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9. In the case last cited,
Denio, J., says: "The [constitutional] convention was not obliged, like the legis-
lative bodies, to look carefully to the preservation of vested rights. It was com-
petent to deal, subject to ratification by the people, and to the Constitution of
the federal government, with all private and social rights, and with all the exist- *
[87]
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* 34 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. in.
into the justice of their action, or questioning its validity, because
of any supposed conflict with fundamental rules of right or of
government, unless they should be able to show collision at some
point between the instrument thus formed and that paramount
law which constitutes, in regard to the subjects it covers, the
fundamental rule of action throughout the whole United States.1
How far the constitution of a State shall descend into the par-
ticulars of government is a question of policy addressed to the
convention which forms it. Certain things are to be looked for
in all these instruments; though even as to these there is great
variety, not only of substance, but also in the minuteness of their
provisions to meet particular cases.
I. We are to expect a general framework of government to be
designed, under which the sovereignty of the people is to be exer-
cised by representatives chosen for the purpose, in such manner
ing laws and institutions of the State. If the convention had so willed, and the
people had concurred, all former charters and grants might have been annihilated.
When, therefore, we are seeking for the true construction of a constitutional pro-
vision, we are constantly to bear in mind that its authors were not executing a
delegated authority, limited by other constitutional restraints, but are to look
upon them as the founders of a State, intent only upon establishing such princi-
ples as seemed best calculated to produce good government and promote the pub-
lic happiness, at the expense of any and all existing institutions which might
stand in their way."
1 All the State constitutions now contain within themselves provisions for their
amendment. Some require the question of calling a convention to revise the
constitution to be submitted to the people at stated periods: others leave it to the
legislature to call a convention or to submit to the people the question of calling
one; while the major part allow the legislature to mature specific amendments to
be submitted to the people separately, and these become a part of the constitu-
tion if adopted by the requisite vote.
When the late rebellion had been put down by the military forces of the United
States, and the State governments which constituted a part of the disloyal svs-
tem had been displaced, serious questions were raised as to the proper steps to
be taken in order to restore the States to their harmonious relations to the Union.
These questions, and the controversy over them, constituted an important part of
the history of our country during the administration of President Johnson; but
as it is the hope and trust of our people that the occasion for discussing such
questions will never arise again, we do not. occupy space with them in this work.
It suffices for the present to say, that Congress claimed, insisted upon, and
enforced the right to prescribe the steps to be taken and the conditions to be
observed in order to restore these States to their former positions in the Union,
and the right also to determine when the prescribed conditions had been com-
* plied with, so as to entitle them to representation in Congress.
[38]
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CH. in.] FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OP CONSTITUTIONS. * 34
as the instrument provides, and with such reservations as it
makes.
II. Generally the qualifications for the right of suffrage will
be declared, as well as the conditions under which it shall be
exercised.
ILL Separate departments will be created for the exercise of
legislative, executive, and judicial power, and care taken to keep
the three as separate and distinct as possible, except so far as
each is made a check upon the other to keep it within proper
bounds, or to prevent hasty and improvident action. The
executive * is a check upon the legislature in the veto [* 35]
power, which most States allow; the legislature is a check
upon both the other departments through its power to prescribe
rules for the exercise of their authority, and through its power
to impeach their officers; and the judiciary is a check upon the
legislature by means of its authority to annul unconstitutional
laws.
IV. Local self-government having always been a part of the
Engiish and American systems, we shall look for its recognition
in any such instrument. And even if not expressly recognized,
it is still to be understood that all these instruments are framed
with its present existence and anticipated continuance in view.
V. We shall also expect a declaration of rights for the pro-
tection of individuals and minorities. This declaration usually
contains the following classes of provisions : —
1. Those declaratory of the general principles of republican
government; such as, that all freemen, when they form asocial
compact, are equal, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to ex-
clusive, separate public emoluments or privileges from the com-
munity, but in consideration of public services; that absolute,
arbitrary power over the lives, liberty, and property of freemen
exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority;
that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace,
safety, happiness, security, and the protection of property; that
for the advancement of these ends they have at all times an in-
alienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their
government in such manner as they may think proper; that all
elections shall be free and equal; that no power of suspending
the laws shall be exercised except by the legislature or its author-
[ 39 ]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[ch. in.
ity; that standing armies are not to be maintained in time of
peace; that representation shall be in proportion to population;
that the people shall have the right freely to assemble to consult
of the common good, to instruct their representatives, and petition
for redress of grievances; and the like.
2. Those declaratory of the fundamental rights of the citizen:
as that all men are by nature free and independent, and have cer-
tain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying aud
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety aud happiness; that
the right to property is before and higher than any consti-
[* 36] tutional * sanction; that the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall for ever be allowed; that every man may freely
speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being re-
sponsible for the abuse of that right; that every man may bear
arms for the defence of himself and of the State; that the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not .be
violated, nor shall soldiers be quartered upon citizens in time of
peace; and the like.
3. Those declaratory of the principles which ensure to the citizen
an impartial trial, and protect him in his life, liberty, and property
against the arbitrary action of those in authority: as that no bill
of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that the right to
trial by jury shall be preserved; that excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive punishments inflicted; that no person shall
be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence, nor
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law ; that private property shall not be taken for public use without
compensation; and the like.
Other clauses are sometimes added declaratory of the principles
of morality and virtue; and it is also sometimes expressly de-
clared — what indeed is implied without the declaration — that
every thing in the declaration of rights contained is excepted out
of the general powers of government, and all laws contrary thereto
shall be void.
Many other things are commonly found in these charters of
'[ 40 ]
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CH. III.] FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OP CONSTITUTIONS. * 36
government;1 but since, while they continue in force, they are to
remain absolute and unchangeable rules of action and decision, it
is obvious that they should not be made to embrace within their
iron grasp those subjects in regard to which the policy or interest
of the State or of its people may vary from time to time, and
which are therefore more properly left to the control of the legis-
lature, which can more easily and speedily make the required
changes.
In considering State constitutions we must not commit the mis-
take of supposing that, because individual rights are guarded and
protected by them, they must also be, considered as owing their
origin to them. These instruments measure the powers of the
rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the governed.
*" What is a constitution, and what are its objects? It is [* 37]
easier to tell what it is not than what it is. It is not the
beginning of a community, nor the origin of private rights; it
is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government;
it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and political free-
dom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their
power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their
protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers which they
possessed before the constitution was made, it is but the framework
of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pre-
existing condition of laws, rights, habits, and modes of thought.
There is nothing primitive in it: it is all derived from a known
source. It presupposes an organized society, law, order, property,
personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and enough of culti-
vated intelligence to know how to guard it against the encroach-
ments of tyranny. A written constitution is in every instance a
limitation upon the powers of government in the hands of agents;
for there never was a written republican constitution which del-
egated to functionaries all the latent powers which lie dormant
1 " This, then, is the office of a written constitution: to delegate to various
public functionaries such of the powers of government as the people' do not
intend to exercise for themselves; to classify these powers, according to their
uture, and to commit them to separate agents ; to provide for the choice of these
agents by the people; to ascertain, limit, and define the extent of the authority
thus delegated; and to reserve to the people their sovereignty over all things not
expressly committed to their representatives." E. P. Hurlbut in Human Rights
ind their Political Guaranties.
[41] _
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[ch. nr.
in every nation, and are boundless in extent, and incapable of
definition." 1
1 Hamilton v. St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 13, per Bales, arguendo. • And
see Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9; Lee v. State, 2(5 Ark. 205-6.
"Written constitutions sanctify and confirm great principles, but the latter are
prior in existence to the former." 2 Webster's Works, 392. See, also, 1 Bl.
Com. 124; 2 Story, Life and Letters, 278; Sidney on Government, c. 3, sec. 27
and li.'i. "If this charter of State government which we call a Constitution were
all there was of constitutional command; if the usages, the customs, the maxims,
that have sprung from the habits of life, modes of thought, methods of trying
facts by the neighborhood, and mutual responsibility in neighborhood interests;
the precepts that have come to usirom the revolutions which overturned tyran-
nies; the sentiments of manly independence and self control which impelled our
ancestors to summon the local community to redress local evils, instead of relying
upon king or legislature at a distance to do so, — if a recognition of all these
were to be stricken from the body of our constitutional law, a lifeless skeleton
might remain, but the living spirit, that which gives it force and attraction, which
makes it valuable, and draws to it the affections of the people; that which dis-
tinguishes it from the numberless constitutions, so called, which in Europe have
been set up and thrown down within the last hundred years, many of which, in
their expressions, seemed equally fair and to possess equal promise with ours,
and have only been wanting in the support and vitality which these alone can
give, — this living and breathing spirit which supplies the interpretation of the
words of the written charter would be utterly lost and gone." People t.
Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 107.
[42]
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CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
•CHAPTER IV. [*38]
OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
The deficiencies of human language are such that if written
instruments were always carefully drawn, and by persons skilled
in the use of words, we should not be surprised to find their mean-
ing often drawn in question, or at least to meet with difficulties
in their practical application. But these difficulties are greatly
increased when draughtsmen are careless or incompetent; and they
multiply rapidly when the instruments are to be applied, not only
to the subjects directly within the contemplation of those who
framed them, but also to a great variety of new circumstances
which could not have been anticipated, but which must nevertheless
be governed by the general rules which the instruments establish.
Moreover, the different points of view from which different interests
regard these instruments incline them to different views of the
instruments themselves. All these circumstances tend to render
the subjects of interpretation and construction prominent in the
practical administration of the law, and often suggest questions of
no little difficulty.
Interpretation differs from construction in that the former "is
the act of finding out the true sense of any form of words; that is,
the sense which their author intended to convey; and of enabling
others to derive from them the same idea which the author in-
tended to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing
of conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct ex-
pressions of the text, from elements known from and given in the
text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not in the letter
of the text. Interpretation only takes place if the text conveys
some meaning or other. But construction is resorted to when, in
comparing two different writings of the same individual, or two
different enactments by the same legislative body, there is found
contradiction where there was evidently no intention of such con-
tradiction one of another, or where it happens that part of a writ
[43]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 38
[CH. IV.
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ing or declaration contradicts the rest. When this is the case,
and the nature of the document or declaration, or whatever else it
may be, is such as not to allow us to consider the whole as being
invalidated by a partial or other contradiction, then resort must be
had to construction; so, too, if found to act in cases which have
not been foreseen by the framers of those rules, by which we are
nevertheless obliged, for some binding reason, faithfully to regulate
as well as we can our action respecting the unforeseen case." 1 In
common use, however, the word construction is generally employed
in the law in a sense embracing all that is properly covered by
both when used in a sense strictly and technically correct; and
we shall so employ it in the present chapter.
[* 39] Prom the earliest periods in the history of * written law,
rules of construction, sometimes based upon sound rea-
son, and seeking the real intent of the instrument, and at other
times altogether arbitrary or fanciful, have been laid down by
those who have assumed to instruct in the law, or who have been
called upon to administer it, by the aid of which the meaning of
the instrument was to be resolved. Somo of these rules have been
applied to particular classes of instruments only; others are more
general in their application, and so far as they are sound, may be
made use of in any case where the meaning of a writing is in dis-
pute. To such of these as seem important in constitutional law
we shall refer, and illustrate them by references to reported cases,
where they have been applied.
A few preliminary words may not be out of place, upon the
questions, who are to apply these rules; what person, body, or
department is to enforce the construction; and how far a deter-
mination, when once made, is to be binding upon other persons,
bodies, or departments.
We have already seen that we are to expect in every constitu-
tion an apportionment of the powers of government. We shall
also find certain duties imposed upon the several departments, as
well as upon specified officers in each, and we shall likewise dis-
1 Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics. See Smith on Stat, and Const-
Construction, 600. Bouvier defines the two terms succinctly as follows: " Inter-
pretation, the discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used
to convey ideas." "Construction, in practice, determining the meaning and
application as to the case in question of the provisions of a constitution, statute,
will, or other instrument, or of an oral agreement." Law Die.
[ 44 ]
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cover that the constitution has sought to hedge about their action
in various ways, with a view to the protection of individual rights,
and the proper separation of duties. And wherever any oue is
called upon to perform any constitutional duty, or to do any act
in respect to which it can be supposed that the constitution has
spoken, it is obvious that a question of construction may at once
arise, upon which some oue must decide before the duty is per-
formed or the act done. From the very nature of the case, this
decision must commonly be made by the person, body, or depart-
ment upon whom the duty is devolved, or from whom the act is
required.
Let us suppose that the constitution requires of the
legislature, * that, in establishing municipal corporations, [* 40]
it shall restrict their powers of taxation ; and a city charter
is proposed which confines the right of taxation to the raising of
money for certain specified purposes, but in regard to those pur-
poses leaves it unlimited; or which allows to the municipality
unlimited choice of purposes, but restricts the rate; or which
permits persons to be taxed indefinitely, but limits the taxation of
property: in either of these cases the question at once arises,
whether the limitation in the charter is such a restriction as the
constitution intends. Let us suppose, again, that a board of su-
pervisors is, by the constitution, authorized to borrow money upon
the credit of the county for any county purpose, and they are
asked to issue bonds in order to purchase stock in some railway
company which proposes to construct a road across the county;
the propositiou is met with the query, Is this a county purpose,
and can the issue of bonds be regarded as a borrowing of money,
within the meaning of the people as expressed in the constitu-
tion? And once again : let us suppose that the governor is em-
powered to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions,
and he is requested to do so in order to provide for a ,class of
private claims whose holders are urgent; can this with any pro-
priety be deemed an extraordinary occasion?
In these and the like cases our constitutions have provided no
tribunal for the specific duty of solving in advance the questions
which arise. In a few of the States, indeed, the legislative de-
partment has been empowered by the constitution to call upon
the courts for their opinion upon the constitutional validity of a
proposed law, in order that, if it be adjudged without warrant,
[45]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 40
[CH. IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
the legislature may abstain from enacting it.1 But those pro-
visions are not often to be met with, and judicial decisions, espe-
cially upon delicate and difficult questions of constitutional law,
can seldom be entirely satisfactory when made, as they commonly
will be under such calls, without the benefit of argument at the
bar, and of that light upon the points involved which might
[* 41] * be afforded by counsel learned in the law, and interested
in giving them a thorough investigation.
It follows, therefore, that every department of the government
and every official of every department may at any time, when a
duty is to be performed, be required to pass upon a question of
constitutional construction.2 Sometimes the case will be such
that the decision when made must, from the nature of things, be
conclusive and subject to no appeal or review, however erroneous
it may be in the opinion of other departments or other officers;
but in other cases the same question may be required to be passed
upon again before the duty is completely performed. The first of
these classes is where, by the constitution, a particular question
is plainly addressed to the discretion or judgment of some one
department or officer, so that the interference of any other de-
partment or officer, with a view to the substitution of its own
discretion or judgment in the place of that to which the consti-
tution has confided the decision, would be impertinent and intru-
sive. Under every constitution cases of this description are to
be met with; and though it will sometimes be found difficult to
1 By the constitutions of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, the
judges of the Supreme Court are required, when called upon by the governor,
council, or either house of the legislature, to give their opinions " upon impor-
tant questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." In Missouri, they are to
give their opinions " upon important questions of constitutional law, and upon
solemn occasions;" and the Supreme Court has held that while the governor
determines for himself whether the occasion is such as to authorize him to call on
the judges for their opinion, they must decide for themselves whether the occa-
sion is such as to warrant the governor in making the call. Opinions of Judges,
49 Mo. 216.
2 "It is argued that the legislature cannot give a construction to the constitu-
tion relative to private rights secured by it. It is true that the legislature, in
consequence of their construction of the constitution, cannot make laws repug-
nant to it. But every department of government, invested with certain consti-
tutional powers, must, in the first instance, but not exclusively, be the judge of
its powers, or it could not act." Parsons, Ch. J., in Kendall v. Inhabitants of
Kingston, 5 Mass. 533.
[46]
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CH. Iv.] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 41
classify them, there can be no doubt, when the case is properly
determined to be one of this character, that the rule must prevail
which makes the decision final.
We will suppose, again, that the constitution empowers the
executive to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions,
and does not in terms authorize the intervention of any one else
in determining what is and what is not such an occasion in the
constitutional sense; it is obvious that the question is addressed
exclusively to the executive judgment, and neither the legislature
nor the judicial department can intervene to compel action if he
decide against it, or to enjoin action if, in his opinion, the proper
occasion has arisen.1 And again, if, by the constitution,
* laws are to take effect at a specified time after their [* 42]
passage, unless the legislature, for urgent reasons, shall
otherwise order, we must perceive at once that the legislature
alone is competent to pass upon the urgency of the alleged
reasons.2 And to take a judicial instance: If a court is required
to give an accused person a trial at the first term after indictment,
1 In exercising his power to call out the militia in certain exigencies, the Pres-
ident is the exclusive and final judge when the exigency has arisen. Martin p.
Mott, 12 Wheat. 29.
'In Gillinwater v. Mississippi & Atlantic Railroad Co., 13 11l. 1, it was urged
that a certain restriction imposed upon railroad corporations by the general rail-
poad law was a violation of the provision of the constitution which enjoins it upon
the legislature " to .encourage internal improvements by passing liberal general
laws of incorporation for that purpose." The court say of this provision: "This
is a constitutional command to the legislature, as obligatory on it as any other of
the provisions of that instrument; but it is one which cannot be enforced by the
courts of justice. It addresses itself to the legislature alone, and it is not for us
to say whether it has obeyed the behest in its true spirit. Whether the provisions
of this law are liberal, and tend to encourage internal improvements, is matter of
opinion, about which men may differ; and as we have no authority to revise legis-
lative action on the subject, it would not become us to express our views in rela-
tion to it. The law makes no provision for the construction of canals and turn-
pike roads, and yet they are as much internal improvements as railroads, and we
might as well be asked to extend what we might consider the liberal provisions of
this law to them, because they are embraced in the constitutional provision, as to
ask us to disregard such provisions of it as we might regard as illiberal. The
argument proceeds upon the idea that we should consider that as done which ought
to be done; but that principle has no application here. Like laws upon other
subjects within legislative jurisdiction, it is for the courts to say what the law is,
not what it should be." It is clear that courts cannot interfere with matters of
legislative discretion. Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s. 68ii.
[47]
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unless good cause be shown for continuance, it is obvious that the
question of good cause is one for the court alone to pass upon,
and that its judgment when exercised is, and must be from the
nature of the case, final. And when in any of these and similar
cases the decision is once made, other departments or other
officers, whatever may have been their own opinions, must assume
the decision to be correct, and are not at liberty to raise any
question concerning it, unless some duty is devolved upon them
which presents the same question anew.
But there are cases where the question of construction is equally
addressed to two or more departments of the government, and it
then becomes important to know whether the decision by one is
binding upon the others, or whether each is to act upon its
own judgment. Let us suppose once more that the governor,
being empowered by the constitution to convene the
[* 43] * legislature upon extraordinary occasions, has regarded
a particular event as being such an occasion, and has
issued his proclamation calling them together with a view to the
enactment of some particular legislation which the event seems
to call for, and which he specifies in his proclamation. Now the
legislature are to enact laws upon their own view of necessity
and expediency; and they will refuse to pass the desired statute
if they regard it as unwise or unimportant. But in so doing they
indirectly review the governor's decision, as in refusing to pass
the law they also decide that the specific event was not one calling
for action on their part. In such a case it is clear that, while the
decision of the governor is final so far as to require the legislature
to meet, it is not final in any sense that would bind the legislative
department to accept and act upon it when they are called to enter
upon the performance of their duty in the making of laws.1
So also there are cases where, after the two houses of the legis-
lature have passed upon the question, their decision is in a certain
sense subject to review by the governor. If a bill is introduced
the constitutionality of which is disputed, the passage of the bill
by the two houses must be regarded as the expression of their
judgment that, if approved, it will be a valid law. But if the
constitution confers upon the governor a veto power, the same
question of constitutional authority will be brought by the bill
before him, since it is manifestly his duty to withhold approval
1 See Opinions of Judges, 49 Mo. 216.
[48]
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from any bill which, in his opinion, the legislature ought not for
any reason to pass. And what reason so valid as that the con-
stitution confers upon them no authority to that end? In all
these and the like cases, each department must act upon its own
judgment, and cannot be required to do that which it regards as
a violation of the constitution, on the ground solely that another
department which, in the course of the discharge of its own duty,
was called upon first to act, lias reached the conclusion that it will
not be violated by the proposed action.
But setting aside now those cases to which we have referred,
where from the nature of things, and perhaps from explicit terms
of the constitution, the judgment of the department or officer
acting must be final, we shall find the general rule to be, that
whenever an act is done which may become the subject of a
proceeding in court, any question of constitutional authority
that might have been raised when the act was done will
be* open for consideration in such proceeding, and that as [* 44]
the courts must finally settle the controversy, so also will
they finally determine the question of constitutional law.
For the constitution of the State is higher in authority than any
law, direction, or decree made by any body or any officer assuming
to act under it, since such body or officer must exercise a dele-
gated authority, and one that must necessarily be subservient to
the instrument by which the delegation is made. In any case of
conflict the fundamental law must govern, and the act in conflict
with it must be treated as of no legal validity. But no mode has
yet been devised by which these questions of conflict are to be
discussed and settled as abstract questions, and their determination
is necessary or practicable only when public or private rights
would be affected thereby. They then become the subject of legal
controversy, and legal controversies must be settled by the courts.
The courts have thus devolved upon them the duty to pass upon
the constitutional validity, sometimes of legislative, and sometimes
of executive acts. And as judicial tribunals have authority, not
only to judge, but also to enforce their judgments, the result of
a decision against the constitutionality of a legislative or executive
act will be to render it invalid through the enforcement of the
paramount law in the controversy which has raised the question.1
1 "When laws conflict in actual cases, they [the courts] must decide which is
•lie superior law, and which must yield; and as we have seen that, according to
4 [49]
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[* 45] * The same conclusion is reached by stating in consecu-
tive order a few familiar maxims of the law. The adminis-
tration of public justice is referred to the courts. To perform this
duty, the first requisite is to ascertain the facts, and the next cb
determine the law that is applicable. The constitution is the funda-
mental 'law of the State, in opposition to which any other law, or
any direction or decree, must be inoperative and void. If, therefore,
such other law, direction, or decree seems to be applicable to the
facts, but on comparison with the fundamental law it is found to be
in conflict, the court, in declaring what the law of the case is, must
necessarily determine its invalidity, and thereby in effect annul
it.1 The right and the power of the courts to do this are so plain,
our principles, every officer remains answerable for what he officially does, a cit-
izen, believing that the law he enforces is incompatible with the superior law, the
constitution simply sues the officer before the proper court as having unlawfully
aggrieved him in the particular case. The court, bound to do justice to every
one, is bound also to decide this case as a simple case of conflicting laws. The
court does not decide directly upon the doings of the legislature. It simply
decides for the case in hand, whether there actually are conflicting laws, and if
so which is the higher law that demands obedience, when both may not be obeyed
at the same time. As, however, this decision becomes the leading decision for
all future cases of the same import, until, indeed, proper and legitimate authority
should reverse it, the question of constitutionality is virtually decided, and it is
decided in a natural, easy, legitimate, and safe manner, according to the prin-
ciple of the supremacy of the law, and the dependence of justice. It is one of
the most interesting and important evolutions of the government of law, and one
of the greatest protections of the citizen. It may well be called a very jewel of
Anglican liberty, and one of the best fruits of our political civilization." Lieber,
Civil Liberty and Self-Government.
"Whenever a law which the judge holds to be unconstitutional is argued in a
tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is
the only one which is peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise to
immense political influence. Few laws can escape the searching analysis; for
there are few which are not prejudicial to some private interest or other, and
none which may not be brought before.a court of justice by the choice of par-
ties, or bythe necessity of the case. But from the time that a judge has refused
to apply any given law in a case, that law loses a portion of its moral sanction.
The persons to whose interest it is prejudicial learn that means exist for evading
its authority; and similar suits are multiplied until it becomes powerless. One
of two alternatives must then be resorted to, — the people must alter the con-
stitution, or the legislature must repeal the law." De Tocqueville, Democracy
in America, c. 6.
1 "It is idle to say that the authority of each branch of the government is
defined and limited by the constitution, if there be not an independent power
able and willing to enforce the limitations. Experience proves that the consti-
[50]
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* and the duty is so generally — we may almost say uni- [* 46]
versally — conceded, that we should not be justified in
wearying the patience of the reader in quoting from the very
numerous authorities upon the subject.1
tution is thoughtlessly but habitually violated; and the sacrifice of individual
rights is too remotely connected with the objects and contests of the masses to
attract their attention. From its very position it is apparent that the conserva-
tive power is lodged in the judiciary, which, in the exercise of its undoubted
rights, is bound to meet any emergency; else causes would be decided, not only
by the legislature, but sometimes without hearing or evidence." Per Gibson,
Ch. J., in De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18.
"Nor will this conclusion, to use the language of one of our most eminent
jurists and statesmen, by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the
legislative power. It will only be supposing that the power of the people is
superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its stat-
utes, stands in opposition to that declared by the people in the constitution, the
judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought
to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which
are not fundamental. Neither would we, in doing this, be understood as im-
pugning the honest intentions, or sacred regard to justice, which we most cheer-
fully aceord to the legislature. But to be above error is to possess an entire
attribute of the Deity; and to spurn its correction, is to reduce to the same
degraded level the most noble and the meanest of his works." Bates v. Kimball,
2 Chip. 77.
"Without the limitations and restraints usually found in written constitutions,
the government could have no elements of permanence and durability; and the
distribution of its powers and the vesting their exercise in separate departments
would be an idle ceremony." Brown, J., in People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 558.
1 1 Kent, 500-507; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Webster on the
Independence of the Judiciary, Works, Vol. III. p. 29. In this speech Mr.
Webster has forcibly set forth the necessity of leaving with the courts the power
to enforce constitutional restrictions. "It cannot be denied," says he, "that
one great object of written constitutions is, to keep the departments of govern-
ment as distinct as possible; and for this purpose to impose restraints designed
to have that effect. And it is equally true that there is no department on which
it is more necessary to impose restraints than upon the legislature. The ten-
dency of things is almost always to augment the power of that department in its
relation to the judiciary. The judiciary is composed of few persons, and those
not such as mix habitually in the pursuits and objects which most engage public
men. They are not, or never should be, political men. They have often un-
pleasant duties to perform, and their conduct is often liable to be canvassed and
censured where their reasons for it are not known or cannot be understood.
The legislature holds the public purse. It fixes the compensation of all other
departments; it applies as well as raises all revenue. It is a numerous body,
and necessarily carries along with it a great force of public opinion. Its mem-
bers are public men, in constant contact with one another and with their constit-
[51]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 47
[CH. IT.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[* 47] * Conclusiveness of Judicial Decisions.
But a question which has arisen and been passed upon in one
case may arise again in another, or it may present itself under
different circumstances for the decision of some other department
or officer of the government. It therefore becomes of the highest
importance to know whether a principle once authoritatively de-
clared is to be regarded as conclusively settled for the guidance,
not only of the court declaring it, but of all courts and all depart-
ments of the government; or whether, on the other hand, the
decision settles the particular controversy only, so that a different
decision may be possible; or, considering the diversity of human
judgments, even probable, whenever in any new controversy other
tribunals may be required to examine and decide upon the same
question.
In some cases and for some purposes the conclusiveness of a
judicial determination is, beyond question, final and absolute. A
decision once made in a particular controversy, by the highest
court empowered to pass upon it, is conclusive upon the parties to
the litigation and their privies, and they are not allowed afterwards
to revive the controversy in a new proceeding for the purpose of
raising the same or any other questions. The matter in dispute
has become res judicata; a thing definitely settled by judicial
uents. It would seem to be plain enough that, without constitutional provisions
which should be fixed and certain, such a department, in case of excitement,
would be able to encroach on the judiciary." "The constitution being the
supreme law, it follows, of course, that every act of the legislature contrary to
that law must be void. But who shall decide this question? Shall the legisla-
ture itself decide it? If so, then the constitution ceases to be a legal, and be-
comes only a moral restraint upon the legislature. If they, and they only, arc to
judge whether their acts be conformable to the constitution, then the constitution
is admonitory or advisory only, not legally binding; because if the construction
of it rests wholly with them, their discretion, in particular cases, may be in
favor of very erroneous and dangerous constructions. Hence the courts of law,
necessarily, when the ease arises, must decide on the validity of particular acts."
"Without this check, no certain limitation could exist on the exercise of legisla-
tive power." See also, as to the dangers of legislative encroachments, De Toc-
queville, Democracy in America, c. 6; Story on Const. 4th ed. § 532 and note.
The legislature, though possessing a larger share of power, no more represents
the sovereignty of the people than either of the other departments; it derives its
authority from the same high source. Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c, Railroad Co., 4
Harr. 402; WhittJngton v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 244.
[52]
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decision; and the judgment of the court imports absolute verity.
Whatever the question involved, — whether the interpretation of a
private contract, the legality of an individual act, or the validity of
a legislative enactment, — the rule of finality is the same. The
controversy has been adjudged, and once finally passed upon is
never to be renewed.1 It must frequently happen, therefore, that
a question of constitutional law will be decided in a private litiga-
tion, and the parties to the controversy, and all others subsequently
acquiring rights under them, in the subject-matter of the suit, will
thereby become absolutely and for ever precluded from renewing
the question in respect to the matter then involved. The rule of
conclusiveness to this extent is one of the most inflexible
principles * of the law; insomuch that even if it were sub- [* 48]
sequently held by the courts that the decision in the par-
ticular case was erroneous, such holding would not authorize the
reopening of the old controversy in order that the final conclusion
might be applied thereto.2
1 Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. 424; Etheridge v. Osborn,
12 Wend. 399; Hayes v. Reese, 34 Barb. 151; Hyatt v. Bates, 35 Barb. 308;
Harris v. Harris, 36 Barb. 88; Young p. Black, 7 Cranch, 567; Chapman v.
Smith, 16 How. 114; Wales v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 276 ; Prentiss v. Holbrook, 2 Mich.
372; Van Kleek v. Eggleston, 7 Mich. 511; Newberry v. Trowbridge, 13 Mich.
278; Crandall v. James, 6 R. L 144; Babcock v. Camp, 12 Ohio, n. s. 11;
Warner v. Scott, 39 Penn. St. 274; Kerr p. Union Bank, 18 Md. 396; Eimer v.
Richards, 25 1ll. 289; Wright v. Leclaire, 3 Iowa, 241; Whittaker v. Johnson
County, 12 Iowa, 595; Peay v. Duncan, 20 Ark. 85; Madox p. Graham, 2 Met.
(Ky.) 56; George p. Gillespie, 1 Greene (Iowa), 421; Clark v. Sammons, 12
Iowa, 368; Taylor p. Chambers, 1 Iowa, 124; Skelding p. Whitney, 3 Wend.
154; Hawkins v. Jones, 19 Ohio, n. s. 22; Slade v. Slade, 58 Me. 157; Geary
p. Simmons, 39 Cal. 224; Cannon v. Brame, 45 Ala. 262; Dwyer v. Goran, 29
Iowa, 126; Verner v. Carson, 66 Penn. St. 440; Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82;
Harris v. Colquit, 44 Geo. 663; Finney v. Boyd, 26 Wis. 366; Ram on Legal
Judgment, p. 14. A judgment, however, is conclusive as an estoppel as to those
&cts without the existence and proof of which it could not have been rendered;
and if it might have been given on any one of several grounds, it is conclusive
between the parties as to neither of them. Lea v. Lea, 97 Mass. 493. And see
Dickinson p. Hayes, 31 Conn. 417; Church v. Chapin, 35 Vt. 223; Packet Co.
V. Sickles, 5 Wall. 580; Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98.
* McLean v. Hugarin, 13 Johns. 184; Morgan v. Plumb, 9 Wend. 287;
Wilder p. Case, 16 Wend. 583; Baker v. Rand, 13 Barb. 152; Kelley v. Pike,
5Cush. 484; Hart v. Jewett, 11 Iowa, 276; Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb.
S81; Newberry p. Trowbridge, 13 Mich. 278; Skildin v. Herrick, 3 Wend. 154;
Brockway v. Kinney, 2 Johns. 210; Platner v. Best, 11 Johns. 530; Phillips v.
Berick, 16 Johns. 136; Page v. Fowler, 37 Cal. 100.
[53]
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\
But if important principles of constitutional law can be thus
disposed of in suits involving only private rights, and when private
individuals and their counsel alone are heard, it becomes of interest
to know how far, if at all, other individuals and the public at large
lare affected by the decision. And here it will be discovered that
quite a different rule prevails, and that a judicial decision has no
such force of absolute conclusiveness as to other parties as it is
allowed to possess between the parties to the litigation in which
the decision has been made, and those who have succeeded to their
rights.
A party is estopped by a judgment against him from disputing
its correctness, so far as the point directly involved in the case
was concerned, whether the reasons upon which it was based were
sound or not, and even if no reasons were given therefor. And if
the parties themselves are estopped, so also should be all those
who, since the decision, claim to have acquired interests in the
subject-matter of the judgment from or under the parties, as per-
sonal representatives, heirs-at-law, donees, or purchasers, and who
are therefore considered in the law as privies. But if strangers who
have no interest in that subject-matter are to be in like manner
concluded, because their controversies are supposed to involve the
same question of law, we shall not only be forced into a series of
endless inquiries, often resulting in little satisfaction, in order to
ascertain whether the question is the same, but we shall also be
met by the query, whether we are not concluding parties by deci-
sions which others have obtained in fictitious controversies and by
collusion, or suffered to pass without sufficient consideration and
discussion, and which might have been given otherwise had other
parties had an opportunity of being heard.
[* 49] * We have already seen that the force of a judgment
does not depend upon the reasons given therefor, or upon
the circumstance that any were or were not given. If there were,
they may have covered portions of the controversy only, or they
may have had such reference to facts peculiar to that case, that in
any other controversy, though somewhat similar in its facts, and
apparently resembling it in its legal bearings, grave doubts might
arise whether it ought to fall within the same general principle.
If one judgment were absolutely to conclude the parties to any
similar controversy, we ought at least to be able to look into the
judicial mind, in order that we might ascertain of a surety that all
[54]
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those facts which should influence the questions of law were sub-
stantially the same in each, and we ought also to be able to see
that the fir§t litigation was conducted in entire good faith, and that
every consideration was presented to the court which could prop-
erly have weight in the construction and application of the law.
All these things, however, are manifestly impossible; and the law
therefore wisely excludes judgments from being used to the preju-
dice of strangers to the controversy, and restricts their conclusive-
ness to the parties thereto and their privies.1 Even parties and
privies are bound only so far as regards the subject-matter then
involved, and would be at liberty to raise the same questions anew
in a distinct controversy affecting some distinct subject-matter.2
All judgments, however, are supposed to apply the existing law
to the facts of the case; and the reasons which are sufficient to
influence the court to a particular conclusion in one case ought to
be sufficient to bring it or any other court to the same conclusion
in all other like cases where no modification of the law has inter-
vened. There would thus be uniform rules for the administra-
tion of justice, and the same measure that is meted out
* to one would be received by all others. And even if the [* 50]
same or any other court, in a subsequent case, should be
in doubt concerning the correctness of the decision which has been
made, there are consequences of a very grave character to be con-
templated and weighed before the experiment of disregarding it
should be ventured upon. That state of things, when judicial de-
cisions conflict, so that a citizen is always at a loss in regard to
his rights and his duties, is a very serious evil; and the alterna-
tive of accepting adjudged cases as precedents in future controver-
sies resting upon analogous facts, and brought within the same
reasons, is obviously preferable. Precedents, therefore, become
1 Burrill v. West, 2 N. H. 190; Davis v. Wood, 1 Wheat. 6; Jackson v.
Yedder, 3 Johns. 8; Case v. Reeve, 14 Johns. 79; Alexander t>. Taylor, 4 Denio,
302; Van Bokkelin v. Ingersoll, 5 Wend. 315; Smith o. Ballantyne, 10 Paige,
101; Orphan House v. Lawrence, 11 Paige, 80; Thomas v. Hubbell, 15 N. Y.
405; Wood v. Stephen, 1 Serg. & R. 175; Peterson v. Lothrop, 34 Penn. St.
223; Twambly v. Henley, 4 Mass. 441; Este v. Strong, 2 Ohio, 401; Cowles v.
Harts, 3 Conn. 516; Floyd v. Mintsey, 5 Rich. 361; Riggins's Ex'rs v. Brown,
12 Geo. 271; Persons ». Jones, to. 371.
* Van Alstiner. Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 28; Taylor v. McCracken, 2 Blackf.
280; Cook v. Vimont, 6 T. B. Monr. 284. See, for a discussion of this doctrine
tnd limitations upon it, Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98.
[55]
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important, and counsel are allowed and expected to call the atten-
tion of the court to them, not as concluding controversies, but as
guides to the judicial mind. Chancellor Kent says: ," A solemn
decision upon a point of law arising in any given case becomes an
authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which
we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges
are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed,
unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misap-
plied in that particular case. If a decision has been made upon
solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in
favor of its correctness, and the community have a right to regard
it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate
their actions and contracts by it. It would therefore be extremely
inconvenient to the public if precedents were not duly regarded,
and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of
such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who
consult them, and people in general can venture to buy and trust,
and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be
lightly disregarded, w$ should disturb and unsettle the great
landmarks of property. When a rule has once been deliberately
adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed unless by a
court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, except for
very urgent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and
if the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a perplex-
ing uncertainty as to the law."1
1 1 Kent, 475. And see Cro. Jac. 527; Goodtitle v. Otway, 7 T. R. 416;
Selby v. Bardons, S B. & Ad. 17 ; Fletcher t>. Lord Somers, 8 Bing. 588 ; Ander-
son v. Jackson, 16 Johns. 402; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 722; Bates r.
Releyea, 23 Wend. 340; Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich. 12; Nelson v. Allen, 1
Terg. 37G ; Palmer v. Lawrence, 5 N. Y. 889; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis.
458 ; Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246; Rex v. Cox, 2 Burr. 787; King v. Younger,
6 T. R. 450 ; Hammond ». Anderson, 4 B. & P. 69; Broom's Maxims, 109. Dr.
Lieber thinks the doctrine of the precedent especially valuable in a free country.
"Liberty and 6teady progression require the principle of the precedent in all
spheres. It is one of the roots with which the tree of liberty fastens in the soil
of real life, and through which it receives the sap of fresh existence. It is the
weapon by which interference is warded off. The principle of the precedent is
eminently philosophical. The English Constitution would not have developed
itself without it. What is called the English Constitution consists of the funda-
mentals of the British polity, laid down in custom, precedent, decisions,^and stat-
utes; and the common law in it is a far greater portion than the statute law.
The English Constitution is chiefly a common-law constitution; and this reflex
[56]
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* 51
* The doctrine of stare decisis, however, is only applica- [* 51]
ble, in its full force, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the courts making * the decisions, since there alone can [* 52]
such decisions be regarded as having established any
rules. Rulings made under a similar legal system elsewhere may
be cited and respected for their reasons, but are not necessarily to
be accepted as guides, except in so far as those reasons commend
themselves to the judicial mind.1 Great Britain and the thirteen
original States had each substantially the same system of common
of a continuous society in a continuous law is more truly philosophical than the
theoretic and systematic, but lifeless constitutions of recent France." Civ. Lib.
and Self-Gov. See also his chapter on precedents in the Hermeneutics. In
Nelson p. Allen, 1 Yerg. 376, where the constitutionality of the " Betterment
Law" came under consideration, the court {White, J.) say: "Whatever might
be my own opinion upon this question, not to assent to its settlement now, after
two solemn decisions of this court, the last made upwards of fourteen years ago,
and not only no opposing decision, but no attempt even by any case, during all
this time, to call the point again in controversy, forming a complete acquiescence,
would be, at the least, inconsistent, perhaps mischievous, and uncalled for by a
correct discharge of official duty. Much respect has always been paid to the
contemporaneous construction of statutes, and a forbidding caution hath always
accompanied any approach towards unsettling it, dictated no doubt by easily
foreseen consequences attending a sudden change of a rule of property, neces-
sarily introductory at least of confusion, increased litigation, and the disturbance
of the peace of society. The most able judges and the greatest names on the
bench have held this view of the subject, and occasionally expressed themselves
to that effect, either tacitly or openly, intimating that if they had held a part in
the first construction they would have been of a different opinion; but the con-
struction having been made, they give their assent thereto. Thus Lord Ellen-
borough, in 2 East, 302, remarks: 'I think it is better to abide by that deter-
mination, than to introduce uncertainty into this branch of the law, it being often
more important to have the rule settled, than to determine what it shall be. I
am not, however, convinced by the reasoning in this case, and if the point were
new I should think otherwise.' Lord Mansfield, in 1 Burp. 419, says: 'Where
solemn determinations acquiesced under had settled precise cases, and a rule of
property, they ought, for the sake of certainty, to be observed, as if they had
originally formed a part of the text of the statute.' And Sir James Mansfield,
in 4 B. & P. 69, says: 'I do not know how to distinguish this from the case
before decided in the court. It is of greater consequence that the law should be
a s uniform as possible, than that the equitable claim of an individual should
be attended to.'" And see People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.
A judgment rendered by a court is authority notwithstanding it was one given
under the law of necessity, in consequence of an equal division of the court.
Begina v. Millis, 13 M. & W. 261; Durante. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107.
1 Caldwell n. Gale, 11 Mich. 77.
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law originally, and a decision now by one of the higher courts of
Great Britain as to what the common law is upon any point is cer-
tainly entitled to great respect in any of the States, though not
necessarily to be accepted as binding authority any more than the
decisions in any one of the other States upon the same point. It
gives us the opinions of able judges as to what the law is, but its
force as an authoritative declaration must be confined to the coun-
try for which the court sits and judges. But an English decision
before the Revolution is in the direct line of authority; and where
a particular statute or clause of the constitution has been adopted
in one State from the statutes or constitution of another, after a
judicial construction had been put upon it in such last-mentioned
State, it is but just to regard the construction to have been
adopted, as well as the words, and all the mischiefs of disregard-
ing precedents would follow as legitimately here as in any other
case.1
It will of course sometimes happen that a court will find a
former decision so unfounded in law, so unreasonable in its deduc-
tions, or so mischievous in its consequences, as to feel compelled
to disregard it. Before doing so, however, it will be well to con-
sider whether the point involved is such as to have become a rule
of property, so that titles have been acquired in reliance upon it,
and vested rights will be disturbed by any change; for in such a
case it may be better that the correction of the error be
[* 53] left to the legislature, which can control its action so * as
to make it prospective only, and thus prevent unjust con-
sequences.2
1 Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 8 Gray, 450; Bond v. Appleton, 8 Mass. 472;
Rutland v. Mendon, 1 Pick. 154; Campbell v. Quinlin, 3 Scam. 288; Little v.
Smith, 4 Scam. 402; Riggs v. Wilton, 13 III. 15; Ingraham v. Regan, 23 Miss.
213; Tyler v. Tyler, 19 111. 151; Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 18; Adams t>.
Field, 21 Vt. 266; Turnpike Co.' v. People, 9 Barb. 167; Drennan v. People,
10 Mich. 169; Myrick v. Hasey,'27 Me. 9; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46;
Attorney-General v. Brunst, 3 Wis. 787; Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 827;
Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23. But it does not necessarily follow that the prior
decision construing the law must be inflexibly followed, since the circumstances
in the State adopting it may be so different as to require a different construction.
Little v. Smith, 4 Scam. 402; Lessee of Gray v. Askew, 3 Ohio, 479.
s "After an erroneous decision touching rights of property has been followed
thirty or forty years, and even a much less time, the courts cannot retrace their
steps without committing a new error nearly as great as the one at the first."
Branson, J., in Sparrow v. Kingman, 1N. Y. 260. See also Emerson v. Atwater,
[58]
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OH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 53
Whenever the case is such that judicial decisions which have
been made are to be accepted as law, and followed by the courts
in future cases, it is equally to be expected that they will be fol-
lowed by other departments of the government also. Indeed in
the great majority of cases the officers of other departments have
no option; for the courts possess the power to enforce their con-
struction of the law as well as to declare it; and a failure to
accept and follow it in one case would only create necessity for
new litigation with similar result. Nevertheless, there are excep-
tions to this rule which embrace all those cases where new action
is asked of another department, which that department is at lib-
erty to grant or refuse for any reasons which it may regard as
sufficient. We cannot conceive that, because the courts have
declared an expiring corporation to have been constitutionally
created, the legislature would be bound to renew its charter, or
the executive to sign an act for that purpose, if doubtful of the
constitutional authority, even though no other adverse reasons ex-
isted.1 In the enactment of laws the legislature must act upon
7 Mich. 12; Loeb v. Mathis, 37 Ind. 806. "It is true that when a principle of
law.doubtful in its character or uncertain in the subject-matter of its application, has
been settled by a series of judicial decisions, and acquiesced in for a considerable
time, and important rights and interests have become established under such
decisions, courts will hesitate long before they will attempt to overturn the result
so long established. But when it is apparently indifferent which of two or more
rales is adopted, the one which shall have been adopted by judicial sanction will
be adhered to, though it may not, at the moment, appear to be the preferable rule.
But when a question involving important public or private rights, extending
through all coming time, has been passed upon on a single occasion, and which
decision can in no just sense be said to have been acquiesced in, it is not only
the right, but the duty of the court, when properly called upon, to re-examine
the questions involved, and again subject them to judicial scrutiny. We are
br no means unmindful of the salutary tendency of the rule stare decisis, but at
the same time we cannot be unmindful of the lessons furnished by our own
consciousness, as well as by judicial history,- of the liability to error and the
advantages of review." Per Smith, J., Pratt v. Brown, 8 Wis. 609. And see
Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 458; Taylor v. French, 19 Vt. 49; Bellows v.
Parsons, 13 N. H. *256; Hannel v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134; Day v. Munson, 14
Ohio, n. s. 488; Green Castle, &c, Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382; Harrow v. Myers,
29 Ind. 469; Mead v. McGraw, 19 Ohio, n. s. 62; Ram on Legal Judgment,
fc'H, S3.
'In the celebrated case of the application of the Bank of the United States
for a new charter, President Jackson felt himself at liberty to act upon his own
Tiew of constitutional power, in opposition to that previously declared by the
[59]
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its own reasons; mixed motives of power, justice, and policy influ-
ence its action; and it is always justifiable and laudable to lean
against a violation of the constitution. Indeed cases must some-
times occur when a court should refrain from declaring a
[* 54] statute * unconstitutional, because not clearly satisfied
that it is so, when if the judges were to act as legislators
upon the question of its enactment, they ought with the same
views to withhold their assent, from grave doubts upon that sub-
ject. The duty is different in the two cases, and presumptions
may control in one which do not exist in the other. But those
cases where new legislation is sought stand by themselves, and are
not precedents for those which involve only considerations concern-
ing the constitutional validity of existing enactments. The general
acceptance of judicial decisions as authoritative, by each and all,
can alone prevent confusion, doubt, and uncertainty, and any other
course is incompatible with a true government of law.
Construction to be Uniform.
A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that
they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that their
practical construction is to be uniform. A constitution is not to
be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some sub-
sequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as
perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A
principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions
would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to
bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion. It is
with special reference to the varying moods of public opinion, and
with a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond
their control, that these instruments are framed; and there can
be no such steady and imperceptible change in their rules as in-
heres in the principles of the common law. Those beneficent
maxims of the common law which guard person and property
have grown and expanded until they mean vastly more to us than
they did to our ancestors, 'aud are more' minute, particular, and
pervading in their protections; and we may confidently look for-
Supreme Court, and President Lincoln expressed similar views regarding the
conclusiveness of the Di ed Scott decision upon executive and legislative action.
See Story on Const. 4th ed. § 375, Dote.
[60]
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ward in the future to still further modifications in the direction of
improvement. Public sentiment and action effect such changes,
and the courts recognize them; but a court or legislature which
should allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in giving
construction to a written constitution not warranted by the inten-
tion of its founders, would be justly chargeable with reckless
disregard of official oath and public duty; and if its course
could become a precedent, these instruments would be of
* little avail. The violence of public passion is quite as [* 55]
likely to be in the direction of oppression as in any other;
and the necessity for bills of rights in our fundamental laws lies
mainly in the danger that the legislature will be influenced by
temporary excitements and passions among the people to adopt
oppressive enactments. What a court is to do, therefore, is to de-
dare the law as written, leaving it to the people themselves to make
such changes as new circumstances may require.1 The meaning
of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not differ-
ent at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass
upon it.2
The Intent to govern.
The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution,
is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. In the
case of all written laws, it is the intent of the lawgiver that is to
be enforced. But this intent is to be found in the instrument
itself. It is to be presumed that language has been employed with
sufficient precision to convey it, and unless examination demon-
strates that the presumption does not hold good in the particular
case, nothing will remain except to enforce it. "Where a law is
plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or
limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what
they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for
construction."3 Possible or eveu probable meanings, wheu one
1 People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 584; Newejl v. People, 7 N. Y. 109; Hyatt
v. Taylor, 42 N. Y. 259.
'Campbell, J., in People p. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 138.
! United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 399; Bosley v. Mattingley, 14 B. Monp.
89; Sturgis p. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 202; Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United
States, 7 Cranch, 60; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, C. C. 84; United States v.
Ragsdale, 1 Hemp. 497; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Penn. St. 446;
[61]
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[* 56] is * plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts
are not at liberty to search for elsewhere.
Ingalls «. Cole, 47 Me. 530; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Furman r.
New York, 5 Sandf. 16; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 83; People v. N. Y. Central
R.R. Co., 24 N. Y. 492; Bidwell v. Whittaker, 1 Mich. 479; Alexander e.
Worthington, 5 Md. 471; Cantwell o. Owens, 14 Md. 215; Case ». Wildridge,
4 Ind. 51; Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 49; Putnam v. Flint, 10 Pick. 504; Heirs
of Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio, 553; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa,
262; Pattison c. Yuba, 13 Cal. 175; Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Kelly, 146; In re
Murphy, 3 Zab. 180; Attorney-General v. Detroit & Erin P. R. Co., Wal. Ch.
394; Smith v. Thursby, 28 Md. 244; State v. Bladsdel, 4 Nev. 241; State e.
Doron, 5 Nev. 399. The remarks of Mr. Justice Bronson in People v. Purdy,
2 Hill, 35, are very forcible in showing the impolicy and danger of looking
beyond the instrument itself to ascertain its meaning, when the terms employed
are positive and free from all ambiguity. "It is said that the Constitution does
not extend to public corporations, and therefore a majority vote was sufficient.
I do not so read the Constitution. The language of the clause is: 'The assent
of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature shall be
requisite to evei-y bill creating, continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic
or corporate.' These words are as broad in their signification as any which
could have been selected for the occasion from our vocabulary, and there is not
a syllable in the whole instrument tending in the slightest degree to limit or
qualify the universality of the language. If the clause can be so construed that
it shall not extend alike to all corporations, whether public or private, it may
then, I think, be set down as an established fact that the English language is too
poor for the framing of fundamental laws which shall limit the powers of the
legislative branch of the government. No one has, I believe, pretended that
the Constitution, looking at that alone, can be restricted to any particular class
or description of corporations. But it is said that we may look beyond the
instrument for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief against which the clause
was directed, and thus restrict its operation. But who shall tell us what that
mischief was? Although most men in public life are old enough to remember
the time when the Constitution was framed and adopted, they are not agreed
concerning the particular evils against which this clause was directed. Some
suppose the clause was intended to guard against legislative corruption, and
others that it was aimed at monopolies. Some are of opinion that it only extends
to private without touching public corporations, while others suppose that it only
restricts the power of the legislature when creating a single corporation, and not
when they are made by the hundred. In this way a solemn instrument— for so
I think the Constitution should be considered — is made to mean one thing by
one man and something else by another, until, in the end, it is in danger of being
rendered a mere dead letter; and that, too, where the language is so plain and
explicit that it is impossible to mean more than one thing, unless we first lose
sight of the instrument itself, and allow ourselves to roam at large in the bound-
less fields of speculation. For one, I dare not venture upon such a course.
Written constitutions of government will soon come to be regarded as of little
[62]
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* " Whether we are considering an agreement between [* 57]
parties, a statute, or a constitution, with a view to its in-
terpretation, the thing which we are to seek is the thought which it
expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in all cases is to the
natural signification of the words employed, in the order of gram-
matical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have
placed them. If thus regarded the words embody a definite mean-
ing, which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between
different parts of the same writing, then that meaning, apparent
on the face of the instrument, is the one which alone we are at
liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a case there
is no room for construction. That which the words declare is the
meaning of the instrument, and neither courts nor legislatures
have a right to add to or take away from that meaning." 1
value if their injunctions may be thus lightly overlooked; and the experiment of
setting a boundary to power will prove a failure. We are not at liberty to pre-
sume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not
understand the force of language." See also same case, 4 Hill, 384, and State
v. King, 44 Mo. 285. Another court has said: "This power of construc-
tion in courts is a mighty one, and, unrestrained by settled rules, would tend to
throw a painful uncertainty over the effect that might be •given to the most plainly
worded statutes, and render courts, in reality, the legislative power of the State.
Instances are not wanting to confirm this. Judge-made law has overrode the
legislative department. It was the boast of Chief Justice Pemberton, one of the
judges of the despot Charles II., and not the worst even of those times, that he
had entirely outdone the Parliament in making law. We think that system of
jurisprudence best and safest which controls most by fixed rules, and leaves least
to the discretion of the judge; a doctrine constituting one of the points of su-
periority in the common law over that system which has been administered in
France, where authorities had no force, and the law of each case was what the
judge of the case saw fit to make it. We admit that the exercise of an unlimited
discretion may, in a particular instance, be attended with a salutary result; still
history informs us that it has often been the case that the arbitrary discretion of
a judge was the law of a tyrant, and warns us that it may be so again." Spencer
p. State, 5 Ind. 76. "Judge-made law," as here employed, is that made by
judicial decisions which construe away the meaning of statutes, or find meanings
in them the legislature never held. The phrase is sometimes used as meaning,
amply, the law that becomes established by precedent. The uses and necessity
of judicial legislation are considered at length by Mp. Austin, in his Province of
Jurisprudence.
1 Newell p. People, 7 N. Y. 97. And see Den v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524; Green-
castle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 569; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. 266; Leonard
c. Wiseman, 31 Md. 204, per Barlol, Ch. J.; McAdoo v. Benbow, 63 N. C.
464; Broom's Maxims (5th Am. ed.), 551, marg.
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\
The whole Instrument to he examined.
Nor is it lightly to be inferred that any portion of a written law
is so ambiguous as to require extrinsic aid in its construction.
Every such instrument is adopted as a whole, and a clause which,
standing by itself, might seem of doubtful import, may yet be
made plain by comparison with other clauses or portions of the
same law. It is therefore a rule of construction, that the whole
is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of
each part; and this Sir Edward Coke regards the most natural
and genuine method of expounding a statute.1 "If any section
[of a law] be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of
discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other
sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or
obvious intent of another."2 And in making this comparison it
is not to be supposed that any words have been employed without
occasion, or without intent that they should have effect as
[* 58] part of * the law. The rule applicable here is, that effect
is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and
to every section and clause. If different portions seem to conflict,
the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather
than one which may make some idle and nugatory.3
This rule is especially applicable to written constitutions, in
which the people will be presumed to have expressed themselves
in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense
importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible
to implication.4 It is scarcely conceivable that a case can arise
where a court would be justifiable in declaring any portion of a
written constitution nugatory because of ambiguity. One part
1 Co. Lit. 381, a.
'Stowell v. Lord Zouch, Plowd. 865; Broom's Maxims, 521.
3 Attorney-General v. Detroit and Erin Plank Road Co., 2 Mich. 138; People
v. Burns, 5 Mich. 114; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262; Manly r.
State, 7 Md. 135; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Belleville Railroad Co. v.
Gregory, 15 111. 20; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, C. C. 584; Ryegate v. Wards-
boro, 30 Vt. 746; Brooks v. Mobile School Commissioners, 31 Ala. 227; Den
v. Dubois, 1 Harrison, 285; Den v. Schenck, 3 Halst. 34; Bigelow v. W. Wis-
consin R.R., 27 Wis. 478.
4 Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 49; People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 36, per Bronson,
J.; Grecncastle Township r. Black, 5 Ind. 570; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650.
[64]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 58
may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it
otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood
by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand
together.1
In interpreting clauses we must presume that words have been
employed in their natural and ordinary meaning. Says Marshall,
Ch. J.: "The framers of the Constitution, and the people who
adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their
natural sense, and to have understood what they meant." 2 This
is but saying that no forced or unnatural construction is to be put
upon their language; and it seems so obvious a truism
that one * expects to see it universally accepted without [* 59]
question; but the attempt is so often made by interested
subtlety and ingenious refinement to induce the courts to force
from these instruments a meaning which their framers never held,
that it frequently becomes necessary to re-declare this fundamen-
tal maxim.3 Narrow and technical reasoning is misplaced when
1 It is a general rule, in the construction of writings, that, a general intent
appearing, it shall control the particular intent; but this rule must sometimes
give way, and effect must be given to a particular intent plainly expressed in one
part of a constitution, though apparently opposed to a general intent deduced
from other parts. Warren v. Sherman, 5 Texas, 441. In Quick v. Whitewater
Township, 7 Ind. 570, it was said that if two provisions of a written constitution
are irreconcilably repugnant, that which is last in order of time and in local posi-
tion is to be preferred.
J Gibbons ». Ogden, 9 Wheat. 188. See Settle r. Van Enrea, 49 N. Y. 281.
3 State v. Mace, 5 Md. 337; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135; Green v. Weller,
32 Miss. 650; Greencastle Township t;. Black, 5 Ind. 570; People r. N. Y. Cen-
tral Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 137, and 24 N. Y. 488; Story on Const. § 453.
"The true sense in which words are used in a statute is to be ascertained gen-
erally by taking them in their ordinary and popular signi6cation, or, if they be
terms of art, in their technical signification. But it is also a cardinal rule of
exposition, that the intention is to be deduced from the whole and every part of
the statute, taken and compared together, from the words of the context, and
such a construction adopted as will best effectuate the intention of the lawgiver.
One part is referred to in order to help the construction of another, and the
intent of the legislature is not to be collected from any particular expression,
bat from a general view of the whole act. Dwarris, 658, 698, 702, 703. And
when it appears that the framers have used a word in a particular sense gener-
ally in the act, it will be presumed that it was intended to be used in the same
sense throughout the act, unless an intention to give it a different signification
plainly appears in the particular part of the act alleged to be an exception to
5 [ 65 ]
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it is brought to bear upon an instrument framed by the people
themselves, for themselves, and designed as a chart upon which
every man, learned and unlearned, may be able to trace the lead-
ing principles of government.
But it must not be forgotten, in construing our constitutions,
that in many particulars they are but the legitimate successors of
the great charters of English liberty, whose provisions declaratory
of the rights of the subject have acquired a well-understood mean-
ing, which the people must be supposed to have had in view in
adopting them. We cannot understand these provisions unless
we understand their history; and when we find them
[* 60] expressed in * technical words, and words of art, we must
suppose these words to be employed in their technical
sense. When the constitution speaks of an ex post facto law, it
means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning
of the phrase having become defined in the history of constitu-
tional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not neces-
sary to employ language of a more popular character to designate
it. The technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly un-
derstood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal
and constitutional history where they havo been employed for the
protection of popular rights.1
the general meaning indicated. Ibid'. 704, et seq. When words are used to which
the legislature has given a plain and definite import in the act, it would be dan-
gerous to put upon them a construction which would amount to holding that the
legislature did not mean what it has expressed. It follows from these principles
that the statute itself furnishes the best means of its own exposition; and if the
sense in which words were intended to be used can be clearly ascertained from
all its parts and provisions, the intention thus indicated shall prevail, without
resorting to other means of aiding in the construction. And these familiar rules
of construction apply with at least as much force to the construction of written
constitutions as to statutes; the former being presumed to be framed with much
greater care and consideration than the latter." Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 678.
1 It is quite possible, however, in applying constitutional maxims, to overlook
entirely the reason upon which they rest, and " considering merely the letter, go
but skin deep into the meaning." On the great debate on the motion for with-
drawing the confidence of Parliament from the ministers, after the surrender of
Cornwallis, — a debate which called out the best abilities of Fox and Pitt as well
as of the ministry, and necessarily led to the discussion of the primary principle
in free government, that taxation and representation, shall go together, — Sir
James Mariott rose, and with great gravity proceeded to say, that if taxation
and representation were to go hand in hand, then Britain had an undoubted
right to tax America, because she was represented in the British Parliament.
[66]
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The Common Law to be kept in View.
In the same connection it may be remarked that the constitu-
tions are to be construed in the light of the common law, and of
the fact that its rules are still left in force. By this we do not
mean that the common law is to control the constitution, or that
the latter is to be warped and perverted in its meaning in order
that no inroads, or as few as possible, may be made in the system
of common-law rules, but only that for its definitions we are- to
draw from that great fountain, and that, in judging what
it means, we * are to keep in mind that it is not the begin- [* 61]
ning of law for the State, but that it assumes the existence
of a well-understood system, which is still to remain in force and
be administered, but under such limitations and restrictions as
that instrument imposes. It is a maxim with the courts that
statutes in derogation of the common law shall be construed
strictly;1 a maxim which we fear is sometimes perverted to the
overthrow of the legislative intent; but the same maxim could
seldom be properly applied to constitutions. When these instru-
ments assume to make any change in the common law, the change
designed is generally a radical one; but as they do not go minutely
into particulars, like the statutes, it will sometimes be easy to
defeat a provision, if courts are at liberty to say that they will
presume against any intention to alter the common law further
than is expressly declared. A reasonable construction is what
such au instrument demands and should receive; and the real
She was represented by the members for the county of Kent, of which the thir-
teen provinces were a part and parcel ; for in their charters they were to hold of
the manor of Greenwich in Kent, of which manor they were by charter to be
parcel! The opinion, it is said, " raised a very loud laugh," but Sir James con-
tinued to support it, and concluded by declaring that he would give the motion
a hearty negative. Thus would he have settled a great principle of constitu-
tional right, for which a seven years' bloody war had been waged, by putting it
In the form of a meaningless legal fiction. Hansard's Debates, Vol. XXII.
■ p. 1184. Lord Mahon, following Lord Campbell, refers the origin of this won-
derful argument to Mr. Hardinge, a Welsh judge, and nephew of Lord Camden.
7 Mahon's Hist. 139. He was said to have been a good lawyer, but must have
read the history of his country to little purpose.
'Broom's Maxims, 33; Sedg. on Stat. & Const. Law, 313. See Harrison v.
Leach, 4 W. Va. 383.
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question is, what the people meant, and not how meaningless their
words can be made by the application of arbitrary rules.1
[* 62] * As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same
word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a
constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be ob-
served in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story
has well observed, " It does not follow, either logically or gram-
matically, that because a word is found in one connection in the
Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same sense is to
be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This
would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of
single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses and
objects, as statesmen and' practical reasouers. And yet nothing
has been more common than to subject the Constitution to this
narrow and mischievous criticism.2 Men of ingenious and subtle
minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having
1 Under a clause of the Constitution of Michigan which provided that *' the
real and personal estate of every female acquired before marriage, and all prop-
erty to which she may afterwards become entitled, by gift, grant, inheritance, or
devise, shall be and remain the estate and property of such female, and shall not
be liable for the debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be
devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried," it was held that a mar-
ried woman could not sell her personal property without the consent of her
husband, inasmuch as the power to do so was not expressly conferred, and the
clause, being in derogation of the common law, was not to be extended by con-
struction. Brown v. Fifield, 4 Mich. 322. The danger of applying arbitrary
rules in the construction of constitutional principles might well, as it seems to us,
be illustrated by this case. For while on the one hand it might be contended
that, as a provision in derogation of the common law, the one quoted should
receive a strict construction, on the other hand it might be insisted with perhaps
equal reason that, as a remedial provision, in furtherance of natural right and
justice, it should be liberally construed, to effect the beneficial purpose bad in
view. Thus arbitrary rules, of directly opposite tendency and force, would be
contending for the mastery in the same case. The subsequent decisions under
the same provision do not appear to have followed this lead. See White v. Zane,
10 Mich. 333; McKee v. Wilcox, 11 Mich. 358; Farr v. Sherman, 11 Mich. 33;
Watson !>. Thurber, 11 Mich. 457; Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Micb. 91; Tong v.
Marvin, 15 Mich. 60; Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447. The common law
is certainly to be kept in view in the interpretation of such a clause, since other-
wise we do not ascertain the evil designed to be remedied, and perhaps are not
able to fully understand and explain the terms employed; but it is to be looked
at with a view to the real intent, rather than for the purpose of arbitrarily
restraining it.
* See remarks of Johnson, J., in Ogden o. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290.
[68]
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CH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OP 8TATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 62
found in the Constitution a word used in some sense, which falls
in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have made that the
standard by which to measure its use in every other part of the
instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed
of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large
for their purposes, and extending it when it seemed too short.
They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and
crippled where they have sought only to adjust its proportions
according to their own opinions." 1 And he gives many instances
where, in the national Constitution, it is very manifest the same
word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule
may be sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but slight,
and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in the
instrument.
Operation to be Prospective.
We shall venture also to express the opinion that a constitution
should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show
a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect. This
is the rule in regard to statutes, and it is " one of such obvious
convenience and justice, that it must always be adhered to in the
construction of statutes, unless there is something on the face of
the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the legislature meant
it to operate retrospectively." 2 Retrospective legislation,
except * when designed to cure formal defects, or other- [* 63]
wise operate remedially, is commonly objectionable in
principle, and apt to result in injustice; and it is a sound rule of
construction which refuses lightly to imply an intent to enact it.
And we are aware of no reasons applicable to ordinary legislation
which do not, upon this point, apply equally well to constitutions.3
1 Story on Const. § 454. And see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 19.
'Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22. See Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477;
Sayre p. Wisner, 8 Wend. 661; State v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422; Hastings v.
Lane, 3 Shep. 134; Brown p. Wilcox, 14 S. & M. 127; Price v. Mott, 52 Penn.
St. 315; Ex parte Graham, 13 Rich. 277; Merwin t> . Ballard, 66 N. C. 398;
Broom's Maxims, 28.
5 In Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio, N. s. 588, a question arose under the provision
of the constitution that " all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform opera-
tion throughout the State." Another clause provided that all laws then in force,
not inconsistent with the constitution, should continue in force until amended or
repealed. Allbyer was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment under a crimes
[69]
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Implications.
The implications from the provisions of a constitution are some-
times exceedingly important, and have large influence upon its
construction. In regard to the Constitution of the United States
the rule has been laid down, that where a general power is con-
ferred.or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one, or the performance of the other, is also con-
ferred.1 The same rule has been applied to the State constitution,
with an important modification, by the Supreme Court of Illinois.
"That other powers than those expressly granted may be, and
often are, conferred by implication, is too well settled to
[* 64] be * doubted. Under every constitution implication must
be resorted to, in order to carry out the general grants of
power. A constitution cannot from its very nature enter into a
minute specification of all the minor powers naturally and obvi-
ously included in and flowing from the great and ■ important ones
which are expressly granted. It is therefore established as a gen-
eral rule, that when a constitution gives a general power, or enjoins
a duty, it also gives, by implication, every particular power neces-
sary for the exercise of the one or the enjoyment of the other.
The implication under this rule, however, must be a necessary,
act previously in force, applicable to Hamilton County only, and the question
was, whether that act was not inconsistent with the provision above quoted, and
therefore repealed by it. The court held that the provision quoted evidently had
regard to future and not to past legislation, and therefore was not repealed. A
similar decision was made in State v. Barbee, 3 Ind. 258. See also State v.
Thompson, 2 Kansas, 432; Slack v. Maysville, &c, R.R. Co., 13 B. Monr. 1;
State v. Macon County Court, 41 Mo. 453. In Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.'s
Bank, 21 N. Y. 12, Denio,J., says: "The rule laid down in Dash v. Van Kleek,
7 Johns. 477, and other cases of that class, by which the courts are admonished
to avoid, if possible, such an interpretation as would give a statute a retrospec-
tive operation, has but a limited application, if any, to the construction of a con-
stitution. When, therefore, we read in the provision under consideration, that
the stockholders of every banking corporation shall be subject to a certain lia-
bility, we are to attribute to the language its natural meaning, without inquiring
whether private interests may not be prejudiced by such a sweeping mandate."
The remark was obiter, as it was found that enough appeared in the constitution
to show clearly that it was intended to apply to existing, as well as to subse-
quently created banking institutions.
1 Story on Const. § 430. See also United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358;
McCulloeh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 428.
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not a conjectural or argumentative one. And it is further modified
by another rule, that where the means for the exercise of a granted
power are given, no other or different means can be implied, as
being more effective or convenient." 1 The rule applies to the
exercise of power by all departments and all officers, and will be
touched upon incidentally hereafter.
Akin to this is the rule that " where a power is granted in gen-
eral terms, the power is to be construed as coextensive with the
terms, unless some clear restriction upon it is deducible [ex-
pressly or by implication] from the context."2 This rule has
been so frequently applied in restraining the legislature from
encroaching upon the grant of power to the judiciary, that we
shall content ourselves in this place with a reference to the cases
collected upon this subject and given in another chapter.
Another rule of construction is, that when the constitution
defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised
or a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition
against legislative interference, to add to the condition, or to ex-
tend the penalty to other cases. On this ground it has been held
by the Supreme Court of Maryland, that where the constitution
defined the qualifications of an officer, it was not in the power of
the legislature to change or superadd to them, unless the power to
do so was expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the
constitution itself.3
* The Light which the Purpose to be accomplished may [* 65]
afford in Construction.
The considerations thus far suggested are such as have no regard
to extrinsic circumstances, but are those by the aid of which we
seek to arrive at the meaning of the constitution from an exami-
1 Field i». People, 2 Scam. 83. See Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298.
■ Story on Const. §§ 424-426.
'Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189. To the same effect see Matter of Dorsey,
7 Port. 293. So the legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of
voters. Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; St. Joseph, &c, R.R. Co. v. Buchanan
County Court, 39 Mo. 485; State v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308; Monroe v. Collins,
17 Ohio, N. 8. 665; State v. Symonds, 57 Me. 148; State v. Staten, 6 Cold.
243; Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369; McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Penn. St. 109;
Quin v. State, 35 Md. 485; Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64; Randolph v. Good,
3 W. Va. 551.
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* 65 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IV.
nation of the words employed. It is possible, however, that after
we shall have made use of all the lights which the instrument itself
affords, there may still be doubts to clear up and ambiguities to
explain. Then, and only then, are we warranted in seeking else-
where for aid. We are' not to import difficulties into a constitu-
tion, by a consideration of extrinsic facts, when none appear upon
its face. If, however, a difficulty really exists, which an examina-
tion of every part of the instrument does not enable us to remove,
there are certain extrinsic aids which may be resorted to, and
which are more or less satisfactory in the light they afford.
Among these aids is a contemplation of the object to be accom-
plished or the mischief designed to be remedied or guarded against
by the clause in which the ambiguity is met with.1 "When we
once know the reason which alone determined the will of the law-
makers, we ought to interpret and apply the words used in a
manner suitable and consonant to that reason, and as will be best
calculated to effectuate the intent. Great caution should always
be observed in the application of this rule to particular given cases;
that is, we ought always to be certain that we do know, and have
actually ascertained, the true and only reason which induced the
act. It is never allowable to indulge in vague and uncertain con-
jecture, or in supposed reasons and views of the framers of an act,
where there are none known with any degree of certainty." 2 The
prior state of the law will sometimes furnish the clue to the real
meaning of the ambiguous provision,8 and it is especially impor-
tant to look into it if the constitution is the successor to another,
and in the particular in question essential changes have apparently
been made.4
[* 66] * Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention.
When the inquiry is directed to ascertaining the mischief de-
signed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished
1 Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471; District Township v. Dubuque, 7
Iowa, 262. See Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330.
a Smith on Stat, and Const. Construction, 634. See also remarks of Bronson,
J., in Purdy v. People, 2 Hill, 35-37. •
3 Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Henry v. Tilson, 19 Vt. 447; Hamilton v.
St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 30; People v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83; Story on
Const. § 428.
4 People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 147.
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by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the pro-
ceedings of the convention which framed the instrument.1 Where
the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the
aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is
one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this
source much reliable assistance in interpretation. Every member
of such a convention acts upon such motives and reasons as
influence him personally, and the motions and debates do not
necessarily indicate the purpose of a majority of a convention in
adopting a particular clause. It is quite possible for a clause to
appear so clear and unambiguous to the members of a convention
as to require neither discussion nor illustration; and the few
remarks made concerning it in the convention might have a plain
tendency to lead directly away from the meaning in the minds of
the majority. It is equally possible for a part of the members to
accept a clause in one sense and a part in another. And even if
we were certain we had attained to the meaning of the convention,
it is by no means to be allowed a controlling force, especially if that
meaning appears not to be the one which the words would most
naturally and obviously convey.2 For as the constitution does
not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from
the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the
people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any
dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that
they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common
understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that
was the sense designed to be conveyed.3 These proceedings there-
fore are less conclusive of the proper construction of the instru-
ment than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction
of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the
* legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeav- [* 67]
oring to arrive at the intent of the people through the dis-
cussions and deliberations of their representatives. The history
1 Per Walworth, Chancellor, Coutant v. People, 11 Wend. 518, and Clark v.
People, 26 Wend. 602; per Bronson, J., Purdy v. People, 2 Hill, 87; People
cN.Y. Central Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 496. See State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio,
». s. 563.
1 Taylor c. Taylor, 10 Minn. 126. And see Eakin ». Racob, 12 S. & R. 352;
Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 1; State v. Doron, 5 Nev. 399.
3 State r. Mace, 5 Md. 348; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 147.
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of the calling of the convention, the causes which led to it, and the
discussions and issues before the people at the time of the election
of the delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satis-
factory as any thing to be gathered from the proceedings of the
convention.
Contemporaneous and Practical Construction.
An important question which now suggests itself is this: How
far the contemporaneous construction, or the subsequent practical
construction of any particular provision of the constitution, is to
have weight with the courts when the time arrives at which a
judicial decision becomes necessary. Contemporaneous construc-
tion may consist simply in the understanding with which the
people received it at the time, or in the acts done in putting it in
operation, and which necessarily assume that it is to be construed
in a particular way. In the first case it can have very little force,
because the evidences of the public understanding, when nothing
has been done under the provision in question, must always
necessarily be vague and indecisive. But where there has been a
practical construction, which has been acquiesced in for a consid-
erable period, considerations in favor of adhering to this construc-
tion sometimes present themselves to the courts with a plausibility
and force which it is not easy to resist. Indeed, where a particular
construction has been generally accepted as correct, and especially
when this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of
the constitution, and by those who had opportunity to understand
the intention of the instrument, it is not to be denied that a strong
presumption exists that the construction rightly interprets the
intention. Especially where this has been given by officers in
the discharge of their duty, and rights have accrued in reliance
upon it, which would be divested by a decision that the construc-
tion was erroneous, the argument ab inconvenienti is sometimes
allowed to have very great weight.
The Supreme Court of the United States has had frequent
occasion to consider this question. In Stewart v. Laird,1 decided
in 1803, that court sustained the authority of its members to sit
as circuit judges on the ground of a practical construction,
[* 68] * commencing with the organization of the government.
1 Cranch, 299.
[74]
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CH. IT.] CONSTRUCTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 68
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,1 Justice Story, after holding
that the appellate power of the United States extends to cases
pending in the State courts, and that the 25th section of the
Judiciary Act, which authorized its exercise, was supported by
the letter and spirit of the Constitution, proceeds to say: "Strong
as this conclusion stands upon the general language of the Con-
stitution, it may still derive support from other sources. It is an
historical fact, that this exposition of the Constitution, extending
its appellate power to State courts, was, previous to its adoption,
uniformly and publicly avowed by its friends, and admitted by its
enemies, as the basis of their respective reasonings both in and
out of the State conventions. It is an historical fact, that at the
time when the Judiciary Act was submitted to the deliberations of
the First Congress, composed, as it was, not only of men of great
learning and ability, but of men who had acted a principal part in
framing, supporting, or opposing that Constitution, the same ex-
position was explicitly declared and admitted by the friends and
by the opponents of that system. It is an historical fact, that the
Supreme Court of the United States have from time to time sus-
tained this appellate jurisdiction in a great variety of cases, brought
from the tribunals of many of the most important States in the
Union, and that no State tribunal has ever breathed a judicial
doubt on the subject, or declined to obey the mandate of the
Supreme Court until the present occasion. This weight of con-
temporaneous exposition by all parties, this acquiescence by en-
lightened State courts, and these judicial decisions by the Supreme
Court through so long a period, do, as we think, place the doctrine
upon a foundation of authority which cannot be shaken without
delivering over the subject to perpetual and irremediable doubts."
The same doctrine was subsequently supported by Chief Justice
Marshall in a case involving the same point, and in which he says
that " great weight has always been attached, and very rightly
attached, to contemporaneous exposition." 2
In Bank of United States v. Halstead 3 the question was made,
whether the laws of the United States authorizing the courts
of the Union so to alter the form of process of execution used
in the Supreme Courts of the States in September, 1789, as to
1 1 Wheat. 351. See Story on Const. § 405-408.
* Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 418.
8 10 Wheat. 63.
[75]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 68 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IV.
[*69] subject to * execution lands and other property not thus
subject by the State laws in force at that time, were con-
stitutional; and Mr. Justice Thompson, in language similar to that
of Chief Justice Marshall in the preceding case, says: "If any
doubt existed whether the act of 1792 vests such power in the
courts, or with respect to its constitutionality, the practical con-
struction given to it ought to have great weight in determining
both questions." And Mr. Justice Johnson assigns a reason for
this in a subsequent case: "Every candid mind will admit that
this is a very different thing from contending that the frequent
repetition of wrong will create a right. It proceeds upon the pre-
sumption tbat the contemporaries of the Constitution have claims
to our deference on the question of right, because they had the
best opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding
of the framers of the Constitution, and of the sense put upon it by
the people when it was adopted by them."1
Great deference has been paid in all cases to the action of the
executive department, where its officers have been called upon,
under the responsibilities of their official oaths, to inaugurate a
new system, and where it is to be presumed, they have carefully
and conscientiously weighed all considerations, and endeavored
to keep within the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. If
the question involved is really one of doubt, the force of their
judgment, especially in view of the injurious consequences that
may result from disregarding it, is fairly entitled to turn the scale
in the judicial mind.2
Wbere, however, no ambiguity or doubt appears in the law, wo
think the same rule obtains here as in other cases, that the court
should confine its attention to the law, and not allow extrinsic
1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290. See Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 499;
State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15.
3 Union Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. 66; Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 12
Wheat. 210; Hughes v. Hughes, 4 T. B. Monr. 42; Chambers v. Fisk, 22 Texas,
604; Britton v. Ferry, 14 Mich. 66; Plummer v. Plummer, 37 Miss. 185; Bur-
gess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; State v. Mayhew, to. 487; Coutant v. People, 11 Wend.
511; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Smith,
8 S. & R. 63; Norris v. Clymer, 2 Penn. St. 277; Moers v. City of Reading.
21 Penn. St. 188; Washington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388; Surgett v. Lapice, 8 How.
68; Bissell v. Penrose, ib. 336; Troup v. Haight, Hopk. 267; United States v.
Gilmore, 8 Wall..330; Hedgecock v. Davis, 64 N. C. 652; Lafayette, &c. R.R.
Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 203.
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CH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OP 8TATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 69
circumstances to introduce a difficulty where the language is plain.
To allow force to a practical construction in such a case would be
to suffer manifest perversions to defeat the evident pur-
pose of the * law-makers. "Contemporary construction [* 70]
. . . can never abrogate the text; it can never fritter
away its obvious sense; it can never narrow down its true limita-
tions; it can never enlarge its natural boundaries."1 While we
conceive this to be the true and only safe rule, we shall be obliged
to confess that some of the cases appear, on first reading, not to
have observed these limitations. In the case first cited of Stewart
v. Laird,2 the practical construction was regarded as conclusive.
To the objection that the judges of the Supreme Court had no
right to sit as circuit judges, the court say: "It is sufficient to
observe that practice and acquiescence under it for a period of
several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial
system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the
construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most
forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obsti-
nate to be shaken or controlled- Of course the question is at rest,
and ought not now to be disturbed." This is certainly very strong
language; but that of a very similar character was used by the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in one case where large and val-
uable estates depended upon a particular construction of a statute,
and very great mischief would follow from changing it. The court
said that, " although if it were now res integra, it might be very
difficult to maintain such a construction, yet at this day the argu-
ment ah inconvenienti applies with great weight. We cannot shake
a principle which in practice has so long and so extensively pre-
vailed. If the practice originated in error, yet the error is now so
common that it must have the force of law. The legal ground on
which this provision is now supported is, that long and continued
usage furnishes a contemporaneous construction which must pre-
vail over the mere technical import of the words." 3 Language
nearly as strong was also used by the Supreme Court of Maryland,
where the point involved was the possession of a certain power by
1 Story on Const. § 407. And see Evans v. Myers, 25 Penn. St. 116;
Sadler v. Langbam, 34 Ala. 311; Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass.
417.
'1 Cranch, 299.
J Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 478.
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* 70 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IV.
\
the legislature, which it had constantly exercised for nearly seventy
years.1
It is believed, however, that in each of these cases an examia<-
tion of the Constitution left in the minds of the judges
[* 71] sufficient * doubt upon the question of its violation to
warrant their looking elsewhere for aids in interpretation,
and that the cases are not in conflict with the general rule as
above laid down. Acquiescence for no length of time can legalize
a clear usurpation of power, where the people have plainly ex-
pressed their will in the constitution, and appointed judicial tri-
bunals to enforce it. A power is frequently yielded to merely
because it is claimed, and it may be exercised for a long period,
in violation of the constitutional prohibition, without the mischief
which the Constitution was designed to guard against appearing,
or without any one being sufficiently interested in the subject to
raise the question; but these circumstances cannot be allowed to
sanction a clear infraction of the Constitution.-2 We think we
allow to contemporary and practical construction its full legitimate
force when we suffer it, where it is clear and uniform, to solve in
its own favor the doubts which arise on reading the instrument to
be construed.3
1 State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487. In Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills, 14 Allen, 389,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts expressed the opinion that the constitu-
tionality of the acts of Congress making treasury notes a legal tender, ought not
to be treated by a State court as open to discussion after the notes had practi-
cally constituted the currency of the country for five years. At a still later day,
however, the Supreme Court of the United States held these acts void, though
they afterwards receded from this position.
* See further, on this subject, the case of Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311,
834; People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 384.
8 There are cases which clearly go further than any we have quoted, and
which sustain legislative action which they hold to be usurpation, on the sole
ground of long acquiescence. Thus in Brighani v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 446, the
question was, Has the legislature power to grant divorces? The court say:
"Our legislature have assumed and exercised this power for a period of more
than forty years, although a clear and palpable assumption of power, ami an
encroachment upon the judicial department, in violation of the Constitution. To
deny this long-exercised power, and declare all the consequences resulting from
it void, is pregnant with fearful consequences. If it affected only the rights of
property, we should not hesitate; but second marriages have been contracted
and children born, and it would bastardize all these, although born under the
sanction of an apparent wedlock, authorized by an act of the legislature before
they were born, and in consequence of which the relation was formed which gave
[78]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CONSTRUCTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 72
1
* Unjust Provisions. [* 72]
We have elsewhere expressed the opinion that a statute cannot
be declared void because opposed to a supposed general
intent or * spirit which it is thought pervades or lies con- [* 73]
cealed in the Constitution, but wholly unexpressed, or be-
thera birth. On account of these children, and for them only, we hesitate.
And in view of this, we are constrained to content ourselves with simply declar-
ing that the exercise of the power of granting divorces, on the part of the legis-
lature, is unwarranted and unconstitutional, an encroachment upon the duties of
the judiciary, and a striking down of the dearest rights of individuals, without
authority of law. We trust we have said enough to vindicate the Constitution,
and feel confident that no department of state has any disposition to violate it,
and that the evil will cease." So in Johnson v. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co.,
23 111. 207, the question was whether railroad corporations could be created by
special law, without a special declaration by way of preamble that the object to
be accomplished could not be attained by general law. The court say: "It is
now too late to make this objection, since by the action of the General Assembly
under this clause, special acts have been so long the order of the day and the
ruling passion with every legislature which has convened under the Constitution,
until their acts of this description fill a huge and misshapen volume, and impor-
tant and valuable rights are claimed under them. The clause has been wholly
disregarded, and it would now produce far-spread ruin'to declare such acts un-
constitutional and void. It is now safer and more just to all parties, to declare
that it must be understood, that in the opinion of the General Assembly, at the
time of passing the special act, its object could not be attained under the general
law, and this without any recital by way of preamble, as in the act to incorpo-
rate the Central Railroad Company. That preamble was placed there by the
writer of this opinion, and a strict compliance with this clause of the Constitu-
tion would have rendered it necessary in every subsequent act. But the legisla-
ture, in their wisdom, have thought differently, and have acted differently, until
now our special legislation and its mischiefs are beyond recovery or remedy."
These cases certainly presented very strong motives for declaring the law to be
what it was not; but it would have been interesting and useful if either of these
learned courts had enumerated the evils that must be placed in the opposite scale
when the question is whether a constitutional rule shall be disregarded; not the
least of which is, the encouragement of a disposition on the part of legislative
bodies to set aside constitutional restrictions, in the belief that, if the unconsti-
tutional law can once be put in force, and large interests enlisted under it, the
courts will not venture to declare it void, but will submit to the usurpation, no
matter how gross and daring. We agree with the Supreme Court of Indiana,
that in construing constitutions, courts have nothing to do with the argument ab
inrontenienti, and should not " bend the Constitution to suit the law of the hour."
Greencastle Township 8. Black, 5 Ind. 565; and with Branson, Ch. J., in what
says in Oakley v. Aspinwall, 8 N. Y. 568: "It is highly probable that incon-
veniences will result from following the Constitution as it is written. But that
[79]
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* 73 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IV.
cause, in the opinion of the court, it violates fundamental rights
or principles, if it was passed in the exercise of a power which the
Constitution confers. Still less will the injustice of a constitu-
tional provision authorize the courts to disregard it, or indirectly
to annul it by construing it away. It is quite possible that the
people may, under the influence of temporary prejudice, or mis-
taken view of public policy, incorporate provisions in their charter
of government, infringing upon the right of the individual man, or
upon principles which ought to be regarded as sacred and funda-
mental in republican government; and quite possible also that
obnoxious classes may be unjustly disfranchised. The remedy for
such injustice must rest with the people themselves, through an
amendment of" their work when better counsels prevail. Such pro-
visions, when free from doubt, must receive the same construction
as any other. We do not say, however, that if a clause should be
found in a constitution which should appear at first blush to de-
consideration can have no force with me. It is not for us, but for those who
made the instrument, to supply its defects. If the legislature or the courts may
take that office upon themselves, or if, under color of construction, or upon any
other specious ground, they may depart from that which is plainly declared, the
people may well despair of ever being able to set any boundary to the powers of
the government. Written constitutions will be more than useless. Believing as
I do that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to the
fundamental law, I have never yielded to considerations of expediency in ex-
pounding it. There is always some plausible reason for latitudinarian construc-
tions which are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring power; some evil to be
avoided or some good to be attained by pushing the powers of the government
beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to such influences that con-
stitutions are gradually undermined and finally overthrown. My rule has ever
been to follow the fundamental law as it is written, regardless of consequences.
If the law does not work well, the people can amend it; and inconveniences can
be borne long enough to await that process. But if the legislature or the courts
undertake to cure defects by forced and unnatural constructions, they inflict a
wound upon the Constitution which nothing can heal. One step taken by the
legislature or the judiciary, in enlarging the powers of the government, opens
the door for another which will be sure to follow; and so the process goes on
until all respect for the fundamental law is lost, and the powers of the govern-
ment are just what those in authority please to call them." Whether there may
not be circumstances under which the State can be held justly estopped from
alleging the invalidity of its own action in apportioning the political divisions of the
State, and imposing burdens on citizens, where such action has been acquiesced
in for a considerable period, and rights have been acquired through bearing the
burdens under it, see Ramsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41; People t>. Maynard, 15
Mich. 470; Kneeland t>. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454.
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CH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
* 73
mand a construction leading to monstrous and absurd conse-
quences, it might not be the duty of the court to question and
cross-question such clause closely, with a view to discover in it, if
possible, some other meaning more consistent with the general
purposes and aims of these instruments. When such a case arises,
it will be time to consider it.1
Duty in Case of Doubt.
But when all the legitimate lights for ascertaining the mean-
ing of the Constitution have been made use of, it may still happen
that the construction remains a matter of doubt. In such a case
it seems clear that every one called upon to act where, in
his * opinion, the proposed action would be of doubtful [* 74]
constitutionality, is bound upon the doubt alone to abstain
from acting. Whoever derives power from the Constitution to
perform any public function is disloyal to that instrument, and
grossly derelict in duty, if he does that which he is not reasonably
satisfied the Constitution permits. Whether the power be legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial, there is manifest disregard of constitu-
tional and moral obligation by one who, having taken an oath to
observe that instrument, takes part in an action which he cannot
say he believes to be no violation of its provisions. A doubt of the
constitutionality of any proposed legislative enactment should in
any caso be reason sufficient for refusing to adopt it; and, if legis-
lators do not act upon this principle, the reasons upon which are
based the judicial decisions sustaining legislation in very many
cases will cease to be of force.
Directory and Mandatory Provisions.
The important question sometimes presents itself, whether we
are authorized in any case, when the meaning of a clause of the
Constitution is arrived at, to give it such practical construction as
will leave it optional with the department or officer to which it
is addressed to obey it or not as he shall see fit. In respect to
statutes it has long been settled that particular provisions may be
regarded as directory merely; by which is meant that they are to
be considered as giving directions which ought to be followed, but
1 McMullen v. Hodge, 5 Texas, 34. See Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111.
6 [81]
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74 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IV.
not as so limiting the power in respect to which the directions
are given that it cannot be effectually exercised without observing
them. The force of many of the decisions on this subject will be
readily assented to by all; while others are sometimes thought to
go to the extent of nullifying the intent of the legislature in essen-
tial particulars. It is not Our purpose to examine the several cases
critically, or to attempt — what we deem impossible — to reconcile
them all; but we shall content ourselves with quoting from a few,
with a view, if practicable, to ascertaining some line of principle
upon which they can be classified.
There are cases where, whether a statute was to be regarded as
merely directory or not, was made to depend upon the employing
or failing to employ negative words which imported that the act
should be done in a particular manner or time, and not
[* 75] * otherwise.1 The use of such words is often very con-
clusive of an intent to impose a limitation; but their
absence is by no means equally conclusive that the statute was
not designed to be mandatory.2 Lord Mansfield would have the
question whether mandatory or not depend upon whether that
which was directed to be done was or was not of the essence of the
thing required.3 The Supreme Court of New York, in an opinion
afterwards approved by the Court of Appeals, laid down the rule
as one settled by authority, that "statutes directing the mode of
proceeding by public officers are directory, and are not regarded as
essential to the validity of the proceedings themselves, unless it be
so declared iu the statute." * This rule strikes us as very general,
and as likely to include within its scope, in many cases, things
which are of the very essence of the proceeding. The questions
in that case were questions of irregularity under election laws, not
in any way hindering the complete expression of the will of the
electors; and the court was doubtless right in holding that the
election was not to be avoided for a failure in the officers appointed
for its conduct to comply in all respects with the directions of
the statute tfiere in question. The same court in another case
say: "Statutory requisitions are deemed directory only when they
1 Slayton v. Hillings, 7 Ind. 144; King v. Inhabitants of St. Gregory, 2 Ad.
& El. 99; King v. Inhabitants of Hipswell, 8 B. & C. 466.
* District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 284.
3 Rex v. Locksdale, 1 Bun-. 447.
4 People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 290; s. c. 8 N. Y. 6 .
[82]
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CH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 75
relate to some immaterial matter, where a compliance is a matter
of convenience rather than of substance." 1 The Supreme Court
of Michigan, in a case involving the validity of proceedings on the
sale of lands for taxes, laid down the rule that "what the law
requires to be done for the protection of the tax-payer is mandatory,
and cannot be regarded as directory merely."2 A similar rule was
recognized in a recent case in Illinois. Commissioners had been
appointed to ascertain and assess the damage and recompense due
to the owners of land which might be taken, on the real estate of
the persons benefited by a certain local improvement, in proportion
as nearly as might be to the benefits resulting to each. By the
statute, when the assessment was completed, the com-
missioners were to sign and return the same to the * city [* 76]
council within forty days of their appointment. This
provision was not complied with, but return was made afterwards,
and the question was raised as to its validity when thus made. In
the opinion of the court, this question was to be decided by
ascertaining whether any advantage would be lost, or right
destroyed, or benefit sacrificed, either to the public or to any
individual, by holding the provision directory. . After remarking
that they had held an assessment under the general revenue law,
returned after the time appointed by law, as void, because the
person assessed would lose the benefit of an appeal from the
assessment,8 they say of the statute before the court: "There are
no negative words used declaring that the functions of the com-
missioners shall cease after the expiration of the forty days, or
that they shall not make their return after that time; nor have
we been able to discover the least right, benefit, or advantage which
the property owner could derive from having the return made
within that time, and not after. No time is limited and made
dependent on that time, within which the owner of the property
may apply to have the assessment reviewed or corrected. The
1 People v. Schermerhorn, 19 Barb. 558. If a statute imposes a duty and
gives the means of performing that duty, it must be held to be mandatory.
Veazie r. China, 50 Me. 518.
'Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich. 154. See also Shawnee County v. Carter, 2 Kan-
sas, 115. In Life Association v. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo. 512, it is held that
a constitutional provision that "all property subject to taxation ought to be
taxed in proportion to its value" is a prohibition against its being taxed in any
other mode, and the word ought is mandatory.
* Marsh r. Chestnut, 14 111. 223.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[CH. IT.
next section requires the clerk to give ten days' notice that the
assessment has been returned, specifying the day when objections
may be made to the assessment before the common council by
parties interested, which hearing may be adjourned from day to
day; and the common council is empowered in its discretion
to confirm or annul the assessment altogether, or to refer it back to
the same commissioners, or to others to be by them appointed. As
the property owner has the same time and opportunity to prepare
himself to object to the assessment and have it corrected, whether
the return be made before or after the expiration of the forty days,
the case differs from that of Chestnut v. Marsh,1 at the very point
on which that case turned. Nor is there any other portion of the
chapter which we have discovered, bringing it within the principle
of that case, which is the well-recognized rule in all the books." 2
The rule is nowhere more clearly stated than by Chief J ustice
Shaw, in Torrey v. Milbury,3 which was also a tax case.
[* 77] "In * considering the various statutes regulating the as-
sessment of taxes, and the measures preliminary thereto,
it is not always easy to distinguish which are conditions precedent
to the legality and validity of the tax, and which are directory
merely, and do not constitute conditions. One rule is very plain
and well settled, that all those measures that are intended for the
security of the citizen, for insuring equality of taxation, and to
enable every one to know with reasonable certainty for what polls
and for what real estate he is taxed, and for what all those who are
[ 1 14 111. 223.
"* Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 111. 108.
3 21 PicV. 67. We commend in the same connection the views of Lewis, Ch.
J., in Corbett v. Bradley, 7 Nev. 108: "When any requirement of a statute is
held to be directory, and therefore not material to be followed, it is upon the
assumption that the legislature itself so considered it, and did not make the right
conferred dependent upon a compliance with the form prescribed for securing it. It
is upon this principle that the courts often hold the time designated in a statute,
where a thing is to be done, to be directory. No court certainly has the right to
hold any requirement of a law unnecessary to be complied with, unless it be mani-
fest the legislature did not intend to impose the consequence which would naturally
follow from a non-compliance, or which would result from holding the requirement
mandatory or indispensable. If it be clear that no penalty was intended to be
imposed for a non-compliance, then, as a matter of course, it is but carrying out
the will of the legislature to declare the statute in that respect to be simply
directory. But, if there be any thing to indicate the contrary, a full compliance
with it must be enforced."
[84]
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CH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 77
liable with him are taxed, are conditions precedent; and if they
are not observed, he is not legally taxed; and he may resist it in
any of the modes authorized by law for contesting the validity of
the tax. But many regulations are made by statutes designed for
the information of assessors and officers, and intended to promote
method, system, and uniformity in the modes of proceeding, a com-
pliance or non-compliance with which does in no respect affect the
rights of tax-paying citizens. These may be considered directory.
Officers may be liable to legal animadversion, perhaps to punish-
ment, for not observing them; but yet their observance is not a
condition precedent to the validity of the tax."
We shall quote further only from a single other case upon this
point. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in considering the va-
lidity of a statute not published within the time required by law,
"understand the doctrine concerning directory statutes to be this:
that where there is no substantial reason why the thing to be done
might not as well be done after the time prescribed as before, no
presumption that by allowing it to be so done it may work an
injury or wrong, nothing in the act itself, or in other acts relating
to the same subject-matter, indicating that the legislature did not
intend that it should rather be done after the time prescribed than
not to be done at all, there the courts assume that the intent was,
that if not done within the time prescribed it might be done after-
wards. But when any of these reasons intervene, then the limit
is established." 1
These cases perhaps sufficiently indicate the rules, so far as any
of general application can be declared, which are to be made use of
in determining whether the provisions of a statute are mandatory
or directory. Those directions which are not of the essence of the
thing to be done, but which are given with a view merely
*to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of the busi- [* 78]
ness, and by a failure to obey which the rights of those
interested will not be prejudiced, are not commonly to be regarded
as mandatory; and if the act is performed, but not in the time or
in the precise mode indicated, it may still be sufficient, if that
'State v. Lean, 9 Wis. 292. See further, for the views of this court on the
subject here discussed, Wendel v. Durbin, 26 Wis. 390. The general doctrine
of the cases above quoted is approved and followed in French v. Edwards, 13
WalL506.
[85]
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T
which is done accomplishes the substantial purpose of the statute.1
But this rule presupposes that no negative words are employed in
the statute which expressly or by necessary implication forbid the
doing of the act at any other time or in any other manner than as
directed. Even-as thus laid down and restricted, the doctrine is
one to be applied with much circumspection; for it is not to be
denied that the courts have sometimes, in their anxiety to sustain
the proceedings of careless or incompetent officers, gone very far
in substituting a judicial view of wbat was essential for that
declared by the legislature.2
But the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they
venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and manda-
tory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. Constitutions do
not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, ex-
cept when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to
be done; and they must then be regarded in the light of limita-
tions upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an
instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish
those fundamental maxims, and fix those unvarying rules,
[* 79] by which all * departments of the government must at all
times shape their conduct; and if it descends to prescribing
1 The following, in addition to those cited, are some of the cases in this coun-
try in which statutes have been declared directory only: Pond v. Negus, 3 Mays.
230; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick. 75; City of Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met.
180; Holland u. Osgood, 8 Vt. 280; Corliss v. Corliss, to. 390; People v. Allen,
6 Wend. 486; Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill, 646; Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill,
43; People v. Holley, 12 Wend. 481 ; Jackson v. Young, 5 Cow. 269; Striker
v. Kelley, 7 Hill, 9; People v. Peck, 11 Wend. 604; Matter of Mohawk and
Hudson Railroad Co., 19 Wend. 143; People v. Runkel, 9 Johns. 147; Gale c.
Mead, 2 Denio, 160; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio,252; Elmendorf v. Mayor, &c,
of New York, 25 Wend. 696; Thames Manufacturing Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn.
550; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; People v. Doe, 1 Mich. 451; Parks v. Good-
win, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 56, Hickey v. Hinsdale, 8 Mich. 267; People v. Hartwell,
12 Mich. 508; State v. McGinley, 4 Ind. 7; Slayton i». Hulings, 7 Ind. 144;
New Orleans v. St. Rowes, 9 La. An. 573; Edwards v. James, 13 Texas, 52;
State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26; Savage v. Walshe, 26 Ala. 620; Webster v. French,
12 111. 302; McKim v. Weller, 11 Cal. 47; State v. Co. Commissioners of Bal-
timore, 29 Md. 516; Fry v. Booth, 19 Ohio, n. s. 25. The list might easily be
largely increased.
* See upon this subject the remarks of Mr. Sedgwick in his work on Statutory
and Constitutional Law, p. 375, and those of Hubbard, J., in Briggs v. Georgia,
15 Vt. 72. Also see Dryfuss v. Budges, 45 Miss. 247.
[86]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
00
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. IV.] CONSTRUCTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 79
mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the proper
dignity of such an instrument, and usurping the proper province of
ordinary legislation. We are not therefore to expect to find in a
constitution provisions which the people, in adopting it, have not
regarded as of high importance, and worthy to-be embraced in
an instrument which, for a time at least, is to control alike the
government and the governed, and to form a standard by which is
to be measured the power which can be exercised as well by the
delegate as by the sovereign people themselves. If directions are
given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a
power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption
that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and
mode only ; and we impute to the people a want of due appreciation
of the purpose and proper province of such an instrument, when
we infer that such directions are given to any other end. Especially
when, as has been already said, it is but fair to presume that the
people in their constitution have expressed themselves in careful
and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance
of the powers delegated, and with a view to leave as little as
possible to implication.1
There arc some cases, however, where the doctrine of directory
statutes lias been applied to constitutional provisions; but they are
at variance with the weight of authority upon the precise points
considered, and we do not think, therefore, we should be warranted
in saying that the judicial decisions as they now stand sanction
the application. In delivering the opinion of the New York Court
of Appeals in one case, Mp. Justice Willard had occasion to con-
sider the constitutional provision, that on the final passage of a
bill the question shall be taken by ayes and noes, which shall be
duly entered upon the journals; and he expressed the opinion that
it was only directory to the legislature.2 The remark was obiter
dictum, as the court had already decided that the provision had
been fully complied with; and those familiar with the reasons
which have induced the insertion of this clause in our
* constitutions will not readily concede that its sole design [* 80]
was to establish a mere rule of order for legislative pro-
1 Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 49; per Bronson, J., in People v. Purdy, 2 Hill,
36; Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 566; Opinions of Judges, 6 Shep.
458. See People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281.
* People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 328.
[87]
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* 80 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IV.
ceedings, which might be followed or not at discretion. Mr. Chief
Justice Thurman, of Ohio, in a case not calling for a discussion ji
the subject, has considered a statute whose validity was assailed
on the ground that it was not passed in the mode prescribed by the
constitution. "By the term mode" he says, "I do not mean to
include the authority in which the law-making power resides, or the
number of votes a bill must receive to become a law. That the
power to make laws is vested in the Assembly alone, and that no
act has any force that was not passed by the number of votes
required by the constitution, are nearly, or quite, self-evident
propositions. These essentials relate to the authority by which,
rather than the mode in which, laws are to be made. Now
to secure the careful exercise of this power, and for other good
reasons, the constitution prescribes or recognizes certain things to
be done in the enactment of laws, which things form a course
or mode of legislative procedure. Thus we find, inter alia, the
provision that every bill shall be fully and distinctly read on three
different days, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of the house
in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule. This is
an important provision without doubt, but, nevertheless, there is
much reason for saying that it is merely directory in its character,
and that its observance by the Assembly is secured by their sense
of duty and official oaths, and not by any supervisory power of the
courts. Any other construction, we incline to think, would lead
to very absurd and alarming consequences. If it is in the power
of every court (and if one has the power, every one has it) to
inquire whether a bill that passed the Assembly was 'fully' and
'distinctly' read three times in each house, and to hold it in-
valid if, upon any reading, a word was accidentally omitted, or
the reading was indistinct, it would obviously be impossible to
know what is the statute law of the State. Now the requisition that
bills shall be fully and distinctly read is just as imperative as that
requiring them to be read three times; and as both relate to the
mode of procedure merely, it would be difficult to find any suf-
ficient reason why a violation of one of them would be less fatal
to an act than a violation of the other." 1
A requirement that a law shall be read distinctly, whether
[* 81] * mandatory or directory, is, from the very nature of the
case, addressed to the judgment of the legislative body,
1 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, n. s. 483.
[88]
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CH. IV.] CONSTHUgTION OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS. * 81
whose decision as to what reading is sufficiently distinct to be a
compliance cannot be subject to review. But in the absence of
authority to the contrary, we should not have supposed that the
requirement of three successive readings on different days stood
upon the same footing.1 To this extent a definite and certain rule
is capable of being, and has been, laid down, which can be literally
obeyed; and the legislative body cannot suppose or adjudge it to
have been done if the fact is otherwise. The requirement has an
important purpose, in making legislators proceed in their action
with caution and deliberation; and there cannot often be difficulty
in ascertaining from the legislative records themselves if the con-
stitution has been violated in this particular. There is, therefore,
no inherent difficulty in the question being reached and passed
upon by the courts in the ordinary mode, if it is decided that the
constitution intends legislation shall be reached through the three
readings, and not otherwise.
The opinion above quoted was recognized as law by the Supreme
Court of Ohio in a case soon after decided. In that case the court
proceed to say: "The . . . provision . . . that no bill shall con-
tain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its
title, is also made a permanent rule in the introduction and passage
of bills through the houses. The subject of the bill is required to
be clearly expressed in the title for the purpose of advising mem-
bers of its subject, when voting in cases in which the reading has
been dispensed with by a two-thirds vote. The provision that a
bill shall contain but one subject was to prevent combinations
by which various and distinct matters of legislation should gain a
support which they could not if presented separately. As a rule
of proceeding in the General Assembly, it is manifestly an impor-
tant one. But if it was intended to effect any practical object for
the benefit of the people in the examination, construction, or oper-
ation of acts passed and published, we are unable to perceive it.
The title of an act may indicate to the reader its subject, and
uuder the rule each act would contain one subject. To suppose
that for such a purpose the Constitutional Convention adopted the
rule under consideration, would impute to them a most minute
provision for a very imperfect heading of the chapters of
laws and their subdivision. This * provision. being in- [* 82]
1 See People v. Campbell, 3 Gilm. 466; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 432.
[89]
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tended to operate upon bills in their progress through the Gen-
eral Assembly, it must be held to be directory only. It relates to
bills, and not to acts. It would be most mischievous in practice
to make the validity of every law depend upon the judgment of
every judicial tribunal of the State, as to whether an act or a bill
contained more than one subject, or whether this one subject was
clearly expressed in the title of the act or bill. Such a question
would be decided according to the mental precision and mental dis-
cipline of each justice of the peace and judge. No practical benefit
could arise from such inquiries. We are therefore of opinion that
in general the only safeguard against the violation of these rules
of the houses is their regard for, and their oath to support, the
constitution of the State. We say, in general, the only safeguard;
for whether a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation of these
rules might authorize the court to pronounce a law unconstitu-
tional, it is unnecessary to determine. It is to be presumed no
such case will ever occur." 1
If the prevailing doctrine of the courts were in accord with this
decision, it might become important to consider whether the object
of the clause in question, as here disclosed, was not of such a
character as to make the provision mandatory even in a statute.
But we shall not enter upon that subject here, as elsewhere we
shall have occasion to refer to decisions made by the highest
judicial tribunals in nearly all of the States, recognizing similar
provisions as mandatory, and to be enforced by the courts. And
we concur fully in what was said by Mr. Justice Emmot, in
speaking of this very provision^ that "it will be found upon full
consideration to be difficult to treat any constitutional provision as
merely directory and not imperative." 2 And with what is said by
Mr. Justice Lumpkin, as to the duty of the courts: "It has been
suggested that the prohibition in the seventeenth section of the first
article of the constitution, 'Nor shall any law pr ordinance pass
containing any matter different from what is expressed in the title
1 Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, n. s. 179. See also the case of Washington v.
Murray, 4 Cal. 388, for similar views. In Hill v. Boyland, 40 Miss. 618, a pro-
vision requiring of all officers an oath to support the constitution, was held not
to invalidate the acts of officials who had neglected to take such an oath. And
in McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, the provision that the style of all laws
shall be, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland," was held
directory.
« People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 186.
[90]
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thereof,' is directory only to the legislative and executive or law-
making departments of the government. But we do not so
understand it. On the contrary, we consider it as much a
* matter of judicial cognizance as any other provision in [* 83]
that instrument. If the courts would refuse to execute a
law suspending the writ of habeas corpus when the public safety
did not require it, a law violatory of the freedom of the press, or
trial by jury, neither would they enforce a statute which contained
matter different from what was expressed in the title thereof." 1
We have thus indicated some of the rules which we think are
to be observed in the construction of constitutions. It will be
perceived that we have not thought it important to quote and to
dwell upon those arbitrary rules to which so much attention is
sometimes given, and which savor rather of the closet than of
practical life. Our observation would lead us to the conclusion
that they are more often resorted to as aids in ingenious attempts
to make the constitution seem to say what it does not, than with
a view to make that instrument express its real intent. All exter-
nal aids, and especially all arbitrary rules, applied to instruments
of this popular character, are of very uncertain value; and we do
not regard it as out of place to repeat here what we have had
occasion already to say in the course of this chapter, that they
are to be made use of with hesitation, and only with much
circumspection.2
1 Protho v. Orr, 12 Geo. 36. See also Opinions of Judges, 6 Shep. 458;
Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 683; People v. Starne, 35 111. 121;
State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224.
* See People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 360, per Johnson, J.; Temple v. Mead, 4
Vt. 540, per Williams, J.; People v. Fancher, 50 N. Y. 291. "In construing so
important an instrument as a constitution, especially those parts which affect the
vital principle of republican government, the elective franchise, or the manner of
exercising it, we are not, on the one hand, to indulge ingenious speculations wliich
may lead us wide from the true sense and spirit of the instrument, nor, on the
other, to apply to it such narrow and constrained views as may exclude the real
object and intent of those who framed it. We are to suppose that the authors of
such an instrument had a thorough knowledge of the force and extent of the
words they employ; that they had a beneficial end and purpose in view; and
that, more especially in any apparent restriction upon the mode of exercising the
right of suffrage, there was some existing or anticipated evil which it was their
purpose to avoid. If an enlarged sense of any particular form of expression
should be necessary to accomplish so great an object as a convenient exercise of
the fundamental privilege or right, — that of election, — such sense must be at-
[91]
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tributed. We are to suppose that those who were delegated to the great business
of distributing the powers which emanated from the sovereignty of the people,
and to the establishment of the rules for the perpetual security of the rights of
person and property, had the wisdom to adapt their language to future as well as
existing emergencies, so that words competent to the then existing state of the
community, and at the same time capable of being expanded to embrace more
extensive relations, should not be restrained to their more obvious and immediate
sense, if, consistently with the general object of the authors and the true prin-
ciples of the compact, they can be extended to other relations and circumstances
which an improved state of society may produce. Qui hceret in litera hceret in
cortice is a familiar maxim of the law. The letter killeth, but the spirit maketh
alive, is the more forcible expression of Scripture." Parker, Ch. J., in Henshaw
v. Foster, 9 Pick. 316.
[92]
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♦CHAPTER V. [*85]
OF THE POWERS WHICH THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAT EXERCISE.
In considering the powers which may be exercised by the legis-
lative department of one of the American States, it is natural that
we should recur to those possessed by the Parliament of Great
Britain, after which, in a measure, the American legislatures have
been modelled, and from which we derive our legislative usages
and customs, or parliamentary common law, as well as the prece-
dents by which the exercise of legislative power in this country
has been governed. It is natural, also, that we should incline to
measure the power of the legislative department in America by
the power of the like department in Britain; and to concede
without reflection that whatever the legislature of the country
from which we derive our laws can do, may also be done by the
department created for the exercise of legislative authority in
this country. But to guard against being misled by a comparison
between the two, we must bear in inind the important distinction
already pointed out, that with the Parliament rests practically
the sovereignty of the country, so that it may exercise all the
powers of the government if it wills so to do; while on the other
hand the legislatures of the American States are not the sovereign
authority, and, though vested with the exercise of one branch of
the sovereignty, they are nevertheless, in wielding it, hedged in
on all sides by important limitations, some of which are imposed
in express terms, and others by implications which are equally im-
perative.
"The power and jurisdiction of Parliament, says Sir Edward
Coke,1 is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be con-
fined, either for persons or causes, within any bounds. And of
this high court it may truly be said: 'Si antiquitatem spectes,
est vetustissima; si dignitatem est honoratissima; si jurisdic-
tionem, est capacissima.' It hath sovereign and uncontrolled
1 4 Inst. 36.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[CH. V.
authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abro-
gating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning
matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or'
[* 86 ] temporal, * civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this
being the place where that absolute despotic power, which
must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the
constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances,
operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of
the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It
can regulate or new-model the succession to the Crown, as was
done in the reign of Henry VIII. and William III. It can alter
the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of
instances, in the reign of King Henry VIII. and his three children.
It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the king-
dom and of Parliaments themselves, as was done by the Act of
Union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elec-
tions. It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impos-
sible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call its power, by a
figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament. True it is,
that what the Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo;
so that it is a matter most essential to the liberties of this king-
dom that such members be delegated to this important trust as
are most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their
knowledge; for it was a known apothegm of the great Lord
Treasurer Burleigh, ' that England could never be ruined but by
a Parliament;' and as Sir Matthew Hale observes: 'This being
the highest and greatest court, over which none other can have
jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment
should fall upon it, the subjects of this kingdom are left without
all manner of remedy.' " 1
The strong language in which the complete jurisdiction of
Parliament is here described is certainly inapplicable to any
authority in the American States, unless it be to the people of
the States when met in their primary capacity for the formation
of their fundamental law; and even then there rest upon them
the restraints of the Constitution of the United States, which bind
them as absolutely as they do the governments which they create.
It becomes important, therefore, to ascertain in what respect the
'1 Bl. Com. 160.
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| State legislatures resemble the Parliament in the powers they
I exercise, and how far we may extend the comparison without
losing sight of the fundamental ideas and principles of the Amer-
ican system.
* The first and most notable difference is that to which [* 87 ]
we have already alluded, and which springs from the dif-
ferent theory on which the British Constitution rests. While
Parliament is recognized as rightfully exercising the sovereign
authority of the country, it is evident that the resemblance between
it and American legislatures in regard to their ultimate powers
cannot be carried very far. The American legislatures only exer-
cise a certain portion of the sovereign power. The sovereignty is
in the people; and the legislatures which they have created are
only to discharge a trust of which they have been made a depos-
itory, but which has been placed in their hands with well-defined
restrictions.
Upon this difference it is to be observed, that while Parliament,
to any extent it may choose, may exercise judicial authority, one
of the most noticeable features in American constitutional law is
the care which has been taken to separate legislative, executive,
and judicial functions. It has evidently been the intention of the
people in every State that the exercise of each should rest with a
separate department. The different classes of power have been
apportioned to different departments; and as all derive their
authority from the same instrument, there is an implied exclusion
of each department from exercising the functions conferred upon
the others.
There are two fundamental rules by which we may measure the
extent of the legislative authority in the States : —
1. In creating a legislative department and •conferring upon it
the legislative power, the people must be understood to have con-
ferred the full and complete power as it rests in, and may be exer-
cised by, the sovereign power of any country, subject only to such
restrictions as they may have seen fit to impose, and to the limita-
tions which are contained in the Constitution of the United States.
The legislative department is not made a special agency, for the
exercise of specifically defined legislative powers, but is intrusted
with the general authority to make laws at discretion.
2. But the apportionment to this department of legislative
power does not sanction the exercise'of executive or judicial func-
[95]
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tions, except in those cases, warranted by parliamentary usage,
where they are incidental, necessary, or proper to the exercise of
legislative authority, or where the constitution itself, in specified
cases, may expressly permit it. Executive power is so intimately
connected with legislative, that it is not easy to draw a line of
separation; but the grant of the judicial power to the
[* 88 ] department * created for the purpose of exercising it must
be regarded as an exclusive grant, covering the whole
power, subject only to the limitations which the constitutions
impose, and to the incidental exceptions before referred to.
While, therefore, the American legislatures may exercise the
legislative powers which the Parliament of Great Britain wields,
except as restrictions are imposed, they are at the same time ex-
cluded from other functions which may be, and sometimes habit-
ually are, exercised by the Parliament.
"The people in framing the constitution," says Denio, Ch. J.,
"committed to the legislature the whole law-making power of
the State, which they did not expressly or impliedly withhold.
Plenary power in the legislature, for all purposes of civil govern-
ment, is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power is
an exception. In inquiring, therefore, whether a given statute is
constitutional, it is for those who question its validity to show that
it is forbidden. I do not mean that the power must be expressly
inhibited, for there are but few positive restraints upon the legis-
lative power contained in the instrument. The first article lays
down the ancient limitations which have always been considered
essential in a constitutional government, whether monarchical or
popular; and there are scattered through the instrument a few
other provisions in restraint of legislative authority. But the
affirmative prescriptions and the general arrangements of the
constitution are far more fruitful of restraints upon the legisla-
ture. Every positive direction contains an implication against
every thing contrary to it, or which would frustrate or disappoint
the purpose of that provision. The frame of the government, the
grant of legislative power itself, the organization of the executive
authority, the erection of the principal courts of justice, create
implied limitations upon the law-making authority as strong as
though a negative was expressed in each instance; but indepen-
dently of these restraints, express or implied, every subject within
[96]
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?, I the scope of civil government is liable to be dealt with by the legis-
J latere." 1
"It has never been questioned, so far as I know," says Redfield,
Ch. J., "that the American legislatures have the same unlimited
power in regard to legislation which resides in the British Parlia-
ment, except where they are restrained by written consti-
tutions. * That must be conceded, I think, to be a fun- [* 89]
damental principle in the political organization of the
American States. We cannot well comprehend how, upon prin-
ciple, it should be otherwise. The people must, of course, possess
all legislative power originally. They have committed this in the
most general and unlimited manner to the several State legis-
latures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the Con-
stitution of the United States, or of the particular State in
question." 2
"I entertain no doubt," says Comstock, J., " that aside from
the special limitations of the constitution, the legislature cannot
exercise powers which are in their nature essentially judicial or
executive. These are, by the constitution, distributed to other
departments of the government. It is only the ' legislative power'
which is vested in the senate and assembly. But where the con-
stitution is silent, and there is no clear usurpation of the powers
distributed to other departments, I think there would be great
difficulty and great danger in attempting to define the limits of
this powep. Chief Justice Marshall said: 'How far the power of
giving the law may involve every other power, in cases where the
constitution is silent, never has been, and perhaps never can be,
definitely stated.'3 That very eminent judge felt the difficulty;
but the danger was less apparent then than it is now, when theo-
ries, alleged to be founded in natural reason or inalienable rights,
but subversive of the just and necessary powers of government,
attract the belief of considerable classes of men, and when too
much reverence for government and law is certainly among the
1 People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 543.
* Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 142. See also Leg-
gett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445; Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; People
e. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Mason v. Wait, 4
Seam. 134; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 27 Barb. 593; Taylor v. Porter,
4 Hill, 144, per Bronson, J.
5 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 136.
7 [97]
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least of the perils to which our institutions are exposed. I am
reluctant to enter upon this field of inquiry, satisfied, as I sji,
that no rule can be laid down in terms which may not contain the
germ of great mischief to society, by giving to private opinion and
■ speculation a license to oppose themselves to the just and legiti-
mate powers of government." 1
Numerous other opinions might be cited to the same
[* 90] effect with * those from which we have here quoted; but
as we shall have occasion to refer to them elsewhere, in
considering the circumstances under which a statute may be
declared unconstitutional, we shall refrain from further references
in this place. Nor shall we enter upon a discussion of the ques-
tion suggested by Chief Justice Marshall as above quoted ;2 since,
however interesting it may be as an abstract question, it is made
practically unimportant by the careful separation of duties between
the several departments of the government which has beeii made
by each of the State constitutions. Had no such separation been
made, the disposal of executive and judicial duties must have
devolved upon the department vested with the general authority
to make laws ;8 but assuming them to be apportioned already, we
are only at liberty to liken the power of the State legislature to
that of the Parliament, when it confines its action to an exercise
of legislative functions; and such authority as is in its uature
1 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 891.
* The power to distribute the judicial power, except so far as that has been
done by the constitution, rests with the legislature, Commonwealth v. Hippie, 69
Penn. St. 9; but when the constitution has conferred it upon certain specified
courts, this must be understood to embrace the whole judicial power, and the
legislature cannot vest any portion of it elsewhere. State v. Maynard, 14 111.
420; Gibson v. Emerson, 2 Eng. 173; Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409; Succes-
sion of Tanner, 22 La. Ann. 91; Gough v. Dorsey, 27 Wis. 130. But a general
provision in the constitution for the distribution of the judicial.power, not refer-
ring to courts-martial, would not be held to forbid such courts by implication.
People v. Daniel, 50 N. Y. 274. Nor would it be held to embrace administra-
tive functions of a quasi judicial nature, such as the assessment of property for
taxation. State v. Commissioners of Ormsby County, 7 Nev. 392, and cases cited.
See Auditor of State e. Atchison,. &c, R.R. Co., 6 Kan. 500; 8. c. 7 Am.
Rep. 575.
3 Calder ». Bull, 2 Root, 350, and 3 Dall. 38G; Ross v. Whitman, 6 Cal. 3G1;
Smith t>. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; per Patterson, J., in Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 19;
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304.
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either executive or judicial is beyond its constitutional powers,
with the few exceptions to which we have already referred.
It will be important therefore to consider those cases where
legislation has been questioned as encroaching upon judicial
authority; and to this end it may be useful, at the outset, to
endeavor to define legislative and judicial power respectively, that
we may the better be enabled to point out the proper line of
distinction when questions arise in their practical application to
actual cases.
The legislative power is the authority, under the constitution, to
make laws, and to alter and repeal them. Laws, in the sense in
which the word is here employed, are rules of civil conduct, or
statutes, which the legislative will has prescribed. "The laws of
a State," observes Mr. Justice Story, "are more usually under-
stood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legis-
lative authority thereof, or long-established local customs
having * the force of laws." 1 "The difference between [* 91]
the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature
makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the
law."2 And it is said that that which distinguishes a judicial
from a legislative act is, that the one is a determination of what
the existing law is in relation to some existing thing already done
or happened, while the other is a predetermination of what the law
shall be for the regulation of all future cases falling under its pro-
visions.3 And in another case it is said: "The legislative power
extends only to the making of laws, and in its exercise it is limited
and restrained by the paramount authority of the federal and
State constitutions. It cannot directly reach the property or
vested rights of the citizen by providing for their forfeiture or
trausfer to another, without trial and judgment in the courts: for
to do so would be the exercise of a power which belongs to another
branch of the government, and is forbidden to the legislative."4
"That is not legislation which adjudicates in a particular case,
prescribes the rule contrary to the general law, and orders it to be
1 Swift r. Tyson, 16 Pet. 18.
* Per Marshall, Ch. J., in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 46; per Gibson,
Ch. J., in Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494. See State v. Gleason,
12Fla. 190.
'Bates r. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77.
4 Newland v. Marsh, 19 111. 382.
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enforced. Such power assimilates itself more closely to despotic
rule than any other attribute of government." 1 i
On the other hand, to adjudicate, upon, and protect, the ryrli'
and interests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe
and apply the laws, is the peculiar province of the judicial depart-
ment.2 "No particular definition of judicial power," says Wood-
bury, J., " is given in the constitution [of New Hampshire], and,
considering the general nature of the instrument, none was to be
expected. Critical statements of the meanings in which all im-
portant words were employed would have swollen into volumes;
and when those words possessed a customary signification, a defi-
nition of them would have been useless. But 'powers
[* 92] judicial,' "'judiciary powers,' and 'judicatures' are all
phrases used in the constitution; and though not particu-
larly defined, are still so used to designate with clearness that
department of government which it was intended should inter-
pret and administer the laws. On general principles, therefore,
those inquiries, deliberations, orders, and decrees, which are
peculiar to such a department, must in their nature be judicial
acts. Nor can they be both judicial and legislative; because a
marked difference exists between the employment of judicial and
legislative tribunals. The former decide upon the legality of
claims and conduct, and the latter make rules upon which, in con-
nection with the constitution, those decisions should be founded.
It is the province of judges to determine what is the law upon
existing cases. In fine, the law is applied by the one, and made
by the other. To do the first, therefore, — to compare the claims
of parties with the law of the land before established, — is in its
nature a judicial act. But to do the last — to pass new rules for
the regulation of new controversies — is in its nature a legislative
1 Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 266. See also Greenough ». Greenough, 11
Penn. St. 494; Dechastellux t>. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18; Trustees, &c, e.
Bailey, 10 Fla. 238.
* Cincinnati, &c., Railroad Co. o. Commissioners of Clinton Co., 1 Ohio,
V. s. 81. See also King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 454; Gordon c. Ingr&ham,
1 Grant's Cases, 152; People c. Supervisors of New York, 16 N. Y. 432; Beebe
v. State, 6 Ind. 515; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494; Taylor f.
Place, 4 R. I. 324. In State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570, a legislative act which
declared certain college officers to have vacated their offices by failure to take an
oath prescribed by a previous act, and which proceeded to appoint successors,
was held void as an exercise of judicial power.
[100]
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. V.] POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. * 92
.'act; and if these rules interfere with the past, or the present, and
do not look wholly to the future, they violate the definition of a
law as ' a rule of civil conduct;'1 because no rule of conduct oan
with consistency operate upon what occurred before the rule itself
was promulgated.
** It is the province of judicial power, also, to decide private
disputes between or concerning persons; but of legislative power
to regulate public concerns, and to make laws for the benefit and
welfare of the State. Nor docs the passage of private statutes
conflict with these principles; because such statutes, when lawful,
are enacted on petition, or by the consent of all concerned; or
else they forbear to interfere with past transactions and vested
rights." 2
With these definitions and explanations, we shall now proceed
to consider some of the cases in which the courts have attempted
to draw the line of distinction between the proper functions of the
legislative and judicial departments, in cases where it has been
claimed that the legislature have exceeded their power by invading
the domain of judicial authority.
* Declaratory Statutes. [* 93]
Legislation is either introductory of new rules, or it is declar-
atory of existing rules. "A declaratory statute is one which
is passed in order to put an end to a doubt as to what is the com-
mon law, or the meaning of another statute, and which declares
what it is and ever has been." 3 Such a statute, therefore, is always
in a certain sense retrospective; because it assumes to determine
what the law"was before it was passed ; and as a declaratory statute
is important only in those cases where doubts have already arisen,
the statute, when passed, may be found to declare the law to be
different from what it has already been adjudged to be by the
courts. Thus Mp. Fox's Libel Act declared that, by the law of
England, juries were judges of the law in prosecutions for libel; it
1 1 Bl. Comm. 44.
'Merrill p. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 204. See Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 69; Tay-
lor p. Porter, 4 Hill, 144; Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 272; Dash v. Van
Klerk, 7 Johns. 498; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657; Leland v. Wilkinson,
10 Pet. 297.
• Bouv. Law Diet. "Statute."
[ioi]
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did not purport to introduce a new rule, but to declare a rule
already and always in force. Yet previous to the passage of thi.°
act the courts had repeatedly held that the jury in these <^ses
were only to pass upon the fact of publication and the truth of
the innuendoes; and whether the publication was libellous or not
was a question of law which addressed itself exclusively to the
court. It would appear, therefore, that the legislature declared
the law to be what the courts had declared it was not. So in the
State of New York, after the courts had held that insurance com-
panies were taxable to a certain extent under an existing statute,
the legislature passed another act, declaring that such companies
were only taxable at a certain other rate; and it was thereby
declared that such was the intention and true construction of the
original statute.1 In these cases it will be perceived that the courts,
in the due exercise of their authority as interpreters of the laws,
have declared what the rule established by the common law or by
statute is, and that the legislature has then interposed, put its own
construction upon the existing law, and in effect declared the
judicial interpretation to be unfounded and unwarrantable. The
courts in these cases have clearly kept within the proper limits of
their jurisdiction, and if they have erred, the error has been one
of judgment only, and has not extended to usurpation of power.
Was the legislature also within the limits of its authority when it
passed the declaratory statute?
[* 94] * The decision of this question must depend upon the
practical application which is sought to be made of the
declaratory statute, and whether it is designed to have practically
a retrospective operation, or only to establish a construction of the
doubtful law for the determination of cases that may arise in the
future. It is always competent to change an existing law by a
declaratory statute; and where it is only to operate upon future
cases, it is no objection to its validity that it assumes the law to
have been in the past what it is now declared that it shall be in the
future. But the legislative action cannot be made to retroact \ipon
past controversies, and to reverse decisions which the courts, in
the exercise of their undoubted authority, have made; for this
would not only be the exercise of judicial power, but it would be
its exercise in the most objectionable and offensive form, since
1 People v. Supervisors of New York, 16 N. Y. 424.
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/ the legislature would in effect sit as a court of review to which
parties might appeal when dissatisfied with the rulings of the
courts.1
As the legislature cannot set aside the construction of the law
already applied by the courts to actual cases, neither can it compel
1 In several different cases the courts of Pennsylvania had decided that a
testator's mark to his name, at the foot of a testamentary paper, but without
proof that the name was written by his express direction, was not the signature
required by the statute, and the legislature, to use the language of Chief Justice
Gibson, "declared, in order to overrule it, that every last will and testament
heretofore made, or hereafter to be made, except such as may have been fully
adjudicated prior to the passage of this act, to which the testator's name is sub-
scribed by his direction, or to which the testator has made his mark or cross,
shall be deemed and taken to be valid. How this mandate to the courts to estab-
lish a particular interpretation of a particular statute, can be taken for any thing
else than an exercise of judicial power in settling a question of interpretation, I
know not. The judiciary had certainly recognized a legislative interpretation of
t statute before it had itself acted, and consequently before a purchaser had been
misled by its judgment; but he might have paid for a title on the unmistakable
meaning of plain words; and for the legislature subsequently to distort or per-
vert it, and to enact that white meant black, or that black meant white, would
in the same degree be an exercise of arbitrary and unconstitutional power."
Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494. The act in this case was held void
bo far as its operation was retrospective, but valid as to future cases. And see
Reiser v. Tell Association, 39 Penn. St. 187. The constitution of Georgia
entitled the head of a family to enter a homestead, and the courts decided that a
single person, having no others dependent upon him, could not be regarded the
head of a family, though keeping house with servants. Afterwards, the legislature
passed an act, declaring that any single person living habitually as housekeeper
to himself should be regarded as the head of a family. Held void as an exercise
of judicial power. Calhoun v. McLendon, 42 Geo. 405. The fact that the
courts had previously given a construction to the law may show more clearly
a purpose in the legislature to exercise judicial authority, but it would not be
essential to that end. As is well said in Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Penn. St. 45:
"It would be monstrous to maintain that when the words and intention of an act
were so plain that no court had ever been appealed to for the purpose of declar-
ing their meaning, it was therefore in the power of the legislature, by a retro-
spective law, to put a construction upon them contrary to the obvious letter and
spirit. Reiser v. William Tell Fund Association, 89 Penn. St. 137, is an author-
ity in point against such a doctrine. An expository act of assembly is destitute
of retroactive force, because it is an act of judicial power, and is in contraven-
tion of the ninth section of the ninth article of the constitution, which deilares
that no man can be deprived of his property unless ' by the judgment of his peers
or the law of the land.'" See 8 Am. Rep. 155, 156. And on the force and
effect of declaratory laws in general, see Salters v. Tobias, 8 Paige, 388; Post-
master-General v. Early, 12 Wheat. 148.
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* 94 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. T.
the courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a law
which the legislature permits to remain in force. "To declare
what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power; to declare what
the law shall be, is legislative. One of the fundamental principles
of all our governments is, that the legislative power
[*95] * shall be separate from the judicial." 1 If the legislature
would prescribe a different rule for the future from that
which the courts enforce, it must be done by statute, and cannot be
done by a mandate to the courts, which leaves the law unchanged,
but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it, not ac-
cording to the judicial, but according to the legislative judgment.2
But in any case the substance of the legislative action should
be regarded rather than the form; and if it appears to be the
intention to establish by declaratory statute a rule of conduct for
the future, the courts should accept and act upon it, without too
nicely inquiring whether the mode by which the new rule is estab-
lished is or is not the best, most decorous and suitable that could
have been adopted.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the
courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according
to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by set-
ting aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,
ordering the discharge of offenders,3 or directing what particu-
lar steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.4
1 Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 498, per Thompson, J.; Ogden v. Blackledge,
2 Cranch, 272; Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Penn. St. 25.
8 Governor v. Porter, 5 Humph. 165; People v. Supervisors, &c, 16 N. Y.
424; Reiser v. Tell Association, 39 Penn. St. 137; O'Conner v. Warner, 4 W.
& S. 227; Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Penn. St. 25.
'In State v. Fleming, 7 Humph. 152, a legislative resolve that "no fine,for-
feiture, or imprisonment, should be imposed or recovered under the act of 1837
[then in force], and that all causes pending in any of the courts for such offence
should be dismissed," was held void as an invasion of judicial authority. The
legislature cannot declare a forfeiture of a right to act as curators of a college.
State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570. But to take away by statute a statutory right of
appeal is not an exercise of judicial authority. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall.
506. And it has been held that a statute allowing an appeal in a particular case
was valid. Prout v. Berry, 2 Gill, 147; State v. Northern Central R. R. Co.,
18 Md. 193. But see cases cited in next note.
4 Opinions of Judges on the Dorr Case, 3 R. I. 299. In the case of Picquet,
Appellant, 6 Pick. 64, the Judge of Probate had ordered letters of administration
to issue to an applicant therefor, on his giving bond in the penal sum of $50,000,
[104]
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* And as a court must act as an organized body of judges, [* 96 ]
aud, where differences of opinion arise, they can only
decide by majorities, it/ has been held that it would not be in the
power of the legislature to provide that, in certain contingencies,
the opinion of the minority of a court, vested, with power by the
constitution, should prevail, so that the decision of the court
in such cases should be rendered against the judgment of its
members.1
•with sureties within the Commonwealth, for the faithful performance of his duties.
He was unable to give the bond, and applied to the legislature for relief. There-
upon a resolve was passed "empowering" the Judge of Probate to grant lhe
letters of administration, provided the petitioner should give bond with his
brother, a resident of Paris, France, as surety, and "that such bond should be
in lieu of any and all bond or bonds by any law or statute in this Commonwealth
now in force required," &p. The Judge of Probate refused to grant the letters
on the terms specified in this resolve, and the Supreme Court, while holding that
it was not compulsory upon him, also declared their opinion that, if it were so,
it would be inoperative and void. In Bradford v. Brooks, 2 Aik. 284, it was de-
cided that the legislature had no power to revive a commission for proving claims
against an estate after it had once expired. See also Bagg's Appeal, 43 Penn.
St. 512. In Hill v. Sunderland, 3 Vt. 507; and Burch v. Newberry, 10 N. Y.
374, it was held that the legislature had no power to grant to parties a right to
appeal after it was gone under the general law. Besides the authorities referred
to, to show that the legislature cannot grant a new trial, see Lewis v. Webb,
3Greenl. 326; Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140; Bates p. Kimball, 2 Chip.
77; Stamford v. Barry, 1 Aik. 314; Merrill p. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 199; Dechas-
tellux p. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18; Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324; Young v.
State Bank, 4 Ind. 301; Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175; Miller v. State, 8
Gill, 145; Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 515; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. Ill; Weaver
p. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; Saunders v. Cabaniss, ib. 173. In Burt v. Williams,
24 Ark. 91, it was held that the granting of continuances of pending cases was
the exercise of judicial authority, and a legislative act assuming to do this was
void. And where, by the general law, the courts have no authority to grant a
divorce for a given cause, the legislature cannot confer the authority in a particular
case. Simmonds v. Simmonds, 103 Mass. 572; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 576. And
see post, 110, note.
1 In Clapp v. Ely, 8 Dutch. 622, it was held that a statute which provided that
no judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed by the Court of Errors
and Appeals, unless a majority of those members of the court who were com-
petent to sit on the hearing and decision should concur in the reversal, was
unconstitutional. Its effect would be, if the court were not full, to make the
opinion of the minority in favor of affirmance control that of the majority in
favor of reversal, unless the latter were a majority of the whole court. Such a
provision in the constitution might be proper and unexceptionable; but if the
constitution has created a Court of Appeals, without any restriction of this char-
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[CH. V.
Nor is it in the power of the legislature to bind individuals by a
recital of facts in a statute, to be used as evidence against the
parties interested. A recital of facts in the preamble of a statute
may perhaps be evidence, where it relates to matters of a public
nature, as that riots or disorders exist in a certain part of the
country;1 but where the facts concern the rights of individuals,
the legislature cannot adjudicate upon them. As private statutes
are generally obtained on the application of some party interested,
and are put in form to suit his wishes, perhaps their exclusion
from being made evidence against any other party would result
from other general principles; but it is clear that the recital could
have no force, except as a judicial finding of facts; and that such
finding is not within the legislative province.2
[* 97] * We come now to a class of cases in regard to which
there has been serious contrariety of opinion; springing
from the fact, perhaps, that the purpose sought to be accomplished
by the statutes is generally effected by judicial proceedings, so that
if the statutes are not a direct invasion of judicial authority, they
at least cover ground which the courts usually occupy under gen-
eral laws which confer the jurisdiction upon them. We refer to
Statutes conferring Power upon Guardians and other Trustees to
sell Lands.
Whenever it becomes necessary or proper to sell the estate of
a decedent for the payment of debts, or of a lunatic or other
incompetent person for the same purpose, or for future support,
or of a minor to provide the means for his education and nurture,
or for the more profitable investment of the proceeds, or of ten-
ants in common to effectuate a partition between them, it will
probably be found in every State that some court is vested with
jurisdiction to make the necessary order, if the facts seem to
render it important after a hearing of the parties in interest.
The case is eminently one for judicial investigation. There are
facts to be inquired into, in regard to which it is always possible
that disputes may arise; the party in interest is often incompetent
to act on his own behalf, and his interest is carefully to be in-
acter, the ruling of this case is that the legislature cannot impose it. The court
was nearly equally divided, standing seven to six.
1 Rex v. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 532.
J Elmendorf p. Carniichael, 3 Litt. 478; Parmeleo c. Thompson, 7 Hill, 80.
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CH. V.] POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. * 97
quired into and guarded; and as the proceeding will usually be
ex parte, there is more than the ordinary opportunity for fraud
upon the party interested, as well as upon the authority which
grants permission. It is highly and peculiarly proper, therefore,
that by general laws judicial inquiry should be provided for
these cases, and that these laws should provide for notice to all
proper parties, and an opportunity for the presentation of any
facts which might bear upon the propriety of granting the appli-
cations.
But it will sometimes be found that the general laws provided
for these cases are not applicable to some which arise; or if appli-
cable, that they do not always accomplish fully all that seems
desirable; and in these cases, and perhaps also in some others
without similar excuse, it has not been unusual for legislative
authority to intervene, and by special statute to grant the power
which, under the general law, is granted by the courts.
The * power to pass such statutes has often been disputed, [* 98 ]
and it may be well to see upon what basis of authority as
well as of reason it rests.
If in fact judicial inquiry is essential in these cases, it would
seem clear that such statutes must be ineffectual and void. But
if judicial inquiry is not essential, and the legislature may confer
the power of sale in such a case upon an ex parte presentation of
evidence, or upon the representations of the parties without any
proof whatever, then we must consider the general laws to be
passed, not because the cases fall within the province of judicial
action, but because the courts can more conveniently consider,
aud properly, safely, and inexpensively pass upon such cases, than
the legislative body, where the power primarily rests.1
The rule upon this subject, as we deduce it from the authorities,
seems to be this: If the party standing in position of trustee
applies for permission to make the sale, for a purpose apparently
for the interest of the cestui que trust, and there are no adverse
1 There are constitutional provisions in Kentucky, Virginia, Missouri, Oregon,
Nevada, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Arkansas, Florida, 11linois, Wiscon-
sin, Texas, West Virginia, and Michigan, forbidding special laws licensing the
sale of the lands of minors and other persons under legal disability. Perhaps
the general provision in some other constitutions, forbidding special laws in cases
whvre a general law could be made applicable, might also be held to exclude such
special authorization.
[107]
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* 98 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. Y.
interests to be considered and adjudicated, the case is not one
which requires judicial action, but it is optional with the legisla-
ture to grant the relief by statute, or to refer the case to the
courts for consideration, according as the one course or the other,
on considerations of policy, may seem desirable.
In the case of Rice v. Parkman,1 it appeared that, certain minors
having become entitled to real estate by descent from their mother,
the legislature passed a special statute empowering their father
as guardian for them, and, after giving bond to the judge of
probate, to sell and convey the lands, and put the proceeds at
interest on good security for the benefit of the minor owners.
A sale was made accordingly; but the children, after coming of
age, brought suit against the party claiming under the sale, insist
ing that the special statute was void. There was in force at the
time this special statute was passed a general statute, under which
license might have been granted by the courts; but it was held
that this general law did not deprive the legislature of that
[* 99 ] full * and complete control over such cases which it would
have possessed had no such statute existed. "If," say
the court, " the power by which the resolve authorizing the sale in
this case was passed were of a judicial nature, it would be very
clear that it could not have been exercised by the legislature with-
out violating an express provision of the constitution. But it
does not seem to us to be of this description of power; for it was
not a case of controversy between party and party, nor is there
any decree or judgment affecting the title to property. The
only object of the authority granted by the legislature was to trans-
mute real into personal estate, for purposes beneficial to all who
were interested therein. This is a power frequently exercised by
the legislature of this State, since the adoption of the constitution,
and by the legislature of the province and of the colony, while
under the sovereignty of Great Britain, analogous to the power
exercised by the British Parliament on similar subjects, time out
of mind. Indeed, it seems absolutely necessary for the interest of
those who, by the general rules of law, are incapacitated from dis-
posing of their property, that a power should exist somewhere of
converting lands into money. For otherwise many minors might
suffer, although having property ; it not being in a condition to yield
1 16 Mass. 826.
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an income. This power must rest in the legislature, in this Com-
monwealth; that body being alone competent to act as the general
guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act for them-
selves.
"It was undoubtedly wise to delegate this authority to other
bodies, whose sessions are regular and constant, and whose struct-
ure may enable them more easily to understand the merits of the
particular application brought before them. But it does not fol-
low that, because the power has been delegated by the legislature
to courts of law, it is judicial in its character. For aught we see,
the same authority might have been given to the selectmen of
each town, or to the clerks or registers of the counties, it being
a mere ministerial act, certainly requiring discretion, and some-
times knowledge of law, for its due exercise, but still partaking
in no degree of the characteristics of judicial power. It is doubt-
less included in the general authority granted by the people to
the legislature by the constitution. For full power and authority
is given from time to time to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, stat-
*utes, and ordinances, directions, and restrictions (so as [*100]
the same be not repugnant or contrary to the constitu-
tion), as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
Commonwealth, and of the subjects thereof. No one imagines
that, under this general authority, the legislature could deprive a
citizen of his estate, or impair any valuable contract in which he
might be interested. But there seems to be no reason to doubt
that, upon his application, or the application of those who properly
represent him if disabled from acting himself, a beneficial change
of his estate, or a sale of it for purposes necessary and convenient
for the lawful owner, is a just and proper subject for the exercise
of that authority. It is, in fact, protecting him in his property,
which the legislature is bound to do, and enabling him to derive
subsistence, comfort, and education from property which might
otherwise be wholly useless during that period of life when it might
be most beneficially employed.
"If this be not true, then the general laws, under which so
many estates of minors, persons non compos mentis, and others,
have been sold and converted into money, are unauthorized by
the constitution, and void. For the courts derive their authority
from the legislature, and, it not being of a judicial nature, if the
[109]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
legislature had it not, they could not communicate it to any
other body. Thus, if there were no power to relieve those from
actual distress who had unproductive property, and were disabled
from conveying it themselves, it would seem that one of the
most essential objects of government — that of providing for the
welfare of the citizens — would be lost. But the argument which
has most weight on the part of the defendants is, that the legisla-
ture has exercised its power over this subject in the only consti-
tutional way, by establishing a general provision ; and that, having
done this, their authority has ceased, they having no right to
interfere in particular cases. And if the question were one of
expediency only, we should perhaps be convinced by the argu-
ment, that it would be better for all such applications to be made
to the courts empowered to sustain them. But as a question
of right, we think the argument fails. The constituent, when he
has delegated an authority without an interest, may do the act
himself which he has authorized another to do; and especially
when that constituent is the legislature, and is not prohibited
by the constitution from exercising the authority. Indeed,
[* 101] the * whole authority might be revoked, and the legisla-
ture resume the burden of the business to itself, if in its
wisdom it should determine that the common welfare required
it. It is not legislation which must be by general acts and rules,
but the use of a parental or tutorial power, for purposes of kind-
ness, without interfering with or prejudice to the rights of any but,
those who apply for specific relief. The title of strangers is not
in any degree affected by such an interposition."
A similar statute was sustained by the Court for the Correction
of Errors in New York. "It is clearly," says the Chancellor,
"within the powers of the legislature, as parens patriae, to prescribe
such rules and regulations as it may deem proper for the superin-
tendence, disposition, and management of the property and effects
of infants, lunatics., and other persons who are incapable of managing
their own affairs. But even that power cannot constitutionally be
so far extended as to transfer the beneficial use of the property to
another person, except in those cases where it can legally be
presumed the owner of the property would himself have given the
use of his property to the other, if he had been in a situation to
act for himself, as in the case of a provision out of the estate of an
[110]
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CH. V.] POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. * 101
infant or lunatic for the support of an indigent parent or other
near relative." 1
1 Cochran p. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 373. See the same case in the Supreme
Court, sub nom. Clarke v. Van Surlay, 15 Wend. 436. See also Suydam t>.
Williamson, 24 How. 427; Williamson v. Suydam, 6 Wall. 723; Heirs of Hol-
man r. Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 3C9; Flo e tine t>. Barton, 2 Wall. 210. In
Opinions of the Judges, 4 N. H. 572, the validity of such a special statute, under
the constitution of New Hampshire, was denied. The judges say: "The objec-
tion to the exercise of such a power by the legislature i^. that it is in its nature
both legislative and judicial. It is the province of the legislature to prescribe the
rule of law, but to apply it to particular cases is the business of the courts of law.
And the thirty-eighth article in the Bill of Rights declares that ' in the government
of the State the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive, and
judicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the
nature of a free government will adinit, or as consistent with that chain of con-
nection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of
union and amity.' The exercise of such a power by the legislature can never be
necesssary. By the existing laws, judges of probate have very extensive juris-
diction to license the sale of real estate of minors by their guardians. If the
jurisdiction of the judges of probate be not sufficiently extensive to reach all
proper cases, it may be a good reason why that jurisdiction should be extended,
but can hardly be deemed a sufficient reason for the particular interposition of the
legislature in an individual case. If there be a defect in the laws, they should be
amended. Under our institutions all men are viewed as equal, entitled to enjoy
equal privileges, and to be governed by equal laws. If it be fit and proper that
license should be given to one guardian, under particular circumstances, to sell
the estate of his ward, it is fit and proper that all other guardians should, under
similar circumstances, have the same license. This is the very genius and spirit
of our institutions. And we are of opinion that an act of the legislature to
authorize the sale of the land of a particular minor by his guardian cannot be
easily reconciled with the spirit of the article in the Bill of Rights which we have
just cited. It is true that the grant of such a license by the legislature to the
guardian is intended as a privilege and a benefit to the ward. But by the law of
the land no minor is capable of assenting to a sale of his real estate in such a
manner as to bind himself. And no guardian is permitted by the same law to
determine when the estate of his ward ought and when it ought not to be sold.
In the contemplation of the law, the one has not sufficient discretion to judge of
the propriety and expediency of a sale of his estate, and the other is not to be
intrusted with the power of judging. Such being the general law of the land, it
>s presumable that the legislature would be unwilling to rest the justification of an
act authorizing the sale of a minor's estate upon any assent which the guardian
or the minor could give in the proceeding. The question then is, as it seems to
m. Can a ward be deprived of his inheritance without his consent by an act of
toe legislature which is intended to apply to no other individual? The fifteenth
article of the Bill of Rights declares that no subject shall be deprived of his prop-
erty but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Can an act of the
legislature, intended to authorize one man to sell the land of another without his
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[* 102] * The same ruling has been made in analogous cases.
In Ohio, a special act of the legislature authorizing com-
missioners to make sale of lands held in fee tail, by devisees under
a will, in order to cut off the entailment and effect a partition
between them, — the statute being applied for by the mother of
the devisees and the executor of the will, and on behalf of the
devisees, — was held not obnoxious to constitutional objection, and
as sustainable on immemorial legislative usage, and on the same
ground which would support general laws for the same purpose.1
In a case in the Supreme Court of the United States, where an
executrix who had proved a will in New Hampshire made sale of
lands 'without authority in Rhode Island, for the purpose of
satisfying debts against the estate, a subsequent act of the
[* 103] Rhode Island legislature, * confirming the sale, was held
not an encroachment upon the judicial power. The land,
it was said, descended to the heirs subject to a lien for the pay-
ment of debts, and there is nothing in the nature of the act of
authorizing a sale to satisfy the lien, which requires that it should
be performed by a judicial tribunal, or that it should be performed
by a delegate rather than by the legislature itself. It is remedial
in its nature, to give effect to existing rights.2 The case showed
the actual existence of debts, and indeed a judicial license for the
sale of lands to satisfy them had been granted in New Hampshire
before the sale was made. The decision was afterwards followed
in a carefully considered case in the same court.8 In each of these
cases it is assumed that the legislature dges not by the special
statute determine the existence or amount of the debts, and dis-
putes concerning them would be determinable in the usual modes.
Many other decisions have been made to the same effect.4
consent, be ' the law of the land' in a free country P If the question proposed
to us can be resolved into these questions, as it appears to us it may, we feel en-
tirely confident that the representatives of the people of this State will agree
with-us in the opinion we feel ourselves bound to express on the question sub-
mitted to us, that the legislature cannot authorize a guardian of minors, by a
special act or resolve, to make a valid conveyance of the real estate of his
wards."
1 Carroll v. Lessee of Olmsted, 16 Ohio; 251.
8 Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 660.
3 Watkins v. Holman's Lessee, 16 Pet. 25-60. See also Florentine v. Barton,
2 Wall. 210; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 10.
* Thurston v. Thurston, 6 R. I. 296, 302; Williamson v. Williamson, 3 S.
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This species of legislation may perhaps be properly called pre-
rogative remedial legislation. It hears and determines no rights;
it deprives no one of his property. It simply authorizes one's
real estate to be turned into personal, on the application of the
person representing his interest, and under such circumstances
that the consent of the owner, if capable of giving it, would be
presumed. It is in the nature of the grant of a privilege to one
person, which at the same time affects injuriously the rights of no
other.1
But a different case is presented when the legislature assumes
to authorize a person who does not occupy a fiduciary rela-
tion to * the owner, to make sale of real estate, to satisfy [* 104]
demands which he asserts, but which are not judicially
determined, or for any other purpose not connected with the con-
venience or necessity of the owner himself. An act of the legis-
lature of Illinois undertook to empower a party who had applied
for it to make sale of the lands pertaining to the estate of a
deceased person, in order to raise a certain specified sum of money
which the legislature assumed to be due to him and another per-
son, for moneys by them advanced and liabilities incurred on
behalf of the estate, and to apply the same to the extinguishment of
their claims. Now it is evident that this act was in the nature of
a judicial decree, passed on the application of parties adverse in
interest to the estate, and in effect adjudging a certain amount to
be due them, and ordering lands to be sold for its satisfaction. As
& M. 715; McComb v. Gilkey, 29 Miss. 146; Boon e. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246;
Stewart c. Griffith, 33 Mo. 13; Estep v. Hutclnnan, 14 S. & R. 435; Snowhill
v. Snowhill, 2 Green, Ch. 20; Dorsey v. Gilbert, 11 G. & J. 87; Norris v. Cly-
raer, 2 Penn. St. 277; Coleman v. Carr, Walker, 258; Davison v. Johonnot, 7
Met 388; Towle v. Forney, 14 N. Y. 423; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445;
Kibby v. ChetwoodV Adra'rs, 4 T. B. Monr. 94; Sbeban's Heirs v. Barnett's
Heirs, 6 T. B. Monr. 594; Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316; Richardson r.
Monson, 22 Conn. 98; Ward v. New England, &c. Co., 1 Cliff. 565; Sohier v.
Massachusetts, &c. Hospital, 3 Cush. 483; Lobrano v. Nelligan, 9 Wall. 295.
In Moore v. Maxwell, 18 Ark. 469, a special statute authorizing the administrator
of one who held the mere naked legal title to convey to the owner of the equitable
title was held valid. In Stanley v. Colt. 5 Wall. 119, an act permitting the sale
of real estate which had been devised to charitable uses was sustained — no diver-
sion of the gift being made.
1 It would be equally competent for the legislature to authorize a person under
legal disability — e. g. an infant — to convey his estate, as to authorize it to be
conveyed by guardian. McComb v. Gilkey, 29 Miss. 146.
8 [113]
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was well said by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in adjudging the
act void: "If this is not the exercise of a power of inquiry into,
and a determination of facts, between debtor and creditor, and
that, too, ex "parte and summary in its character, we are at a loss
to understand the meaning of terms; nay, that it is adjudging aud
directing the application* of one person's property to another, on a
claim of indebtedness, without notice to, or hearing of, the parties
whose estate is divested by the act. That the exercise of such
power is in its nature clearly judicial, we think too apparent to
need argument to illustrate its truth. It is so self-evident from
the facts disclosed that it proves itself." 1
[* 105] * A case in harmony witli the one last referred to was
decided by the Supremo Court of Michigan. Under the
act of Congress " for the relief of citizens of towns upon the lands
1 Lane v. Dorman, 3 Scam. 242. In Dubois v. McLean, 4 McLean, 486, Judge
Pope assumes that the case of Lane v. Dorman decides a special act, authorizing
an executor to sell lands of the testator to pay debts against bis estate, would
be unconstitutional. We do not so understand that decision. On the contrary,
another case in the same volume, Edwards v. Pope, p. 465, fully sustains the
cases before decided, distinguishing them from Lane ». Dorman. But that indeed
is also done in the principal case, where the court, after referring to similar cases
in Kentucky, say: "These cases are clearly distinguished from the case at bar.
The acts were for the benefit of all the creditors of the estates, without distinc-
tion; and in one case, in addition, for the purpose of perfecting titles contracted
to be made by the intestate. The claims of the creditors of the intestate were to
be established by judicial or other satisfactory legal proceedings, and, in truth
in the case last cited, the commissioners were nothing more than special com-
missioners. The legislative department, in passing these acts, investigated
nothing, nor did an act which could be deemed a judic al inquiry. It neither
examined proof, nor determined the nature or extent of claims; it merely au-
thorized the application of tie real estate to the payment of debts generally,
discriminating in favor of no one creditor, and giving no one a preference over
another. Not so in the case before us; the amount is investigated and ascer-
tained, and the sale is directed for the benefit of two persons exclusively. The
proceeds are to be applied to the payment of such claims and none other, for
liabilities said to be incurred but not liquidated or satisfied; and those, too,
created after the death of the intestate." See also Mason v. Wait, 4 Scam. 127—
134. The case of Estep v. Hutchman, 14 S. & R. 435, would seem to be
more open to question on this point than any of the others before cited. It wm
the case of a special statute, author zing the guardian of infant heirs to con-
vey their lands in satisfaction of a contract made by their ancestor; and
which was sustained. Compare this with Jones t>. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59, where
an act authorizing a guardian to sell lands to pay the ancestor's debts was held
void.
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of the United States, under certain circumstances," approved May
23, 1844, and which provided that the trust under said act should
be conducted under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed
by the legislative authority of the State," &c, the legislature passed
an act authorizing the trustee to give deeds to a person named
therein, and those claiming under him; thus undertaking to dis-
pose of the whole trust to the person thus named and his grantees,
and authorizing no one else to be considered or to receive any relief.
This was very plainly an attempted adjudication upon the rights
of the parties concerned; it did not establish regulations for the
administration of the trust, but it adjudged the trust property to
certain claimants exclusively, in disregard of any rights which
might exist in others; and it was therefore declared to be
void.1 And it has also been held that, whether a * cor- [* 106]
poration has been guilty of abuse of authority under its
i Cash, Appellant, 6 Mich. 193. The case of Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 858,
is perhaps to be referred to another principle than that of encroachment upon
judicial authority. That was a case where the legislature, by special act, bad
undertaken to authorize the sale of property, not for the purpose of satisfying
liens upon it, or of meeting or in any way providing for the necessities or
wants of the owners, but solely, after paying expenses, for the investment of
the proceeds. It appears from that case that the executors under the will of the
former owner held the lands in trust for a daughter of the testator during her
natural life, with a vested remainder in fee in her two children. The special act
assumed to empower them to sell and convey the complete fee, and apply the
proceeds, first, to the payment of their commissions, costs, and expenses ; second,
to the discharge of assessments, liens, charges, and incumbrances on the land,
of which, however, none were shown to exist; and, third, to invest the proceeds
and pay over the income, after deducting taxes and charges, to the daughter
during her life, and after her decease to convey, assign, orp iy over the same to the
persons who would be entitled under the will. The court regarded this as an un-
authorized interference with private property upon no necessity, and altogether
void, as depriving the owners of their property contrary to the '' law of the land."
At the same time the authority of those cases, where it has been held that the
legislature, acting as the guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act
for themselves by reason of infancy, lunacy, or other like cause, may constitution-
ally pass either general or private laws, under which an effectual disposition of
their property might be made, was not questioned. The court cite, with appar-
ent approval, the cases, among others, of Rice p. Parkman, 16 Mass. 326; Coch-
ran p. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; and Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657. The
case of Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256, was similar, in the principles involved,
to Powers p. Bergen, and was decided in the same way. See also Kneass's Ap-
peal, 31 Penn. St. 87, and compare with Kerr p. Kitchen, 17 Penn. St. 438;
Martin's Appeal, 23 Penn. St. 437; Tharp v. Fleming, 1 Houston, 592.
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charter, so as justly to subject it to forfeiture,1 and whether a
widow is entitled to dower in a specified parcel of land,2 are judicial
questions which cannot be decided by the legislature. In these
cases there are necessarily adverse parties; the questions that
would arise are essentially judicial, and over which the courts pos-
sess jurisdiction at the common law; and it is presumable that
legislative acts of this character must have been adopted carelessly,
and without a due consideration of the proper boundaries which
mark the separation of legislative from judicial duties.3
1 State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Campbell v. Union Bank, 6 How. (Miss.) 661;
Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 G. & J. 122; Regents of University r. William*, 9
G. & J. 3G5. In Miners Bank of Dubuque v. United States, 1 Morris, 482, a
clause in a charter authorizing the legislature to repeal it for any abuse or mis-
user of corporate privileges was held to refer the question of abuse to the legis-
lative judgment. In Erie & North East R. R Co. v. Casey, 26 Penn. St. 287,
on the other hand, it was held that the legislature could not conclude the
corporation by its repealing act, but that the question of abuse of corporate
authority would be one of fact to be passed upon, if denied, by a jury, so tbat
the act would be valid or void as the jury should find. The authority of both
these cases was denied in Flint & Fentonville P. R. Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich.
99, in which it was held that the reservation of a power to repeal a charter for
violation of its provisions necessarily presented a judicial question, and the repeal
must be preceded by a proper judicial finding. In Carey v. Gilt s, 9 Geo. 523i
the appointment by the legislature of a receiver for an insolvent bank was sus-
tained; and in Hindinan v. Piper, 50 Mo. 292, a legislative appointment of a
trustee was also sustained in a peculiar case.
* Edwards v. Pope, 8 Scam. 465.
a The unjust and dangerous character of legislation of this description are
well stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: "When, in the exercise of
proper legislative powers, general laws are enacted which bear, or may bear, on
the whole community, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the constitu-
tion, the whole community will be interested to procure their repeal by a voice
potential. And that is the great security for just and fair legislation. Bat
when individuals are selected from the mass, and laws are enacted affecting
their property, without summons or notice, at the instigation of an interested
party, who is to stand up for them, thus isolated from the mass, in injury and in-
justice, or where are they to seek relief from such acts of despotic power? They
have no refuge but in the courts, the only secure place for determining conflict-
ing rights by due course of law. But if the judiciary give way, and, in the lan-
guage of the Chief Justice in Greenough v. Greenough, in 11 Penn. St. 494,
'confesses itself too weak to stand against the antagonism of the legislature and
the bar,' one independent co-ordinate branch of the government will become the
subservient handmaid of the other, and a quiet, insidious revolution will be
effected in the administration of the government, whilst its form on paper re-
mains the same." Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 268.
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* We! have elsewhere referred to a number of cases where [* 107]
statutes have been held unobjectionable which validated
legal proceedings, notwithstanding irregularities apparent in them.1
These statutes may as properly be made applicable to judicial as
to ministerial proceedings; and although, when they refer to such
proceedings, they may at first seem like an interference with
judicial authority, yet if they are only in aid of judicial proceed-
ings, and tend to their support by precluding parties from taking
advantage of errors which do not affect their substantial rights,
they cannot be obnoxious to the charge of usurping judicial power.
The legislature does, or may, prescribe the rules under which the
judicial power is exercised by the courts; and in doing so, it may
dispense with any of those formalities which are not essential to
the jurisdiction of the court; and whatever it may dispense with
by statute anterior to the proceedings, we believe it may also dis-
pense with by statute after the proceedings have been taken, if the
court has failed to observe any of those formalities. But it would
not be competent for the legislature to authorize a court to pro-
ceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties, without giving
them an opportunity to be heard before it; and, for the same rea-
son, it would be incompetent for it, by retrospective legislation, to
make valid proceedings which had been had in the courts, but
which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties. Such a
legislative enactment would be doubly objectionable: first, as an
exercise of judicial power, since, the proceedings in court being
void, it would be the statute alone which would constitute an
adjudication upon the rights of the parties; and, second, because,
in all judicial proceedings, notice to parties and an opportunity
to defend are essential, — both, of which they would be deprived
of in such a case.2 And for like reasons a statuto validating
1 See post, pp. 371-381.
* In McDaniel v. Correll, 19 HI. 226, it appeared that a statute had been passed
to make valid certain legal proceedings by which an alleged will was adjudged
void, and which were had against non-resident defendants, over whom the courts
bad obtained no jurisdiction. The court say: "If it was competent for the legis-
lature to make a void proceeding valid, then it has been done in this case.
Upon this question we cannot for a moment doubt or hesitate. They can no
more impart a binding efficacy to a void proceeding, than they can take one man's
property from him and give it to another. Indeed, to do the one is to accomplish
the oiher. By the decree in this case the will in question was declared void,
and, consequently, if effect be given to the decree, the legacies -given to those
[117]
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[* 108] proceedings * had before an intruder into a judicial office,
before whom no one is authorized or required to appear,
and who could have jurisdiction neither of the parties nor of the
subject-matter, would also be void.1
absent defendants by the will are taken from them and given to others, according
to our statute of descents. Until the passage of the act in question, they were
not bound by the verdict of the jury in this case, and it could not form the basis
of a valid decree. Had the decree been rendered before the passage of the act,
it would have been as competent to make that valid as it was to validate the ante-
cedent proceedings upon which alone the decree could rest. The want of juris-
diction over the defendants was as fatal to the one as it could be to the other. If
we assume the act to be valid, then the legacies which before belonged to the
legatees have now ceased to be theirs, and this result has been brought about
by the legislative act alone. The effect of the act upon them is precisely the
same as if it had declared in direct terms that the legacies bequeathed by this will
to these defendants should not go to them, but should descend to the heirs-at-Iaw
of the testator, according to our law of descents. This it will not be pretended
that they could do directly, and they had no more authority to do it indirectly,
by making proceedings binding upon them which were void in law." See, to the
same effect, Richards v. Rote, 68 Penn. St. 248.
1 In Denny ». Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361, a judge in insolvency had made certain
orders in a case pending in another jurisdiction, and which the courts subse-
quently declared to be void. The legislature then passed an act declaring that
they "are hereby confirmed, and the same shall be taken and deemed good and
valid in law, to all intents and purposes whatsoever." On the question of the
validity of this act the court say: "The precise question is, whether it can be
held to operate so as to confer a jurisdiction over parties and proceedings which
it has been judicially determined does not exist, and give validity to acts and proc-
esses which have been adjudged void. The statement of this question seems to
us to suggest the obvious and decisive objection to any construction of the statute
which would lead to such a conclusion. It would be a direct exercise by the
legislature of a power in its nature clearly judicial, from the use of which it is
expressly prohibited by the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights. The
line which marks and separates judicial from legislative duties and functions is
often indistinct and uncertain, and it is sometimes difficult to decide within which
of the two classes a particular subject falls. All statutes of a declaratory nature,
which are designed to interpret or give a meaning to previous enactments, or to
confirm the rights of parties either under their own contracts or growing out of
the proceedings of courts or public bodies, which lack legal validity, involve in
a certain sense the exercise of a judicial power. They operate upon subjects
which might properly come within the cognizance of the courts and form the
basis of judicial consideration ami judgment. But they may, nevertheless, be
supported as being within the legitimate sphere of legislative action, on the ground
that they do not declare or determine, but only confirm rights; that they give
effect to the acts of parties according to their intent; that they furnish new and
more efficacious remedies, or create a more beneficial interest or tenure, or, by
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* Legislative Divorces. [* 109]
There is another class of cases in which it would seem that
action ought to be roferred exclusively to the judicial tribunals,
but in respect to which the prevailing doctrine seems to be, that
supplying defects and curing informalities in the proceedings of courts, or of
public officers acting within the scope of their authority, they give effect to acts to
which there was the express or implied assent of the parties interested. Statutes
which are intended to accomplish such purposes do not necessarily invade the
province, or directly interfere with the action of judicial tribunals. But if we adopt
the broadest and most comprehensive view of the power of the legislature, we
must place some limit beyond which the authority of the legislature cannot go
without trenching on the clear and well-defined boundaries of judicial powep."
"Although it may be difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any general rule
which may serve to determine, in all cases, wh"ther the limits of constitutional
restraint are overstepped by the exercise by one branch of the government of
powers exclusively delegated to another, it certainly is practicable to apply to
each case as it arises some test by which to ascertain whether this fundamental
principle is violated. If, for example, the practical operation of a statute is to
determine adversary suits pending between party and party, by substituting in
place of the well-settled rules of law the arbitrary will of the legislature, and
thereby controlling the action of the tribunal before which the suits are pending,
no one can doubt that it would be an unauthorized act of legislation, because it
directly infringes on the peculiar and appropriate functions of the judiciary. It
is the exclusive province of the courts of justice to apply established' principles
to cases within their jurisdiction, and to enforce their jurisdiction by rendering
judgments and executing them by suitable process. The legislature have no
power to interfere with this jurisdiction in such manner as to change the decision
of cases pending before courts, or to impair or set aside their judgments, or to
take cases out of the settled course of judicial proceeding. It is on this principle
that it has been held, that the legislature have no power to grant a new trial or
direct a rehearing of a cause which has been once judicially settled. The right
to a review, or to try anew facts which have been determined by a verdict or
decree, depends on fixed and well-settled principles, which it is the duty of the
court to apply in the exercise of a sound judgment and discretion. These can-
not be regulated or governed by legislative action. Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324,
837; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326; Decbastellux p. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18.
A fortiori, an act of the legislature cannot set aside or amend final judgments
or decrees." The court further consider the general subject at length, and ad-
judge the particular enactment under consideration void, both as an exercise of
judicial authority, and also because, in declaring valid the void proceedings in
insolvency against the debtor, under which assignees had been appointed, it took
away from the debtor his property, "not by due process of law or the law of the
land, but by an arbitrary exercise of legislative will." See, further, Griffin's
Executor v. Cunningham, 20 Grat. 109.
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\
[* 110] the legislature * has complete control unless specially
restrained by the State constitution. The granting of
divorces from the bonds of matrimony was not confided to the
courts in England, and from the earliest days the Colonial and
State legislatures in this country have assumed to possess the same
power over the subject which was possessed by the Parliament, and
from time to time they have passed special laws declaring a disso-
lution of the bonds of matrimony in special cases. Now it is clear
that "the question of divorce involves investigations which are
properly of a judicial nature, and the jurisdiction over divorces
ought to be confined exclusively to the judicial tribunals, under
the limitations to be prescribed by law;"1 and so strong is the
general conviction of this fact, that the people in framing their
constitutions, in a majority of the States, have positively forbidden
any such special laws.2
1 2 Kent, 106. See Levins v. Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 607.
* The following are constitutional provisions: — Alabama: Divorces from the
bonds of matrimony shall not be granted but in the eases by law provided for,
and by suit in chancery; but decrees in chancery for divorce shall be final, un-
less appealed from in the manner prescribed by law, within three months from the
date of the enrolment thereof. Arkansas: The General Assembly shall not
have power to pass any bill of divorce, but may prescribe by law the manner in
which such cases may be investigated in the courts of justice, and divorces granted.
California: No divorce shall be granted by the legislature. The provision is
the same or similar in Iowa, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
Nebraska, Oregon, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin. Florida: Divorces from
the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed but by the judgment of a court, as
shall be prescribed by law. Georgia: The Superior Court shall have exclusite
jurisdiction in all cases of divorce, both total and partial. Illinois: The Gen-
eral Assembly shall not pass . . . special laws . . . for granting divorces. Kan-
sas: And power to grant divorces is vested in the District Courts subject to
regulations by law. Kentucky: The General Assembly shall have no power to
grant divorces, . . . but by general laws shall confer such powers on the courts
of justice. Louisiana: The legislature may enact general laws regulating the . . •
granting of divorce; but no special laws shall be enacted relating to particular
or individual cases. Massachusetts: All causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony
. . . shall be heard and determined by the Governor and Council, until the legis-
lature shall by law make other provision. Mississippi: Divorces from the bonds
of matrimony shall not be granted but in cases provided for by law, and by
suit in chancery. New Hampshire: All causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony
. . . shall be heard and tried by the Superior Court, until the legislature shall
by law make other provision. New York: . . . nor shall any divorce be granted
otherwise than by due judicial proceedings. North Carolina: The General
Assembly shall have power to pass general laws regulating divorce and alimony,
[120]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
01
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. V.] POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. * 111
* Of the judicial decisions on the subject of legislative [* 111]
power over divorces there seem to be three classes of cases.
The doctrine of the first class seems to be this: The granting of a
divorce may be either a legislative or a judicial act, according as
the legislature shall refer its consideration to the courts, or reserve
it to itself. The legislature has the same full control over the sta-
tus of husband and wife which it possesses over the other domestic
relations, and may permit or prohibit it according to its own views
of what is for the interest of the parties or the good of the public.
In dissolving the relation, it proceeds upon such reasons as to it
seem sufficient; and if inquiry is made into the facts of the past,
it is no more than is needful when any change of the law is con-
templated, with a view to the establishment of more salutary rules
for the future. The inquiry, therefore, is not judicial in its nature,
and it is not essential that there be any particular finding of mis-
conduct or unfitness in the parties. As in other cases of legisla-
but shall not have power to grant a divorce or secure alimony in any particular
case. Ohio: The General Assembly shall grant no divorce, nor exercise any
judicial power, not herein expressly conferred. Pennsylvania: The legislature
shall not have power to enact laws annulling the contract of marriage in any case
where by law the courts of this Commonwealth are, or hereafter may be, empow-
ered to decree a divorce. Tennessee: The legislature shall have no power to
grant divorces, but may authorize the courts of justice to grant them for such
causes as may be specified by law; but such laws shall be general and uniform
in their operation throughout the State. Virginia: The legislature shall confer
on the courts the power to grant divorces, . . . but shall not, by special legis-
lation, grant relief in such cases. West Virginia: The Circuit Courts shall have
power under such general regulations as may be prescribed by law, to grant
divorces, . . . but relief shall not be granted by special legislation in such
cases. Missouri: The legislature shall not pass special laws divorcing any
named parties. Under the Constitution of Michigan it was held that, as the
legislature was prohibited from granting divorces, they could pass no special act
authorizing the courts to divorce for a cause which was not a legal cause for
divorce under the general laws. Toft v. Teft, 3 Mich. 67. See also Clark v.
Clark, 10 N. H. 387; Simonds v. Simonds, 103 Mass. 572; s. c. 4 Am. Rep.
676. The case of White v. White, 105 Mass. 325, was peculiap. A woman pro-
cured a divorce from her husband, and by the law then in force he was prohibited
from marrying again except upon leave procured from the court. He did marry
again, however, and the legislature passed a special act to affirm this marriage.
In pursuance of a requirement of the constitution, jurisdiction of all cases of
marriage and divorce had previously been vested by law in the courts. Held,
that this took from the legislature all power to act upon the subject in special
cases, and the attempt to validate the marriage was consequently ineffectual.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. . [CH. V.
tive action, the reasons or the motives of the legislature cannot be
inquired into; the relation which the law permitted before is now
forbidden, and the parties are absolved from the obligations grow-
ing out of that relation wliich continued so long as the relation
existed, but which necessarily cease with its termination. Mar-
riage is not a contract, but a status; the parties cannot have vested
rights of property in a domestic relation; therefore the legislative
act does not come under condemnation as depriving parties
[* 112] of * rights contrary to the law of the land, but, as in other
cases within the scope of the legislative authority, the leg-
islative will must be regarded as sufficient reason for the rule
which it promulgates.1
i The leading case on this subject is Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541. On the
question whether a divorce is necessarily a judicial act, the court say: "A fur-
ther objection is urged against this act; viz., that by the new constitution of 1818,
there is an entire separation of the legislative and judicial departments, and that
the legislature can now pass no act or resolution not clearly warranted by that
constitution; that the constitution is a grant of power, and not a limitation of
powers already possessed; and, in short, that there is no reserved power in the
legislature since the adoption of this constitution. Precisely the opposite of this
is true. From the settlement of the State there have been certain fundamental
rules by which power has been exercised. These rules were embodied in an
instrument called by some a constitution, by others a charter. All agree that it
was the first constitution ever made in Connecticut, and made, too, by the people
themselves. It gave very extensive powers to the legislature, and left too much
(for it left every thing almost) to their will. The constitution of 1818 proposed
to, and in fact did, limit that will. It adopted certain general principles by a
preamble called a Declaration of Rights; provided for the election and appoint-
ment of certain organs of the government, such as the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments; and imposed upon them certain restraints. It found the
State sovereign and independent, with a legislative power capable of making all
laws necessary for the good of the people, not forbidden by the Constitution of
the United States, nor opposed to the sound maxims of legislation; and it left
them in the same condition, except so far as limitations were provided. There
is now and has been a law in force on the subject of divorces. The law wa»
passed a hundred and thirty years ago. It provides for divorces a vinculo matri-
monii in four cases; viz., adultery, fraudulent contract, wilful desertion, and seven
years' absence unheard of. The law has remained in substance the same as it
was when enacted in 16C7. During all this period the legislature has interfered
like the Parliament of Great Britain, and passed special acts of divorce a vin-
culo matrimonii; and at almost every session since the Constitution of the United
States went into operation, now forty-two years, and for the thirteen years of
the existence of the Constitution of Connecticut, such acts have been, in multi-
plied cases, passed and sanctioned by the constituted authorities of our State.
We are not at liberty to inquire into the wisdom of our existing law upon this
[ 122 ]
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CH. V.] P0WER8 EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. * 113
* The second class of cases to which we have alluded [* 113]
hold that divorce is a judicial act in those cases upon
which the general laws confer on the courts power to adjudicate;
and that consequently in those cases the legislature cannot pass
special laws, but its full control over the relation of marriage will
leave it at liberty to grant divorces in other cases, for such causes
as shall appear to its wisdom to justify them.1
A third class of cases deny altogether the authority of these
special legislative enactments, and declare the act of divorce to
be in its nature judicial, and not properly within the province of
thb legislative powep.2 The most of these decisions, however,
lay more or less stress upon clauses in the constitutions other
than those which in general terms separate the legislative and
judicial functions, and some of them would perhaps have been
diffirently decided but for those other clauses. But it is safe to
say, that the general sentiment in the le,gal profession is against
the rightfulness of special legislative divorces; and it is believed
subject; nor into the expediency of such frequent interference of the legislature.
We can only inquire into the constitutionality of the act under consideration.
The power is not prohibited either by the Constitution of the United States or
by that of this State. In view of the appalling consequences of declaring the
general law of the State, or the repeated acts of our legislature, unconstitutional
and void, consequences easily perceived, but not easily expressed, — such as
bastardizing the issue and subjecting the parties to punishment for adultery, —
the court should come to the result only on a solemn conviction that their oaths
of office and these constitutions imperiously demand it. Feeling myself no such
conviction, I cannot pronounce the act void." Per Daggett, J., Hosmer, Ch. J.,
and Bisxell, J., concurring. Peters, J., dissented. Upon the same subject, see
Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463; Wright p. Wright, 2 Md. 429; Gaines v.
Gaines. 9. B. Monp. 295; Cabell p. Cabell, 1 Met. (Ky.) 319; Dickson v. Dick-
son, 1 Yerg. 110; Melizet's Appeal, 17 Penn. St. 449; Cronise v. Cronise, 54
Penn. St. 255; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 ; Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harp. 440;
Noel p. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; and the examination of the whole subject by Mp.
Bishop, in bis work on Marriage and Divorce.
1 Levins p. Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 604; Opinions of Judges, 16 Me. 479;
Adams p. Palmer, 51 Me. 480. See also Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harp. 440. In
a well-reasoned case in Kentucky, it was held that a legislative divorce obtained
on the application of one of the parties while suit for divorce was pending in a
court of competent jurisdiction, would not affect the rights to property of the
other, growing out of the relation. Gaines v. Gaines, 9 B. Monp. 295.
'Bri^bam p. Miller, 17 Ohio, 445; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Ponder
v. Graham, 4 Flop. 23; State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120; Bryson v. Campbell, 12 Mo.
498; Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590. See also Jones v. Jones, 12 Penn. St.
353, 354.
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[CH. V.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
that, if the question could originally have been considered by the
courts, unembarrassed by any considerations of long acquiescence,
and of the serious consequences which must result from affirming
their unlawfulness, after so many had been granted and new
relations formed, it is highly probable that these enactments would
have been held to be usurpations of judicial authority, and we
should have been spared the necessity for the special constitu-
tional provisions which have since been introduced. Fortunately,
these provisions render the question now discussed of little prac-
tical importance; at the same time that they refer the
[* 114] decision * upon applications for divorce to those tribunals
which must proceed upon inquiry, and cannot condemn
without a hearing.1
The force of a legislative divorce must in any case be confined
to a dissolution of the relation; it can only be justified on the
ground that it merely lays down a rule of conduct for the parties
to observe towards each other for the future. It cannot inquire
iuto the past, with a view to punish the parties for their offences
against the marriage relation, except so far as the divorce itself
can be regarded as a punishment. It cannot order the payment of
alimony, for that would be a judgment;2 it cannot adjudge upon
conflicting claims to property between the parties, but it must leave
all questions of this character to the courts. Those rights of
property which depend upon the continued existence of the relation
will be terminated by the dissolution, but only as in any other case
1 If marriage is a natural right, then it would seem that any particular mar-
riage that parties might lawfully form they must have a lawful right to continue
in, unless by misbehavior they subject themselves to a forfeiture of the right
And if the legislature can annul the relation in one case, without any finding
that a breach of the marriage contract has been committed, then it would seem
that they might annul it in every case, and even prohibit all parties from entering
into the same relation in the future. The recognition of a full and complete
control of the relation in the legislature, to be exercised at its will, leads in-
evitably to this conclusion; so that, under the " rightful powers of legislation"
which our constitutions confer upon the legislative department, a relation essen-
tial to organized civil society might be abrogated entirely. Single legislative
divorces are but single steps towards this barbarism which the application of the
same principle to every individual case, by a general law, would necessarily bring
upon us. See what is said by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Bryson v. Bry-
aon, 17 Mo. 593, 594.
* Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 4G3; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 48C.
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f CH. V.] POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. * 114
rights in the future may be incidentally affected by a change in
the law.1
Legislative Encroachments upon Executive Power.
If it is difficult to point out the precise boundary which sep-
arates legislative from judicial duties, it is still more difficult to
discriminate, in particular cases, between what is properly legis-
lative and what is properly executive duty. The authority that
makes the laws has large discretion in determining the means
through which they shall be executed; and the perform-
ance of * many duties which they may provide for by law, [*115]
they may refer either to the chief executive of the State,
or, at their option, to any other executive or ministerial officer, or
even to a person specially named for the duty.2 What can be def-
initely said on this subject is this: That such powers as are specially
conferred by the constitution upon the governor, or upon any other
specified officer, the legislature cannot require or authorize to be
performed by any other officer or authority; and from those duties
which the constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law.3
1 Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 545.
'This is affirmed in the recent case of Bridges v. Shallcross, in the Supreme
Court of West Virginia, not yet reported. The constitution of that State pro-
vides that the governor shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate appoint, all officers whose offices are established by the constitution,
or shall be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise pro-
vided for, and that no such officers shall be appointed or elected by the legislature.
The Court decided that this did not preclude the legislature from creating a Hoard
of Public Works of which the State officers should be ex officio the members.
] Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 522. "Whatever power or duty is
expressly given to, or imposed upon, the executive department, is altogether free
from the interference of the other branches of the government. Especially is
this the case where the subject is committed to the discretion of the chief executive
officer, either by the constitution or by the laws. So long as the power is vested
in him, it is to be by him exercised, and no other branch of the government can
control its exercise." Under the Constitution of Ohio, which forbids the exercise
pf any appointing power by the legislature, except as therein authorized, it was
held that the legislature could not, by law, constitute certain designated persons
• State board, with power to appoint commissioners of the State House, and
directors of the penitentiary, and to remove such directors for cause. State v.
Kennon, 7 Ohio, N. s. 546. And see Davis v. State, 7 Md. 161; also, Bridges
Shallcross, Sup. Court of West Va., not yet reported. As to what are public
officers, see State v. Stanley, 66 N. C. 59; s. c. 8 Am. R p. 488. An appointment
<o office was said in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. 404, to be intrinsi-
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* 115 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. V.
But other powers or duties the executive cannot exercise or assume
except by legislative authority, and the power which in its discre-
tion it confers it may also in its discretion withhold, or confide to
other hands.1 Whether in those cases where power is given by the
constitution to the governor, the legislature have the same author-
ity to make rules for the exercise of the power, that they have to
make rules to govern the proceedings in the courts, may
[*116] perhaps be a question.2 It would seem * that this must
depend generally upon the nature of the power, and upon
cally an executive act. In a certain sense this is doubtless so, but it would not
follow that the legislature could exercise no appointing power, or could confer
none on others than the chief executive of the State. Where the constitution
contains no negative words to limit the legislative authority in this regard, the
legislature in enacting a law must decide for itself what are the suitable, con-
venient, or necessary agencies for its execution, and the authority of the executive
must be limited to taking care that the law is executed by such agencies.
1 "In deciding this question [as to the authority of the governor], recurrence
must be had to the constitution. That furnishes the only rule by which the court
can be governed. That is the charter of the governor's authority. All the pow-
ers delegated to him by or in accordance with that instrument, he is entided to
exercise, and no others. The constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the
legislative department of the government, but it is to be regarded as a grant of
powers to the other departments. Neither the executive nor the judiciary,
therefore, can exercise any authority or power except such as is clearly granted
by the constitution." Field v. People, 2 Scam. 80.
* Whether the legislature can constitutionally remit a fine, when the pardon-
ing power is vested in the governor by the constitution, has been made a question;
and the cases of Haley v. Clarke, 20 Ala. 439, and People v. Bireham, 12 Cal.
50, are opposed to each other upon the point. If the fine is payable to the
State, perhaps the legislature should be considered as having the same right to
discharge it that they would have to release any other debtor to the State from
his obligation. In Morgan v. Buffington, 21 Mo. 549, it was held that the State
Auditor was not obliged to accept as conclusive the certificate from the Speaker
of the House as to the sum due a member of the House for attendance upon it,
but that he might lawfully inquire whether the amount had been actually earned
by attendance or not. The legislative rule, therefore, cannot go to the extent
of compelling an executive officer to do something else than his duty, under any
pretence of regulation. The power to pardon offenders is vested by the several
State constitutions in the governor. It is not, however, a power which neces-
sarily inheres in the executive. State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 22. And several of
the State constitutions have provided that it shall be exercised under such regu-
lations as shall be prescribed by law. There are provisions more or less broad
to this purport in those of Kansas, Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi,
Oregon, Indiana, Iowa, and Virginia. In State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, an act of
the legislature .requiring the applicant for the remission of a fine or forfeiture
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CH. V.] POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. * 116
the question whether the constitution, in conferring it, has fur-
nished a sufficient rule for its exercise. Where complete power to
pardon is conferred upon the executive, it may be doubted if the
legislature can impose restrictions under the name of rules or reg-
ulations; but where the governor is made commander-in-chief of
the military forces of the State, it is obvious that his authority
must bo exercised under such proper rules as the legislature may
prescribe, because the military forces are themselves under the
control of the legislature, and military law is prescribed by that
department. There would be this clear limitation upon the power
of the legislature to prescribe rules for the executive department;
that they must not be such as, under pretence of regulation,
divest the executive of, or preclude his exercising, any of his con-
stitutional prerogatives or powers. Those matters which the
constitution specifically confides to him the legislature cannot
directly or indirectly take from his control.
Delegating Legislative Power.
One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority,
there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency
alone * the laws must be made until the constitution [*117]
itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wis-
dom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted
cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agcn-
to forward to the governor, with his application, the opinion of certain county
officers a.s to the propriety of the remission, was sustained as an act within the
power conferred by the constitution upon the legislature to prescribe regulations
in these cases. And see Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 500. The power to reprieve
is not included in the power to pardon. Ex parte Howard, 17 N. II. 515. It
has been decided that to give parties who have been convicted and fined the
benefit of the insolvent laws is not an exercise of the pardoning powep. Ex parte
Scott, 19 Ohio, n. s. 581. And where the constitution provided that "In all
criminal and penal cases, except those of treason and impeachment, [the
governor] shall have power to grant pardons after conviction, and remit fines
&nd forfeitures," &p.,it was held that this did not preclude the legislature from
passing an act of pardon and amnesty for parties liable to prosecution, but not
jet convicted. State v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 600.
[127]
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* 117 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. V.
cies upon which the power shall'be devolved, nor can it substitute
the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those
to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereigc
trust.1
But it is not always essential that a legislative act should be a
completed statute which must in any event take effect as law, at the
time it leaves the hands of the legislative department. A statute
may be conditional, and its taking effect may be made to depend
upon some subsequent event.2 Affirmative legislation may in some
cases be adopted, of which the parties interested are at liberty to
avail themselves or not at their option. A private act of incor-
poration cannot be forced upon the corporators; they may refuse
the franchise if they so choose.3 In these cases the legis-
[* 118] lative * act is regarded as complete when it has passed
through the constitutional formalities necessary to per-
1 "These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society, and
the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every common-
wealth, in all forms of government: —
"First. They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied
in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at
court and the countryman at plough.
"Secondly. These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately
but the good of the people.
"Thirdly. They must not raise taxes on the property of the people without
the consent of the people, given by themselves or their deputies. And this
properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being,
or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to
deputies, to be from time to time chosen by tfcemselves.
"Fourthly. The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making
laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." Locke
on Civil Government, § 142.
That legislative power cannot be delegated, see Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb.
112; Bradley v. Baxter, ii. 122; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483 ; People v. Stout,
23 Barb. 349; Rice r. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; Santo r. State, 2 Iowa, 165: Gee-
brick v. State, 6 Iowa, 491; State t>. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; State v. Weir, 33
Iowa, 134; People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343; Railroad Company ». Commissioners
of Clinton County, 1 Ohio, N. S. 77; Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507;
Commonwealth v. McWilliains, 11 Penn. St. 61; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342;
Mohmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482; State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 862; State v. Swisher,
17 Texas, 441; State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458.
1 Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch, 882; Bull v. Read, 13 Grat 78;
State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357; Peck t>. Weddell, 17 Ohio, n. 8. 271; Stater.
Kirkley, 29 Md. 85.
3 Angell and Ames on Corp. § 81.
[128]
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CH. V.] POWERS EXERCISED BT LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. * 118
fected legislation, notwithstanding its actually going into operation
as law may depend upon its subsequent acceptance. We have
elsewhere spoken of municipal corporations, and of the powers of
legislation which may be and commonly are bestowed upon them,
and the bestowal of which is not to be considered as trenching
upon the maxim that legislative power is not to be delegated, since
that maxim is to be understood in the light of the immemorial
practice of this country and of England, which has always recog-
nized the propriety of vesting in the municipal organizations cer-
tain powers of local regulation, in respect to which the parties
immediately interested may fairly be supposed more competent to
judge of their needs than any central authority. As municipal
organizations are mere auxiliaries of the State government in the
important business of municipal rule, the legislature may create
them at will from its own views of propriety or necessity, and
without consulting the parties interested; and it also possesses the
like power to abolish them, without stopping to inquire what may
be the desire of the corporators on that subject.1
Nevertheless, as the corporators have a special and peculiar
interest in the terms and conditions of the charter, in the powers
conferred and liabilities imposed, as well as in the general ques-
tion whether they shall originally be or afterwards remain incor-
porated at all or not, and as the burdens of municipal government
must rest upon their shoulders, and especially as by becoming
incorporated they are held, in law, to undertake to discharge the
duties the charter imposes, it seems eminently proper that their
voice should be heard on the question of their incorporation, and
that their decision should be conclusive, unless, for strong reasons
of State policy or local necessity, it should seem important for the
State to overrule the opinion of the local majority. The right to
refer any legislation of this character to the people peculiarly
interested does not seem to be questioned, and the reference is
by no means unusual.2
1 City of Patterson ». Society, &c, 4 Zab. 385; Cheany v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr.
330; Berlin ». Gorham, 34 N. H. 266. The question of a levee tax may lawfully
be referred to the voters of the district of territory over which it is proposed to
spread the tax, regardless of municipal divisions. Alcorn r. Hamer, 38 Miss.
652. And see, in general, Angell and Ames on Corp. § 31 and note; also post,
pp. 190-192.
* Bull r. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33; Morford v.
9 [ 129 ]
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[* 119] * For the like reasons the question whether a county or
township shall be divided and a new one formed,1 or two
townships or school districts formerly one be reunited,2 or a county
seat located at a particular place, or after its location removed
elsewhere,8 or the municipality contract particular debts, or engage
in a particular improvement,4 is always a question which may
with propriety be referred to the voters of the municipality for
decision.
Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; City of Patterson v. Society, &c., 4 Zab. 385; Gorham
v. Springfield, 21 Me. 58; Commonwealth v. Juilges of Quarter Sessions, 8 Penn.
St. 391; Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Penn. St. '.'14; Call v. Chadbourne, 46
Me. 206; State t>. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Hobartt.
Supervisors, &c, 17 Cal. 28; Bank of Chenango r. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467;
Steward v. Jefferson, 3 Harr. 335; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; Lafayette, &c,
R. R. Co. u. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185. The right to refer to the people of several
municipalities the question of their consolidation was disputed in Smith r.
McCarthy, 56 Penn. St. 359, but sustained by the court.
1 State o. Reynolds, 5 Gilm. 1. See State v. McNiell, 24 Wis. 149. The
question whether a general school law shall be accepted in a particular munici-
pality may be referred to its voters. State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458.
* Commonwealth v. Judges, &c, 8 Penn. St. 391; Call v. Chadbourne, 46
Me. 206.
3 Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Penn. St. 214. See People v. Salomon, 51
111. 37.
4 The following are cases in which municipal subscriptions to works of inter-
nal improvement, under statutes empowering them to be made, have been sus-
tained: Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120; Bridgeport ». Housatonic Railroad
Co., 15 Conn. 475; Thomas v. Lelaud, 24 Wend. 65; Clarke v. Rochester, 24
Barb. 446; Benson v. Mayor, &c, of Albany, 24 Barb. 248; Corning v. Greene,
23 Barb. 83; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232; Starin v. Genoa, 29 Barb. 442,
and 23 N. Y. 439; Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Pretty-
man v. Supervisors, &c, 19 111. 40G; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 111. 451; John-
son v. Stack, 24 111. 75; Perkins v. Perkins, ib. 2U8; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis.
195; Clark v. Janesville, ib. 136; Stein v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Mayor of
Wetumpka v. Winter, 29 Ala. 651; Pattison v. Yuba, 13 Cal. 175; Blanding
v. Burr, ib. 343; Hobart v. Supervisors, &c, 17 Cal. 23; Dubuque County ».
Railroad Co., 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; State v. Bissell, ib. 828; Clapp v. Cedar
County, 5 Iowa, 15; Gaines v. Robb, 8 Iowa, 193; McMillen v. Boyles, 6 Iowa,
804; Taylor u. Newberne, 2 Jones Eq. 141; Caldwell v. Justices of Burke, 4
Jones Eq. 323; Louisville. &c, Railroad Co. v. Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637; Nichol
v. Mayor of Nashville, 9 Humph. 252; Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton
Co., 1 Ohio, n. s. 77; Trustees of Paris v. Cherry, 8 Ohio, N. s. 564; Cass
v. Dillon, 2 Ohio, n. s. 607; State v. Commissioners of Clinton Co., 6 Ohio,
n. s. 280; State v. Van Home, 7 Ohio, n. a. 327; State v. Trustees of Union,
8 Ohio, u. 8. 394; Trustees, &c. v. Shoemaker, 12 Ohio, n. 8. 624; State r.
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The question then arises, whether that which may be
done in * reference to any municipal organization within [* 120]
the State may not also be done in reference to the State
at large? May not any law framed for the State at large be made
conditional on an acceptance by the people at large, declared
through the ballot-box? If it is not unconstitutional to delegate
to a single locality the power to decide whether it will be governed
by a particular charter, must it not quite as clearly be within the
power of the legislature to refer to the people at large, from whom
all power is derived, the decision upon any proposed statute affect-
ing the whole State? And can that be called a delegation of power
which consists only in the agent or trustee referring back to the
principal the final decision in a case where the principal is the
party concerned, and where perhaps there are questions of policy
and propriety involved which no authority can decide so satis-
factorily and so conclusively as the principal to whom they are
referred?
If the decision of these questions is to depend upon the weight
of judicial authority up to the present time, it must be held that
there is no power to refer the adoption or rejection of a general
law to the people of the State, any more than there is to refer it to
Commissioners of Hancock, 12 Ohio, n. 8. 596; Powers v. Dougherty Co., 23
Geo. 65; San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Texas, 19; Commonwealth v. McWilliams,
11 Penn. St. 61; Sharpless v. Mayor, &c, 21 Penn. St. 147; Moers v. Reading,
to. 188; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monr. 526; Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B. Monr. 1;
City of St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; City of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74;
Cotton p. Commissioners of Leon, 6 Fla. 610; Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich.
491; Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 639, and 24 How.
326; Same v. Wallace, 21 How. 547; Zabriske v. Railroad Co., 23 How. 381;
Amey u. Mayor, &c, 24 How. 365; Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wal. 176; Thomp-
son v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Rogers v. Burlington, ib. 654; Butler v. Dun-
bam, 27 111.. 474; Gibbons v. Mobile & Great Northern Railroad Co., 36 Ala.
410; St. Joseph, &c, Railroad Co. v. Buchanan Co. Court, 39 Mo. 485; State
v. Linn Co. Court, 44 Mo. 504; Stewart c. Supervisors of Polk Co., 30 Iowa,
9; John v. C. R. & F. W. R. R. Co., 35 Ind. 639; Leavenworth County o. Mil-
ler, 7 Kan. 479; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio, n. s. 14; Ex parte Selma, &c,
R.R. Co., 45 Ala. 696; S. & V. R.R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 149. In several
of tueui the power to authorize the municipalities to decide upon sucb subscrip-
tions has been contested as a delegation of legislative authority, but the courts —
even those which bold the subscriptions void on other grounds — do not look upon
these cases as being obnoxious to the constitutional principle referred to in the
text.
[ 131 ]
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any other authority. The prevailing doctrine in the courts appears
to be, that, except in those cases where, by the constitution, ttw
people have expressly reserved to themselves a power of decision,
the function of legislation cannot be exercised by them, even to the
extent of accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for
their consideration. "The exercise of tins power by the people in
other cases is not expressly and in terms prohibited by the constitu-
tion, but it is forbidden by necessary and unavoidable implication.
The Senate and Assembly are the only bodies of men clothed with
the power of general legislation. They possess the entire power,
with the exception above stated. The people reserved no part of
it to themselves [with that exception], and can therefore exercise
it in no other case." It is therefore held that the legislature have
no power to submit a proposed law to the people, nor have the
people power to bind each other by acting upon it. They volun-
tarily surrendered that power when they adopted the constitution.
The government of the State is democratic, but it is a represen-
tative democracy, and in passing general laws the people act only
through their representatives in the legislature.1
[* 121] * Nor, it seems, can such legislation be sustained as
legislation of a conditional character, whose force is to
depend upon the happening of some future event, or upon some
future change of circumstances. "The event or change of circum-
stances on which a law may be made to take effect must be such
as, in the judgment of the legislature, affects the question of the
1 Per Buggies, Ch. J., in Barto v. Hirarod, 8 N. Y. 489. It is worthy of con-
sideration, however, whether there is any thing in the reference of a statute to
the people for acceptance or rejection which is inconsistent with the representa-
tive system of government. To refer it to the people to frame and agree upon
a statute for themselves would be equally impracticable and inconsistent with
the representative system; but to take the opinion of the people upon a bill
already framed by representatives and submitted to them, is not only practicable,
but is in precise accordance with the mode in which the constitution of the State
is adopted, and with the action which is taken in many other cases. The repre-
sentative in these cases has fulfilled precisely those functions which the people aa
a democracy could not fulfil; and where the case has reached a stage when the
body of the people can act without confusion, the representative has stepped
aside to allow their opinion to be expressed. The legislature is not attempting
in such a case to delegate its authority to a new agency, but the trustee, vested
with a large discretionary authority, is taking the opinion of the principal upon
the necessity, policy, or propriety of an act which is to govern the principal
himself. See Smith v. Jauesville, 26 Wis. 291.
[132]
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expediency of the law; an event on which the expediency of the
law in the opinion of the law-makers depends. On this question
of expediency, the legislature must exercise its own judgment
definitively and finally. When a law is made to take effect upon
the happening of such an event, the legislature in effect declared
the law inexpedient if the event should not happen, but expedient
if it should happen. They appeal to no other man or men to judge
for them in relation to its present or future expediency. They
exercise that power themselves, and then perform the duty which
the constitution imposes upon them." But it was held that in the
case of the submission of a proposed free-school law to the people,
no such event or change of circumstances affecting the expediency
of the law was expected to happen. The wisdom or expediency
of the School Act, abstractly considered, did not depend on the
vote of the people. If it was unwise or inexpedient before that
vote was taken, it was equally so afterwards. The event on which
the act was to take effect was nothing else than the vote of the
people on the identical question which the constitution makes
it the duty of the legislature itself to decide. The legislature
has no power to make a statute dependent on such a
* contingency, because it would be confiding to others [* 122]
that legislative discretion which they are bound to exer-
cise themselves, and which they cannot delegate or commit to
any other man or men to be exercised.1
1 Per Ruggles, Ch. J., in Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 490. And see Santo v.
State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; State v. Swisher, 17 Texas,
441; State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 470;
People v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349; State v. Wil eox, 45 Mo. 458. But upon this
point there is great force in what is said by Redfield, Ch. J., in Slate v. Parker,
26 Vt 357: "If the operation of a law may fairly be made to depend upon a
future contingency, then, in my apprehension, it makes no essential difference
what is the nature of the contingency, so it be an equal and fair one, a moral and
legal one, not opposed to sound policy, and so far connected with the object and
purpose of the statute as not to be a mere idle and arbitrary one. And to us the
contingency, upon which the present statute was to be suspended until another
legislature should meet and have opportunity of reconsidering it, was not only
proper and legal, and just and moral, but highly commendable and creditable to
the legislature who passed the statute; for at the very threshold of inquiry into
the expediency of such a law lies the other and more important inquiry, Are the
people prepared for such a law? Can it be successfully enforced? These ques-
tions being answered in the affirmative, he must be a bold man who would even
vote against the law; and something more must he be who would, after it had
[133]
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[* 123] * The same reasons which preclude the original enact-
ment of a law from being referred to the people woatl
been passed with that assurance, be willing to embarrass its operation or rejoice
at its defeat.
"After a full examination of the arguments by which it is attempted to be
sustained that statutes made dependent upon such contingencies are not valid
laws, and a good deal of study and reflection, I must declare that I am fully
convinced — although at first, without much examination, somewhat inclined to
the same opinion — that the opinion is the result of false analogies, and so founded
upon a latent fallacy. It seems to me that the distinction attempted between
the contingency of a popular vote and other future contingencies is without all
just foundation in sound policy or sound reasoning, and that it has too often been
made more from necessity than choice, — rather to escape from an overwhelming
analogy than from any obvious difference in principle in the two classes of cases;
for . . . one may find any number of cases in the legislation of Congress, where
statutes have been made dependent upon the shifting character of the revenue
laws, or the navigation laws, or commercial rules, edicts, or restric tions of other
countries. In some, perhaps, these laws are made by representative bodies, or,
it may be, by the people of these States, and in others by the lords of the treas-
ury, or the boards of trade, or by the proclamation of the sovereign; and in all
these cases no question can be made of the perfect legality of our acts of Congress
being made dependent upon such contingencies. It is, in fact, the only possible
mode of meeting them, unless Congress is kept constantly in session. The same
is true of acts of Congress by which power is vested in the President to levy
troops or draw money from the public treasury, upon the contingency of a decla-
ration or an act of war committed by some foreign state, empire, kingdom, prince,
or potentate. If these illustrations are not sufficient to show the fallacy of the
argument, more would not avail." See also State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 292; Bull
t>. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Johnson v. Rich, 9 Barb. 680; State v. Reynolds, 5 Gilm.
1; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 349. In the recent case of Smith v. Janesville,
26 Wis. 291, Chief Justice Dixon discusses this subject in the following lan-
guage: "But it is said that the act is void, or at least so much of it as pertains
to the taxation of shares in national banks, because it was submitted to a vote
of the people, or provided that it should take effect only after approval by a
majority of the electors voting on the subject at the next general election. This
was no more than providing that the act should take effect on the happening of
a certain future contingency, that contingency being a popular vote in its favor.
No one doubts the general power of the legislature to make such regulations and
conditions as it pleases with regard to the taking effect or operation of laws.
They may be absolute, or conditional and contingent; and if the latter, they
may take effect on the happening of any event which is future and uncertain.
Instances of this kind of legislation are not unfrequent. The law of Congress
suspending the writ of habeas corpus during the late rebellion is one, and several
others are referred to in the case In re Richard Oliver, 17 Wis. 681. It being
conceded that the legislature possesses this general power, the only question here
would seem to be, whether a vote of the people in favor of a law is to be excluded
from the number of those future contingent events upon which it may be pro-
[134]
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T
■t- render it equally incompetent to refer to their decision the ques-
tion, whether an existing law should be repealed. If the one is
"a plain surrender to the people of the law-making power," so
also is the other.1 It would seem, however, that if a legislative
act is, by its terms, to take effect in any contingency, it is not
unconstitutional to make the time when it shall take effect depend
upon the event of a popular vote being for or against it, — the
time of its going into operation being postponed to a later day in
the latter contingency.2 It would also seem that if the question
of the acceptance or rejection of a municipal charter can be
referred to the voters of the locality specially interested, it would
be equally competent to refer to them the question whether a
State law establishing a particular police regulation should be of
force in such locality or not. Municipal charters refer most
questions of local government, including police regulations, to the
local authorities; on the supposition that they are better able to
Tided that it shall take effect. A similar question was before this court in a late
case (State ex rel. Attorney-General v. O'Neill, Mayor, &c, 24 Wis. 149), and
was very elaborately discussed. We came unanimously to the conclusion in that
case that a provision for a vote of the electors of the city of Milwaukee in favor
of an act of the legislature, before it should take effect, was a lawful contingency,
and that the act was valid. That was a law affecting the people of Milwaukee
particularly, while this was one affecting the people of the whole State. There
the law was submitted to the voters of that city, and here it was submitted to
those of the State at large. What is the difference between the two cases? It
is manifest, on principle, that there cannot be any. The whole reasoning of that
case goes to show that this act must be valid, and so it has been held in the best-
congidered cases, as will be seen by reference to that opinion. We are con-
strained to hold, therefore, that this act is and was in all respects valid from the
time it took effect, in November, 1866; and consequently that there was no want
of authority for the levy and collection of the taxes in question." This decision,
though opposed to many others, appears to us entirely sound and reasonable.
1 Geebrick p. State, 5 Iowa, 491; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 492 j Parker v. Com-
monwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507.
1 State p. Parker, 26 Vt. 857. The act under consideration in that case was,
by its terms, to take effect on the second Tuesday of March after its passage,
unless the people, to whose votes it was submitted, should declare against it, in
which case it should take effect in the following December. The case was dis-
tinguished from Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 488, and the act sustained. At the
same time the court express their dissent from the reasoning upon which the New
York case rests. In People p. Collins, 8 Mich. 848, the court was equally divided
in a case similar to that in Vermont, except that in the Michigan case the law,
which was passed and submitted to the people in 1858, was not to go into effect
until 1870, if the vote of the people was against it.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
decide for themselves upon the needs, as well as the sentiments, of
their constituents, than the legislature possibly can be, and are
therefore more competent to judge what local regulations are
important, and also how far the local sentiment will assist in their
enforcement. The same reasons would apply in favor of permit-
ting the people of the locality to accept or reject for themselves a
particular police regulation, since this is only allowing them less
extensive powers of local government than a municipal charter
would confer; and the fact that the rule of law on that
[* 124] subject might be different in different * localities, accord-
ing as the people accepted or rejected the regulation,
would not seem to affect the principle, when the same result is
brought about by the different regulations which municipal cor-
porations establish for themselves in the exercise of an undisputed
authority.1 It is not to be denied, however, that there is con-
siderable authority against the right of legislative delegation in
these cases.
The legislature of Delaware, in 1847, passed an act to authorize
the citizens of the several counties of the State to decide by bal-
lot whether the license to retail intoxicating liquors should be per-
mitted. By this act a general election was to be held; and if a
majority of votes in any county should be cast against license, it
1 In New Hampshire an act was passed declaring bowling-alleys, situate within
twenty-five rods of a dwelling-house, nuisances; but the statute was to be in
force only in those towns in which it should be adopted in town meeting. In
State v. Noyes, lOlFost. 293, this act was held to be constitutional. "Assuming,"
say the court, "that the legislature has the right to confer the power of local
regulation upon cities and towns, that is, the power to pass ordinances and by-
laws, in such terms and with such provisions, in the classes of cases to which the
power extends, as they may think proper, it seems to us hardly possible seriously
to contend that the legislature may not confer the power to adopt within such
municipality a law drawn up and framed by themselves. If they may pass a
law authorizing towns to make ordinances to punish the keeping of billiard-rooms,
bowling-alleys, and other places of gambling, they may surely pass laws to punish
the same acts, subject to be adopted by the town before they can be of force in
it." And it seems to us difficult to answer this reasoning, if it be confined to such
laws as fall within the proper province of local government, and which are there-
fore usually referred to the judgment of the municipal authorities or their constit-
uency. A similar question arose in Smith v. Village of Adrian, 1 Mich. 495, but
was not decided. In Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467, it was held
competent to authorize the electors of an incorporated village to determine for
themselves what sections of the general act for the incorporation of villages should
apply to their village. See, further, People o. Salomon, 51 111. 87.
[136]
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should not thereafter be lawful for any person to retail intoxicat-
ing liquors within such county; but if the majority should be cast
in favor of license, then licenses might be granted in the county
so voting, in the manner and under the regulations in said act
prescribed. The Court of Errors and Appeals of that State held
this act void, as an attempted delegation of the trust to make laws,
and upon the same reasons which support the cases before cited,
where acts have been held void which referred to the people of the
State for approval a law of general application.1 The same de-
cision was made near the same time by the Supreme
•Court of Pennsylvania,2 followed afterwards in an elabo- [* 125]
rate opinion by the Supreme Court of Iowa.3
By statute in Indiana it was enacted that no person should retail
spirituous liquors, except for sacramental, mechanical, chemical,
medicinal, or culinary purposes, without the consent of the
majority of the legal voters of the proper township who might
cast their votes for license at the April election, nor without filing
with the county auditor a bond as therein provided; upon the filing
of which the auditor was to issue to the person filing the same a
license to retail spirituous liquors, which was to be good for one
year from the day of the election. This act was held void upon
similar reasons to those above quoted.4 This case follows the
decisions in Pennsylvania and Delaware,6 and it has since been
followed by another decision of the Supreme Court of that State,
except that while in the first case only that portion of the statute
which provided for submission to the people was held void, in the
later case that unconstitutional provision was held to affect the
whole statute with infirmity, and render the whole invalid.6
Irrepealable Laws.
Similar reasons to those which forbid the legislative department
of the State from delegating its authority will also forbid its pass-
1 Rice o. Foster, 4 Harr. 479.
'Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507.
'Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 495.
4 Maize o. State, 4 Ind. 342.
s Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507; Rice «. Foster, 4 Harr. 479.
See also State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11 Penn.
St. 61; State v. Copeland, 8 R. I. 38.
„ * Meshmeier o. State, 11 Ind. 484.
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ing any irrepealable law. The constitution, in conferring the leg-
islative authority, has prescribed to its exercise any limitations
which the people saw fit to impose; and no other power than the
people can superadd other limitations. To say that the legislature
may pass irrepealable laws, is to say that it may alter the very
constitution from which it derives its authority; since in so far as
one legislature could bind a subsequent one by its enactments, it
could in the same degree reduce the legislative power of its suc-
cessors, and the process might be repeated until, one by one, the
subjects of legislation would be excluded altogether from
[* 126] their control, and the constitutional provision, that the * leg-
islative power shall be vested in two houses, would be to a
greater or less degree rendered ineffectual.1
"Acts of Parliament," says Blackstone, "derogatory to the
power of subsequent Parliaments, bind not; so the statute 11
Henry VII. c. 1, which directs that no person for assisting a king
de facto shall be attainted of treason by act of Parliament or
otherwise, is held to be good only as to common prosecutions for
high treason, but it will not restrain- or clog any parliamentary
attainder. Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign
power, is always of equal, and always of absolute authority; it
acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature
must have been if its ordinances could bind a subsequent Parlia-
ment. And upon the same principle, Cicero, in his letters to Atti-
cus, treats with a proper contempt those restraining clauses which
endeavor to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures. 'When
1 "Unlike the decision of a court, a legislative act does not bind a subsequent
legislature. Each body possesses the same power, and has a right to exercise
the same discretion. Measures, though often rejected, may receive legislative
sanction. There is no mode by which a legislative act can be made irrepealable,
except it assume the form and substance of a contract. If in any line of
legislation, a permanent character could be given to acts, the most injurious
consequences would result to the country. Its policy would become fixed and
unchangeable on great national interests, which might retard, if not destroy, the
public prosperity. Every legislative body, unless restricted by the constitution,
may modify or abolish the acts of its predecessors; whether it would be wise to
do so, is a matter for legislative discretion." Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean,
161. See this subject considered in Wall v. State, 23 Ind. 150, and State c.
Oskins, 28 Ind. 364. In Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. C23, it was held that one
legislature could not bind a future one to a particular mode of appeal.
[ 138 ]
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you repeal the law itself,' says he,' you at the same time repeal the
prohibitory clause which guards against such repeal.' " 1
Although this reasoning does not in all its particulars apply to
the American legislatures, the principle applicable in each case is
the same. There is a modification of the principle, however, by
an important provision of the Constitution of the United States,
forbidding the States from passing any laws impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts. Legislative acts are sometimes in substance
contracts between the State and the party who is to derive some
right under them, and they are not the less under the protection
of the clause quoted because of having assumed this form. Char-
ters of incorporation, except those of a municipal character,—
and which, as we have already seen, create mere agencies
of government, — * are held to be contracts between the [* 127] ^
State and the corporators, and not subject to modification
or change by the act of the State alone, except as may be author-
ized by the terms of the charters themselves.2 And it now seems <
to be settled, by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, that a State, by contract to that effect, based upon a con-
sideration, may exempt the property of an individual or corpora-
tion from taxation for any specified period or even permanently.
And it is also settled, by the same decisions, that where a charter
containing an exemption from taxes, or an agreement that the
taxes shall be to a specified amount only, is accepted by the cor-
porators, the exemption is presumed to be upon sufficient con- 1< 'v i ,
sideration, and consequently binding upon the State.3 ''IVW'AiiY •
'1 Bl. Com. 90. ^ 1 \*. .
'Dartmouth College p. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Planters Bank v. Sharp,
6 How. 301.
3 Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; New Jersey p. Wilson, 7 Cranch,
164; Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co.
p. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 432; Dodge 0. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mechanics and
Traders Bank v. Debolt, 18 How. 381; Jefferson Branch Bank p. Skelly, 1 Black,
436. See also Hunsaker p. Wright, 30 1ll. 146; Spooner p. McConnell, 1 McLean,
347; post, 280. The right of a State legislature to grant away the right of tax-
ation, which is one of the essential attributes of sovereignty, has been strenuously
denied. See Debolt v. Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co., 1 Ohio, n. s. 568; Mechanics
and Traders Bank v. Debolt, ib. 591; Brewster p. Hough, 10 N. H. 143; Mott
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 30 Penn. St. 9. And see Thorpe v. Rutland and
B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 146; post, 280 and note. In Brick Presbyterian Church
p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5 Cow. 538, it was held that a municipal corpora-
tion had no power, as a party, to make a contract which should control or em-
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Territorial Limitation to State Legislative Authority.
The legislative authority of every State must spend its
[* 128] force * within the territorial limits of the State. The
legislature of one State cannot make laws by which people
outside the State must govern their actions, except as they may
have occasion to resort to the remedies which the State provides,
or to deal witli property situated within the State. It can have no
authority upon the high seas beyond State lines, because there is
the point of contact with other nations, and all international ques-
tions belong to the national government.1 It cannot provide for the
punishment as crimes of acts committed beyond the State boundary,
because such acts, if offences at all, must be offences against the
sovereignty within whose limits they have been done.2 But if the
consequences of an unlawful act committed outside the State have
reached their ultimate and injurious result within it, it seems
that the perpetrator may be punished as an offender against such
State.3
barrass its discharge of legislative duties. And see post, p. 206. In Coats v.
Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 Cow. 585, it was decided that though a municipal
corporation grant lands for cemetery purposes, and covenant for their quiet
enjoyment, it will not thereby be estopped afterwards to forbid the use of the
land, by by-law, for that purpose, when such use becomes or is likely to become a
nuisance. See also, on the same subject, Morgan v. Smith, 4 Minn. 104;
Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Penn. St. 411; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 377; Hamrick v. Rouse,
17 Geo. 56, where it was held that the legislature could not bind its successors
not to remove a county seat; Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Texas, 698; Shaw v. Macon,
21 Geo. 280; Regents of University v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 390; Mott v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad Co., 30 Penn. St. 9. In Bank of Republic v. Hamilton, 21 111-
53, it was held that, in construing a statute, it will hot be intended that the
legislature designed to abandon its right as to taxation. This subject is con-
sidered further, post, pp. 280-284.
1 1 Bish. Cr. Law, § 120.
s State v. Knight, 2 Hayw. 109; People ». Merrill, 2 Park. Cr. R. 590;
Adams v. People, 1 N. Y. 173; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Morrissey v.
People, 11 Mich. 327; Bromley v. People, 7 Mich. 472; State v. Main, 16 Wis.
898.
* In Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320, it was held constitutional to punish in
Michigan a homicide committed by a mortal blow in Canadian waters, from which
death resulted in the State. In Morrissey o. People, 11 Mich. 827, the court
was divided on the question whether the State could lawfully provide for the
punishment of persons who, having committed larceny abroad, brought the stolen
[ 140 ]
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Other Limitations of Legislative Authority.
Besides the limitations of legislative authority to which we have
referred, others exist which do not seem to call for special remark.
Some of these are prescribed by constitutions,1 but
* others spring from the very nature of free government. [* 129]
The latter must depend for their enforcement upon legis-
lative wisdom, discretion, and conscience. The legislature is to
make laws for the public good, and not for the benefit of individu-
als. It has control of the public moneys, and should provide for
property within the State. The power was sustained in People v. Williams,
24 Mich. 156, where the larceny was in another State. And see State v. Main,
16 Wis. 398.
1 The restrictions upon State legislative authority are much more extensive in
some constitutions than in others. The Constitution of Missouri has the following
provision: "The General Assembly shall not pass special laws divorcing any
named parties, or declaring any named person of age, or authorizing any named
minor to sell, lease, or encumber his or her property, or providing for the sale
of the real estate of any named minor or other person laboring under iegal
disability, by any executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or other person, or
establishing, locating, altering the course, or effecting the construction of roads,
or the building or repairing of bridges, or establishing, altering, or vacating any
street, avenue, or alley in any city or town, or extending the time for the assess-
ment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any assessor or collector of
taxes from the due performance of his official duties, or giving effect to informal
or invalid wills or deeds, or legalizing, except as against the State, the unauthor-
ized or invalid acts of any officer, or granting to any individual or company the
right to lay down railroad tracks in the streets of any city or town, or exempting
any property of any named person or corporation from taxation. The General
Assembly shall pass no special law for any case for which provision can be made
hy a general law, but shall pass general laws providing, so far as it may deem
necessary, for the cases enumerated in this section, and for all other cases where
a general law can be made applicable." Constitution of Missouri, art. 4, § 27.
We should suppose that so stringent a provision would, in some of these cases,
lead to the passage of general laws of doubtful utility in order to remedy the
hardships of particular cases. As to when a general law can be made appli-
cable, see Thomas v. Board of Commissioners, 5 Ind. 4; State v. Squires, 26
Iowa, 340; Johnson p. Railroad Co., 23 111. 202. In State v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan-
sas, 178, it was held that the constitutional provision, that "in all cases where a
general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted," left a dis-
cretion with the legislature to determine the cases in which special laws should
be passed. See to the same effect Gentile p. State, 29 Ind. 409, and Marks v.
Trustees of Pirdue University, 37 Ind. 163, overruling Thomas v. Board of
Commissioners, supra. To the same effect is State v. County Court of Boone,
[141]
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disbursing them only for public purposes. Taxes should only
be levied for those purposes which properly constitute a public
burden. But what is for the public good, and what are public
purposes, and what does properly constitute a public burden, are
questions which the legislature must decide upon its own judgment,
and in respect to which it is vested with a large discretion which
cannot be controlled by the courts, except, perhaps, where its action
is clearly evasive, and where, under pretence of a lawful authority,
it has assumed to exercise one that is unlawful. Where the power
which is exercised is legislative in its character, the courts can
enforce only those limitations which the constitution imposes, and
not those implied restrictions which, resting in theory only, the
people have been satisfied to leave to the judgment, patriotism, and
sense of justice of their representatives.1
50 Mo. 317. Compare Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Darling v. Rogers, 7 Kan.
692; Ex parte Pritz, 9 Iowa, 30. Where the legislature is forbidden to pass
special or local laws regulating county or township business, a special act allow-
ing and ordering payment of a particular claim is void, even though the claim,
being merely an equitable one, cannot be audited by any existing board. Wil-
liams t>. Bidleman, 7 Nev. 68. See Darling v. Rogers, 7 Kan. 592. An act
creating a criminal court for a particular county is not in conflict with the consti-
tutional prohibition of special legislation. Eitel v. State, 33 Ind. 201. See
Matter of Bovle, 9 Wis. 261. A constitutional provision that requires all laws
of a general nature to have uniform operation throughout the State is eomplied
with in a statute applicable to all cities of a certain class having less than one
hundred thousand inhabitants, though in fact there be but one city in the State
of that class. Welker c. Potter, 18 Ohio, n. s. 85. See, further, Bourland v.
Hildreth, 26 Cal. 162; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366; McAurich v. Mississippi,
&c, R.R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Rice v. State, 3 Kansas, 141; Jackson v. Shawl,
29 Cal. 267; Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409; State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15;
Ensworth o. Albin, 46 Mo. 450.
1 State v. McCanu, 21 Ohio St. 211,212.
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OF THE ENACTMENT OP LAWS.
*CHAPTER VI. [*130]
OP THE ENACTMENT OP LAWS.
When the supreme power of a country is wielded by a single
man, or by a single body of men, few questions can arise in the
courts concerning the manner of its exercise, and any discussion of
rules by which it is to be governed, in the enactment of laws, can be
of very little practical value. For whenever the sovereign power
expresses its will that a certain rule shall be established, that
expression must be conclusive, whether such forms have been ob-
served in making the declaration as are customary and proper or
not. We may query whether the will has been declared; we may
question and cross-question the words employed, to ascertain the
real sense that they express; we may doubt and hesitate as to the
intent; but when discovered, it must govern, and it is idle to talk
of forms that should have surrounded the expression, but do not.
But when the legislative power of a State is to be exercised by a
department composed of two branches, or, as in most of the
American States, of three branches, and these brandies have their
several duties marked out and prescribed by the law to which they
owe their origin, and which provides for the exercise of their
powers in certain modes and under certain forms, there are other
questions to arise than those of the mere intent of the law-makers,
and sometimes forms become of the last importance. For in such
case not only is it important that the will of the law-makers be
clearly expressed, but it is also essential that it be expressed in
due form of law; since nothing becomes law simply and solely
because men who possess the legislative power will that it shall be,
unless they express their determination to that effect, in the mode
pointed out by the instrument which invests them with the power,
and under all the forms which that instrument has rendered
essential. And if, when the constitution was adopted, there were
known and settled rules and usages, forming a part of the law of
the country, in reference to which the constitution has evidently
been framed, and these rules and usages required the observance of
[ 143 ]
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particular forms, the constitution itself must also be understood as
requiring them, because in assuming their existence, and
[* 131] being * framed with reference to them, it has in effect
adopted them as a part of itself, as much as if they were
expressly incorporated in its provisions. Where, for an instance,
the legislative power is to be exercised by two houses, and by
settled and well-understood parliamentary law, these two houses
are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the deter-
mination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the
separate determination of the other, the constitution, in providing
for two houses, has evidently spoken in reference to this settled
custom, incorporating it as a rule of constitutional interpretation;
so that it would require no prohibitory clause to forbid the two
houses from combining in one, and jointly enacting laws by the
vote of a majority of all. All those rules which are of the essentials
of law-making must be observed aud followed ; and it is only the
customary rules of order and routine, such as in every deliberative
body are always understood to be under its control, and subject to
constant change at its will, that the constitution can be understood
to have left as matters of discretion, to be established, modified, or
abolished by the bodies for whose government in non-essential
matters they exist.
Of the two Houses of the Legislature}
In the enactment of laws the two houses of the legislature are
of equal importance, dignity, and power, and the steps which result
in laws may originate indifferently in either. This is the general
rule; but as one body is more numerous than the other and more
directly represents the people, and in many of the States, is
renewed by more frequent elections, the power to originate all money
bills, or bills for the raising of revenue, is left exclusively, by the
constitutions of some of the States, with this body, in accordance
1 The wisdom of a division of the legislative department has been demon-
strated by the leading writers on constitutional law, as well as by general expe-
rience. See De Lolme, Const, of England, b. 2, c. 3; Federalist, No. 22; 1
Kent, 208; Story on Const. §§ 5-15-570. The early experiments in Pennsylvania
and Georgia, based on Franklin's views, for which see his Works, Vol. V. p. 165,
were the only ones made by any of the original States with a single house. The
first Constitution of Vermont also provided for a single legislative body.
[ 144 ]
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with the custom in England which does not permit bills of this
character to originate with the House of Lords.1 To these
• bills, however,' the other house may propose alterations, [* 132]
and they require the assent of that house to their passage,
the same as other bills. The time for the meeting of the legisla-
ture will be such time as is fixed by the constitution or by statute;
but it may be called together by the executive in special session as
the constitution may prescribe, and the two houses may also
adjourn any general session to a time fixed by them for the holding
of a special session, if an agreement to that effect can be arrived
at; and if not, power is conferred by a majority of the constitutions
upon the executive to prorogue and adjourn them. And if the
executive in any case undertake to exercise this power to prorogue
and adjourn, on the assumption that a disagreement exists between
the two houses which warrants his interference, and his action is
acquiesced in by those bodies, who thereupon cease to hold their
regular sessions, the legislature must be held in law to have
adjourned, and no inquiry can be entered upon as to the rightful-
ness of the governor's assumption that such a disagreement
existed.2
1 There are provisions in the Constitutions of Massachusetts, Delaware, Min-
nesota, Missi>sippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Vermont, Indiana, Oregon, Kentucky, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Virginia, and Maine, requiring revenue bills to originate in the more popular
branch of the legislature, but allowing the Senate the power of amendment usual
io other cases. During the second session of the-forty-first Congress, the House
of Representatives by their vote denied the right of the Senate under the Con-
stitution to originate a bill repealing a law imposing taxes; but the Senate did
not assent to this conclusion. In England the Lords are not allowed to amend
money bills, and by resolutions of 5th and 6th July, 1860, the Commons deny
their right even to reject them.
'This question became important and was passed upon in People v. Hatch,
33 111. 9. The Senate had passed a resolution for an adjournment of the session
line die on a day named, which was amended by the House by fixing a different
day. The Senate refused to concur, and the House then passed a resolution
expressing a desire to recede from its action in amending the resolution, and
requesting a return of the resolution by the Sem.te. While matters st.iod thus,
the governor, assuming that such a disagreement existed as empowered him to
interfere, sent in his proclamation, declaring the legislature adjourned to a day
named, and which was at the very end of the official term of the members. The
message created excitement; it does not seem to have been at once acquiesced
in, and a protest against the governor's authority was entered upon the journal;
but for eleven days in one house and twelve in the other no entries were made
10 [ 145 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
01
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 133 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. VI.
[*133] "There are' certain matters which each house deter-
mines for itself, and in respect to which its decision is
conclusive. It chooses its own officers, except where, by consti-
tution or statute, it is otherwise provided; it determines its own
rules of proceeding, it decides upon the election and qualification
of its own members.1 These powers it is obviously proper should
rest with the body immediately interested, as essential to enable it
to enter upon and proceed with its legislative functions, without
liability to interruption and confusion. In determining questions
concerning contested seats, the house will exercise judicial power,
but generally in accordance with a course of practice which has
sprung from precedents in similar cases, and no other authority is
at liberty to interfere.
Each house has also the power to punish members for disor-
derly behavior, and other contempts of its authority, as well as to
expel a member for any cause which seems to the body to render
it unfit that he continue to occupy one of its seats. This power
is generally enumerated in the constitution among those which
the two houses may exercise, but it need not be specified in that
instrument, since it would exist whether expressly conferred or
not. It is " a necessary and incidental power, to enable the house
to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of
upon their journals, and it was unquestionable that practically they had acqui-
esced in the action of the governor, and adjourned. At the expiration of the
twelve days, a portion of the members came together again, and it was claimed
by them that the message of the governor was without authority, and the two
houses must be considered as having been, in point of law, in session during the
intervening period, and that consequently any bills which had before been passed
by them and sent to the governor for his approval, and which he had not returned
within ten days, Sundays excepted, had become laws under the constitution.
The Supreme Court held that, as the two houses had practically acquiesced in
the action of the governor, the session had come to an end, and that the mem-
bers had no power to reconvene on their own motion, as had been attempted.
The case is a very full and valuable one on several points pertaining to legisla-
tive proceedings and authority.
1 In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, it was held that the correctness of a
decision by one of the houses, that certain persons had been chosen members,
could not be inquired into by the courts. In that case a law was assailed as void,
on the ground that a portion of the members who voted for it, and without whose
votes it would not have had the requisite majority, had been given their seats in
the House in defiance of law, and to the exclusion of others who had a majority
of legal votes. See the same principle in State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309. See
also Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Penn. St. 33G.
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the State. It is a power of protection. A member may be phys-
ically, mentally, or morally wholly unfit; he may be affected with a
contagious disease, or insane, or noisy, violent, and disorderly, or in
the habit of using profane, obscene, and abusive language." And,
"independently of parliamentary customs and usages, our legisla-
tive houses have the power to protect themselves by the punish-
ment and expulsion of a member "; and the courts cannot inquire
into the justice of the decision, or even so much as examine the
proceedings to see whether opportunity for defence was furnished
or not.1
* Each house may also punish contempts of its authority [* 134]
by other persons, without express authority from the con-
stitution therefor ; 2 but where imprisonment is imposed as a pun-
ishment, it must terminate with the final adjournment of the house,
and if the prisoner be not then discharged by its order, he may be
released on habeas corpus?
By common parliamentary law, the members of the legislature
are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of
that body, and for a reasonable time before and after to enable
them to go to and return from the same. 'By the constitutions of
some of the States this privilege lias been enlarged, so as to
exempt the persons of legislators from any service of civil process,4
and in others their estates are exempt from attachment for some
prescribed period.5 For any arrest contrary to the parliamentary
1 Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, 468. And see Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.
* Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1; Stock-
dale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El. 231; Burnham v. Morissey, 14 Gray, 226; State
b. Matthews, 87 N. H. 450.
* Jefferson's Manual, § 18; Priehard's Case, 1 Lev. 165.
* " Senators and representatives shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest. They shall not be subject to
any civil process during the session of the legislature, or for fifteen days next
before the commencement and after the termination of each session." Const, of
Mich. art. 4, § 7. The same exemption from civil process is found in the Con-
ititutions of Kansas, Nebraska, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Missouri, Mis-
sissippi, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Oregon: Exemption from arrest is not vio-
lated by the service of citations or declarations in civil cases. Gentry v. Griffith,
27 Texas, 461; Case «. Rorabacker, 15 Mich. 537.
'The Constitution of Rhode Island provides that "the person of every
member of the General Assembly shall be exempt from arrest, and his
estate from attachment, ip any civil action, during the session of the General
Asaembly, and two days before the commencement and two days after the
[147]
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law or to these provisions, the house of which the person arrested
is a member may give summary relief by ordering his discharge,
and if the order is not complied with, by punishing the persons
concerned in the arrest as for a contempt of its authority. The
remedy of the member, however, is not confined to this mode of
relief. His privilege is not the privilege of the house merely, but
of the people, and is conferred to enable him to discharge the trust
confided to him by his constituents;1 and if the house neglect to
interfere the court from which the process issued should set it
aside on the facts being represented, and any court or officer
having authority to issue writs of habeas corpus may also
[* 135] * inquire into the case, and release the party from the un-
lawful imprisonment.2
Each house must also be allowed to proceed in its own way in
the collection of such information as may seem important to a
proper discharge of its functions, and whenever it is deemed
desirable that witnesses should be examined, the power and
authority to do so is very properly referred to a committee, with
any such powers short of final legislative or judicial action as
may seem necessary or'expedient in the particular case. Such a
committee has no authority to sit during a recess of the house
which has appointed it, without its permission to that effect; but
the house is at liberty to confer such authority if it see fit.3 A
refusal to appear or to testify before such committee, or to pro-
duce books or papers, would be a contempt of the house;4 but
the committee cannot punish for contempts; it can only report
the conduct of the offending party to the house for its action.
The power of the committee will terminate with the final dissolu-
tion of the house appointing it.
Each house keeps a journal of its proceedings, which is a public
termination thereof, and all process served contrary hereto shall be void."
Art. 4, § 5.
1 Coffin p. Coffin, 4 Mass. 27.
* On this subject, dishing on Law and Practice of Parliamentary Assemblies,
§§ 546-597, will be consulted with profit.
3 Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Marshall v. Harwood, 7 Md. 466. See
also parliamentary cases, 5 Grey, 374; 9 Grey, 350; 1 Chandler, 50.
4 Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226. But the privilege of a witness to be
exempt from a compulsory disclosure of his own criminal conduct is the same
when examined by a legislative body or committee as when sworn in court.
Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.
r 148 j
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record, and of which the courts are at liberty to take judicial
notice.1 If it should appear from these journals that any act did
not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the legis-
lature did not follow any requirement of the constitution, or that
in any other respect the act was not constitutionally adopted,
the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute
void.2 But whenever it is acting in the apparent performance
of legal functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made
in favor of the action of a legislative body; it will not be pre-
sumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals, that
either house has exceeded its authority, or disregarded a
* constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative [* 136]
acts, unless where the constitution has expressly required
the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance, where it
requires the yeas and nays to be entered.8
The law also seeks to cast its protection around legislative ses-
sions, and to shield them against corrupt and improper influences,
by making void all contracts which have for their object to influ-
ence legislation in any other manner than by such open and pub-
lic presentation of facts and arguments and appeals to reason as
are recognized as proper and legitimate with all public bodies.
While counsel may be properly employed to present the reasons
in favor of any public measure to the body authorized to pass
upon it, or to any of its committees empowered to collect facts
! Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 111. 297; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 475; People
r. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 2 Penn. St. 446;
McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 430; State v. Moffit, 5 Ohio, 358; Turley v. Logan
Co. 17 111. 151; People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 317; Jones v.
Hutchinson, 43 111. 721; Forelyce v. Goodman, 20 Ohio, N. 6. 1.
1 See cases cited in preceding note. Also Prescott v. Trustees of 111. & Mich.
Canal, 19 111. 324. The case of Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal, 253, appears to be
contra. And see Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Richoux, 23 La. An. 458; s. c.
8 Am. Rep. 600. A remarkable case recently came under judgment in South
Carolina. An act to simplify practice passed the two houses of the legislature.
By the previous law the courts for the county of Barnwell were held at Black-
ville, and the new act contained a provision continuing them at that place. As
presented to and signed by the governor, however, it substituted Barnwell for
Btakville. Held that the provision thus changed was void, — the journals show-
in;: the change, — and that the courts must still be held at Blackville. State v.
Piatt, 2 S. C. (N. 8.) 150.
1 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, x. s. 475; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424; Super-
iors v. People, 25 111. 181.
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and hear arguments, and parties interested may lawfully contract
to pay for this service, yet to secretly approach the members of
such a body with a view to influence their action at a time and
in a manner that do not allow the presentation of opposite views,
is improper and unfair to the opposing interest; and a contract
to pay for this irregular and improper service would not be en-
forced by the law.1
1 This whole subject was very fully considered in the case of Frost v. Inhabi-
tants of Belmont, 6 Allen, 152, which was a bill filed to restrain the payment by
the town of demands to the amount of nearly S9000, which the town had voted
to pay as expenses in obtaining their act of incorporation. By the court, Chap-
man, J.: "It is to be regretted that any persons should have attempted to
procure an act of legislation in this Commonwealth, by such means as some of
these items indicate. By the regular course of legislation, organs are provided
through which any parties may fairly and openly approach the legislature, and
be heard with proofs and arguments respecting any legislative acts which they
may be interested in, whether public or private. These organs are the various
committees appointed to consider and report upon the matters to be acted upon
by the whole body. When private interests are to be affected, notice is given
of the hearings before these committees; and thus opportunity is given to
adverse parties to meet face to face and obtain a fair and open hearing. And
though these committees properly dispense with many of the rules which regu-
late hearings before judicial tribunals, yet common fairness requires that neither
party shall be permitted to have secret consultations, and exercise secret influ-
ences that are kept from the knowledge of the other party. The business of
'lobby members' is not to go fairly and openly before the committees, and present
statements, proofs, and arguments that the other side has an opportunity to meet
and refute, if they are wrong, but to go secretly to the members and ply them
with statements and arguments that the other side cannot openly meet, however
erroneous they may be, and to bring illegitimate influences to bear upon thera.
If the 'lobby member' is selected because of his political or personal influence,
it aggravates the wrong. If his business is to unite various interests by means
of projects that are called 'log rolling,' it is still worse. The practice of pro-
curing members of the legislature to act under the influence of what they have
eaten and drank at houses of entertainment tends to render those who yield to
such influences wholly unfit to act in such cases. They are disqualified from
acting fairly towards interested parties or towards the public. The tendency
and object of these influences are to obtain by corruption what it is supposed
cannot be obtained fairly.
"It is a well-established principle, that all contracts which are opposed to
public policy, and to open, upright, and fair dealing, are illegal and void. The
principle was fully discussed in Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472. In several other
States it lias been applied to cases quite analogous to the present case.
"In Pingrey ». Washburn, 1 Aiken, 264, it was held in Vermont that an
agreement, on the part of a corporation, to grant to individuals certain privileges
[ 150 ]
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* The Introduction and Passage of Bills. [* 137]
Any member may introduce a bill in the house to which he
belongs, in accordance with its rules; and this he may do
in consideration that they would withdraw their opposition to the passage of a
legislative act touching the interests of the corporation, is against sound policy,
prejudicial to just and correct legislation, and void. In Gulick v. Ward, 5 Halst.
87, it was decided in New Jersey that a contract which contravenes an act of
Congress, and tends to defraud the United States, is void. A. had agreed to
give B. $100, on condition that B. would forbear to propose or offer himself
to the Postmaster-General to carry the mail on a certain mail route, and it was
held that the contract was against public policy and void. The general principle
as to contracts contravening public policy was discussed in that case at much
length. In Wood o. McCann, 6 Dana, 366, the defendant had employed the
plaintiff to assist him in obtaining a legislative act in Kentucky legalizing his
divorce from a former wife, and his marriage with his present wife. The court
say: 'A lawyer may be entitled to compensation for writing a petition, or even
for making a public argument before the legislature or a committee thereof;
but the law should not hold him or any other person to a recompense for exer-
cising any personal influence in any way, in any act of legislation. It is certainly
important to just and wise legislation, and therefore to the most essential interest
of the public, that the legislature should be perfectly free from any extraneous
influence which may either corrupt or deceive the members, or any of them.'
"In Clippinger c. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315, it was decided in Pennsyl-
vania that a contract to procure or endeavor to procure the passage of an act of
the legislature, by using personal influence with the members, or by- any sinister
means, was void, as being inconsistent with public policy and the integrity of
our political institutions. And an agreement for a contingent fee to be paid on
the passage of a legislative act was held to be illegal and void, because it would
be a strong incentive to the exercise of personal and sinister influences to effect
the object
"The subject has been twice adjudicated upon in New York. In Harris o.
Roof, 10 Barb. 489, the Supreme Court held that one could not recover for ser-
vices performed in going to see individual members of the house, to get them to
aid in voting for a private claim, the services not being performed before the
house as a body, nor before its authorized committees. In Sedgwick v. Stanton,
4 Kernan, 289, the Court of Appeals held the same doctrine, and stated its proper
limits. Selden, J., makes the following comments on the case of Harris v. Roof:
'Now the court did not mean by this decision to hold that one who has a claim
against the State may not employ competent persons to aid him in properly pre-
senting such claim to the legislature, and in supporting it with the necessary
proofs and arguments. Mr. Justice Hand, who delivered the opinion of the court,
very justly distinguishes between services of the nature of those rendered in that
case, and the procuring and preparing the necessary documents in support of a
claim, or acting as counsel before the legislature or some committee appointed
[151]
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[* 138] at any * tim6 when the house is in session, unless the
constitution, the law, or the rules of the house forbid.
[* 139] The Constitution of Michigan * provides that no new bill
shall be introduced into either house of the legislature
after the first fifty days of the session shall have expired ;1 and the
Constitution of Maryland provides that no bill shall originate iu
either house within the last ten days of the session.2 The purpose
of these clauses is to prevent hasty and improvident legislation,
and to compel, so far as any previous law can accomplish that
by that body. Persons may, no doubt, be employed to conduct an application to
tbe legislature, as well as to conduct a suit at law; and may contract for and re-
ceive pay for their services in preparing documents, collecting evidence, making
statements of facts, or preparing and making oral or written arguments, provided
all these are used or designed to be used before the legislature or some committee
thereof as a body; but they cannot, with propriety, be employed to exert their
personal influence with individual members, or to labor in any form privately with
such members out of the legislative halls. Whatever is laid before the legislature
in writing, or spoken openly or publicly in its presence or that of a committee, if
false in fact, may be disproved, or if wrong in argument may be refuted; but
that which is whispered into the private ear of individual members is frequently
beyond the reach of correction. The point of objection in this class of cases then
is, the personal and private nature of the services to be rendered.'
"In Fuller v. Dame, cited above, Shair, Ch. J., recognizes the well-established
right to contract and pay for professional services when the promisee is to act as
attorney and counsel, but remarks that ' the fact appearing that persons do so act
prevents any injurious effects from such proceeding. Such counsel is considered
as standing in the place of his principal, and his arguments and representations
are weighed and considered accordingly.' He also admits the right of disinter-
ested persons to volunteer advice; as when a person is about to make a will, one
may represent to him the propriety and expediency of making a bequest to a par-
ticular person; and so may one volunteer advice to another to marry another
person; but a promise to pay for such service is void.
"Applying the principles stated in these cases to the bills which the town voted
to pay, it is manifest that some of the money was expended for objects that are
contrary to public policy, and of a most reprehensible character, and which could
not, therefore, form a legal consideration for a contract:"
See f urther a full discussion of the same subject, and reaching the same con-
clusion, by Mr. Justice Grier, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 16 How.
814. See also Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Frankfort v. Winterport, 54
Me. 250. A contract to assist by money and influence to secure the election of
a candidate to a public office in consideration of a share of its emoluments, in the
event of election, is void as opposed to public policy, and if voluntarily rescinded
by the parties a recovery cannot be had of the moneys advanced under it. Mar-
tin v. Wade, 37 Cal. 168.
1 Art. 4, § 28. » Art. 3, § 26.
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result, the careful examination of proposed laws, or at least the
affording of opportunity for that purpose; which will not always be
done when bills may be introduced up to the very hour of adjourn-
ment, and, with the concurrence of the proper majority, put im-
mediately upon their passage.1
For the same reason it is required by the constitutions of several
of the States, that no bill shall have the force of law until on three
several days it be read in each house, and free discussion allowed
thereon; unless, in case of urgency, four-fifths or some other
specified majority of the house shall deem it expedient to dispense
with this rule. The journals which each house keeps of its pro-
ceedings ought to show whether this rule is complied with or not;
but in case they do not, the passage in the manner provided by
the constitution must be presumed in accordance with the gen-
eral rule which presumes the proper discharge of official duty.2
1 A practice has sprung up of evading these constitutional provisions by intro-'
dueing a new bill after the time has expired when it may constitutionally be
done, as an amendment to some pending bill, the whole of which, except the
enacting clause, is struck out to make way for it. Thus, the member who thinks
he may possibly have occasion for the introduction of a new bill after the consti-
tutional period has expired, takes care to introduce sham bills in due season
which he can use as stocks to graft upon, and which he uses irrespective of their
character or contents. The sham bill is perhaps a bill to incorporate the city of
Siam. One of the member's constituents applies to him for legislative permission
to construct a dam across the Wild Cat Rivep. Forthwith, by amendment, the
bill entitled a bill to incorporate the city of Siam has all after the enacting clause
stricken out, and it is made to provide, as its sole object, that John Doe may con-
struct a dam across the Wild Cat. With this title and in this form it is passed;
bat the house then considerately amends the title to correspond with the purpose
of the bill, and the law is passed, and the constitution at the same time saved!
This dodge is so transparent, and so clearly in violation of the constitution, and
the evidence at the same time is so fully spread upon the record, that it is a matter
of surprise to find it so often resorted to.
• Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 1ll. 181; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio,
k. s. 480. In People v. 'Starne, 35 1ll. 121, it is said the courts' should not
enforce a legislative act unless there is record evidence, from the journals of the
two houses, that every material requirement of the constitution has been satisfied.
The clause in the Constitution of Ohio is: "Every bill shall be fully and dis-
tinctly read on three different days, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of
the house in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule "; and in Mil-
ler p. State, 3 Ohio, n. s. 481, and Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, n. s. 178, this
provision was held to be merely directory. The distinctness with which any bill
must be read cannot possibly be defined by any law; and it must always, from
the necessity of the case, rest with the house to determine finally whether in this
[153]
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[* 140] * As to what shall constitute a reading of a bill, it seems
to be held sufficient to read the written instrument that
is adopted by the two houses; and if any thing else becomes law
in consequence of its passage, and by reason of being referred to
in it, it is nevertheless not essential that it be read with the reading
of the bill.1 Thus, a statute which incorporated a military compauy
by reference to its constitution and by-laws, was held valid notwith-
standing the constitution and by-laws, which would acquire the
force of law by its passage, were not read in the two houses as a
part of it.2 But there cannot be many cases, we should suppose,
to which this ruling would be applicable.
It is also provided in the constitutions of some of the States that,
on the final passage of every bill the yeas and nays shall be entered
on the journal. Such a provision is designed to serve an important
purpose in compelling each member present to assume as well as
to feel his due share of responsibility in legislation; and also in
furnishing definite and conclusive evidence whether the bill has
been passed by the requisite majority or not. "The constitution
prescribes this as the test by which to determine whether the
requisite number of members vote in the affirmative. The office of
the journal is to record the proceedings of the house, and authen-
ticate and preserve tho same. It must appear on the face of
the journal that the bill passed by a constitutional majority.
These directions are all clearly imperative. They are
[* 141] * expressly enjoined by the fundamental law, and cannot
be dispensed with by the legislature." 8
particular the constitution has been complied with or not; but the rule respect-
ing three several readings on different days is specific, and capable of being
precisely complied with, and we do not see how, even under the rules applied to
statutes, it can be regarded as directory merely, provided it has a purpose beyond
the mere regular and orderly transaction of business. That it has such a pur-
pose, (hat it is designed to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and is
therefore not a mere rule of order, but one of protection to the public interests
and to the citizens at large, is very clear; and independent of the question wheiher
definite constitutional principles can be dispensed with in any case on the ground
of their being merely directory, we cannot see how this can be treated as any
thing but mandatory. See People v. Campbell, 3 Gilm. 466 ; McCulloch v. State,
11 Ind. 424.
1 Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466.
* Bibb County Loan Association v. Richards, 21 Geo. 592.
'Spangler v. Jacoby, 14' 111. 297; Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25
HI. 183. There have been cases, as we happen to know, in which several bills
[154]
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For the vote required in the passage of any particular law,
the reader is referred to the constitution of his State. A sim-
ple majority of a quorum is sufficient, unless the constitution
establishes some other rule ; and where, by the constitution, a two-
thirds or three-fourths vote is made essential to the passage of any
particular class of bills, two-thirds or three-fourths of a quorum
will be understood, unless the terms employed clearly indicate
that this proportion of all the members, or of all those elected, is
intended.1
The Title of a Statute.
The title of an act was formerly considered no part of it; and
although it might be looked to as a guide to the intent of the law-
makers when the body of the statute appeared to be in any respect
ambiguous or doubtful,2 yet it could not enlarge or restrain the
provisions of the act itself,3 and the latter might therefore be
good when that and the title were in conflict. The reason for this
was that anciently titles were not prefixed at all, and when after-
wards they came to be introduced, they were usually prepared by
the clerk of the house in which the bill first passed, and attracted
but little attention from the members. They indicated the clerk's
understanding of the contents or purpose of the bills, rather than
that of the house; and they therefore were justly regarded as
have been put on their passage together, the yeas and nays being once called for
them all, though the journal is made to state falsely a separate vote on each. We
need hardly say that this is a manifest violation of the constitution, which requires
separate action in every case, and that when resorted to, it is usually for the pur-
pose of avoiding another provision of the constitution which seeks to preclude
"log-rolling" legislation, by forbidding the incorporation of distinct measures
in one and the same statute.
1 Southworth v. Palmyra & Jacksonburg Railroad Co., 2 Mich. 287; State v.
McBride, 4 Mo. 303. By most of the constitutions either all the laws, or laws
on some particular subjects, are required to be adopted by a majority vote or
some other proportion of "all the members elected," or of " the whole repre-
sentation.'' These and similar phrases require all the members to be taken into
account whether present or not. Where a majority of all the members elected is
required in the passage of a law, an ineligible person is not on that account to be
excluded in the count. Satterlee v. San Francisco, 22 Cal. 314.
* United States p. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 480;
Eastman v. McAlpin, 1 Kelley, 157; Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Call, 195. See Dwarris
on Statutes, 502.
» Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wal. 107.
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furnishing very little insight into the legislative intention. Titles
to legislative acts, however, have recently, in some States, come to
possess very great importance, by reason of constitutional pro-
visions, which not only require that they shall correctly indicate
the purpose of the law, but which absolutely make the title to
control and exclude every thing from effect and operation as law
which is incorporated in the body of the act but is not within the
purpose indicated by the title. These provisions are given in the
note, and it will readily be perceived that they make a very great
change in the law.1
[* 142] * In considering these provisions it is important to re-
gard, —
1. The evils designed to be remedied. The Constitution of New
Jersey refers to these as "the improper influences which may
result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as
have no proper relation to each other." In the language of the
1 The Constitutions of Minnesota, Kansas, Maryland, Kentucky, Nebraska,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania provide that "no law shall embrace more than one sub-
ject, which shall be expressed in its title." Those of Michigan, New Jersey,
Louisiana, and Texas are similar, substituting the word object for suhjed. The
Constitutions of South Carolina, .Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas, and California
contain similar provisions. The Constitution of New Jersey provides that, "to
avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same
act such things as have no proper re ation to each other, every law shall embrace
but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title." The Constitution of
Missouri contains a similar provision, with the addition, that, "if any subject
embraced in an act be not expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to
so much thereof as is not so expressed." The Constitutions of Indiana, Oregon,
and Iowa provide that " every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters prop-
erly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any
subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such
act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title."
The Constitution of Nevada provides that " every law enacted by the legislature
shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which
subject shall be briefly expressed in the title." The Conslitutions of New York
and Wisconsin provide that " no private or local bill which may be passed by the
legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in
the title." The Constitution of Illinois is in this regard nearly identical with that
of Missouri. Whether the word object is to have any different construction from
the word subject, as used in these provisions, is a question which may some time
require discussion; but as it is evidently employed for precisely the same purpose,
it would seem that it ought not to have. Compare Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28,
and People v. Lawrence, 86 Barb. 192.
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Supreme Court of Louisiana, speaking of the former practice:
"The title of an act often afforded no clue to its contents. Im-
portant general principles were found placed in acts private or
local in their operation; provisions concerning matters of practice
or judicial proceedings were sometimes included in the same
statute with matters entirely foreign to them, the result of which
was that on many important subjects the statute law had become
almost unintelligible, as they whose duty it has been to examine
or act under it can well testify. To prevent any further accu-
mulation to this chaotic mass was the object of the constitutional
provision under consideration." 1 The Supreme Court of Michigan
say: "The history and purpose of this constitutional pro-
vision are too well understood to require any * elucidation [* 143]
at our hands. The practice of bringing together into one
bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary con-
nection with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all,
and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which
could succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive of the
legislator and dangerous to the State. It was scarcely more so,
however, than another practice, also intended to be remedied by
this provision, by which, through dexterous management, clauses
were inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and
their passage secured through legislative bodies whose members
were not generally aware of their intention and effect. There was
no design by this clause to embarrass legislation by making laws
unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, and thus
multiplying their number; but the framers of the constitution
meant to put an end to legislation of the vicious character referred
to, which was little less than a fraud upon the public, and to re-
quire that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon
its own merits, and that the legislature should be fairly satisfied
of its design when required to pass upon it." 2 The Court of
Appeals of New York declare the object of this provision to be
"that neither the members of the legislature nor the people should
be misled by the title." 3 The Supreme Court of Iowa say: "The
1 Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. An. 298. See Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298.
* People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 491. And see Board of Supervisors v. Heenan,
2 Miun. 336; Davis v. Bank of Fulton, 31 Geo. 69; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo.
878.
'Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 8 N. Y. 253.
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intent of this provision of the constitution was, to prevent the
union, in the same act, of incongruous matters, and of objects
having no connection, no relation. And with this it was designed
to prevent surprise in legislation, by having matter of one nature
embraced in a bill whose title expressed another."1 And similar
expressions will be found in many other reported cases.2 It may
therefore be assumed as -settled that the purpose of these provi-
sions was: first, to prevent hodge podge, or "log-rolling" legis-
lation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature,
by means of provisions in bills of which the titles
[* 144] * gave no intimation, and which might therefore be over-
looked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and,
third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if
they shall so desire.
2. The particularity required in stating the object. The gen-
eral purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has
but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To
require every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a
separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreason-
able, but would actually render legislation impossible. It has
accordingly been held that the title of "an act to establish a
police government for the city of Detroit," was not objectionable
for its generality, and that all matters properly connected with
the establishment and efficiency of such a government, including
taxation for its support, and courts for the examination and trial
of offenders, might constitutionally be included in the bill under
this general title. Under any different ruling it was said, "the
police government of a city could not be organized without a dis-
tinct act for each specific duty to be devolved upon it, and these
could not be passed until a multitude of other statutes had taken
1 State v. County Judge of Davis Co., 2 Iowa, 282.
* See Conner v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5 N. Y. 293; Davis t>. State, 7 Md.
151. The Supreme Court of Indiana also understand the provision in the con-
stitution of that State to be designed, among other things, to assist in the codifi-
cation of the laws. Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 685; Hingle
t>. State, 24 Ind. 28.
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the same duties from other officers before performing them. And
these several statutes, fragmentary as they must necessarily be,
would often fail of the intended object, from the inherent diffi-
culty in expressing the legislative will when restricted to such
narrow bounds." 1 The generality of a title is therefore no objec-
tion to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongru-
ous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered
as having a necessary or proper connection.2 The legislature must
determine for itself how broad and comprehensive shall be the
object of a statute, and how much particularity shall be employed
in the title in defining it.3 One thing, however, is very
* plain ; that the use of the words " other purposes," which [* 145]
has heretofore been so common in the title to acts, with a
1 People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 495. See also Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82,
and Whiting p. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind.
223; Mayor, &c, of Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112; State v. Union, 33 N. J.
354; Humboldt County e. Churchill Co. Commissioners, 6 Nev. 30.
1 Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; People p. Briggs, 50
N. T. 563.
'In State v. Powers, 14 Ind. 195, an act came under consideration, the title
to which was, "An act to amend the first section of an act entitled 'An act
concerning 1 censes to vend foreign merchandise, to exhibit any caravan, mena-
gerie, circus, rope and wire dancing puppet-shows, and legerdemain,' approved
June 15, 1852, and for the encouragement of agriculture, and concerning the
licensing of stock and exchange brokers." It was held that the subject of the
act was licenses, and that it was not unconstitutional as containing more than
one subject. But it was held also that, as the licenses which it author zed and
required were specified in the title, the act could embrace no others, and conse-
quently a provision in the act requiring concerts to be licensed was void. In
State p. County Judge of Davis County, 2 Iowa, 280, the act in question was
entitled "An act in relation to certain State roads therein named." It contained
sixty-six sections, in which it established some forty-six roads, vacated some, and
provided for the re-location of others. The court sustained the act. "The
object of an act may be broader or narrower, more or less extensive; and the
broader it is, the more particulars will it embrace. . . . There is undoubtedly
great objection to uniting so many particulars in one act, but so long as they are
of the same nature, and come legitimately under one general determination or
object, we cannot say that the act is unconstitutional." P. 284. Upon this sub-
ject see Indiana Central Railroad Co. p. Potts, 7 Ind. 684, where it is considered
at length. Also Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Hall v. Bunte, 20 Ind.
304; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182. An act entitled "An act fixing the time
md mode of electing State printer, defining his duties, fixing compensation, and
repealing all laws coming in conflict with this act," was sustained in Walker v.
Dunham, 17 Ind. 483.
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view to cover any and every thing, whether connected with the
main purpose indicated by the title or not, can no longer bo of any
avail .»I ere these provisions exist. As was said by the Supreme
Court of New York in a case where these words had been made
use of in the title to a local bill: "The words ' for other purposes'
must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing, and
amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional require-
ment. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can
be brought in by their aid." 1
3. What is embraced by the title. The repeal of a statute on a
given subject, it is held, is properly connected with the subject
matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a
repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding
the title is silent on that subject.2 So an act to incorpo-
[* 146J rate a railroad * company, it has been held, may authorize
counties to subscribe to its stock, or otherwise aid the
construction of the road.3 So an act to incorporate the Firemen's
Benevolent Association may lawfully include under this title pro-
visions for levying a tax upon the income of foreign insurance
companies, at the place of its location, for the benefit of the corpo-
ration.4 So an act to provide a homestead for widows and children
was held valid, though what it provided for was the pecuniary means
1 Town of Fishkill v. Fishkdl and Beekman Plank Road Co., 22 Barb. 642.
See, to the same effect, Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42
Mo. 578. An act entitled "An act to repeal certain acts therein named," is
void. People v. Mellen, 32 111. 181. An act, having for its sole object to legal-
ize certain proceedings of the Common Council of Janesville, but entitled merer/
"An act to legalize and authorize the assessment of street improvements and
assessments," was held not to express the subject, because failing to specify the
locality. Durkee v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 697.
s Gabbert v. Railroad Co., 11 Ind. 365. The constitution under which tin's
decision was made required the law to contain but one subject, and matters
properly connected therewith; but the same decision was made under the New
York Constitution, which omits the words here italicized; and it may well be
doubted whether the legal effect of the provision is varied by the addition of
those words. See Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barb. 640.
3 Supervisors, &c. v. People, 25 111. 181. So a provision for the costs on
appeal from a justice, is properly connected with the subject of an act entitled
of "the election and qualification of justices of the peace, and defining their
jurisdiction, powers, and duties in civil cases." Robinson v. Skipworth, 28 Ind.
311.
* Firemen's Association v. Lounsbury, 21 111. 611.
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sufficient to purchase a homestead.1 So an act "to regulate pro-
ceedings in the county court" was held to properly embrace a
provision giving an appeal to the District Court, and regulating
the proceedings therein on the appeal.2 So an act entitled " an act
for the more uniform doing of township business" may properly
provide for the organization of townships.3 So it is held that the
changing of the boundaries of existing counties is a matter properly
connected with the subject of forming new counties out of those
existing.4 So a provision for the organization and sitting of courts
in new counties is properly connected with the subject of the
formation of such counties, and may be included in " an act to
authorize the formation of new counties, and to change county
boundaries." 5 Many other cases are referred to in the note which
will further illustrate the views of the courts upon this subject.
There has been a general disposition to construe the constitutional
provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a con-
struction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of
the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted.6
1 Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La. An. 329.
* Morphey v. Menard, 11 Texas, 673.
3 Clinton v. Draper, 14 Ind. 295.
'Haggard p. Hawkins, 14 Lid. 299. And see Duncombe p. Prindle, 12
Iowa, 1.
s Brandon v. State, 16 Ind. 197. In this case, and also in State v. Bowers,
14 Ind. 198, it was held that if the title to an original act is sufficient to embrace
the matters covered by the provisions of an act amendatory thereof, it is unneces-
sary to inquire whether the title of an amendatory act would, of itself, be sufficient.
And see Morford p. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.
• Green v. Mayor, &c, R. M. Charlt. 368; Martin v. Broach, 6 Geo. 21;
Protho p. Orr, 12 Geo. 36; Wheeler v. State, 23 Geo. 9; Hill v. Commissioners,
22 Geo. 203; Jones v. Columbus, 25 Geo. 610; Denham p. Holeman, 26 Geo.
182; Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Texas, 184; Battle v. Howard, 13 Texas, 345;
Robinson v. State, 15 Texas, 311; Conner v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 2 Sandf.
355, and 5 N. Y. 285; Fisbkill v. Plank Road Co., 22 Barb. 634; Brewster v.
Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Williams v. People,
24 2s. Y. 405; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; Sharp v. Mayor, &c, of New
York, 31 Barb. 572; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 51; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525;
Parkinson p. State, 14 Md. 184; Bossier v. Steele, 13 La. An. 433; Lasfon p.
Dufoe, 9 La. An. 329; State v. Harrison, 11 La. An. 722; Williams v. Payson,
14 La. An. 7; Fletcher p. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298; Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199;
Gabbert v. Railroad Co., ib. 365; Railroad Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; Wil-
kins v. Miller, 9 Ind. 100; Foley v. State, ib. 363; Gillespie v. State, ib. 380;
Henry p. Henry, 13 Ind. 250; Igoe p. State, 14 Ind. 239; Haggard v. Hawkins,
ll [161]
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[* 147] * 4. The effect if the title embrace more than one object.
Perhaps in those States where this constitutional provision
t'6. 299; Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 641; Sturgeon v. Hitchens, 22 Ind. 107; Lauer
v. State, ib. 461; Central Plank Road Co. v. Hannaman, ib. 484; Gifford t.
Railroad Co., 2 Stoekt. 171 j Johnson ». Higgins, 8 Met. (Ky.) 566; Chiles t.
Drake, 2 Met. (Ky.) 146; Louisville, &c, Co. ». Ballard," ib. 165; Phillips
v. Covington, &c, Co.,«6. 219; Chiles v. Monroe, 4 Met. (Ky.) 72; Common-
wealth p. Dewey, 15 Grat. 1; Whiting v. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Tuttle
v. Strout, 7 Minn. 465; Supervisors, &c. v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330; Railroad Co.
c. Gregory, 15 111. 20; People p. Mellen, 32 111. 181; Cutlip v. Sheriff, 3 W. Va.
588; McAunich v. Mississippi, &c. R.R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; State v. Gut, 13
Minn. 341; People v. Allen, 42 N.Y. 404; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495.
In Davis v. Woolnough, 9 Iowa, 104, an act entitled "An act for revising
and consolidating the laws incorporating the city of Dubuque, and to establish
a city court therein," was held to express by its title but one object, which
was, the revising and consolidating the laws incorporating the city; and the
city court, not being an unusual tribunal in such a municipality, might be pro-
vided for by the act, whether mentioned in the title or not. "An act to enable
the supervisors of the city and county of New York to raise money by tax,"
provided for raising money to pay judgments then existing, and also any there-
after to be recovered; and it also contained the further provision, that whenever
the controller of the city should have reason to believe that any judgment then
of record or thereafter obtained had been obtained by collusion, or was founded
in fraud, he should take the proper and necessary means to open and reverse the
same, &c. This provision was held constitutional, as properly connected with
the subject indicated by the title, and necessary to confine the payments of the
tax to the objects for which the moneys were intended to be raised. Sharp t\
Mayor, &c., of New York, 31 Barb. 672. In O'Leary v. Cook Co., 28 III. 634,
it was held that a clause in an act incorporating a college, prohibiting the sale
of ardent spirits within a distance of four miles, was so germane to the primary
object of the charter as to be properly included within it. By the first section
of "an act for the relief of the creditors of the Lockport and Niagara Falls
Railroad Company," it was made the duty of the president of the corporation, or
one of the directors to be appointed by the president, to advertise and sell the
real and personal estate, including the franchise of the company, at public auction
to the highest bidder. It was then declared that the sale should be absolute,
and that it should vest in the purchaser or purchasers of the property, real or
personal, of the company, all the franchise, rights, and privileges of the cor-
poration, as fully and as absolutely as the same were then possessed by the
company. The money arising from the sale, after paying costs, was to be applied,
first, to the payment of a certain judgment, and then to other liens according
to priority; and the surplus, if any, was to be divided ratably among the other
creditors, and then if there should be an overplus, it was to be divided ratably
among the then stockholders. By the second section of the act, it was declared
that the purchaser or purchasers should have the right to sell and distribute
stock to the full amount which was authorized by the act of incorporation, and
[162]
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is limited * in its operation to private and local bills, it [* 148]
might be held that an act was not void for embracing two
or more objects which were indicated by its title, provided one of
them only was of a private and local nature. It has been held in
New York that a local bill was not void because embracing general
provisions also ;1 and if they may constitutionally be embraced in
the act, it is presumed they may also be constitutionally embraced
in the title. But if the title to the act actually indicates, and the
act itself actually embraces, two distinct objects, when the consti-
tution says it shall embrace but one, the.whole act must be treated
as void, from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing
between the two, and holding the act valid as to the one and void
as to the other.
5. The effect where the act is broader than the title. But if the
act is broader than the title, it may happen that one part of it can
stand because indicated by the title, while as to the object not
iudicated by the title it must fail. Some of the State constitutions,
it will be perceived, have declared that this shall be the rule; but
the declaration was unnecessary ; as the general rule, that so much
of the act as is not in conflict with the constitution must be sus-
tained, would have required the same declaration from the courts.
If by striking from the act all that relates to the object not
indicated by the title, that which is left is complete in itself,
sensible, capable of being executed, and wholly independent of
that which is rejected, it must be sustained as constitu-
tional. * The principal questions in each case will there- [*149]
fore be, whether the act is in truth broader than the title;
and if so, then whether the other objects in the act are so intimately
connected with the one indicated by the title that the portion of the
the several amendments thereto; and to appoint an election, choose directors,
and organize a corporation anew, with the same powers as the existing company.
There was then a proviso, that nothing in the act should impair or affect the
subscriptions for new stock, or the obligations or liabilities of the company
which had been made or incurred in the extension of the road from Lockport to
Rochester, &c. The whole act was held to be constitutional. Mosier r. Hilton,
15 Barb. 667. And see Mills t>. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400, — a very liberal case;
Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 111. 94; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. 286; Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 8 Bush, 108; State v. St. Louis Cathedral, 23 La. An. 720; Simpson
v. Bailey, 3 Oreg. 515; Neifing r. Pontiac, 56 111. 172.
1 People r. McCann, 16 N. Y. 68.
[163]
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act relating to them cannot be rejected, and leave a comulfte and
sensible enactment which is capable of being executed.1
As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as
they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as
to preclude many matters being included in the act which might
with entire propriety have been embraced in one enactment with
the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded,
because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The
courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title; they are vested with
no dispensing power; the constitution has made the title the
conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have
operation; it is no answer to say that the title might have been
made more comprehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen
fit to make it so. Thus, " An act concerning promissory notes and
bills of exchange" provided that all promissory notes, bills of
exchange, or other instruments in writing, for the payment of money,
or for the delivery of specific articles, or to convey property, or
to perform any other stipulation therein mentioned, should be
negotiable, and assignees of the same might sue thereon in their
own names. It was held that this act was void, as to all the
instruments mentioned therein except promissory notes and
bills of exchange;2 though it is obvious that it would have
been easy to frame a title to the act which would have embraced
them all, and which would have been unobjectionable. It has
also been held that an act for the preservation of the Muskegon
River Improvement could not lawfully provide for the levy and
collection of tolls for the payment of the expense of constructing
the improvement, as the operation of the act was carefully limited
by its title to the future.8 So also it has been held that " au act
to limit the number of grand jurors, and to point oiit the mode of
1 People i). Briggs, 50 N. Y. 566. "None of the provisions of a statute
should be regarded as unconstitutional where they all relate, directly or indirectly,
to the same subject, have a natural connection, and are not foreign to the subject
expressed in the title." Phillips v. Bridge Co., 2 Met. (Ky.) 222, approved,
Smith t). Commonwealth, 8 Bush, 112. See Ex parte Upshaw, 45 Ala. 234.
2 Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199. See also State v. Kiusella, 14 Minn. 524.
3 Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269. See further Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala.
229; Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; Stuart v. Einsella, 14 Minn.
624. In Cutlip v. Sheriff, 3 W. Va. 588, it was held that if an act embraces two
objects, only one of which is specified in the title, the whole is void; but this is
opposed to the authorities generally.
[ 164 ]
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their selection, denning their jurisdiction, and repealing all laws
inconsistent therewith," couM not constitutionally contain pro-
visions which should authorize a defendant in a criminal case, on
a trial for any offence, to be found guilty of any lesser
offence necessarily * included therein.1 These cases must [* 150]
suffice upon this point; though the cases before referred
to will furnish many similar illustrations.
In all we have said upon this subject we have assumed the con-
stitutional provision to be mandatory. Such has been the view of
the courts almost without exception. In California, however, a ■
different view has been taken, the court saying: "We regard this
section of the constitution as merely directory; and, if we were
inclined to a different opinion, would be careful how we lent our-
selves to a construction which must in effect obliterate almost
every law from the statute-book, unhinge the business and destroy
the labor of. the last three years. The first legislature that met
under the constitution seems to have considered this section as
directory ; and almost every act of that and the subsequent sessions
would be obnoxious to this objection. The contemporaneous
exposition of the first legislature, adopted or acquiesced in by
every subsequent legislature, and tacitly assented to by the courts,
taken in connection with the fact that rights have grown up under
it, so that it has become a rule of property, must govern our
decision."2 Similar views have also been expressed in the State
of Ohio.3 These cases, and especially what is said by the Califor-
nia court, bring forcibly before our minds a fact, which cannot be
kept out of view in considering this subject, and which has a very
important bearing upon the precise point which these decisions
cover. The fact is this: that whatever constitutional provision can
be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by
the legislature as if it was devoid even of moral obligation, and to
be therefore habitually disregarded. To say that a provision is
directory seems, with many persons, to be equivalent to saying
that it is not law at all. That this ought not to be so must be con-
ceded; that it is so we have abundant reason and good authority
1 Foley v. State, 9 Ind. 363; Gillespie v. State, ib. .380. See also Indiana
Cent. Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; State
t. Lafeyette Co. Court, 41 Mo. 39; People r. Denahy, 20 Mich. 349.
'Washington c. Murray, 4 Cal. 388.
• Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, n. s. 475; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, n. s. 177.
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for saying. If, therefore, a constitutional provision is to be enforced
at all, it must be treated as mandator. And if the legislature habit-
ually disregard it, it seems to us that there is all the more urgent
necessity that the courts should enforce it. And it also
[* 151] seems to us that there are few evils which * can be inflict-
ed by a strict adherence to the law, so great as that which
is done by the habitual disregard, by any department of the gov-
ernment, of a plain requirement of that instrument from which it
derives its authority, and which ought, therefore, to be scrupulously
observed and obeyed. Upon this subject we need only refer here
to what we have said concerning it in another place.1
Amendatory Statutes.
.It has also been deemed important, in some of the States, to
provide by their constitutions, that "no act shall ever be revised
or amended by mere reference to its title; but the act revised or
section amended shall be set forth and published at full length."3
Upon this provision an important query arises. Does it mean
that the act or section revised or amended shall be set forth and
published at full length as it stood before, or does it mean only
that it shall be set forth and published at full length as amended
or revised? Upon this question perhaps a consideration of the
purpose of the provision may throw some light. "The mischief
designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory stat-
utes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes
deceived in regard to their effects, and the public, from the diffi-
culty in making the necessary examination and comparison, failed
to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An
amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to
1 Ante, p. 74.
2 This is the provision as it is found in the Constitutions of Indiana, Nevada,
Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. In Kansas, Ohio, Nebraska, Michigan, Louisiana,
Wisconsin, Missouri, and Maryland there are provisions of similar import. In
Tennessee the provision is: "All acts which revive, repeal, or amend former
laws, shall recite, in their caption or otherwise, the title or substance of the law
repealed, revived, or amended." Art. 1, § 17.
In Texas it appears to be held that the legislature may repeal a definite por-
tion of a section without the re-enactment of the section with such portion omitted.
Chambers v. State, 25 Texas, 307. But qucere of this. Any portion of a section
amended which is not contained in the amendatory section as set forth and pub-
lished is repealed. State v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631.
[ 166 ]
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substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was
only referred to, but not published, was well calculated to mis-
lead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes
drawn in that form for the express purpose. Endless confusion
was thus introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely pro-
hibited such legislation."1 If this is a correct view of the pur-
pose of the provision, it does not seem to be at all important to
its accomplishment that the old law should be republished, if the
law as amended is given in full, with such reference to the old
law as will show for what the new law is substituted.
Nevertheless, * it has been decided in Louisiana that the [* 152]
constitution requires the old law to be set forth and pub-
lished ;2 and the courts of Indiana, assuming the provision in their
own constitution to be taken from that of Louisiana after the deci-
sions referred to had been made, at one time adopted and followed
them as precedents.3 It is believed, however, that the general
understanding of the provision in question is different, and that
it is fully complied with in letter and spirit, if the act or section
revised or amended is set forth and published as revised or amended,
and that any thing more only tends to render the statute unneces-
sarily cumbrous.4 Statutes which amend others by implication,
however, are not within this provision; and it is not essential that
they even refer to the acts or sections which by implication they
amend.5
1 People ». Mahaney, 13 Mich. 497.
* Walker o. Caldwell, 4 La. An. 297.; Heirs of diverge v. Salter, 5 La. An.
94.
'Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 327; Rogers ». State, 6 Ind. 31. These
cases were overruled in Greencastle, &c, Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382.
4 See Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; People v. Pritchard, 21
Mich. 236; People v. McCallun, 1 Neb. 182; State v. Draper, 47 Mo. 29;
Booneville v. Trigg, 46 Mo. 288. Under such a constitutional provision where
a statute simply repeals others, it is not necessary to set them out. Falconer v.
Robinson, 46 Ala. 340. Compare Bird v. Wasco County, 3 Oreg. 282.
s People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 496; Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41; Branhara v.
Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio, n. s. 573. Repeals by
implication, however, are not favored. Ibid. And see Naylor v. Field, 5 Dutch.
287; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 58; Attorney-General ». Brown, 1 AVis. 525;
Dodge v. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 177; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio, n. 8. 20; McCool v.
Smith, 1 Black, 459; New Orleans v. Southern Bank, 15 La. An. 89; Blain v.
Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Swann r. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151;
State v. The Treasurer, 41 Mo. 16; Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wal. 652.
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It was a parliamentary rule that a statute should not be re-
pealed at the same session of its enactment, unless a clause per-
mitting it was inserted in the statute itself;1 but this rule did
not apply to repeals by implication,2 and it is possibly not recog-
nized in this country at all, except where it is incorporated in the
State constitution.8
Signing of Bills.
When a bill has passed the two houses, it is engrossed for the
signatures of the presiding officers. This is a constitutional re-
quirement in most of the States, and therefore cannot be dis-
pensed witli; though, in the absence of any such requirement, it
would seem not to be essential.4 And if, by the consu-
lt* 153] tution of * the State, the governor is a component part of
the legislature, the bill is then presented to him for his
approval.
Approval of Laws.
The qualified veto power of the governor is regulated by the
constitutions of those States which allow it, and little need be said
here beyond referring to the constitutional provisions for informa-
tion concerning them. It has been held that if the governor, by
statute, was entitled to one day, previous to the adjournment of the
legislature, for the examination and approval of laws, this is to be
understood as a full day of twenty-four hours, before the hour of
the final adjournment.6 It has also been held that, in the approval
of laws, the governor is a component part of the legislature, and
that unless the constitution allows further time for the purpose, he
1 Dwarris on Statutes, Vol. I. p. 269; Sedgw. on Stat and Const. Law, 122;
Smith on Stat, and Const. Construction, 908.
* Ibid. And see Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41.
* Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41; Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513; Smith
on Stat, and Const. Construction, 908; Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. p. State, 29
Ala. 573.
4 Speer v. Plank Road Co., 22 Penn. St. 376.
6 Hyde v. White, 24 Texas, 137. The five days allowed in New Hampshire
for the governor to return bills which have not received his assent, include days
on which the legislature is not in session, if it has not'finally adjourned. Opinions
of Judges, 45 N. H. 607. But the day of presenting the bill to the governor
should be excluded. Ibid. As to the power of the governor, derived from long
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must exorcise his power of approval before the two houses adjourn,
or his act will be void.1 But under a provision of the Constitution
of Minnesota, that the governor may approve and sign "within
three days of the adjournment of the legislature any act passed
during the last three days of the session," it has been held that
Sundays were not to be included as a part of the prescribed time ;2
and under the Constitution of New York, which provided that, " if
any bill shall not be returned by the governor within ten days,
Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, the
same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless
the legislature shall, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in
which case it shall not be a law," it was held that the governor
might sign a bill after the adjournment, at any time within the ten
days.3 The governor's approval is not complete until the
bill has passed beyond his control * by the constitutional [* 154]
and customary mode of legislation; and at any time prior
to that he may reconsider and retract any approval previously
usage, to approve and sign bills after the adjournment of the legislature, see
Solomon v. Cartersville, 41 Geo. 157.
Neither house can, without the consent of the other, recall a bill after its
transmission to the governor. People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 269.
The delivery of a bill passed by the two houses to the secretary of the com-
monwealth according to custom, is not a presentation to the governor for his
approval, within the meaning of the constitutional clause which limits him to a
certain number of days after the presentation of the bill to veto it. Opinions of
the Justices, 99 Mass. 636.
1 Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165. The court also held in this case that, notwith-
standing an act purported to have been approved before the actual adjournment,
it was competent to show by parol evidence that the actual approval was not
until the next day. In support of this ruling, People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, was
cited, where it was held that the court might go behind the statute-book and in-
quire whether an act to which a two-thirds vote was essential had constitutionally
passed. That, however, would not be in direct contradiction of the record,
but it would be inquiring into a fact concerning which the statute was silent, and
other records supplied the needed information.
* Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366.
8 People v. Bowen, 30 Barb. 24. Where on the tenth day the governor sent
a bill with his objections to the house with which it originated, but the messenger,
finding the house had adjourned for the day, returned it to the governor, who
retained it, it was held that to prevent the bill becoming a law it should have
been left with the proper officer of the house instead of being retained by the
governor. Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189.
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made.1 His disapproval of a bill is communicated to the house in
which it originated, with his reasons; and it is there reconsidered,
and may be again passed over the veto by such vote as the consti-
tution prescribes.2
1 People v. Hatch, 19 111. 283. An act apportioning the representatives was
passed by the legislature and transmitted to the governor, who signed his appro-
val thereon by mistake, supposing at the time that he was subscribing one of
several other bills then lying before him, and claiming his official attention; his
private secretary thereupon reported the bill to the legislature as approved, not
by the special direction of the governor, nor with his knowledge or special assent,
but merely in his usual routine of customary duty, the governor not being con-
scious that he had placed his signature to the bill until after information was
brought to him of its having been reported approved; whereupon he sent a mes-
sage to the speaker of the house to which it was reported, stating that it had
been inadvertently signed and not approved, and on the same day completed a
veto message of the bill which was partially written at the time of signing his
approval, and transmitted it to the house where the bill originated, having first
erased his signature and approval. It was held that the bill had not become a
law. It had never passed out of the governor's possession after it was received
by him until after be had erased his signature and approval, and the court was
of opinion that it did not pass from his control until it had become, a law by the
lapse often days under the constitution, or by his depositing it with his approval
in the office of the secretary of state. It had long been the practice of the gov-
ernor to report, formerly through the secretary of state, but recently through his
private secretary, to the house where bills originated, his approval of them; but
this was only a matter of formal courtesy, and not a proceeding necessary to the
making or imparting vitality to the law. By it no act could become a law which
without it would not be a law. Had the governor returned the bill itself to the
house, with his message of approval, it would have passed beyond his control,
and the approval could not have been retracted, unless the bill had been with-
drawn by consent of the house; and the same result would have followed his
filing the bill with the secretary of state with his approval subscribed.
The Constitution of Indiana provides, art. 5, § 14, that, "if any bill shall not
be returned by the governor within three days, Sundays excepted, after it shall
have been presented to him, it shall be a law without his signature, unless the
general adjournment shall prevent its return; in which case it shall be a law
unless the governor, within five days next after the adjournment, shall file suc'1
bill with his objections thereto, in the office of the secretary of state," &c. Under
this provision it was held that where the governor, on the day of the final ad-
journment of the legislature, and after the adjournment, filed a bill received that
day, in the office of the secretary of state, without approval or objections thereto,
it thereby became a law, and he could not file objections afterwards. Tarlton v.
Peggs, 18 Ind. 24.
* A bill which, as approved and signed, differs in important particulars from
the one signed, is no law. Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721.
If the governor sends back a bill which has been submitted to him, stating
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* Other Powers of the Governor. [* 155]
The power of the governor as a branch of the legislative depart-
ment is almost exclusively confined to the approval of bills. As
executive, he communicates to the two houses information con-
cerning the condition of the State, and may recommend measures
to their consideration, but he cannot originate or introduce bills.
He may convene the legislature in extra session whenever extra-
ordinary occasion seems to have arisen; but their powers when
convened are not confined to a consideration of the subjects to
which their attention is called by his proclamation or his message,
and they may legislate on any subject as at tho regular sessions.1
An exception to this statement exists in those States where, by the
express terms of the constitution, it is provided that when convened
in extra session the legislature shall consider no subject except
that for which they were specially called together, or which may
that he cannot act upon it because of some supposed informality in its passage,
this is in effect an objection to the bill, and it can only become a law by further
action of the legislature, even though the governor may have been mistaken as
to the supposed informality. Birdsall v. Carrick, 3 Nev. 154.
In practice the veto power, although very great and exceedingly important in
this country, is obsolete in Great Britain, and no king now ventures to resort to
it As the Ministry must at all times be in accord with the House of Commons,
— except where the responsibility is taken of dissolving the Parliament and
appealing to the people, — it must follow that any bill which the two houses have
passed must be approved by the monarch. The approval has become a matter
of course, and the governing power in Great Britain is substantially in the House
of Commons. 1 Bl. Com. 184-5, and notes.
1 The Constitution of Iowa, art. 4, § 11, provides that the governor "may,
on extraordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly by proclamation, and
shall state to both houses, when assembled, the purpose for which they have been
convened." It was held in Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82, that the General
Assembly, when thus convened, were not confined in their legislation to the pur-
poses specified in the message. "When lawfully convened, whether in virtue of
the provision in the constitution or the governor's proclamation, it is the ' General
Assembly' of the State, in which the full and exclusive legislative authority of
the State is vested. Where its business at such session is not restricted by some
constitutional provision, the General Assembly may enact any law at a special or
extra session that it might at a regular session. Its powers, not being derived
from the governor's proclamation, are not confined to the special purpose for
which it may have been convened by him."
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have been submitted to them by special message of the gov-
ernor.1
. Wlien Acts are to take Effect.
The old rule was that statutes, unless otherwise ordered, took
effect from the first day of the session on which they were
[* 156] passed ;2 * but this rule was purely arbitrary, based upon
no good reason, and frequently working very serious in-
justice. The present rule is that an act takes effect from the time
when the formalities of enactment are actually complete under the
constitution, unless it is otherwise ordered, or unless there is some
constitutional or statutory rule on the subject which prescribes
otherwise. By the Constitution of Mississippi,3 " no law of a gen-
eral nature, unless otherwise provided, shall be enforced until sixty
days after the passage thereof." By the Constitution of Illinois,1
no' act of the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day
of July next after its passage, unless in case of emergency (which
emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of the act)
the General Assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of all the mem-
bers elected to each house, otherwise direct. By the Constitution
of Michigan,6 no public act shall take effect, or be in force, until
the expiration of ninety days from the end of the session at which
the same is passed, unless the legislature shall otherwise direct by
a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house. These
and similar provisions are designed to secure, as far as possible,
the public promulgation of the law before parties are bound to
take notice of and act under it, and to obviate the injustice of a
rule which should compel parties at their peril to know and obey a
law of which, in the nature of things, they could not possibly have
heard; they give to all parties the full constitutional period in
which to become acquainted with the terms of the statutes which
1 Provisions to this effect will be found in the Constitutions of Illinois, Michi-
gan, Missouri, and Nevada; perhaps in some others.
* 1 Lev. 91; Latless e. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660. This is changed by 33 Geo.
HI. c. 13, by which statutes since passed take effect from the day when they
receive the royal assent, unless otherwise ordered therein. Where an act is to
take effeot from and after its passage, it will do so, even though not promulgated
in the official journal. Thomas o. Scott, 23 La. An. 689. And its effect covers
the whole day of its approval. Wood v. Fort, 42 Ala. 641.
3 Art. 7, § 6. 4 Art. 3, § 23. 6 Art. 4, § 20.
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are passed, except when the legislature has otherwise directed ; and
no one is bound to govern his conduct by the new law until that
period has elapsed.1 And the fact that, by the terms of the statute,
something is to be done under it before the expiration of the consti-
tutional period for it to take effect, will not amount to a legislative
direction that the act shall take effect at that time, if the act itself
is silent as to the period when it shall go into operation.2
* The Constitution of Indiana provides3 that "no act [* 157]
shall take effect until the same shall have been published
and circulated in the several counties of this State, by authority,
except in case of emergency; which emergency shall be declared
in the preamble, or in the body of the law." Unless the emer-
gency is thus declared, it is plain that the act cannot take earlier
effect.4 But the courts will not inquire too nicely into the mode
of publication. If the laws are distributed in bound volumes, in
a manner and shape not substantially contrary to the statute on
that subject, and by the proper authority, it will be held sufficient,
notwithstanding a failure to comply with some of the directory
provisions of the statute on the subject of publication.5
1 Price v. Ilopkin, 13 Mich. 318. See, however, Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick.
430; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153. Where a law has failed to take effect for
want of publication, all parties are chargeable with notice of that fact. Clark
r. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136.
* Supervisors of Iroquois Co. v. Ready, 34 111. 293. An act for the removal
of a county seat provided for taking the vote of the electors of the county upon
it on the 17th of March, 1863, at which time the legislature had not adjourned.
It was not expressly declared in the act at what time it should take effect, and it
was therefore held that it would not take effect until sixty days from the end of
the session, and a vote of the electors taken on the 17th of March was void.
And it was also held in this case, and in Wheeler r. Chubbuck, 16 111. 361, that
"the direction must be made in a clear, distinct, and unequivocal provision, and
could not be helped out by any sort of intendment or implication,1' and that the
act must all take effect at once, and not by piecemeal.
* Art. 4, § 28.
4 Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415; Hendrickson t>. Hendrickson, 7
Ind. 13; Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98. The legislature must necessarily in these
cases be judge of the existence of the emergency. Carpenter v. Montgomery,
tupra. The Constitution of Tennessee provides that "No law of a general
nature shall take effect until forty days after its passage, unless the same, or the
caption, shall state that the public welfare requires that it should take effect
Kroner." Art. 1, § 20.
s State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46. See further, as to this constitutional provision,
Jones r. Cavins, 4 Ind. 305.
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The Constitution of Wisconsin, on the other hand, provides1
that "no general law shall be in force until published "; thus
leaving the time when it should take effect to depend, not alone
upon the legislative direction, but upon the further fact of publi-
cation. But what shall be the mode of publication seems to be
left to the legislative determination. It has been held, however,
that a general law was to be regarded as published although
printed in the volume of private laws, instead of the volume of
public laws as the statute of the State would require.2 But an
unauthorized publication — as, for example, of an act for the in-
corporation of a city in two local papers instead of the State
paper — is no publication in the constitutional sense.3
[* 158] * The Constitution of Iowa provides that " no law of the
General Assembly, passed at a regular session, of a public
nature, shall take effect until the fourth day of July next after the
passage thereof. Laws passed at a special session shall take
effect ninety days after the adjournment of the General Assembly
by which they were passed. If the General Assembly shall deem
any law of immediate importance, they may provide that the same
shall take effect by publication in newspapers in the State."4
Under this section it is not competent for the legislature to con-
fer upon the governor the discretionary power which the consti-
tution gives to that body, to fix an earlier day for the law to take
effect.6
'Art. 7, § 21.
* Matter of Boyle, 9 Wis. 264. Under this provision it has been decided that
a law establishing a municipal court in a city is a general law. Matter of Boyle,
supra. See Eitel t>. State, 83 Ind. 201. Also a statute jbr the removal of a
county seat. State t>. Lean, 9 Wis. 279. Also a statute incorporating a muni-
cipality, or authorizing it to issue bonds in aid of a railroad. Clark v. Janes-
ville, 10 Wis. 136. And see Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa, 70.
3 Clark p. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136. See; further, Mills v. Jefferson, 20 Wis.
50.
4 Art. 3, § 26.
5 Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa, 70; Pilkey v. Gleason, ib. 522.
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* CHAPTER VII. [*159]
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT
MAY BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
We have now examined somewhat briefly the legislative power
of the State, and the bounds which expressly or by implication are
set to it, and also some of the conditions necessary to its proper
and valid exercise. In so doing it has been made apparent that,
under some circumstances, it may become the duty of the courts
to declare that what the legislature has assumed to enact is void,
either from want of constitutional power to enact it, or because the
constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed. In the
further examination of our subject, it will be important to consider
what the circumstances aro under which the courts will feel im-
pelled to exercise this high prerogative, and what precautions
should be observed before assuming to do so.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legis-
lative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the
fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in
any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty
and official oath decline the responsibility. The legislative and
judicial are co-ordinate departments of the government, of equal
dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper func-
tions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the
limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of
the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of
power which, by the constitution, is not conferred upon it. The
constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not
make any one of the three departments subordinate to another,
when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare
legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but
not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to
the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the
cases which come before them, they must enforce the con-
stitution as the paramount law, whenever a legislative * en- [* 160]
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actment comes in conflict with it.1 But the courts sit, not to
review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce the legisla-
tive will; and it is only where they find that the legislature has
failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at
liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what
every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the
courts when the judges assume to act and to render judgments or
decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority,
the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the adminis-
trators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void,
it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative
power, but because the act is forbidden by the constitution, and
because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is para-
mount to that of their representatives expressed in any law." 2
Nevertheless, in declaring a law unconstitutional, a court must
necessarily cover the same ground which has already been covered
by the legislative department in deciding upon the propriety of
enacting the law, and they must indirectly overrule the decision of
that co-ordinate department. The task is therefore a delicate one,
and only to be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation. It is
a solemn act in any case to declare that that body of men to whom
the people have committed the sovereign function of making the
laws for the commonwealth, have deliberately disregarded the limi-
tations imposed upon this delegated authority, and usurped power
which the people have been careful to withhold; and it is almost
equally so when the act which is adjudged to be unconstitutional
appears to be chargeable rather to careless and improvident action,
or error in judgment, than to intentional disregard of obligation.
But the duty to do this in a proper case, though at one time
doubted, and by some persons persistently denied, it is now gener-
ally agreed that the courts cannot properly decline, and in its per-
formance they seldom fail of proper support if they proceed with
due caution and circumspection, and under a proper sense as well
of their own responsibility, as of the respect due to the action and
judgment of the law-makers.3
1 Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 834; Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Co.,
18 Wend. 53.
* Lindsay v. Commissioners, &p., 2 Bay, 61.
• There are at least two cases in American judicial history where judges have
been impeached as criminals for refusing to enforce unconstitutional enactments.
[176]
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* I. Ia view of the considerations which have been sug- [* 161]
gested, the rule which is adopted by some courts, that they
One of these — the case oi'Trevett v. Weedon, decided by the Superior Court of
Rbode Island in 1786 — is particularly interesting as being the first case in which
a legislative enactment was declared unconstitutional and void on the ground of
incompatibility with the State constitution. Mr. Arnold, in his history of Rhode
Island, vol. 2, ch. 24, gives an account of this case; and the printed brief in
opposition to the law, and in defence of the impeached judges, is in possession
of the present writer. The act in question was one which imposed a heavy
penalty on any one who should refuse to receive on the same terms as specie the
bills of a bank chartered by the State, or who should in any way discourage
the circulation of such bills. The penalty was made collectible on summary
conviction, without jury trial; and the act was held void on the ground that jury
trial was expressly given by the colonial charter, which then constituted the
constitution of the State. Although the judges were not removed on impeach-
ment, the legislature refused to re-elect them when their terms expired at the
end of the year, and supplanted them by more pliant tools, by whose assistance
the paper money was forced into circulation, and public and private debts extin-
guished by means of it. Concerning the other case, we copy from the Western
Law Monthly, " Sketch of Hon. Calvin Pease," vol. 5, p. 3, June, 1863: "The
first session of the Supreme Court [of Ohio] under the constitution was held at
Warren, Trumbull County, on the first Tuesday of June, 1803. The State was
divided into three circuits. . . . The third circuit of the State was composed of
the counties of Washington, Belmont, Jefferson, Columbiania, and Trumbull.
At this session of the legislature, Mr. Pease was appointed President Judge of
the Third Circuit in April, 1803, and though nearly twenty-seven years old, he
was very youthful in his appearance. He held the office until March 4, 1810,
when he sent his resignation to Governor Huntingdon. . . . During his term of
service upon the bench many interesting questions were presented for decision,
and among them the constitutionality of some portion of the act of 1805, defining
the duties of justices of the peace; and he decided that so much of the fifth
section as gave justices of the peace jurisdiction exceeding $20, and so much of
the twenty-ninth section as prevented plaintiffs from recovering costs in actions
commenced by original writs in the Court of Common Pleas, for sums between
$20 and $50, were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and of the
State of Ohio, and therefore null and void. . . . The clamor and abuse to which
this decision gave rise was not in the least mitigated or diminished by the circum-
stance that it was concurred in by a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court,
Messrs. Huntingdon and Tod. ... At the session of the legislature of 1807-8,
steps were taken to impeach him and the judges of the Supreme Court who con-
curred with him; but the resolutions introduced into the house were not acted
upon during the session. But the scheme was not abandoned. At an early day
of the next session, and with almost indecent haste, a committee was appointed
to inquire into the conduct of the offending judges, and with leave to exhibit
articles of impeachment, or report otherwise, as the facts might justify. The
committee without delay reported articles of impeachment against Messrs. Pease
12 [ 177 ]
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[* 162] will not * decide a legislative act to be unconstitutional by
a majority of a bare quorum of the judges only, — less than
a majority of all,— but will instead postpone the argument until
the bench is full, seems a very prudent and proper precaution to
be observed before entering upon questions so delicate and so im-
portant. The benefit of the wisdom and deliberation of every
judge ought to be had under circumstances so grave. Something
more than private rights are involved; the fundamental law of the
State is in question, as well as the correctness of legislative actiou;
and considerations of courtesy, as well as the importance of the
question involved, should lead the court to decline to act at all,
where they cannot sustain the legislative action, until a full bench
has been consulted, and its deliberate opinion is found to be against
it. But this is a rule of propriety, not of constitutional obligation;
and though generally adopted and observed, each court will regu-
late, in its own discretion, its practice in this particular.1
and Tod, but not against Huntingdon, who in the mean time had been elected
governor of the State. . . . The articles of impeachment were preferred by the
House of Representatives on the 23d day of December, 1808. He was sum-
moned at once to appear before the Senate as a high court of impeachment, and
he promptly obeyed the summons. The managers of the prosecution on the
part of the House were Thomas Morris, afterwards Senator in Congress from
Ohio, Joseph Sharp, James Pritehard, Samuel Marrett, and Othniel Tooker. . . •
Several days were consumed in the investigation, but the trial resulted in the
acquittal of the respondent." Sketch of Hon. George Tod, August number of
same volume: "At the session of the legislature of 1808-9, he was impeached
for concurring in decisions made by Judge Pease, in the counties of Trumbull
and Jefferson, that certain provisions of the act of the legislature, passed in
1805, defining the duties of justices of the peace, were in conflict with the Con-
stitution of the United States and of the State of Ohio, and therefore void.
These decisions of the courts of Common Pleas and of the Supreme Court, it
was insisted, were not only an assault upon the wisdom and dignity, but also
upon the supremacy of the legislature, which passed the act in question. This
could not be endured; and the popular fury against the judges rose to a very
high pitch, and the senator from the county of Trumbull in the legislature at
that time, Calvin Cone, Esq., took no pains to soothe the offended dignity of the
members of that body, or their sympathizing constituents, but pressed a con-
trary line of conduct. The udges must be brought to justice, he insisted
vehemently, and be punished, so that others might be terrified by the example,
and deterred from committing similar offences in the future. The charges against
Mr. Tod were substantially the same as those against Mr. Pease. Mr. Tod was
first tried, and acquitted. The managers of the impeachment, as well as the
result, were the same in both cases."
1 Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky, 8 Pet. 118. It has been
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CH. 711.] DECLABING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL. * 163
* II. Neither will a court, as a general rule, pass upon a [* 163]
constitutional question, and decide a statute to be invalid,
unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the
determination of the cause. "While the courts cannot shun the
discussion of constitutional questions when fairly presented, they
will not go out of their way to find such topics. They will not seek
to draw in such weighty matters collaterally, nor on trivial occa-
sions. It is both more proper and more respectful to a co-ordinate
department to discuss constitutional questions only when that is
the very lis mota. Thus presented and determined, the decision
carries a weight with it to which uo extra-judicial disquisition is
entitled." 1 In any case, therefore, where a constitutional question
is raised, though it may be legitimately presented by the record,
yet if the record also presents some other and clear ground upon
intimated that inferior courts should not presume to pass upon constitutional
questions, but ought in all cases to treat statutes as valid. Ortman o. Greenman,
4 Mich. 291. But no tribunal can exercise judicial power, unless it is to decide
according to its judgment; and it is difficult to discover any principle of justice
which can require a magistrate to enter upon the execution of a statute when he
believes it to be invalid, especially when he must thereby subject himself to
prosecution, without any indemnity in the law if it proves to be invalid. Undoubt-
edly when the highest courts in the land hesitate to declare a law unconsti-
tutional, and allow much weight to the legislative judgment, the inferior courts
should be still more reluctant to exercise this power, and a becoming modesty
would at least be expected of those judicial officers who have not been trained
to the investigation of legal and constitutional questions. But in any case a
judge or justice, being free from doubt in his own mind, and unfettered by any
judicial decision properly binding upon him, must follow his own sense of duty
upon constitutional as well as upon any other questions. See Miller v. State,
3 Ohio, JJ. 8. 483; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, n. S. 180; Mayberry v. Kelly,
1 Kansas, 116. In the case last cited it is said: "It is claimed by counsel for
the plaintiff in error, that the point raised by the instruction is, that inferior
courts and ministerial officers have no right to judge of the constitutionality of a
law passed by a legislature. But is this law? If so, a court created to interpret
the law must disregard the constitution in forming its opinions. The constitution
is law, — the fundamental law, — and must as much be taken into consideration
by a justice of the peace as by any other tribunal. When two laws apparently
conflict, it is the duty of all courts to construe them. If the conflict is irrec-
oncilable, they must decide which is to prevail; and the constitution is not an
exception to this rule of construction. If a law were passed in open, flagrant
violation of the constitution, should a justice of the peace regard the law, and
pay no attention to the constitutional provision? If that is his duty in a plain
case, is it less so when the construction becomes more difficult?"
1 Hoover v. Wood, 9 Ind. 287; Ireland v. Turnpike Co., 19 Ohio, n. s. 373.
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which the court may rest its judgment, and thereby render the
constitutional question immaterial to the case, that course will be
adopted, and the question of constitutional power will be left for
consideration until a case arises which cannot be disposed of with-
out considering it, and when consequently a decision upon such
question will be unavoidable.1
III. Nor will a court listen to an objection made to the constitu-
tionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not affect, and
who has therefore no interest in defeating it. On this ground it
has been held that the objection that a legislative act was
unconstitutional, because divesting the rights of remainder-men
against their will, could not be successfully urged by the owner of
the particular estate, and could only be made on behalf
[* 164] * of the remainder-men themselves.2 And a party who has
assented to his property being taken under a statute
cannot afterwards object that the statute is in violation of a
provision in the constitution designed for the protection of private
property.3 The statute is assumed to be valid, until some one
complains whose rights it invades. "Prima facie, and on the face
of the act itself, nothing will generally appear to show that the act
is not valid; and it is only when some person attempts to resist its
operation, and calls in the aid of the judicial power to pronounce
it void, as to him, his property or his rights, that the objection of
unconstitutionality can be presented and sustained. Respect for
the legislature, therefore, concurs with well-established principles
of law in the conclusion that such an act is not void, but voidable
only; and it follows, as a necessary legal inference from this
position, that this ground of avoidance can be taken advantage of
by those only who have a right to question the validity of the act,
and not by strangers. To this extent only is it necessary to go, in
order to secure and protect the rights of all persons against the
unwarranted exercise of legislative power, and to this extent only,
therefore, are courts of justice called on to interpose." 4
1 Ex parte Randolph, 2 Brock. 447; Frees c. Ford, 6 N. T. 177, 178;
White v. Scott, 4 Barb. 56; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573.
* Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 543. See also Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Penn.
St. 859; Antoni o. Wright, 22 Grat. 857.
3 Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47; Mobile and
Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586.
4 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 96. And see Uingham, &c, Turnpike Co.
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DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
IV. Nor can a court declare a statute unconstitutional and void,
solely on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions, or
because it is supposed to violate the natural, social, or political
rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is
prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by the constitu-
tion. It is true there are some reported cases in which judges
have been understood to intimate a doctrine different from what
is here asserted; but it will generally be found, on an examination
of those cases, that what is said is rather by way of argument and
illustration, to show the unreasonableness of putting upon consti-
tutions such a construction as would permit legislation of the
objectionable character then in question, and to induce a more
cautious and patient examination of the statute, with a
view to * discover in it, if possible, some more just and [* 165]
reasonable legislative intent, than as laying down a rule
by which courts would be at liberty to limit, according to their
own judgment and sense of justice and propriety, the extent of
legislative power in directions in which the constitution had im-
posed no restraint. Mp. Justice Story, in one case, in examining
the extent of power granted by the charter of Rhode Island,
which authorized the General Assembly to make laws in the most
ample manner, "so as such laws, 4c, be not contrary and repug-
nant unto, but as near as may be agreeable to, the laws of Eng-
land, considering the nature and constitution of the place and
people there," expresses himself thus: " What is the true extent
of the power thus granted must be open to explanation as well by
usage as by construction of the terms in which it is given. In
a government professing to regard the great rights of personal
liberty and of property, and which is required to legislate in sub-
ordination to the general laws of England, it would not lightly
be presumed that the great principles of Magna Charta were to be
disregarded, or that the estates of its subjects were liable to be
taken away without trial, without notice, and without offence.
Even if such authority could be deemed to have been confided by
the charter to the General Assembly of Rhode Island, as an exer-
t. Norfolk Co., 6 Allen, 353; De Jarnette p. Haynes, 23 Miss. 600; Sinclair e.
Jackson, 8 Cow. 543, 579; Heyward p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 8 Barb. 489;
Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 149; Williamson v. Carlton, 51 Me. 449; State
'.Rich, 20 Miss. 393.
[181]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
01
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 165 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. YH.
cise of transcendental sovereignty before the Revolution, it can
scarcely be imagined that that great event could have left the
people of tbat State subjected to its uncontrolled and arbitrary
exercise. That government can scarcely be deemed to be free,
where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the
will of a legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental
maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of
personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At
least no court of justice in this country would be warranted in
assuming that the power to violate and disregard them — a power
so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty
— lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or
ought to be implied from any general expressions of the will of the
people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights
so vital to their security and well-being, without very strong and
direct expressions of such an intention." "We know of no case in
which a legislative act to transfer the property of A. to B., without
his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of
[*166] legislative power in any State in *the Union. On the
contrary, it has been constantly resisted, as inconsistent
with just principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has been
attempted to be enforced."1 The question discussed by the
learned judge in this case is perceived to have been, What is the
scope of a grant of legislative power to be exercised in conformity
with the laws of England? Whatever he says is pertinent to that
question; and the considerations he suggests are by way of argu-
ment to show that the power to do certain unjust and oppressive
1 Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657. See also what is said by the same judge
in Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43. "It is clear tbat statutes passed against plain
and obvious principles of common right and common reason are absolutely null
and void, so far as they are calculated to operate against those principles." Ham
v. McClaws, 1 Bay, 98. But the question in that case was one of construction;
whether the court should give to a statute a construction which would make it
operate against common right and common reason. In Bowman v. Middlcton, 1
Bay, 282, the court held an act which divested a man of his freehold and passed
it over to another, to be void "as against common right as well as against Magna
Charta." In Regents of University v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365, it was said
that an act was void as opposed to fundamental principles of right and justice
inherent in the nature and spirit of the social compact. But the court bad
already decided that the act was opposed, not only to the constitution of the
State, but to that of the United States also. See Mayor, &c, of Baltimore
v. State, 15 Md. 376.
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CH. VII.] DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL. * 166
acts was not covered by the grant of legislative power. It is not
intimated that if they were within the grant, they would be im-
pliedly prohibited because unjust and oppressive.
In another case arising in the Supreme Court of New York,
one of the judges, in considering the rights of the city of New
York to certain corporate property, has said: "The inhabitants
of the city of New York have a vested right in the City Hall, mar-
kets, water-works, ferries, and other public property, which cannot
be taken from them any more than their individual dwellings or
storehouses. Their rights, in this respect, rest not merely upon
the constitution, but upon the great principles of eternal justice
which lie at the foundation of all free governments." 1 The great
principles of eternal justice which affected the particular case
had been incorporated in the constitution; and it therefore be-
came unnecessary to consider what would otherwise have been
the rule; nor do we understand the court as intimating any
opinion upon that subject. It was sufficient for the case,
to find * that the principles of right and justice had been [* 167]
recognized and protected by the constitution, and that the
people had not assumed to confer upon the legislature a power to
deprive the city of rights which did not come from the constitution,
but from principles antecedent to and recognized by it.
So it is said by Hosmer, Ch. J., in a Connecticut case: "With
those judges who assert the omnipotence of the legislature in all
cases where the constitution has not interposed an explicit re-
straint, I cannot agree. Should there exist — what I know is not
only an incredible supposition, but a most remote improbability —
a case of direct infraction of vested rights, too palpable to be ques-
tioned and too unjust to admit of vindication, I could not avoid
considering it as a violation of the social compact, and within the
control of the judiciary. If, for example, a law were made without
any cause to deprive a person of his property, or to subject him to
imprisonment, who would not question its legality, and who would
aid in carrying it into effect? On the other hand I cannot harmo-
nize with those who deny the power of the legislature, in any case,
to pass laws which, with entire justice, operate on antecedent legal
rights. A retrospective law may be just and reasonable, and the
right of the legislature to enact one of this description I am not
1 Benson v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 10 Barb. 244.
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* 167 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. VII.
speculatist enough to question." 1 The cases here supposed of
unjust and tyrannical enactments would probably be held not to
be within the power of any legislative body in the Union. One
of them would be clearly a bill of attainder; the other, unless it
was in the nature of remedial legislation, and susceptible of being
defended on that theory, would be an exercise of judicial power,
and therefore in excess of legislative authority, because not included
in the apportionment of power made to that departmeut. No ques-
tion of implied prohibition would arise in either of these cases;
but if the grant of power had covered them, and there had been
no express limitation, there would, as it seems to us, be very
great probability of unpleasant and dangerous conflict of author-
ity if the courts were to deny validity to legislative action on
subjects within their control, on the assumption that the legis-
lature had disregarded justice or sound policy. The moment
a court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of the
legislature, in any case where the constitution has vested the
legislature with power over the subject, that moment it
[* 168] enters * upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to
its authority, and where its discretion alone will measure
the extent of its interference.2
The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except
where the constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative
power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it
1 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 225.
* "If the legislature should pass a law in plain and unequivocal language,
within the general scope of their constitutional powers, I know of no authority
in this government to pronounce such an act void, merely because, in the opinion
of the judicial tribunals, it was contrary to the principles of natural justice;
for this would be vesting in the court a latitudinarian authority which might be
abused, and would necessarily lead to collisions between the legislative and
judicial departments, dangerous to the well-being of society, or at least not in
harmony with the structure of our ideas of natural government." Per lingers, J-,
in Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 2 Rawle, 374. "All the courts can do with
odious statutes is to chasten their hardness by construction. Such is the imper-
fection of the best human institutions, that, mould them as we may, a large dis-
cretion must at last be reposed somewhere. The best and in many cases the
only security is in the wisdom and integrity of public" servants, and their identity
with the people. Governments cannot be administered without committing powers
in trust and confidence." Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 528, per Stuart, J. And see
Johnston r. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb, 603; Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster,
5 Geo. 194; State c. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178.
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CH. VII.] DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL. * 168
operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case.
The courts are not tho guardians of the rights of the people of the
State, except as those rights are secured by some constitutional
provision which comes within the judicial cognizance. The protec-
tion against unwise or oppressive legislation, within constitutional
bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the repre-
sentatives of the people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign
capacity can correct the evil; but courts cannot assume their
rights.1 The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute
when it conflicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of
opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with the law-
making power.2 Any legislative act which does not encroach upon
the powers apportioned to the other departments of the govern-
ment, being prima facie valid, must be enforced, unless restrictions
upon the legislative authority can be pointed out in the constitu-
tion, and the case shown to come within them.3
1 Bennett p. Bull, Baldw. 74.
'Perkins, J., in Madison & Indianapolis Railroad Co. p. Whiteneck, 8 Ind.
222: Bull p. Read, 13 Grat. 98, per Lee, J.
• Sill p. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 803; Varick p. Smith, 5 Paige, 137;
Cochran p. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 381; Wyne-
hamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 430; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 235;
People p. New York Central Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 138; People v. Toynbee, 2
Park. Cp. R. 490; Dow t. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Derby Turnpike Co. p. Parks, 10
Conn. 522, 543; Hartford Bridge Co.p. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; Holden
p. James, 11 Mass. 896; Norwich p. County Commissioners, 13 Pick. 60; Daw-
son v. Shaver, 1 Blackf. 206; Beauchamp p. State, 6 Blackf. 305; Doe v. Doug-
lass, 8 Blackf. 10; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327;
Beebe p. State, 6 Ind. 528; Newland p. Marsh, 19 1ll. 376, 384; Bliss p. Com-
monwealth, 2 Litt. 90; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; Campbell p. Union Bank,
6 How. Miss. 672; Tate's Ex'r p. Bell, 4 Yerg. 206; Andrews v. State, 3 Heis.
165; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 8; Whittington p. Polk, 1 Harp. & J. 236; Norris v.
Abingdon Academy. 7 Gill. & J. 7; Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 491; State v.
Lyles, 1 McCord, 238; Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341; Ex parte Newman, t'6.
502; Hobart p. Supervisors, 17 Cal. 28; Crenshaw p. Slate River Co., 6 Rand.
245; Lewis p. Webb, 3 Greenl. 326; Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140;
Lunt's Case, 6 Greenl. 412; Scott v. Smart's Ex'rs, 1 Mich. 306; Williams v.
Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Tyler p. People, 8 Mich. 820; Cotton v. Commissioners
of Leon County, 6 Fla. 610; State v. Robinson, 1 Kansas, 27; Santo v. State,
2 Iowa, I65; Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa, 804; Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Binn.
355; Moore p. Houston. 8 S. & R. 169; Braddee p. Brownfield, 2 W. & S. 271;
Harvey p. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63 ; Commonwealth p. Maxwell, 27 Penn. St.
456; Carey v. Giles, 9 Geo. 253; Macon and Western Railroad Co. v. Davis,
13 Geo. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Geo. 80; Boston v. Cummins, 16
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* 169 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. Vn.
[* 169] * V. If the courts are not at liberty to declare statutes
void because of their apparent injustice or impolicy, neither
can they do so because they appear to the minds of the judges to
violate fundamental principles of republican government, unless it
shall be found that those principles are placed beyond legislative
encroachment by the constitution. The principles of republican
government are not a set of inflexible rules, vital and active in
the constitution, though unexpressed, but they are subject to
variation and modification from motives of policy and public
necessity; and it is only in those particulars in which experience
has demonstrated any departure from the settled practice to work
injustice or confusion, that we shall discover an incorporation of
them in the constitution in such form as to make them definite
rules of action under all circumstances. It is undoubtedly a
maxim of republican government, as we understand it, that
taxation and representation should be inseparable; but where the
legislature interferes, as in many cases it may do, to compel taxa-
tion by a municipal corporation for local purposes, it is evident
that this maxim is applied in the case in a much restricted
[* 170] and very imperfect sense only, since the * representation
of the locality taxed is but slight in the body imposing
the tax, and the burden may be imposed, not only against the pro-
test of the local representative, but against the general opposition
of the municipality. The property of married women is taxable,
notwithstanding they are not allowed a voice in choosing repre-
sentatives.1 The maxim is not entirely lost sight of in such cases,
but its application in the particular case, and the determination
how far it can properly and justly be made to yield to considerations
of policy and expediency, must rest exclusively with the law-making
power, in the absence of any definite constitutional provisions so
embodying the maxim as to make it a limitation upon legislative
authority.2 It is also a maxim of republican government that local
Geo. 102; Van Home v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 309; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 886;
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 18; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128.
1 Wheeler v. Wall, 6 Allen, 568.
* "There are undoubtedly fundamental principles of morality and justice which
no legislature is at liberty to disregard, but it is equally undoubted that no
court, except in the clearest cases, can properly impute the disregard of those
principles to the legislature. . . . This court can know nothing of public policy
except from the constitution and the laws, and the course of administration and
[186]
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CH. TO.] DECLARING STATUTES DNCONSTITOTIONAL. * 170
concerns shall be managed in the local districts, which shall chooso
their own administrative and police officers, and establish for them-
selves police regulations ; but this maxim is subject to such excep-
tions as the legislative power of the State shall see fit to make ; and
when made, it must be presumed that the public interest, con-
venience, and protection are subserved thereby.1 The State may
interfere to establish new regulations against the will of the local
constituency; and if it shall think proper in any case to assume
to itself those powers of local police which should be executed by
the people immediately concerned, we must suppose it has been
done because the local administration has proved imperfect and
inefficient, and a regard to the general well-being has demanded
the change. In these cases the maxims which have prevailed in
the government address themselves to the wisdom of the legis-
lature, and to adhere to them as far as possible is doubtless to
keep in the path of wisdom; but they do not constitute restrictions
so as to warrant the other departments in treating the exceptions
which are made as unconstitutional.2
decision. It has no legislative powers. It cannot amend or modify any legis-
lative acts. It cannot examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as pol-
itic or impolitip. Considerations of that sort must in general be addressed to
the legislature. Questions of policy there are concluded here." Chase, Ch. J.,
in License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 469.
1 People p. Draper, 15 N. Y. 547. See post, p. 191, 192.
1 In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 500, where the Metropolitan Police Act of
Detroit was claimed to be unconstitutional on various grounds, the court say:
"Besides the specific objections made to the act as opposed to the provisions of
the constitution, the counsel for respondent attacks it on ' general principles,' and
especially because violating fundamental principles in our system, that govern-
ments exist by consent of the governed, and that taxation and representation go
togethep. The taxation under the act, it is said, is really in the hands of a police
board, a body in the choice of which the people of Detroit have no voice. This
argument is one which might be pressed upon the legislative department with
great force, if it were true in point of fact. But as the people of Detroit are
really represented throughout, the difficulty suggested can hardly be regarded as
fundamental. They were represented in the legislature which passed the act,
and had the same proportionate voice there with the other municipalities in the
State, all of which receive from that body their powers of local government, and
such only as its wisdom shall prescribe within the constitutional limit. They were
represented in that body when the present police board were appointed by it,
and the governor, who is hereafter to fill vacancies, will be chosen by the State
at large, including their city. There is nothing in the maxim that taxation and
representation go together which requires that the body paying the tax shall
[187]
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[* 171] * VI. Nor are the courts at liberty to declare an act
void, because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit sup-
posed to pervade the constitution, but not expressed in words.
"When the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by
necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the legis-
lature, we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having
discovered something in the spirit of the constitution which is
not even mentioned in the instrument"1 "It is difficult," says
Mr. Senator Verplanck, "upon any general principles, to limit
the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial
interposition, except so far as the express words of a written con-
stitution give that authority. There are indeed many dicta and
some great authorities holding that acts contrary to the first
principles of right are void. The principle is unquestion-
[* 172] ably * sound as the governing rule of a legislature in rela-
tion to its own acts, or even those of a preceding legislature.
It also affords a safe rule of construction for courts, in the inter-
pretation of laws admitting of any doubtful construction, to pre-
sume that the legislature could not have intended an unequal and
unjust operation of its statutes. Such a construction ought never
to be given to legislative language if it be susceptible of any other
more conformable to justice; but if the words be positive and
without ambiguity, I can find no authority for a court to vacate or
alone be consulted in its assessment; and if there were, we should find it violated
at every turn in our system. The State legislature not only has a control in this
respect over inferior municipalities, which it exercises by general laws, but it
sometimes finds it necessary to interpose its power in special cases to prevent
unjust or burdensome taxation, as well as to compel the performance of a clear
duty. The constitution itself, by one of the clauses referred to, requires the
legislature to exercise its control over the taxation of municipal corporations, by
restricting it to what that body may regard as proper bounds. And municipal
bodies are frequently compelled most unwillingly to levy taxes for the payment
of claims, by the judgments or mandates of courts in which their representation
is quite as remote as that of the people of Detroit in this police board. It can-
not therefore be said that the maxims referred to have been entirely disregarded
by the legislature in the passage of this act. But as counsel do not claim that,
in so far as they have been departed from, the constitution has been violated, we
cannot, with propriety, be asked to declare an act void on any such general
objection." And see Wynehamer p. People, 13 N. Y. 429, per Selden, J-i
Benson v. Mayor, &c, of Albany, 24 Barb. 256 et seq.; Baltimore v. State, 15
Md. 376; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; White v. Stamford, 37 Conn. 587.
1 People v. Fisher, 24 Wend. 220; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233.
[188]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
01
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. VII.] DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL. * 172
repeal a statute on that ground alone. But it is only in express
constitutional provisions, limiting legislative power and controlling
the temporary will of a majority, by a permanent and paramount
law, settled by the deliberate wisdom of the nation, that I can
find a safe and solid ground for the authority of courts of justice
to declare void any legislative enactment. Any assumption of
authority beyond this would be to place in the hands of the
judiciary powers too great and too undefined either for its own
security or the protection of private rights. It is therefore a
most gratifying circumstance to the friends of regulated liberty,
that in every change in their constitutional polity which has yet
taken place here, whilst political power has been more widely
diffused among the people, stronger and better-defined guards
have been given to the rights of property." And after quoting
certain express limitations, he proceeds: "Believing that we are
to rely upon these and similar provisions as the best safeguards
of our rights, as well as the safest authorities for judicial direction,
I cannot bring myself to approve of the power of courts to annul
any law solemnly passed, either on an assumed ground of its being
contrary to natural equity, or from a broad, loose, and vague in-
terpretation of a constitutional provision beyond its natural and
obvious sense." 1
The accepted theory upon this subject appears to be this: Iu
every sovereign State there resides an absolute and uncontrolled
power of legislation. In Great Britain this complete power rests
in the Parliament: in the American States it resides in the people
themselves as an organized body politic. But the people,
by * creating the Constitution of the United States, have [* 173]
delegated this power as to certain subjects, and under
certain restrictions to the Congress of the Union; and that
portion they cannot resume, except as it may be done through
amendment of the national Constitution. For the exercise of the
legislative power, subject to this limitation, they create, by their
State constitution, a legislative department upon which they confer
it; and granting it in general terms, they must be understood to
grant the whole legislative power which they possessed, except so
1 Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 881-383. See also People v. Gallagher,
4 Mich. 244; Benson v. Mayor, &e., of Albany, 24 Barb. 252 et seq.; Grant v.
Courter, ib. 232; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 391, per Comslock, J.; ib.
p. 453, per Selden, J.; ib. p. 477, per Johnson, J.
[189]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
far as at the same time they saw fit to impose restrictions. While,
therefore, the Parliament of Britain possesses completely the abso-
lute and uncontrolled power of legislation, the legislative bodies of
the American States possess the same power, except, first, as it
may have been limited by the Constitution of the United States;
and, second, as it may have been limited by the constitution of
the State. A legislative act cannot, therefore, be declared void,
unless its conflict with one of these two instruments can be pointed
out.1
It is to be borne in mind, however, that there is a broad dif-
ference between the Constitution of the United States and the
constitutions of the States as regards the power which may be
exercised under them. The government of the United States is
one of enumerated powers; the governments of the States are
possessed of all the general powers of legislation. When a lav
of Congress is assailed as void, we look in the national Constitu-
tion to see if the grant of specified powers is broad enough to
embrace it; but when a State law is attacked on the same ground,
it is presumably valid in any case, and this presumption is a con-
clusive one, unless in the Constitution of the United States or of
the State we are able to discover that it is prohibited. We look
in the Constitution of the United States for grants of legislative
power, but in the constitution of the State to ascertain if any
limitations have been imposed upon the complete power with
which the legislative department of the State was vested in its
creation. Congress can pass no laws but such as the Constitution
authorizes either expressly or by clear implication; while the
State legislature has jurisdiction of all subjects on which its
legislation is not prohibited.2 "The law-making power of
[* 1,74] the * State," it is said in one case, " recognizes no re-
straints, and is bound by none, except such as are imposed
by the constitution. That instrument has been aptly termed a
1 People v. New York Central Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 138; Gentry v. Grif-
fith, 27 Texas, 461. And see the cases cited, ante, p. 168, note 4.
* Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 303; People v. Supervisors of Orange,
27 Barb. 593; People c Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 257;
People v. New York Central Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 497, 504; People e.
Toynbee, 2 Park. Cp. R. 490; State v. Gutierrez, 15 La. An. 190; Walpole e.
Elliott, 18 Ind. 258; Smith p. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; Commonwealth v. Hartman,
17 Penn. St. 119; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 260; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn.
St. 477.
[190]
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* 174
legislative act by the people themselves in their sovereign capacity,
and is therefore the paramount law. Its object is not to grant
legislative power, but to confine and restrain it. Without the
constitutional limitations, the power to make laws would be abso-
lute.^rKese^ITmitations are~created and imposed by express words,
or arise by necessary implication. The leading feature of the con-
stitution is the separation and distribution of the powers of the
government. It takes care to separate the executive, legislative,
and judicial powers, and to define their limits. The executive can
do no legislative act, nor the legislature any executive act, and
neither can exercise judicial authority." 1
It does not follow, however, that in every case the courts, be-
fore they can set aside a law as invalid, must be able to find in
the constitution some specific inhibition which has been disre-
garded, or some express command which has been disobeyed.
Prohibitions are only important where they are in the nature of
exceptions to a general grant of power; and if the authority to
do an act has not been granted by the sovereign to its represent-
ative, it cannot be necessary to prohibit its being done. If in
one department was vested the whole power of the government,
it might be essential for the people, in the instrument delegating
this complete authority, to make careful and particular exception
of all those cases which it was intended to exclude from its cog-
nizance; for without such exception the government might do
whatever the people themselves, when met in their sovereign
capacity, would have power to do. But when only the legislative
power is delegated to one department, and the judicial to another,
it is not important that the one should be expressly forbidden to
try causes, or the other to make laws. The assumption of judi-
cial power by the legislature in such a case is unconstitutional,
because, though not expressly forbidden, it is nevertheless
* inconsistent with the provisions which have conferred [* 175]
upon another department the power the legislature is
seeking to exercise.2 And for similar reasons a legislative act
wliich should undertake to make a judge the arbiter in his own
controversies would be void, because, though in form a provision
for the exercise of judicial power, in substance it would be the crea-
1 Sill o. Corning, 15 N. Y. 303.
8 Ante, p. 87-114, and cases cited.
C 191 ]
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* 175 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. VD.
V
tion of an arbitrary and irresponsible authority, neither legislative,
executive, nor judicial, and wholly unknown to constitutional
government.1 It could not be necessary to forbid the judiciary
to render judgment without suffering the party to make defence;
because it is implied in judicial authority that there shall be a
hearing before condemnation.2 Taxation cannot be arbitrary, be-
cause its very definition includes apportionment, nor can it be for
a purpose not public, because that would be a contradiction in
terms.8 The right of local self-government cannot be taken away,
because all our constitutions assume its continuance as the un-
doubted right of the people, and as an inseparable incident to
republican government.4 The bills of rights in the American con-
stitutions forbid that parties shall be deprived of property except
by the law of the land; but if the prohibition had been omitted, a
legislative enactment to pass one man's property over to another
would nevertheless be void. If the act proceeded upon the assump-
tion that such other person was justly entitled to the estate, and
therefore it was transferred, it would be void, because judicial in its
nature ; and if it proceeded without reasons, it would be equally void,
as neither legislative nor judicial, but a mere arbitrary fiat.6 There
is no difficulty in saying that any such act, which under pretence
of exercising one power is usurping another, is opposed to the con-
'Post, 410-413, and cases cited.
* Post, 353-4. On this subject in general, reference is made to those very
complete recent works, Bigelow on Estoppel and Freeman on Judgments.
* Post, ch. 14. And see Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; Tyson p. School
Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 575; Opinions of
Judges, 58 Me. 590; People v. Bacheller, N.Y. Court of Appeals, Albany
Law Jour. vol. 8, p. 120; Lowell v. Boston, Sup. Court of Mass., not yet
reported.
4 People v. Mayor, &c. of Chicago, 51 111. 81; People v. Hurlbut, 24
Mich. 44.
* Bowman p. Middleton, 1 Bay, 252; Wilkinson p. Leland, 2 Pet. 657; Ter-
rett p. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 26G. It is now
considered an universal and fundamental proposition in every well-regulated
and properly administered government, whether embodied in a constitutional
form or not, that private property cannot be taken for a strictly private purpose
at all, nor for public without a just compensation; and that the obligation of
contracts cannot be abrogated or essentially impaired. These and other vested
rights of the citizen are held sacred and inviolable, even against the plenitude
of power in the legislative department." Nelson, J., in People p. Morris, 13
Wend. 328.
[192]
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CH. VII.]
* 175
DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
stitution and void. It is assuming a power which the people, if they
have not granted it at all, have reserved to themselves. The max-
ims of Magna Charta and the common law are the interpreters of
constitutional grants of power, and those acts which by those max-
ims the several departments of government are forbidden to do
cannot be considered within any grant or apportionment of power
which the people in general terms have made to those departments.
The Parliament of Great Britain, indeed, as possessing the
sovereignty * of the country, has the power to disregard [* 176]
fundamental principles, and pass arbitrary and unjust en-
actments; but it cannot do this rightfully, and it has the power to
do so simply because there is no written constitution from which
its authority springs or on which it depends, and by which the
courts can test the validity of its declared will. The rules which
confine the discretion of Parliament within the ancient landmarks
are rules for the construction of the powers of the American legis-
latures; and however proper and prudent it may be expressly to
prohibit those things which are not understood to be within the
proper attributes of legislative power, such prohibition can never
be regarded as essential, when the extent of the power apportioned
to the legislative department is found upon examination not to be
broad enough to cover the obnoxious authority. The absence of
such prohibition cannot, by implication, confer powep.
Nor, where fundamental rights are declared by the constitution,
is it necessary at the same time to prohibit the legislature, in ex-
press terms, from taking them away. The declaration is itself a
prohibition, and is inserted in the constitution for the express
purpose of operating as a restriction upon legislative powep.1
Many things, indeed, which are contained in the bills of rights to
be found in the American constitutions, are not, and from the very
nature of the case cannot be, so certain and definite in character as
to form rules for judicial decisions; and they are declared rather
as guides to the legislative judgment than as marking an absolute
limitation of power. The nature of the declaration will generally
enable us to determine without difficulty whether it is the one thing
or the othep. If it is declared that all men are free, and no man
can be slave to another, a definite and certain rule of action is
laid down, which the courts can administer; but if it be said that
1 Beobe v. State, 6 Ind. 518. This principle is very often acted upon when
not expressly declared.
13 [ 193 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
01
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 176 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. VII.
"the blessings of a free government can only be maintained bj-&
firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and
virtue," we should not be likely to commit the mistake of sup-
posing that this declaration would authorize the courts to substitute
their own view of justice for that which may have impelled the
legislature to pass a particular law, or to inquire into the modera-
tion, temperance, frugality, and virtue of its members, with a view
to set aside their action, if it should appear to have been
[* 177] influenced by the opposite qualities. It is plain that * what
in the one case is a rule, in the other is an admonition
addressed to the judgment and the conscience of all persons in
authority, as well as of the people themselves.
So the forms prescribed for legislative action are in the nature
of limitations upon its authority. The constitutional provisions
which establish them are equivalent to a declaration that the
legislative power shall be exercised under these forms, and shall
not be exercised under any othep. A statute which does not
observe them will plainly be ineffectual.1
Statutes unconstitutional in Part.
It will sometimes be found that an act of the legislature is
opposed in some of its provisions to the constitution, while others,
standing by themselves, would be unobjectionable. So the forms
observed in passing it may be sufficient for some of the purposes
sought to be accomplished by it, but insufficient for others. In any
such case the portion which conflicts with the constitution, or in
regard to which the necessary conditions have not been observed,
must be treated as a nullity. Whether the other parts of the
statute must also be adjudged void because of the association must
depend upon a consideration of the object of the law, and in what
manner and to what extent the unconstitutional portion affects the
remaindep. A statute, it has been said, is judicially held to be
unconstitutional, because it is not within the scope of legislative
authority; it may either propose to accomplish something pro-
hibited by the constitution, or to accomplish some lawful, and even
laudable object, by means repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States or of the State.2 A statute may contain some such
1 See ante, p. 130 el seq.
* Commonwealth v. Clapp. 5 Gray, 100. "A law that is unconstitutional is
[194]
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* 177
provisions, and yet the same act, having received the sanction of
all branches of the legislature, and being in the form of law, may
contain other useful and salutary provisions, not obnoxious to any
just constitutional exception. It would be inconsistent with all
just principles of constitutional law to adjudge these enactments
void, because they are associated in the same act, but not connected
with or dependent on others which are unconstitutional.1
Where, therefore, a part of a * statute is unconstitutional, [* 178]
that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the re-
mainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in
subject-matter, depending on each other, operating together for
the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning,
that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the
one without the other.2 The constitutional and unconstitutional
provisions may even be contained in the same section, and yet be
perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first may stand though
the last fall. The point is not whether they are contained in the
same section; for the distribution into sections is purely artificial;
but whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in sub-
so because it is either an assumption of power not legislative in its nature, or
because it is inconsistent with some provision of the federal or State Constitu-
tion.'' Woodtcorth, J., in Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 27 Penn. St. 456.
1 Commonwealth p. Clapp, 5 Gray, 100. See, to the same effect, Fisher p.
McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Warren v. Mayor, &c., of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84; Wel-
lington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 95; Commonwealth p. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482;
Commonwealth p. Pomeroy, 5 Gray, 486; State v. Copeland, 8 R. I. 33; State
r. Snow, 3 R. I. 64; Armstrong p. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374; Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf.
248; MeCulloch ». State, 11 Ind. 432; People p. Hill, 7 Cal. 97; Lathrop p.
Mills, 19 Cal. 513; Thomson p. Grand Gulf Railroad Co., 3 How. Miss. 240;
Campbell v. Union Bank, 6 How. Miss. 625; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. p.
State, 29 Ala. 573; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Cox, 3 Eng. 436;
Mayor, &c, of Savannah p. State, 4 Geo. 26; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio,
s. s. 1; Robinson p. Bank of Darien, 18 Geo. 65; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn.
290; People p. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 190; Williams p. Payson, 14 La. An. 7;
Ely t. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70; Davis c. State, 7 Md. 151; State v. Com-
missioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 521; Bank of Hamilton p. Dudley's Lessee, 2
Pet. 526. "To the extent of the collision and repugnancy, the law of the State
must yield; and to that extent, and no further, it is rendered by such repugnancy
inoperative and void." Commonwealth r. Kimball, 24 Pick. 361, per Shaw,
Ox. J.; Norris v. Boston, 4 Met. 288.
* Commonwealth p. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 485. See People v. Briggs, 50 N.Y.
666.
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stance.1 If, when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out,
that which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being ex-
ecuted in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly
independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. The
difficulty is in determining whether the good and bad parts of the
statute are capable of being separated within the meaning of this
rule. If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and
is void as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid
as to the other. But if its purpose is to accomplish a single object
only, and some of its provisions are void, the whole must fail
unless sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid of the
invalid portion.2 And if they are so mutually connected
[* 179] with and * dependent on each other, as conditions, con-
siderations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant
1 Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 485; Willard v. People, 4 Scam. 47";
Eells v. People, 4 Scam. 512; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379; State v. Easter-
brook, 3 Nev. 173; Hagerstown v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369.
* Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165. But perhaps the doctrine of sustaining one
part of a statute when the other is void was carried to an extreme in this case.
A prohibitory liquor law had been passed which was not objectionable on consti-
tutional grounds, except that the last section provided that " the question of pro-
hibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquor" should be submitted to
the electors of the State, and if it should appear "that a majority of the votes
cast as aforesaid, upon said question of prohibition, shall be for the prohibitory
liquor law, then this act shall take effect on the first day of July, 1855." The
court held this to be an attempt by the legislature to shift the exercise of legis-
lative power from themselves to the people, and therefore void; but they also
held that the remainder of the act was complete without this section, and must
therefore be sustained on the rule above given. The reasoning of the court by
which they are brought to this conclusion is ingenious; but one cannot avoid
feeling, especially after reading the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Wright,
that by the decision the court gave effect to an act which the legislature did not
design should take effect unless the result of the unconstitutional submission to
the people was in its favor. For a similar ruling, see Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342;
overruled in Mcshmcier t>. State, 11 Ind. 482. And see State v. Dombaugb,
20 Ohio, n. 8. 173, where it was held competent to construe a part of an act held
to be valid by another part adjudged unconstitutional, though the court con-
sidered it " quite probable " that if the legislature had supposed they were without
power to adopt the void part of the act, they would have made an essen-
tially different provision by the other. See also People v. Bull, 46 N. 68>
where part of an act was sustained which probably would not have been adopted
by the legislature separately. It must be obvious in any case where part of a"
act is set aside as unconstitutional, that it is unsafe to indulge in the same extreme
[ 196 ]
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the belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and if all
could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all
the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected
must fall with them.1
It has accordingly been held where a statute submitted to the
voters of a county the question of the removal of their county seat,
and one section imposed the forfeiture of certain vested rights in
case the vote was against the removal, that this portion of the act
being void, the whole must fall, inasmuch as the whole was sub-
mitted to the electors collectively, and the threatened forfeiture
would naturally affect the result of the vote.2
And where a statute annexed to the city of Racine certain lands
previously in the township of Racine, but contained an express
provision that the lands so annexed should be taxed at a different
and less rate than other lauds in the city; the latter provision
being held unconstitutional, it was also held that the whole statute
presumptions in support of the remainder that are allowable in support of a com-
plete act when some cause of invalidity is suggested to the whole of it. In the
latter case, we know the legislature designed the whole act to have effect, and we
should sustain it if possible; in the former, we do not know that the legislature
would have been willing that a part of the act should be sustained if the remainder
were held void, and there is generally a presumption more or less strong to the
contrary. While, therefore, in the one case the act should be sustained unless
the invalidity is clear, in the other the whole should fall unless it is manifest the
portion not opposed to the constitution can stand by itself, and that in the leg-
islative intent it was not to be controlled or modified in its construction and
effei-t by the part which was void.
The Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah a few years since, in considering
a statute which authorized the probate courts to grant divorces for specified
causes, held it void so far as it undertook to confer jurisdiction on the probate
courts, but good so far as it authorized divorces; and as the jurisdiction to grant
them could, under their conclusions, vest nowhere else, they held it might be
administered by themselves as district judges. This was not exactly sustaining
the half of a law by itself, but it was sustaining it by means of something sub-
stituted in the place of the other half.
1 Warren v. Mayor, <&c, of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 99; State v. Commissioners
of Perry County, 5 Ohio, n. s. 507; Slauson v. Racine, 18 Wis. 398; Allen
County Commissioners v. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491; Garrard Co. Court o. Navigation
Co., 10 Am. Law Reg. N. s. 160.
'State v. Commissioners of Perry County, 5 Ohio, N. s. 507. And see
Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 388.
[ 197 ]
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must fail, inasmuch as such provision was clearly intended as a
compensation for the annexation.1
And where a statute, in order to obtain a jury of six
[* 180] persons, * provided for the summoning of twelve jurors,
from whom six were to be chosen and sworn, and under
the constitution the jury must consist of twelve, it was held that
the provision for reducing the number to six could not be rejected
and the statute sustained, inasmuch as this would be giving to it a
construction and effect different from that the legislature designed;
and would deprive the parties of the means of obtaining impartial
jurors which the statute had intended to give.2
On the other hand, — to illustrate how intimately the valid and
invalid portions of a statute may be associated, — a section of the
criminal code of Illinois provided that " if any person shall harbor
or secrete any negro, mulatto, or person of color, the same being
a slave or servant, owing service or labor to any other persons,
whether they reside in this State or in any other State, or Territory,
or district, within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the
United States, or shall in any wise hinder or prevent the lawful
owner or owners of such slaves or servants from retaking them in
a lawful manner, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor," &c, and it was held that, although the latter
portion of the section was void within the decision in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,3 yet that the first portion, being a police regulation
for the preservation of order in the State, and important to its well-
being, and capable of being enforced without reference to the rest,
was not affected by the invalidity of the rest.4
A legislative act may be entirely valid as to some classes of
cases, and clearly void as to others. A general law for the punish-
ment of offences, which Bhould endeavor to reach, by its retroactive
operation, acts before committed, as well as to prescribes rule of
conduct for the citizen in the future, would be void so far as it was
retrospective, but such invalidity would not affect the operation of
the law in regard to the cases which were within the legislative
control. A law might be void as violating the obligation of exist-
1 Slauson v. Racine, IS Wis. 398, followed in State v Dousman, 28 Wis. 547.
* Campau ». Detroit, 14 Mich. 272.
s 16 Pet. 539.
4 Willard v. People, 4 Scam. 470; Eells v. People, ib. 512. See Hagerstown
v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369.
[198]
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ing contracts, but valid as to all contracts which should be entered
into subsequent to its passage, and which therefore would have no
legal force except such as the law itself would allow.1 In any such
case the unconstitutional law must operate as far as it can,2
and it will not be held invalid on the objection * of a party [* 181]
whose interests are not affected by it in a manner which
the constitution forbids. If there are any exceptions to this rule,
they must be of cases only where it is evident, from a contempla-
tion of the statute and of the purpose to be accomplished by it, that
it would not have been passed at all, except as an entirety, and
that the general purpose of the legislature will be defeated if it
shall be held valid as to some cases and void as to others.
Waiving a Constitutional Objection.
There are cases where a law in its application to a particular
case must be sustained, because the party who makes objection
has, by prior action, precluded himself from being heard against
it. Where a constitutional provision is designed for the protection
solely of the property rights of the citizen, it is competent for him
to waive the protection, and to consent to such action as would be
invalid if taken against his will. On this ground it has been held
that an act appropriating the private property of one person for the
private purposes of another, on compensation made, was valid if he
whose property was taken assented thereto; and that he did assent
and waive the constitutional privilege, if he received the compensa-
tion awarded, or' brought an action to recover it.8 So if an act
providing for the appropriation of property for a public use shall
authorize more to be taken than the use requires, although such act
would be void without the owner's assent, yet with it all objection
1 Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68; Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369. In People
t. Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525, certain commissioners were appointed to take for a
city hall either lands belonging to the city or lands of individuals. The act made
no provision for compensation. The commissioners elected to take lands belong-
ing to the city. Held, that the act was not wholly void for the omission to pro-
vide compensation in case the lands of individuals had been selected.
! Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47. The case of Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 333,
appears to be opposed to this principle, but it also appears to us to be bated
upon cases -which are not applicable.
'Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47.
[199]
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on the ground of unconstitutionality is removed.1 And where
parties were authorized by statute to erect a dam across a river,
provided they should first execute a bond to the people conditioned
to pay such damages as each and every person might sustain in
consequence of the erection of the dam, the damages to be assessed
by a justice of the peace, and the dam was erected and damages as-
sessed as provided by tho statute, it was held, in an action on the
bond to recover those damages, that the party erecting the dam and
who had received the benefit of the statute, was precluded by his
action from contesting its validity, and could not insist upon his
right to a common-law trial by jury.2 In these and the like
[* 182] cases the statute must be read with * an implied proviso that
the party to be affected shall assent thereto; and such con-
sent removes all obstacle, and lets the statute in to operate the same
as if it had in terms contained the condition.3 In criminal cases,
however, the doctrine that a constitutional privilege may be waived
must be true to a very limited extent only. A party may consent
to waive rights of property, but the trial and punishment for public
offences are not within the province of individual consent or
agreement.
Judicial Doubts on Constitutional Questions.
It has been said by an eminent jurist, that when courts are called
upon to pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation, passed
witli all the forms and ceremonies requisite to give it the force of
law, they will approach the question with great caution, examine it
in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation
and patient attention can throw any new light upon the subject,
and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity
of the act are placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt.4
1 Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511. And see Heyward v. Mayor, &c, of
New York, 8 Barb. 489; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586;
Detmold v. Drake, 46 N. Y. 318.
s People w. Murray, 5 Hill, 468. See Lee v. Tillotson, 24 Wend. 339.
3 Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 518. And see Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend.
149; Chamberlain v. Lyell, 3 Mich. 448; Beeeher v. Baldy, 7 Mich. 488;
Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586; Detmold v. Drake, 46
N. Y. 318.
1 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 95, per Shaw, Ch. J. See Brown v.
Buzan, 24 Ind. 194. If an act may be valid or not according to the circum-
[ 200 ]
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A reasonable doubt must be solved in favor of the legislative action,
and the act be sustained.1
"The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the
constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy, which
ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative in a doubt-
ful case. The court when impelled by duty to render such a
judgment would be unworthy of its station could it be
unmindful *of the solemn obligation which that station [*183]
imposes; but it is not on slight implication and vague
conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have tran-
scended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void. The oppo-
sition between the constitution and the law should be such that
the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompati-
bility with each othep." 2 Mp. Justice Washington gives a reason
for this rule, whicli has been repeatedly recognized in other cases
which we have cited. After expressing the opinion that the partic-
ular question there presented, and which regarded the constitution-
ality of a State law, was involved iu difficulty and doubt, he says:
"But if I could rest my opinion in favor of the constitutionality of
the law on which the question arises, on no other ground than this
doubt so felt and acknowledged, that alone would, in my estima-
tion, be a satisfactory vindication of it. It is but a decent respect
stances, a court would be bound to presume that such circumstances existed as
would render it valid. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.
1 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 18; Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Flint River
Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Geo. 194; Carey v. Giles, 9 Geo. 253; Macon and
Western Railroad Co. v. Davis, 13 Geo. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14
Geo. 80; Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 524; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass.
245; Norwich e. County Commissioners of Hampshire, 13 Pick. 61; Hartford
Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 227; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. II. 312;
Eason v. State, 6 Eng. 481; Hedley p. Commissioners of Franklin Co., 4 Blackf.
116; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327; La Fayette v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 79; Ex parte
McCollum, 1 Cow. 564; Coutant v. People, 11 Wend. 511; Clark v. People,
26 Wend. 606; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 381; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md.
376: Cotton p. Commissioners of Leon Co., 6 Fla. 610; Lane v. Dorman, 3
Scam. 238; Newland v. Marsh, 19 1ll. 381; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v.
Smith, 3 S. & R. 63; Weister p. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 477; Sears v. Cottrell, 5
Mich. 251; People v. Tyler, 8 Mich. 820; Allen County Commissioners p. Sil-
vers, 22 Ind. 491; State v. Robinson, 1 Kansas, 17; Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat.
426; Gormley v. Taylor, 44 Geo. 76; State v. Cape Girardeau, &c, R.R. Co., 48
Mo. 468.
* Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128, per Marshall, Ch. J.
[201]
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due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legisla-
tive body by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its
validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyoud all
reasonable doubt." 1
The constitutionality of a law, then, is to be presumed, because
the legislature, which was first required to pass upon the question,
acting, as they must be deemed to have acted, witli integrity, and
with a just desire to keep within the restrictions laid by the con-
stitution upon their action, have adjudged that it is so. They are
a co-ordinate department of the government with the judiciary,
invested with very high and responsible duties, as to some of
which their acts are not subject to judicial scrutiny, and they
legislate under the solemnity of an official oath, which it is not to
be supposed they will disregard. It must, therefore, be supposed
that their own doubts of the constitutionality of their action have
been deliberately solved in its favor, so that the courts may with
some confidence repose upon their conclusion as one based upon
their best judgment. For although it is plain, upon the au-
thorities, that the courts should sustain legislative action when
not clearly satisfied of its invalidity, it is equally plain in reason
that the legislature should abstain from adopting such action if
not fully assured of their authority to do so. Respect for the
instrument under which they exercise their power should
[* 184] impel the * legislature in every case to solve their doubts
in its favor, and it is only because we are to presume
they do so, that courts are warranted in giving weight in any case
to their decision. If it were understood that legislators refrained
from exercising their judgment, or that, in cases of doubt, they
allowed themselves to lean in favor of the action they desired to
accomplish, the foundation for the cases we have cited would be
altogether taken away.
As to what the doubt shall be upon which the court is to act,
we conceive that it can make no difference whether it springs from
an endeavor to arrive at the true interpretation of the constitution,
or from a consideration of the law after the meaning of the con-
stitution has been judicially determined. It has sometimes been
supposed that it was the duty of the court, first, to interpret the
constitution, placing upon it a construction that .must remain un-
1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 270.
[ 202 ]
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varying, and then test the law in question by it; and that any
other rule would lead to differing judicial decisions, if the legis-
lature should put one interpretation upon the constitution at one
time and a different one at another. But the decided cases do not
sanction this rule,1 and the difficulty suggested is rather imaginary
than real, since it is but reasonable to expect that, where a con-
struction has once been placed upon a constitutional provision, it
will be followed afterwards, even though its original adoption may
have sprung from deference to legislative action rather than from
settled convictions in the judicial mind.2
The duty of the court to uphold a statute when the conflict
between it and the constitution is not clear, and the implication
which must always exist that no violation has been intended by
the legislature, may require it in some cases, where the meaning
of the constitution is not in doubt, to lean in favor of such a con-
struction of the statute as might not at first view seem most
obvious and natural. For as a conflict between the statute and
the constitution is not to be implied, it would seem to follow, where
the meaning of the constitution is clear, that the court, if possible,
mmt give the statute such a construction as will enable it to have
effect. This is only saying, in another form of words, that the
court must construe the statute in accordance with the
legislative * intent; since it is always to be presumed [* 185]
the legislature designed the statute to take effect, and
not to be a nullity.
The rule upon this subject is thus stated by the Supreme Court
of Illinois: "Whenever an act of the legislature can be so con-
strued and applied as to avoid conflict with the constitution and
give it the force of law, such construction will be adopted by the
courts. Therefore, acts of the legislature, in terms retrospective,
and which, literally interpreted, would invalidate and destroy
vested rights, are upheld by giving them prospective operation
only; for, applied to, and operating upon, future acts and trans-
actions only, they are rules of property under and subject to which
the citizen acquires property rights, and are obnoxious to no con-
stitutional limitation; but as retroactive laws, they reach to and
destroy existing rights, through force of the legislative will, with-
1 Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v. New York, 5 Sandf. 14; Clark v. People, 26
Wend. 606; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 457.
• People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 162.
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out a hearing or judgment of law. So will acts of the legislature,
having elements of limitation, and capable of being so applied and
administered, although the words are broad enough to, and do,
literally read, strike at the right itself, be construed to limit and
control the remedy; for as such they are valid, but as weapons
destructive of vested rights they are void; and such force only
will be given the acts as the legislature could impart to them."1
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, where a similar ques-
tion is involved, recognizing their obligation " so to construe every
act of the legislature as to make it consistent, if it be possible,
with the provisions of the constitution," proceed to the examina-
tion of a statute by the same rule, "without stopping to inquire
what construction might be warranted by the natural import of the
language used."2
And Harris, J., delivering the opinion of the majority of the
Court of Appeals of New York, says: "A legislative act is not
to be declared void upon a mere conflict of interpretation between
the legislative and the judicial power. Before proceeding to annul,
by judicial sentence, what has been enacted by the law-making
power, it should clearly appear that the act cannot be supported
by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption."3 And
the Supreme Court of New York consider this but
[* 186] * the application of the familiar rule, that in the expo-
sition of a statute it is the duty of the court to seek to
ascertain and carry out the intention of the legislature in its en-
actment, and to give full effect to such intention, and they are
bound so to construe the statute, if practicable, as to give it force
and validity, rather than to avoid it, or render it nugatory.4
The rule is not different when the question is whether any por-
tion of a statute is void, than when the whole is assailed. The
excess of power, if there is any, is the same in either case, and is
not to be applied in any instance.
And on this ground it has been held that where the repealing
clause in an unconstitutional statute repeals all inconsistent acts,
the repealing clause is to stand and have effect, notwithstanding
1 Newland t>. Marsh, 19 I1L 384. See, also, Bigelow v. West Wisconsin
Co., 27 Wis. 478.
s Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 17.
3 People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 241.
* Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 471. See Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 27.
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CH. Til.] DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL. * 186
the invalidity of the rest.1 But other cases hold that such repeal-
ing clause is to be understood as designed to repeal all conflicting
provisions, in order that those of the new statute can have effect;
and that if the statute is invalid, nothing can conflict with it, and
therefore nothing is repealed.2 Great caution is necessary in
some cases, or the rule which was designed to ascertain and
effectuate the legislative intent will be pressed to the extreme of
giving effect to part of a statute exclusively, when the legislative
intent was that it should not stand except as a component part of
the whole.
Inquiry into Legislative Motives.
From what examination has been given to this subject, it ap-
pears that whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a
question of power; that is, whether the legislature in the partic-
ular case, in respect to the subject-matter of the act, the manner in
which its object is to be accomplished, and the mode of enacting it,
has kept within the constitutional limits and observed the constitu-
tional conditions. In any case in which this question is answered
in the affirmative, the courts are not at liberty to inquire into the
proper exercise of the power. They must assume that
legislative discretion has been properly exercised.8 * If [* 187]
evidence was required, it must be supposed that it was
before the legislature when the act was passed ;4 and if any special
finding was required to warrant the passage of the particular act,
it would seem that the passage of the act itself might be held
equivalent to such finding.6 And although it has sometimes been
1 Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 489; Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70.
1 Shepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit Railroad Co., 6 Wis. 605; State v.
Judge of County Court, 11 Wis. 50; Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165; Sullivan v.
Adams, 3 Gray, 470; Devoy v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 35 Barb. 264; Cam-
pau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; Harbeck v. New
York, 10 Bosw. 366.
1 People t>. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 193; People v. New York Central Railroad
Co., 34 Barb. 137; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh.
154.
* De Camp v. Eveland, 19 Barb. 81; Lusher v. Scites, 4 W. Va. 11.
'Johnson r. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co., 23 111. 207. The constitution
of Illinois provided that "corporations not possessing banking powers or priv-
ileges may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special
[ 205 ]
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urged at the bar that the courts ought to inquire into the motives
of the legislature where fraud and corruption were alleged, and
annul their action if the allegation were established, the argu-
ment has in no case been acceded to by the judiciary, and they
have never allowed the inquiry to be entered upon.1 The reasons
are the same here as those which preclude an inquiry into the
motives of the governor in the exercise of a discretion vested in
acts, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment of the
General Assembly, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under
general laws." A special charter being passed without any legislative declara-
tion that its object could not be attained under a general law, the Supreme Court
sustained it, but placed their decision mainly on the ground that the clause had
been wholly disregarded, "and it would now produce far-spread ruin to declare
such acts unconstitutional and void." It is very clearly intimated in the opinion,
that the legislative practice, and this decision sustaining it, did violence to tie
intent of the constitution. A provision in the constitution of Indiana that "no
act shall take effect until the same shall have been published and circulated in
the several counties of this State, by authority, except in case of emergency,'*
adds the words, "which emergency shall be declared in the preamble, or in the
body of the law;" thus clearly making the legislative declaration necessary.
Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415; Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98; Htndrick-
son v. Hendrickson, 7 Ind. 18.
1 Sunbury and Erie Railroad Co. v. Cooper, 33 Penn. St. 278; Ex parte New-
man, 9 Cal. 502; Baltimore v. State, 1.5 Md. 376; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met.
(Ky.) 566. "The courts cannot impute to the legislature any other but public
motives for their acts." People v. Draper, 16 N. Y. 645, per Denio, Ch. J.
"We are not made judges of the motives of the legislature, and the court will
not usurp the inquisitorial office of inquiry into the bona Jules of that body in
discharging its duties." Shankland, J., in the same case, p. 655. "The powers
of the three departments are not merely equal; they are exclusive in respect to
the duties assigned to each. They are absolutely independent of each other. It
is now proposed that one of the three powers shall institute an inquiry into the
conduct of another department, and form an issue to try by what motives the
legislature were governed in the enactment of a law. If this may be done, we
may also inquire by what motives the executive is induced to approve a bill or
withhold his approval, and in case of withholding it corruptly, by our mandate
compel its approval. To institute the proposed inquiry would be a direct attack
upon the independence of the legislature, and a usurpation of power subversive
of the constitution." Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 302, per Gookins, J. "We are
not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only ex-
amine into its power under the constitution." Per Chase, Ch. J., in Ex parie
McCardle, 7 Wall. 514. And see McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 431; Bradshaw
v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Humboldt County v. Churchill County Comm'rs, 6 Nev. 30;
Flint, »&c., Plank Road Co. b. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 103; State v. Fagan, 22 La.
An. 645; State v. Hays, 49 Mo. 607.
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CH. yn.] DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
him exclusively. He is responsible for his acts in such a case
not to the courts, but to the people.1
* Consequences if a Statute is Void. [* 188]
When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it
had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contracts
which depend upon it for their consideration are void; it consti-
tutes a protection to no one who has acted under it, and no one
can be punished for having refused obedience to it before the deci-
sion was made.2 And what is true of an act void in toto is true
also as to any part of an act which is found to be unconstitutional,
and which, consequently, is to be regarded as having never, at any
time, been possessed of any legal force.
1 Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 522; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 302.
* Strong v. Daniel, 5 Ind. 348; Astrom v. Hammond, 3 McLean, 107;
Meagher v. Storey Co., 5 Nev. 244. But one acting as an officer under an un-
constitutional law was held in Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pcnn. St. 436, to
be an officer de facto. This could hardly be so, however, if the law creating
the office was unconstitutional. There can be no officer de facto when there is
no office. See Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250. In People v. Salomon, 54 111.
46, a ministerial officer was severely censured for presuming to disregard a law
as unconstitutional. The court found it to be valid, but if they had held the con-
trary, the officer certainly could not have been punished for anticipating their de-
cision in his own action. In Texas it is reported to have been recently held, in
an opinion which we have not seen, that an act held unconstitutional must be
deemed to have the force of law for the protection of officers acting under it up
to the time of the decision declaring it void. Sessurus v. Botts, 34 Tex. 335.
And in some States a disposition has been manifested to hold that contracts made
by municipal bodies under an unconstitutional law may be enforced where they
have found their way into the hands of bona fide purchasers before the invalidity
was judicially declared. Stcines v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167; State v. Saline
County Court, ib. 390; Columbia County o. King, 13 Fla. 45; Same v. Davidson,
it. 482.
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[*189] "CHAPTER VIII.
THE SEVERAL GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
In the examination of American constitutional law, we shall
not fail to notice the care taken and the means adopted to bring
the agencies by which power is to be exercised as near as possible
to the subjects upon which the power is to operate.
In contradistinction to those governments where power is con-
centrated in one man, or one or more bodies of men, whose
supervision and active control extend to all the objects of gov-
ernment within the territorial limits of the State, the American
system is one of complete decentralization, the primary and vital
idea of which is, that local affairs shall be managed by local
authorities, and general affairs only by the central authority. It
was under the control of this idea that a national Constitution
was formed, under which the States, while yielding to the national
government complete and exclusive jurisdiction over external
affairs, conferred upon it such powers only, in regard to matters
of internal regulation, as seemed to be essential to national union,
strength, and harmony, and without which the purpose in organ-
izing the national authority might have been defeated. It is this,
also, that impels the several States, as if by common arrangement,
to subdivide their territory into counties, towns, road, and school
districts, and to confer upon each the powers of local legislation,
and also to incorporate cities, boroughs, and villages wherever a
dense population renders different rules important from those
which are needful for the rural districts.
The system is one which almost seems a part of the very nature
of the race to which we belong. A similar subdivision of the realm
for the purposes of municipal government has existed in England
from the earliest ages;1 and in America, the first settlers, as if
1 Crabbe's History of English Law, c. 2; 1 Bl. Com. 114; Hallam's Middle
Ages, c. 8, pt. 1; 2 Kent, 278; Vaughan's Revolutions in English History, b. i,
c. 8.
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* 189
instinctively, adopted it in their frame of government, and
* no other has ever supplanted it, or even found advocates. [* 190]
In most of the colonies the central power created and pro-
vided for the organization of the towns;1 in one at least the towns
preceded and created the central authority;2 but in all, the final
result was substantially the same, that towns, villages, boroughs,
cities, and counties exercised the powers of local government, and
the Colony or State the powers of a more general nature.3
1 For an interesting history of the legislation in Connecticut on this subject,
see Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131. In New Hampshire, see Bow v.
Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351. The learned note to Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9
Gray, 503, will give similar information concerning the organization and authority
of towns in the Massachusetts provinces. And see People v. Hurlbut, 24
Mich. 98. Mr. Elliott well says: "The prime strength of New England and
of the whole republic was and is in the municipal governments and in the homes."
And be adds, that among the earliest things decided in Massachusetts was, " that
trivial things should be ended in towns." (1635.) Elliott's New England, Vol.
I. p. m.
* Rhode Island; see Arnold's History, c. 7. It is remarked by this author
that, when the charter of Rhode Island was suspended to bring the Colony under
the dominion of Andros, "the American system of town governments, which
necessity had compelled Rhode Island to initiate fifty years before, became the
means of preserving the individual liberty of the citizen when that of the State or
Colony was crushed." Ib. Vol. I. p. 487.
2 "The townships," says De Tocqueville, " are only subordinate to the State
in those interests which I shall term social, as they are common to all of the
citizens. They are independent in all that concerns themselves, and among the
inhabitants of New England I believe that not a man is to be found who would
acknowledge that the State has any right to interfere in their local interests. The
towns of New England buy and sell, prosecute or are indicted; augment or
diminish their rates, without the slightest opposition on the part of the adminis-
trative authority of the State. They are bound, however, to comply with the
demands of the community. If a State is in need of money, a town can neither
give nor withhold the supplies. If a State projects a road, the township cannot
refuse to let it cross its territory; if a police regulation is made by the State it
must be enforced by the town. An uniform system of instruction is organized
all over the country, and every town is bound to establish the schools which the
law ordains. . . . Strict as this obligation is, the government of the State im-
poses it in principle only, and in its performance the township assumes all its
independent rights. Thus taxes are voted by the State, but they are assessed
and collected by the township; the existence of a school is obligatory, but the
township builds, pays, and superintends it. In France, the State collector re-
ceives the local imposts; in America, the town collector receives the taxes of the
State. Thus the French government lends its agents to the commune; in Amer-
ica, the township is the agent of the government. The fact alone shows the
14 [ 209 ]
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The several State constitutions have been framed with this
system in view, and the delegations of power which they make,
and the express and implied restraints which they impose there-
upon, can only be correctly understood and construed by keeping
in view its present existence and anticipated continuance. There
are few of the general rules of constitutional law that are not
more or less affected by the fact that the powers of government
are not concentrated in any one body of men, but are carefully
distributed, with a view to being exercised with intelli-
[* 191] gence,* economy, and facility, and as far as possible by
the persons most directly and immediately interested.
It has already been seen that the legislature cannot delegate its
power to make laws; but fundamental as this maxim is, it is so
qualified by the customs of our race, and by other maxims which
regard local government, that the right of the legislature, in the
entire absence of authorization or prohibition, to create towns and
other inferior municipal organizations, and to confer upon them
the powers of local government, and especially of local taxation
and police regulation usual with such corporations, would always
pass unchallenged. The legislature in these cases is not regarded
as delegating its authority, because the regulation of such local
affairs as are commonly left to local boards and officers is not un-
derstood to belong properly to the State; and when it interferes,
as sometimes it must, to restrain and control the local action,
there should be reasons of State policy or dangers of local abuse
to warrant the interposition.1
extent of the differences which exist between the two nations." Democracy in
America, c. 5.
'"It seems to be generally conceded that powers of local legislation may be
granted to cities, towns, and other municipal corporations. And it would require
strong reasons to satisfy us that it could have been the design of the framers of
our constitution to take from the legislature a power which has been exercised in
Europe by governments of all classes from the earliest history, and the exercise
of which has probably done more to promote civilization than all other causeE
combined; which has been constantly exercised in every part of our country
from its earliest settlement, and which has raised up among us many of our most
valuable institutions." State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 292, per Bell, J. See also
Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Dalby v. Wolf, 14 Iowa, 228; State
v. Simonds, 3 Mo. 414; McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Monr. 433; Smith t>. Levinus,
8 N. Y. 472; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Burgess t>. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; New
Orleans u.Turpin, 13 La. An. 56; Gilkeson v. The Frederick Justices, 13 Grat.
577; Mayor, Ac., of New York v. Ryan, 2 E. D. Smith, 868; St. Louis ».
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CH. VIII.] THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. * 191
The people of the municipalities, however, do not define for
themselves their own rights, privileges, and powers, nor is there
any common law which draws any definite line of distinction be-
tween the powers which may be exercised by the State and those
which must be left to the local governments.1 The municipalities
must look to the State for such charters of government as the
legislature shall see fit to provide; and they cannot prescribe for
themselves the details, though they have a right to expect that
those charters will be granted with a recognition of the
general * principles with which we are familiar. The [* 192]
charter, or the general law under which they exercise
their powers, is their constitution, in which they must be able to
show authority for the acts they assume to perform. They have
no inherent jurisdiction to make laws or adopt regulations of gov-
ernment; they are governments of enumerated powers, acting by
a delegated authority; so that while the State legislature may
exercise such powers of government coming within a proper desig-
nation of legislative power as are not expressly or impliedly pro-
hibited, the local authorities can exercise those only which are
expressly or impliedly conferred, and subject to such regulations
or restrictions as are annexed to the grant.2
The creation of municipal corporations, and the conferring
upon them of certain powers and subjecting them to correspond-
ing duties, does not deprive the legislature of the State of that
general control over their citizens which was before possessed.
It still has authority to amend their charters, enlarge or diminish
their powers, extend or limit their boundaries, consolidate two or
more into one, overrule their legislative action whenever it is
Russell, 9 Mo. 503; Bliss v. Eraus, 16 Ohio, n. 8. 65; Trigally ». Memphis,
6 Cold. 382; Duraeh's Appeal, 63 Penn. St. 491; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458;
Jones v. Richmond, 18 Grat. 517; State v. Neill, 24 Wis. 149; Bradley o.
M'Atee, 7 Bush, 667; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 309; Burckholter v. M'Connellsville,
20 Ohio, 308; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 108; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis.
415.
1 As to the common law affecting these corporate existences, and the effect
of usage, see 2 Kent, 278, 279.
1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 254;
Abendrpth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 363; Baldwin v. North Branford, 32 Conn.
47; Webster r. Harwinton, ib. 131; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Lack-
land i>. Northern Missouri Railroad Co., 31 Mo. 180; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio,
s. a. 268; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23.
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* 192 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. Tin.
deemed unwise, impolitic, or unjust, and even abolish them alto-
gether in the legislative discretion.1 The rights and franchises of
such a corporation, being granted for the purposes of the
[* 193] government, can never * become such vested rights as
against the State that they cannot be taken away; nor
does the charter constitute a contract in the sense of the constito-
tional provision which prohibits the obligation of contracts being
violated.2 Restraints on the legislative power of control must be
1 St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Coles v. Madison Co., Breese, 115; Rich-
land County v. Lawrence County, 12 HI. 1; Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13
111. 27 ; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 111. 1; People v. Power, 25 IE. 187; St. Louis
v, Russell, 9 Mo. 503; State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; McKim e. Odorn, 3 Bland,
407; Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416; Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Grat.
247; Brighton v. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27; Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361; Mills
v. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271; Weeks t.
Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; State t>. Branin, 3 Zab. 484; Patterson v. Society, &c,
4 Zab. 385; Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kansas, 124; City of St. Louis e. Caffe-
rata, 24 Mo. 94; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Aspinwall v. Commissioners,
&c, 22 How. 364; Howard v. McDiamid, 26 Ark. 100; Philadelphia v. Fox,
64 Penn. St. 169; Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Kuhn v. Board of Educa-
tion, 4 W. Va. 499; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 580; Hess ». Pegg, 7 Nev. 23.
The legislature may in its discretion recall to itself and exercise so much of
such powers as it has conferred upon municipal corporations as is not secured to
them by the constitution. People v. Pinkney, 32 N. Y. 377. The creditors of a
county cannot prevent the legislature reducing its limits, notwithstanding their
security may be diminished thereby. Wade v. Richmond, 18 Grat. 583. This
power is not defeated or effected by the circumstance that the municipal corpo-
ration was by its charter made the trustee of a charity; and in such case, if the
corporation is abolished, the Court of Chancery may be empowered and directed
by the repealing act to appoint a new trustee to take charge of the property and
execute the trust. Montpelier r. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12. And see Harri-
son v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Montpelier Academy ». George, 14 La. An.
406; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162; Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La. An.
665. But neither the identity of a corporation, nor its right to take property by
devise, is destroyed by a change in its name, or enlargement of its area, or an
increase in the number of its corporators. Girard r. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1.
Changing a borough into a city does not of itself abolish or affect the existing
borough ordinances. Trustees of Erie Academy v. City of Erie, 31 Penn. St. 51o.
Nor will it affect the indebtedness of the corporation, which will continue to be
its indebtedness under its new organization. Olney v. Harvey, 50 HI. 453. A
general statute, containing a clause repealing all statutes contrary to its provi-
sions, does not repeal a clause in a municipal charter on the same subject. State
v. Branin, 3 Zab. 484.
* This principle was recognized by the several judges in Dartmouth College
». Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. And see People e. Morris, 13 Wend. 331; St.
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found in the constitution of the State, or they must rest alone in
the legislative discretion.1 If the legislative action in these cases
operates injuriously to the municipalities or to individuals, the
remedy is not with the courts. The courts have no power to inter-
fere, and the people must be looked to, to right through the ballot-
Louis p. Russell, 9 Mo. 507; Montpelier p. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12; Trustees
of Schools v. Tatman, 13 11l. 30; Brighton p. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27; Reynolds
p. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162; Police Jury p. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 665; Mt. Car-
mel p. Wabash County, 50 1ll. 69; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 24, 30, 37.
1 "Where a corporation is the mere creature of legislative will, established
for the general good and endowed by the State alone, the legislative may, at
pleasure, modify the law by which it was created. For in that case there would
be but one party affected, — the government itself, — and therefore not a con-
tract within the meaning of the constitution. The trustees of such a corporation
would be the mere mandatories of the State, having no personal interest involved,
and could not complain of any law that might abridge or destroy their agency."
Montpelier Academy v. George, 14 La. An. 406. In Trustees of Schools v.
Tatman, 13 1ll. 30, the court say: "Public corporations are but parts of the
machinery employed in carrying on the affairs of the State; and they are subject
to be changed, modified, or destroyed, as the exigencies of the public may
demand. The State may exercise a general superintendence and control over
them and their rights and effects, so that their property is not diverted from the
uses and objects for which it was given or purchased." It is a lawful exercise
of legislative authority upon the division of counties, towns, &c, to confer a
part of the corporate property of the old carporation upon the new, and to
direct the old body to pay it over to the new. Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass.
16; Bristol p. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524; Milwaukee Town v. Milwaukee City,
12 Wis. 93; Marshall Co. Court v. Calloway Co. Court, 3 Bush, 93. But it
seems that this apportionment of property can only be made at the time of the
division. Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass. 390; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass.
76. See Richland p. Lawrence, 12 1ll. 8; Bowdoinham p. Richmond, 6 Greenl.
112. In the latter case, it was held that the apportionment of debts between an
old town and one created from it was in the nature of a contract; and it was not
in the power of the legislature afterwards to release the new township from pay-
ment of its share as thus determined. But the case of Layton p. New Orleans,
L2 La. An. 515, is contra. See also Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Penn. St.
374, which in principle seems to accord with the Louisiana case. In Burns p-
Clarion County, 62 Penn. St. 422, it was held the legislature had the power to
open a settlement made by county creditors with the county treasurer, and to
compel them to settle with him on principles of equity. See further Cambridge
p. Lexington, 17 Pick. 222; Attorney-General p. Cambridge, 16 Gray, 247;
Clark p. Cambridge, &c, Bridge Proprietors, 104 Mass. 236. The legislature
has power to lay out a road through several towns, and apportion the expense
between them. Waterville p. Kennebeck County, 59 Me. 80; Commonwealth
v. Newburyport, 103 Mass. 129.
[213]
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box all these wrongs.1 This is the general rule; and the excep-
tions to it are not numerous, and will be indicated hereafter.
The powers of these corporations are either express or implied.
The former are those which the legislative act under which they
exist confers in express terms; the latter are such as are neces-
sary in order to carry into effect those expressly granted, and
which must, therefore, be presumed to have been within the inten-
tion of the legislative grant.3 Certain powers are also incidental
to corporations, and will be possessed unless expressly or by
implication prohibited. Of these an English writer has said:
"A municipal corporation has at common law few powers beyond
those of electing, governing, and removing its members, and reg-
ulating its franchises and property. The power of its governing
1 "The correction of these abuses is as readily attained at the ballot-box
as it would be by subjecting it to judicial revision. A citizen or a number of
citizens may be subtracted from a county free from debt, having no taxation for
county purposes, and added to an adjacent one, whose debts are heavy, and
whose taxing powers are exercised to the utmost extent allowed by law, and this,
too, without consulting their wishes. It is done every day. Perhaps a majority
of the people, thus annexed to an'adjacent or thrown into a new cqunty by the
division of an old one, may have petitioned the legislature for this change; but
this is no relief to the outvoted minority, or the individual who deems himself
oppressed and vexed by the change. Must we, then, to prevent such occasional
hardships, deny the power entirely?
"It must be borne in mind that these corporations, whether established over
cities, counties, or townships (where such incorporated subdivisions exist), are
never intrusted and can never be intrusted with any legislative power inconsist-
ent or conflicting with the general laws of the land, or derogatory to those rights
either of person or property which the constitution and the general laws guarantee.
They are strictly subordinate to the general laws, and merely created to carry
out the purposes of those laws with more certainty and efficiency. Tbey may
be and sometimes are intrusted with powers which properly appertain to private
corporations, and in such matters their power as mere municipal corporations
ceases." City of St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 414.
2 2 Kent, 278, note; Halstead v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 3 N. Y. 433;
Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 112; New London v. Brainerd, 22 Conn. 552; State
v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424; McMillan v. Lee County, 3 Iowa, 311; La Fayette
v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; Clark ». Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 212; State v. Morristown,
33 N. J. 63; Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Pet. 162; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470. In
this last case, it was held that these corporations had implied power to borrow
[* 19-4]
Powers of Public Corporations.
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officers can only extend to the administration of the by-laws and
other ordinances by which the body is regulated." 1 But without
being expressly empowered so to do, they may sue and be sued;
may have a common seal; may purchase and hold lands
and other * property for corporate purposes, and convey [* 195]
the same; may make by-laws whenever necessary to
accomplish the design of the incorporation, and enforce the same
by penalties; and may enter into contracts to effectuate the cor-
porate purposes.2 Except as to these incidental powers, and which
need not be, though they usually are, mentioned in the charter, the
charter itself, or the general law under which they exist, is the
measure of the authority to be exercised.
And the general disposition of the courts in this country has
been to confine municipalities within the limits that a strict con-
struction of the grants of powers in their charters will assign to
them; thus applying substantially the same rule that is applied to
charters of private incorporation.8 The reasonable presumption is
1 Willcock on Municipal Corporations, tit. 769.
» Angell and Ames on Corp. §§ 111, 239; 2 Kyd on Corp. 102; State v.
Ferguson, 33 N. H. 430. See Dillon, Mun. Corp. for an examination in the
light of the authorities of the several powers here mentioned.
'Under a city charter which authorized the common council to appoint asses-
sors for the purpose of awarding damages to those through whose property a
street might be opened, and to assess such damages on the property benefited,
it was decided that the council were not empowered to levy a tax to pay for the
other expenses of opening the street. Reed v. Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161. So a
power to enact by-laws and ordinances to abate and remove nuisances will not
authorize the passing of an ordinance to prevent nuisances, or to impose penalties
for the creation thereof. Rochester v. Collins, 12 Barb. 559. A power to impose
penalties for obstructions to streets would not authorize the like penalties for
encroachments upon streets, where, under the general laws of the State, the
offences are recognized as dilFerent and distinct. Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15
Mich. 54. Authority to levy a tax on real and personal estate would not warrant
an income tax, especially when such a tax is unusual in the State. Mayor of
Savannah t>. Hartridge, 8 Geo. 23. It will appear, therefore, that powers near
akin to those expressly conferred are not, for that reason, to be taken by impli-
cation. And see Commonwealth v. Erie and N. E. Railroad Co., 27 Penn. St.
839. This rule has often been applied where authority has been asserted on
behalf of a municipal corporation to loan its credit to corporations formed to
construct works of internal improvement. See La Fayette ». Cox, 5 Ind. 38.
A power to pass ordinances to prohibit the sale or giving away of intoxicating
liquors in certain special eases is an implied exclusion of the power to prohibit
the sale or giving away in other cases. State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424. In
Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 465, it is said: "For all the purposes of juris-
[ 215 ]
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that the State has granted in clear and unmistakable terms all it
has designed to grant at all.
[* 196] * It must follow that, if in any case a party assumes to
deal with a corporation on the supposition that it possesses
powers which it does not, or to contract in any other manner than
is permitted by the charter, he will not be allowed, notwithstand-
ing he may have complied with the undertaking on his part, to
maintain a suit agaiust the corporation based upon its unauthorized
action. Even where a party is induced to enter upon work for a
corporation by the false representations of corporate officers, in
regard to the existence of facts on which by law the power of the
corporation to enter upon the work depends, these false representa-
tions cannot have the effect to give a power which in the particular
case was wanting, or to validate a contract otherwise void, and
therefore can afford no ground of action against the corporation;
but every party contracting with it must take notice of any want
of authority which the public records would show.1 This is the
i
diction corporations are like the inferior courts, and must show the power given
them in every case. If this be wanting, their proceedings must be holden void
whenever they come in question, even collaterally; for they are not judicial and
subject to direct review on certiorari. 2 Kyd on Corp. 104-107." See also
Milhau t>. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611; Douglass v.
Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Mount Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 899; Hooper r.
Emery, 14 Me. 375; Mayor, &c, of Macon v. Macon and Western R.R- Co.,
7 Geo. 224; Hopple v. Brown, 13 Ohio, M. s. 811; Lackland v. Northern Mis-
souri Railroad Co., 31 Mo. 180; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Bennett ». Borough
of Birmingham, 31 Penn. St. 15; Tucker r. Virginia City, 4 Nev. 20; Leaven-
worth v. Norton, 1 Kansas, 432; Kyle v. Malin, 8 Ind. 34; Johnson v. Pbitadel-
- phia, GO Penn. St. 451; Kniper r. Louisville, 7 Bush, 599; English t>. Chicot
County, 26 Ark. 454; Pullen v. Raleigh, 68 N. C. 451.
1 The common council of Williamsburg had power to open, regulate, grade,
and pave streets, but only upon petition signed by one third of the persons own-
ing lands within the assessment limits. A party entered into a contract with the
corporation for improving a street upon the false representations of the council
that such a petition had been presented. Held, that the provision of the la*
being public, and all the proceedings leading to a determination by the council
to make a particular improvement being matters of record, all persons were
chargeable with notice of the law and such proceedings; and that, notwithstand-
ing the false representations, no action would lie against the city for work done
under the contract. Swift t». Williamsburg, 24 Barb. 427. "If the plaintiff can
recover on the state of facts he has stated in his complaint, the restrictions and
limitations which the legislature sought to impose upon the powers of the com-
mon council will go for nothing. And yet these provisions are matters of
[ 216 ]
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CH. VIII.] THE GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. * 196
general rule, and the cases of unauthorized action which may hind
the corporation are exceptional, and will be referred to further on.
substance, and were designed to be of some service to the constituents of the
common council. They were intended to protect the owners of lands and the
tax-payers of the city, as well against the frauds and impositions of the con-
tractors who might be employed to make local improvements, as against the
illegal acts of the common council themselves in employing the contractors.
But if the plaintiff can recover in this action, of what value or effect are all these
safeguards? If the common council desire to make a local improvement, which
the persons to be benefited thereby, and to be assessed therefor, are unwilling
to have made, the consent of the owners may be wholly dispensed with, accord-
ing to the plaintiff's theory. The common council have only to represent that
the proper petition has been presented and the proper proceedings have been
taken, to warrant the improvement. They then enter into the contract. The
improvement is made. Those other safeguards for an assessment of the ex-
penses and for reviewing the proceedings may or may not be taken. But when
the work is completed and is to be paid for, it is found that the common council
have no authority to lay any assessment or collect a dollar from the property
benefited by the improvement. The contractor then brings his action, and
recovers from the city the damages he has sustained by the failure of the city to
pay him the contract price. The ground of his action is the falsity of the repre-
sentations made to him. But the truth or falsity of such representations might
have been ascertained by the party with the use of the most ordinary care and
diligence. The existence of the proper petition, and the taking of the necessary
initiatory steps to warrant the improvement, were doubtless referred to and
recited in the contract made with the plaintiff. And he thus became again directly
chargeable with notice of the contents of all these papers. It is obvious that the
restrictions and limitations imposed by the law cannot be thus evaded. The
consent of the parties interested in such improvements cannot be dispensed with;
the responsibility, which the conditions precedent created by the statute impose,
cannot be thrown off in this manner. For the effect of doing so is to shift entirely
the burden of making these local improvements, to relieve] those on whom the
law sought to impose the expense, and to throw it on others who are not liable
either in law or morals."
So where the charter of Detroit provided that no public work should be con-
tracted for or commenced until an assessment had been levied to defray the
expense, and that no such work should be paid or contracted to be paid for,
except out of the proceeds of the tax thus levied, it was held, that the city cor-
poration had no power to make itself responsible for the price of any public
work, and that such work could only be paid for by funds actually in the hands
of the city treasurer, provided for the specific purpose. Goodrich v. Detroit, 12
Mich. 279. But if the city receives the fund and misappropriates it, it will be
liable. Lansing v. Van Gorder, 24 Mich. 456.
Parties dealing with the agents or officers of municipal corporations must, at
their own peril, take notice of the limits of the powers both of the municipal
corporation, and of those assuming to act on its behalf. State e. Eirkley, 29
[ 217 ]
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[* 197] * Corporations by Prescription and Implication.
The origin of many of the corporate privileges asserted and
enjoyed in England is veiled in obscurity, and it is more than
probable that in some instances they had no better foundation than
an uninterrupted user for a considerable period. In other cases
the regal or baronial grant became lost in the lapse of time, and
the evidence that it had ever existed might rest exclusively upon
reputation, or upon the inference to be drawn from the exercise of
corporate functions. In all these cases it seems to be the law that
the corporate existence may be maintained on the ground of pre-
scription; that is to say, the exercise of corporate rights for a
time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary is
sufficient evidence that such rights were once granted by com-
petent authority, and are therefore now exercised by right and not
by usurpation.1 And this presumption concludes the crown, not-
withstanding tho maxim that the crown shall lose no rights by
lapse of time. If the right asserted is one of which a grant might
be predicated, a jury is bound to presume a grant from that pre-
scription.2 In this particular the claim to a corporate franchise
stands on the same ground as any claim of private right which
requires a grant for its support, and is to be sustained under
the same circumstances of continuous assertion and enjoyment.3
And even the grant of a charter by the crown will not preclude
the claim to corporate rights by prescription; for a new charter
does not extinguish old privileges.*
A corporation may also be established upon presumptive evidence
that a charter has been granted within the time of memory. Such
evidence is addressed to a jury, and though not conclusive upon
Md. 85; Gould v. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 464; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 209;
Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 381.
1 Introduction to Willcock on Municipal Corporations; The King p. Mayor,
&c, of Stratford upon Avon, 14 East, 360; Robie v. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 326.
See Londonderry v. Andover, 28 Vt. 416.
* Mayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 108, per Lord Mansfield. Compare
People p. Maynard, 15 Mich. 470; State v. Bunker, 59 Me. 366.
* 2 Kent, 277; Angell and Ames on Corp. § 70; 1 Kyd on Corp. 14.
4 Hadduck's Case, T. Raym. 439 ; The King v. Mayor, &c, of Stratford upon
Avon, 14 East, 360 ; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 366. See Jameson v. People,
16 11l. 259.
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them, yet if it reasonably satisfies their minds, it will justify them
in a verdict finding the corporate existence. "There is a great
difference," says Lord Mansfield, "between length of time which
operates as a bar to a claim, and that which is ionly used by way
of evidence. A jury is concluded by length of time which operates
as a bar; as where the statute of limitations is pleaded to a debt;
though the jury is satisfied that the debt is still due and unpaid, it
is still a bar, So in the case of presumption. If it be time out of
mind, a jury is bound to preclude the right from that prescription,
if there could be a legal commencement of the right. But any
written evidence, showing that there was a time when the prescrip-
tion did not exist, is an answer to a claim founded on prescription.
But length of time used merely by way of evidence may be left to
the consideration of the jury, to be credited or not, and to draw
their inference one way or the other according to circumstances." 1
The same ruling has been had in several cases in the courts of
this country, where corporate powers had been exercised, but no
charter could be produced. In one of these cases common reputa-
tion that a charter had once existed was allowed to be given to the
jury; the court remarking upon the notorious fact that two great
fires in the capital of the colony had destroyed many of the public
records.2 In other cases there was evidence of various acts which
could only lawfully and properly be done by a corporation, cover-
ing a period of thirty, forty, or fifty years, and done with the
knowledge of the State and without question.3 The inference of
corporate powers, however, is not one of law; but is to be drawn
as, a fact by the jury.4
Wherever a corporation is found to exist by prescription, the
same rule as to construction of powers, we apprehend,
would apply as in other cases. * The presumption as to [* 198]
the powers granted would be limited by the proof of the
1 Mayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 108, 109 ; citing, among other cases, Bedle
v. Beard, 12 Co. 6.
'Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 552. And see Bow p. Allenstown, 34 N. H.
351.
3 Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 400; New Boston p. Dunbarton,
13 N. H. 409, and 15 N. H. 201; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351; Trott v.
Warren, 2 Fairf. 227.
* New Boston v. Dunbarton, 15 N. H. 201; Bowp. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351;
Mayor of Hull p. Horner, 14 East, 102.
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usage, and nothing could be taken by intendment which the usage
did not warrant.
Corporations are also said sometimes to exist by implication.
When that power in the State which can create corporations grants
to individuals such property, rights, or franchises, or imposes upon
them such burdens, as can only be properly held, enjoyed, con-
tinued, or borne, according to the terms of the grant, by a corporate
entity, the intention to create such corporate entity is to be pre-
sumed, and corporate capacity is held to be conferred so far as is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the grant or burden. On
this subject it will be sufficient for our purpose to refer to authori-
ties named in the note.1 In these cases the rule of strict con-
struction of corporate powers applies with unusual force.
Municipal By-Laws.
The power of municipal corporations to make by-laws is limited
in various ways.
1. It is controlled by the Constitution of the United States and
of the State. The restrictions imposed by those instruments, and
which directly limit the legislative power of the State, rest equally
upon all the instruments of government created by the State. If
a State cannot pass an ex post facto law, or law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts under
the State with delegated authority.2 By-laws, therefore, which
in their operation would be ex post facto, or violate contracts, are
1 Dyer, 400, cited by Lord Kenyon, in Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 672,
and in 2 Kent, 276; Viner's Abr. tit. "Corporation"; Conservators of River
Tone v. Ash, 10 B. & C. 349; 8. C. t&. 883, citing case of Sutton Hospital,
10 Co. 28; per Kent, Chancellor, in Denton t>. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 325;
Coburn v. Ellenwood, 4 N. H. 101; Atkinson v. Bemis, 11 N. H. 46; North
Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9; per
Shaw, Ch. J., in Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 188; Mahony v. Bank of tie
State, 4 Ark. 620.
* Angell and Ames on Corporations, § 332; Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c, of New
York, 7 Cow. 588; Brooklyn Central Railroad Co. v. Brooklyn City Railroad
Co., 32 Barb. 858; Illinois Conference Female College v. Cooper, 25 111. 148.
The last was a case where a by-law of an educational corporation was held void,
as violating the obligation of a contract previously entered into by the corpora-
tion in a certificate of scholarship which it had issued. See. also Davenport, &c-i
Co. v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229; Saving Society o. Philadelphia, 81 Penn. St.
175; Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Geo. 404.
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CH. VIII.] THE GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. * 198
not within the power of municipal corporations; and whatever the
people by the State constitution have prohibited the State govern-
ment from doing, it cannot do indirectly through the local govern-
ments.
2. Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general
laws of the State, and with the provisions of the municipal charter.
Whenever they come in conflict with either, the by-law must give
way.1 The charter, however, may expressly or by necessary impli-
cation exclude the general laws of the State on any particular
subject, and allow the corporation to pass local laws at discretion,
which may differ from the rule in force elsewhere.2 But in these
cases the control of the State is not excluded if the legislature
afterward see fit to exercise it; nor will conferring a power
upon a * corporation to pass by-laws and impose penalties [* 199]
for the regulation of any specified subject necessarily super-
sede the State law on the same subject, but the State law and the
by-law may both stand together if not inconsistent.3 Indeed,
the same act may constitute an offence against both the State and
the municipal corporation, and may be punished under both with-
out violation of any constitutional principle.4
'Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 428; Mayor, &c, of New York p. Nichols, 4
Hill, 209; Petersburg p. Metzker, 21 111. 205; Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn.
128; Andrews v. Insurance Co., 37 Me. 256; Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio, N. 8. 439;
Carr p. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191; Commonwealth v. Erie and Northeast Railroad
Co., 27 Penn. St. 339; Burlington p. Rellar, 18 Iowa, 59; Conwell v. O'Brien,
11 Ind. 419; March v. Commonwealth, 12 B. Monr. 25. See Baldwin p. Green,
10 Mo. 410; Cowen p. West Troy, 43 Barb. 48; State p. Georgia Medical
Society, 38 Geo. 629; Pesterfield p. Vickers, 3 Cold. 205; Mays v. Cincinnati,
1 Ohio, n. s. 268; Wirth v. Wilmington, 68 N. C. 24.
'State v. Clarke, 1 Dutch. 54. Peculiar and exceptional regulations may
even be made applicable to particular portions of a city only, and yet not be
invalid. Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Commonwealth p. Patch, 97 Mass.
222, per Hoar, J.; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 647.
* City of St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; City of St. Louis v. CaOferata, 24
Mo. 97; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 261; Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281; Mayor, &c,
of Mobile p. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400.
'Such is the clear weight of authority, though the decisions are not uniform.
In Rogers p. Jones, 1 Wend. 261, it is said: "But it is said that the by-law of
a town or corporation is void, if the legislature have regulated the subject by law.
If the legislature have passed a law regulating as to certain things in a city, I
apprehend the corporation are not thereby restricted from making further reg-
ulations. Cases of this kind have occurred and nevei been questioned on that
ground; it is only to notice a case or two out of many. The legislature have
[221]
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1
[* 200] * 3. Municipal by-laws must also be reasonable. When-
ever they appear not to be so, the court must, as a matter
imposed a penalty of one dollar for servile labor on Sunday; the corporation of
New York have passed a by-law imposing the penalty of five dollars for the same
offence. As to storing gunpowder in New York, the legislature and corporation
have each imposed the same penalty. Suits to recover the penalty have been
sustained under the_ corporation law. It is believed that the ground has never
been taken that there was a conflict with the State law. One of these cases is
reported in 12 Johns. 122. The question was open for discussion, but not noticed."
In Mayor, &c, of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400, the validity of a municipal by-
law imposing a fine of fifty dollars, for an assault and battery committed within
the city, was brought in question. Collier, Ch. J., says, p. 403: "The object of
the power conferred by the charter, and the purpose of the ordinance itself wis
not to punish for an offence against the criminal justice of the country, but to
provide a mere police regulation, for the enforcement of good order and quiet
within the limits of the corporation. So far as an offence has been committed
against the public peace and morals, the corporate authorities have no power to'
inflict punishment, and we are not informed that they have attempted to arrogate
it. It is altogether immaterial whether the State tribunal has interfered and
exercised its powers in bringing the defendant before it to answer for the assault
and battery; for whether he has there been punished or acquitted is alike unim-
portant. The offence against the corporation and the State we have seen are
distinguishable and wholly disconnected, and the prosecution at the suit of each
proceeds upon a different hypothesis ; the one contemplates the observance of the
peace and good order of the city j the other has a more enlarged object in view,
the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the State." See also Mayor, &c.,
of Mobile v. Rouse, 8 Ala. 515; Intendant, &c, of Greensboro p. Mullins, 13 Ala.
341; Mayor, &c, of New York v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith, 156 ; People v. Stevens,
13 Wend. 341 j Blatchley v. Moser, 15 Wend. 215; Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281;
Ambrose v. State, ib. 351; Lawrenceburg v. Wuest, 16 Ind. 337; Amboy c.
Sleeper, 31 111. 499; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24
Mo. 94; Shafer v. Momma, 17 Md. 331. On the other hand it was held in
State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330, that where a municipal corporation was authorized
to take cognizance of and punish an act as an offence against its ordinances
which was also an offence against the general laws of the State, and this power
was exercised and the party punished, he could not afterwards be proceeded
against under the State law. "The constitution," say the court, "forbids that
a person shall be twice punished for the same offence. To hold that a party can
be prosecuted for an act under the State laws, after he has been punished for the
same act by the municipal corporation within whose limits the act was done,
would be to overthrow the power of the General Assembly to create corporations
to aid in the management of the affairs of the State. For a power in the State to
punish, after a punishment had been inflicted by the corporate authorities, could
only find a support in the assumption that all the proceedings on the part of the
corporation were null and void. The circumstance that the municipal authorities
have not exclusive jurisdiction over the acts which constitute offences within their
[ 222 ]
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THE GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
of law, declare them void.1 To render them reasonable, they
should tend in some degree to the accomplishment of the
objects for which the corporation * was created and its [* 201]
powers conferred. A by-law, that persons chosen annually
as stewards of the Society of Scriveners should furnish a dinner
on election day to the freemen of the society, — the freemen not
being the electors nor required to attend, and the office of steward
being for no other purpose but that of giving the dinner,— was
limits does not affect the question. It is enough that their jurisdiction is not
excluded. If it exists, — although it may be concurrent, — if it is exercised, it
is valid and binding so long as it is a constitutional principle that no man may be
punished twice for the same offence." This case seems to be supported by State
r. Welch, 36 Conn. 216, and the case of Slaughter v. People, cited below, goes
still further. Those which hold that the party may be punished under both the
State and the municipal law are within the principle of Fox v. State. 5 How. 410;
Moore v. People, 14 How. 13. And see Phillips v. People, 55 111. 429. In
Jefferson City v. Courtmire, 9 Mo. 092, it was held that authority to a municipal
corporation to " regulate the police of the city " gave it no power to pass an
ordinance for the punishment of indictable offences. And in Slaughter v. People,
2 Doug. (Mich.) 334, it was held not competent to punish, under city by-laws,
an indictable offence.
Where an act is expressly or by implication permitted by the State law, it can-
not be forbidden by the corporation. Thus, the statutes of New York established
certain regulations for the putting up and marking of pressed hay. and provided
that such hay might be sold without deduction for tare, and by the weight as
marked, or any other standard weight that should be agreed upon. It was held
that the city of New York had no power to prohibit under a penalty the sale of
such hay without inspection; this being obviously inconsistent with the statute
which gave a right to sell if its regulations were complied with. Mayor, &c, of
New York v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209.
1 2 Kyd on Corporations, 107 ; Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587; Cham-
berlain of London v. Compton, 7 D. & R. 597 ; Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52;
Gosling p. Veley, 12 Q. B. 347; Dunham ». Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor, &c,
of Memphis v. Winfield, 8 Humph. 707; Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Waters
r. Leech, 3 Ark. 110; White v. Mayor, 2 Swan, 364 ; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala.
461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728; Austin t>. Murray, 16 Pick. 121; Godard,
Petitioner, ib. 504; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462; Commissioners
r. Gas Co., 12 Penn. St. 318; State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170; Gallatin v.
Bradford, 1 Bibb, 209; Carevv v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 15 Mich. 525;
State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161; St. Louis v.
Weber, 44 Mo. 550. But where the question of the reasonableness of a by-law
depends upon evidence, and it relates to a subject within the jurisdiction of the
corporation, the court will presume it to be reasonable until the contrary is
shown. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221. And see St. Louis v. Weber,
[ 223]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
01
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 201 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. VIIT
held not connected with the business of the corporation, anTnot
tending to promote its objects, and therefore unreasonable and
void.1 And where a statute permitted a municipal corporation
to license the sale of intoxicating drinks and to charge a license
fee therefor, a by-law requiring the payment of a license fee of
one thousand dollars was held void as not advancing the purpose
of the law, but as being in its nature prohibitory.2 And if a cor-
poration has power to prohibit the carrying on of dangerous occu-
pations within its limits, a by-law which should permit one person
to carry on such an occupation and prohibit another, who had an
equal right, from pursuing the same business; or which should
allow the business to be carried on in existing buildings, but pro-
hibit the erection of others for it, would be unreasonable.3 And
a right to license an employment does not imply a right to charge
a license fee therefor with a view to revenue, unless such seems
to be the manifest purpose of the power; but the authority of the
corporation will be limited to such a charge for the license as will
cover the necessary expenses of issuing it, and the additional
labor of officers and other expenses thereby imposed. A license
is issued under the police power; but the exaction of a license
fee with a view to revenue would be an exercise of the power of
taxation; and the charter must plainly show an intent to confer
that power, or the municipal corporation cannot assume it.4
1 Society of Scriveners v. Brooking, 3 Q. B. 95. See, on this general subject,
Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 251 to 264.
* Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728.
* Mayor, &c, of Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 261. A power to prevent and
regulate the carrying on of manufactures dangerous in causing or promoting fires
does not authorize an ordinance prohibiting the erection of wooden buildings
within the city, or to limit the size of buildings which individuals shall be per-
mitted to erect on their own premises. Ibid. An ordinance for the destruction
of property as a nuisance without a judicial hearing is void. Darst v. People,
51 1ll. 286. An ordinance for the arrest and imprisonment without warrant of
a person refusing to assist in extinguishing a fipe is void. Judson v. Reardon,
16 Minn. 431.
* State v. Roberts, 11 Gill & J. 506; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, n. s. 268;
Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625; Freeholders v. Barber, 2 Halst. 64; Kip p.
Paterson, 2 Dutch. 298; Bennett p. Borough of Birmingham, 31 Penn. St. 15;
Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; Mayor,
&c, of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 144; Johnson p. Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451;
State p. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123; Mayor, &c, of New York p. Second Avenue
R.R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261. Nevertheless, the courts will not inquire very closely
[ 224 ]
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*A by-law to be reasonable should be certain. If it [*202]
affixes a penalty for its violation, it would seem that such
penalty should be a fixed and certain sum, and not left to the dis-
cretion of the officer or court which is to impose it on conviction;
though a by-law imposing a penalty not exceeding a certain sum
has been held not to be void for uncertainty.1
So a by-law to be reasonable should be in harmony with the
general principles of the common law. If it is in general re-
straint of trade, — like the by-law that no person shall exercise
the art of painter in the city of London, not being free of the com-
pany of painters, — it will be void on this ground.2 To take an
illustration from a private corporation: it has been held that a
by-law of a bank, that all payments made or received by the bank
must be examined at the time, and mistakes corrected before the
dealer leaves, was unreasonable and invalid, and that a recovery
might be had against the bank for an over-payment discovered
afterwards, notwithstanding the by-law.3 So a by-law of a town,
into the expense of a license with a view to adjudge it a tax, where it does not
appear to be unreasonable in amount in view of its purpose as a regulation. Ash
b. People, 11 Mich. 347; Johnson ». Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451; Burlington
t. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 102. And in some cases it has been held that
license fees might be imposed under the police power with a view to operate as
a restriction upon the business or thing licensed. Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 299;
Tenney r. Lenz, ib. 567. But in such cases, where the right to impose such
license fees can be fairly deduced from the charter, it would perhaps be safer and
less liable to lead to confusion and difficulty to refer the corporate authority to
the taxing power, rather than exclusively to the power of regulation. See Dun-
ham o. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462, upon the extent of the police power.
Fees which are imposed under the inspection laws of the State are akin to license
fees, and if exacted not for revenue, but to meet the expenses of regulation, are
to be referred to the police power. Cincinnati Gas Light Co. v. State, 18 Ohio,
N. 8. 243. On this subject in general, see Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 291 to 308.
1 Mayor, &c, of Huntsville v, Phelps, 27 Ala. 55, overruling Mayor, &c, of
Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 144. And see Piper v. Chappell, 14 M. & W. 624.
* Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52; Chamberlain of London b. Compton. 7 D.
& R. 597. Compare Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Willard v. Killingworth,
8 Conn. 247. But a by-law is not void, as in restraint of trade, which requires
loaves of bread baked for sale to be of specified weight and properly stamped,
or which requires bakers to be licensed. Mayor, &c, of Mobile v. Yuille, 3
Ala. 137.
'Mechanics and Farmers Bank v. Smith, 19 Johns. 115; Gallatin v. Brad-
ord, 1 Bibb, 209. Although these are cases of private corporations, they are
cited here because the rules governing the authority to make by-laws are the
same with both classes of corporations.
15 [ 225 ]
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which, under pretence of regulating the fishery of clams and
oysters within its limits, prohibits all persons except the inhabi-
tants of the town from taking shell-fish in a navigable
[*>203] river, is void as in contravention of common right.1 *And
for like reasons a by-law is void which abridges the rights
and privileges conferred by the general laws of the State, unless
express authority therefor can be pointed out in the corporate
charter.2 And a by-law which assumes to be a police regulation,
but deprives a party of the use of his property without regard to
the public good, under the pretence of the preservation of health,
when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose of the
regulation, will be set aside as a clear and direct infringement of
the right of property without any compensating advantages.3
1 Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391. As it had been previously held that every
person has a common-law right to fish in a navigable river or arm of the sea,
until by some legal mode of appropriation this common right was extinguished,
— Peek v. Lockwood, 5 Day, 22, — the by-law in effect deprived every citizen,
except residents of the township, of rights which were vested, so far as from the
nature of the case a right could be vested. See also Marietta v. Fearing, 4
Ohio, 427. That a right to regulate does not include a right to prohibit, see
also Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121. And see
Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611.
* Dunham v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor, Ac, of New York
v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209. See Strauss o. Pontiac, 40 111. 301.
3 By a by-law of the town of Charlestown all persons were prohibited, with-
out license from the selectmen, from burying any dead body brought into town
on any part of their own premises or elsewhere within the town. By the court,
Wilde, J.: "A by-law to be valid must be reasonable; it must be legi, fidei,
rationi cotuona. Now if this regulation or prohibition had been limited to the
populous part of the town, and were made in good faith for the purpose of pre-
serving the health of the inhabitants, which may be in some degree exposed to
danger by the allowance of interments in the midst of a dense population, it
would have been a very reasonable regulation. But it cannot be pretended that
this by-law was made for the preservation of the health of the inhabitants. Its
restraints extend many miles into the country, to the utmost limits of the town.
Now such an unnecessary-restraint upon the right of interring the dead we think
esseutially unreasonable. If Charlestown may lawfully make such a by-law as
this, all the towns adjoining Boston may impose similar restraints, and conse-
quently all those who die in Boston must of necessity be interred within the
precincts of the city. That this would be prejudicial to the health of the inhab-
itants, especially in the hot seasons of the year, and when epidemic disease!
prevail, seems to be a well-established opinion. Interments, therefore, in cities
and large populous towns, ought to be discountenanced, and no obstacles should
be permitted to the establishment of cemeteries at suitable places in the vicinity
[226]
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* Delegation of Municipal Powers. [* 204]
Another and very important limitation which rests upon mu-
nicipal powers is that they shall be executed by the municipality
The by-law in question is therefore an unreasonable restraint upon many of the
citizens of Boston, who are desirous of burying their dead without the city, and
for that reason void. And this by-law would seem to be void for another reason.
A by-law for the total restraint of one's right is void; as if a man be barred of
the use of his land. Com. Dig. By-Law, c. 4. The land where the bodies were
interred was the land of the Catholic Bishop of Boston, purchased by him in
1830, and then consecrated as a Catholic burying-ground, and has ever since
been used as such, for the interment of Catholics dying in Charlestown and
Boston. It is true the by-law does not operate to the total restraint or depriva-
tion of the bishop's right, but it is a total restraint of the right of the burying
the dead in Boston, for which a part of the burying-ground was appropriated.
The illegality of the by-law is the same, whether it may deprive one of the use
of a part or the whole of his property; no one can be so deprived, unless the
public good requires it. And the law will not allow the right of private property
to be invaded under the guise of a police regulation for the preservation of
health, when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose of the regula-
tion. Now we think this is manifest from the case stated in regard to the by-law
in question. It is a clear and direct infringement of the right of property,
without any compensating advantages, and not a police regulation made in good
faith for the preservation of health. It interdicts, or in its operation necessarily
intercepts, the sacred use to which the Catholic burying-ground was appropriated
and consecrated, according to the forms of the Catholic religion; and such an
interference, we are constrained to say, is wholly unauthorized and most unreason-
able." Austin o. Murray, 16 Pick. 125. So in Wreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41,
the common council of Detroit, under a power granted by statute to compel the
owners and occupants of slaughter-houses to cleanse and abate them whenever
necessary for the health of the inhabitants, assumed to pass an ordinance alto-
gether prohibiting the slaughtering of animals within certain limits in the city;
and it was held void. See further State r. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170. Upon
the whole subject of municipal by-laws, see Angell and Ames on Corp. c. 10;
Grant on Corp. 76 et seq. See also Redfield on Railways (3d ed.). Vol. I. p. 88;
Dillon, Mun. Corp. c. 12. The subject of the reasonableness of by-laws was
considered at some length in People v. Medical Society of Erie, 24 Barb. 570,
and Same v. Same, 32 N. Y. 187. In the first case it was held that a regulation
subjecting a member of the County Medical Society to expulsion, for charging
less than the established fees, was unreasonable and void. In the second, it was
decided that where a party had the prescribed qualifications for admission to the
society, he could not be refused admission, on the ground of his having previous
to that time failed to observe the code of medical ethics prescribed by the society
for its members. Municipal by-laws may impose penalties on parties guilty of a
violation thereof, but they cannot impose forfeiture of property or rights, with-
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itself, or by such agencies or officers as the statute has pointed
out. So far as its functions are legislative, they rest in the dis-
cretion and judgment of the municipal body intrusted with them,
and that body cannot refer the exercise of the power to the dis-
cretion and judgment of its subordinates or of any other author-
ity. So strictly is this rule applied, that when a city charter
authorized the common council of the city to make by-laws and
ordinances ordering and directing any of the streets to be pitched,
levelled, paved, flagged, &c, or for the altering or repair-
[* 205] ing the * same, " within such time and in such maimer as
they may prescribe under the superintendence and direc-
tion of the city superintendent," and the common council passed
an ordinance directing a certain street to be pitched, levelled, and
flagged, " in such manner as the city superintendent, under the
direction of the committee on roads of the common council, shall
direct and require," the ordinance was held void, because it left
to the city superintendent and the committee of the common coun-
cil the decision which, under the law, must be made by the council
itself. The trust was an important and delicate one, as the ex-
penses of the improvement were, by the statute, to be paid by the
owners of the property in front of which it was made. It was in
effect a power of taxation; and taxation is the exercise of sover-
eign authority; and nothing short of the most positive and explicit
language could justify the court in holding that the legislature
intended to confer such a power, or permit it to be conferred, on a
city officer or committee. The statute in question not only con-
tained no such language, but, on the contrary, clearly expressed
the intention of confining the exercise of this power to the com-
mon council, the members of which were elected by and respon-
sible to those whose property they were thus allowed to tax.1
Tliis restriction, it will be perceived, is the same which rests
upon the legislative power of the State, and it springs from the
out express legislative authority. State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 430; Phillips t,
Allen, 41 Penn. St. 481. See also Kirk v. Nowell, 1 T. R. 124; White v. Tall-
man, 2 Dutch. 67; Hart v. Albany, 9 Wend. 588; Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 III.
817; St. Paul v. Coulter, 12 Minn. 41.
1 Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92. See also Smith v. Morse, 2 Cat.
524; Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540; Whyte v. Nashville, 2 Swan, 864;
East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 111. 28; Rogers v. Collier, 43 Mo. 359; State r.
Jersey City, 1 Dutch. 309; Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush, 464; Lyon v. Jerome,
26 Wend. 485; State v. Patterson, 34 N. J. 168; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 60.
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same reasous. The people in the one case in creating the legis-
lative department, and the legislature in the other in conferring
the corporate powers, have selected the depository of the power
which they have designed should be exercised, and in confiding it
to such depository have impliedly prohibited its being exercised
by any other agency. A trust created for any public purpose can-
not be assignable at the will.of the trustee.1
* Equally incumbent upon the State legislature and these [* 206]
municipal bodies is the restriction that they shall adopt no
irrepealable legislation. No legislative body can so part with its
powers by any proceeding as not to be able to continue the exer-
cise of them. It can and should exercise them again and again,
as often as the public interests require.2 Such a body has no
power, even by contract, to control and embarrass its legislative
powers and duties. On this ground it has been held, that a grant
1 The charter of Washington gave the corporation authority "to authorize
the drawing of lotteries, for effecting any important improvement in the city,
which the ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish; provided that
the amount raised in each year shall not exceed ten thousand dollars. And
provided also that the object for which the money is intended to be raised shall
be first submitted to the President of the United States, and shall be approved
by him." Per Marshall, Ch. J., speaking of this authority: "There is great
weight in the argument that it is a trust, and an important trust, confided to
the corporation itself, for the purpose of effecting important improvements in the
city, and ought, therefore, to be executed under the immediate authority and
inspection of the corporation. It is reasonable to suppose that Congress, when
granting a power to authorize gaming, would feel some solicitude respecting the
fairness with which the power should be used, and would take as many precau-
tions against its abuse as was compatible with its beneficial exercise. Accordingly,
wc find a limitation upon the amount to be raised, and on the object for which
the lottery may be authorized. It is to be for any important improvement in the
city, which the ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish ; and it is
subjected to the judgment of the President of the United States. The power
thus cautiously granted is deposited with the corporation itself, without an indi-
cation that it is assignable. It is to be exercised like other corporate powers,
by the agents of the corporation under its control. While it remains where
Congress has placed it, the character of the corporation affords some security
against its abuse, — some security that no other mischief will result from it
than is inseparable from the thing itself. But if the management, control, and
responsibility may be transferred to any adventurer who will purchase, all the
security for fairness which is furnished by character and responsibility is lost."
Clark c. Washington, 12 Wheat. 64.
* East Hartford e. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 535; Dillon, Mun. Corp.
§ 61.
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of land by a municipal corporation, for the purposes of a cemetery,
with a covenant for quiet enjoyment by the grantee, could not
preclude the corporation, in the exercise of its police powers, from
prohibiting any further use of the land for cemetery purposes,
when the advance of population threatened to make such use a
public nuisance.1 So when " a lot is granted as a place of deposit
for gunpowder, or other purpose innocent in itself at the time;
it is devoted to that purpose till, in the progress of population,
it becomes dangerous to the property, the safety, or the lives of
hundreds; it cannot be that the mere form of the grant, because
the parties choose to make it particular instead of general and
absolute, should prevent the use to which it is limited being re-
garded and treated as a nuisance, when it becomes so in fact.
In this way the legislative powers essential to the comfort and
preservation of populous communities might be frittered
[*207] away into*perfect insignificance. To allow rights thus
to be parcelled out and secured beyond control would fix
a principle by which our cities and villages might be broken up.
Nuisances might and undoubtedly would be multiplied to au in-
tolerable extent."2
And on the same ground it is held, that a municipal corporation,
having power to establish, make, grade, and improve streets, does
not, by once establishing the grade, preclude itself from changing
it as the public needs or interest may seem to require, notwith-
standing the incidental injury which must result to those individ-
uals who have erected buildings with reference to the first grade.3
1 Brick Presbyterian Church p. City of New York, 5 Cow. 540; New York
v. Second Avenue R.R. Co., 32 N. Y. 2G1. Compare Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Penn.
St. 411; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 377.
! Coats v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 Cow. 605. See also Davis t>. Mayor,
&c, of New York, 14 N. Y. 506; Attorney-General v. Mayor, &c, of New
York, 3 Duer, 119; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 51; Gozzle ». Georgetown, 6
Wheat. 597; Louisville City R.R. Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415.
3 Calendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; Griggs e. Foote, 4 Allen, 195; Radcliffe's
Executors v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; O'Connor v.
Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St. 187; Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Penn. St. 233; Shinner
v. Hartford Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523; Snyder v. Rockport, 6 Ind. 237; La
Fayette v. Bush, 19 Ind. 326; La Fayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140; Real ».
Keokuk, 4 Green (Iowa), 47; Cole v. Muscatine, 14 Iowa, 296; Russell o. Bur-
lington, 30 Iowa, 262; Roberts v. Chicago, 26 111. 249; Murphy p. Chicago, 29
111. 279; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154; Rome v. Omberg, 28 Geo. 46; Roll
d. Augusta, 34 Geo. 326; Reynolds t>. Shreveport, 13 La. An. 426; White p.
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So a corporation having power under the charter to establish and
regulate streets cannot under this authority, without explicit legis-
lative consent, permit individuals to lay down a railway in one of
its streets, and confer privileges exclusive in their character and
designed to be perpetual in duration. In a case where this was
attempted, it has been said by the court: "The corporation has
the exclusive right to control and regulate the use of the streets
of the city. In this respect, it is endowed with legislative sover-
eignty. The exercise of that sovereignty has no limit, so long as
it is within the objects and trusts for which the power is conferred.
An ordinance regulating a street is a legislative act, entirely be-
yond the control of the judicial power of the State. But the
resolution in question is not such an act. Though it relates to a
street, and very materially affects the mode in which that street is
to be used, yet in its essential features it is a contract. Privileges
exclusive in their nature and designed to be perpetual in their
duration are conferred. Instead of regulating the use of the
street, the use itself to the extent specified in the resolution is
granted to the associates. For what has been deemed an adequate
consideration, the corporation has assumed to surrender a portion
of their municipal authority, and has in legal effect agreed with
the defendants that, so far as they may have occasion to use the
street for the purpose of constructing and operating their
railroad, the right to regulate * and control the use of that [* 208]
street shall not be exercised. ... It cannot be that powers
vested in the corporation as an important public trust can thus be
frittered away, or parcelled out to individuals or joint-stock asso-
ciations, and secured to them beyond control." 1
Yazoo City, 27 Miss. 357; Humes p. Mayor, &c, 1 Humph. 403; St. Louis v.
Gamo, 12 Mo. 414; Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 20; Keasy v. Louisville, 4
Dana, 154; Smith p. Washington, 20 How. 135. Compare Louisville v. Rolling
Mill Co., 3 Bush, 416. The law would seem to be otherwise declared in Ohio.
See Rhodes v. Cincinnati, 10 Ohio, 159; McCombs v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 474;
s. p. 18 Ohio, 229; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, n. s. 459. Compare Alex-
ander p. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 256.
1 Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435; s. c. 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611.
See also Davis p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 14 N. Y. 506; State v. Mayor, &e.r
3 Duer, 119; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351. The consent of the legislature in
any such case would relieve it of all difficulty, except so far as questions might
arise concerning the right of individuals to compensation, as to which see post,
p. 15. In Milhau p. Sharp, supra, it was also held that a corporation, with author-
ity "from time to time to regulate the rates of fare to be charged for the
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* 208 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. VIII.
So it has been held, that the city of Philadelphia exercised a
portion of the public right of eminent domain in respect to the
streets within its limits, subject only to the higher control of the
State and the use of the people; and therefore a written license
granted by the city, though upon a valuable consideration, author-
izing the holder to connect his property with the city railway by
a turnout and track, was not such a contract as would prevent
the city from abandoning or removing the railway wherever, in
the opinion of the city authorities, such action would tend to the
benefit of its police.1
Thus hedged in by the limitations which control the legislative
power of the State, these corporations are also entitled to the same
protection which surrounds the exercise of State legislative power.
One of these is, that no right of action shall arise in favor of au
individual for incidental injury suffered by him in consequence of
their adopting or failing to adopt legislative action.2 Another is,
that the same presumption that they have proceeded upon sufficient
information and with correct motives shall support their legisla-
tive action which supports the statutes of the State, and precludes
judicial inquiry on these points.3 These rules, however,
[*209] must be confined to those cases where the corporation *is
exercising a discretionary power, and where the reasons
which are to determine whether it shall act or not, and if it does,
what the action shall be, are addressed to the municipal body
carriage of persons," could not by resolution divest itself thereof as to the
carriages employed on a street-railway.
1 Bryson p. Philadelphia, 47 Penn. St. 329. Compare Louisville City E.B.
Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415.
5 RadeliftVs Ex'rs v. Mayor, &c, of Brookyn, 4 N. Y. 195; Duke v. Mayor,
&c, of Rome, 20 Geo. 635; Larkin v. Saginaw County, 11 Mich. 88; St. Louis
v. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414; Griffin v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 9 N. Y. 456; Ben-
nett v. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 120; Weightman ». Washington, 1 Black, 39;
Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio, n. s. 375; Barton c. Syracuse, 37 Barb.
292; Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio, n. s. 19; 8. c. 2 Am. Rep. 368; Hewson
o. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475; Murtagh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 480; Commission-
ers v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324;
Grant ». Erie, 69 Penn. St. 420; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 272; Sparhawk v. Salem, 1
Allen, 30; Randall v. Eastern R. Corp., 106 Mass. 276; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 326;
Hughes v. Baltimore, Taney, 243.
3 Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 193; New York and Harlaem Railroad Co. v.
Mayor, &c, of New York, 1 Hilton, 562; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Freeport
t>. Marks, 59 Penn. St. 253. Compare State v. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Ohio,
N. S. 262.
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exclusively. If the corporation is in the position of trustee of
property for other persons, it is subject to the same supervision
and control with other trustees, and where a specific act is required
by law to be done, exact performance may be compelled as in
other cases.
Among the implied powers of such an organization appears to
be the power to defend and indemnify its officers where they have
incurred liability in the bona fide discharge of their duty. It has
been decided in a case where irregularities had occurred iu the
assessment of a tax, in consequence of which the tax was void,
and the assessors had refunded to the persons taxed the moneys
which had been collected and paid into the town, county, and
State treasuries, that the town had authority to vote to raise a sum
of money in order to refund to the assessors what had been so
paid by them, and that such vote was a legal promise to pay, on
which the assessors might maintain action against the town. "The
general purpose of this vote," it was said, " was just and wise.
The inhabitants, finding that three of their townsmen, who had
been elected by themselves to an office, which they could not, with-
out incurring a penalty, refuse to accept, had innocently and inad-
vertently committed an error which, in strictness of law, annulled
their proceedings, and exposed them to a loss perhaps to the whole
extent of their property, if all the inhabitants individually should
avail themselves of their strict legal rights, — finding also that the
treasury of the town had been supplied by the very money which
these unfortunate individuals were obliged to refund from their
own estates, and that, so far as the town tax went, the very per-
sons who had rigorously exacted it from the assessors, or who were
about to do it, had themselves shared in due proportion the benefits
and use of the money which had been paid into the treasury, in
the shape of schools, highways, and various other objects which
the necessities of a municipal institution call for,— concluded to
reassess the tax, and to provide for its assessment in a manner
which would have produced perfect justice to every individual of
the corporation, and would have protected the assessors from the
effects of their inadvertence in the assessment which was found to
be invalid. The inhabitants of the town had a perfect right to
make this reassessment, if they had a right to raise the money
originally. The necessary supplies to the treasury of a town can-
not be intercepted, because of an inequality in the mode of appor-
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tioning the sum upon the individuals. Debts must be
[* 210] incurred, duties must be performed, by every town; * the
safety of each individual depends upon the execution of
the corporate duties and trusts. There is and must be an inherent
power in every town to bring the money necessary for the purposes
of its creation into the treasury; and if its course is obstructed
by the ignorance or mistakes of its agents, they may proceed to
enforce the end and object by correcting the means; and whether
this be done by resorting to their original power of voting to raise
money a second time for the same purposes, or by directing to re-
assess the sum before raised by vote, is immaterial; perhaps the
latter mode is best, at least it is equally good." 1
It has also been held competent for a town to appropriate money
to indemnify the school committee for expenses incurred in defend-
ing an action for an alleged libel contained in a report made by
them in good faith, and in which action judgment had been ren-
dered in their favor.2 And although it should appear that the
officer had exceeded his legal right and authority, yet if he has
acted in good faith in an attempt to perform his duty, the town lias
the right to adopt his act and to bind itself to indemnify
[* 211] him.3 *And perhaps the legislature may even have power
to compel the town, in such a case, to reimburse its officers
1 Per Parker, Ch. J., in Nelson e. Milford, 7 Pick. 23. See also Baker r.
Windham, 13 Me. 74; Fuller v. Groton, 11 Gray, 340.
A municipal corporation, it is said, may offer rewards for the detection of
offenders within its limits, but its promise to reward an officer for that which,
without such reward, it was his duty to do, is void. Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 91, and
cases cited. And see note, p. 212, supra.
'Fuller v. Inhabitants of Groton, 11 Gray, 340. See also Hadsell p. Inhab-
itants of Hancock, 3 Gray, 526; Pike ». Middleton, 12 N. H. 278.
* A surveyor of highways cut a drain for,the purpose of raising a legal ques-
tion as to the bounds of the highway, and the town appointed a committee to
defend an action brought against the surveyor therefor, and voted to defray the
expenses incurred by the committee. By the court: "It is the duty of a town
to repair all highways within its bounds, at the expense of the inhabitants, so that
the same may be safe and convenient for travellers; and we think it has the
power, as incident to this duty, to indemnify the surveyor or other agent against
any charge or liability he may incur in the bona fide discharge of this duty,
although it may turn out on investigation that he mistook his legal rights and
authority. The act by which the surveyor incurred a liability was the digging a
ditch, as a drain for the security of the highway; and if it was done for the pur-
pose of raising a legal question as to the bounds of the highway, as the defend-
ants offered to prove at the trial, the town had, nevertheless, a right to adopt
[234]
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the expenses incurred by them in the honest but mistaken dis-
charge of what they believed to be their duty, notwithstanding the
town, by vote, has refused to do so.1
Construction of Municipal Powers.
The powers conferred upon municipalities must be construed
with reference to the object of their creation, namely, as agencies
of the State in local government.2 The State can create them for
the act, for they were interested in the subject, being bound to keep the highway
in repair. They had, therefore, a right to determine whether they would defend
the surveyor or not; and having determined the question, and appointed the
plaintiffs a committee to carry on the defence, they cannot now be allowed to
deny their liability, after the committee have paid the charges incurred under
the authority of the town. The town had a right to act on the subject-matter
which was within their jurisdiction; and their votes are binding and create a
legal obligation, although they were under no previous obligation to indemnify the
surveyor. That towns have an authority to defend and indemnify their agents
who may incur a liability by an inadvertent error, or in the performance of their
duties imposed on them by law, is fully maintained by the case of Nelson v.
Milford, 7 Pick. 18." Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 568. And see Briggs v.
Whipple, 6 Vt. 95.
1 Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y. 143. See this case com-
mented upon by Lyon, J., in State v. Tappen, 29 Wis. 67-1, 680. On the page
last mentioned it is said, "We have seen no case except in the courts of New
York, which holds that such moral obligation gives the legislature power to com-
pel payment." Where officers make themselves liable to penalties for refusal
to perform duty, the corporation has no authority to indemnify them. Halstead
c. Mayor, &c, of New York, 3 N. Y. 430; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126.
See Frost t. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill, 244; Vincent
r. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 105.
■ A somewhat peculiar question was involved in the case of Jones v. Rich-
mond, 18 Grat. 517. In anticipation of the evacuation of the city of Richmond
by the Confederate authorities, and under the apprehension that scenes of disorder
might follow, which would be aggravated by the opportunity to obtain intoxicating
liquors, the common council ordered the seizure and destruction of all such liquors
within the city, and pledged the faith of the city to the payment of the value.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia afterwards decided that the city might be held
liable on the pledge in an action of assumpsit. Hives, J., says: "By its char-
ter the council is specially empowered to ' pass all by-laws, rules, and regula-
tions which they shall deem necessary for the peace, comfort, convenience, good
order, good morals, health, or safety of said city, or of the people or property
therein.' It is hard to conceive of larger terms for the grant of sovereign leg-
islative powers to the specified end than those thus employed in the charter; and
they must be taken by necessary and unavoidable intendment to comprise the
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no other purpose, and it can confer powers of government to no
other end, without at once coming in conflict with the constitu-
tional maxim, that legislative power cannot be delegated, or with
other maxims designed to confine all the agencies of government to
the exercise of their proper functions. And wherever the munici-
pality shall attempt to exercise powers not within the proper province
of local self-government, whether the right to do so be claimed under
express legislative grant, or by implication from the charter, the act
must be considered as altogether ultra vires, and therefore void.
A reference to a few of the adjudged cases will perhaps best
illustrate this principle. The common council of the city of
Buffalo undertook to provide an entertainment and ball for its
citizens and certain expected guests on the 4th of July, and for
that purpose entered into contract with a hotel keeper to provide
the entertainment at his house, at the expense of the city. The
entertainment was furnished and in part paid for, and suit was
brought to recover the balance due. The city had authority, under
its charter, to raise and expend moneys for various specified pur-
poses, and also " to defray the contingent and other expenses of
the city." But providing an entertainment for its citizens is no
part of municipal self-government, and it has never been
[* 212] considered, * where the common law has prevailed, that
the power to do so pertained to the government in any of
its departments. The contract was therefore held void, as not
within the province of the city government.1
powers of eminent domain within these limits of prescribed jurisdiction. There
were two modes open to the council: first, to direct the destruction of these
stores, leaving the question of the city's liability therefor to be afterwards liti-
gated and determined; or, secondly, assuming their liability, to contract for the
values destroyed under their orders. Had they pursued the first mode, the cor-
poration would have been liable in an action of trespass for the damages ; but they
thought proper to adopt the latter mode, make it a matter of contract, and
approach their citizens, not as trespassers, but with the amicable proffer of a
formal receipt and the plighted faith of the city for the payment. In this they
seem to me to be well justified." Judge Dillon doubts the soundness of this
decision. Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 371, note. The case seems to us analogous
in principle to that of the destruction of buildings to stop the progress of a fire.
In each case private property is destroyed to anticipate and prevent an impend-
ing public calamity.
1 Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110. See also the case of New London v.
Brainard, 22 Conn. 552, which follows and approves this case. The cases differ
in this only, that in the first suit was brought to enforce the illegal contract,
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The supervisors of the city of New York refused to perform a
duty imposed upon them by law, and were prosecuted severally
for the penalty which the law imposed for such refusal, and judg-
ment recovered. The board of supervisors then assumed, on
behalf of the city and county, the payment of these judgments,
together with the costs of defending the suits, and caused drafts
to be drawn upon the treasurer of the city for these amounts.
It was held, that these drafts upon the public treasury to indem-
nify officers for disregard of duty were altogether unwarranted
and void, and that it made no difference that the officers had
acted conscientiously in refusing to perform their duty, and in
the honest belief that the law imposing the duty was unconstitu-
tional. The city had no interest in the suits against the super-
visors, and appropriating the public funds to satisfy the judgments
and costs was not within either the express or implied powers
conferred upon the board.1 It was in fact appropriating the pub-
lic money for private purposes, and a tax levied therefor must
consequently be invalid, on general principles controlling the right
of taxation, which will be considered in another place. In a recent
case in Iowa it is said: "No instance occurs to us in which it
would be competent for [a municipal corporation] to loan its
credit or make its accommodation paper for the benefit of citizens
to enable them to execute private enterprises;"2 and where it
^tf.i'e in the second the city was enjoined from paying over moneys which it had
*j,ropriated for the purposes of the celebration. The cases of Tash v. Adams,
i 'Cush. 252, and Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103, are to the same effect. A town,
it has been held, cannot lawfully be assessed to pay a reward offered by a vote
of the town for the apprehension and conviction of a person supposed to have
committed murder therein. Gale v. South Berwick, 51 Me. 174. Nor under its
general authority to raise money for " necessary town charges," is a town author-
ized to raise and expend moneys to send lobbyists to the legislature. Frankfort
r. Winterport, 54 Me. 250. Or, under like authority, to furnish a uniform for a
?olunteer military company. Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502. Where a
municipal corporation enters into a contract ultra vires, no implied contract
irises to compensate the contractor for any thing he may have done under it,
notwithstanding the corporation may have reaped a benefit therefrom. McSpedon
v. New York, 7 Bosw. 601; Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96.
'Halstead v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 3 N. Y. 430. See a similar case in
People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill, 244. See also Carroll v. St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444;
Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 103; Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396; Merrill
e. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126.
* Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 224. See Tyson r. School Directors, 51
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cannot loan its credit to private undertakings, it is equally
[* 213] without * power to appropriate the moneys in its treasury,
or by the conduct of its officers to subject itself to implied
obligations.1
The powers 'conferred upon the municipal governments must
also be construed as confined in their exercise to the territorial
limits embraced within the municipality; and the fact that these
powers are conferred in general terms will not warrant their exer-
cise except within those limits. A general power " to purchase,
hold, and convey estate, real and personal, for the public use" of
the corporation, will not authorize a purchase outside the corpo-
rate limits for that purpose.2 Without some special provision they
cannot, as of course, possess any control or rights over lands lyiug
outside ;3 and the taxes they levy of their own authority, and the
moneys they expend, must be for local purposes only.4
But the question is a very different one how far the legislature
of the State may authorize the corporation to extend its action to
Penn. St 9; Freeland t>. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Thompson v. Pittston, 59
Me. 545; Kelly o. Marshall, 69 Penn. St. 319; Allen v. Jay, Supreme Court of
Maine, Law Reg., Aug. 1873, with note by Judge Redfield.
1 "In determining whether the subject-matter is within the legitimate authority
of the town, one of the tests is to ascertain whether the expenses were incurred
in relation to a subject specially placed by law in other hands. ... It is a
decisive test against the validity of all grants of money by towns for objects
liable to that objection, but it does not settle questions arising upon expenditures
for objects not specially provided for. In such cases the question will still recur,
whether the expenditure was within the jurisdiction of the town. It may be
safely assumed that, if the subject of the expenditure be in furtherance of some
duty enjoined by statute, or in exoneration of the citizens of the town from a
liability to a common burden, a contract made in reference to it will be valid and
binding upon the town." Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 487. See Tucker v. Vir-
ginia City, 4 Nev. 20. It is no objection to the validity of an act which author-
izes an expenditure for a town-hall, that rooms to be rented for stores are
contained in it. White v. Stamford, 37 Conn. 578.
* Riley v. Rochester, 9 N. Y. 64.
3 Per Kent, Chancellor, Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 836. And see
Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171; Weaver v. Cherry, 8 Ohio, n. s. 664;
North Hempstead v. Hempstead, Hopk. 294; Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N. H.
465.
4 In Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 896, the action of a town appropriating
money in aid of the construction of a county road, was held void and no protec-
tion to the officers who had expended it See also Concord v. Boscawen, 17
N. H. 465.
[ 238 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
01
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. VITT.] THE GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. * 213
objects outside the city limits, and to engage in enterprises of a
public nature which may be expected to benefit the citizens of the
municipality in common with the people of the State at large, and
also in some special and peculiar manner, but which nevertheless
are not under the control of the corporation, and are so far aside
from the ordinary purposes of local governments that assistance by
the municipality in such enterprises would not be warranted under
auy general grant of power for municipal government. For a few
years past the sessions of the legislative bodies of the
several States have been prolific in * legislation which has [* 214]
resulted in flooding the country with municipal securities
issued in aid of works of public improvement, to be owned, con-
trolled, and operated by private parties, or by corporations created
for the purpose; the works themselves being designed for the con-
venience of the people of the State at large, but being nevertheless
supposed to be specially beneficial to certain localities because
running near or through them, and therefore justifying, it is sup-
posed, the imposition of a special burden by taxation upon such
localities to aid in their construction.1 We have elsewhere2 referred
to cases in which it has been held that the legislature may consti-
tutionally authorize cities, townships, and counties to subscribe to
the stock of railroad companies, or to loan them their credit, and
to tax their citizens to pay these subscriptions, or the bonds or other
securities issued as loans, where a peculiar benefit to the munici-
pality was anticipated from the improvement. The rulings in
these cases, if sound, must rest upon the same right which allows
such-municipalities to impose burdens upon their citizens to con-
struct local streets or roads, and they can only be defended on the
ground that " the object to be accomplished is so obviously con-
nected with the [municipality] and its interests as to conduce
obviously and in a special manner to their prosperity and advance-
ment." 3 But there are authorities which dispute their soundness,
1 In Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen, 500, it was held competent
for the legislature to authorize a town to raise money by taxation for a State
agricultural college, to be located therein. The case, however, we think, stands
on different reasons from those where aid has been voted by municipalities to
public improvements. See it explained in Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94.
And see Marks p. Trustees of Pardue University, 37 Ind. 155.
* Ante, p. 119.
* Talbot t. Dent, 9 B. Monp. 526. See Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 44.
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and it cannot be denied that this species of legislation has been
exceedingly mischievous in its results, that it has created a great
It seems not inappropriate to remark in this place that the three authors who
have treated so ably of municipal constitutional law (Mr. Sedgwick, Slat. &
Const. Law, 464), of railway law (Judge Redfield), and of municipal corpora-
tions (Judge Dillon) have all united in condemning this legislation as unsound
and unwarranted by the principles of constitutional law. See the views of the
two writers last named in note to the case of People v. Township Board of Salem,
9 Am. Law Reg. 487. And Judge Dillon well remarks in his Treatise on Mu-
nicipal Corporations (§ 104) that, "regarded in the light of its effects, there
is little hesitation in affirming that this invention to aid private enterprises has
proved itself baneful in the last degree."
If we trace the beginning of this legislation, we shall find it originating at a
time when there had been little occasion to consider with care the limitations to
the functions of municipal government, because as yet those functions had been
employed with general caution and prudence, and no disposition had been mani-
fested to stretch their powers to make them embrace matters not usually recog-
nized as properly and legitimately falling within them, or to make use of the
municipal machinery to further private ends. Nor did the earliest decisions
attract much attention, for they referred to matters somewhat local, and the spirit
of speculation was not as yet rife. When the construction of railways and canals
was first entered upon by an expenditure of public funds to any considerable
extent, the States themselves took them in charge, and for a time appropriated
large sums and incurred immense debts in enterprises, some of which were of
high importance and others of little value, the cost and management of which
threatened them at length with financial disaster, bankruptcy, and possible repu-
diation. No long experience was required to demonstrate that railways and
canals could not be profitably, prudently, or safely managed by the shifting
administrations of State government; and many of the States not only made pro-
vision for disposing of their interest in works of public improvement, but, in view
of a bitter experience of the evils already developed in undertaking to construct
and control them, they amended their constitutions so as to prohibit the State,
when again the fever of speculation should prevail, from engaging anew in such
undertakings.
All experience shows, however, that men are abundant who do not scruple to
evade a constitutional provision which they find opposed to their desires, if they can
possibly assign a plausible reason for doing so; and in the case of the provisions
before referred to, it was not long before persons began to question their phra-
seology very closely, not that they might arrive at the actual purpose, — which
indeed was obvious enough, — but to discover whether that purpose might not be
defeated without a violation of the express terms. The purpose clearly was to
remand all such undertakings to private enterprise, and to protect the citizens of
the State from being taxed to aid them; but while the State was forbidden to
engage in such works, it was unfortunately not expressly declared that the sev-
eral members of the State, in their corporate capacity, were also forbidden to do
so. The conclusion sought and reached was that the agencies of the State were
[240]
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burden of public debt for which in a large number of cases the
anticipated benefit was never received, and that, as is likely to be
at liberty to do what was forbidden to the State itself, and the burden of debt
which the State might not directly impose upon its citizens, it might indirectly
place upon their shoulders by the aid of municipal action.
The legislation adopted under this construction some of the courts felt com-
pelled to sustain, upon the accepted principle of constitutional law that no legis-
lative authority is forbidden to the legislature unless forbidden in terms; and the
voting of municipal aid to railroads became almost a matter of course wherever a
plausible scheme could be presented by interested parties to invite it. In some
localities, it is true, vigorous protest was made; but as the handling of a large
amount of public money was usually expected to make the fortune of the projectors,
whether the enterprise proved successful or not, means either fair or unfair were
generally found to overcome all opposition. Towns sometimes voted large sums
to railroads on the ground of local benefit where the actual and inevitable result
was local injur)', and the projectors of one scheme succeeded in obtaining and
negotiating the bonds of one municipality to the amount of a quarter of a million
dollars, which are now being enforced, though the work they were to aid was never
seriously begun. A very large percentage of all the aid voted was sacrificed in
discounts to purchasers of bonds, expended in worthless undertakings, or otherwise
lost to the tax payers; and the cases might almost be said to be exceptional in which
municipalities, when afterwards they were called upon to meet their obligations,
could do so with a feeling of having received the expected consideration. Some
State and territorial governors did noble work in endeavoring to stay this reckless
legislative and municipal action, and some of the States at length rendered such
action impossible by constitutional provisions so plain and positive that the most
ingenious mind was unable to misunderstand or pervert them.
When the United States entered upon a scheme of internal improvement, the
Cumberland road was the first important project for which its revenues were
demanded. The promises of this enterprise were of continental magnificence
and importance, but they ended after heavy national expenditures in a road no
more national than a thousand others which the road-masters in the several
States have constructed with the local taxes; and it wa»finally abandoned to the
States as a common highway. When next a great national scheme was broached,
the aid of the general government was demanded by way of subsidies to private
corporations, who presented schemes of works of great public convenience and
utility, which were to open up the new territories to improvement and settlement
sooner than the business of the country would be likely to induce unaided private
capital to do it, and which consequently appealed to the imagination rather than
to facts to demonstrate their importance, and afforded abundant opportunity for
scheming operators to call to their assistance the national sentiment, then
peculiarly strong and active by reason of the attempt recently made to overthrow
the government, in favor of projects whose national, importance in many cases
the imagination alone could discover. The general result was the giving away of
immense bodies of land, and in some cases the granting of pecuniary aid, with
i recklessness*and often with an appearance of corruption that at length startled
16 [ 241 ]
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the case where municipal governments take part in projects foreign
to the purposes of their creation, it has furnished unusual facil-
the people, and aroused a public spirit before which the active spirits in Congress
who had promoted these grants, and sometimes even demanded them in the name
of the poor settler in the wilderness who was unable to get his crops to market,
were compelled to give way. The scandalous frauds connected with the Pacific
Railway, which disgraced the nation in the face of the world, and the great and
disastrous financial panic of 1873, were legitimate results of such subsidies; but
the pioneer in the wilderness had long before discovered that land grants were
not always sought or taken with a view to an immediate appropriation to the
roads for the construction of which they were nominally made, but that tLe result
in many cases was, that large tracts were thereby kept out of market and from
taxation which otherwise would have been purchased and occupied by settlers who
would have lessened his taxes by contributing their share to the public burdens.
The grants, therefore, in such cases, instead of being at once devoted to improve-
ments for the benefit of settlers, were in fact kept in a state of nature by the
speculators who had secured them, until the improvements of settlers in their
vicinity could make the grantees wealthy by the increase in value such improve-
ments gave to the land near them. In saying this the admission is freely made
that in many cases the grants were promptly and honestly appropriated in accord-
ance with their nominal purpose; but the general verdict now is that the system
was necessarily corruptive and tended to invite fraud, and that some persons of
influence managed to accumulate great wealth by grants indirectly secured to
themselves under the unfounded pretence of a desire to aid and encourage the
pioneers in the wilderness.
Some States also have recently in their corporate capacity again engaged in
issuing bonds to subsidize private corporations, with the natural result of serious
State scandals, State insolvency, public discontent, and in some cases it would
seem almost inevitable repudiation. Their governments, amid the disorders of
the times, have fallen into the hands of strangers and novices, and the hobby of
public improvement has been ridden furiously to gratify the greed of individuals.
It has olten been well remarked that the abuse of a power furnishes no argu-
ment against its existence; but a system so open to abuses may well challenge
attention to its foundations. And when those foundations are examined, it is
denied that they have any sound support in the municipal constitutional law of
this country. The same reasons which justify subsidies to the business of com-
mon carriers by railway will support taxation in aid of any private business
whatsoever.
It is sometimes loosely said that railway companies are public corporations,
but the law does not so regard them. It is the settled doctrine of the law that,
like banks, mining companies, and manufacturing companies, they are mere pri-
vate corporations, supposed to be organized for the benefit of the individual
corporators, and subject to no other public supervision or control than any other
private association for business purposes to which corporate powers have been
granted. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 668; Buonaparte v.
Camden and Amboy R.R. Co., Baldw. 205; Eustis v. Parker, 1 N. H. 237;
[ 242 ]
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ities for fraud and public plunder, and led almost inevitably, at
last, to discontent; sometimes even to disorder and violence.
Ohio, &c, RR Co. v. Ridge, 5 Blackf. 78; Roanoke, &c, R.R. Co. v. Davis,
2 Dev. & Bat. 451; Dearborn v. Boston & M. RR. Co., 4 Fost, 179; Trus-
tees, &c, v. Auborn, &c, R.R. Co., 3 Hill, 570; Tinsman e. Belvidere, &c.,
RR. Co., 2 Dutch. 148; Thorpe v. Rutland, &c, RR. Co., 27 Vt. 155; Ala-
bama R.R. Co. i). Kidd, 29 Ala. 221; Turnpike Co. r. Wallace, 8 Watts, 816;
Seymour v. Turnpike Co., 10 Ohio, 476; Ten Eyck v. D. & R. Canal, 3 Harr.
200; A. & A. on Corp., § 30-36; Redf. on Railw. c. 3, § 1; Pierce on Rail-
roads, 19, 20. Taxation to subsidize them cannot therefore be justified on the
ground of any public character they possess, any more than to subsidize banks or
mining companies. It is truly said that it has long been the settled doctrine that
the right of eminent domain may be employed in their behalf, and it has some-
times been insisted with much earnestness that wherever the State may aid an
enterprise under the right of eminent domain, it may assist it by taxation also.
But the right of taxation and the right of eminent domain are by no means coex-
tensive, and do not rest wholly upon like reasons. The former compels the citizen
to contribute his proportion of the public burden; the latter compels him to part
with nothing for which he is not to receive pecuniary compensation. The tax in
the one case is an exaction, the appropriation in the other is only a forced sale.
To take money for private purposes under pretence of taxation is, as has been
often said, but robbery and plunder; to appropriate under the right of eminent
domain for a private corporation robs no one, because the corporation pays for
what is taken, and in some cases, important to the welfare and prosperity of the
community, and where a public convenience is to be provided, — as in the case of
a grist mill, — it has long been' held competent to exercise the one power, while
the other was conceded to be inadmissible. Few persons would attempt to justify
a tax in aid of a mill-owner, on the ground that laws appropriating lands for his
benefit, but at his expense, have been supported.
The truth is, the right to tax in favor of private corporations of any descrip-
tion must rest upon the broad ground that the power of the legislature, subject
only to the express restrictions of the constitution, is supreme, and that, in the
language of some of the cases, "if there be the least possibility that making
the gift will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a
question of policy, and not of natural justice, and the determination of the
legislature is conclusive." (Pott, p. 489.) But nothing is better settled on
authority than that this strong language, though entirely true when it refers to
the making provision for those things which it falls within the province of govern-
ment to provide for its citizens, or to the payment of services performed for the
Slate, or the satisfaction of legal, equitable, or moral obligations resting upon
it, is wholly inadmissible when the purpose is to impose a burden upon one man
for the benefit of another. Many such cases might be suggested in which there
would not only be a "possibility," but even a strong probability, that a small
burden imposed upon the public to set an individual up in business, or to build
bin a house, or otherwise make him comfortable, would be promotive of the
public welfare; but in law the purpose of any such burden is deemed private
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[* 215] * Assuming that any such subscriptions or securities
may be authorized, the first requisite to their validity
and the incidental benefit to the public is not recognized as an admissible basis
of taxation.
In Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me., it became necessary to reaffirm a doc-
trine, often declared by the courts, that however great was the power to tax, it was
exceeded, and the legislature was attempting the exercise of a power not legislative
in its character, when it undertook to impose a burden on the public for a private
purpose. And it was also held that the raising of money by tax in order to loan
the same to private parties to enable them to erect mills and manufactories in
such town, was raising it for a private purpose, and therefore illegal. Appltton,
Ch. J., most truly remarks in that case, that "all security of private rights,
all protection of private property, is at an end, when one is compelled to raise
money to loan at the will of others for their own use and benefit, when the power
is given to a majority to lend or give away the property of an unwilling minority."
And yet how plain it is that the benefit of the local public might possibly have
been promoted by the proposed erections! This case was decided near the same
time with one in the United States Circuit Court of Kansas, in which Dillon,
Circuit J., held a law authorizing the town of Iola to issue its bonds in aid of a
manufactory proposed to be established in its midst was void, as an attempt to
exercise the taxing power for private purposes.
These cases are not singular: they are representative cases; and they are
cited only because they are among the most recent expressions of judicial opin-
ion on the subject. With them may be placed Lowell r. Boston, also a very
recent case not yet reported, in which the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
after the great fire of 1872 in Boston, denied the power of the Commonwealth
to permit taxation in order to loan the moneys out to the persons who had suf-
fered by the fire. These three decisions of eminent tribunals indicate a limit to
legislative power in the matter of taxation, and hold, what has been decided very
many times before, that it is not necessary the constitution should forbid expressly
the taxing for private purposes, since it is implied in the very idea of taxation
that the purpose must be public, and a taking for any other purpose is unlawful
confiscation.
One difference there undoubtedly is between the case of a railroad corpora-
tion and a manufacturing corporation; that there are precedents in favor of tax-
ing for the one and not for the other. But what we insist is, that the precedents
are a departure from sound principle, and that, as in every other case where
principle is departed from, evils have resulted. A catalogue of these would
include the squandering of the public domain; the enrichment of schemers
whose policy it has been, first to obtain all they can by fair promises, and then
avoid as far and as long as possible the fulfilment of the promises; the cor-
ruption of legislation; the loss of State credit; great public debts recklessly
contracted for moneys often recklessly expended; public discontent because the
enterprises fostered from the public treasury and on the pretence of public ben-
efit are not believed to be managed in the public interest; and, finally, great
financial panic, collapse, and disaster. At such a cost has the strong expression
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would seem, then, to be a special legislative authority to make or
issue them; an authority which does not reside in the general
words in which the powers of local self-government are usually
conferred,1 and one also which must be carefully followed by the
of dissent which all the while has accompanied these precedents been disregarded
and set aside.
Some most remarkable illustrations may be found in our legislative history of
the devices and shifts that will be resorted to for the plunder of the public when
the doctrine is once submitted to, that private corporations may be subsidized
from the public treasury. In this place we content ourselves with mentioning
one. The people of 11linois by constitutional provision have expressly forbidden
such subsidies. Unfortunately for the State, a number of towns and counties had
previously voted considerable sums to railroad companies, which still remain
unpaid. Some of these constituted such burdens upon the municipalities voting
them that the local authorities did not venture to impose the necessary taxes to
pay the interest, much less to provide for the principal. What should be done
under such circumstances? The holders of the debts wanted their pay: the munic-
ipalities wanted to get rid of their obligations. It would seem that nothing was
to be done but for the one party to pay or the other to resort to the proper
legal remedy. With millions at stake, however, ingenious men were not want-
ing who could suggest some other plan, and the one suggested was, that these
local obligations should be saddled upon the State. It seems incredible, but it
is nevertheless true, that such influences were brought to bear as secured legisla-
tion which, covertly and by indirection, imposed upon the State the burden. So
gross and palpable a disregard of the constitutional principle which requires tax-
ation to be gathered from those upon whom the burden justly rests (post, p. 493-4)
is not often known.
As denying the right to tax in aid of railroad corporations, reference is made
to Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 166; State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa,
388; Myers v. Johnson County, 14 Iowa, 47; Smith v. Henry County, 15 Iowa,
385; Ten Eyck v. Keokuk, t'6. 486; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 212; McClure
r. Owen, 26 Iowa, 243; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28; People v. Township
Board of Salem, 21 Mich. 11; Bay City p. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499;
Whiting v. Sheboygan R.R. Co., 25 Wis. 167; Phillips v. Albany, 28 Wis. 357;
and to dissenting opinions in many of the cases where a majority of the Court
sustained the right, Compare also what is said by Church, Ch. J., in People p.
Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401.
1 Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171. A general power to borrow money
or incur indebtedness to aid in the construction of" any road or bridge" must
be understood to have reference only to the roads or bridges within the munici-
pality. Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 173; State v. Wapello County, 13
Iowa, 388; La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38. There are decisions in the Supreme
Court of the United States which appear to be to the contrary. The city charter
of Muscatine conferred in detail the usual powers, and then authorized the city
"to borrow money for any object in its discretion," after a vote of the city in
favor of the loan. In Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384, the court seem to have
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municipality in all essential particulars, or the subscription or
security will be void. And while mere irregularities of action, not
going to the essentials of the power, would not prevent parties who
had acted in reliance upon the securities enforcing them, yet aa
the doings of these corporations are matters of public record, and
they have no general power to issue negotiable securities, any one
who becomes holder of such securities, even though they be nego-
tiable in form, will take them with constructive notice of any want
of power in the corporation to issue them, and cannot enforce them
when their issue was unauthorized.1
construed this clause as authorizing a loan for any object whatever; though such
phrases are understood usually to be confined in their scope to the specific objects
before enumerated; or at least to those embraced within the ordinary functions
of municipal governments. See -Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38. The case in 1
Wallace was followed in Rogers v. Burlington, 8 Wall. 654, four justices dis-
senting. See also Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270. A municipal corpora-
tion having power to borrow money, it is held, may make its obligations
payable wherever it shall agree. Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384. But some
cases hold that such obligations can only be made payable at the corporation
treasury, unless there is express legislative authority to make them payable
elsewhere. People v. Tazewell County, 22 111. 147; Pekin v. Reynolds, 31 ILL
529. Such corporations cannot give their obligations all the qualities of nego-
tiable paper, without express legislative permission. Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21
Iowa, 565. See Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§
406. 407.
1 There is considerable confusion in the cases on this subject. If the corpo-
ration has no authority to issue negotiable paper, or if the officers who assume
to do so have no power under the charter for that purpose, there can be no doubt
that the defence of want of power may be made by the corporation in any suit
brought on the securities. Smith p. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 818; Gould v. Sterling,
23 N. Y. 458; Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 298; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
209. And in any case, if the holder has received the securities with notice of
any valid defence, he takes them subject thereto. But where the corporation has
power to issue negotiable paper in some cases, and its officers have assumed to
do so in cases not within the charter, whether a bona fide holder would be charge-
able with notice of the want of authority in the particular case, or, on the other
hand, would be entitled to rely on the securities themselves as sufficient evidence
that they were properly issued when nothing appeared on their face to apprise
him of the contrary, is a question still open to some dispute.
In Stoncy v. American Life Insurance Co., 11 Paige, 635, it was held that a
negotiable security of a corporation which upon its face appears to have been
duly issued by such corporation, and in conformity with the provisions of its
charter, is valid in the hands of » bona fide holder thereof without notice,
although such security was in fact issued for a purpose, and at a place not author-
ized by the charter of the company, and in violation of the laws of the State
where it was actually issued. In Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 203, the law is
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* In some of the cases involving the validity of the sub- [* 216]
scriptions made or bonds issued by municipal corporations
rtated as follows: "Where a corporation has power, under any circumstances,
to issue negotiable securities, the bona fide holder has a right to presume they
were issued under the circumstances which give the requisite authority, and they
are no more liable to be impeached for any infirmity in the hands of such
holder than any other commercial papep." See also Commissioners of Knox
Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539; Russell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287; Thorn
v. Commissioners of Miami Co., 2 Black, 722; De Voss v. Richmond, 18 Grat.
338: San Antonio p. Lane, 32 Tex. 405. In Farmers and Mechanics Bank v.
The Butchers and Drovers Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, it is said: "A citizen who deals
directly with a corporation, or who takes its negotiable paper, is presumed to
know the extent of its corporate powers. But when the paper is, upon its face,
in all respects such as the corporation has authority to issue, and its only defect
consists in some extrinsic fact, — such as the purpose or object for which it was
issued, —to hold that the person taking the paper must inquire as to such extra-
neous fact, of the existence of which he is in no way apprised, would obviously
conflict with the whole policy of the law in regard to negotiable papep." In
Madison and Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. The Norwich Savings Society, 24 Ind.
461, this doctrine is approved, and a distinction made, in the earlier case of
Smead v. Indianapolis, &c, Railroad Co., 11 Ind. 104, between paper executed
ultra tires and that executed within the power of the corporation, but, by an
abuse of the power in that particular instance, was repudiated. In Halstead
v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5 Barb. 218, action was brought upon warrants
drawn by the corporation of New York upon its treasurer, not in the course of
its proper and legitimate business. It was held that the corporation under its
charter had no general power to issue negotiable paper, though, not being pro-
hibited by law, it might do so for any debt contracted in the course of its proper
legitimate business. We quote from the opinion of Edwards, J.: "It was con-
tended on the argument, that the rule of the law-merchant which protects the
bona fide holder of negotiable paper, without notice, was of universal applica-
tion; and that, if the defendants had a right to issue negotiable paper, it must
or necessitate be subject to the same rules as the negotiable paper of an individ-
ual. This view seems plausible, but will it bear the test of examination? In
the first place, the defendants have no general power, either express or implied,
to issue negotiable papep. They have only a special or conditional implied power
for that purpose; that it is necessary as a condition precedent to the validity of
such paper that the debt which forms the consideration should be contracted in
the proper legitimate business of the defendant. The act under which they
wepe incorporated is declared to be a public act Every person who takes their
negotiable paper is bound to know the extent of their powers, and is presumed
to receive it with a full knowledge that they have only a limited and conditional
power to issue it. He is thus put on his inquiry, and takes it at his peril. The
circumstances under which a bona fide holder, without notice, receives the nego-
tiable paper of a natural person, or of a corporation having the general express
power to issue negotiable paper, are very different. In both those instances, the
[ 247 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
01
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
216
[CH. Tin.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[* 217] in aid of internal * improvements, there has been occasion
to consider clauses in the State constitutions designed to
power to issue such paper is general and unconditional; and hence the rules which
have been established by commercial policy, for the purpose of giving currency
to mercantile paper, are applicable. It results from the views which have been
expressed, that the drafts in question, not having been issued by the defendants
in their proper and legitimate business, are void in the hands of the plaintiff,
although received by him without actual notice of their consideration." This
decision was affirmed in 3 N. Y. 430. In Gould v. Town of Stirling, 23 N. T.
464, it was held that where a town had issued negotiable bonds, which could only
be issued when the written assent of two-thirds of the resident persons taxed
in the town had been obtained and filed in the county clerk's office, the bonds
issued without such assent were invalid, and that the purchaser of them could
not rely upon the recital in the bonds that such assent had been obtained, but
must ascertain for himself at his peril. Say the court: "One who takes a nego-
tiable promissory note or bill of exchange, purporting to be made by an agent,
is bound to inquire as to the power of the agent. Where the agent is appointed
and the power conferred, but the right to exercise the power has been made to
depend upon the existence of facts of which the agent may be supposed to be in
an especial manner cognizant, the bona fide holder is protected; because he is
presumed to have taken the paper upon the faith of the representation as to those
facts. The mere fact of executing the note or bill amounts in itself, in such a
case, to a representation by the agent to every person who may take the paper
that the requisite facts exist. But the holder has no such protection in regard
to the existence of the power itself. In that respect the subsequent bona fide
holder is in no better situation than the payee, except in so far as the latter
would appear of necessity to have had cognizance of facts which the other can-
not [must?] be presumed to have known," And the case is distinguished from
that of the Farmers and Mechanics Bank r. Butchers and Drovers Bank, 16
N. Y. 125, where the extrinsic fact affecting the authority related to the state of
accounts between the bank and one of its customers, which could only be known
to the teller and other officers of the bank. See also Brady v. Mayor, &c, of
New York, 2 Bosw. 173; Hopple v. Brown Township, 13 Ohio, n. s. 311; Veeder
v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280. The subject is reviewed in Clark v. City of Des Moines,
19 Iowa, 209. The action was brought upon city warrants, negotiable in form,
and of which the plaintiff claimed to be bona fide assignee, without notice of any
defects. The city offered to show that the warrants were issued without any
authority from the city council, and without any vote of the council authorizing
the same. It was held that the evidence should have been admitted, and that it
would constitute a complete defence. See further Head v. Providence, &c,
Co., 2 Cranch, 169; Royal British Bank v. Turquand, 6 EI. & Bl. 327; Knox
County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 544; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287; San-
born v. Deerfield, 2 N. H. 254; Alleghany City v. McClurkan, 14 Penn. St. 83;
Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Fisher, 1 Stock. 667; Clapp v. Cedar Co.,
5 Iowa, 15; Commissioners, &c. v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; Madison and Indianapolis
R.R. Co. v. Norwalk Savings Society, 24 Ind. 457; Bird t>. Daggett, 97 Mass.
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limit the power of the "legislature to incur indebtedness [*218]
on behalf of the State, and which clauses, it has been
urged, were equally imperative in restraining indebtedness on
behalf of the several political divisions of the State. The Consti-
tution of Kentucky prohibited any act of the legislature author-
izing any debt to be contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth,
except for certain specified purposes, unless provision should be
made in such act for an annual tax sufficient to pay such debt
within thirty years; and the act was not to have effect unless
approved by the people. It was contended that this provision was
not to apply to the Commonwealth as a mere ideal abstraction,
unconnected with her citizens and her soil, but to the Common-
wealth as composed of her people, and their territorial organiza-
tions of towns, cities, and counties, which make up the State, and
that it embraced in principle every legislative act which author-
ized a debt to be contracted by any of the local organizations of
which the Commonwealth was composed. The courts of that
State held otherwise. "The clause in question," they say, " ap-
plies in terms to a debt contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth
as a distinct corporate body; and the distinction between a debt
on behalf of the Commonwealth, and a debt or debts on behalf of
one county, or of any number of counties, is too broad and palpa-
494. It is of course impossible to reconcile these authorities; but the doctrine
in the case of Gould v. Town of Stirling appears to us to be sound, and that,
■wherever a want of power exists, a purchaser of the securities is chargeable with
notice of it, if the defect is disclosed by the corporate records, or, as in that
case, by other records where the power is required to be shown. See Fish v.
Kenosha, 26 Wis. 24. That the powers of the agents of municipal corporations
are matters of record, and the corporation not liable for an unauthorized act, see
further Baltimore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276; Johnson ». Common Council, 16
Ind. 227. Those who deal with a corporation must take notice of the restrictions
in its charter, or in the general law, regarding the making of contracts. Brady
p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 2 Bosw. 173; 8. c. 20 N. Y. 312; Swift p. Wil-
liamsburg, 24 Barb. 427; Zabriskie v. Cleveland, &c, R.R. Co., 23 How. 381;
Hull v. Marshall County, 12 Iowa, 142; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199;
Marsh v. Supervisors of Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676. If they are not, no subse-
quent ratification by the corporation can make them valid. Leavenworth v.
Rankin, 2 Kansas, 357. The courts of Missouri and Florida have held that
purchasers of securities issued under unconstitutional laws will be protected,
and the securities enforced if they were purchased before the laws were declared
invalid. Steines p. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167; Columbia County v. King,
13 Fla. 451.
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ble to admit of the supposition that the latter class of
[* 219] * debts was intended to be embraced by terms specifically
designating the former only." 1 The same view has been
taken by the courts of Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Kansas, of
the provisions in the constitutions of those States restricting the
power of the legislature to contract debts on behalf of the State in
aid of internal improvements ;2 but the decisions of the first-
named State have since been doubted,3 and those in Illinois, it
would seem, overruled.4 In Michigan it has been held that they
were inapplicable to a constitution adopted with a clear purpose to
preclude taxation for such enterprises.5
1 Slack v. Railroad Co., 18 B. Monr. 16.
* Dubuque County v. Railroad Co., 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; Clapp v. Cedar
County, 5 Iowa, 15; Clark v. Jancsville, 10 Wis. 136; Bushnell v. Beloit, ib.
195; Prettyman v. Supervisors, 19 111. 406; Robertson v. Rockford. 21 111. 451;
Johnson v. Stark County, 24 111. 75; Perkins ». Lewis, ib. 208; Butler v. Dun-
ham, 27 111. 474; Leavenworth Co. ts. Miller, 7 Kansas, 479.
a State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa. 388. And see People v. Supervisor, &c,
16 Mich. 254.
4 In People v. Mayor, &c, of Chicago, 51 111. 34, it is held expressly that
the provision of the State constitution prohibiting the State from creating a
debt exceeding fifty thousand dollars without the consent of the people manifested
at a general election, would preclude the State from creating a like debt against
a municipal corporation, except upon the like conditions. And it was pertinently
said: '* The protection of the whole implies necessarily the protection of all its
organized parts, and the whole cannot be secure while all or any of its parts are
exposed to danger. What is the real value of this provision of the constitution
if the legislature, inhibited from incurring a debt beyond fifty thousand dollars
on behalf of the State, may force a debt tenfold or one hundred-fold greater —
for there is no limit to the power — upon all the cities of the State? We can
perceive none." We do not see how this can be reconciled with the earlier
Illinois cases, and it is so manifestly right, it is hoped the learned court will never
make the attempt.
* The following extract from the opinion in Bay City v. State Treaurer, 23
Mich. 504, is upon this point: "Our State had had a bitter experience of the
evils of the government connecting itself with works of public improvement. In
a time of inflation and imagined prosperity, the State had contracted a large debt
for the construction of a system of railroads, and the people were oppressed with
heavy taxation in consequence. Moreover, for a portion of this debt they had
not received what they bargained for, and they did not recognize their legal or
moral obligation to pay for it. The good name and fame of the State suffered in
consequence. The result of it all was that a settled conviction fastened itself
upon the minds of our people, that works of internal improvement should be
private enterprises; that it was not in the proper province of government to
connect itself with their construction or management, and .that an imperative
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Another class of legislation, which has recently demanded the
attention of the courts, has been little less troublesome, from the
State policy demanded that no burdens should be imposed upon the people by
State authority, for any such purpose. Under this conviction they incorporated
in the constitution of 1850, under the significant title of 'Finance and Tax-
ation,' several provisions expressly prohibiting the State from being a party to,
or interested in, any work of internal improvement, or engaged in carrying on
any snch work, except in the expenditure of grants made to it; and also from
subscribing to, or being interested in, the stock of any company, association, or
corporation, or loaning its credit in aid of any person, association, or corpora-
tion. Art. XIV. § 9, 8, and 7.
"All these provisions were incorporated by the people on the constitution, as
precautions against injudicious action by themselves, if in another time of infla-
tion and excitement they should be tempted to incur the like burdensome tax-
ation in order to accomplish public improvements in cases where they were not
content to wait the result of private enterprise. The people meant to erect such
effectual barriers that if the temptation should return, the means of inflicting the
like injury upon the credit, reputation, and prosperity of the State, should not
be within the reach of the authorities. They believed these clauses of the con-
stitution accomplished this purpose perfectly, and none of its provisions had
more influence in recommending that instrument to the hearty good-will of the
people.
"In process of time, however, a majority in the legislature were found willing,
against the solemn warning of the executive, to resort again to the power of
taxation in aid of internal improvement. It was discovered that though "the
State" was expressly inhibited from giving such aid in any form, except in the
disposition of grants made to it, the subdivisions of which the State was com-
posed were not under the like ban. Decisions in other States were found which
were supposed to sanction the doctrine that, under such circumstances, the State
might do indirectly through its subdivisions what directly it was forbidden to do.
Thus a way was opened by which the whole purpose of the constitutional pro-
visions quoted might be defeated. The State could not aid a private corporation
with its credit, but it might require each of its townships, cities, and villages to
do so. The State could not load down its people with taxes for the construction
of a public improvement, but it might compel the municipal authorities, which
were its mere creatures, and which held their whole authority and their life at its
will, to enforce such taxes, one by one, until the whole people were bent to the
burden.
"Now, whatever might be the just and proper construction of similar pro-
visions in the constitutions of States whose history has not been the same with
our own, the majority of this court thought when the previous case was before
us, and they still think, that these provisions in our constitution do preclude the
State from loaning the public credit to private corporations, and from imposing
taxation upon its citizens or any portion thereof in aid of the construction of
railroads. So the people supposed when the constitution was adopted. Consti-
tutions do not change with the varying tides of public opinion and desire; the
will of the people therein recorded is the same inflexible law until changed by their
[251]
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new, varied, and peculiar questions involved, than that in relation
to municipal subscriptions in aid of internal improvements. As
the power to declare war and to conduct warlike operations rests
in the national government, and that government is vested with
unlimited control of all the resources of the country for those
purposes, the duty of national defence, and, consequently, the duty
to defend all the citizens as well as all the property of all the
municipal organizations in the several States, rests upon the na-
tional authorities. This much is conceded, though in a qualified
degree, also, and, subordinate to the national government, a like
duty rests doubtless upon the State governments, which may
employ the means and services of their citizens for the purpose.
But it is no part of the duty of a township, city, or county, as
such, to raise men or money for warlike operations, nor have they
any authority, without express legislative sanction, to impose upon
their people any burden by way of taxation for any such purpose.1
Nevertheless, when a war arises which taxes all the energies of the
nation, which makes it necessary to put into the field a large pro-
portion of all the able-bodied men of the country, and which rend-
ers imperative a resort to all available means for filling the ranks
of the army, recruiting the navy, and replenishing the
[* 220] national treasury, the question * becomes a momentous
one, whether the local organizations — those which are
managed most immediately by the people themselves — may not
be made important auxiliaries to the national and State govern-
ments in accomplishing the great object in which all alike are
interested so vitally; and if they are capable of rendering- impor-
own deliberative action; and it cannot be permissible to the courts that in order
to aid evasions and circumventions, they shall subject these instruments, which in
the main only undertake to lay down broad general principles, to a literal and
technical construction, as if they were great public enemies standing in the way
of progress, and the duty of every good citizen was to get around their pro-
visions whenever practicable, and give them a damaging thrust whenever con-
venient. They must construe them, as the people did in their adoption, if the
means of arriving at that construction are within their powep. In these cases we
thought we could arrive at it from the public history of the times"
1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Gove p. Epping, 41 N. H. 545; Crowell
p. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Baldwin v. North Branford, 82 Conn. 47; Webster v.
Harwinton, t'6. 131. See also Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502; Cover p. Bay-
town, 12 Minn. 124; Fiske p. Hazzard, 7 R. I. 438; Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me.
446; People p. Supervisors of Columbia, 43 N. Y. 130; Walschlager v. Liberty,
23 Wis. 362.
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tant assistance, whether there is any constitutional principle which
would be violated by making use of these organizations in a case
where failure on the part of the central authority would precipi-
tate general dismay and ruin. Indeed, as the general government,
with a view to convenience, economy, and promptness of action,
will be very likely to adopt, for any purposes of conscription, the
existing municipal divisions of the States, and its demand for
men to recruit its armies will assume a form seeming to impose
on the people whose municipal organization embraces the territory
covered by the demand, the duty <^ meeting it, the question we
have stated may appear to be one rather of form than of substance,
inasmuch as it would be difficult to assign reasons why a duty
resting upon the citizens of a municipality may not be considered
as resting upon the corporation itself of which they are the con-
stituents, and if so, why it may not be assumed by the munici-
pality itself, and then be discharged in like manner as any other
municipal burden, if the legislature shall grant permission for that
purpose.
One difficulty that suggests itself in adopting any such doctrine
is, that, by the existing law of the land, able-bodied men between
certain specified ages are alone liable to be summoned to the per-
formance of military duty; and if the obligation is assumed by
the municipal organizations of the State, and discharged by the
payment of money or the procurement of substitutes, the taxation
required for this purpose can be claimed, with some show of rea-
son, to be taxation of the whole community for the particular benefit
of that class upon whom by the statutes the obligation rests. When
the public funds are used for the purpose, it will be insisted that
they are appropriated to discharge the liabilities of private indi-
viduals. Those who are already past the legal age of service, and
who have stood their chance of being called into the field, or per-
haps have actually rendered the required service, will be able to
urge with considerable force that the State can no longer honorably
and justly require them to contribute to the public defence, but
ought to insist that those within the legal ages should perform
their legal duty; and if any upon whom that duty rests shall
actually have enrolled themselves in the army with a view to dis-
charge it, such persons may claim, with even greater rea-
son, that every consideration of * equality and justice [* 221]
demands that the property they leave behind them shall
not be taxed to relieve others from a duty equally imperative.
[ 253 ]
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Much may be said on both sides of this subject, but the judicial
decisions are clear, that the people of .any municipal corporation
or political division of a State have such a general interest in
relieving that portion of their fellow-citizens who are liable to the
performance of military duty, as will support taxation or render
valid indebtedness contracted for the purpose of supplying their
places, or of rilling any call of the national authorities for men,
with volunteers who shall be willing to enter the ranks for such
pecuniary inducements as may be offered them. The duty of
national defence, it is held, rears upon every person under the pro-
tection of the government who is able to contribute to it, and not
solely upon those who are within the legal ages. The statute
which has prescribed those ages has for its basis the presumption
that those between the limits fixed are best able to discharge the
burden of military service to. the public benefit, but others are
not absolved from being summoned to the duty, if at any time
the public exigency should seem to demand it. Exemption from
military duty is a privilege rather than a right, and, like other
statutory privileges, may be recalled at any time when reasons of
public policy or necessity seem to demand the recall.1 Moreover,
there is no valid reason, in the nature of things, why those who
are incapable of performing military service, by reason of age,
physical infirmity, or other cause, should not contribute, in pro-
portion to their ability, to the public defence by such means as are
within their power; and it may well happen that taxation, for the
purpose of recruiting the armies of the nation, will distribute the
burden more equally and justly among all the citizens than any
other mode which could be devised. Whether it will be just and
proper to allow it in any instance must rest with the legislature
to determine; but it is unquestionably competent, with legislative
permission, for towns, cities, and counties to raise money by loans
or by taxation to pay bounty moneys to those who shall volunteer
to fill any call made upon such towns, cities, or counties to supply
men for the national armies.2
1 See post, p. 383, and cases cited in note.
* "The power to create a public debt, and liquidate it by taxation, is too clear
for dispute. The question is, therefore, narrowed to a single point: Is the purpose
in this instance a public oneP Does it concern the common welfare and interest
of the municipality? Let us see. Civil war was raging, and Congress provided
in the second section of the act of 24th February, 1864, that the quota of the
troops of each ward of a city, town, township, precinct, &c, should be as nearly
[ 254 ]
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CH. VIII.] THE GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. * 222
* Relief of the community from an impending or pos- [* 222]
sible draft is not, however, the sole consideration which
will support taxation by the municipal corporations of the State to
raise money for the purpose of paying bounties to soldiers. Grat-
itude to those who have entered the military service, whether as
volunteers or drafted men, or as substitutes for others
who were drafted or were * liable to be, is a consideration [* 223]
which the State may well recognize, and it may compen-
as possible in proportion to the number of men resident therein liable to render
military service. Section three provided that all volunteers who may enlist after
a draft shall be ordered shall be deducted from the number ordered to be drafted
in such ward, town, &c Volunteers are therefore by law to be accepted in
relief of the municipality from a compulsory service to be determined by lot or
chance. Does the relief involve the public welfare or interest? The answer
rises spontaneously in the breast of every one in the community liable to the mil-
itary burden. It is given, not by the voice of him alone who owes the service,
but swells into a chorus from his whole family, relatives, and friends. Military
service is the highest duty and burden the citizen is called to obey or to bear. It
involves life, limb, and health, and is therefore a greater ' burden' than the tax-
ation of property. The loss or the injury is not confmed to the individual him-
self, but extends to all the relations he sustains. It embraces those bound to him
in the ties of consanguinity, friendship, and interest; to the community which
must furnish support to his family, if he cannot, and which loses in him a member
whose labor, industry, and property contribute to its wealth and its resources;
who assists to bear its burdens, and whose knowledge, skill, and public spirit con-
tribute to the general good. Clearly the loss of that part of the population upon
whom the greatest number depend, and who contribute most to the public wel-
fare, by their industry, skill, and property, and good conduct, is a common loss,
and therefore a general injury. These are alike subject to the draft. The blind
and relentless lot respects no age, condition, or rank in life. It is, therefore,
clearly the interest of the community that those should serve who are willing,
whose loss wili sever the fewest ties, and produce the least injury.
"The bounty is not a private transaction in which the individual alone is ben-
efited. It benefits the public by inducing and enabling those to go who feel they
can best be spared. It is not voluntary in those who pay it. The community is
subject to the draft, and it is paid to relieve it from a burden of wap. It is not
a mere gift or reward, but a consideration for services. It is therefore not a
confiscation of one man's property for another's use, but it is a contribution from
the public treasury for a general good. In short, it is simply taxation to relieve
the municipality from the stern demands of war, and avert a public injury in the
loss of those who contribute most to the public welfare." Speer v. School Direc-
tors of Blairsville, 50 Penn. St. 159. See also Waldo v. Portland, 33 Conn.
363; Bartholomew p. Harwinton, ib. 408; Fowler v. Danvers, 8 Allen, 80;
Lowell p. Oliver, ib. 247; Washington County p. Berwick, 56 Penn. St. 466;
Trustees of Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio, N. s. 38; State p. Wilkesbarre, 20 Ohio, N. s.
292. Also Opinions of Justices, 52 Me. 595, in which the view is expressed
that towns cannot, under the power to raise money for " necessary town charges,"
[ 255 ]
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* 223 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. THI.
Bate the service either by the payment of bounty moneys directly
to such persons, or by provision for the support of those dependent
upon them while they shall be absent from their homes. Whether
we regard such persons as public benefactors, who, having taken
upon themselves the most severe and dangerous duty a citizen is
ever called upon to perform, have thereby entitled themselves to
public reward as an incentive to fidelity and courage, or as persons
who, having engaged in the public service for a compensation inad-
equate to the toil, privation, and danger incurred, are deserving of
the bounty as a further recognition on the part of the community
of the worth of their services, there seems in either case to be no
sufficient reason to question the right of the legislature to authorize
the municipal divisions of the State to raise moneys in any of the
usual modes, for the purpose of paying bounties to them
[* 224] or their families in recognition of such services.1 "And if
a municipal corporation shall have voted moneys for such
purpose without legislative authority, it is competent for
[* 225] the * legislature afterwards to legalize their action if it
shall so choose.3
raise and pay commutation moneys to relieve persons drafted into the military
service of the United States.
1 The act under which the Pennsylvania case, cited in the preceding note, wis
decided, authorized the borough to contract a debt for the payment of three
hundred dollars to each non-commissioned officer and private who might there-
after volunteer and enter the service of the United States, and be credited upon
the quota of the borough under an impending draft. The whole purpcrse, there-
fore, was to relieve the community from the threatened conscription. But in the
case of Brodhead p. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652, it was held constitutional, not only
to provide for the future by such municipal taxation, but also to raise moneys to
pay bounties to volunteers previously enlisted, and even to those who should
thereafter procure substitutes for themselves, and "have them credited on the
municipal quota.
* Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 82 Conn. 118; Bartholomew p. Harwinton,
83 Conn. 408; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Shackford p. Newington, 46
N. H. 415; Lowell p. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Ahl p. Gl. im, 52 Penn. St. 432;
Weister p. Hade, ib. 474; Coffman p. Keightley, 24 Ind. 509; Board of Com-
missioners v. Brearss, 25 Ind. 110; Connor p. Fulsom, 13 Minn. 219; State v.
Demorest, 32 N. J. 528; Taylor p. Thompson, 42 111. 9; Barbour p. Camden, 51
Me. 608; Hart p. Holden, 56 Me. 572; Burnham p. Chelsea, 43 Vt. 69; Butler
p. Pultney, ib. 481. In State p. Jackson, 33 N. J. 450, a statute authorizing a
town to raise money by tax to relieve its inhabitants from the burden of a draft
under a law of Congress, was held void as tending to defeat the purpose of such
law. The decision was made by a bare majority of a bench of eleven judges.
Compare O'Hara p. Carpenter, 23 Mich. 410, in which a contract of insurance
against a military draft was held void on grounds of public policy.
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Cfl. VIII.] THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. * 226
*The cases to which we have referred in the notes [* 226]
assume that, if the purpose is one for which the State
might properly levy a tax upon its citizens at large, the legislature
would also have power to apportion and impose the duty, or confer
the power of assuming it upon the towns and other municipal or
political divisions. And the rule laid down is one which opens a
broad field to legislative discretion, allowing as it does the
raising and * appropriation of moneys, whenever, in the [* 227]
somewhat extravagant words of one of the cases, there is
"the least possibility that it will be promotive in any degree of the
public welfare."1 The same rule, substantially, has been recognized
by the Court of Appeals of New York. "The legislature is not
confined in its appropriation of the public moneys, or of the sums
to be raised by taxation in favor of individuals, to cases in which
a legal demand exists against the State. It can thus recognize
claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense of these
terms, or in gratitude or charity. Independently of express con-
stitutional restrictions, it can make appropriations of money when-
ever the public well-being requires or will be promoted by it, and
it is the judge of what is for the public good. It can, moreover,
under the power to levy taxes, apportion the public burdens among
all the tax-paying citizens of the State, or among those of a partic-
ular section or political division."2 And where citizens have vol-
untarily advanced moneys for the purpose of paying bounties to
recruits who fill the quota of a municipal corporation, on an under-
standing, based upon informal corporate action, that the moneys
should be refunded when a law should be passed permitting it, a
subsequent act of the legislature authorizing taxation for this pur-
pose is valid.3
However broad are the terms employed in describing the legis-
lative power over taxation in these cases, it is believed that no one
of them has gone so far as to sanction taxation or the appro-
1 Booth v. Woodbury, 82 Conn. 128, per Butler, J. "To make a tax law
unconstitutional on this ground, it must be apparent at first blush that the com-
munity taxed can have no possible interest in the purpose to which their money
is to be applied." Sharpless ». Mayor, &c, 21 Penn. St. 174, following Cheaney
r. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 845.
'Guilford r. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y. 149.
* Weister t>. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 474. And see People v. Sullivan, 43 111.
418; Johnson v. Campbell, 49 111. 816. Compare Susquehanna Depot o. Barry,
61 Penn. St. 817.
17 [ 257 ]
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priation of the public revenue in order to refund to individuals
moneys which they may have paid to relieve themselves from an
impending draft, or may have voluntarily contributed to any public
purpose, from motives purely personal to themselves, without any
reason to rely upon the credit of the State, or of any municipal
corporation, for reimbursement, and where the circumstances are
not such as fairly to challenge the public gratitude. Taxation in
such a case, where no obligation, honorary or otherwise, rests upon
the public, would be nothing else than a naked case of appropri-
ating the property of the tax-payer for private purposes, and that
without reference to anticipated public benefits.1
1 Tyson v. School Directors, &c, 51 Penn. St. 9. A meeting of persons liable
to draft under the law of the United States was called, and an association formed,
called the Halifax Bounty Association, which levied an assessment of thirty dol-
lars on each person liable to military duty in the township, and solicited contri-
butions from others. Afterwards, an act was passed by the legislature, with
a preamble reciting that certain citizens of Halifax township, associated as the
Halifax Bounty Association, for freeing the said township from the late drafts,
advanced moneys, which were expended in paying bounties to volunteers to fill
the quota of the township. The act then authorized and required the school
directors to borrow such sums of money as would fully reimburse the said Hali-
fax Bounty Association for moneys advanced to free said township from the
draft, and then further authorized the school directors to levy and collect a tax
to repay the sums borrowed. The court say: "We are bound to regard the
statute as an authority to reimburse what was intended by the Association as
advances made to the township with the intent or understanding to be reimbursed
or returned to those contributing. This was the light in which the learned judge
below regarded the terms used; and unless this appears in support of the present
levy by the school directors, they are acting without authority. But the learned
judge, if I properly comprehend his meaning, did not give sufficient importance
to these terms, and hence, I apprehend, he fell into error. He does not seem to
have considereil it essential whether the Association paid its money voluntarily
in aid of its own members, or expressly to aid the township in saving its people
from a draft, with the understanding that it was advanced in the character of a
loan if the legislature chose to direct its repayment, and the school directors
chose to act on the authority conferred. This we cannot agree to. Such an
enactment would not be legislation at all. It would be in the nature of judicial
action, it is true; but wanting the justice of notice to the parties to be affected
by the hearing, trial, and all that gives sanction and force to regular judicial
proceedings, it would much more resemble an imperial rescript than constitutional
legislation: first, in declaring an obligation where none was created or previously
existed; and next, in decreeing payment by directing the money or property of
the people to be sequestered to make the payment. The legislature can exercise
no such despotic functions; and as it is not apparent in the act that they at-
tempted to do so, we are not to presume that they did. They evidently intended
[258 ] y'
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* But it has been held by the Supreme Court of Massa- [* 228]
chusetts that towns might be authorized by the legislature
to raise moneys by taxation for the purpose of refunding sums
contributed by individuals to a common fund, in order to fill the
quota of such towns under a call of the President, notwithstand-
ing such moneys might have been contributed without promise or
expectation of reimbursement. The court were of opinion
that such contributions * might well be considered as ad- [* 229]
vancements to a public object, and, being such, the leg-
islature might properly recognize the obligation and permit the
towns to provide for its discharge.1
* On a preceding page we have spoken in strong terms of [* 230]
the complete control.which is possessed by the legislative
authority of the State over the municipal corporations. There are
nevertheless some limits to its power in this regard, as there are in
various other directions limits to the legislative power of the State.
Some of these are expressly denned ; others spring from the usages,
customs, and maxims of our people; they are a part of its history,
a part of the system of local self-government in view of the con-
tinuance and perpetuity of which all our constitutions are framed,
and of the right to which the people can never be deprived except
through express renunciation on their part. One undoubted right
of the people is to choose, directly or indirectly, under the forms
and restrictions prescribed by the legislature for reasons of general
State policy, the officers of local administration, and the board that
is to make the local laws. This is a right which of late has some-
the advancements to be reimbursed to be only such as were made on the faith that
they were to be returned." See also Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Miller
c. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540; Pease v. Chicago, 21 111. 508; Ferguson v. Landraw,
5 Bush, 230; Esty v. Westminster, 97 Mass. 324; Cole v. Bedford, ib. 326;
Usher v. Colchester, 33 Conn. 667; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me. 315; Thompson
r. Pittston, ib. 545; Kelly v. Marshall, 69 Penn. St. 319. In Freeland v. Hast-
ings, 10 Allen, 570, it was held that the legislature could not empower towns to
raise money by taxation for the purpose of refunding what had been paid by
individuals for substitutes in military service. In Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio, n. s.
38, it was held that taxes to refund bounties previously and voluntarily paid
might be authorized. See also State v. Harris, 17 Ohio, N. 8. 608. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, in the well-reasoned case of State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664,
deny the power of the State to compel a municipal corporation to pay bounties
where it has not voted to do so.
1 Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 585. And see Hilbish v. Leatherman, 64
Penn. St. 154, and compare Tyson v. School Directors, 61 Penn. St. 9.
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times been encroached upon under various plausible pretences, but
almost always with the result which reasonable men should have
anticipated from the experiment of a body at a distance attempting
to govern a local community of whose affairs or needs they could
know but little, except as they should derive information from
sources likely to have interested reasons for misleading.1 Another
is the right of the local community to determine what pecuniary
burdens it shall take upon its shoulders. But here from the very
nature of the case there must be some limitations. The munici-
palities do not exist wholly for the benefit of their corporators, but
as a part of the machinery of State government, and they cannot
be permitted to decline a performance of their duties or a discharge
of their obligations as such. They cannot abolish local govern-
ment; they cannot refuse to provide the conveniences for its
administration; they cannot decline to raise the necessary taxes
for the purpose; they cannot repudiate pecuniary obligations that
justly rest upon them as a local government. Over these matters
the legislature of the State must have control, or confusion would
inevitably be introduced into the whole system. But beyond this
it is not often legitimate for the State to go except in moulding and
shaping the local powers, and perhaps permitting the local authorities
to do certain things for the benefit of their citizens which under
the general grants of power would be inadmissible.
On this general subject we shall venture to lay down the follow-
ing propositions as the result of the authorities: —
1 On this subject reference is made to what is said by Campbell, Ch. J., in
People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 87 et seq. See also p. 97. Much has been said
concerning the necessity of legislative interference in some cases where bad men
were coming into power through universal suffrage in cities, but the recent expe-
rience of the country shows that this has oftener been said to pave the way for
bad men to obtain office or grants of unusual powers from the legislature than
with any purpose to effect local reforms. And the great municipal scandals and
frauds that have prevailed, like those which were so notorious in New York City,
have been made possible and then nursed and fostered by illegitimate interference
at the seat of State government. Some officers, usually of local appointment,
are undoubtedly to be regarded as state officers whose choice may be confided to
a state authority without any invasion of local right; such as militia officers,
officers of police, and those who have charge of the execution of the criminal
laws; but those who are to administer the corporate funds and have the control
of the corporate property, those who make the local laws and those who execute
them, cannot rightfully be chosen by the central authority. Dillon, Mun. Corp.
§ 83. See People v. Com. Council of Detroit, Sup. Court of Mich. Oct. Term, 1873.
[ 260 ]
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1. That the legislature has undoubted power to compel the
municipal bodies to perform their functions as local governments
under their charters, and to recognize, meet, and discharge the
duties and obligations properly resting upon them as such, whether
they be legal, or merely equitable or moral; and for this purpose
it may require them to exercise the power of taxation whenever
and wherever it may be deemed necessary or expedient.1
2. That in some cases, in view of the twofold character of such
bodies, as being on the one hand agencies of State government,
and on the other, corporations endowed with capacities and per-
mitted to hold property and enjoy peculiar privileges for the ben-
efit of their corporators exclusively, the legislature may permit the
incurring of expense, the contracting of obligations, and the levy of
taxes which are unusual, and which would not be admissible under
the powers usually conferred. Instances of the kind may be men-
tioned in the offer of military bounties, and the payment of a dis-
1 In support of this, we refer to the very strong case of Guilford v. Supervisors
of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615^ s. c. 13 N. Y. 143; where a town was compelled
by the legislative authority of the State to reimburse its officers the expenses
incurred by them in the honest but mistaken endeavor to discharge what they
believed to be their duty; also to Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 530, in which it is
said by Crocket, J., that: "It is established by an overwhelming weight of au-
thority, and I believe is conceded on all sides, that the legislature has the consti-
tutional power to direct and control the affairs and property of a municipal
corporation for municipal purposes, provided it does not impair the obligation
of a contract, and by appropriate legislation may so control its affairs as ulti-
mately to compel it, out of the funds in its treasury, or by taxation to be imposed
for that purpose, to pay a demand when properly established, which in good
conscience it ought to pay, even though there be no legal liability to pay it"
(citing Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Beals v. Almador Co., 35 Cal. 624;
People v. Supervisors of San Francisco, 11 Cal. 206; Sharp v. Contra Costa
Co., 34 Cal. 284; People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432; People v. Alameda, 26 Cal.
641, and holding that a city might be compelled to pay the claim of persons who
bad acted as commissioners in the extension of certain of its streets); also to
Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Penn. St. 374, in which the legislature as-
sumed the right of apportioning the indebtedness of a town among the boroughs
carved out of it; supported by Layton p. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515; People
p. Alameda, 26 Cal. 641; and Burns v. Clarion County, 62 Penn. St. 423; also to
People p. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401, in which the legislative power to direct the con-
struction of a public road, and to compel the creation of a town debt for the pur-
pose, was fully sustained; to People v. Power, 25 1ll. 187; Waterville v. County
Commissioners, 59 Me. 80; and to numerous other cases cited ante, p. 193, note,
and which we will not occupy space by repeating here.
[261]
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proportionate share of a State burden in consideration of peculi
local benefits which are to spring from it.1
[* 231] * 3. But it is believed the legislature has no power, against
the will of a municipal corporation, to compel it to contract
debts for local purposes in which the State has no concern or to
assume obligations not within the ordinary functions of municipal
government. Such matters are to be disposed of in view of the in-
terests of the corporators exclusively, and they have the same right
to determine them for themselves which the associates in private
corporations have to determine for themselves the questions which
arise for their corporate action. The State in such cases may re-
move restrictions and permit action, but it cannot compel it.2
1 The subject of military bounties has been sufficiently referred to already.
As to the right to permit a municipal corporation to burden itself with a local
tax for a State object, we refer to Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500; Marks t.
Trustees of Pardue University, 87 Ind. 155; Hasbrouck ». Milwaukee, 13 Wis.
37. The first was a case in which, in consideration of the local benefits ex-
pected from the location of the State agricultural college in a certain town, the
town was permitted to levy a large local tax in addition to its proportion of the
State burden for the erection of the necessary buildings. The second case
was of a similar nature. The third was the case of permission to levy a city tax
to improve the city harbor; a work usually done by the general government.
There are cases which go further than these, and hold that the legislature may
compel a municipal corporation to do what it may thus permit. Thus, in Kirby
v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 258, it appeared that by an act of April 3, 1848, the com-
missioners of Bradford County were required to add $500 annually, until 1857,
to the usual county rates and levies of the borough of Towanda in said county,
for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the court house and jail, then in
process of erection in that borough. The act was held constitutional on the
principle of assessment of benefits. In Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608, a law
was sustained which " authorized and required" the village of Brockport to levy
a tax for the erection of a State normal school building at that place. It is to
be said of this case, however, that there was to be in the building a grammar
school free to all the children of proper acquirements in the village; so that the
village was to receive a peculiar and direct benefit from it, besides those which
would be merely incidental to the location of the normal school in the place.
But for this circumstance it would be distinctly in conflict with State v. Haben,
22 Wis. 660, where it was held incompetent for the legislature to appropriate
the school moneys of a city to the purchase of a site for a State normal school;
and also with other cases yited in the next note. It must be conceded, however,
that there are other cases which support it
8 There are undoubtedly some cases which go to the extent of holding that
municipal corporations and organizations are so completely under the legislative
control, that whatever the legislature may permit them to do, it may compel them
[ 262 ]
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xalir * 4. And there is much good reason for assenting also [* 232]
to what several respectable authorities have held, that where
to do, whether the corporators are willing or not. A leading case is Thomas v.
Leland, 24 Wend. 67. In that case it appeared that certain citizens of Utica
had given their bond to the people of the State of New York, conditioned for
the payment into the canal fund of the sum of $38,615, the estimated difference
between the cost of connecting the Chenango Canal with the Erie at Utica,
instead of at Wbitesborough, as the canal commissioners bad contemplated;
and it was held within the constitutional powers of the legislature to require this
sum to be assessed upon the taxable property of the city of Utica, supposed to
be benefited by the canal connection. The court treat the case as "the ordinary
one of local taxation to make or improve a public highway," and dismiss it with
few words. If it could be considered as merely a case of the apportionment
between a number of municipalities of the expense of a public highway running
through them, it would have the support of Waterville v. County Commission-
ers, 59 Me. 80; Commonwealth r. Newburyport, 103 Mass. 129; and also what
is said in Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 503, where it is admitted that
over the matter of the construction of such a highway, as well as the apportion-
ment of expense, the State authority must necessarily be complete. • It has been
considered in subsequent New York cases as a case of apportionment merely.
See People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 437; Howell v. Buffalo, 37 N. Y. 271. The
cases of Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 258, and Gordon ». Comes, 47 N. Y. 608,
referred to in the preceding note, it will be perceived, were also treated as cases
merely of apportionment. How that can be called a case of apportionment,
however, which singles out a particular town, and taxes it for benefits to be
expected from a highway running across the State, without doing the same by
any other town in the State, it is not easy to perceive. In Commissioners of
Revenue v. The State, 45 Ala. 399, it appeared that the legislature had created
a local board consisting of the president of the county commissioners of revenue
of Mobile County, the mayor of Mobile, the president of the Bank of Mobile,
the president of the Mobile Chamber of Commerce, and one citizen of Mobile
appointed by the governor, as a board for the improvement of the river, harbor,
and bay of Mobile, and required the commissioners of revenue of Mobile County
to issue to tbem for that purpose county bonds to the amount of $1,000,000,
and to levy a tax to pay them. Here was an appointment by the State of local
officers to make at the expense of the locality an improvement which it has been
customary for the general government to take in charge as one of national con-
cern; but the Supreme Court of the State sustained the act, going farther, as
we think, in doing so, than has been gone in any other case. In Hasbrouck v.
Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37, approved and defended in an able opinion in Mills
c. Charleton, 29 Wis. 413, the power of the legislature to compel the city of
Milwaukee to issue bonds or levy a tax for the improvement of its harbor was
distinctly denied, though it was conceded that permission might be given, which
the city could lawfully act upon. Compare also Knapp v. Grant, 27 Wis. 147;
State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226. In People v.
Bacbeller, recently decided in the Supreme Court of Appeals of New York, that
[ 263 ]
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a demand is asserted against a municipality, though of a nature I
that the legislature would have a right to require it to incur and
court, through an able and lucid opinion by Grover, J., denied the validity of a
mandatory statute compelling a town to take stock in a railroad corporation,'
and to issue its bonds in exchange therefor. The authority to permit the town
to do this was not discussed, but, taking that as admitted, it is declared that
municipal corporations, in the making or refusing to make arrangements of the
nature of that attempted to be forced upon the town in question, were entitled
to the same freedom of action precisely which individual citizens might claim.
This opinion reviews the prior decisions in the same State, and finds nothing
conflicting with the views expressed. In People v. Mayor, &c, of Chicago, 51
111. 17; 8. c. 2 Am. Rep. 278, it was denied, in an opinion of great force and
ability delivered by Chief Justice Breese, that the State could empower a board
of park commissioners of State appointment to contract a debt for the city of
Chicago for the purposes of a public park for that city, and without the consent
of its citizens. The learned judge says (p. 31): "Whilst it is conceded that
municipal corporations, which exist only for public purposes, are subject at all
times to the control of the legislature creating them, and have in their franchises
no vested rights, and whose powers and privileges the creating power may alter,
modify, or abolish at pleasure, as they are but parts of the machinery employed
to carry on the affairs of the State, over which and their rights and effects the
State may exercise a general superintendence and control, — Richland County c.
Lawrence County, 12 III. 8; Trustees of Schools v. Talman, 13 to. 30,—we
are not of the opinion that that power, vast as it is, can be so used as to compel
any one of our many cities to issue its bonds against its will to erect a park, or
for any other improvement, to force it to create a debt of millions; in effect,
to compel every property-owner in the city to give his bond to pay a debt thus
forced upon the city. It will hardly be contended that the legislature can com-
pel a holder of property in Chicago to execute his individual bond as security
for the payment of a debt so ordered to be contracted. A city is made up of
individuals owning property within its limits, the lots and blocks which compose
it, and the structures which adorn them. What would be the universal judg-
ment, should the legislature, sua sponte, project magnificent and costly structures
within one of our cities, — triumphal arches, splendid columns, and perpetual
fountains, — and require in the act creating them that every owner of property
within the city limits should give his individual obligation for his proportion of
the cost, and impose such cost as a lien upon his property for ever. What
would be the public judgment of such an act, and wherein would it differ from
the act under consideration?" And again: "Here, then, is a case where taxes
may be assessed, not by any corporate authority of the city, but by commission-
ers, to whom is entrusted the erection, embellishment, and control of this park,
and this without consent of the property-owners.
"We do not think it within the constitutional competency of the legislature to
delegate this power to these commissioners. If the principle be admitted that
the legislature can, uninvited, of their mere will, impose such a burden as this
upon the city of Chicago, then one much heavier and more onerous can be
[ 264 ]
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* discharge, yet if its legal and equitable obligation is dis- [• 233]
puted, the corporation has the right to have the dispute
settled by the courts, and cannot be bound by a legislative allow-
ance of the claim.1
imposed; in short, no limit can be assigned to legislative power in this regard.
If this power is possessed, then it must be conceded that the property of every
citizen within it is held at the pleasure and will of the legislature. Can it be that
the General Assembly of the State, just and honest as its members may be, is
the depository of the rights of property of the citizens? Would there be any
sufficient security for property if such a power was conceded? No well-regu-
lated mind can entertain the idea that it is within the constitutional competency
of the legislature to subject the earnings of any portion of our people to the
hazards of any such legislation."
This case should be read in connection with the following in the same State,
and all in the same direction. People ». Common Council of Chicago, 51 111. 58;
Lovingston v. Wider, 53 111. 302; People v. Canty, 55 111. 33; Wider v. East
St. Louis, ib. 133. Also People v. Common Council of Detroit, Sup. Court of
Michigan, Oct. Term, 1873.
We are constrained to think the recent case of People v. Bacheller above
referred to is inconsistent with the previous case of Thomas v. Lcland in the
same State, and therefore overrules it. And putting that case aside, as well as a
few other cases which were decided on the ground of an apportionment of local
benefits, we think the case in Alabama will stand substantially alone. Before
that decision the Supreme Court of Illinois were able to say, in a case calling for
a careful and thorough examination of the authorities, that counsel had "failed
to find a case wherein it has been held that the legislature can compel a city
against its will to incur a debt by the issue of its bonds for a local improvement."
People v. Mayor, &c, 51 El. 33.
1 It was held in People v. Hawes, 37 Barb. 440, that the legislature had no
right to direct a municipal corporation to satisfy a claim made against it for dam-
ages for breach of contract, out of the funds or property of such corporation.
In citing the cases of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y. 143,
and People o. Supervisors of New York, 11 Abb. 114, a distinction is drawn
by which the cases are supposed to be reconciled with the one then under
decision. "Those cases and many others," say the court, p. 455, "related not
to the right or power of the legislature to compel an individual or corporation to
pay a debt or claim, but to the power of the legislature to raise money by tax,
and apply such money, when so raised, to the payment thereof. We could not,
under the decisions of the courts on this point, made in these and other cases,
now hold that the legislature had not authority to impose a tax to pay any claim,
or to pay it out of the State treasury; and for this purpose to impose a tax upon
the property of the State, or upon any portion of the State. This was fully set-
tled in People v. Mayor, &c.,"of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; but neither that case nor
the case in 13 N. Y. 143, in any manner gave a warrant for the opinion, that the
legislature had a right to direct a municipal corporation to pay a claim for dam-
ages for breach of a contract, out of the funds or property of the corporation,
[ 265 ]
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Having concisely stated these general views, we r
[• 234] merely, that "those cases which hold that the S&i/i may
raise bounty moneys by taxation, to be paid to persons in
the military service, we think stand by themselves, and are sup-
ported by different principles from any which can fairly be sum-
moned to the aid of some of the other cases which we have cited.
The burden of the public defence unquestionably rests upon the
whole community; and the legislature may properly pro-
[* 235] vide for its apportionment and * discharge in such manner
as its wisdom may prescribe. But those cases which hold
it competent for the legislature to give its consent to a municipal
corporation engaging in works of public improvement outside its
territorial limits, and becoming a stockholder in a private corpora-
tion, must be conceded on all hands to have gone to the very lim-
without a submission of such claim to a judicial tribunal." If by this is meant
that the legislature has power to compel a corporation to tax its citizens for the
payment of a demand, but has not the authority to make it a charge against the
corporation in any other mode, the distinction seems to be one of form rather
than of substance. It is no protection to the rights or property of a municipal
corporation to hold that the legislature cannot determine upon a claim against it,
if at the same time the corporation may be compelled by statute to assume and
discharge the obligation through the levy of a tax for its satisfaction. But if it is
only meant to declare that the legislature cannot adjudicate upon disputed claims,
there can be no good reason to find fault with the decision. It is one thing to
determine that the nature of a claim is such as to make it proper to satisfy it by
taxation, and another to adjudge how much is justly due upon it. The one is
the exercise or legislative power, the other of judicial. See Sanborn v. Rice, 9
Minn. 273; Commonwealth p. Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St. 496; Plimpton v. Som-
erset, 33 Vt. 283. But the power to decide upon the breach of a contract by a
corporation, and the extent of the damages which have resulted, is less objec-
tionable and less likely to lead to oppression, than the power to impose through
taxation a claim upon a corporation which it never was concerned in creating,
against which it protests, and which is unconnected with the ordinary functions
and purposes of municipal government. In Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52
Penn. St. 374, a decision was made which seems to conflict with that in People
v. Hawes, supra; and with the subsequent case of Baldwin v. Mayor, &c, of
New York, 42 Barb. 549. The Pennsylvania court decided that the constitu-
tional guaranty of the right to jury trial had no application to municipal corpora-
tions, and a commission might be created by the legislature to adjust the demands
between them. See, also, Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515. In People
p. Power, 25 111. 187, it was held competent for the legislature to apportion the
taxes collected in a county between a city therein and the remainder of the
county, and that the county revenues " must necessarily be within the control of
the legislature for political purposes."
[ 266 ]
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its of constitutional power in this direction; and to hold that the
legislature may go even further, and, under its power to control
the taxation of the political divisions and organizations of the
State, may compel them, without the consent of their citizens, to
raise money for such or any other unusual purposes, or to contract
debts therefor, seems to us to be introducing new principles into
our system of local self-government, and to be sanctioning a cen-
tralization of power not within the contemplation of the makers of
the American constitutions. We think where any such forced tax-
ation is resisted by the municipal organization, it will be very diffi-
cult to defend it as a proper exercise of legislative authority in a
government where power is distributed on the principles which
prevail here.
Legislative Control of Corporate Property.
The legislative power of the State controls and disposes of the
property of the State. How far it may also control and dispose
of the property of those agencies of government which it has cre-
ated and endowed with corporate powers is a question which hap-
pily there has been very little occasion to discuss in the courts.
Being created as an agency of government, it is evident that the
municipality cannot in itself have that complete and absolute con-
trol and power of disposition of its property which is possessed by
natural persons and private corporations in respect to their several
possessions. For it can hold and own property only for corporate
purposes, and its powers are liable at any time to be so modified
by legislation as to render the property no longer available. More-
over, the charter rights may Ire altogether taken away; and in that
case the legislature has deprived the corporation of its property
by depriving it of corporate capacity to hold it. And in many
ways, while the corporation holds and enjoys property, the legislat-
ure must possess power to interfere with its control, at least inci-
dentally; for the mere fact that the corporation possesses property
cannot deprive the State of its complete authority to mould
and change* the corporate organization, and enlarge or [* 236]
diminish its powers, which it possessed before. But whether
the State can directly intervene and take away the corporate prop-
erty, or convert it to other uses than those for which it was pro-
cured, or whether, on repealing a charter of incorporation, it can
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take to itself the corporate property, and dispose of it at its dis- A
cretion, are different questions from any raised by the indirect and m
incidental interference referred to.
In the leading case, in which it was decided by the Supreme I
Court of the United States that a private charter of incorpora-
tion, granted by a State, was a contract between the State and
the corporators, not subject to modification or repeal, except in
pursuance of a right expressly reserved, but that the charter of a
municipal corporation was not such a contract, it was at the same
time declared, as the opinion of the judges, that the legislature
could not deprive such municipal corporations of their vested
rights in property. "It may be admitted," says one of the judges,
"that corporations for mere public government, such as towns,
cities, and counties, may in many respects be subject to legisla-
tive control. But it will hardly be contended, that even in respect
to such corporations the legislative power is so transcendent that
it may, at its will, take away the private property of the corpo-
ration, or change the uses of its private funds acquired under the
public faith. Can the legislature confiscate to its own use the pri-
vate funds which a municipal corporation holds under its charter,
without any default or consent of the corporators? If a mu-
nicipal corporation be capable of holding devises and legacies
to charitable uses, as many municipal corporations are, does the
legislature, under our forms of limited government, possess the
authority to seize upon those funds and appropriate them to other
uses, at its own arbitrary pleasure, against the will of the donors
and donees? From the very nature of our government, the pub-
lic faith is pledged the other way, and that pledge constitutes
a valid compact; and that compact is subject only to judicial
inquiry, construction, and abrogation." 1 "The government lias
no power to revoke a grant, even of its own funds, when given to
a private person or corporation for special uses. It cannot recall
its own endowments, granted to any hospital or college, or
[* 237] city or town', for the use of such corporations. * The only
authority remaining to the government is judicial, to ascer-
tain the validity of the grant, to enforce its proper uses, to sup-
press frauds, and, if the uses are charitable, to secure their regular
1 Story, J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 694, 695.
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CH. TBI.] THE GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. * 237
administration through the means of equitable tribunals, in cases
where there would otherwise be a failure of justice." 1
"In respect to public corporations," says another judge,
"which exist only for public purposes, such as towns, cities, &c, .
the legislature may, under proper limitations, change, modify,
enlarge, or restrain them, securing, however, the property for the
use of those for whom and at whose expense it was purchased."2
These views had been acted upon by the same court in preceding
cases.3 They draw a distinction between the political rights and
privileges conferred on corporations, and which are not vested
rights in any sense implying constitutional permanency, and
such rights in property as the corporation acquires, and which
in the view of these decisions are protected by the same reasons
which shield similar rights in individuals.4
When the municipal divisions of the territory of the State are
changed in their boundaries, two or more consolidated in one,
or one subdivided, it is conceded that the legislature possesses
the power to make such disposition of the corporate property as
natural equity would require in view of the altered condition of
things. The fact that a portion of the citizens, before entitled to
the benefits springing from the use of specific property for public
purposes, will now be deprived of that benefit, cannot affect the
validity of the legislative act, which is supposed in some other
1 Story, J., in Dartmouth College r. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 698.
* Washington, J., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 663.
* Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Town of Pawlet v. Clark, ib. 292. See
also State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660, referred to, ante, 230-31 note. In People v.
Common Council of Detroit, Sup. Court of Michigan, Oct. Term, 1873, this sub-
ject was largely considered, and the court denied the right of the State to compel
a municipal corporation to contract a debt for a mere local object; for example,
a city park.
4 " It is an unsound and even absurd proposition that political power conferred
by the legislature can become a vested right, as against the government, in any
individual or body of men. It is repugnant to the genius of our institutions,
and the spirit and meaning of the Constitution; for by that fundamental law, all
political rights not there defined and taken out of the exercise of legislative dis-
cretion were intended to be left subject to its regulation. If corporations can
set up a vested right as against the government to the exercise of this species of
power, because it has been conferred upon them by the bounty of the legislature,
w may any and every officer under the government do the same." Nelson, J., in
People c. Morris, 13 Wend. 331. And see Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 532;
Benson v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 10 Barb. 244.
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1
way to compensate them for the incidental loss.1 And ir
[* 238] many * other cases the legislature properly exercises
similar power of control in respect to the corpora/f^rop-
erty, and may direct its partition and appropriation, in order to
accommodate most justly and effectually, in view of new circum-
stances, the purposes for which it was acquired.
The rule upon the subject we take to be this: when corporate
powers are conferred, there is an implied compact between the
State and the corporators that the property which they are
given the capacity to acquire for corporate purposes under their
charter shall not be taken from them and appropriated to other
uses.2 If the State grants property to the corporation, the grant
is an executed contract, which cannot be revoked. The rights
acquired, either by such grants or by any other legitimate mode
in which such a corporation cau acquire property, are vested
rights, and cannot be taken away. Nevertheless if the corporate
powers should be repealed, the corporate ownership would neces-
sarily cease, and even when not repealed, a modification of those
powers, or a change in corporate bounds, might seriously affect, if
not altogether divest, the rights of individual corporators, so far
as they can be said to have any rights in public property. And
in other ways, incidentally as well as by direct intervention, the
State may exercise authority and control over the disposition
and use of corporate property, according to the legislative view of
what is proper for tlie public interest and just to the corporators,
subject only — as we think — to this restriction, that the purpose
for which the property was originally acquired shall be kept in
view, so far as the circumstances will admit, in any disposition
that may be made of it.3
1 Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 533. And see ante, 232-234, notes.
1 If land is dedicated as a public square, and accepted as such, a law devoting
it to other uses is void, because violating the obligation of contracts. Warren
v. Lyons City, 22 Iowa, 351. As there was no attempt in that case to appro-
priate the land to such other uses under the right of eminent domain, the ques-
tion of the power to do so was not considered.
* "That the State may make a contract with, or a grant to, a public municipal
corporation, which it could not subsequently impair or resume, is not denied; but
in such a case the corporation is to be regarded as a private company. A grant
may be made to a public corporation for purposes of private advantage; and
although the public may also derive a common benefit therefrom, yet the corpora-
tion stands on the same footing, as respects such grant, as would any body of per-
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TV
* This restriction is not the less applicable where corpo- [* 239]
rate powers are abolished than it is in other cases; and
=ons upon whom like privileges were conferred. Public or municipal corporations,
however, which exist only for public purposes, and possess no powers except such
as are bestowed upon them for public political purposes, are subject at all times to
the control of the legislature, which may alter, modify, or abolish them at pleas-
ure." Trumbull, J., in Richland County v. Lawrence County, 12 1ll. 8. "Pub-
lic corporations are but parts of the machinery employed in carrying on the
affairs of the State; and they are subject to be changed, modified, or destroyed,
as the exigencies of the public may demand. The State may exercise a general
superintendence and control over them and their rights and effects, so that their
property is not diverted from the uses and objects for which it was given or pur-
chased/1 Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 1ll. 30, per Treat, Ch. J. And see
Harrison p. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704;
Same v. Same, 29 Vt. 19; Benson v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 10 Barb. 223. See
also City of Louisville v. University, 15 B. Monp. 642. In State v. St. Louis County
Court, 34 Mo. 572, the following remarks are made by the court, in considering
the cause shown by the county in answer to an application to compel it to meet
a requisition for the police board of St. Louis: "As to the second cause shown'
in the return, it is understood to mean, not that there is in fact no money in the
treasury to pay this requisition, but that as a matter of law all the money which
is in the treasury was collected for specific purposes from which it cannot be
diverted. The specific purposes for which the money was collected were those
heretofore directed by the legislature; and this act, being a later expression of the
will of the legislature, controls the subject, and so far as it conflicts with previous
acts repeals them. The county is not a private corporation, but an agency of
the State government; and though as a public corporation it holds property, such
holding is subject to a large extent to the will of the legislature. Whilst the
legislature cannot take away from a county its property, it has full power to
direct the mode in which the property shall be used for the benefit of the county."
Compare People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 433. In Darlington v. New York, 31
N. Y. 1134, the complete control of the legislature over the corporate property
of cities was asserted, and it was held competent to subject the city to liability for
property destroyed by a riot. It will be observed that the strong expression of
legislative power is generally to be found in cases where the thing actually done
was dearly and unquestionably competent. In Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 233,
this language is used: "The agents of the corporation can sell or dispose of the
properiy of the corporation only in the way and according to the order of the
legislature; and therefore the legislature may by law operating immediately upon
the subject dispose of this property, or give effect to any previous disposition or
attempted disposition. The property itself is a trust, and the legislature is the
prime and controlling power, managing and directing the use, disposition, and
direction of it." Quoted and approved in San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal.
558. These strong and general expressions should be compared with what is said
in Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, in which the right of municipal corpo-
rations to constitutional protection in their property is asserted fully. The same
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* 239 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. VIII.
whatever might be the nature of the public property •which tl^
corporation had acquired, and whatever the purpose of the acqui-
sition, the legislature, when by taking away the corporate authority
it became vested with the control of the property, would be under
obligation to dispose of it in such manner as to give the original
corporators the benefit thereof, by putting it to the use designed,
if still practicable, or to some kindred or equally beneficial use
having reference to the altered condition of things. The obliga-
tion is one which, from the very nature of the case, must rest for
its enforcement in great measure upon the legislative good faith
and sense of justice; and it could only be in those cases where
there had been a clear disregard of the rights of the original cor-
porators, in the use attempted to be made of the property, that
relief could be had through judicial action.
No such restriction, however, can rest upon the legislature in
regard to the rights and privileges which the State grants to
municipal corporations in the nature of franchises, and which are
granted only as aids or conveniences to the municipality in effect-
ing the purposes of its incorporation. These, like the corporate
powers, must be understood to be granted during pleasure.1
right is asserted in People v. Baclieller, lately decided in the Court of Appeals
of New York; People v. Major, &c., of Chicago, 51 111. 17; People v. Tappan,
29 Wis. 664; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, and very many others. See
Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 39 et seq., and cases referred to in notes. And see Hewison
v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 483, as to the distinction between the public or govern-
mental character of municipal corporations, and their private character as re-
spects the ownership and management of their own property.
1 East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 635. On this subject, see
c. 9, post. The case of Trustees of Aberdeen Academy r. Mayor, &c, of Aber-
deen, 13 S. & M. 645, appears to be contra. By the charter of the town of
Aberdeen in 1837, the legislature granted to it the sole power to grant licenses
to sell vinous and spirituous liquors withiu the corporate limits thereof, and to
appropriate the money arising therefrom to city purposes. In 1848 an act was
passed giving these moneys to the Aberdeen Female. Academy. The act was
held void, on the ground that the original grant was of a franchise which consti-
tuted property, and it could not be transferred to another, though it might be
repealed. The case cites Bailey v. Mayor, &c, 3 Hill, 541, and St. Louis e. Rus-
sell, 9 Mo. 507, which seem to have little relevancy. Also, 4 Wheat. 663, 698,
699; and 2 Kent, 305, note, for the general rule protecting municipal corpora-
tions in their vested rights to property. The case of Benson v. Mayor, &c, of
New York, 10 Barb. 223, also holds the grant of a ferry franchise to a municipal
corporation to be irrevocable, but the authorities generally will not sustain this
view. See post, p. 283, and note,
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• Toivns and Counties. [* 240]
•
Thus far we have been considering general rules, applicable
to all classes of municipal organizations possessed of corporate
powers, and by which these powers may be measured, or the
duties which they impose defined. In regard to some of these
organizations, however, there are other and peculiar rules which
require separate mention. Some of them are so feebly endowed
with corporate life, and so much hampered, controlled, and directed
in the exercise of the functions which are conferred upon them,
that they are sometimes spoken of as nondescript in character, and
as occupying a position somewhere between that of a corporation
and a mere voluntary association of citizens. Counties, townships,
school districts, and road districts do not usually possess corporate
powers under special charters; but they exist under general laws
of the State, which apportion the territory of the State into polit-
ical divisions for convenience of government, and require of the
people residing within those divisions the performance of certain
public duties as a part of the machinery of the State; and, in
order that they may be able to perform these duties, vest them
with certain corporate powers. Whether they shall assume those
duties or exercise those powers, the people of the political divisions
are not allowed the privilege of choice; the legislature assumes this
division of the State to be essential in republican government, and
the duties are imposed as a part of the proper and necessary burden
which the citizens must bear in maintaining and perpetuating
constitutional liberty.1 Usually their functions are wholly of a
public nature, and there is no room to imply any contract between
them and the State, in their organization as corporate bodies, ex-
cept that which springs from the ordinary rules of good faith, and
which requires that the property they shall acquire, by local taxation
or otherwise, for the purposes of their organization, shall
not be seized by the State, and appropriated * in other [* 241]
ways. They are, therefore, sometimes called quasi corpo-
rations,2 to distinguish them from the corporations in general,
1 Granger ». Pulaski County, 26 Ark. 37; Scales v. Chatahoochee County,
« Geo. 225.
! Riddle v. Proprietors, &c, 7 Mass. 186, 187; School District v. Wood, 13
Mas«. 192; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl. 361; Denton v. Jackson, 2
18 [ 273 ]
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* 241 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. VI*
1
which possess more completely the functions of an artificici' entity.
Chief Justice Parker, of Massachusetts, in speaking of school dis-
tricts, has said: "That they are not bodies politic and corporate,
with the general powers of corporations, must be admitted; and
the reasoning advanced to show their defect of power is conclusive.
The same may be said of towns and other municipal societies;
which although recognized by various statutes, and by immemo-
rial usage, as persons or aggregate corporations, with precise duties
which may be enforced, and privileges which may be maintained
by suits at law, yet are deficient in many of the powers incident to
the general character of corporations. They may be considered,
under our institutions, as quasi corporations, witli limited powers,
co-extensive with the duties imposed upon them by statute or usage,
but restrained from the general use of authority which belougs to
these metaphysical persons by the common law. The same may
be said of all the numerous corporations which have been from time
to time created by various acts of the legislature; all of them
enjoying the power which is expressly bestowed upon them, and
perhaps, in all instances where the act is silent, possessing, by
necessary implication, the authority which is requisite to execute
the purposes of their creation." "It will not do to apply the strict
principles of law respecting corporations in all cases to these
aggregate bodies which are created by statute in this Common-
wealth. By the several statutes which have been passed respecting
school districts, it is manifest that the legislature has supposed
that a division of towns, for the purpose of maintaining schools, will
promote the important object of general education ; and this valua-
ble object of legislative care seems to require, in construing their
acts, that a liberal view should be had to the end to be effected." 1
Following out this view, the courts of the New England States have
held, that when judgments are recovered against towns, parishes,
and school districts, any of the property of private owners
[* 242] within * the municipal division is liable to be taken for
their discharge. The reasons for this doctrine, and the
custom upon which it is founded, are thus stated by the Supreme
Court of Connecticut: —
Johns. Ch. 325; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 367; Eastman v. Meredith, 36
N. H. 296; Hopple v. Brown, 13 Ohio, n. s. 311; Commissioners of Hamilton
Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio, N. s. 109; Ray County v. Bentley, 49 Mo. 236.
1 School District p. Wood, 13 Mass. 192.
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V
"We know that the relation in which the members of munic-
ipal corporations in this State have been supposed to stand, in
respect to the corporation itself, as well as to its creditors, has
elsewhere been considered in some respects peculiar. We have
treated them, for some purposes, as parties to corporate proceed-
ings, and their individuality has not been considered as merged in
their corporate connection. Though corporators, they have been
holden to be parties to suits by or against the corporation, and
individually liable for its debts. Heretofore this has not been
doubted as to the inhabitants of towns, located ecclesiastical
societies, and school districts.
"From a recurrence to a history of the law on this subject, we
are persuaded that the principle and usage here recognized and
followed, in regard to the liability of the inhabitants of towns and
communities, were very early adopted by our ancestors. And
whether they were considered as a part of the common law of
England, or originated here, as necessary to our state of society,
it is not very material to inquire. We think, however, that the
principle is not of domestic origin, but to some extent was
operative and applied in the mother country, especially in cases
where a statute fixed a liability upon a municipality which had
no corporate funds. The same reason and necessity for the appli-
cation of such a principle and practice existed in both countries.
Such corporations are of a public and political character; they
exercise a portion of the governing power of the State. Statutes
impose upon them important public duties. In the performance
of these, they must contract debts and liabilities, which can only
be discharged by a resort to individuals, either by taxation or
execution. Taxation, in most cases, can only be the result of the
voluntary action of the corporation, dependent upon the contingent
will of the majority of the corporators, and upon their tardy and
uncertain action. It affords no security to creditors, because they
have no power over it. Such reasons as these probably operated
with our ancestors in adopting the more efficient and certain rem-
edy by execution, which has been resorted to in the present case,
and which they had seen to some extent in operation in the country
whose laws were their inheritance.
*" The plaintiff would apply to these municipal or [* 243]
qumi corporations the close principles applicable to private
corporations. But inasmuch as they are not, strictly speaking,
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
corporations, but only municipal bodies, without pecuniary funds,
it will not do to apply to them literally, and in all cases, the law of
corporations.1
"The individual liability of the members of quasi corporations,
though not expressly adjudged, was very distinctly recognized in
the case of Russell v. The Men of Devon.2 It was alluded to as a
known principle in the case of the Attorney-General v. The City of
Exeter,3 applicable as well to cities as to hundreds and parishes.
That the rated inhabitants of an English parish are considered as
the real parties to suits against the parish is now supposed to be
well settled ; and so it was decided in the case of The Kiug v. The
Inhabitants of Woburn,4 and The King v. The Inhabitants of Hard-
wick.5 And, in support of this principle, reference was made to
the form of the proceedings; as that they are entitled ' against the
inhabitants,' etc.
"In the State of Massachusetts, from whose early institutions
we have borrowed many valuable specimens, the individual re-
sponsibility of the inhabitants of towns for town debts has long
been established. Distinguished counsel in the case of the Mer-
chants Bank v. Cook,6 referring to municipal bodies, say: 'For a
century past the practical construction of the bar has been that, in
an action by or against a corporation, a member of the corpo-
ration is a party in the suit.' In several other cases in that State
the same principle is repeated. In the case of Riddle v. The Pro-
prietors of the. Locks and Canals en Merrimack River,7 Parsons,
Ch. J., in an allusion to this private responsibility of corporators,
remarks: 'And the sound reason is, that having no corporate
fund, and no legal means of obtaining one, each corporator is
liable to satisfy any judgment obtained against the corporation.'
So in Brewer v. Inhabitants of New Gloucester,3 the court say:
'As the law provides that, when judgment is recovered against the
inhabitants of a town, execution may be levied upon the property
of any inhabitant, each inhabitant must be considered as a party.'
In the case before referred to of the Merchants Bank v.
[* 241] Cook, "Parker, Ch. J., expresses the opinion of the court
upon this point thus: 'Towns, parishes, precincts, lfec,
1 School District p. Wood, 13 Mass. 192.
3 2 Russ. 45. 4 10 East, 395.
• 4 Pick. 405. • 7 7 Mass. 187.
* 2 Term Rep. 660.
• 11 East, 577.
"14 Mass. 216.
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are but a collection of individuals, witli certain corporate powers
for political and civil purposes, without any corporate fund, from
which a judgment can be satisfied; but each member of the com-
munity is liable, in his person and estate, to the execution which
may issue against the body ; each individual, therefore, may be
well thought to be a party to a suit brought against them by their
collective name. In regard to banks, turnpikes, and other corpo-
rations, the case is different.' The counsel concerned in the case
of Mower v. Leicester,1 without contradiction, speak of this prac-
tice of subjecting individuals as one of daily occurrence. The law
on this subject was very much considered in the case of Chase v.
The Merrimack Bank,2 and was applied and enforced against the
members of a territorial parish. 'The question is,' say the court,
'whether, on an execution against a town or parish, the body or
estate of any inhabitant may bo lawfully taken to satisfy it. This
question seems to have been settled in the affirmative by a series
of decisions, and ought no longer to be considered as an open
question.' The State of Maine, when separated from Massachu-
setts, retained most of its laws and usages, as they had been
recognized in the parent State; and, among others, the one in
question. In Adams v. Wiscasset Bank,3 Mellen, Ch. J., says:
'It is well known that all judgments against quasi corporations
may be satisfied out of the property of any individual inhabitant.'
"The courts of this State, from a time beyond the memory of
any living lawyer, have sanctioned and carried out this usage, as
one of common-law obligation; and it has been applied, not to
towns only, but also, by legal analogy, to territorial ecclesiastical
societies and school districts. The forms of our process against
these communities have always corresponded with this view of the
law. The writs have issued against the inhabitants of towns,
societies, and districts as parties. As early in the history of our
jurisprudence as 1805, a statute was enacted authorizing com-
munities, such as towns, societies, &c, to prosecute and defend
suits, and for this purpose to appear, either by themselves, agents,
or attorneys. If the inhabitants were not then considered as
parties individually, and liable to the consequences of judgments
against such communities as parties, there would have
been a glaring * impropriety in permitting them to appear [* 245J
1 9 Mass. 247. * 19 Pick. 564.' 5 1 Greenl. 361.
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and defend by themselves; but, if parties, such a right was neces-
sary and indispensable. Of course this privilege has been and
may be exercised.1
"Our statute providing for the collection of taxes enacts that
the treasurer of the State shall direct his warrant to the collectors
of the State tax in the several towns. If neither this nor the fur-
ther proceedings against the collectors and the selectmen authorized
by the statute shall enforce the collection of the tax, the law directs
that then the treasurer shall issue Iris execution against the inhab-
itants of such town. Such an execution may be levied upon the
estate of the inhabitants; and this provision of the law was not
considered as introducing a new principle, or enforcing a novel
remedy, but as being only in conformity with the well-known usage
in other cases. The levy of an execution under this statute pro-
duced the case of Beers v. Botsford.2 There the execution, which
had been issued against the town of Newtown by the treasurer of
the State, had been levied upon the property of the plaintiff, an
inhabitant of that town, and he had thus been compelled to pay the
balance of a State tax due from the town. He sued the town of
Newtown for the recovery of the money so paid by him. The most
distinguished professional gentlemen in the State were engaged as
counsel in that case ; and it did not occur, either to them or to the
court, that the plaintiff's property had been taken without right:
on the contrary, the case proceeded throughout on the conceded
principle of our common law, that the levy was properly made
upon the estate of the plaintiff. And without this the plaintiff
could not have recovered of the town, but must have resorted to
his action against the officer for his illegal and void levy. In Ful-
ler v. Hampton,3 Peters, J., remarked that, if costs are recovered
against a town, the writ of execution to collect them must have
been issued against the property of the inhabitants of the town ; and
this is the invariable practice. The case of Atwater v. Woodbridge 4
also grew out of this ancient usage. The ecclesiastical society of
Bethany had been taxed by the town of Woodbridge for its mon-
eys at interest, and the warrant for the collection of the tax had
been levied upon the property of the plaintiff, and the tax had
thus been collected of him, who was an inhabitant of the located
1 1 Swift's System, 227.
3 5 Conn. 417.
a 8 Day, 159.
4 6 Conn. 223.
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society of Bethany. Brainerd, J., who drew up the * opin- [* 246]
ion of the court, referring to this proceeding, said: 'This
practice, with regard to towns, has prevailed in New England, so
far as I have been able to investigate the subject, from an early
period, — from its first settlement, — a practice brought by our
forefathers from England, which had there obtained in corporations
similar to the towns incorporated in New England.' It will here
be seen that the principle is considered as applicable to territorial
societies as to towns, because the object to be obtained was the
same in both, —' that the town or society should be brought to a
sense of- duty, and make provision for payment and indemnity ;'
a very good reason, and very applicable to the case we are consid-
ering.
"The law on this subject was more distinctly brought out and
considered by this court in the late case of McCloud v. Selby,1 in
which this well-known practice, as it had been applied to towns
and ecclesiastical societies, was extended and sanctioned as to
school districts; 'else it would be breaking in upon the analogies
of the law.' 'They are communities for different purposes, but
essentially of the same character.' And no doubt can remain,
since the decision of this case, but that the real principle, in all of
the cases on this subject, has been, and is, that the inhabitants of
quasi corporations are parties individually, as well as in their cor-
porate capacities, to all the actions in which the corporation is a
party. And to the same effect is the language of the elementary
writers." 2
So far as this rule rests upon the reason that these organizations
have no common fund, and that no other mode exists by which
demands against them can be enforced, it cannot be considered
applicable in those States where express provision is made by law
for compulsory taxation to satisfy any judgment recovered against
the corporate body, — the duty of levying the tax being imposed
upon some officer, who may be compelled by mandamus to perform
1 10 Conn. 390-395.
* Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375, citing 2 Kent, 221 ; Angell and Ames on
Corp. 374; 1 Swift's Dig. 72, 794; 5 Dane's Abr. 158. And see Dillon, Mun.
Corp. c. 1. It was held competent in the above case to extend the same principle
to incorporated cities; and an act of the legislature permitting the enforcement of
city debts in the same mode was sustained. For a more recent case in Massa-
chusetts than these cited, see Gaskill v. Dudley, 6 Met. 551.
[ 279]
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it. Nor has any usage, so far as we are aware, grown up in any
of the newer States, like that which had so early an origin
[*247] in New England. * More just, convenient, and inexpen-
sive modes of enforcing such demands have been estab-
lished by statute, and the rules concerning them are conformed
more closely to those which are established for other corporations.
On the other hand, it is settled that these corporations are not
liable to a private action, at the suit of a party injured by a neglect
of its officers to perform a corporate duty, unless such action is
given by statute. This doctrine has been frequently applied where
suits have been brought against towns, or the highway officers of
towns, to recover for damages sustained in consequence of defects
in the public ways. The common law gives no such action, and it
is therefore not sustainable at all, unless given by statute. A dis-
tinction is made between those corporations which are created as
exceptions, and receive special grants of power for the peculiar
convenience and benefit of the corporators, on the one hand, and
the incorporated inhabitants of a district, who are by statute
invested with particular powers, without their consent, on the other.
In the latter case, the State may impose corporate duties, and com-
pel their performance, under penalties; but the corporators, who
are made such whether they will or no, cannot be considered in
the light of persons who have voluntarily, and for a consideration,
assumed obligations, so as to owe a duty to every person interested
in the performance.1
1 Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 250; Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439;
Farnura v. Concord, 2 N. H. 392; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl. 361;
Baxter v. Winooski Turnpike, 22 Vt. 123; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375;
Chidsey ». Canton, 17 Conn. 475; Young c. Commissioners, &c., 2 N. & McC.
637; Commissioners of Highways v. Martin, 4 Mich. 557; Morey v. Newfane,
8 Barb. 645; Lorillard t>. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392; Galen v. Clyde and Rose
Plank Road Co., 27 Barb. 543; Reardon v. St. Louis, 86 Mo. 555; Sherburne
v. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; State v. County of Hudson, 1 Vroom, 187; Hedges
v. Madison Co., 1 Gilm. 567; Granger v. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 87; Weightman t>.
Washington, 1 Black, 39; Ball v. Winchester, 32 N. H. 448; Eastman v. Mere-
dith, 36 N. H. 284; Waltham v. Kemper, 55 111. 346; Sutton v. Board, 41 Miss.
236; Cooley v. Freeholders, 3 Dutch. 415. These cases follow the leading Eng-
lish case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667. In the very carefully con-
sidered case of Eastman v. Meredith, 86 N. H. 284, it was decided, on the
principle above stated, that if a building erected by a town for a town-house is
so imperfectly constructed that the flooring gives way at the annual town-meeting,
and an inhabitant and legal voter, in attendance on the meeting, receives thereby
[280]
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The reason which exempts these public bodies from liability to
private actions, based upon neglect to perform public obligations,
does not apply to villages, boroughs, and cities, which
accept special * charters from the State. The grant of the [* 248]
corporate franchise, in these cases, is usually made only at
the request of the citizens to be incorporated, and it is justly
assumed that it confers what to them is a valuable privilege. This
privilege is a consideration for the duties which the charter imposes.
Larger powers of self-government are given than are confided to
towns or counties; larger privileges in the acquisition and control
of corporate property; and special authority is conferred to make
use of the public highways for the special and peculiar convenience
of the citizens of the municipality in various modes not permissible
elsewhere. The grant by the State to the municipality of a portion
of its sovereign powers, and their acceptance for these beneficial
purposes, is regarded as raising an implied promise, on the part of
the corporation, to perform the corporate duties; and this implied
contract, made with the sovereign power, enures to the benefit of
every individual interested in its performance.1 In this respect
a bodily injury, he cannot maintain an action against the town to recover dam-
ages for this injury. The case is carefully distinguished from those where cor-
porations have been held liable for the negligent use of their own property by
means of which others are injured. The familiar maxim that one shall so use
his own as not to injure that which belongs to another is of general application.
1 Selden, J., in Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161, note. See also Mayor of
Lyme v. Turner, Cowp. 86; Henley v. Lyme Regis, 5 Bing. 91; Same case in
error, 8 B. & Adol. 77, and 1 Bing. N. C. 222; Mayor, &c, of New York v.
Furze, 8 Hill, 612; Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 464; Hut-
son c. Mayor, &c, of New York, 9 N. Y. 163; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158;
Mills r. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Barton v. Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Lee v. Sandy
Hill, 40 N. Y. 442; Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 40; Riddle v. Proprietors
of Locks, &c, 7 Mass. 183; Bigelow v. Inhabitants of Randolph, 14 Gray, 541;
Mears v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 9 Ired. 73; Browning v. Springfield, 17
111. 143; Bloomington ». Bay, 42 111. 503; Springfield v. LeClaire, 49 111. 476;
Peru v. French, 55 111. 818; Pittsburg v. Grier, 22 Penn. St. 54; Jones v. New
Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Stackhouse v. Lafayette, 26 Ind. 17; Brinkmeyer r. Evans-
vine, 29 Ind. 187; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Grat. 241; Richmond v. Long, ib. 375;
Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Scott v. Mayor, &c, of Manchester, 37 Eng.
L. & Eq. 495; Smoot v. Wetumpka, 24 Ala. 112; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich.
165; Rusch ». Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md.
468; Covington v. Bryant, 7 Bush, 248; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black,
41; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Nebraska v. Campbell, ib. 590. In the
recent case of Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84, this whole subject is considered
[ 281 ]
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these corporations are looked upon as occupying the same position
as private corporations, which, having accepted a valuable franchise,
on condition of the performance of certain public duties, are held
to contract by the acceptance for the performance of these duties.
In the case of public corpprations, however, the liability is contin-
gent on the law affording the means of performing the duty, which,
in some cases, by reason of restrictions upon the power of taxation,
they might not possess. But assuming the corporation to be clothed
with sufficient power by the charter to that end, the liability of a
city or village, vested with control of its streets, for any neglect to
keep them in repair, or for any improper construction, has been
determined in many cases.1 And a similar liability would exist in
other cases where the same reasons would be applicable.
at length; and the court (one judge dissenting) deny the soundness of the prin-
ciple stated in the text, and hold that municipal corporations existing under spe-
cial charters are not liable to individuals for injuries caused by neglect to perform
corporate duties, unless expressly made so by statute. This case is referred to
and dissented from in Waltham v. Kemper, 55 111. 347. In Murtaugh v. St.
Louis, 44 Mo. 480, Currier, J., says: "The general result of the adjudications
seems to be this: When the officer or servant of a municipal corporation is in
the exercise of a power conferred upon the corporation for its private benefit,
and injury ensues from the negligence or misfeasance of such officer or servant,
the corporation is liable, as in the case of private corporations or parties; but
when the acts or omissions complained of were done or omitted in the exercise
of a corporate franchise conferred upon the corporation for the public good, and
not for the private corporate advantage, then the corporation is not liable for
the consequences of such acts or omissions." Citing Bailey v. New York,
3 Hill, 531; Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 550; Richmond v. Long's Adm'r, 17
Grat. 375; Sherburne v. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; Dargan v. Mobile, 31 Ala.
469; Stewart v. New Orleans, 9 La. An. 461; Prother v. Lexington, 13 B.
Monr. 559. And as to exemption from liability in the exercise or failure to
exercise legislative authority, see ante, p. 208, and note.
1 Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161, note; Hickok p. Plattsburg, ib. 158;
Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Browning v. Springfield, 17 111. 143; Hyatt t.
Rondout, 44 Barb. 385; Lloyd v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5 N. Y. 369;
Rusch v. Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443. And see Dillon, Mun. Corp. c. 18, and the
cases cited in the preceding note. The cases of Weet v. Brockport, and Hickok
Plattsburg, were criticised by Mr. Justice Marvin, in the case of Peck v.
Batavia, 32 Barb. 634, where, as well as in Cole v. Medina, 27 Barb. 218, he
held that a village merely authorized to make and repair sidewalks, but not in
terms absolutely and imperatively required to do so, had a discretion conferred
upon it in respect to such walks, and was not responsible for a refusal to enact
ordinances or by-laws in relation thereto; nor, if it enacted such ordinances or
by-laws, was it liable for damages arising from a neglect to enforce them. The
[ 282 ]
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* But if the ground of the action is the omission by the [* 249]
corporation to repair a defect, it would seem that notice of
the defect should be brought home to the corporation, or to officers
charged with some duty respecting the streets, or that facts should
appear sufficient to show that, by proper vigilance, it must have
been known.1
In regard to all those powers which are conferred upon the
corporation, not for tlie benefit of the general public, but of the
corporators, — as to construct works to supply a city with water, or
gas-works, or sewers, and the like, — the corporation is held to a
still more strict liability, and is made to respond in damages to the
parties injured by the negligent manner in which the work is con-
structed, or guarded, even though, under its charter, the agents for
the construction are not chosen or controlled by the corporation,
and even where the work is required by law be let to the lowest
responsible bidder.
In Bailey v. Mayor, <fec, of New York,2 an action was brought
against the city by one who had been injured in his property by the
careless construction of the Croton dam for the purpose of supply-
ing the city with water. The work was constructed under the
control of water commissioners, in whose appointment the city had
no voice; and upon this ground, among others, and also on the
ground that the city officers were acting in a public capacity, and,
like other public agents, not responsible for the misconduct
of * those necessarily appointed by them, it was insisted [* 250]
the city could not be held liable. Nelson, Ch. J., examin-
ing the position that, "admitting the water commissioners to be
the appointed agents of the defendants, still the latter are not
liable, inasmuch as they were acting solely for the State in
doctrine that a power thus conferred is discretionary does not seem consistent
with the ruling in some of the other cases cited, and is criticised in Hyatt v.
Rondout, 44 Barb, 392. Calling public meetings for political or philanthropic
purposes is no part of the business of a municipal corporation, and it is not liable
to one who, in lawfully passing by where the meeting is held, is injured by the
discharge of a cannon fired by persons concerned in the meeting. Boyland v.
Mayor, &c, of New York, 1 Sandf. 27.
1 Hart v. Brooklyn, 36 Barb. 226; Dewey v. City of Detroit, 15 Mich. 309;
Garrison v. New York, 5 Bosw. 497; McGinity v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5
Duer, 674; Decatur v. Fisher, 53 HI. 407; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129;
Hume r. New York, 47 N. Y. 639.
• 3 Hill, 531; 2 Denio, 433.
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prosecuting the work in question, and therefore are not responsible
for the conduct of those necessarily employed by them for that
purpose," says: " We admit, if the defendants are to be regarded
as occupying this relation, and are not chargeable with any want
of diligence in the selection of agents, the conclusion contended
for would seem to follow. They would then be entitled to all the
immunities of public officers charged with a duty which, from its
nature, could not be executed, without availing themselves of the
services of others ; and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not
apply to such cases. If a public officer authorize the doing of an
act not within the scope of his authority, or if he be guilty of
negligence in the discharge of duties to be performed by himself,
he will be held responsible; but not for the misconduct or
malfeasance of such persons as he is obliged to employ. But this
view cannot be maintained on the facts before us. The powers
conferred by the several acts of the legislature, authorizing the
execution of this great work, are not, strictly and legally speaking,
conferred for the benefit of the public; the grant is a special,
private franchise, made as well for the private emolument and ad-
vantage of the city as for public good. The State, in its sovereign
character, has no interest in it. It owns no part of the work. The
whole investment, under the law, and the revenue and profits to be
derived therefrom, are a part of the private property of the city, as
much so as the lands and houses belonging to it situate within its
corporate limits.
"The argument of the defendants' counsel confounds the powers
in question with those belonging to the defendants in their charac-
ter as a municipal or public body, — such as are granted exclusively
for public purposes to counties, cities, towns, and villages, where
the corporations have, if I may so speak, no private estate or in-
terest in the grant.
"As the powers in question have been conferred upon one of
these public corporations, thus blending, in a measure, those con-
ferred for private advantage and emolument with those already
possessed for public purposes, there is some difficulty, I
[* 251] * admit, in separating them in the mind, and properly dis-
tinguishing the one class from the other, so as to distribute
the responsibility attaching to the exercise of each.
"But the distinction is quite clear and well settled, and the pro-
cess of separation practicable. To this end, regard should be had,
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not so much to the nature and character of the various powers con-
ferred, as to the object and purpose of the legislature in conferring
them. If granted for public purposes exclusively, they belong
to the corporate body in its public, political, or municipal character.
But, if the grant was for purposes of private advantage and emolu-
ment, though the public may derive a common benefit therefrom, the
corporation quo ad hoc is to be regarded as a private company. It
stands on the same footing as would any individual or body of
persons upon whom the like special franchises had been con-
ferred.1
"Suppose the legislature, instead of the franchise in question,
had conferred upon the defendants' banking powers, or a charter
for a railroad leading into the city, in the usual manner in which
such powers are conferred upon private companies, could it be
doubted that they would hold them in the same character, and be
subject to the same duties and liabilities? It cannot be doubted but
they would. These powers, in the eye of the law, would be entirely
distinct and separate from those appertaining to the defendants as
a municipal body. So far as related to the charter thus conferred,
they would be regarded as a private company, and be subject to
the responsibilities attaching to that class of institutions. The
distinction is well stated by the Master of the Rolls, in Moodalay
v. East India Co.,2 in answer to an objection made by counsel.
There the plaintiff had taken a lease from the company, granting
him permission to supply the inhabitants of Madras with tobacco
for ten years. Before the expiration of that period, the company
dispossessed him, and granted the privilege to another. The plain-
tiff, preparatory to bringing an action against the company,
filed a bill of discovery. One of the objections * taken by [* 252]
the defendant was, that the removal of the plaintiff was .
incident to their character as a sovereign power, the exercise of
which could not be questioned in a bill or suit at law. The Master
of the Rolls admitted that no suit would lie against a sovereign
power for any thing done in that capacity; but he denied that the
1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat 668, 672; Phillips v. Bury, 1
Ld. Raym. 8; 2 T. R. 362, s. c.; Allen v. McKeen, 1 Sumn. 297; People v.
Morris, 13 Wend. 381-338; 2 Kent's Com. 275 (4th ed.); United States Bank
e. Planters Bank, 9 Wheat. 907; Clark v. Corp. of Washington, 12 ib. 40;
Moodalay v. East India Co., 1 Brown's Ch. R. 469.
1 1 Brown's Ch. R. 469.
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defendants came within the rule. 'They have rights,' he observed,
'as a sovereign power; they have also duties as individuals; if
they enter into bonds in India, the sums secured may be recovered
here. So in this case, as a private company, they have entered into
a private contract, to which they must be liable.' It is upon the
like distinction that municipal corporations, in their private char-
acter as owners and occupiers of lands and houses, arc regarded
in the same light as individual owners and occupiers, and dealt
with accordingly. As such, they are bound to repair bridges, high-
ways, and churches; are liable to poor rates; and, in a word, to
the discharge of any other duty or obligation to which an individ-
ual owner would be subject." 1
la Stoors v. City of Utica,2 it was held that a city, owing to the
public the duty of keeping its streets in a safe condition for travel,
was liable to persons receiving injury from the neglect to keep
proper lights and guards at night around an excavation which had
been made for the construction of a sewer, notwithstanding it had
contracted for all proper precautions with the persons executing
the work. And in the City of Detroit v. Corey8 the corporation
was held liable in a similar case, notwithstanding the work was
required by the charter to be let to the lowest bidder. Manning,
J., in speaking to the point whether the contractors were to be con-
sidered as the agents of the city, so that the maxim respondeat
superior should apply, says: "It is to be observed that
[* 253] the * power under which they acted, and which made that
lawful which would otherwise have been unlawful, was not
1 2 Inst. 703 ; Thursfield v. Jones, Sir T. Jones, 187; Rex v. Gardner, Cowp.
79; Mayor of Lyme v. Turner, ib. 87; Henley e. Mayor of Lyme, 5 Bing. 91;
1 Bing. N. C. 222, s. c. in House of Lords. See, also, Lloyd v. Mayor, &c., of
New York, 5 N. Y. 369; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468. "The cor-
poration of the city of New York possesses two kinds of powers, —one govern-
mental and public, and, to the extent they are held and exercised, is clothed with
sovereignty; the other private, and, to the extent they are held and exercised,
is a legal individual. The former are given and used for public puqioses, the
latter for private purposes. While in the exercise of the former, the corporation
is a municipal government, and while in the exercise of the latter is a corporate,
legal individual." Ibid, per Foot, J. See upon this point also, Western Fund
Savings Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Penn. St. 175; Louisville v. Commonwealth,
1 Duvall, 295; People v. Common Council of Detroit, 27 Mich, ante 230 and note.
• 17 N. Y. 104.
3 9 Mich. 165. Compare Mills t>. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Jones v. New
Haven, 34 Conn. 1.
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a power given to the city for governmental purposes, or a public
municipal duty imposed on the city, as to keep its streets in repair,
or the like, but a special legislative grant to the city for private
purposes. The sewers of the city, like its works for supplying the
city with water, are the private property of the city; they belong
to the city. The corporation and its corporators, the citizens, are
alone interested in them; the outside public or people of the State
at large have no interest in them, as they have in the streets of the
city, which are public highways.
"The donee of such a power, whether the donee be an individ-
ual or a corporation, takes it with the understanding—for such
are the requirements of the law in the execution of the power —
that it shall be so executed as not unnecessarily to interfere with
the rights of the public, and that all needful and proper measures
will be taken, in the execution of it, to guard against accidents to
persons lawfully using the highway at the time. He is individ-
ually bound for the performance of these obligations; he cannot
accept the power divested of them, or rid himself of their perform-
ance by executing them through a third person as his agent. He
may stipulate with the contractor for their performance, as was
done by the city in the present case, but he cannot thereby relieve
himself of his personal liability, or compel an injured party to look
to his agent, instead of himself, for damages." And in answer
to the objection that the contract was let to the lowest bidder, as
the law required, it is shown that the provision of law to that
effect was introduced for the benefit of the city, to protect it
against frauds, and that it should not, therefore, relieve it from
any liability.1
1 See, also, Rochester White Lead Co. v. City of Rochester, 8 N. Y. 463;
Grant v. City of Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381; City of Buffalo v. Holloway, 14 Barb.
101, and 7 N. Y. 493; Lloyd v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 6 N. Y. 369; Del-
monico r. Mayor, &c, of New York, 1 Sandf. 222; Barton r. Syracuse, 37
Barb. 292; Storrs p. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104; Springfield v. LeClaire, 49 111. 476;
Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Baltimore v. Pendleton, 15 Md. 12; St. Paul
r. Leitz, 3 Minn. 297. For further illustration of the rules of liability to which
municipal corporations are subject for the negligent discharge of corporate duties,
or the improper construction of corporate works, see Wallace p. Muscatine,
4 Greene (Iowa), 373; Creal v. Keokuk, ib. 47; Cotes v. Davenport, 9 Iowa,
227; Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wal. 189; Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, 41; Walcott v.
Swampscott, 1 Allen, 101; Buttrick v. Lowell, ib. 172; Munn v. Pittsburgh, 40
Penn. St. 364; Pekin v. Newell, 26 111. 320; Weightman v. Washington, 1
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[* 254] * We have not deemed it important, in considering the
subject embraced within this chapter, to discuss the various
questions which might be suggested in regard to the validity of the
proceedings by which it is assumed in any case that a municipal
corporation has become constituted. These questions are gener-
ally questions between the corporators and the State, with which
private individuals are regarded as having no concern. In pro-
ceedings where the question whether a corporation exists or not
arises collaterally, the courts will not permit its corporate charac-
ter to be questioned, if it appear to be acting under color of law,
and recognized by the State as such. Such a question should be
raised by the State itself, by quo warranto or other direct proceeding.1
And the rule, we apprehend, would be no different, if the constitu-
tion itself prescribed the manner of incorporation. Even in such
a case, proof that the corporation was acting as such, under legis-
lative action, would be sufficient evidence of right, except as against
the State ; and private parties could not enter upon any question
of regularity. And the State itself may justly be precluded, on the
principle of estoppel, from raising such an objection, where there
has been long acquiescence and recognition.2
Black, 39; Kavanaugh v. Brooklyn, 38 Barb. 232; Wendell r. Troy, SO Barb.
329; Mills r. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130; City of
Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Champaign v. Patterson, 50 111. 62; Ros3 f.
Madison, 1 Ind. 281; Mayor, &c, of New York t>. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433; Roch-
ester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 8 N. Y. 463; Wheeler v. City of Worcester,
10 Allen, 591; Burnham v. Boston, ib. 290; Boon v. City of Utica, 2 Barb. 104;
Martin v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. Y.
512; Lacour v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 3 Duer, 406; Pittsburgh v. Grier,
22 Penn. St. 54; Erie City v. Schwingle, t'6. 384; and the numerous cases col-
lected and classified in Dillon on Municipal Corporations. A municipal corpo-
poration is not liable for neglect to devise and construct a proper system of
drainage. Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324. See ante, 208, and
note. Cities are not liable for the careless conduct of officials in the discharge of
duty. Dillon, §§ 774 to 778, and cases cited.
1 State r. Carr, 6 N. H. 367; President, &c, of Mendota v. Thompson, 20
111. 200; Hamilton t>. President, &c, of Carthage, 24 HI. 22. These were
prosecutions by municipal corporations for recovery of penalties imposed by
by-laws, and where the plea of nul tiel corporation was interposed and over-
ruled. See, also, Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50
ni. so.
8 In People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 470, where the invalidity of an act organ-
izing a county, passed several years before, was suggested on constitutional
grounds, Campbell, J., says: "If this question had been raised immediately, we
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CH. VIII.] THE GRADES OP MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. * 255
are not prepared to say that it would have been altogether free from difficulty.
But inasmuch as the arrangement there indicated had been acted upon for ten
years before the recent legislation, and had been recognized as valid by all
parties interested, it cannot now be disturbed. Even in private associations the
acts of parties interested may often estop them from relying on legal objec-
tions, which might have availed them if not waived. But in public affairs, where
the people have organized themselves under color of law into the ordinary
municipal bodies, and have gone on year after year raising taxes, making im-
provements, and exercising their usual franchises, their rights are properly
regarded as depending quite as much on the acquiescence as on the regularity
of their origin, and no ex post facto inquiry can be permitted to undo their
corporate existence. Whatever may be the rights of individuals before such
general acquiescence, the corporate standing of the community can no longer be
open to question. See Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41; and Lanning o. Car-
penter, 20 N. Y. 474, where the efl'ect of the invalidity of an original county
organization is very well considered in its public and private bearings. There
have been direct legislative recognitions of the new division on several occasions.
The exercise of jurisdiction being notorious and open in all such cases, the State
as well as county and town taxes being all levied under it, there is no principle
which could justify any court, at this late day, in going back to inquire into the
regularity of the law of 1857." A similar doctrine has been applied in support
of the official character of persons who, without authority of law, have bee"n
named for municipal offices by State authority, and whose action in such offices
has been acquiesced in by the citizens or authorities of the municipality. See
People v. Salomon, 54 111. 51; People v. Lothrop, 24 Mich. 235. Compare Kim-
ball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151. But such acquiescence could not make them local
officers and representatives of the people for new and enlarged powers subse-
quently attempted to be given by the legislature. People v. Common Council of
Detroit, 27 Mich. Nor in respect to powers not purely local. People v. Spring-
wells, 25 Mich. 163.
19
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256 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. II.
[*256] * CHAPTER IX.
PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES.
As the government of the United States was one of enumerated
powers, it was not deemed important by the framers of its Consti-
tution that a bill of rights should be incorporated among its pro-
visions. If, among the powers conferred, there was none which
would authorize or empower the government to deprive the citizen
of any of those fundamental rights which it is the object and the
duty of government to protect and defend, and to insure which is
the sole purpose of bills of rights, it was thought to be at least
unimportant to insert negative clauses in that instrument, inhibit-
ing the government from assuming any such powers, since the
mere failure to confer them would leave all such powers beyond
the sphere of its constitutional authority. And, as Mr. Hamilton
argued, it might seem even dangerous to do so. "For why declare
that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why,
for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall
not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions
may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would
confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish,
to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that
power. They might urge, with a semblance of reason, that the
Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of pro-
viding against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and
that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press
afforded a clear implication that a right to prescribe proper reg-
ulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national
government. This may serve as a specimen of t"he numerous
handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive
powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of
rights." 1
1 Federalist, No. 84.
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 256
It was also thought that bills of rights, however impor-
tant * under a monarchical government, were of no [* 257]
moment in a constitution of government framed by the
people for themselves, and under which public affairs were to be
managed by means of agencies selected by the popular choice, and
subject to frequent change by popular action. "It has been sev-
eral times truly remarked, that bills of rights are, in their origin,
stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of pre-
rogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered
to the prince. Such was Magna Charta, obtained by the barons,
sword in hand, from King John. Such were the subsequent con-
firmations of that charter by succeeding princes. Such was the
Petition of Right, assented to by Charles the First, in the beginning
of his reign. Such also was the Declaration of Right presented by
the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and
afterwards thrown into the form of an act of Parliament, called
the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore, that, according to
their primitive signification, they have no application to constitu-
tions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and exe-
cuted by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in
strictness, the people surrender nothing; and, as they retain every
thing, they have no need of particular reservations. 'We, the
people of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion for the United States of America.' This is a better recog-
nition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which
make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights,
and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than
in a constitution of government."1
Reasoning like this was specious, but it was not satisfactory to
many of the leading statesmen of that day, who believed that " the
purposes of society do not require a surrender of all our rights
to our ordinary governors; that there are certain portions of right
not necessary to enable them to carry on an effective government,
and which experience has nevertheless proved they will be con-
stantly encroaching on, if submitted to them; that there are also
certain fences which experience has proved peculiarly efficacious
against wrong, and rarely obstructive of right, which yet the
1 Federalist, No. 84, bv Hamilton.
[ 291 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
01
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 257 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.
\
governing powers have ever shown a disposition to weaken and
remove." 1 And these governing powers will be no less
[* 258] disposed * to be aggressive when chosen by majorities than
when selected by the accident of birth, or at the will of
privileged classes. Indeed if, during the long struggle for consti-
tutional liberty in England, covering the whole of the seventeenth
century, importance was justly attached to a distinct declaration
and enumeration of individual rights on the part of the govern-
ment, when it was still in the power of the governing authorities
to infringe upon or to abrogate them at any time, and when, con-
sequently, the declaration could possess only a moral force, a similar
declaration would appear to be of even more value in the Consti-
tution of the United States, where it would constitute authoritative
law, and be subject to no modification or repeal, except by the
people themselves whose rights it was designed to protect, nor even
by them except in the manner by the Constitution provided.2
1 Jefferson's Works, Vol. III. 201.
* Mr. Jefferson sums up the objections to a bill of rights !n the Constitution
of the United Status, and answers them as follows: "1. That the rights in
question are reserved by the manner in which the Federal powers are granted.
Answer: A constitutive act may certainly be so formed as to need no declara-
tion of rights. The act itself has the force of a declaration, as far as it goes;
and if it goes to all material points, nothing more is wanting. In the draft of
a constitution which I had once a thought of proposing in Virginia, and printed
afterwards, I endeavored to reach all the great objects of public liberty, and did
not mean to add a declaration of rights. Probably the object was imperfectly
executed; but the deficiencies would have been supplied by others in the course
of discussion. But in a constitutive act which leaves some precious articles un-
noticed, and raises implications against others, a declaration of rights becomes
necessary by way of supplement. This is the case of our new Federal Consti-
tution. This instrument forms us into one State, as to certain objects, and gives
us a legislative and executive body for those objects. It should therefore guard
us against their abuses of power, within the field submitted to them. 2. A positive
declaration of some essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude.
Answer: Half a loaf is better than no bread. If we cannot secure all our rights,
let us secure what we can. 3. The limited powers of the Federal government,
and jealousy of the subordinate governments, afford a security, which exists in
no other instance. Answer: The first member of this seems resolvable into the
first objection before stated. The jealousy of the subordinate governments is a
precious reliance. But observe that those governments are only agents. They
must have principles furnished them whereon to found their opposition. The
declaration of rights will be the text whereby they will try all the acts of the
Federal government. In this view it is necessary to the Federal government
also; as by the same text they may try the opposition of the subordinate govern-
[ 292 J
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* The want of a bill of rights was, therefore, made the [* 259]
ground of a decided, earnest, and formidable opposition to
the confirmation of the national Constitution by the people; and its
adoption was only secured in some of the leading States in con-
nection with the recommendation of amendments which should
cover the ground.1
The clauses inserted in the original instrument, for the protection
of person and property, had reference mainly to the action of the
State governments, and were made limitations upon their power.
The exceptions embraced a few cases only, in respect to which the
experience of both English and American history had forcibly
demonstrated the tendency of power to abuse, not when wielded by
a prince only, but also when administered by the agencies of the
people themselves.
Bills of attainder were prohibited to be passed, either by the Con-
gress2 or by the legislatures of the several States.3 Attainder,
in a strict sense, means an extinction of civil and political rights
and capacities; and at the common law it followed, as of course,
on conviction and sentence to death for treason; and, in greater
or less degree, on conviction and sentence for the different classes
of felony.
A bill of attainder was a legislative conviction for alleged crime,
ments. 4. Experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights. True. But
though it is not absolutely efficacious, under all circumstances, it is of great
potency always, and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will often keep up
the building which would have fallen with that brace the less. There is a re-
markable difference between the characters of the inconveniences which attend a
declaration of rights, and those which attend the want of it. The inconveniences
of the declaration are, that it may cramp government in its useful exertions. But
the evil of this is short-lived, moderate, and reparable. The inconveniences of the
want of a declaration are permanent, afflictive, and irreparable. They are in con-
stant progression from bad to worse. The executive, in our governments, is not V1
the sole, it is scarcely the principal, object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the «-
legislatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years.;
TJEaFoT the executive will come in its turn; but it will be at a remote period.
Letter to Madison, March 15, 1789, 3 Jefferson's Works, p. 4. See also same
volume, pp. 13 and 101; Vol. II. pp. 329, 358.
1 For the various recommendations by Massachusetts, South Carolina, New
Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, see 1 Elliott1*
Debates, 322-334.
* Constitution of United States, art. 1, § 9.
1 Constitution of United States, art. 1, § 10.
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* 259 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.
\
with judgment of death. Such convictions have not been uncom-
mon under other governments, and the power to pass these bills has
been exercised by the Parliament of England at some periods in
its history, under the most oppressive and unjustifiable
[* 260] * circumstances, greatly aggravated by an arbitrary course
of procedure, which had few of the incidents of a judicial
investigation into alleged crime. Of late years in England no one
had attempted to defend it as a legitimate exercise of power; and
if it would be unjustifiable anywhere, there were many reasons why
it would be specially obnoxious under a free government, and why
consequently its prohibition, under the existing circumstances of
our country, would be a matter of more than ordinary importance.
Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers
and organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its
members upon the people, which renders them liable to be pecul-
iarly susceptible to popular clamor, is not properly constituted to
try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge,
especially in those cases in which the popular feeling is strongly
excited, — the very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted
by this mode. And although it would be conceded that, if such
bills were allowable, they should properly be presented only for
offences against the general laws of the land, and be proceeded
with on the same full opportunity for investigation and defence
which is afforded in the courts of the common law, yet it was
remembered that in practice they were often resorted to because an
obnoxious person was not subject to punishment under the gen-
eral law,1 or because, in proceeding against him by this mode, some
rule of the common law requiring a particular species or degree of
evidence might be evaded, and a conviction secured on proofs that
1 Cases of this description were most numerous during the reign of Henry VIII.,
and among the victims was Cromwell, who is said to have first advised that mon-
arch to resort to this objectionable proceeding. Even the dead were attainted,
as in the case of Richard III., and later, of the heroes of the Commonwealth.
The most atrocious instance in history, however, only relieved by its weakness
and futility, was the great act of attainder passed in 1688 by the Parliament
of James II., assembled in Dublin, by which between two and three thousand
persons were attainted, their property confiscated, and themselves sentenced to
death if they failed to appear at a time named. And, to render the whole pro-
ceeding as horrible in barbarity as possible, the list o the proscribed was care-
fully kept secret until after the time fixed for their appearance! Macaulay's
History of England, c. 12.
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 260
a jury would not be suffered to accept as overcoming the legal
presumption of innocence. Whether the accused should neces-
sarily be served with process; what degree or species of evidence
Bhould be required; whether the rules of law should be
* followed, either in determining what constituted a crime, [* 261]
or in. dealing with the accused after conviction, — were all
questions which would necessarily address themselves to the legis-
lative discretion and sense of justice; and the very qualities which
are essential in a court to protect individuals on trial before them
against popular clamor, or the hate of those in power, were pre-
cisely those which were likely to prove weak or wanting in the
legislative body at such a time.1 And what could be more obnox-
ious in a free government than the exercise of such a power by
a popular body, controlled by a mere majority, fresh from the
contests of exciting elections, and quite too apt, under the most
favorable circumstances, to suspect the motives of their adversa-
ries, and to resort to measures of doubtful propriety to secure
party ends 1
Legislative punishments of this severe character, however, were
not the only ones known to parliamentary history; but there were
others of a milder form, which were only less obnoxious in that
the consequences were less terrible. Those legislative convictions
which imposed punishments less than that of death were called
bills of pains and penalties, as distinguished from bills of attainder;
but the constitutional provisions we have referred to were undoubt-
edly aimed at any and every species of legislative punishment for
criminal or supposed criminal offences; and the term "bill of
attainder" is used in a generic sense, which would include bills
of pains and penalties also.2
1 This was equally true, whether the attainder was at the command of the
king, as in the case of Cardinal Pole's mother, or at the instigation of the popu-
lace, as in the case of Wentworth, Earl of Strafford. The last infliction of capi-
tal punishment in England, under a bill of attainder, was upon Sir John Fenwick,
in the reign of William and Mary. It is worthy of note that in the preceding
reign Sir John had been prominent in the attainder of the unhappy Monmouth.
Macaulay's History of England, c. 5.
* Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 138; Story on Constitution, § 1344; Cummings
v. Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Ex parte Garland, ». 333; Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wal.
601. "I think it will be found that the following comprise those essential ele-
ments of bills of attainder, in addition to those I have already mentioned [which
were that they declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted, so
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* 262 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.
[* 262] * The thoughtful reader will not fail to discover, in the
acts of the American States during the Revolutionary
period, sufficient reason for this constitutional provision, even if
the still more monitory history of the English attainders had not
been so freshly remembered. Some of these acts provided for the
forfeiture of the estates, within the Commonwealth, of those British
subjects who had withdrawn from the jurisdiction because not sat-
isfied that grievances existed sufficiently serious to justify the last
resort of an oppressed people, or because of other reasons not
satisfactory to the existing authorities; and the only investigation
provided for was an inquiry into the desertion. Others mentioned
particular persons by name, adjudged them guilty of adhering to
the enemies of the State, and proceeded to inflict punishment upon
them, so far as the presence of property within the Commonwealth
would enable the government to do so.1 These were the resorts
of a time of extreme peril; and if possible to justify them in a
period of revolution, when every thing was staked on success, and
when the public safety would not permit too much weight to scru-
ples concerning the private rights of those who were not aiding the
popular cause, the power to repeat such acts under any possible
circumstances in which the country could be placed again was felt
to be too dangerous to be left in the legislative hands. So far as
proceedings had been completed under those acts, before the treaty
of 1783, by the actual transfer of property, they remained valid
that it had lost all heritable property], which distinguish them from other legisla-
tion, and which made them so obnoxious to the statesmen who organized our
government: 1. They were convictions and sentences pronounced by the legis-
lative department of the government, instead of the judicial. 2. The sentence
pronounced and the punishment inflicted were determined by no previous law or
fixed rule. S. The investigation into the guilt of the accused, if any such were
made, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his presence or that of his
counsel, and no recognized rule of evidence governed the inquiry." Per Miller,
J., in Ex parte Garland, 4 WaL 388.
1 See Belknap's History of New Hampshire, c. 26; 2 Ramsay's History of
South Carolina, 351; 8 Rhode Island Colonial Records, 609; 2 Arnold's History
of Rhode Island, 360, 449; Thompson r. Carr, 5 N. H. 510; Sleght v. Kane, 2
Johns. Cas. 236; Story on Const. 4th ed. § 1344 note. On the general subject
of bills of attainder, one would do well to consult, in addition to the cases in 4
Wallace, those of Blair v. Ridgeley, 41 Mo. 63 (where it was very elaborately
examined by able counsel); State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 248; Randolph v. Good, 3
W. Va. 551; Ex parte Law, decided by Mr. Justice Erskine, in the United States
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 262
and effectual afterwards; but so far as they were then incomplete,
they were put an end to by that treaty.1
The conviction of the propriety of this constitutional provision
has been so universal, that it has never been questioned, either in
legislative bodies or elsewhere. Nevertheless, cases have recently
arisen, growing out of the attempt to break up and destroy the
government of the United States, in which the Supreme
Court of * the United States has adjudged certain action [* 263]
of Congress to be in violation of this provision and con-
sequently void.2 The action referred to was designed to exclude
District Court of Georgia, May term, 18C6 ; State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570; Beirne
v. Brown, 4 W. Va. 72; Peerce v. Carskadon, ib. 284.
1 Jackson v. Munson, 3 Caines, 137.
s On the 2d of July, 1862, Congress, by "an act to prescribe an oath of
office, and for other purposes," enacted that "hereafter every person elected or
appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United
States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service,
excepting the President of the United States, shall, before entering upon the du-
ties of such office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I, A B,
do solemnly swear or affirm that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the
United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given
no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hos-
tility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted, nor attempted to exercise,
the functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority
in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to
any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution within the United
States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear or affirm that, to the
best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully dis-
charge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God."
On the 24th of January, 1865, Congress passed a supplementary act as follows:
"No person after the date of this act shall be admitted to the bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States, or at any time alter the 4th of March next shall
be admitted to the bar of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or
of the Court of Claims, as an attorney or counsellor of such court, or shall be
allowed to appear and to be beard in any such court, by virtue of any previous
admission, or any special power of attorney, unless he shall have first taken and
subscribed the oath " aforesaid. False swearing, under each of the acts, was made
perjury. See 12 Statutes at Large, 502; 13 ib. 424. In Ex parte Garland, 4
Wal. 333, a majority of the court held the second of these acts void, as partaking
of the nature of a bill of pains and penalties, and also as being an ex post facto
law. The act was looked upon as inflicting a punishment for1 past conduct; the
exaction of the oath being the mode provided for ascertaining the parties upon
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* 263
[CH. IX.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
from practice in the United States courts all persons who had
taken up arras against the government during the recent rebellion,
or who had voluntarily given aid and encouragement to its ene-
mies; and the mode adopted to effect the exclusion was to require
of all persons, before they should be admitted to the bar or allowed
to practise, an oath negativing any such disloyal action. This
decision was not at first universally accepted as sound; and the
Supreme Courts of West Virginia and of the District of Columbia
declined to follow it, insisting that permission to practise in the
courts is not a right, but a privilege, and that the with-
[* 264] holding * it for any reason of State policy or personal
unfitness could not be regarded as the infliction of crim-
inal punishment.1
The Supreme Court of the United States have also, upon the
same reasoning, held a clause in the Constitution of Missouri,
which, among other things, excluded all priests and clergymen
from practising or teaching unless they should first take a similar
oath of loyalty, to be void, overruling in so doing a decision of the
Supreme Court of that State.2
whom the act was intended to operate. See Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wal. 597.
The conclusion declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parte
Garland had been previously reached by Mr. Justice Trigg, of the United States
Circuit Court, in Matter of Baxter; by Mr. Justice Busteed, of the District
Court of Alabama, in Matter of Shorter et al.; and by Mr. Justice Erskine, of
the District Court of Georgia, in Ex parte Law. An elector cannot be ex-
cluded from the right to vote on the ground of being a deserter who has never
been tried and convicted as such. Huber v. Reily, 53 Penn. St. 112; McCafferty
v. Guyer, 59 Penn. St. 109; State v. Sytnonds, 57 Me. 148. See ante, 64, note3.
1 See the cases of Ex parte Magruder, American Law Register, Vol. VI. N. s.
p. 292; and Ex parte Hunter, ib. 410, 2 W. Va. 122; Ex parte Quarrier, 4 W.
Va. 210. See also Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293; Ex parte Yale, 24*Cal. 241.
* Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277. See also the case of State v. Adams,
44 Mo. 570, in which it was held that a legislative act declaring that the board
of curators of St. Charles College had forfeited their office, was of the nature
of a bill of attainder and void. The Missouri oath of loyalty was a very strin-
gent one, and applied to electors, State, county, city, and town officers, officers
in any corporation, public or private, professors and teachers in educational in-
stitutions, attorneys and counsellors, bishops, priests, deacons, ministers, elders,
or other clergymen of any denomination. The Supreme Court of Missouri had
held this provision valid in the following cases: State v. Garesche, 36 Mo. 256,
case of an attorney; State ». Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, case of a minister, reversed
as above stated; State v. Bernoudy, 36 Mo. 279, case of the recorder of St.
Louis; State c. McAdoo, 36 Mo. 452, where it is held that a certificate of elec-
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 264
The same provisions of the national Constitution which we have
cited1 also forbid the passage either by the States or by Congress
of any ex post facto law.
At an early day it was settled by authoritative decision, in oppo-
sition to what might seem the more natural and obvious meaning
of the term ex post facto, that in their scope and purpose these
provisions were confined to laws respecting criminal punishments,
and had no relation whatever to retrospective legislation of any
other description. And it has, therefore, been repeatedly held,
that retrospective laws, when not of a criminal nature, do not
come in conflict with the national Constitution, unless obnoxious
to its provisions on other grounds than their retrospective char-
acter.
"The prohibition in the letter," says Chase, J., in the leading
case,* "is not to pass any law concerning or after the fact; but
the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is
this: that the legislatures of the several States shall not pass laws
after a fact done by a subject or citizen, which shall have relation
to such fact, and punish him for having done it. The pro-
hibition, * considered in this light, is an additional bulwark [* 265]
in favor of the personal security of the subject, to protect
his person from punishment by legislative acts having a retro-
spective operation. I do not think it was inserted to secure the
citizen in his private rights of either property or contracts. The
prohibitions not to make any thing but gold and silver coin a
tender in payment of debts, and not to pass any law impairing
the obligation of contracts, were inserted to secure private rights;
but the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law was to
secure the person of the subject from injury or punishment, in
consequence of such law. If the prohibition against making ex
post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights from being
affected or injured by such law, and the prohibition is suffi-
tion issued to one who failed to take the oath as required by the constitution was
void. In Beirne v. Brown, 4 W. Va. 72, and Peerce p. Carskadon, ib. 234, an
act excluding persons from the privilege of sustaining suits in the courts of the
State, or from proceedings for a rehearing, except upon their taking an oath that
they had never been engaged in hostile measures against the government, was
sustained. And see State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119.
1 Constitution of United States, art. 1, §§ 9 and 10.
* Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
ciently extensive for that object, the other restraints I have enu-
merated were unnecessary, and therefore improper, for both of
them are retrospective.
"I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within
the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that
makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which
was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punish-
ment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in
order to convict the offender. All these and similar laws are
manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true dis-
tinction is between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws.
Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but
every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law; the former
only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights
vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective and is generally
unjust, and may be oppressive; and there is a good general rule,
that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in
which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and
also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commence-
ment; as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly
retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facta
committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within
the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal
[* 266] law; but * only those that create or aggravate the crime,
or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evi-
dence for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an
operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antece-
dent time, or to save time from the statute of limitations, or to
excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the
like, is retrospective. But such acts may be proper and necessary,
as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference
between making an unlawful act lawful, and the making an inno-
cent act criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The expressions
ex post facto are technical; they had been in use long before the
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 266
Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legis-
lators, lawyers, and authors." 1
Assuming this construction of the constitutional provision to be
correct, — and it has been accepted and followed as correct by the
courts ever since, — it would seem that little need be said relative
to the first, second, and fourth classes of ex post facto laws, as
enumerated in the opinion quoted. It is not essential, howevor, in
order to render a law invalid on these grounds, that it should
expressly assume the action to which it relates to be criminal, or
provide for its punishment on that ground. If it shall subject an
individual to a pecuniary penalty for an act which, when done,
involved no responsibility,2 or if it deprives a party of any valuable
right — like the right to follow a lawful calling — for acts which
were innocent, or at least not punishable by law when committed,3
the law will be ex post facto in the constitutional sense, notwith-
standing it does not in terms declare the acts to which the penalty
is attached criminal.4 But how far a law may change the punishment
for a criminal offence, and make the change applicable to
past offences, is certainly a question of great * difficulty, [* 267]
which has been increased by the decisions made concern-
ing it. As the constitutional provision is enacted for the protection
and security of accused parties against arbitrary and oppressive
legislative action, it is evident that any change in the law which
1 See, also, Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.
266; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Pet. 380; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110;
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet 421; Carpenter v. Pennsyl-
vania, 17 How. 463; Camming* v. Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Ex parte Garland,
ib. 333; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; Woart r. Winnick, 3 N. H. 475;
Locke v. Dane, 9 Mass. 363; Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns, 497; Evans v.
Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Tucker v. Harris, 13 Geo. 1; Perry's Case, 8
Grat 632; Municipality No. 1 r. Wheeler, 10 La. An. 745; New Orleans v.
Poutz, 14 La, An. 853. Huber v. Reily, 53 Penn. St. 115.
1 Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean, 212.
'Cnmmings v. Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Ex parte Garland, ib. 333. But a
divorce is not a punishment, and it may therefore be authorized for causes hap-
pening previous to the passage of the divorce act. Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss.
349.
4 The repeal of an amnesty law by a constitutional convention was held to be
a post facto as to the cases covered by the law in State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140.
An act to validate an invalid conviction would be ex post facto. In re Murphy,
1 Woolw. 141.
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* 267 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.
\
goes in mitigation of the punishment is not liable to this objection.1
But what does go in mitigation of the punishment? If the law
makes a fine less in amount, or imprisonment shorter in point of
duration, or relieves it from some oppressive incident, or if it
dispenses with some severable portion of the legal penalty, no
embarrassment would be experienced in reaching a conclusion that
the law was favorable to the accused, and therefore not ex post facto.
But who shall say, when the nature of the punishment is altogether
changed, and a fine is substituted for the pillory, or imprisonment
for whipping, or imprisonment at hard labor for life for the death
penalty, that the punishment is diminished, or at least not increased
by the change made? What test of severity does the law or reason
furnish in these cases? and must the judge decide upon his own
view of the pain, loss, ignominy, and collateral consequences usually
attending the punishment? or may he take into view the peculiar
condition of the accused, and upon that determine whether, in his
particular case, the punishment prescribed by the new law is more
severe than that under the old or not?
In State v. Arlin,2 the respondent was charged with a robbery,
which, under the law as it existed at the time it was committed,
was subject to be punished by solitary imprisonment not exceeding
six months, and confinement for life at hard labor in the State
prison. As incident to this severe punishment, he was entitled by
the same law to have counsel assigned him by the government, to
process to compel the attendance of witnesses, to a copy of his
indictment, a list of the jurors who were to try him, &c. Before
he was brought to trial, the punishment for the offence was reduced
to solitary imprisonment not exceeding six months, and confine-
ment at hard labor in the State prison for not less than seven
nor more than thirty years. By the new act, the court, if they
thought proper, were to assign the respondent counsel, and
[* 268] * furnish him with process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf; and, acting under this discretion,
the court assigned the respondent counsel, but declined to do more;
while the respondent insisted that he was entitled to all the priv-
ileges to which he would have been entitled had the law remained
1 Strong b. State, 1 Blackf. 193; Keen v. State, 3 Chand. 109; Boston v.
Cummins, 16 Geo. 102; Woart e. Winnick, 3 N. H. 473; State v. Arlin, 39
N. H. 180; Clarke r. State, 23 Miss. 261; Maul v. State, 25 Texas, 166.
• 39 N. H. 179.
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 268
unchanged. The court held this claim to be unfounded in the law.
"It is contended," they say, " that, notwithstanding the severity of
the respondent's punishment was mitigated by the alteration of the
statute, he is entitled to the privileges demanded, as incidents to
the offence with which he is charged, at the date of its commission;
in other words, it seems to be claimed, that, by committing the
alleged offence, the respondent acquired a vested right to have
couusel assigned him, to be furnished with process to procure the
attendance of witnesses, and to enjoy all the other privileges to
which he would have been entitled if tried under laws subjecting
him to imprisonment for life upon conviction. This position
appears to us wholly untenable. We have no doubt the privileges
the respondent claims were designed and created solely as inci-
dents of the severe punishment to which his offence formerly
subjected him, and not as incidents of the offence. When the pun-
ishment was abolished, its incidents fell with it; and he might as
well claim the right to be punished under the former law as to be
entitled to the privileges connected with a trial under it." 1
In Strong v. State,2 the plaintiff in error was indicted
and convicted * of perjury, which, under the law as it [* 269]
existed at the time it was committed, was punishable by
not exceeding one hundred stripes. Before the trial, this punish-
ment was changed to imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceed-
ing seven years. The court held this amendatory law not to be ex
1 With great deference it may be suggested whether this case does not over-
look the important circumstance, that the new law, by taking from the accused
that absolute right to defence by counsel, and to the other privileges by which
the old law surrounded the trial, — all of which were designed as securities
•gainst unjust convictions, — was directly calculated to increase the party's peril,
and was in consequence brought within the reason of the rule which holds a law
or post facto which changes the rules of evidence after the fact, so as to make a
less amount or degree sufficient. Could a law be void as ex post facto which
made a party liable to conviction for perjury in a previous oath on the testimony
pf a single witness, and another law unobjectionable on this score which deprived
a party, when put on trial for a previous act, of all the usual opportunities of
exhibiting the facts and establishing his innocence? Undoubtedly, if the party
accused was always guilty, and certain to be convicted, the new law must be
regarded as mitigating the offence; but, assuming every man to be innocent until
he is proved to be guilty, could such a law be looked upon as "mollifying the
rigor" of the prior law, or as favorable to the accused, when its mollifying cir-
cumstance is more than counterbalanced by others of a contrary character?
'1 Blackf. 193.
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* 269 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.
post facto, as applied to the case. "The words ex post facto have a
definite, technical signification. The plain and obvious meaning of
this prohibition is, that the legislature shall not pass any law, after
a fact done by any citizen, which shall have relation to that fact, so
as to punish that which was innocent when done, or to add to the
punishment of that which was criminal, or to increase the malig-
nity of a crime, or to retrench the rules of evidence so as to make
conviction more easy." "Apply this definition to the act uuder
consideration. Does this statute make a new offence? It does not.
Does it increase the malignity of that which was au offence before?
It does not. Does it so change the rules of evidence as to make
conviction more easy? This cannot be alleged. Does it then
increase the punishment of that which was criminal before its
enactment? We think not." 1
So in Texas it has been held that the infliction of stripes, from
the peculiarly degrading character of the punishment, was worse
than the death penalty. "Among all nations of civilized mau,
from the earliest ages, the infliction of stripes has been considered
more degrading than death itself." 2 While, on the other hand, iu
South Carolina, where, at the time of the commission of a forgery,
the punishment was death, but it was changed before final judg-
ment to fine, whipping, and imprisonment, the new law was
applied to the case in passing the sentence.8 These cases illus-
1 Mr. Bishop says of this decision: "But certainly the court went far in this
case." 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, § 219 (108).
* Herber v. State, 7 Texas, 69.
8 State v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418. In Clark v. State, 23 Miss. 261, defendant
was convicted of a mayhem. Between the commission of the act and bis convic-
tion, a statute had been passed, changing the punishment for this offence from
the pillory and a fine to imprisonment in the penitentiary, but providing further,
that " no offence committed, and no penalty and forfeiture incurred previous to
the time when this act shall take effect shall be affected by this act, except that
when any punishment, forfeiture, or penalty should have been mitigated by it,
its provisions should be applied to the judgment to be pronounced for offencei
committed before its adoption." In regard to this statute the court say: "We
think that in every case of offence committed before the adoption of the peni-
tentiary code, the prisoner has the option of selecting the punishment prescribed
in that code in lieu of that to which he was liable before its enactment." Bnt
inasmuch as the record did not show that the defendant claimed a commutation
of his punishment, the court confirmed a sentence imposed according to the terms
of the old law. On this subject, see further the cases of Holt v. State, 2 Texas,
363; Dawson v. State, 6 Texas, 347.
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION OP PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 270
trate * the difficulty of laying down any rule which will [* 270]
be readily and universally accepted as to what is a mitiga-
tion of punishment, where its character is changed, and when from
the very nature of the case there can be no common standard, by
which all minds, however educated, can measure the relative
severity and ignominy.
In Hartung v. People,1 the law providing for the infliction of
capital punishment had been so changed as to require the party
liable to this penalty to be sentenced to confinement at hard labor
in the State prison until the punishment of death should bo
inflicted; and it further provided that such punishment should
not be inflicted under one year, nor until the governor should
issue his warrant for the purpose. The act was evidently designed
for the benefit of parties convicted, and, among other things, to
enable advantage to be taken, for their benefit, of any circumstances
subsequently coming to light which might show the injustice of the
judgment, or throw any more favorable light on the action of the
accused. Nevertheless, the court held the act inoperative as to
offences before committed. "In my opinion," says Denio, J., " it
would be perfectly competent for the legislature, by a general law,
to remit any separable portion of the prescribed punishment. For
instance, if the punishment were fine and imprisonment, a law
which should dispense with either the fine or the imprisonment
might, I think, be lawfully applied to existing offences; and so, in
my opinion, the term of imprisonment might be reduced, or the
number of stripes diminished, in cases punishable in that manner.
Any thing which, if applied to an individual sentence, would fairly
fall within the idea of a remission of a part of the sentence, would
not be liable to objection. And any change which should be refer-
able to prison discipline or penal administration as its primary
object might also be made to take effect upon past as well as future
offences; as changes in the manner or kind of employment of con-
victs sentenced to hard labor, the system of supervision,
the means of restraint, or the like. Changes of this * sort [* 271]
might operate to increase or mitigate the severity of the
punishment of the convict, but would not raise any question under
the constitutional provision we are considering. The change
wrought by the act of 1860, in the punishment of existing offences
1 22 N. Y. 105.
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* 271 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.
of murder, does not fall within either of these exceptions. If it
is to be construed to vest in the governor a discretion to deter
mine whether the convict should be executed or remain a perpet-
ual prisoner at hard labor, this would only be equivalent to what he
might do under the authority to commute a sentence. But he can,
under the Constitution, only do this once for all. If he refuses
the pardon, the convict is executed according to sentence. If be
grants it, his jurisdiction of the case ends. The act in question
places the convict at the mercy of the governor in office at the
expiration of one year from the time of the conviction, and of all
of his successors during the lifetime of the convict. He may be
ordered to execution at any time, upon any notice, or without
notice. Under one of the repealed sections of the Revised Stat-
utes, it was required that a period should intervene between the
sentence and execution of not less than four, nor more than
eight weeks. If we stop here, the change effected by the statute is
between an execution within a limited time, to be prescribed by the
court, or a pardon or commutation of the sentence during that
period, on the one hand, and the placing the convict at the mercy
of the executive magistrate for the time, and his successors, to be
executed at his pleasure at any time after one year, on the other.
The sword is indefinitely suspended over his head, ready to fall at
any time. It is not enough to say, if even that can be said, that
most persons would probably prefer such a fate to the former cap-
ital sentence. It is enough to bring the law within the condem-
nation of the Constitution, that it changes the punishment after
the commission of the offence, by substituting for the prescribed
penalty a different one. We have no means of saying whether
one or the other would be the most severe in a given case. That
would depend upon the disposition and temperament of the con-
vict. The legislature cannot thus experiment upon the criminal
law. The law, moreover, prescribes one year's imprisonment, at
hard labor in the Slate prison, in addition to the punishment of
death. In every case of the execution of a capital sentence, it
must be preceded by the year's imprisonment at hard labop. True,
the concluding part of the punishment cannot be executed
[* 272] * unless the governor concurs by ordering the execution.
But as both parts may, in any given case, be inflicted,
and as the convict is consequently, under this law, exposed to the
double infliction, it is, within both the definitions which have been
[ 306 ] .
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION OP PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 272
mentioned, an ex post facto law. It changes tlie punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment than that which the law annexed to
the crime when committed. It is enough, in my opinion, that it
changes it in any manner except by dispensing with divisible por-
tions of it; but upon the other definition announced by Judge
Chase, where it is implied that the change must be from a less to
a greater punishment, this act cannot be sustained." This decision
has since been several times followed in the State of New York,1
and it must now be regarded as the settled law of that State, that
"a law changing the punishment for offences committed before its
passage is ex post facto and void, under the Constitution, unless the
change consists in the remission of some separable part of the pun-
ishment before prescribed, or is referable to prison discipline or
penal administration as its primary object."2 And this rule seems
to U3 a sound and sensible one, with perhaps this single qualifica-
tion, — that the substitution of any other punishment for that of
death must be regarded as a mitigation of the penalty.8
But so far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party
has no more right, in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist
that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the
act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. Remedies
must always be under the control of the legislature, and it would
create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to
be conducted only in accordance with the rules of practice, and
heard only by the courts, in existence when its facts arose. The
legislature may abolish courts and create new ones, and it may
prescribe altogether different modes of procedure in its discretion,
though it cannot lawfully, we think, in so doing, dispense with
any of those substantial protections with which the existing law
surrounds the person accused of crime. A law giving the govern-
ment additional challenges,4 and another which authorized
* the amendment of indictments,6 have both been sus- [* 273]
1 Shepherd v. People, 25 N.Y. 406; Ratzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124; Kuck-
ler v. People, 6 Park. Cr. Rep. 212.
'Per Davia, J., in Ratzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124.
'See 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, § 219 (108).
'Walston v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Monr. 15; State e. Ryan, 13 Minn. 370;
State c. Wilson, 48 N. H. 398; Commonwealth e. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412.
1 State v. Manning, 14 Texas, 402; Lasure v. State, 19 Ohio, n. s. 43. See
State v. Corson, 59 Me. 137. The defendant in any case must be proceeded
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tained as applicable to past transactions, as any similar law.
tending only to improve the remedy, but working no injustice to
the defendant, and depriving him of no substantial right, doubt-
less would be.
And a-law is not objectionable as ex'post facto which, in provid-
ing for the punishment of future offences, authorizes the offender's
conduct in the past to be taken into the account, and the punish-
ment to be graduated accordingly. Heavier penalties are often
provided by law for a second or any subsequent offence than for
the first; and it has not been deemed objectionable that, in pro-
viding for such heavier penalties, the prior conviction authorized
to be taken into the account may have taken place before the law
was passed.1 In such case, it is the second or subsequent offence
that is punished, not the first;2 and the act would be void if the
offence to be actually punished had been committed before it had
taken effect, even though it was after its passage.3
Lawn impairing the Obligation of Contracts.
The Constitution of the United States also forbids the Statea
passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.4 It is
remarkable that this very important clause was passed over
against and punished under the law in force when the proceeding is had. State
c. Williams, 2 Rich. 418; Keene v. State, 2 Chand. 109; People v. 'Phelps, 5
Wend. 9; Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 738. A law is not unconstitutional
which precludes a defendant in a criminal case from taking advantage of vari-
ances which do not prejudice him. Commonwealth v. Hall, 97 Mass. 570. Nor
one which, though passed after the commission of the offence, authorizes a
change of venue to another county of the judicial district. Gut v. State, 9
Wal. 35- Nor one which gives the government a right to additional challenges.
Walston v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Monr. 15; State r. Ryan, 13 Minn. 870; State
v. Wilson, 48 N. H. 398; Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 108 Mass. 412. Nor one,
it seems, which requires an oath of past loyalty of voters. Blain r. Ridgeley,
41 Mo. 63; State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119: Contra, Green v. Shumway, 39 N. Y.
418. And see cases cited, ante, 64, note 3. But a statute providing that the
rule of law precluding a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accom-
plice should not apply to cases of misdemeanor, it was held could not have
retrospective operation. Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32.
1 Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 788; Ross's Case, 2 Pick. 165; People r.
Butler, 3 Cow. 847.
* Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 788.
■ Riley's Case, 2 Pick. 172.
4 Const, art 1, § 10.
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 273
almost without comment during the discussions preceding the
adoption of that instrument, though since its adoption no clause
which the Constitution contains has been more prolific of litiga-
tion, or given rise to more animated and at times angry contro-
versy. It is but twice alluded to in the papers of the Federalist;1
and though its great importance is assumed, it is evident that the
writer had no conception of the prominence it was afterwards to
hold in constitutional discussions, or of the very numerous cases
to which it was to be applied in practice.
The first question that arises under this provision is,
What is a * contract in the sense in which the word is [* 274]
here employed? In the leading case upon this subject,
it appeared that the legislature of Georgia had made a grant of
land, but afterwards, on an allegation that the grant had been
obtained by fraud, a subsequent legislature had passed another
act annulling and rescinding the first conveyance, and asserting
the right of the State to the laud it covered. "A contract," says
Ch. J. Marshall, " is a compact between two or more parties, and
is either executory or executed. An executory contract is one in
which a party binds himself to do or not to do a particular thing.
Such was the law under which the conveyance was made by the
governor. A contract executed is one in which the object of
the contract is performed; and this, says Blackstone, diners in
nothing from a grant. The contract between Georgia and the
purchasers was executed by the grant. A contract executed,
as well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding
on the parties. A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extin-
guishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a contract not
to reassert that right. A party is, therefore, always estopped by
his own grant. Since then, in fact, a grant is a contract exe-
cuted, the obligation of which still continues, and since the Con-
stitution uses the general term 'contract,' without distinguishing
between those which are executory and those which are executed,
it must be construed to comprehend the latter as well as the
former. A law annulling conveyances between individuals, and
declaring that the grantors should stand seized of their former
estates, notwithstanding those grants, would be as repugnant to
the Constitution as a law discharging the vendors of property from
1 Federalist, Nos. 7 and 44.
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the obligation of executing their contracts by conveyances. It
would be strange if a contract to convey was secured by the Con-
stitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected.
If, under a fair construction of the Constitution, grants are com-
prehended under the term 'contracts,' is a grant from the State
excluded from the operation of the provision? Is the clause to
be considered as inhibiting the State from impairing the obligation
of contracts between two individuals, but as excluding from that
inhibition contracts made with itself? The words themselves con-
tain no such distinction. They are general, and are applicable to
contracts of every description. If contracts made with the State
are to be exempted from their operations, the exception
[* 275] must arise from the character of * the contracting party,
not from the words which are employed." And the court
proceed to give reasons for their decision, that violence should not
"be done to the natural meaning of words, for the purpose of leav-
ing to the legislature the power of seizing, for public use, the estate
of an individual, in the form of a law annulling the title by which
he holds that estate."1
It will be seen that this leading decision settles two important
points: first, that an executed contract is within the provision,
and second, that it protects from violation the contracts of States
equally with those entered into between private individuals.2 And
1 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 183.
* This decision has been repeatedly followed. In the founding of the Colony
of Virginia, the religious establishment of England was adopted, and before the
Revolution the churches of that denomination had become vested, by grants of
the crown or Colony, with large properties, which continued in their possession
after the constitution of the State had forbidden the creation or continuance of
any religious establishment, possessed of exclusive rights or privileges, or the
compelling the citizens to worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay
taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously believe. By statute in
1801, the legislature asserted their right to all the property of the Episcopal
churches in the respective parishes of the State; and, among other things,
directed and authorized the overseers of the poor and their successors in each
parish, wherein any glebe land was vacant or should become so, to sell the same
and appropriate the proceeds to the use of the poor of the parish. By this act,
it will be seen, the State sought in effect to resume grants made by the sover-
eignty, — a practice which had been common enough in English history, and of
which precedents were not wanting in the history of the American Colonies.
The Supreme Court of the United States held the grant not revocable, and that
the legislative act was therefore unconstitutional and void. Terrett v. Taylor, 9
[310]
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it has since been held that compacts between two States are in
like manner protected.1 These decisions, however, do not
fully * determine what under all circumstances is to be [* 276]
regarded as a contract. A grant of land by a State is a
contract, because in making it the State deals with the purchaser
precisely as any other vendor might; and if its mode of convey-
ance is any different, it is only because by virtue of its sover-
eignty, it has power to convey by other modes than those which
the general law opens to private individuals. But many things
done by the State may seem to hold out promises to individuals,
which after all cannot be treated as contracts without hampering
the legislative power of the State in a manner that would soon
leave it without the means of performing its essential functions.
The State creates offices, and appoints persons to fill them; it
establishes municipal corporations, with large and valuable privi-
leges for its citizens; by its general laws it holds out inducements
to immigration; it passes exemption laws, and laws for the en-
couragement of trade and agriculture; and under all these laws
a greater or less number of citizens expect to derive profit and
emolument. But can these laws be regarded as contracts between
the State and the officers and corporations who are, or the cit-
Cranch, 43. See also Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 335; People v.
Piatt, 17 Johns. 195; Montgomery v. Kasson, 16 Cal. 189; Grogan v. San
Francisco, 18 Cal. 590; Rehobotb p. Hunt, 1 Pick. 224; Lowry v. Francis,
2 Yerg. 534; University of North Carolina t>. Foy, 2 Havw. 810; State v.
Barker, 4 Kansas, 379 and 435. The lien of a bondholder, who has loaned
money to the State on a pledge of property by legislative act, cannot be divested
or postponed by a subsequent legislative act. Wabash, &c, Co. v. Beers, 2
Black, 448.
1 On the separation of Kentucky from Virginia, a compact was entered into
between the proposed new and the old State, by which it was agreed "that all
private grants and interests of lands, within the said district, derived from the
laws of Virginia, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed
State, and shall be determined by the laws now existing in this State." After
the admission of the new State to the Union, " occupying claimant" laws were
passed by its legislature, such as were not in existence in Virginia, and by the
force of which, under certain circumstances, the owner might be deprived of his
title to land, unless he would pay the value of lasting improvements made upon
it by an adverse claimant. These acts were also held void; the compact was
held inviolable under the Constitution, and it was deemed no objection to its
binding character, that its effect was to restrict, in some directions, the legislative
power of the State entering into it. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1. See also
Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457.
[ 311 ]
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izens of the State who expect to be, benefited by their passage, so
as to preclude their being repealed?
On these points it would seem that there could be no difficulty.
When the State employs officers or creates municipal corporations
as the mere agencies of government, it must have the power
to discontinue the agency whenever it comes to be regarded as
no longer important. "The framers of the Constitution did not
intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil
institutions, adopted for internal government." 1 They may,
therefore, discontinue offices and abolish or change the organi-
zation of municipal corporations at any time, according to the
existing legislative view of state policy, unless forbidden
[*277 ] by their own constitutions from doing so.2 And * although
municipal corporations, as respects the property which
1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629, per Marshall, Ch. J.
'Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Warner v. People, 2 Denio, 272;
Commonwealth 8. Bacon, 6 S. & R. 322; Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W. & S.
418; Conner v. New York, 2 Sandf. 355, and 5 N. Y. 285; Wilcox v. Rodman,
46 Mo. 323; State v. Douglass, 26 Wis. 428; Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103;
Robinson t>. White, 26 Ark. 139; Alexander v. McKenzie, 2 S. C. (n. s.) 81.
Compare People v. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 302. "Where an
office is created by statute, it is wholly within the control of the legislature. The
term, the mode of appointment, and the compensation may be altered at pleasure,
and the latter may be even taken away without abolishing the office. Such
extreme legislation is not to be deemed probable in any case. But we are now
discussing the legislative power, not its expediency or propriety. Having the
power, the legislature will exercise it for the public good, and it is the sole judge
of the exigency which demands its interference." Per Sandford, J., 2 Sandf. 369.
"The selection of officers who are nothing more than public agents for the effect-
uating of public purposes is matter of public convenience or necessity, and so,
too, are the periods for the appointment of such agents; but neither the one nor
the other of these arrangements can constitute any obligation to continue such
agents, or to reappoint them, after the measures which brought them into being
shall have been found useless, shall have been fulfilled, or shall have been abrogated
as even detrimental to the well-being of the public. The promised compensation
for services actually performed and accepted, during the continuance of the par-
ticular agency, may undoubtedly be claimed, both upon principles of compact and
of equity; but to insist beyond this upon the perpetuation of a public policy
either useless or detrimental, and upon a reward for acts neither desired nor per-
formed, would appear to be reconcilable with neither common justice nor common
sense." Daniel, J., in 10 How. 416. See also Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Penn.
St. 49; Standiford v. Wingate, 2 Duv. 443; Taft v. Adams, 3 Gray, 126;
Walker v. Peellc, 18 Ind. 264; People v. Haskell, 5 Cal. 357 ; Territory v. Pyle,
1 Oregon, 149; Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538. But if the term of an office is
[312]
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION OP PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 277
they hold, control, and manage for the benefit of their citizens,
are governed by the same rules and subject to the same liabilities
as individuals, yet this property, so far as it has been derived from
the State, or obtained by the exercise of the ordinary powers of
government, must be held subject to control by the State, but
under the restriction only, that it is not to be appropriated to uses
foreign to those for which it has been acquired. And the fran-
chises conferred upon such a corporation, for the benefit of its
citizens, must be liable to be resumed at any time by that author-
ity which may mould the corporate powers at its will, or even
revoke them altogethep. The greater power will comprehend the
less.1 If, however, a grant is made to a municipal corpo-
ration * charged with a trust in favor of an individual, [* 278]
fixed by the Constitution, the legislature cannot remove the officer— except as
that instrument may allow — either directly, or indirectly by abolishing the
office. People v. Dubois, 23 1ll. 547; State v. Messmore, 14 Wis. 163; Com-
monwealth v. Gamble, 62 Penn. St. 343; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 422; Lowe v. Com-
monwealth, 3 Met. Ky. 240. Compare Christy p. Commissioners, 39 Cal. 3.
Nor can the legislature take from a constitutional officer a portion of the charac-
teristic duties belonging to the office and devolve them upon an office of its own
creation. State v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 413; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 84, disapproving State
p. Dews, R. M. Charl. 397. Compare People v. Raymond, 37 N. Y. 428;
King v. Hunder, 65 N. C. 603; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 754. As to control of munic-
ipal corporations, see further, Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Bradford v.
Cary, 5 Greenl. 339; Bush p. Shipman, 4 Scam. 186; Trustees, &p. p. Tatman,
13 1ll. 27; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 558;
People v. Banvard, 27 Cal. 470; ante, p. 8.
1 In East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 533, Mp. Justice Wood-
bury, in speaking of the grant of a ferry franchise to a municipal corporation,
says: "Our opinion is. . . . that the parties to this grant did not by their
charter stand in the attitude towards each other of making a contract by it, such
as is contemplated by the Constitution, and as could not be modified by subse-
quent legislation. The legislature was acting here on the one part, and public
municipal and political corporations on the othep. They were acting, too, in
relation to a public object, being virtually a highway across the river, over
another highway up and down the rivep. From this standing and relation of
these parties, and from the subject-matter of their action, we think that the
doings of the legislature as to this ferry must be considered rather as public laws
than as contracts. They related to public interests. They changed as those
interests demanded. The grantees, likewise, the towns, being mere organizations
for public purposes, were liable to have their public powers, rights, and duties
modified or abolished at any moment by the legislature. They are incorporated
for public, and not private objects. They are allowed to hold privileges or prop-
erty only for public purposes. The members are not shareholders nor joint part-
[313]
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[* 279] private corporation, * or charity, the interest which the
cestui que trust has under the grant may sustain it
ners in any corporate estate, which they can sell or devise to others, or which
can be attached and levied on for their debts. Hence, generally, the doings
between them and the legislature are in the nature of legislation rather than com-
pact, and subject to all the legislative conditions just named, and therefore to be
considered not violated by subsequent legislative changes. It is hardly possible
to conceive the grounds on which a different result could be vindicated, without
destroying all legislative sovereignty, and checking most legislative improvements,
as well as supervision over its subordinate public bodies." A different doctrine
was advanced by Mr. Justice Sarculo, in Benson v. Mayor, &c, of New York,
10 Barb. 234, who cites in support of his opinion, that ferry grants to the city of
New York could not be taken away by the legislature, what is said by Chancellor
Kent (2 Kent's Com. 275), that " public corporations. . . . may be empowered
to take and hold private property for municipal uses; and such property is
invested with the security of other private rights. So corporate franchises,
attached to public corporations, are legal estates, coupled with an interest, and
are protected as private property." This is true in a general sense, and it is also
true that, in respect to such property and franchises, the same rules of responsi-
bility are to be applied as in the case of individuals. Bailey v. Mayor, &c, of
New York, 3 Hill, 531. But it does not follow that the legislature, under its
power to administer the government, of which these agencies are a part, and for
the purposes of which the grant has been made, may not at any time modify the
municipal powers and privileges, by transferring the grant to some other agency,
or revoking it when it seems to have become unimportant. In People v. Power,
25 111. 190, Breese, J., in speaking of a law which provided that three-fourths of
the taxes collected in the county of Sangamon, with certain deductions, should
be paid over to the city of Springfield, which is situated therein, says: "While
private corporations are regarded as contracts, which the legislature cannot con-
stitutionally impair, as the trustee of the public interests it has the exclusive and
unrestrained control over public corporations; and as it may create, so it may
modify or destroy, as public exigency requires or the public interests demand.
Coles v. Madison County, Breese, 115. Their whole capacities, powers, and
duties are derived from the legislature, and subordinate to that power. If, then,
the legislature can destroy a county, they can destroy any of its parts, and take
from it any one of its powers. The revenues of a county are not the property
of the county, in the sense in which revenue of a private person or corporation
is regarded. The whole State has an interest in the revenue of a county, and
for the public good the legislature must have the power to direct its application.
The power conferred upon a county to raise a revenue by taxation is a political
power, and its application when collected must necessarily be within the control
of the legislature for political purposes. The act of the legislature nowhere pro-
poses to take from the county of Sangamon, and give to the city of Springfield,
any property belonging to the county, or revenues collected for the use of the
county. But if it did, it would not be objectionable. But, on the contrary, it
proposes alone to appropriate the revenue which may be collected by the county,
by taxes levied on property both in the city and county, in certain proportions
[314]
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION OP PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 279
against legislative revocation, a vested equitable interest being
property in the same sense and entitled to the same protection as
a legal.1
Those charters of incorporation, however, which are granted, not
as a part of the machinery of the government, but for the private
benefit or purposes of the corporators, stand upon a different foot-
ing, and are held to be contracts between the legislature and the
corporators, having for their consideration the liabilities and duties
which the corporators assume by accepting them; and the grant
of the franchise can no more be resumed by the legislature, or its
benefits diminished or impaired without the consent of the grantees,
than any other grant of property or valuable thing, unless the right
to do so is reserved in the charter itself.2
ratably to the city and county." And see Bush v. Shipman, 4 Scam. 190; Rich-
land County v. Lawrence County, 12 1ll. 1; Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52
Penn. St. 374; Guilford p. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615, and 13 N. Y.
143; ante, 235-239, and cases cited.
1 See Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292, and Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch,
43. The municipal corporation holding property or rights in trust might even
be abolished without affecting the grant; but the Court of Chancery might be
empowered to appoint a new trustee to take charge of the property, and to exe-
cute the trust. Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12.
* Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519; Trustees of Vincennes
University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268; Planters Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Piqua
Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Binghampton Bridge Case, 3 Wal. 51; Norris v.
Trustees of Abingdon Academy, 7 G. & J. 7; Grammar School v. Burt, 11 Vt.
632; Brown p. Hummel, 6 Penn. St. 86 ; State v. Heyward, 3 Rich. 389; People
r. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351; Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Penn. St. 133;
Commercial Bank of Natchez v. State, 14 Miss. 599; Backus v. Lebanon, 11
X.H. 19; Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 225; Bridge Co.
v. Hoboken Co., 2 Beas. 81; Miners Bank p. United States, 1 Greene (Iowa),
553; Edwards p. Jagers, 19 Ind. 407; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Bruffet v.
G. W. R.R. Co., 25 1ll. 353; People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co.,
9 Mich. 285; Bank of the State p. Bank of Cape Fear, 13 Ired. 75; Mills p.
Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wal. 10; Wales p. Stetson, 2
Mass. 146; Nichols v. Bertram, 3 Pick. 342; King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass.
447; State v. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. 30; Central Bridge v. Lowell, 15 Gray,
106; Bank of the Dominion v. McVeigh, 20 Grat. 457. The mere passage of an
act of incorporation, however, does not make the contract; and it may be repealed
prior to a full acceptance by the corporators. Mississippi Society v. Musgrove,
44 Miss. 820; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 723. It is under the protection of the decision I
in the Dartmouth College Case that the most enormous and threatening powers in 1
our country have been created; some of the great and wealthy corporations
actually having greater influence in the country at large and upon the legislation
of the country than the States to which they owe their corporate existence. I
[315]
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* 280 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.
[* 280] * Perhaps the most interesting question which arises in
this discussion is, whether it is competent for the legislat-
ure to so bind up its-own hands by a grant as topreclude it from
exercising for the future any of the essential attributes of sover-
eignty in regard to any of the subjects within its jurisdiction;
whether, for instance, it can agree that it will not exercise the
power of taxation, or the police power of the State, or the right
of eminent domain, as to certain specified property or persons;
and whether if it shall undertake to do so, the agreement is not
void on the general principle that the legislature cannot diminish
the power of its successors by irrepealable legislation, and that any
other rule might cripple and eventually destroy the government
itself. If the legislature has power to do this, it is certainly a very
dangerous power, exceedingly liable to abuse, and may possibly
come in time to make the constitutional provision in question as
prolific of evil as it ever has been, or is likely to be, of good.
So far as the power of taxation is concerned, it has been so often
Every privilege granted or right conferred — no matter by what means or on
what pretence — being made inviolable by the Constitution, the government
is frequently found stripped of its authority in very important particulars, by
unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation; and a clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion, whose purpose was to preclude the repudiation of debts and just contracts,
protects and perpetuates the evil. To guard against such calamities in the fut-
ure, it is customary now for the people in framing their constitutions to forbid
the granting of corporate powers except subject to amendment and repeal; but
the improvident grants of an early day are beyond their reach.
In Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 561, Pearson, J., states the difference between
the acts of incorporation of public and private corporations as follows: "The
substantial distinction is this. Some corporations are created by the mere will
of the legislature, there being no other party interested or concerned. To this
party a portion of the power of the legislature is delegated, to be exercised for
the general good, and subject at all times to be modified, changed, or annulled.
Other corporations are the result of contract. The legislature is not the only
party interested; for, although it has a public purpose ta be accomplished, it
chooses to <lo it by the instrumentality of a second party. These two parties
make a contract. The legislature, for and in consideration of certain labor and
outlay of money, confers upon the party of the second part the privilege of being
a corporation, with certain power and capacities. The expectation of benefit to
the public is the moving consideration on one side, that of expected remuneration
for the outlay is the consideration on the other. It is a contract, and therefore
cannot be modified, changed, or annulled, without the consent of both parties."
An incorporated academy, whose endowment comes exclusively from the public,
is a public corporation. Dart v. Houston, 22 Geo. 506. Compare State v.
Adams, 44 Mo. 570.
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION OP PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 280
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, though not
without remonstrance on the part of State courts,1 that an agree-
ment by a State, for a consideration received or supposed to be
received, that certain property, rights, or franchises shall be
exempt from taxation, or be taxed only at a certain * agreed [* 281]
rate, is a contract protected by the Constitution, that the
question can no longer be considered an open one.2 In any case,
however, there must be a consideration, so that the State can be
supposed to have received a beneficial equivalent; for it is con-
ceded on all sides that if the exemption is made as a privilege
only, it may be revoked at any time.8
'Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Debolt, 1 Ohio, N. 8. 691; Toledo Bank v.
Bond, ib. 622; Knoop v. Piqua Bank, ib. 603; Milan and R. Plank Road Co. v.
Husted, 3 Ohio, n. s. 578; Piscataqua Bridge v. N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. C9;
Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 143; Backus o. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 24; Thorpe v.
R. & B. R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140; Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 410; Mott
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 30 Penn. St. 9; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v.
East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Miller in Washington University ». Rouse, 8 Wal. 441, in which the Chief Jus-
tice and Justice Field concurred. Also Raleigh, &c, R.R. Co. v. Reid, 64
N. C. 155.
* New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court,
3 How. 133; Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Life and Trust Co. v.
Debolt, ib. 416; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mechanics and Traders
Bank r. Debolt, 18 How. 380; Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Thomas, ib.
384; McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wal. 143; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wal.
430; Washington University v. Rouse, t'6. 431; Wilmington R.R. Co. v. Reid,
13 Wal. 264; Raleigh and Gaston R.R. Co. v. Reid, ib. 269. See also Atwater
». Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223; Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335; Parker v.
Redfield, 10 Conn. 495; Landon v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 251; Herrick c. Ran-
dolph, 13 Vt. 525; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 751; O'Donnell v. Bailey, 24
Miss. 386; St. Paul, &c, R.R. Co. v. Parcher, 14 Minn. 297.
a Christ's Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; Brainard v. Colchester, 31
Conn. 410. See also Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 442; Dole t>. The
Governor, 3 Stew. 387. If an exemption from taxation exists in any case, it
must be the result of a deliberate intention to relinquish this prerogative of
sovereignty, distinctly manifested. Easton Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Penn.
St. 460; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 561; Christ Church r. Philadel-
phia, 24 How. 302; Oilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 513; Herrick v. Randolph,
13 Vt. 531; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259;
s. c. 13 Wal. 373; People e. Roper, 25 N. Y. 629; People v. Commissioners of
Taxes, 47 N. Y. 501; Lord t. Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116; s. C. 4 Am. Rep. 41;
Erie Railway Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Penn. St. 84; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 351;
Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 667; 8. c. 3 Am. Rep. 809; North Missouri R.R.
Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490; 8. c. 8 Am. Rep. 141.
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* 281 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.
\
The power of the legislature to preclude itself in any case from
exercising the power of eminent domain is not so plainly decided.
It must be conceded, under the authorities, that the State may
grant exclusive franchises, — like the right to construct the only
railroad which shall be built between certain termini; or the only
bridge which shall be permitted over a river between specified
limits; or to own the only ferry which shall be allowed at a cer-
tain point,1 — but the grant of an exclusive privilege will not pre-
vent the legislature from exercising the power of eminent domain
in respect thereto. Franchises, like every other thing of value,
and in the nature of property, within the State, are subject to this
power, and any of their incidents may be taken away, or them-
selves altogether annihilated by means of its exercise.2 And it is
believed that an express agreement in the charter, that the power
of eminent domain should not be so exercised as to impair or affect
the franchise granted, if not void as an agreement beyond the
power of the legislature to make, must be considered as only a
valuable portion of the privilege secured by the grant, and as such
liable to be appropriated under the power of emiuent
[* 282] domain. The exclusiveness * of the grant, and the agree-
ment against interference with it, if valid, constitute
elements in its value to be taken into account in assessing com-
pensation; but appropriating the franchise in such a case no more
violates the obligation of the contract than does the appropriation
of land which the State has granted under an express or implied
agreement for quiet enjoyment by the grantee, but which never-
theless may be taken when the public need requires. All grants
are subject to this implied condition; and it may well be worthy
of inquiry, whether the agreement that a franchise granted shall
not afterwards be appropriated can have any other or greater
force than words which would make it an exclusive franchise, but
which, notwithstanding, would not preclude a subsequent grant
1 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446, and 6 How. 507; Binghampton
Bridge Case, 8 Wal. 51; Shorter v. Smith, 9 Geo. 529; Piscataqua Bridge c.
N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. 85; Boston Water Power Co. o. Boston and Worcester
R.R. Co., 23 Pick. 360; Boston and Lowell R.R. v. Salem and Lowell R.R.,
2 Gray, 9; Costar r. Brash, 25 Wend. 628; California Telegraph Co. v. Alta
Telegraph Co., 22 Cal. 398.
* Matter of Kerr, 42 Barb. 119; Endfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford and
N. H. R.R. Co., 17 Conn. 40, 454; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446,
and 6 How. 607.
[318]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
01
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 282
on making compensation.1 The words of the grant are as much
in the way of the grant of a conflicting franchise in the one case
as in the other.
It has also been intimated in a very able opinion that
the * police power of the State could not be alienated even [* 283]
by express grant.2 And this opinion is supported by those
1 Mr. Greenleaf, in a note to his edition of Cruise on Real Property, Vol. II.
p. 67, says upon this subject: "In regard to the position that the grant of the
franchise of a ferry, bridge, turnpike, or railroad, is in its nature exclusive, so
that the State cannot interfere with it by the creation of another similar franchise,
tending materially to impair its value, it is with great deference submitted that
an important distinction should be observed between those powers of government
which are essential attributes of sovereignty, indispensable to be always pre-
served in full vigor, such as the power to create revenues for the public purposes,
to provide for the common defence, to provide safe and convenient ways for the
public necessity and convenience, and to take private property for public uses,
and the like, and those powers which are not thus essential, such as the power
to alienate the lands and other property of the State, and to make contracts of
service, and &f purchase and sale, or the like. Powers of the former class are
essential to the constitution of society, as without them no political community
can well exist; and necessity requires that they should continue unimpaired.
They are intrusted to the legislature to be exercised, not to be bartered away;
anil it is indispensable that each legislature should assemble with the same
measure of sovereign power which was held by its predecessors. Any act of the
legislature disabling itself from the future exercise of powers intrusted to it for
the public good must be void, being in effect a covenant to desert its paramount
duty to the whole people. It is therefore deemed not competent for a legislat-
ure to covenant that it will not, under any circumstances, open another avenue
for the public travel within certain limits, or in a certain term of time; such
covenant being an alienation of sovereign powers, and a violation of public duty."
See also Redfield on Railways (3d ed.), Vol. I. p. 258. That the intention to
relinquish the right of eminent domain is not to be presumed in any legislative
grant, see People v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 32 Barb. 113; Illinois and
Michigan Canal v. Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Co., 14 111. 321.
!" We think the power of the legislature to control existing railways in this
respect may be found in the general control over the police of the country, which
resides in the law-making power in all free States, and which is, by the fifth arti-
cle of the Bill of Rights in this State, expressly declared to reside perpetually
and inalienably in the legislature, which is, perhaps, no more than the enuncia-
tion of a general principle applicable to all free states, and which cannot there-
fore be violated so as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by express
grant, to any mere public or private corporation. And when the regulation of
the police of a city or town, by general ordinances, is given to such cities or
towns, and the regulation of their own internal police is given to railroads, to be
carried into effect by their by-laws and other regulations, it is, of course, always,
is all such cases, subject to the superior control of the legislature. That is a
[819]
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cases where it has been held that licenses to make use of property
in certain modes may be revoked by the State, notwithstanding
they may be connected with grants and based upon a considera-
tion.1 But this subject we shall recur to hereafter.
It would seem, therefore, to be the prevailing opinion, and one
based upon sound reason, that the State could not barter away,
or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of those essential
powers which are inherent in all governments, and the existence
of which in full vigor is important to the well-being of organized
society; and that any contracts to that end, being without author-
ity, cannot be enforced under the provision of the national Con-
stitution now under consideration. If the tax cases are to be
regarded as an exception to this statement, the exception is per-
haps to be considered a nominal rather than a real one, since
taxation is for the purpose of providing the State a revenue, and
the State laws which have been enforced as contracts in these
case have been supposed to be based upon consideration,
[* 284] * by which the State receives the benefit which would have
accrued from an exercise of the relinquished power in the
ordinary mode.
responsibility which legislatures cannot divest themselves of, if they would.''
Thorpe r. R. & B. R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 149, per Redfiehl, Ch. J. See also Indian-
apolis, &c, R.R. Co. v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84; Ohio, &c., R.R. Co. v. M'Clel-
land, 25 111. 140. See State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189, on the same subject. In
Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 367; s. C. 3 Am. Rep. 309, it was decided that a
provision in a city charter that, after the first improvement of a street, repairs
should be made at the expense of the city, was not a contract; and on its repeal
a lot owner, who had paid for the improvement, might have his lot assessed for
the repairs. Compare Hamraett o. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146; s. c. 3 Am.
Rep. 615.
1 See, upon this subject, Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c, of New
York, 5 Cow. 538; Vanderbilt r. Adams, 7 Cow. 349; State t>. Sterling. 8 Mo.
697; Him v. State, 1 Ohio, N. s. 15; Calder v. Kurby, 6 Gray, 597; Brimmer
o. Boston, 102 Mass. 19. Whether a State, after granting licenses to sell liquors
for which a fee is received, can revoke them by a general law forbidding sales, is
in dispute upon the authorities. See Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo. 606; State v.
Sterling, ib. 697; Calder ». Kurby, 5 Gray, 59*; Metropolitan Board of Ex-
cise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; and Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70,
which hold that it may: and State v. Phalen, 3 Harr. 441; Adams v. Hackett, 7
Fost. 294; and Boyd r. State, 46 Ala., which are contra. See also State t\
Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389. If it has the power, it would seem an act of bad faith to
exercise it, without refunding the money received for the license. Hirn v. State,
1 Ohio, n. s. 21.
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 284
We have said in another place that citizens have no vested right
in the existing general laws of the State which can preclude their
amendment or repeal, and that there is no implied promise on the
part of the State to protect its citizens against incidental injury
occasioned by changes in the law. Nevertheless there may be
laws which amount to propositions on the part of the State, which,
if accepted by individuals, will become binding contracts. Of this
class are perhaps to be considered bounty laws, by which the State
promises the payment of a gratuity to any one who will do any
particular act supposed to be for the State interest. Unquestion-
ably the State may repeal such an act at any time;1 but when
the proposition has been accepted by the performance of the act
before the law is repealed, the contract would seem to be com-
plete, and the promised gratuity becomes a legal debt.2 And
where a State was owner of the stock of a bank, and by the law
its bills and notes were to be received in payment of all debts
due to the State, it was properly held that this law constituted a
contract with those who should receive the bills before its repeal,
and that a repeal of the law could not deprive these holders of the
right which it assured. Such a law, with the acceptance of the
bills under it, " comes within the definition of a contract. It is
a contract founded upon a good and valuable consideration,—
a consideration beneficial to the State, as its profits are increased
by sustaining the credit, and consequently extending the circula-
tion of the paper of the bank."3
That laws permitting the dissolution of the contract of mar-
riage are not within the intention of the clause of the Constitution
under discussion seems to be the prevailing opinion.4 It has been
intimated, however, that, so far as property rights are concerned,
the contract must stand on the same footing as any other, and that
a law passed after the marriage, vesting the property in the wife for
1 Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co.
r. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 82, and 13 Wall. 373.
* People p. Auditor-General, 9 Mich. 327. See Montgomery v. Kasson, 16
Cal. 189; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480.
'Woodruff o. Trapnall, 10 How. 190. See Winter v. Jones, 10 Geo. 190;
Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44; Antoni v. Wright, 22 Grat. 833.
4 Per Marshall, Ch. J., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629;
Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 183; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 385; Cronise v.
Cronise, 54 Penn. St. 255; Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss. 349; Adams v. Palmer,
51 Me. 480.
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* 284 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.
her sole use, would be void, as impairing the obligation of
[* 285] contracts.1 * But certainly there is no such contract em-
braced in the marriage as would prevent the legislature
changing the law, and vesting in the wife solely all property
which she should acquire thereafter; and if the property had
already become vested in the husband, it would be protected in
him, against legislative transfer to the wife, on other grounds than
the one here indicated.
"The obligation of a contract" it is said, " consists in its bind-
ing force on the party who makes it. This depends upon the laws
in existence when it is made; these are necessarily referred to
in all contracts, and forming a part of them as the measure of
the obligation to perform them by the one party, and the right
acquired by the other. There can be no other standard by which
to ascertain the extent of either, than that which the terms of the
contract indicate, according to their settled legal meaning; when
it becomes consummated, the law defines the duty and the right,
compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and gives
the other a right to enforce the performance by the remedies then
in force. If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty, or to
impair the right, it necessarily bears on the obligation of the con-
tract, in favor of one party, to the injury of the other; hence any
law which, in its operations, amounts to a denial or obstruction of
the rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act only on
the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Consti-
tution." 2 "It is the civil obligation of contracts which [the Con-
1 Holmes ». Holmes, 4 Barb. 295.
'McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 612. "The obligation of a contract. . .
is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. The law, then,
which has this binding obligation, must govern and control the contract, in every
shape in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affects its validity, con-
struction, or discharge. It is, then, the municipal law of the State, whether that
be written or unwritten, which is emphatically the law of the contract made
within the State, and must govern it throughout, whenever its performance is
sought to be enforced." Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 259.
"As I understand it, the law of the contract forms its obligation." Thompson,
J., ib. 802. "The obligation of the contract consists in the power and efficacy
of the law which applies to, and enforces performance of, the contract, or the
payment of an equivalent for non-performance. The obligation does Dot inhere
and subsist in the contract itself, proprio vigore, but in the law applicable to the
contract. This is the sense, I think, in which the Constitution uses the term
'obligation.1" Trimble, J., ib. 318. And see Van Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wia.
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CB. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 285
stitution] is designed to reach; that is, the obligation
which is recognized * by, and results from, the law of the [* 286]
State in# which it is made. If, therefore, a contract when
made is by the law of the place declared to be illegal, or deemed
to be a nullity, or a nude pact, it has no civil obligation, because
the law, in such cases, forbids its having any binding efficacy or
force. It confers no legal right on the one party and no corre-
spondent legal duty on the other. There is no means allowed or
recognized to enforce it; for the maxim is ex nudo pacto non oritur
actio. But when it does not fall within the predicament of being
either illegal or void, its obligatory force is coextensive with its
stipulations." 1
Such being the obligation of a contract, it is obvious that the
rights of the parties in respect to it are liable to be affected in
many ways by changes in the laws, which it could not have been
the intention of the constitutional provision to preclude. "There
are few laws which concern the general police of a State, or the
government of its citizens, in their intercourse with each other or
witli strangers, which may not in some way or other affect the
contracts which they have entered into or may thereafter form.
For what are laws of evidence, or which concern remedies, frauds,
and perjuries, laws of registration, and those which affect landlord
and tenant, sales at auction, acts of limitation, and those which
limit the fees of professional men, and the charges of tavern-
keepers, and a multitude of others which crowd the codes of every
State, but laws which affect the validity, construction, or duration,
or discharge of contracts ?" 2 But the changes in these laws are
577; Johnson r. Higgins, 8 Met. (Ky.) 566. A law giving interest on debts
which bore none when contracted, was held void in Goggans v. Turnispeed, 1
S. C. x. s. 40; 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 278. The legislature cannot authorize the
compulsory extinction of ground rents on payment of a sum in gross. Falairet's
Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 479; 8. c. 5 Am. Rep. 450.
1 Story on Const. § 1880. Slave contracts which were legal when made, are
not rendered invalid by the abolition of slavery, nor can the States make them
void by their constitutions, or deny remedies for their enforcement. White v.
Hart, 13 Wall. 649; Osborn t>. Nicholson, t'6. 653. An act of indemnity held
not to relieve a Sheriff from his obligation on his official bond to account for
moneys which had been paid away under military compulsion. State v. Gatz-
weiler, 89 Mo. 17 ; 8. c. 8 Am. Rep. 119.
* Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 259. As to the indirect
modification of contracts by the operation of police laws, see post, 674-584.
[ 323 ]
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not regarded as necessarily affecting the obligation of contracts.
Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered accord-
ing to the will of the State, provided the alteration does not
impair the obligation of the contract;1 and it does not impair it,
provided it leaves the parties a substantial remedy, according to
the course of justice as it existed at the time the contract was
made.2
[* 287] * It has accordingly been held that laws changing
remedies for the enforcement of legal contracts will be
valid, even though the new remedy be less convenient than the
old, or less prompt and speedy.8
"Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy
may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall
direct."4 To take a strong instance; although the law at the
The taxing power conferred upon a municipal corporation is not a contract
between it and the State. Richmond v. Richmond, &e., R. R. Co., 21 Grat. 611.
1 Bronson v. Kirizie, 1 How. 316, per Taney, Ch. J.
* Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; Van Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 578;
Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Butler r.
Palmer, 1 Hill, 824; Van Renselaer v. Snyder, 9 Barb. 302, and 13 N. Y. 299;
Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22; Guild ». Rogers, 8 Barb. 502; Story v. Ftirman,
25 N. Y. 214; Coriell v. Ham, 4 Greene (Iowa), 455; Heyward v. Juild, 1
Minn. 483; Swift v. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550; Maynes v. Moor, 16 Ind. 116 ; Smith
v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371; Grosvenor v. Chesley, 48 Me. 369; Van Renselaer r.
Ball, 19 N. Y. 100; Van Renselaer v. Hays, ib. 68; Litchfield v. McComber,
42 Barb. 288; Paschal v. Perez, 7 Texas, 365; Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kansas, 155;
Kenyon v. Stewart, 44 Penn. St. 179; Clark v. Martin, 49 Penn. St. 299; Rison
v. Farr, 24 Ark., 161; Sanders v. Hillsborough Insurance Co., 44 N. H. 238;
Huntzinger v. Brock, 3 Grant's Cases, 243; Mechanics, &c, Bank Appeal, 31
Conn. 63.
3 Odgen v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 270; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 359; Bum-
gardner v. Circuit Court, 4 Mo. 50; Trapley v. Hauler, 17 Miss. 310; Quack-
enbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128, 3 Denio 594, and 1 N. Y. 129; Bronson r.
Newberry, 2 Doug. Mich. 38; Rockwell v. Hubbell's Adm'rs, ib. 197; Evans r.
Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282; Sprecker
v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371; Porter v. Mariner, 50
Mo. 364; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Penrose p. Erie Canal Co., 56 Penn.
St. 46; Smith v. Van Gilder, 26 Ark. 527.
* Sturges e. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Ch. J. A statute
allowing the defence of want of consideration in a sealed instrument previously
given does not violate the obligation of contracts. Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa,
251. See, further, Parsons v. Casey, 28 Iowa, 436; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall.
68; Cook v. Gregg, 46 N. Y. 439. A statutory judgment lien may be taken
away. Watson v. N. Y. Central R.R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157; Woodbury v. Grimes,
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 287
time the contract is made permits the creditor to take the body of
his debtor in execution, there can be no doubt of the right
to abolish all laws for this purpose, leaving the creditor to his
remedy against property alone. "Confinement of the debtor may
be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be al-
lowed as a means of inducing him to perforin it. But the State
may refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold this means,
and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of
the contract, and simply to release the prisoner does not impair
the obligation."1 Nor is there any constitutional objection to
such a modification of those laws which exempt certain portions
of a debtor's property from execution as shall increase the
exemptions, nor to the modifications being made applicable to
contracts previously entered into. The State "may, if it thinks
proper, direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the
tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household fur-
niture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to execution on
judgments. Regulations of this description have always been con-
sidered, in every civilized community, as properly belonging to the
remedy, to be exercised or not, by every sovereignty, ac-
cording to its own views of policy and humanity. It *must [* 288]
reside in every State to enable it to secure its citizens from
unjust and harrassing litigation, and to protect them in those pur-
suits which are necessary to the existence and well-being of every
community." 2
1 Col. 100. Or extended before it has expired. Ellis r. Jones, 51 Mo. 180.
The obligation of the contract is not impaired if a substantial remedy remains.
Richmond v. Richmond, &c, R.K. Co., 21 Grat. 611.
1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Mason r.
Hailc, 12 Wheat. 370; Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 38; Maxey v.
Loyal, 38 Geo. 540. A special act admitting a party imprisoned on a judgment for
tort to take the poor debtors' oath was sustained in Matter of Nichols, 8 R. 1.60.
1 Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, per Taney, Ch. J.; Rockwell v. Hubbell's
Adm'rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197; Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128, 3 Denio,
594, and 1 N.Y. 129; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11
Wis. 432; Cusic c. Douglas, 3 Kansas, 123; Maxey v. Loyal, 38 Geo. 531;
Hardiman v. Downer, 3i) Geo. 425; Hill v. Kessler, 63 N. C. 437; Farley v.
Dowe, 45 Ala. 324; Sneider e. Heidelberger, t'6. 126; In re Kennedy, 2 S. C.
s. s. 216; Gunn v. Barry, 44 Geo. 351. The case of Kibbey ». Jones, 7 Bush,
243, seems to be contra. The increase in exemptions, however, must not go to
the extent to render the remedy nugatory or impracticable. Stephenson v.
Osborne, 41 Miss. 119. It has been decided that a homestead exemption may
[ 325 ]
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And laws which change the rules of evidence relate to the
remedy only; and while, as we have elsewhere shown, such laws
may, on general principles, be applied to existing causes of action,
so, too, it is plain that they are not precluded from such application
by the constitutional clause we are considering.1 And it has
been held that the legislature may even take away a common-
law remedy altogether, without substituting any in its place,
if another and efficient remedy remains. Thus, a law abolishing
distress for rent has been sustained as applicable to leases in force
at its passage;2 and it was also held that an express stipulation
in the lease, that the lessor should have this remedy, would not
prevent the legislature from abolishing it, because this was a
subject concerning which it was not competent for the parties to
contract in such manner as to bind the hands of the State. In
the language of the court: "If this is a subject on which parties
can contract, and if their contracts when made become by virtue
of the Constitution of the United States superior to the power of
the legislature, then it follows that whatever at any time exists as
part of the machinery for the administration of justice may be
perpetuated, if parties choose so to agree. That this can scarcely
have been within the contemplation of the makers of the Consti-
tution, and that if it prevail as law it will give rise to grave
inconveniences, is quite obvious. Every such stipulation is in its
own nature conditional upon the lawful continuance of the
[* 289] process. The State is no party to * their contract. It is
bound to afford adequate process for the enforcement of
rights; but it has not tied its own hands as to the modes by
which it will administer justice. Those from necessity belong to
the supreme power to prescribe; and their continuance is not the
be made applicable to previously existing contracts. Hill v. Kessler, 68 N. C.
437; Hardiman v. Downer, 39 Geo. 425; Ladd v. Adams, 66 N. C. 164. Contra,
Homestead Cases, 22 Grat 266. "Statutes pertaining to the remedy are merely
such as relate to the course and form of proceedings, but do not affect the sub-
stance of a judgment when pronounced." Per Merrick, Ch. J., in Morton v.
Valentine, 15 La. An. 153. See Watson v. N. Y. CentralR.R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157.
1 Neass v. Mercer, 15 Barb. 318. On this subject see the discussions in the
Federal courts, Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Ogden r. Saunders,
12 Wheat. 213; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hay-ward, 2 How.
608; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68.
8 Van Renselaer v. Synder, 9 Barb. 302, and 13 N. Y. 299; Guild v. Rogers,
8 Barb. 502; Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22.
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 289
subject of contract between private parties. In truth, it is not at
all probable that the parties made their agreement with reference
to the possible abolition of distress for rent. The first clause of
this special provision is, that the lessor may distrain, sue, re-enter,
or resort to any other legal remedy, and the second is, that in
cases of distress the lessee waives the exemption of certain
property from the process, which by law was exempted. This
waiver of exemption was undoubtedly the substantial thing which
the parties had in view; but yet perhaps their language cannot be
confined to this object, and it may therefore be proper to consider
the contract as if it had been their clear purpose to preserve their
legal remedy, even if the legislature should think fit to abolish it.
Iu that aspect of it the contract was a subject over which they had
no control." 1
But a law which deprives a party of all legal remedy must
necessarily be void. "If the legislature of the State were to
undertake to make a law preventing the legal remedy upon a
contract lawfully made, and binding on the party to it, there is no
question that such legislature would, by such act, exceed its legiti-
mate powers. Such an act must necessarily impair the obligation
of the contract within the meaning of the Constitution." 2 This
has beeu held in regard to those cases in which it was sought to
deprive certain classes of persons of the right to maintain suits,
because of their having participated in rebellion against the
government.3 And where a statute does not leave a party a
1 Conkey ». Hart. 14 N. Y. 30; citing Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend. 35;
Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; and Van Ren-
selaer v. Snyder, 13 N. Y. 299.
* Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430. Osborne r. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 662; U. S.
s. Conway, Hempst. 313; Johnson v. Bond, ib. 533; West v. Sansom, 44 Geo.
295. See Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Penn. St.
46. In Jackoway o. Denton, 25 Ark. 641, a clause in the Constitution of Ar-
kansas declaring all contracts for the sale or purchase of slaves void, was held
invalid. Affirmed in White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 649. An act withdrawing all the
property of a debtor from the operation of legal process, leaving only a barren
right to sue, is void. State ». Bank of South Carolina, 1 S. C. n. s. 63.
* Rieon t>. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Jackson
r. Same, ib. 117. The case of Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wall. 599, should be consid-
ered in connection with these. A remedy may, however, be denied to a party
until he has performed his duty to the State in respect to the demand in suit:
t. g. paid the tax upon the debt sued for. Walker v. Whitehead, 43 Geo. 538;
Garrett v. Cordell, ib. 366; Welborn v. Akin, 44 Geo. 420.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
substantial remedy according to the course of justice as it existed
at the time the contract was made, but shows upon its face an
intention to clog, hamper, or embarrass the proceedings to euforce
the remedy, so as to destroy it entirely, and thus impair
[* 290] the contract so far as it is in the * power of the legislat-
ure to do it, such statute cannot be regarded as a mere
regulation of the remedy, but is void, because a substantial denial
of right.1
And where a statute dividing a town and incorporating a new
one enacted that the new town should pay its proportion towards
the support of paupers then constituting a charge against the old
town, it was held that a subsequent statute exonerating the new
town from this liability was void as impairing the contract created
by the first-rnentioned statute.2 And in any case the lawful repeal
of a statute cannot constitutionally be made to destroy contracts
which have been entered into under it, but being legal when made,
they remain valid notwithstanding the repeal.8
So where, by its terms, a contract provides for the payment of
money by one party to another, and, by the law then in force,
property would be liable to be seized, and sold on execution to the
highest bidder, to satisfy any judgment recovered on such contract,
a subsequent law, forbidding property from being sold on execution
for less than two thirds the valuation made by appraisers, pursuant
to the directions contained in the law, though professing to act
only on the remedy, amounts to a denial or obstruction of the
rights accruing by the contract, and is directly obnoxious to the
prohibition of the Constitution.4 So a law which takes away from
1 Oatraan v. Bond, 15 Wis. 28. As to control of remedies, see post, 361.
* Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl. 12.
3 Tuolumne Redemption Co. ». Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515; McCauley v. Brooks,
16 Cal. 11; Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; State r.
Phalen, 3 Harr. 441; State v. Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389.
4 McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Willard v. Longstreet, 2 Doug. (Mich.)
172; Rawley v. Hooker, 21 Ind. 144. So a law which, as to existing mortgages
foreelosable by sale, prohibits the sale for less than half the appraised value of
the land, is void for the same reason. Gantley's Lessee t>. Ewing, 3 How. 707;
Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311. And a law authorizing property to be turned
out in satisfaction of a contract is void. Abercrombie o. Baxter, 44 Geo. 36.
The "scaling laws," so called, under which contracts made-while Confederate
notes were the only currency, are allowed to be satisfied on payment of a sum
equal to what the sum called for by them in Confederate notes was worth when
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 290
mortgagees the right to possession under their mortgages until
after foreclosure is void, because depriving them of the right to the
rents and profits, which was a valuable portion of the right secured
by the contract. "By this act the mortgagee is required to incur
the additional expense of foreclosure, before obtaining possession,
and is deprived of the right to add to his security, by the percep-
tion of the rents and profits of the premises, during the time
required to accomplish this and the time of redemption, and during
that time the rents and profits are given to another, who may or
may not appropriate them to the payment of the debt, as
he chooses, and the mortgagee in the * mean time is sub- [* 291]
jected to the risk, often considerable, of the depreciation in
the value of the security."1 So a law is void which extends the
time for the redemption of lands sold on execution, or for delin-
quent taxes, after the sales have been made; for in such a case the
contract with the purchaser, and for which he has paid his money,
is, that he shall have title at the time then provided by the law;
and to extend the time for redemption is to alter the substance of
the contract, as much as would be the extension of the time for
payment of a promissory note.2 So a law which shortens the time
for redemption from a mortgage, after a foreclosure sale has taken
place, is void; the rights of the party being fixed by the foreclosure
and the law then in force, and the mortgagor being entitled, under
they were made, have been sustained, but this is on the assumption that the con-
tracts are enforced as near as possible according to the actual intent. Harmon v.
Wallace, 2 S. C. N. 8. 208; Robeson v. Brown, 63 N. C. 554; Hillard v.
Moore, 65 N. C. 540; Pharis v. Dice, 21 Grat. 303; Thornington v. Smith,
8 Wall. 1.
1 Mundy p. Monroe, 1 Mich. 76 ; Blackwood v. Vanvleet, 11 Mich. 252. Com-
pare Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484; James v. Stull, 9 Barb. 482; Cook v.
Gray, 2 Houston, 455. In the last case it was held that a statute shortening the
notice to be given on foreclosure of a mortgage under the power of sale, from
twenty-four to twelve weeks, was valid as affecting the remedy only; and that a
stipulation in a mortgage that on default being made in payment the mortgagee
aiight sell "according to law," meant according to the law as it should be when
sale was made. See also Bathold v. Fox, 13 Minn. 501, in wliieh it was decided
that in the case of a mortgage given while the law allowed the mortgagee posses-
sion during the period allowed for redemption after foreclosure, such law might
he so changed as to take away this right.
* Robinson c. Howe, 13 Wis. 341; Dikeman o. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484; Goe-
aen p. Schroeder, 8 Minn. 387. But see Stone v. Basset, 4 Minn. 298; Hey ward
t. Judd, to. 483; Freeborn v. Pettibone, 6 Minn. 277.
[ 329 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 291
[ce. ix.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
the law, to possession of the land until the time of redemptjn
expires.1 And where by statute a purchaser of lands from the
State had the right, upon the forfeiture of his contract of purchase
for the non-payment of the sum due upon it, to revive it at any
time before a public sale of the lands, by the payment of all sums
due upon the contract, with a penalty of five per cent, it was held
that this right could not be taken away by a subsequent change
in the law which subjected the forfeited lands to private
[* 292] entry and sale.2 And a statute which * authorizes stay of
execution, for an unreasonable or indefinite period, on
judgments rendered on pre-existing contracts, is void, as postpon-
ing payment, and taking away all remedy during the continuance
of the stay.3 And a law is void on this ground which declares a
1 Cargill o. Power, 1 Mich. 369. The contrary ruling was made in Butler v.
Palmer, 1 Hill, 324, by analogy to the statute of limitations. The statute, it was
said, was no more in effect than saying: "Unless you redeem within the shorter
time prescribed, you shall have no action for a recovery of the land, nor shall
your defence against an action be allowed, provided you get possession." And
in Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 346, the court, speaking of a similar right in a
party, say: " So far as his right of redemption was concerned, it was not derived
from any contract, but was given by the law only; and the time within which he
might exercise it might be shortened by the legislature, provided a reasonable
time was left in which to exercise it, without impairing the obligation of any con-
tract." And see Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371, to the same effect.
* State v. Commissioners of School and University lands, 4 Wis. 414.
3 Chadwick o. Moore, 8 W. & S. 49; Bunn v. Gorgas, 41 Penn. St. 441;
Stevens v. Andrews, 31 Mo. 205; Hasbrouck o. Shipman, 16 Wis. 296. In Brei-
tenbach v. Bush, 44 Penn. St. 313, and Coxe v. Martin, ib. 322, it was held that
an act staying all civil process against volunteers who had enlisted in the national
service for three years or during the war was valid, — " during the war" being
construed to mean unless the war should sooner terminate. See also State ».
Carew, 13 Rich. 498. A general law that all suits pending should be continued
until peace between the Confederate States and the United States, was held void
in Burt v. Williams, 24 Ark. 94. See also Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Grat. 244;
Hudspeth v. Davis, 41 Ala. 389; Aycock v. Martin, 37 Geo. 124; Coffman v.
Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 29; Jacobs v. Smallwood, 63 N. C. 112; Cutts v.
Hardee, 38 Geo. 350; Sequestration Cases, 30 Texas, 688. A law permitting a
year's stay upon judgments where security is given, is valid. Farnsworth e.
Vance, 2 Cold. 108. But a statute was held void which stayed all proceedings
against volunteers who had enlisted '' during the war," this period being indefinite,
Clark v. Martin, 3 Grant's Cas. 393. In Johnson v. Higgins, 8 Met. (Ky.) 566,
it was held that the act of the Kentucky legislature of May 24, 1861, which for-
bade the rendition in all the courts of the State, of any judgment from date till
January 1st, 1862, was valid. It related, it was said, not to the remedy for
[ 330 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 292
forfeiture of the charter of a corporation for acts or omissions
which constituted no cause of forfeiture at the time they occurred.1
And it has been held that where a statute authorized a municipal
corporation to issue bouds, and to exercise the power of local tax-
ation in order to pay them, and persons bought and paid value for
bonds issued accordingly, this power of taxation is part of the con-
tract, and cannot be withdrawn until the bonds are satisfied; that
an attempt to repeal or restrict it by statute is void; and that
unless the corporation imposes and collects the tax in all respects
as if the subsequent statute had not been passed, it will be com-
pelled to do so by mandamus.2 And it has also been held that a
statute repealing a former statute, which made the stock of stock-
holders in a corporation liable for its debts, was, in respect to
creditors existing at the time of the repeal, a law impairing the
obligation of contracts.3 In each of these cases it is
evident that substantial rights * were affected; and so [* 293]
far as the laws which were held void operated upon the
remedy, they either had an effect equivalent to importing some
new stipulation into the contract, or they failed to leave the party a
substantial remedy such as was assured to him by the law in force
when the contract was made. In Pennsylvania it has been held
that a statute authorizing a stay of execution on contracts in which
the debtor had waived the right was unconstitutional;4 but it seems
to us that an agreement to waive a legal privilege which the law
gives as a matter of State policy cannot be binding upon a party,
unless the law itself provides for the waiver.6
enforcing a contract, but to the courts which administer the remedy; and those
courts, in a legal sense, constitute no part of the remedy. A law exempting
soldiers' from civil process until thirty days after their discharge from military
service was held valid as to all contracts subsequently entered into, in Bruns v.
Crawford, 84 Mo. 330. And see McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127. A statute
suspending limitation laws during the existence of civil war, and until the State
was restored to her proper relations to the Union, was sustained in Bender v. Craw-
ford, 33 Texas, 745. Compare Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393.
'People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 285, per Chris-
tiancy, J.; State r. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. 80. See Ireland o. Turnpike Co.,
19 Ohio, K. 8. 873.
'Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535. See also Soutter v. Madison, 15 Wis.
30; Smith r. Appleton, 19 Wis. 468.
1 Hawthorne t>. Calef, 2 Wall. 10.
4 Billmeyer r. Evans, 40 Penn. St. 324; Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Penn. St. 127.
'See Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 30; Handy v. Chatfield, 28 Wend. 35.
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Where, however, by the operation of existing laws, a i&ntract
cannot be enforced without some new action of a party to fix his
liability, it is as competent to prescribe by statute the requisites to
the legal validity of such act as it would be in any case to prescribe
the legal requisites of a contract to be thereafter made. Thus,
though a verbal promise is sufficient to revive a debt barred by
the statute of limitations or by bankruptcy, yet this rule may be
changed by a statute making all such future promises void unless
in writing.1 It is also equally true that where a legal impediment
exists to the enforcement of a contract which parties have entered
into, the constitutional provision in question will not preclude the
legislature from removing such impediment and validating the
contract. A statute of that description would not impair the obli-
gation of contracts, but would perfect and enforce it.2 And for
similar reasons the obligation of contracts is not impaired by con-
tinuing the charter of a corporation for a certain period, in order
to the proper closing its business.3
One other topic remains to be mentioned in this connection, and
that relates to the power of the States to pass insolvent laws, and
the classes of contracts to which they may be made to apply. As
this whole subject has been gone over very often and very fully by
the Supreme Court of the United States, and the important ques-
tions seem at last to be finally set at rest, and moreover as it is
comparatively unimportant while a federal bankrupt law
[* 294] exists, we shall * content ourselves with giving what we
understand to be the conclusions of the court.
1. The several States have power to legislate on the subject of
bankrupt and insolvent laws, subject, however, to tlie authority
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution to adopt a uuiform
system of bankruptcy, which authority, when exercised, is para-
mount, and State enactments in conflict with those in Congress
upon the subject must give way.4
1 Joy v. Thompson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 373; Kingsley v. Cousins, 47 Me. 91.
* As whero the defence of usury to a contract is taken away by statute.
Welsh v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9. And see
Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68, and the cases cited, post, pp. 375, 376.
* Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245.
4 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Farmers'and Mechanics'Bank v.
Smith, 6 Wheat. 131; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Baldwin v. Hale,
1 Wall. 229.
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CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. * 294
2. Such State laws, however, discharging the person or the prop-
erty of the debtor, and thereby terminating the legal obligation of
the debts, cannot constitutionally be made to apply to contracts
entered into before they were passed, but they may be made appli-
cable to such future contracts as can be considered as having been
made in reference to them.1
3. Contracts made within a State where an insolvent law exists,
between citizens of that State, are to be considered as made in
reference to the law, and are subject to its provisions. But the law
cannot apply to a contract made in one State between a citizen
thereof and a citizen of another State,2 nor to contracts not made
within the State, even though made between citizens of the same
State,3 except, perhaps, where they are citizens of the State pass-
ing the law.4 And where the contract is made between a citizen
of one State and a citizen of another, the circumstance that the
contract is made payable in the State where the insolvent law
exists will not render such contract subject to be discharged under
the law.6 If, however, the creditor in any of these cases makes
himself a party to proceedings under the insolvent law, he will be
bound thereby like any other party to judicial proceedings, and is
not to be heard afterwards to object that his debt was excluded by
the Constitution from being affected by the law.6
New provisions for personal liberty, and for the protection of the
right to life, liberty, and property, are made by the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States;
and these will be referred to in the two succeeding chapters.7 The
most important clause in the fourteenth amendment is that part of
section 1 which declares that all persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.
'Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Springer v. Foster, 2 Story, 387;
Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348; Woodhull v. Wagner, Baldw. 300; Suydham v.
Broadnax, 14 Pet. 75; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 310; Baldwin p. Hale, 1 Wall.
231.
* McMillan v. McNeill, 4 Wheat. 209.
4 Marsh v. Putnam, 3 Gray, 551.
6 Baldwin p. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Baldwin v. Bank of Newberry, to, 234;
Gilman p. Lockwood, 4 Wall. 409.
'Clay p. Smith, 3 Pet. 411; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Gilman v. Lock-
wood, 4 Wall. 409.
'See ante, p. 11; post, pp. 299, 897.
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of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.1 This
provision very properly puts an end to any question of the title of
the freedmen and others of their race to the rights of citizenship;
but it may be doubtful whether the further provisions of the same
section surround the citizen with any protections additional to
those before possessed under the State constitutions; though, as a
principle of State constitutional law has now been made a part of
the Constitution of the United States, the effect will be to make the
Supreme Court of the United States the final arbiter of cases in
which a violation of this principle by State laws is complained of,
inasmuch as the decisions of the State courts upon laws which are
supposed to violate it will be subject to review in that court on
appeal.2
1 The complete text of this section is as follows: " Section 1. All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
'See ante, pp. 12-14. Notwithstanding this section, the protection of all
citizens in their privileges and immunities, and in their right to an impartial
administration of the laws, is just as much the business of the individual States
as it was before. This amendment of the Constitution does not concentrate power
in the general government for any purpose of police government within the
States; its object is to preclude legislation by any State which shall "abridge
the privileges or immunites of citizens of the United States," or "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," or " deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws "; and Congress is
empowered to pass all laws necessary to render such unconstitutional State legis-
lation ineffectual. This amendment received a very careful examination at the
hands of the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case of the Live
Stock Dealers and Butchers Association v. The Crescent City, &c, Co., not yet
reported. See Story on Const. 4th ed. App. to vol. 2.
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•CHAPTER X. *295
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.
Although the people from whom we derive our laws now possess
a larger share of civil and political liberty than any other in Europe,
there was a period in their history when a considerable proportion
were in a condition of servitude. Of the servile classes one portion
were villeins regardant, or serfs attached to the soil, and transfer-
able with it, but not otherwise,1 while the other portion were vil-
lein* in gross, whose condition resembled that of the slaves known
to modern law in America.2 How these people became reduced to
this unhappy condition, it may not be possible to determine at
this distance of time with entire accuracy; but in regard to the
first class, we may suppose that when a conqueror seized the terri-
tory upon which he found them living, he seized also the people as
a part of the lawful prize of war, granting them life on condition
of their cultivating the soil for his use; and that the second were
often persons whose lives had been spared on the field of battle,
and whose ownership, in accordance with the custom of barbar-
ous times, would pertain to the persons of their captors. Many
other causes also contributed to reduce persons to this condition.3
1 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92. "They originally held lands of their lords on
condition of agricultural service, which in a certain sense was servile, but in
reality was not so, as the actual work was done by the theows, or slaves. . . .
They did not pay rent, and were not removable at pleasure; they went with the
land and rendered services, uncertain in their nature, and therefore opposed to
rent. They were the originals of copyholders." Note to Reeves, History of
English Law, Pt. I. c 1.
1 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92. "These are the persons who are described
by Sir William Temple as ' a sort of people who were in a condition of down-
right servitude, used and employed in the most servile works; and belonging,
they and their children and effects, to the lord of the soil, like the rest of the
stock or cattle upon it.'" Reeves, History of English Law, Pt. L c. 1.
'For a view of the condition of the servile classes, see Wright, Domestic
Manners and Sentiments, 101, 102; Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of
1829), pp. 8, 78, 365; Hallam, Middle Ages, Pt. H. c. 2; Vaughan, Revolutions
in English History, Book 2, c. 8; Broom, Const. Law, 74 et seq.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
At the beginning of the reign of John it has been estimated that
one half of the Anglo-Saxons were in a condition of servitude, and
if we go back to the time of the Conquest, we find a still larger
proportion of the people held as the property of their lords, and
incapable of acquiring and holding any property as their own.1
Their treatment was such as might have been expected from
masters trained to war and violence, accustomed to think lightly
of human life and human suffering, and who knew little of and
cared less for any doctrine of human rights which embraced within
its scope others besides the governing classes.
It would be idle to attempt to follow the imperceptible
[* 296] steps by * which involuntary servitude at length came to
an end in England. It was never abolished by statute,1
and the time when slavery ceased altogether cannot be accurately
determined.3 The causes were at work silently for centuries; the
historian did not at the time note them; the statesman did not
observe them; they were not the subject of agitation or contro-
versy; but the time arrived when the philanthropist could examine
the laws and institutions of his country, and declare that slavery
had ceased to be recognized, though at what precise point in legal
history the condition became unlawful he might not be able to
1 Hume, History of England, Vol. I., App. 1.
4 Barrington on the Statutes (3d ed.), 272.
'Mr. Hargrave says, at the commencement of the seventeenth century. 20
State Trials, 40; May, Const. Hist. c. 11. And Mr. Barrington (On Stat.
3d ed. p. 278) cites from Rymer a commission from Queen Elizabeth in the
year 1574, directed to Lord Burghley and Sir Walter Mildmay, for inquiring
into the lands, tenements, and other goods of all her bondmen and bondwomen
in the counties of Cornwall, Devonshire, Somerset, and Gloucester, such as
were by blood in a slavish condition, by being born in any of her manors, and
to compound with any or all of such bondmen or bondwomen for their manu-
mission and freedom. And this commission, he says, in connection with other
circumstances, explains why we hear no more of this kind of servitude. And
see Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829), 674. This author says that
villeinage had disappeared by the time of Charles II. Hurd says in 1661. Law
of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. I. p. 136. And see 2 Bl. Com. 96. Macaulay
says there were traces of slavery under the Stuarts. History of England, c. 1.
Hume (History of England, c. 23) thinks there was no law recognizing it after
the time of Henry VII., and that it had ceased before the death of Elizabeth.
Froude (History of England, c. 1) says in the reign of Henry VIII. it had
practically ceased. Mr. Christian says the last claim of villeinage which we
find recorded in our courts was in 15th James I. Noy, 27; 11 State Trials, 842.
Note to Blackstone, Book 2, p. 96.
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 296
determine. Among the causes of its abrogation lie might be able
to enumerate: 1. That the slaves were of the same race with their
masters. There was therefore not only an absence of that antip-
athy which is often found existing when the ruling and the ruled
are of different races, and especially of different color, but instead,
thereof an active sympathy might often be supposed to exist, which
would lead to frequent emancipations. 2. The common law pre-
sumed every man to be free until proved to be otherwise; and this
presumption, when the slave was of the same race as his master,
and had no natural badge of servitude, must often have rendered it
extremely difficult to recover the fugitive who denied his thraldom.
3. A residence for a year and a day in a corporate town rendered
the villein legally free ;1 so that to him the towns consti-
tuted cities of * refuge. 4. The lord treating him as a [* 297]
freeman, — as by receiving homage from him as tenant, or
entering into a contract with him under seal, — thereby emancipated
him, by recognizing in him a capacity to perform those acts which
only a freeman could perform. 5. Even the lax morals of the times
were favorable to liberty, since the condition of the child followed
that of the father;2 and in law the illegitimate child was nullius
filius, — had no father. And, 6. The influence of the priesthood
was generally against slavery, and must often have shielded the
fugitive and influenced emancipations by appeals to the con-
science, especially when the master was near the close of life, and
the conscience naturally most sensitive.3 And with all these influ-
1 Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829), p. 79. But this was only
as to third persons. The claim of the lord might be made within three years.
Ibid. And see Mackintosh, History of England, c. 4.
* Barrington on Statutes (3d ed.), 276, note; 2 Bl. Com. 93. But in the
very quaint account of "Villeinage and Niefty," in Mirror of Justices, § 28, it
is said, among other things, that " those are villeins who are begotten of a free-
man and a nief, and born out of "matrimony." The ancient rule appears to have
been that the condition of the child followed that of the mother; but this was
changed in the time of Henry I. Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829),
p. 78; Hallam, Middle Ages, Pt. II. c. 2.
* In 1514, Henry VHI. manumitted two of his villeins in the following words:
"Whereas God created all men free, but afterwards the laws and customs of
nations subjected some under the yoke of servitude, we think it pious and merito-
rious with God to manumit Henry Knight, a tailor, and John Herle, a husband-
man, our natives, as being born within the manor of Stoke Clymercysland, in
our county of Cornwall, together with all their issue born or to be born, and all
their goods, lands, and chattels acquired, so as the said persons and their issue
22 [ 337 ]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
ences there should be noted the further circumstance, that a class
of freemen was always near to the slaves in condition and suffering,
with whom they were in association, and between whom and them-
selves there were frequent intermarriages,1 and that from these to
the highest order in the State there were successive grades; the
children of the highest gradually finding their way into those below
them, and ways being open by which the children of the lowest
might advance themselves, by intelligence, energy, or thrift, through
the successive grades above them, until the descendants of dukes
and earls were found cultivating the soil, and the man of obscure
descent winning a place among the aristocracy of the realm,
through his successful exertions at the bar, or his services to the
State. Inevitably these influences must at length over-
[* 298] throw the * slavery of white men which existed in Eng-
land,2 and no other ever became established within the
realm. Slavery was permitted, and indeed fostered, in the colo-
nies; in part because a profit was made of the trade, and in part
also because it was supposed that the peculiar products of some of
them could not be profitably cultivated with free labor ;3 and at
times masters brought their slaves with them to England and re-
moved them again without question, until in Sommersett's Case,
in 1771, it was ruled by Lord Mansfield that slavery was repug-
nant to the common law, and to bring a slave into England was to
emancipate him.4
shall from henceforth by us be free and of free condition." Barrington on Stat-
utes (3d ed.), 275. See Mackintosh, History of England, c. 4. Compare this
with a deed of manumission in Massachusetts, to be found in Sumner's Speeches,
II. 289; Memoir of Chief Justice Parsons, by his son, 176, note.
1 Wright, Domestic Manners and Sentiments, p. 112.
8 Macaulay (History of England, c. 1 ) says the thief instrument of emanci-
pation was the Christian religion. Mackintosh (History of England, c. 4) also
attributes to the priesthood great influence iri this reform, not only by their
direct appeals to the conscience, but by the judges, who were ecclesiastics, mul-
tiplying presumptions and rules of evidence consonant to the equal and humane
spirit which breathes throughout the morality of the Gospel. Hume (History of
England, c. 23) seems to think emancipation was brought about by selfish con-
siderations on the part of the barons, and from a conviction that the returns
from their lands would be increased by changing villeinage into socage tenures.
* Robertson, America, Book 9; Bancroft, United States, Vol. L c. 5.
* Lofft, 18; 20 Howell, State Trials, 1; Life of Granville Sharp, by Hoare,
c. 4; Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. I. p. 189. The judgment of
Lord Mansfield is said to have been delivered w th evident reluctance. 20 State
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 298
The same opinion had been previously expressed by Lord Holt,
but without authoritative decision.1
In Scotland a condition of servitude continued to a later period.
The holding of negroes in slavery was indeed held to be
illegal * soon after the Sommersett Case; but the salters [* 299]
and colliers did not acquire their freedom until 1799,
nor without an act of Parliament.2 A previous statute for their
enfranchisement through judicial proceedings had proved . in-
effectual.*
The history of slavery in this country pertains rather to general
history than to a work upon State constitutional law. Through-
out the land involuntary servitude is abolished by constitutional
amendment, except as it may be imposed in the punishment of
crime.4 Nor do we suppose the exception will permit the convict to
be subjected to other servitude than such as is under the control
and direction of the public authorities, in the manner heretofore
Trials, 79; per Lord Stovodl, 2 Hagg. Adm. 105, 110; Broom, Const. Law,
105. Of the practice prior to the decision Lord Stowell said: "The personal
traffic in slaves resident in England had been as public and as authorized in
London as in any of our West India Islands. They were sold on the Exchange,
and other places of public resort, by parties themselves resident in London,
and with as little reserve as they would have been in any of our West India
possessions. Such a state oP things continued without impeachment from a
very early period up to nearly the end of the last century." The Slave Grace,
2 Hagg. Adm. 105. In this case it was decided that if a slave, carried by his
master into a free country, voluntarily returned with him to a country where
slavery was allowed by the local law, the status of slave would still attach to
bim, and the master's right to his service be resumed. Mr. Broom collects the
authorities on this subject in general, in the notes to Sommersett's Case, Const.
Law, 105.
1 "As soon as a slave comes into England, he becomes free; one may be a
villein in England, but not a slave." Holt, Ch. J., in Smith v. Brown, 2 Salk.
666. See also Smith v. Gould, Ld. Raym. 1274; 8. c. Salk. 666. There is a
learned note in Quincy's Rep. p. 94, collecting the English authorities on the
subject of slavery.
• 39 Geo. III. c. 56.
5 May's Const. Hist. c. 11.
4 Amendments to Const, of U. S. art. 13. See Cooley's Story on the Consti-
tution, c. 46, for the history of this article, and the decisions bearing upon it.
The Maryland act for the apprenticing of colored children, which made impor-
tant and invidious distinctions between them and white children, and gave the
master property rights in their services not given in other cases, was held void
under this article. Matter of Turner, 1 Abb. U. S. 84.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
customary. The laws of the several States allow the letting of the
services of the convicts, either singly or in numbers, to contractors
who are to employ them in mechanical trades in or near the prison,
and under the surveillance of its officers; but it might well be
doubted if a regulation which should suffer the convict to be placed
upon the auction block and sold to the highest bidder, either for
life or for a term of years, would be in harmony with the constitu-
tional prohibition. It is certain that it would be open to very grave
abuses, and it is so inconsistent with the general sentiment iu
countries where slavery does not exist, that it may well be believed
not to have been within the understanding of the people in incor-
porating the exception with the prohibitory amendment.1
The common law of England permits the impressment of sea-
faring men to man the royal navy;2 but this species of servitude
was never recognized in the law of America.3 The citizen may
doubtless be compelled to serve his country in her wars; but the
common law as adopted by us has never allowed arbitrary dis-
criminations for this purpose between persons of different avo-
cations.
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.
Near in importance to exemption from any arbitrary control of
the person is that maxim of the common law which secures to the
citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the govern-
ment, and protection in person, property, and papers, against even
the process of the law, except in a few specified cases. The
maxim that "every man's house is his castle,"4 is made
[* 300] a * part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibit-
1 The State has no power to imprison a child in a house of correction who has
committed no crime, on a mere allegation that he is "destitute of proper parental
care, and is growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness, and vice." People
v. Turner, 55 1ll. 280; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 645. Compare Prescott v. State, 19
Ohio, N. s. 184; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 388.
'Broadfoot's Case, 18 State Trials, 1323; Fost. Cp. Law, 178; Rex v. Tubbs,
Cowp. 512; Ex parte Fox, 5 State Trials, 276; 1 Bl. Com. 419; Broom, Const.
Law, 116.
3 There were cases of impressment in America before the Revolution, but
they were never peaceably acquiesced in by the people. See Life and Times of
Warren, 55.
4 Broom, Maxims, 321. The eloquent passage in Chatham's speech on Gen-
eral Warrants is familiar: "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 300
ing unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been
looked upon as of high value to the citizen.
If in English history we inquire into the original occasion for
these constitutional provisions, we shall probably find it in the
abuse of executive authority, and in the unwarrantable intrusion
of executive agents into the houses and among the private papers
of individuals, in order to obtain evidence of political offences
either committed or designed. The final overthrow of this practice
is so clearly and succinctly stated in a recent work on the constitu-
tional history of England that we cannot refrain from copying the
account in the note below.1
all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake ; the wind may
blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the king of
England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement." And see Lieber on Civil Liberty and Self-Government, c. 6.
1 "Among the remnants of a jurisprudence which had favored prerogative at
the expense of liberty was that of the arrest of persons under general warrants,
without previous evidence of their guilt or identification of their persons. This
practice survived the Revolution, and was continued without question, on the
ground of usage, until the reign of George III., when it received its death-blow
from the boldness of Wilkes and the wisdom of Lord Camden. This question
was brought to an issue by No. 45 of the 'North Briton,' already so often men-
tioned. There was a libel, but who was the libeller? Ministers knew not, nor
waited to inquire, after the accustomed forms of law; but forthwith Lord Hal-
ifax, one of the secretaries of state, issued a warrant, directing four messengers,
taking with them a constable, to search for the authors, printers, and publishers;
•and to apprehend and seize them, together with their papers, and bring them in
safe custody before him. No one having been charged or even suspected, — no
evidence of crime having been offered, — no one was named in this dread instru-
ment. The offence only was pointed at, not the offender. The magistrate who
should have sought proofs of crime deputed this office to his messengers. Armed
with their roving commission, they set forth in quest of unknown offenders; and,
unable to take evidence, listened to rumors, idle tales, and curious guesses.
They held in their hands the liberty of every man whom they were pleased to
suspect. Nor were they triflers in their work. In three days they arrested no
less than forty-nine persons on suspicion, — many as innocent as Lord Halifax
himself. Among the number was Dryden Leach, a printer, whom they took from
his bed at night. They seized his papers, and even apprehended his journeymen
and servants. He had printed one number of the ' North Briton,' and was then
reprinting some other numbers; but as he happened not to have printed No. 45,
he was released without being brought before Lord Halii'ax. They succeeded,
however, in arresting Kearsley the publisher, and Balfe the printer, of the obnox-
ious number, with all their workmen. From them it was discovered that Wilkes
was the culprit of whom they were in search; but the evidence was not on oath;
and the messengers received verbal directions to apprehend Wilkes under the
[341]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[* 301] * The history of this controversy should be read in
connection with that in America immediately previous to
general warrant. Wilkes, far keener than the crown lawyers, not seeing his oim
name there, declared it ' a ridiculous warrant against the whole English nation,'
and refused to obey it. But after being in custody of the messengers for some
hours, in his own house, he was taken away in a chair, to appear before the sec-
retaries of state. No sooner had he been removed than the messengers, return-
ing to his house, proceeded to ransack his drawers; and carried off all his private
papers, including even his will and his pocket-book. When brought into the
presence of Lord Halifax and Lord Egremont, questions were put to Wilkes
which he refused to answer; whereupon he was committed close prisoner to the
Tower, denied the use of pen and paper, and interdicted from receiving the vis-
its of his friends or even of his professional advisers. From this imprisonment,
however, he was shortly released on a writ of habeas corpus, by reason of his
privilege as a member of the House of Commons.
"Wilkes and the printers, supported by Lord Temple's liberality, soon ques-
tioned the legality of the general warrant. First, several journeymen printers
brought action against the messengers. On the first trial, Lord Chief Justice
Pratt — not allowing bad precedents to set aside the sound principles of English
law — held that the general warrant was illegal; that it was illegally executed;
and that the messengers were not indemnified by statute. The journeymen re-
covered three hundred pounds damages; and the other plaintiffs also obtained
verdicts. In all these cases however, bills of exceptions were tendered and
allowed. Mr. Wilkes himself brought an action against Mr. Wood, under-sec-
rctary of state, who had personally superintended the execution of the warrant.
At this trial it was proved that Mr. Wood and the messengers, after Wilkes's
removal in custody, had taken entire possession of his house, refusing admission
to his friends; had sent for a blacksmith, who opened the drawers of his bureau;*
and having taken out the papers, had carried them away in a sack, without taking
any list or inventory. All his private manuscripts were seized, and his pocket-
book filled up the mouth of the sack. Lord Halifax was examined, and admitted
that the warrant had been made out three days before he had received evidence
that Wilkes was the author of the 'North Briton.' Lord Chief Justice Pratt
thus spoke of the warrant: 'The defendant claimed a right, under precedents,
to force persons' houses, break open escritoires, and seize their papers upon a
general warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus taken away,
and where no offenders' names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a
discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions
may chance to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state,
and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property
of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject.' The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff with one thousand pounds
damages.
"Four days after Wilkes had obtained his verdict against Mr. Wood, Dryden
Leach, the printer, gained another verdict, with four hundred pounds damages,
against the messengers. A bill of exceptions, however, was tendered and re-
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 301
the American Revolution, * in regard to writs of assistance [* 302]
issued by the courts to the revenue officers, empowering
ceived in this as in other cases, and came on for hearing before the Court of
King's Bench in 1765. After much argument, and the citing of precedents show-
ing the practice of the secretary of state's office ever since the Revolution, Lord
Mansfield pronounced the warrant illegal, saying: 'It is not fit that the judging
of the information should be left to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate
should judge, and give certain directions to the officer.' The other three judges
agreed that the warrant was illegal and bad, 'believing that no degree of an-
tiquity can give sanction to an usage bad in itself.' The judgment was therefore
affirmed.
"Wilkes had also brought actions for false imprisonment against both the
secretaries of state. Lord Egreinont's death put an end to the action against
him; and Lord Halifax, by pleading privilege, and interposing other delays
unworthy of his position and character, contrived to put off his appearance until
after Wilkes had been outlawed, when he appeared and pleaded the outlawry.
But at length, in 1769, no further postponement could be contrived; the action
was tried, and Wilkes obtained no less than four thousand pounds damages.
Not only in this action, but throughout the proceedings, in which persons ag-
grieved by the general warrant had sought redress, the government offered an
ob tinate and vexatious resistance. The defendants were harrassed by every
obstacle which the law permitted, and subjected to ruinous costs. The expenses
which government itself incurred in these various actions were said to have
amounted to one hundred thousand pounds. •
"The liberty of the subject was further assured at this period by another
remarkable judgment of Lord Camden. In November, 1762, the Earl of Hali-
fax, as secretary of state, had issued a warrant directing certain messengers,
taking a constable to their assistance, to search for John Entinck, clerk, the
author or one concerned in the writing of several numbers of the 'Monitor, or
British Freeholder,' and to seize him, together with his books and papers, and
bring him in safe custody before the secretary of state. In execution of this
warrant, the messengers apprehended Mr. Entinck in his house, and seized the
books and papers in his bureau, writing-desk, and drawers. This case differed
from that of Wilkes, as the warrant specified the name of the person against
whom it was directed. In respect of the person, it was not a general warrant;
but as regards the papers, it was a general search-warrant, — not specifying any
particular papers to be seized, but giving authority to the messengers to take all
his books and papers according to their discretion.
"Mr. Entinck brought an action of trespass against the messengers for the
seizure of his papers, upon which a jury found a special verdict, with three hun-
dred pounds damages. This special verdict was twice learnedly argued before
the Court of Common Pleas, where, at length, in 1765, Lord Camden pronounced
an elaborate judgment. He even doubted the right of the secretary of state to
commit persons at all, except for high treason; but in deference to prior deci-
sions, the court felt bound to acknowledge the right. The main question, how-
ever, was the legality of a search-warrant for papers. 'If this point should be
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* 302 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. X.
[* 303] them, in their discretion, to search * suspected places for
smuggled goods, and which Otis pronounced "the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English
liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that, ever was found
in an English law book ; " since they placed "the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer."1 All these matters are
now a long way in the past; but it has not been deemed unwi8e to
repeat in the State constitutions, as well as in the Constitution of
the United States,2 the principles already settled in the common
law upon this vital point in civil liberty.
determined in favor of the jurisdiction,' said Lord Camden, 'the secret cabinets
and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search
and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall see fit to
charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a
seditious libel.' 'This power, so assumed by the secretary of state, is an execu-
tion upon all the party's papers in the first instance. His house is rifled; his most
valuable papers are taken out of his possession, before the paper, for which he is
charged, is found to be criminal by any competent jurisdiction, and before he
is convicted either of writing, publishing, or being concerned in the paper.' It
had been found by the special verdict that many such warrants had been issued
since the Revolution; but he wholly denied their legality. He referred the origin
of the practice to the Star Chamber, which in pursuit of libels had given search-
warrants to their messenger of the press; a practice which, after the abolition
of the Star Chamber, had been revived and authorized by the licensing act of
Charles II., in the person of the secretary of state. And he conjectured that
this practice had been continued after the expiration of that act, — a conjecture
shared by Lord Mansfield and the Court of King's Bench. With the unanimous
concurrence of the other judges of his court, this eminent magistrate now finally
condemned this dangerous and unconstitutional practice." May's Constitutional
History of England, c. 11. See also Semayne's Case, 5 Coke, 91; 1 Smith's
Lead. Cas. 183; Entinck v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, and 19 State Trials, 1030;
Note to same case in Broom, Const. Law, 613; Money p. Leach, Burr. 1742;
Wilkes's Case, 2 Wils. 151, and 19 State Trials, 1405. For' debates in Parlia-
ment on the same subject, see Hansard's Debates, Vol. XV. p. 1393 to 1418,
Vol. XVI. pp. 6 and 209. In further illustration of the same subject, see
De Lolme on the English Constitution, c. 18; Story on Const. §§ 1901, 1902;
Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Sailly v. Smith, 11 Johns. 500.
1 Works of John Adams, Vol. II. pp. 523, 524; 2 Hildreth's U. S. 499; 4
Bancroft's U. S. 414; Quincy, Mass. Reports, 51. See also the appendix to
these reports, p. 395, for a history of writs of assistance.
* U. S. Const. 4th Amendment. The scope of this work does not call for any dis-
cussion of the searches of private premises, and seizures of books and papers, which
are made under the authority, or claim of authority, of the revenue laws of the
United States. Perhaps, under no other laws are such liberties taken by minis-
terial officers; and it would be surprising to find oppressive action on their part so
[ 344 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 303
For the service of criminal process, the houses of private par-
ties are subject to be broken and entered under circumstances
which are fully explained in the works on criminal law, and need
not be enumerated here. And there are also cases where search-
warrants are allowed to be issued, under which an officer may be
protected in the like action. But as search-warrants are a species
of process exceedingly arbitrary in character, and which ought not
to be resorted to except for very urgent and satisfactory reasons,
the rules of law which pertain to them are of more than ordinary
strictness; and if the party acting under them expects legal pro-
tection, it is essential that these rules be carefully observed.
* In the first place they are only to be granted in the [* 304]
cases expressly authorized by law; and not generally in
such cases until after a showing made before a judicial officer,
under oath, that a crime has been committed, and that the party
complaining has reasonable cause to suspect that the offender, or
the property which was the subject or the instrument of the crime,
is concealed in some specified house or place.1 And the law, in
requiring a showing of reasonable cause for suspicion, intends that
evidence shall be given of such facts as shall satisfy the magistrate
that the suspicion is well founded; for the suspicion itself is no
ground for the warrant except as the facts justify it.2
In the next place, the warrant which the magistrate issues must
particularly specify the place to be searched, and the object for
which the search is to be made. If a building is to be searched,
the name of the owner or occupant should be given;3 or, if not
occupied, it should be particularly described, so that the officer will
be left to no discretion in respect to the place; and a misdescrip-
tion in regard to the ownership,4 or a description so general that it
applies equally well to several buildings or places, would render
often submitted to without legal contest, if the facilities they possess to embarass,
annoy, and obstruct the merchant in his business, were not borne in mind. The
federal decisions, however, go very far to establish the doctrine that, in matters
of revenue, the regulations Congress sees fit to establish, however unreasonable
they may seem, must prevail. For a very striking case, see Henderson's Dis-
tilled Spirits, 14 Wall. 44.
1 2 Hale, P. C. 142; Bishop, Cp. Pro. §§ 716-719; Archbold, Cp. Law, 147.
'Commonwealth v. Lottery Tickets, 5 Cush. 369; Else v. Smith, 1 D. &
B. 97.
3 Stone v. Dana, 5 Met. 98.
4 Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; Allen v. Staples, 6 Gray, 491.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
the warrant void in law.1 Search-warrants are always obnoxious
to very serious objections; and very great particularity is justly
required in these cases, before the privacy of a man's premises is
allowed to be invaded by the minister of the law.2 And therefore
a designation of goods to be searched for as " goods, wares, and
merchandises," without more particular description, has been
regarded as insufficient, even in the case of goods supposed to be
smuggled,8 where there is usually greater difficulty in giving
description, and where consequently more latitude should be
permitted than in the case of property stolen.
[* 305] * Lord Hale says," It is fit that such warrants to search
do express that search be made in the day-time ; and though
I do not say they are unlawful without such restriction, yet they
are very inconvenient without it; for many times, under pretence
of searches made in the night, robberies and burglaries have been
committed, and at best it creates great disturbance." 4 And the
statutes upon this subject will generally be found to provide for
searches in the day-time only, except in very special cases.
The warrant should also be directed to the sheriff or other
proper officer, and not to private persons; though the party com-
plainant may be present for the purposes of identification,6 and
other assistance can lawfully be called in by the officer if necessary.
The warrant must also command that the goods or other articles
to be searched for, if found, together with the party in whose cus-
tody they are found, be brought before the magistrate, to the end
that, upon further examination into the facts, the goods, and the
party in whose custody they were, may be disposed of according
to law.6 And it is a fatal objection to such a warrant, that it
1 Thus, a warrant to search the "houses and buildings of Hiram Ide and
Henry Ide," is too general. Humes v. Tabor, 1 R. I. 464. See McGlinchy v.
Barrows, 41 Me. 74; Ashley v. Peterson, 25 Wis. 621. So a warrant for tie
arrest of an unknown person under the designation of John Doe, without further
description, is void. Commonwealth v. Crotty, 10 Allen, 403.
'A warrant for searching a dwelling-house will not justify a forcible entry into
a barn adjoining the dwelling-house. Jones v. Fletcher, 41 Me. 254; Downing
v. Porter, 8 Gray, 539; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 716-719.
« Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; Archbold, Cr. Law, 143.
• 2 Hale, P. C. 150. See Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 145.
5 2 Hale, P. C. 150; Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 145.
6 2 Hale, P. C. 150; Bell & Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich.
126; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1.
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 305
leaves the disposition of the goods searched for to the ministerial
officer, instead of requiring them to be brought before the magis-
trate, that he may pass his judgment upon the truth of the com-
plaint made; and it would also be a fatal objection to a statute
authorizing such a warrant, if it permitted a condemnation or
other final disposition of the goods, without notice to the claim-
ant, and without an opportunity for a hearing being afforded him.1
The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence
of an intended crime; but only after lawful evidence of an offence
actually committed.2 Nor even then is it allowable to invade one's
privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against
him,3 * except in a few special cases where that which is [* 306]
the subject of the crime is supposed to be concealed, and
the public or the complainant has an interest in it or in its destruc-
tion. Those special cases are familiar and well understood in the
law. Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for
stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been smuggled into the
country in violation of the revenue laws, for implements of gaming
or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or prohibited liquors kept for
sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers kept for sale or
circulation, and for powder or other dangerous or explosive mate-
rial so kept as to endanger the public safety.4 A statute which
should permit the breaking and entering a man's house, and the
1 The "Search and Seizure" clause in some of the prohibitory liquor laws was
held void on this ground. Fisher p. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curtis,
311; Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 126. See also Matter of Morton, 10 Mich.
208, for a somewhat similar principle.
■ We do not say that it would be incompetent to authorize, by statute, the
issue of search-warrants for the prevention of offences in some cases; but it is
difficult to state any case in which it might be proper, except in such cases of
attempts, or of preparations to commit crime, as are in themselves criminal.
3 The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, found also
in many State constitutions, would clearly preclude the seizure of one's papers
in order to obtain evidence against him; and the spirit of the fifth amendment —
that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against him-
self— would also forbid such seizure.
4 These are the most common cases, but in the following search-warrants are
also sometimes provided for by statute: books and papers of a public character,
retained from their proper custody; females supposed to be concealed in houses
of ill-fame; children enticed or kept away from parents or guardians; concealed
weapons; counterfeit money, and forged bills or papers. See cases under English
statutes specified in 4 Broom and Hadley's Commentaries, 332.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
examination of books and papers with a view to discover the evi-
dence of crime, might possibly not be void on constitutional grounds
in some other cases; but the power of the legislature to authorize
a resort to this process is one which can properly be exercised only
in extreme cases, and it is better oftentimes that crime should go
unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have his prem-
ises invaded, his desks broken open, his private books, letters, and
papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the misconstructions of
ignorant and suspicious persons; and all this under the direction
of a mere ministerial officer, who brings with him such assistants
as he pleases, and who will select them more often with reference
to physical strength and courage than to their sensitive regard to
the rights and feelings of others. To incline against the enact-
ment of such laws, is to incline to the side of safety.1 In
[* 307] principle they are * objectionable; in the mode of execu-
tion they are necessarily odious; and they tend to invite
1 Instances sometimes occur in which ministerial officers take such liberties,
in endeavoring to detect and punish offenders, as are even more criminal than
the offences tbey seek to punish. The employment of spies and decoys to lead
men on to the commission of crime, on the pretence of bringing criminals to
justice, cannot be too often or too strongly condemned; and that prying into
private correspondence by officers, which has sometimes been permitted by
postmasters, is directly in the face of the law, and cannot be excused. The
importance of public confidence in the inviolability of correspondence through
the post-office cannot well be overrated; and the proposition to permit letters to
be opened, at the discretion of a ministerial officer, would excite general indig-
nation. In Maine it has been decided that a telegraph operator may be com-
pelled to disclose the contents of a message sent by him for another party, and
that no rule of public policy would forbid. State v. Litchfield, 58 Me. 267. The
case is treated as if no other considerations were involved than those which arise
in the ordinary case of a voluntary disclosure by one private person to another,
without necessity. Such, however, is not the nature of the communication made
to the operator of the telegraph. That instrument is used as a means of cor-
respondence, and as a valuable, and in many cases an indispensable, substitute for
the postal facilities; and the communication is made, not because the party desires
to put the operator in possession of facts, but because transmission without it is
impossible. It is not voluntary in any other sense than this, that the party makes
it rather than deprive himself of the benefits of this great invention and improve-
ment The reasons of a public nature for maintaining the secrecy of telegraphic
communication are the same with those which protect correspondence by mail;
and though the operator is not a publie officer, that circumstance appears to us
immaterial. He fulfils an important public function, and the propriety of his pre-
serving inviolable secrecy in regard to communications is so obvious, that it is
common to provide statutory penalties for disclosures. If on grounds of public
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 307
abuse and to cover the commission of crime. We thiik it would
generally be safe for the legislature to regard all those searches
and seizures " unreasonable" which have hitherto been unknown
to the law, and on that account to abstain from authorizing them;
leaving parties and the public to the accustomed remedies.1
We have said that if the officer follows the command of his war-
rant he is protected ; and this is so even when the complaint proves
policy the operator should not voluntarily disclose, why do not the same con-
siderations forbid the courts compelling him to do so? Or if it be proper to
make him testify to the correspondence by telegraph, what good reason can be
given why the postmaster should not be made subject to the process of subpoena
for a like purpose, and compelled to bring the correspondence which passes
through his hands into court, and open it for the purposes of evidence?
We must maintain the opinion, notwithstanding the decision of so eminent a
tribunal, that, the public are not entitled to a man's private correspondence,
whether obtainable by seizing it in the mails, or by compelling the operator of
the telegraph to testify to it, or by requiring his servants to take from his desks
his private letters and journals, and bring them into court on subpcena duces
tecum. Any such compulsory process to obtain it would be nothing short of a
most arbitrary and unjustifiable seizure of private papers; such an "unreason-
able seizure" as is directly condemned by the Constitution. In England, the
secretary of state sometimes issues his warrant for opening a particular letter,
where he is possessed of such facts as he is satisfied would justify him with
the public; but no American officer or body possesses such authority, and its
usurpation should not be tolerated. For an account of the former and present
English practice on this subject, see May, Constitutional History, c. 11; Todd,
Parliamentary Government, Vol. I. p. 272; Broom, Const. Law, 615.
1 A search-warrant for libels and other papers of a suspected party was illegal
at the common law. See 11 State Trials, 313, 321; Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.),
HI; Wilkes v. Wood, 19 State Trials, 1153. "Search-warrants were never
recognized by the common law as processes which might bo availed of by indi-
viduals in the course of civil proceedings, or for the maintenance of any mere
private right; but their use was confined to the case of public prosecutions
instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime, and the detection and pun-
ishment of criminals. Even in those cases, if we may rely on the authority of
Lord Coke, their legality was formerly doubted; and Lord Camden said that
they crept into the law by imperceptible practice. But their legality has long
been considered to be established, on the ground of public necessity; because
without them felons and other malefactors would escape detection." Merrick, J.,
in Robinson v. Richardson, 13 Gray, 456. "To enter a man's house," said Lord
Camden, " by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse
than the Spanish Inquisition ; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live
an hour." See his opinion in Entinck v. Carrington, 19 State Trials, 1029; S. c.
2 Wils. 275; and .Broom, Const. Law, 658; Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205;
Leach v. Money, 19 State Trials, 1001; 8. o. 3 Burr. 1692; and 1 W. Bl. 555;
Note to Entinck v. Carrington, Broom, Const. Law. 613.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
to have been unfounded.1 But if he exceed the command
[* 308] by * searching in places not described therein, or by seiz-
ing persons or articles not commanded, he is not protected
by the warrant, and can only justify himself as in other cases where
he assumes to act without process.2 Obeying strictly the command
of his warrant, he may break open outer or inner doors, and his
justification does not depend upon his discovering that for which
he is to make search.8
In other cases than those to which we have referred, and sub-
ject to the general police power of the State, the law favors the
complete and undisturbed dominion of every man over his own
premises, and protects him therein with such jealousy that he
may defend his possession against intruders, in person or by his
servants or guests, even to the extent of taking the life of the
intruder, if that seem essential to the defence.4
Quartering Soldiers in Private Houtes.
A provision is found incorporated in the constitution of nearly
every State, that " no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war
1 Barnard v. Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501.
■ Crozier v. Cudney, 9 D. & R. 224; Same case, 6 B. & C. 232; State v.
Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278.
* 2 Hale, P. C. 151; Barnard v. Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501.
4 That in defence of himself, any member of his family or his dwelling, a man
has a right to employ all necessary violence, even to the taking of life, see
Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193; Yates v. People, 32 N. Y. 509; Logue v. Com-
monwealth, 88 Penn. St. 265; Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150; Maher v. People,
24 111. 241; Bohannan v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush, 481; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 474.
But except where a forcible felony is attempted against person or property, he
should avoid such consequences if possible, and cannot justify standing up and
resisting to the death, when the assailant might have been avoided by retreat.
People v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396. But a man assaulted in his dwelling is under
no obligation to retreat; his house is his castle, which he may defend to any
extremity. And this means not simply the dwelling-house proper, but includes
whatever is within the curtilage as understood at the common law. Pond t?.
People, 8 Mich. 150. And in deciding what force it is necessary to employ in
resisting the assault, a person must act upon the circumstances as they appear to
him at the time; and he is not to be held criminal because on a calm survey of
the facts afterwards it appears that the force employed in defence was-excessive.
See the cases above cited. Also Schiner v. People, 23 111. 17; Patten v. People,
18 Mich. 314; Henton o. State, 24 Texas, 454.
[ 350 ]
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\
but in a manner to be prescribed by law." To us, after four-fifths
of a century have passed away since occasion has existed for com-
plaint of the action of the government in this particular, the repe-
tition of this declaration seems to savor of idle form and ceremony;
but "a frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the
Constitution" can never be unimportant, and indeed may well be
regarded as "absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of
liberty, and to maintain a free government."1 It is difficult to
imagine a more terrible engine of oppression than the power in the
executive to fill the house of an obnoxious person with a company
of soldiers, who are to be fed and warmed at his expense, under
the direction of an officer accustomed to the exercise of arbitrary
power, and in whose presence the ordinary laws of courtesy, not
less than the civil restraints which protect person and property,
must give way to unbridled will; who is sent as an instru-
ment of * punishment, and with whom insult and outrage [* 309]
may appear quite in the line of his duty. However con-
trary to the spirit of the age such a proceeding may be, it may
always be assumed as possible that it may be resorted to in times
of great excitement, when party action is generally violent; and
"the dragonadea of Louis XIV. in France, of James II. in Scot-
land, and those of more recent and present date in certain countries,
furnish sufficient justification of this specific guaranty."2 The
clause, as we find it in the national and State constitutions, has
come down to us through the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights
of 1688, and the Declaration of Independence; and it is but a
branch of the constitutional principle, that the military shall in
time of peace be in strict subordination to the civil power.3
1 Constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Florida, Illinois,
and North Carolina. See also Constitutions of Virginia, Nebraska, and Wiscon-
sin, for a similar declaration.
'Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, c. 11.
* Story on the Constitution, §§ 1899, 1900; Rawle on Constitution, 126. In
exceptional cases, however, martial law may be declared and enforced, whenever
the ordinary legal authorities are unable to maintain the public peace, and sup-
press violence and outrage. Todd, Parliamentary Government in England, Vol.
I. p. 342; 1 Bl. Com. 413-415. As to martial law in general, see Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 129.
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* 309 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. X.
Criminal Accusations.
Perhaps the most important of the protections to personal liberty
consists in the mode of trial which is secured to every person ac-
cused of crime. At the common law, accusations of felony were
made in the form of an indictment by a grand jury; and this
process is still retained in many of the States,1 while others have
substituted in its stead an information filed by the prosecuting
officer of the State or county. The mode of investigating the facts,
however, is the same in all; and this is through atrial by jury,
surrounded by certain safeguards which are a well understood part
of the system, and which the government cannot dispense with.
First, we may mention that the humanity of our law always
presumes an accused party innocent until he is proved to be guilty.
This is a presumption which attends all the proceedings against
him, from their initiation until they result in a verdict, which
either finds the party guilty or converts the presumption of inno-
cence into an adjudged fact.2
If there were any mode short of confinement which would, with
reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused to
answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict upon
him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him, in a greater
or less degree, Do the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet
1 The indictment, to accomplish the purpose of the constitutional require-
ment, should set out the material facts charged against the accused. State t>.
O'Flaherty, 7 Nev. 153. This, however, would not preclude the legislature from
establishing forms, provided they furnished such reasonable information as would
apprize the accused of the charge he was to meet.
2 It is sometimes claimed that where insanity is set up as a defence in a crim-
inal case, the defendant takes upon himself the burden of proof to establish it,
and that he must make it out beyond a reasonable doubt. For recent cases
taking this view, see State v. Felton, 32 Iowa, 49; McKenzie v. State. 42 Geo.
334; Boswell v. Commonwealth, 20 Grat. 860. Other well-considered cases do
not support this view. The burden of proof, it is held, rests throughout upon the
prosecution to establish all the conditions of guilt; and the presumption of inno-
cence that all the while attends the prisoner entitles him to an acquittal, if the
jury arc not reasonably satisfied of his guilt. A reasonable doubt of his capacity
to commit the crime as justly entitles him to an acquittal, as a reasonable doubt
on any other branch of the case. See State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43; People t'.
McCann, 16 N. Y. 68; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 373; Commonwealth
v. Dana, 2 Met. 340; Hopps v. People, 31 111. 885; People o. Garbutt, 17 Mich.
23; State v. Klinger, 43 Mo. 127; State v. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414.
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it is not determined that he has committed any crime. If
the punishment on conviction cannot exceed in severity the for-
feiture of a large sum of money, then it is reasonable to suppose
that such a sum of money, or an agreement by responsible
* parties to pay it to the government in case the accused [* 310]
should fail to appear, would be sufficient security for his
attendance; and therefore, at the common law, it was customary
to take security of this character in all cases of misdemeanor; one
or more friends of the accused undertaking for his appearance for
trial, and agreeing that a certain sum of money should be levied of
their goods and chattels, lands and tenements, if he made default.
But in the case of felonies, the privilege of giving bail before trial
was not a matter of right; and in this country, although the crim-
inal code is much more merciful than it formerly was in England,
and in some cases the allowance of bail is almost a matter of
course, there are others in which it is discretionary with the mag-
istrate to allow it or not, and where it will sometimes be refused if
the evidence of guilt is strong or the presumption great. Capital
offences are not generally regarded as bailable; at least, after in-
dictment, or when the party is charged by the finding of a coroner's
jury;1 and this upon the supposition that one who may be sub-
jected to the terrible punishment that would follow a conviction,
would not for any mere pecuniary considerations remain to abide
the judgment.2 And where the deatli penalty is abolished and
imprisonment for life substituted, it is believed that the rule would
be the same notwithstanding this change, and bail would still be
denied in the case of the highest offences, except under very pecu-
liar circumstances.3 In the case of other felonies it is not usual
to refuse bail, and in some of the State constitutions it has been
deemed important to make it a matter of right in all cases except
on capital charges "when the proof is evident or the presumption
great."4
1 Matter of Barronet, 1 El. & Bl. 1; Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39.
* State v. Summons, 19 Ohio, 139.
'The courts have power to bail, even in capital cases. United States r.
Hamilton, 3 Dall. 18; United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. 224; State v. Rockafel-
low, 1 Halst. 332; Commonwealth v. Semmes, 11 Leigh, 665; Commonwealth v.
Archer, 6 Grat. 705; People v. Smith, 1 Cal. 9; People v. Van Home, 8 Barb.
158. In England, when all felonies were capital, it was discretionary with the
courts to allow bail before trial. 4 Bl. Com. 297, and note.
4 The Constitutions of a majority of the States now contain provisions to
23 [ 353 ]
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* 310 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. X.
When bail is allowed, unreasonable bail is not to be re-
[* 311] quired; * but the constitutional principle that demands
this is one which, from the very nature of the case, ad-
dresses itself exclusively to the judicial discretion and sense of
justice of the court or magistrate empowered to fix upon the
amount. That bail is reasonable which, in view of the nature of
the offence, the penalty which the law attaches to it, and the proba-
bilities that guilt will be established on the trial, seems no more
than sufficient to secure the party's attendance. In determining
this, some regard should be had to the prisoner's pecuniary cir-
cumstances; that which is reasonable bail to a man of wealth,
being equivalent to a denial of right if exacted of a poor man
charged with the like offence. When the court or magistrate re-
quires greater security than in his judgment is needful to secure
attendance, and keeps the prisoner in confinement for failure to
give it, it is plain that the right to bail which the constitution
attempts so carefully to secure lias been disregarded; and though
the wrong is one for which, in the nature of the case, no remedy
exists, the violation of constitutional privilege is aggravated, in-
stead of being diminished, by that circumstance.1
The presumption of innocence is an absolute protection against
conviction and punishment, except either, first, on confession in
open court; or, second, on proof which places the guilt beyond any
reasonable doubt. Formerly, if a prisoner arraigned for felony
stood mute wilfully, and refused to plead, a terrible mode was
resorted to f r the purpose of compelling him to do so; and this
might even end in his death :2 but a more merciful proceeding is
this effect. And see Foley v. People, Breese, 31; Ullery c. Commonwealth,
8 B. Monr. 3; Shore ». State, 6 Mo. 640; State v. Summons, 19 Ohio, 139;
Ex parte Wray, 30 Miss. 673; Moore v. State, 36 Miss. 137; Ex parte Banks,
28 Ala. 89.
1 The magistrate in taking bail exercises an authority essentially judicial.
Regina v. Badger, 4 Q. B. 468; Linford v. Fitzroy, 13 Q. B. 240. As to his
duty to look into the nature of the charge and the evidence to sustain it, see
Barronet's Case, 1 El. & Bl. 1.
* 4 Bl. Com. 324. In treason, petit felony, and misdemeanors, wilfully
standing mute was equivalent to a conviction, and the same punishment might be
imposed; but in other cases there could be no trial or judgment without plea;
and an accused party might therefore sometimes stand mute and suffer himself
to be pressed to death, in order to save his property from forfeiture. Poor Giles
Corey, .accused of witchcraft, was perhaps the only person ever pressed to death
[364]
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 31
now substituted; the court entering a plea of not guilty for a
party who, for any reason, fails to plead for himself.
Again, it is required that the trial be speedy; and here also the
injunction is addressed to the sense of justice and sound judgment
of the court. In this country, where officers are specially appointed
or elected to represent the people in these prosecutions, their posi-
tion gives them an immense power for oppression; and it is to be
feared they do not always sufficiently appreciate the responsibility,
and wield the power with due regard to the legal rights and priv-
ileges of the accused.1 When a person charged with crime is
willing to proceed at once to trial, no delay on the part of the
prosecution is reasonable, except only that which is necessary
for proper preparation and to secure the attendance of
* witnesses.2 Very much, however, must be left to the [* 312]
judgment of the prosecuting officer in these cases; and
the court would not compel the government to proceed to trial at
the first term after indictment found or information filed, if the
officer who represents it should state, under the responsibility of
his official oath, that he was not and could not be ready at that
time.3 But further delay would not generally be allowed without a
more specific showing of the causes which prevent the State proceed-
ing to trial, including the names of the witnesses, the steps taken to
procure them, and the facts expected to be proved by them, in order
that the court might judge of the reasonableness of the applica-
tion, and that the prisoner might, if he saw fit to take that course,
for refusal to plead in America. 3 Bancroft's U. S. 93; 2 Hildreth'a U. S. 160.
For English cases, see Cooley's Bl. Com. 325, note. Now in England the court
enters a plea of not guilty for a prisoner refusing to plead, and the trial proceeds
as in other cases.
1 It is the duty of the prosecuting attorney to treat the accused with judicial
fairness; and to inflict injury at the expense of justice is no part of the purpose
for which he is chosen. Unfortunately, however, we sometimes meet with cases
in which these officers appear to regard themselves as the counsel for the com-
plaining party rather than the impartial representative of public justice. Bu
we trust it is not often that cases occur like a recent one in Tennessee, in which
the Supreme Court felt called upon to set aside a verdict in a criminal case,
where by the artifice of the prosecuting officer the prisoner had been induced to
go to trial under the belief that certain witnesses for the State were absent, when
in fact they were present and kept in concealment by this functionary. Curtis v.
State, 6 Cold. 9.
s See this discussed in Ex parte Stanley, 4 Nev. 113.
'Watts v. State, 26 Geo. 231.
[ 355 ]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
secure an immediate trial by admitting that the witnesses, if pres-
ent, would testify to the facts which the prosecution have claimed
could be proved by them.1
It is also requisite that the trial be public. By this is not meant
that every person who sees fit shall in all cases be permitted to
attend criminal trials; because there are many cases where, from
the character of the charge, and the nature of the evidence by
which it is to be supported, the motives to attend the trial on the
part of portions of the community would be of the worst char-
acter, and where a regard to public morals and public decency
would require that at least the young be excluded from hearing
and witnessing the evidences of human depravity which the trial
must necessarily bring to light. The requirement of a public trial
is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly
dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of
interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of
their responsibility and to the importance of their functions; and
the requirement is fairly met with, if, without partiality or favorit-
ism, a reasonable proportion of the public is suffered to attend,
notwithstanding that those persons whose' presence could be of no
service to the accused, and who would only be drawn thither by a
prurient curiosity, are excluded altogether.
[* 313] * But a far more important requirement is that the pro-
ceeding to establish guilt shall not be inquisitorial. A
peculiar excellence of the common-law system of trial over that
which has prevailed in other civilized countries, consists in the fact
that the accused is never compelled to give evidence against him-
self. Much as there was in that system that was heartless and
cruel, it recognized fully the dangerous and utterly untrustworthy
character of extorted confessions, and was never subject to the
reproach that it gave judgment upon them.2
1 The Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Ch. II. c. 2, § 1, required a prisoner charged
with crime to be released on bail, if not indicted the first term after the commit-
ment, unless the king's witnesses could not be obtained; and that he should be
brought to trial as early as the second term after the commitment. The prin-
ciples of this statute are considered as having been adopted into the American
common law: post, 345.
8 See Lieber's paper on Inquisitorial Trials, Appendix to Civil Liberty and
Self-Government. Also the article on Criminal Procedure in Scotland and Eng-
land, Edinb. Review, Oct. 1858. And for an illustration of inquisitorial trials in
our owu day, see Trials of Troppman and Prince Pierre Bonaparte, Am. Law
[ 356 ]
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 313
It is the law in some of the States, when a person is charged
witli crime, and is brought before an examining magistrate, and
the witnesses in support of the charge have been heard, that the
prisoner may also make a statement concerning the transaction
charged against him, and that this may be used against him on the
trial if supposed to have a tendency to establish guilt. But the
prisoner is to be first cautioned that he is under no obligation to
answer any question put to him unless he chooses, and that what-
ever he says and does must be entirely voluntary.1 He is also to be
allowed the presence and advice of counsel; and if that privilege
is denied him it may be sufficient reason for discrediting any dam
aging statements he may have made.2 When, however, the statute
lias been complied with, and no species of coercion appears to
have been employed, the statement the prisoner may have made is
evidence which can be used against him on his trial, and is gen-
erally entitled to great weight.8 And in any other case
•except treason4 the confession of the accused may be [*314]
Review, Vol. V. p. 14. Judge Foster relates from Whitelocke, that the bishop
of London having said to Felton, who had assassinated the Duke of Bucking-
ham, "If you will not confess, you must go to the rack," the man replied, "If it
must be so, I know not whom I may accuse in the extremity of my torture, —
Bishop Laud, perhaps, or any lord of this board." "Sound sense," adds Foster,
"in the mouth of an enthusiast and ruffian." Laud having proposed the rack, the
matter was shortly debated at the board, and it ended in a reference to the judges,
who unanimously resolved that the rack could not be legally used. De Lolme on
Constitution of England (ed. of 1807), p. 181, note; 4 Bl. Com. 325; Broom,
Const. Law, 148; Trial of Felton, 3 State Trials, 368, 371; Brodie, Const. Hist,
c. 8. A legislative body has no more right than a court to make its examination
of parties or witnesses inquisitorial. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.
1 See Rev. Stat of New York, Pt. 4, c. 2, tit. 2, §§ 14-16.
* Rex v. Ellis, Ry. & Mood. 432. However, there is no absolute right to the
presence of counsel, or to publicity in these preliminary examinations, unless
given by statute. Cox ». Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37.
1 It should not, however, be taken on oath, and if it is, that will be sufficient
reason for rejecting it. Rex v. Smith, 1 Stark. 242; Rex o. Webb, 4 C. & P.
664; Rex v. Lewis, 6 C. & P. 161; Rex v. Rivers, 7 C. & P. 177; Regina t>.
Pikesley, 9 C. &. P. 124; People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 384. "The view of
the English judges, that an oath, even where a party is informed be need answer
no questions unless he pleases, would, with most persons, overcome that caution,
is, I think, founded on good reason and experience. I think there is no country
— certainly there is none from which any of our legal notions are borrowed —
where a prisoner is ever examined on oath." People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 318,
per Campbell, J.
4 In treason there can be no conviction unless on the testimony of two wit-
[ 357 ]
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[CH. X.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
received in evidence to establish his guilt, provided no circum-
stance accompanies the making of it which should detract from
ts weight in producing conviction.
But to make it admissible in any case it ought to appear that it
was made voluntarily, and that no motives of hope or fear were
employed to induce the accused to confess. The evidence ought
to be clear and satisfactory that the prisoner was neither threat-
ened nor cajoled into admitting what very possibly was untrue.
Under the excitement of a charge of crime, coolness and self-pos-
session are to be looked for in very few persons; and however
strongly we may reason with ourselves that no one will confess a
heinous offence of which he is not guilty, the records of criminal
courts bear abundant testimony to the contrary. If confessions
could prove a crime beyond doubt, no act which was ever punished
criminally would be better established than witchcraft;1 and the
judicial executions which have been justified by such confessions
ought to constitute a solemn warning against the too ready reli-
ance upon confessions as proof of guilt in any case. As "Mr.
Justice Parke several times observed " while holding one of his
•circuits, " too great weight ought not to be attached to evidence of
what a party has been supposed to have said, as it very frequently
happens, not only that the witness has misunderstood what the
party has said, but that by unintentionally altering a few of the
expressions really used, he gives an effect to the statement com-
pletely at variance with what the party really did say."2 And
when the admission is full and positive, it perhaps quite as often
happens that it has been made under the influence of the terrible
fear excited by the charge, and in the hope that confession may
nesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. Const, of United
States, art. 3, § 8.
1 See Mary Smith's Case, 2 Howell's State Trials, 1049; Case of Essex
Witches, 4 t'6. 817; Case of Suffolk Witches, 6 16. 647; Case of Devon Witches,
8 ih. 1017. It is true that torture was employed freely in cases of alleged witch-
craft, but the delusion was one which often seized upon the victims as well as their
accusers, and led the former to freely confess the most monstrous and impossible
actions. Much curious and valuable information on this subject may be found in
"Superstition and Force," by Lea; "A Physician's Problems," by Elam; and
Leckey, History of Rationalism.
'Note to Earle v. Picken, 5 C. & P. 542. See also 1 Greenl Ev. § 214,
and note; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574; Derby v. Derby, 21 N. J
Eq. 36.
[ 358 ]
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 314
ward * off some of the consequences likely to follow if guilt [* 315]
were persistently denied.
A confession alone ought not to be sufficient evidence of the
corpus delicti. There should be other proof that a crime has actu-
ally been committed; and the confession should only bo allowed
for the purpose of connecting the defendant with the offence.1 And
if the party's hopes or fears are operated upon to induce him to
make it, this fact will be sufficient to preclude the confession being
received; the rule upon this subject being so strict that even say-
ing to the prisoner it will be better for him to confess, has been
decided to be a holding out of such inducements to confession,
especially when said by a person having a prisoner in custody, as
should render the statement obtained by means of it inad-
missible.2 If, however, * statements have been made [* 316]
before the confession, which were likely to do away with
1 In Stringfellow p. State, 26 Miss. 157, a confession of murder was held not
sufficient to warrant conviction, unless the death of the person alleged to have
been murdered was shown by other evidence. In People e. Hennessey, 1.0 Wend.
147, it was decided that a confession of embezzlement by a clerk would not war-
rant a conviction where that constituted the sole evidence that an embezzlement
bad been committed. So on an indictment for blasphemy, the admission by the
defendant that he spoke the blasphemous charge, is not sufficient evidence of the
uttering. People r. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. R. 14. And see State t>. Guild, 5 Halst.
163; Long's Case, 1 Hayw. 524; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349; Ruloff v.
State, 18 N. Y. 179.
2 Rex r. Enoch, 5 C. & P. 539; State v. Bostick, 4 Harr. 563; Boyd v. State,
2 Humph. 390; Morehead v. State, 9 Humph. 635; Commonwealth v. Taylor,
5 Cush. 605; Rex v. Partridge, 7 C. & P. 551; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 97
Mass. 574; State v. Staley, 14 Minn. 105; Frain t». State, 40 Geo. 529; Austine
v. State, 51 111. 236; People v. Phillips, 42 N. Y. 200; State v. Brockman, 46
Mo. 566. Mr. Phillips states the rule thus: "A promise of benefit or favor, or
threat or intimation of disfavor, connected with the subject of the charge, held oi t
by a person having authority in the matter, will be sufficient to exclude a con-
fession made in consequence of such inducements, either of hope or fear. The
prosecutor, or prosecutor's wife or attorney, or the prisoner's master or mistress,
or a constable, or a person assisting him in the apprehension or custody, or a
magistrate acting in the business, or other magistrate, has been respectively looked
upon as having authority in the matter; and the same principle applies if the prin-
ciple has been held out by a person without authority, in the presence of a
person who has such authority, and with his sanction, either express or implied."
1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 544, and cases cited. But we think
the better reason is in favor of excluding confessions where inducements have been
held out by any person, whether acting by authority or not. Rex v. Simpson, 1
Mood. C. C. 410; State v. Guild, 5 Halst. 163; Spears v. State, 2 Ohio, H. s.
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the effect of the inducements, so that the accused cannot be sup-
posed to have acted under their influence, the confession may be
583; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496; Rex v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221; Rex
v. Kingston, ib. 887; Rex t>. Dunn, ib. 543; Rex v. Walkley, 6 C. & P. 175; Rex
v. Thomas, ib. 353. "The reason is, that in the agitation of mind in which the
party charged is supposed to be, he is liable to be influenced by the hope of
advantage or fear of injury to state things which are not true." Per Morion, J.,
in Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496; People v. McMahon, 15 N. T. 387.
There are not wanting many opposing authorities, which proceed upon the idea,
that "a promise made by an indifferent person, who interfered officiously without
any kind of authority, and promised without the means of performance, can scarcely
be deemed sufficient to produce any effect, even on the weakest mind, as an
inducement to confess.". 1 Greenl. Ev. § 223. No supposition could be more
fallacious; and in point of fact a case can scarcely occur in which some one, from
age, superior wisdom or experience, or from his relations to the accused or to
the prosecutor, would not be likely to exercise more influence upon his mind
than some of the persons who are regarded as " in authority " under the rule as
stated by Mr. Phillips. Mr. Greenleaf thinks that, while as a rule of law all
confessions made to persons in authority should be rejected, " promises and threats
by private persons, not being found so uniform in their operation, perhaps may,
with more propriety, be treated as mixed questions of law and fact; the prin-
ciple of law, that a confession must be voluntary, being strictly adhered to, and
the question, whether the promises or threats of the private individuals who
employed them were sufficient to overcome the mind of the prisoner, being left
to the discretion of the judge under all the circumstances of the case." 1 Greenl.
Ev. § 223. This is a more reasonable rule than that which admits such confessions
under all circumstances; but it is impossible for a judge to say whether induce-
ments, in a particular case, have influenced the mind or not; if their nature were
such that they were calculated to have that effect, it is safer, and more in accord-
ance with the human principles of our criminal law, to presume, in favor of life
and liberty, that the confessions were "forced from the mind by the flattery of
hope, or by the torture of fear" (per Eyre, C. B., Warickshall's Case, 1 Leach,
C. C. 299), and exclude them altogether. This whole subject is very fully con-
sidered in note to 2 Leading Criminal Cases, 182. And see Whart. Cr. Law,
§ 686 et seq. The cases of People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 385, and Common-
wealth v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574, have carefully considered the general subject.
In the second of these, the prisoner had asked the officer who made the arrest,
whether he had better plead guilty, and the officer had replied that "as a general
thing it was better for a man who was guilty to plead guilty, for he got a lighter
sentence." After this he made statements which were relied upon to prove
guilt. These statements were not allowed to be given in evidence. Per Foster, J.:
"There is no doubt that any inducement of temporal fear or favor coming from
one in authority, which preceded and may have influenced a confession, will cause
it to be rejected, unless the confession is made under such circumstances as to
show that the influence of the inducement had passed away. No cases require
more careful scrutiny than those of disclosures made by the party under arrest to
[360]
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 316
received in evidence;1 but the showing ought to be very satisfac-
tory on this point before the court should presume that the pris-
oner's hopes did not still cling to, or his fears dwell upon, the first
inducements.2
Before prisoners were allowed the benefit of assistance from
counsel on trials for high crimes, it was customary for them to
make such statements as they saw fit concerning the charge against
them, during the progress of the trial, or after the evidence for the
prosecution was put in; and upon these statements the prose-
cuting officer or the court would sometimes ask questions, which
the accused might answer or not at his option. And although this
practice has now become obsolete, yet if the accused in any case
should manage or assist in his own defence, and should claim the
right of addressing the jury, it would be difficult to confine him
to " the record " as the counsel may be confined in his
* argument. A disposition has been manifested of late to [* 317]
allow the accused to give evidence in his own behalf; and
statutes to that effect are in existence in some of the States, the
operation of which is believed to have been generally satisfactory.3
These statutes, however, cannot be so construed as to authorize
compulsory process against an accused to compel him to disclose
more than he chooses; they do not so far change the old system
the officer who has him in custody, and in none will slighter threats or promises
of favor exclude the subsequent confessions. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Cush.
610; Commonwealth p. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 193; Commonwealth v. Morey,
1 Gray, 461. 'Saying to the prisoner that it will be the worse for him if he does
not confess, or that it will be the better for him if he does, is sufficient to exclude
the confession, according to constant experience.' 2 Hale, P. C. 659; 1 Greenl.
Ev. § 219; 2 Bennett and Heard's Lead. Cp. Cas. 164. Each case depends
largely on its own special circumstances. But we have before us an instance in
which the officer actually held out to the defendant the hope and inducement of
a lighter sentence if he pleaded guilty. And a determination to plead guilty at
the trial, thus induced, would naturally lead to an immediate disclosure of guilt."
And the court held it an unimportant circumstance that the advice of the officer
was given at the request of the prisoner, instead of being volunteered.
1 State p. Guild, 5 Halst. 163; Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Penn. St. 269;
State v. Vaigneur, 5 Rich. 391; Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. 535; Rex v. Howes,
6 C. & P. 404; Rex v. Richards, 5 C. & P. 318; Thompson v. Commonwealth,
20 Grat. 724.
1 See State p. Roberts, 1 Dev. 259; Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. 535; Thomp-
son v. Commonwealth, 20 Grat. 724; State v. Lowhorne, 66 N. C. 538.
J See American Law Register, Vol. V. (n. s.) pp. 129, 705.
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* 317 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. X
as to establish an inquisitorial process for obtaining evidat;
they confer a privilege, which the defendant may use at Ins option;
If he does not choose to avail himself of it, unfavorable inferences
are not to be drawn to his prejudice from that circumstance;1 and
if he does testify, he is at liberty to stop at any point he chooses,
and it must be left to the jury to give a statement, which he declines
to make a full one, such weight as, under the circumstances, they
think it entitled to;2 otherwise the statute must have set aside
and overruled the constitutional maxim which protects an accused
1 People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555. For a case
resting upon an analogous principle, see Carne v. Litchfield, 2 Mich. 340. A
different view would seem to be taken in Maine. See State v. Bartlett, 5o Me.
200. And see the next note. In Devries v. Phillips, 63 N. C. 53, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held it not admissible for counsel to comment to the
jury on the fact that the opposite party did not come forward to be sworn is i
witness as the statute permitted. See also Crandall v. People, 2 Lansing, 309.
In Michigan the wife of an accused party may be sworn as a witness with his
assent; but it has been held that his failure to call her was not to subject him
to inferences of guilt, even though the case was such that if his defence was
true, his wife must have been cognizant of the facts. Knowles r. People, lo
Mich. 408.
* By a recent case this paragraph appears to have led to some misapprehension
of our views, and consequently we must regard it as unfortunately worded.
Nevertheless, after full consideration, it has been concluded to leave it as it
stands. What we intend to affirm by it is, that the privilege to testify in his
own behalf is one the accused may waive without justly subjecting himself to un-
favorable comments; and that if he avails himself of it, and stops short of a full
disclosure, no compulsory process can be made use of to compel him to testily
further. It was not designed to be understood that, in the latter case, his failure
to answer any proper question would not be the subject of comment and criticism
by counsel; but, on the contrary, it was supposed that this was implied in the
remark, that " it must be left to the jury to give a statement which he declines to
make a full one such weight as, under the circumstances, they think it entitled
to." All circumstances which it is proper for the jury to consider, it is proper
for counsel to comment upon.
The case referred to is that of State v. Ober, just decided in the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire. The defendant was put on trial for an illegal sale
of liquors; and, having offered himself as a witness, was asked on cross-examin-
ation a question directly relating to the sale. He declined to answer, on the
ground that it might tend to criminate him. Being convicted, it was alleged for
error that the court suffered the prosecuting officer to comment on this refusal
to the jury. The Supreme Court held this no error. We not only approve of
this ruling, but we should be at a loss for reasons which could furnish plausible
support for any other. It is in entire accord with the practice which has pre-
vailed without question in Michigan, and which has always assumed that the
[ 362 ]
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a JjCH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 317
party against being compelled to testify against himself, and the
statutory privilege becomes a snare and a danger.1
* The testimony for the people in criminal cases can [* 318]
only, as a general rule, be given by witnesses who are
present in court.2 The defendant is entitled to be confronted
right of comment, where the party makes himself his own witness and then
refuses to answer proper questions, was as clear as the right to exemption from
unfavorable comment when he abstains from asserting his statutory privilege.
The case of Connors v. People, 50 N. Y. 240, is different. There the
defendant, having taken the stand as a witness, objected to answer a question;
but was directed by the court to do so, and obeyed the direction. This was held
no error, because he had waived his pr vilege. If the defendant had persisted in
refusing, we are not advised what action the court would have deemed it proper
to take, and it is easy to conceive of serious embarrassments in such a case.
Under the Michigan practice, when the court had decided the question to be a
proper one, it would have been left to the defendant to answer or not at his
option, but if he failed to answer what seemed to the jury a proper inquiry,
it would be thought surprising if they gave his imperfect statement much cre-
dence.
1 The statute of Michigan of 1861, p. 169, removed the common-law disabili-
ties of parties to testify, and added, "Notbin r in this act shall be construed as
giving the right to compel a defendant in criminal cases to testify; but any such
defendant shall be at liberty to make a statement to the court or jury, and may
be cross-examined on any such statement. It has been held that this statement
should not be under oath. People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 814. That its purpose
was to give every person on trial for crime an opportunity to make full explana-
tion to the jury, in respect to the circumstances given in evidence which are sup-
posed to have a bearing against him. Annis v. People, 13 Mich. 511. That the
statement is evidence in the case, to which the jury can attach such weight as
they think it entitled to. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212. That the court has
no right to instruct the jury that, when it conflicts with the testimony of an un-
impeached witness, they must believe the latter in preference. Durant v. People,
13 Mich, 351. And that the prisoner, while on the stand, is entitled to the
assistance of counsel in directing his attention to any branch of the charge, that
he may make explanations concerning it if he desires. Annis v. People, 13 Mich.
511. The prisoner does not cease to be a defendant by becoming a witness, nor
forfeit righ s by accepting a privilege. In People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 321,
Campbell, J., in speaking of the right which the statute gives to cross-examine a
defendant who has made his statement, says: "And while his constitutional right
of decli ing to answer questions cannot be removed, yet a refusal by a party
to answer any fair question, not going outside of what he has offered to explain,
would have its proper weight with the jury." See Commonwealth v. Mullen, 97
Mass. 547; Commonwealth v. Curtis, t&. 574; Commonwealth v. Morgan, 107
Mass. 199.
1 State p. Thomas, 64 N. C. 74; Goodman ». State, Meigs, 197; Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 19 Grat. 656. By the old common law, a party accused of felony
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with the witnesses against him; and if any of them be absent
from the Commonwealth, so that their attendance cannot be com-
pelled, or if they be dead, or have become incapacitated to give
evidence, there is no mode by which their statements against the
prisoner can be used for his conviction. The exceptions to this
rule are of cases which are excluded from its reasons by their
peculiar circumstances; but they are far from numerous. If the
witness was sworn before the examining magistrate, or before a
coroner, and the accused had an opportunity then to cross-examiue
him, or if there were a former trial on which he was sworn, it
seems allowable to make use of his deposition, or of the minutes
of his examination, if the witness has since deceased, or is insane,
or sick and unable to testify, or has been summoned but appears
to have been kept away by the opposite party.1 So, also, if a per-
son is on trial for homicide, the declarations of the party whom he
is charged with having killed, if made under the solemnity of a con-
viction that he was at the point of death, and relating to matters
of fact concerning the homicide, which passed under his own obser-
vation, may be given in evidence against the accused ; the condition
of the party who made them being such that every motive to false-
hood must be supposed to have been silenced, and the mind to be
impelled by the most powerful considerations to tell the truth.2
was not allowed to call witnesses to contradict the evidence for the Crown; and
this seems to have been on some idea that it would be derogatory to the royal
dignity to permit it. Afterwards, when they were permitted to be called, they
made their statements without oath; and it was not uncommon for both the
prosecution and the court to comment upon their testimony as of little weight
because unsworn. It was not until Queen Anne's time that they were put under
oath.
The rule that the prisoner shall be confronted with the witnesses against him
does not preclude such documentary evidence to establish collateral facts as
would be admissible under the rules of the common law in other cases. U. S. v.
Benner, Baldw. 240; U. S. v. Little, 2 Wash. C. C. 205; U. S. v. Ortega, i
Wash. C. C. 631. But the corpus delicti — e.g. the fact of marriage in an in-
dictment for bigamy — cannot be proved by certificates. People v. Lambert,
5 Mich. 349.
1 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 163-166; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 520-527; Whart. Cr. Law,
§ 667; 2 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 217, 229. Whether evidence
that the witness cannot be found after diligent inquiry, or is out of the jurisdic-
tion, would be sufficient to let in proof of his former testimony, see Bui. N. P.
239, 242; Rex v. Hagan, 8 C. & P. 167; Sills v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 601.
• 1 Greenl. Ev. § 156; 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 285-289;
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Not that such evidence is of very conclusive character: it is not
always easy for the hearer to determine how much of the declara-
tion related to what was seen and positively known, and
how much was surmise * and suspicion only; but it is [* 319]
admissible from the necessity of the case, and the jury
must judge of the weight to be attached to it.
In cases of felony, where the prisoner's life or liberty is in peril,
he has the right to be present, and must be present, during the
whole of the trial, and until the final judgment. If he be absent,
either in prison or by escape, there is a want of jurisdiction over
the person, and the court cannot proceed with the trial, or receive
the verdict, or pronounce the final judgment.1 But misdemeanors
may be tried in the absence of the accused.
The Traverse Jury.
Accusations of criminal conduct are tried at the common law by
jury;2 and wherever the right to this trial is guaranteed by the
constitution without qualification or restriction, it must be under-
stood as retained in all those cases which were triable by jury at
Whart. Cp. Law, §§ 689-682; Donnelly v. State, 2 Dutch. 463; Hill's Case, 2
Grat. 594;. State p. Freeman, 1 Speers, 57; State v. Brunetto, 13 La An. 45;
Dunn v. State, 2 Pike, 229; Mose v. State, 35 Ala. 421; Brown v. State, 32 Miss.
433; Whitley v. State, 38 Geo. 70; State v. Quick, 15 Rich. 158; Jackson v
Commonwealth, 19 Grat. 656; State v. Oliver, 2 Houston, 585. This whole
subject was largely considered in Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193.
1 See Andrews v. State, 2 Sneed, 550 ; Jacobs v. Cone, 5 S. & R. 835; Witt
v. State, 5 Cold. 11; State p. Alman, 64 N. C. 364; Gladden v. State, 12 Fla.
577; Maurer v. People, 43 N. Y. 1; Note to Winchell v. State, 7 Cow. 525. In
capital cases the accused stands upon all his rights, and waives nothing. Demp-
aey v. People, 47 1ll. 325; People v. McKay, 18 Johns. 217; Burley v. State, 1
Neb. 385. The court cannot make an order changing the venue in a criminal
case in the absence of and without notice to the defendant. Ex parte Bryan,
44 Ala. 404. Nor in the course of the trial allow evidence to be given to the
jury in his absence, even though it be that of a witness which had been previously
reduced to writing. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 19 Grat. 656; Wade v. State,
12 Geo. 25. And in a capital case the record must affirmatively show the pres-
ence of the accused at the trial, and when the verdict is received and sentence
pronounced. Dougherty v. Commonwealth, 69 Penn. St. 286.
'It is worthy of note that all that is extant of the legislation of the Plymouth
Colony for the first five years, consists of the single regulation, "that all criminal
facts, and also all manner of trespasses and debts between man and man, shall
be tried by the verdict of twelve honest men, to be impanelled by authority, in
form of a jury, upon their oath." 1 Palfrey's New England, 340.
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the common law, and with all the common-law incidents to a jury
trial, so far, at least, as they can be regarded as tending to the
protection of the accused.1
A petit, petty, or traverse jury is a body of twelve men, who are
sworn to try the facts of a case, as they are presented in the
evidence placed before them. Any less than this number of
twelve would not be a common-law jury, and not such a jury as
the Constitution guarantees to accused parties, when a less number
is not allowed in express terms; and the necessity of a full panel
could not be waived — at least, in case of felony—even by
consent.2 The infirmity in case of a trial by a jury of less than
twelve, by consent, would be that the tribunal would be one
unknown to the law, created by mere voluntary act of the parties;
and it would in effect be an attempt to submit to a species of
arbitration the question whether the accused has been guilty of au
offence against the State. But in those cases which formerly were
not triable by jury, if the legislature provide for such a trial now,
they may doubtless create for the purpose a statutory tribunal,
composed of any number of persons, and no question of constitu-
tional power or right could arise.
1 See note to p. 410, post. A citizen not in the land or naval service, or in
the militia in actual service, cannot be tried by court-martial or military commis-
sion, on a charge of discouraging volunteer enlistments or resisting a military
conscription. In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.
The constitutional right of trial by jury extends to newly created offences.
Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283; State v. Peterson, 41 Vt. 504. But not to
offences against city by-laws. McGenr v. Woodruff, 4 Vroom, 213.
* Work v. State, 2 Ohio, n. s. 290; Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128;
Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. 561; 2 Lead. Cr. Can. 337; Hill t>. People, 16 Mich.
351. And see State o. Everett, 14 Minn. 447. In Commonwealth o. Dailey, 12
Cush. 80, it was held that, in a case of misdemeanor, the consent of the deft-nd-
ant that a verdict might be received from eleven jurors was binding upon him,
and the verdict was valid. See also State v. Cox, 3 Eng. 436; Murphy r. Com-
monwealth, 1 Met. (Ky.) 365; Tyzee v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 1; State
v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470; Brown v. State, 16 Ind. 496; Opinions of Judges, 41
N. H. 550. In Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 356, it was decided that if one of the
jurors called was an alien, the defendant did not waive the objection by faib'ng to
challenge him, if he was not aware of the disqualification; and if the court refused
to set aside the verdict on affidavits showing these facts, the judgment upon it
would be reversed on error. The case of State r. Quarrel, 2 Bay, 150, is contra.
The case of Stone v. State, 2 Scam. 326, in which it was held competent for the
court, even in a capital case, to strike off a juryman after he was sworn, because
of alienage, affords some support for' Hill v. People.
[ 366 ]
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Cfl. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. *~319
Many of the incidents of a common-law trial by jury are essen-
tial elements of the right. The jury must be indifferent between
the prisoner and the commonwealth; and to secure impartiality
challenges are allowed, both for cause, and also peremptory with-
out assigning cause. Th s jury must also be summoned
*from the vicinage where the crime is supposed to have [* 320]
been committed ;1 and the accused will thus have the
benefit on his trial of his own good character and standing with
his neighbors, if these he has preserved; and also of such
knowledge as the jury may possess of the witnesses who may give
evidence against him. He will also be able with more certainty to
secure the attendance of his own witnesses. The jury must unani-
mously concur in the verdict. This is a very old requirement in
1 Offences against the United States are to be tried in the'district, and those
against the State in the county in which they are charged to have been committed;
but courts are generally empowered, on the application of an accused party, to
order a change of venue, where for any reason a fair and impartial trial cannot
be had in the locality. It has been held incompetent to order such a change of
renue on the application of the prosecution. Kirk v. State, 1 Cold. 344. See also
Wheeler d. State, 24 Wis. 52; Osborn v. State, 24 Ark. 629. And in another
case in Tennessee it was decided that a statute which permitted offences com-
mitted near the boundary line of two counties to be tried in either was an invasion
of the constitutional principle stated in the text. Armstrong v. State, 1 Cold.
338. See also State v. Denton, 6 Cold. 539. But see State r. Robinson, 14
Minn. 447.
A most extraordinary attempt to deprive a party of the benefit of trial by a
jury of the vicinage was recently frustrated by the ecision of Judge Blatchford,
U.S. District Judge for the southern district of New York. The "New York Sun,"
of which Mr. Charles A. Dana was editor-in-chief, published an article reflecting
upon the public conduct of an official at Washington. This article was claimed
to be a libel. The actual offence, if any, was committed in New York; but a
technical publication also took place in Washington, by the sale of papers there.
The offended party chose to have his complaint tried summarily by a police justice
of the latter city, instead of submitting it to a jury required to be indifferent
between the parties. A U. S. Commissioner, well read rather in the arbitrary
lessons of civil war than in the principles of civil liberty, had no hesitation in
issuing a warrant for Mr. Dana's arrest in New York for transportation to Wash-
ington for trial; but Judge Blatchford treated the proceeding with little respect,
and ordered Mr. Dana's discharge. It would have been a singular result of a
revolution where one of the grievances complained of was the assertion of a right
to send parties abroad for trial, if it should have been found that an editor might
be seized any where in the Union and transported by a federal officer to every
territory in which his paper might find its way, I o be tr d in ch in succession
for offences which consisted in a single act not actually done in any of them.
[ 367 ]
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* 320 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. X.
the English common law, and it has been adhered to, notwithstand-
ing very eminent men have assailed it as unwise and inexpedient.1
And the jurors must be left free to act in accordance with the
dictates of their judgment. The final decision upon the facts is to
rest with them, and interference by the court with a view to coerce
them into a verdict against their convictions, is unwarrantable and
irregular. A judge is not justified in expressing his opinion to
the jury that the defendant is guilty upon the evidence adduced.2
Still less would he be justified in refusing to receive and record the
verdict of the jury, because of its being, in his opinion, rendered
in favor of the prisoner when it ought not to have been.
1 For the origin of this principle, see Forsyth, Trial by Jury, c. 11. The
requirement of unanimity does not prevail in Scotland, or on the Continent.
Among the eminent men who have not approved it may be mentioned Locke and
Jeremy Bentham. See Forsyth, supra; Lieber, Civil Liberty and Sell-Govern-
ment, c. 20.
* A judge who urges his opinion upon the facts to the jury decides the cause,
while avoiding the responsibility. How often would a jury be found bold enough
to declare their opinion in opposition to that of the judge upon the bench, whose
words would fall upon their ears with all the weight which experience, learning,
and commanding position must always carry with them? What lawyer would
care to sum up his case, if he knew that the judge, whose words would be so
much more influential, was to declare in his favor, or would be bold enough to
argue the facts to the jury, if he knew the judge was to declare against hira?
Blackstone has justly remarked that "in settling and adjusting a question of fact,
where intrusted to any single magistrate, partiality and injustice have an ample
field to range in; either by boldly asserting that to be proved which is not so, or
by more artfully distinguishing away the remainder." 8 Bl. Com. 380. These
are evils which jury trial is designed to prevent; but the effort must be vain if
the judge is to control by his opinion where the law has given him no power to
command. In Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, c. 181, the author
justly condemns the practice with some judges in libel cases, of expressing to the
jury their belief in the defendant's guilt. On the trial of parties, charged with
a libel on the Empress of Russia, Lord Kenyan, sneering at the late Libel Act,
said: "I am bound by my oath to declare my own opinion, and I should forget
my duty were I not to say to you that it is a gross libel." Upon this Lord
Campbell remarks: "Mr. Fox's act only requires the judges to give their opinion
on matters of law in libel cases as in other cases. But did any judge ever say,
'Gentlemen, I am of opinion that this is a wilful, malicious, and atrocious mur-
der '? For a considerable time after the act passed, against the unanimous oppo-
sition of the judges, they almost all spitefully followed this course. I myself
h ard one judge say: * As the legislature requires me to give my own opinion in
the present case, I am of opinion that this is a diabolically atrocious libel."
Upon this subject, see McGuffie v. State, 17 Geo. 497; State v. McGinnis, 5
Nev. 337; Pittock v. O'Niell, 63 Penn. St. 253; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 544.
[ 368 J
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 320
* He discharges his duty of giving instructions to the [* 321]
jury when he informs them what in his view the law is
which is applicable to the case before them, and what is essential
to constitute the offence charged; and the jury should be left free
and unbiassed by his opinion to determine for themselves whether
the facts in evidence are such as, in the light of the instructions of
the judge, make out beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused
party is guilty as alleged.1
How far the jury are to judge of the law as well as of the facts,
is a question, a discussion of which we do not propose to enter upon.
If it be their choice to do so, they may return specially what facts
they find established by the evidence, and allow the court to apply
the law to those facts, and thereby to determine whether the party
is guilty or not. But they are not obliged in any case to find a
special verdict; they have a right to apply for themselves the law
to the facts, and to express their own opinion, upon the whole evi-
dence, of the defendant's guilt. Where a general verdict is thus
given, the jury necessarily determine in their own mind what the
law of the case is;2 and if their determination is favorable to the
prisoner, no mode is known to the law in which it can be reviewed
or reversed. A writ of error does not lie on behalf of the Com-
monwealth to reverse an acquittal, unless expressly given
by statute;3 nor can a new * trial be granted in such a [* 322]
1 The independence of the jury, so far as regards the matters of fact in issue
before them, was settled by Penn's Case, 6 Howell's State Trials, 951, and by
Bushel's Case, which grew out of it, and is reported in Vaughan's Reports, 135.
A very full account of these cases is also found in Forsyth on Trial by Jury,
397. See Bushel's Case also in Broom's Const. Law, 120, and the valuable note
thereto. Bushel was foreman of the jury which refused to find a verdict of guilty
at the dictation of the court, and he was punished as for contempt of court for
his refusal, but was released on habeas corpus.
* "As the main object of the institution of the trial by a jury is to guard
accused persons against all decisions whatsoever by men intrusted with any per-
manent official authority, it is not only a settled principle that the opinion which
the judge delivers has no weight but such as the jury choose to give it, but their
verdict must besides [unless they see fit to return a special finding] comprehend
the whole matter in trial, and decide as well upon the fact as upon the point of
law which may arise out of it; in other words, they must pronounce both on the
commission of a certain fact, and on the reason which makes such fact to be con-
trary to law." DeLolme on the Constitution of England, c. 13.
1 See State ». Reynolds, 4 Hayw. 110; United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 174;
People v. Dill, 1 Scam. 257; People v. Royal, »*6. 557; Commonwealth v. Cum-
24 [ 369 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 322
[CH. I.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
case;1 but neither a writ of error nor a motion for a new trial
could reach an erroneous determination by the jury, because,
as they do not give reasons for their verdict, the precise grounds
for it can never be legally known, and it is always presumable that
it was given in favor of the accused because the evidence was not
sufficient in degree or satisfactory in character; and no one is at
liberty to allege or suppose that they have disregarded the law.
Nevertheless, as it is the duty of the court to charge the jury
upon the law applicable to the case, it is still an important question
whether it is the duty of the jury to receive and act upon the law
as given to them by the court, or whether on the other hand, his
opinion is advisory only, so that they are at liberty either to follow
it if it accords with their own convictions, or to disregard it if it
does not.
In one class of cases, that is to say, in criminal prosecutions for
libels, it is now very generally provided by the State constitutions,
or by statute, that the jury shall determine the law and the facts.2
mings, 3 Cush. 212; People v. Corning, 2 N. Y. 9; State v. Kemp, 17 Wis. 669.
A constitutional provision, saving "to the defendant the right of appeal" in
criminal cases, does not, by implication, preclude the legislature from giving to
the prosecution the same right. State v. Tait, 22 Iowa, 143.
1 People v. Comstock, 8 Wend. 549; State v. Brown, 16 Conn. 54; State r.
Eanouse, 1 Spencer, 115; State v. Burns, 3 Texas, 118; State r. Taylor, 1
Hawks, 462.
* See Constitutions of Alabama, Connecticut, California, Delaware, Georgia,
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. That of Maryland makes the jury judges of the
law in all criminal cases; and the same rule is established by constitution or statute
in some other States. In Holder v. State, 5 Geo. 444, the following view was taken
of such a Btatute: "Our penal code declares, 'On every trial of a crime or
offence contained in this code, or for any crime or offence, the jury shall be judges
of the law and the fact, and shall in every case give a general verdict of guilty or
not guilty, and on the acquittal of any defendant or prisoner, no new trial shall oc
any account be granted by the court.' Juries were, at common law, in some sense
judges of the law. Having the right of rendering a general verdict, that right
involved a judgment on the law as well as the facts, yet not such a judgment ai
necessarily to control the court. The early commentators on the common law,
notwithstanding they concede this right, yet hold that it is the duty of the jury
to receive the law from the court. Thus Blackstone equivocally writes: • And
such public or open verdict may be either general, guilty or not guilty, or special,
setting forth all the circumstances of the case, and praying the judgment of the
court whether, for instance, on the facts stated, it be murder or manslaughter, or
no crime at all. This is where they doubt the matter of law, and therefore c/tooie
[ 370 ]
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 322
How great a change is made in the common law by these
* provisions it is difficult to say, because the rule of the [* 323]
common law was not very clear upon the authorities; but
for that very reason, and because the law of libel was sometimes
administered with great harshness, it was certainly proper, and
highly desirable, that a definite and liberal rule should be thus
established.1
In all other cases the jury have the clear legal right to return a
simple verdict of guilty or not guilty, and in so doing they necessa-
rily decide such questions of law as well as of fact as are involved
in the general question of guilt. If their view conduce to an
acquittal, their verdict to that effect can neither be reviewed nor
Bet aside. In such a case, therefore, it appears that they pass upon
the law as well as the facts, and that their finding is conclusive. If,
on the other hand, their view leads them to a verdict of guilty, and
it is the opinion of the court that such verdict is against law, the
verdict will be set aside and a new trial granted. In such a case,
although they have judged of the law, the court sets aside their
conclusion as improper and unwarranted. But it is clear that the
jury are no more the judges of the law when they acquit than
to 'leave it to the determination of the court, though they have an unquestionable
right of determining upon all the circumstances, and of finding a general verdict
if they think proper so to hazard a breach of their oath,' &c. i Bl. Com. 361;
Co. Lit 228 a; 2 Hale, P. C. 313. Our legislature have left no doubt about
this matter. The juries in Georgia can find no special verdict at law. They are
declared to be judges of the law and the facts, and are required in every case to
give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty; so jealous and rightfully jealous
were our ancestors of the influence of the State upon the trial of a citizen charged
with crime. We are not called upon in this case to determine the relative strength
of the judgment of the court and the jury, upon the law in criminal cases, and
shall express no opinion thereon. We only say it is the right and duty of the
court to declare the law in criminal cases as well as civil, and that it is at the
same time the right of the jury to judge of the law as well as of the facts in crimi-
nal cases. I would not be understood as holding that it is not the province of
the court to give the law of the case distinctly in charge to the jury; it is unques-
tionably its privilege and its duty to instruct them as to what the law is, and
officially to direct their finding as to the law, yet at the same time in such way as
not to limit the range of their judgment." See also McGutfie v. State, 17 Geo.
497; Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 480.
1 For a condensed history of the struggle in England on this subject, see
May's Constitutional History, c. 9. See also Lord Campbell's Lives of the
Chancellors, c 178; Introduction to Speeches of Lord Erskine, edited by James
L. High; Forsyth's Trial by Jury, c. 12.
[371]
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* 323 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. X.
when they condemn, and the different result in the two cases comes
from the merciful maxim of the common law, which will not suffer
an accused party to be twice put in jeopardy for the same cause,
however erroneous may have been the first acquittal. In theory,
therefore, the rule of law would seem to be, that it is the
[* 324] duty of the 'jury to receive and follow the law as delivered
to them by the court; and such is the clear weight of
authority.1
There are, however, opposing decisions,2 and it is evident that
the judicial prerogative to direct conclusively upon the law cannot
be carried very far or insisted upon with much pertinacity, when
the jury have such complete power to disregard it, without the
'United States r. Battiste, 2 Sum. 240; Stittinus v. United States, 5 Cranch,
C. C. 578; United States v. Morris, 1 Curt. 53; United States v. Riley, 5 BlatcL
206; Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 427; Robbing v. State, 8 Ohio, n. s. 131;
Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263; Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185;
Commonwealth v. Rock, 10 Gray, 4; State v. Peace, 1 Jones, 251; Handy r.
State, 7 Mo. 607; Nels v. State, 2 Texas, 280; People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 566;
Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603; People v. Finnigan, 1 Park. C. R. 147; Safford
v. People, ib. 474; McGowan i>. State, 9 Yerg. 184; Pleasant p. State, 13 Ark.
360; Montee v. Commonwealth, 3 J.J. Marsh. 132; Commonwealth v. Van
Tuyl, 1 Met. (Ky.) 1; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536; People v. Stewart, 7 Cal.
40; Batre p. State, 18 Ala. 119, reviewing previous cases in the same State. "Ai
the jury have the right, and if required by the prisoner are bound to return •
general verdict of guilty or not guilty, they must necessarily, in the discharge of
their duty, decide such questions of law as well as of fact as are involved in the
general question, and there is no mode in which their opinions on questions of
law can be reviewed by this court or any other tribunal. But this does not
diminish the obligation of the court to explain the law. The instructions of the
court in matters of law may safely guide the consciences of the jury, unless they
know them to be wrong; and when the jury undertake to decide the law (as they
undoubtedly have the power to do) in opposition to the advice of the court,
they assume a high responsibility, and should be very careful to see clearly that
they are right." Commonwealth p. Knapp, 10 Pick. 496, cited with approval in
McGowan v. State, 9 Yerg. 195, and Bale v. State, 10 Yerg. 555.
* See especially State p. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14, where will be found a very full
and carefully considered opinion, holding that at the common law the jury are
the judges of the law in criminal cases. See also State p. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 280;
Doss v. Commonwealth, 1 Grat. 557; State v. Jones, 5 Ala. 666; State c. Snow,
6 Shep. 346; State v. Allen, 1 McCord, 525; Armstrong v. State, 4 Blackf. 247;
Warren v. State, ib. 150; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326; Lynch p. State, 9 Ind.
641; Nelson p. State, 2 Swan, 482; People v. Thayers, 1 Park. C. R. 596; People
p. Videto, ib. 603; McPherson v. State, 22 Geo. 478. The subject was largely
discussed in People p. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337.
[ 372]
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 324
action degenerating into something like mere scolding. Upon tins
subject the remarks of Mr. Justice Baldwin, of the Supreme Court
of the United States, to a jury assisting him in the trial of a crim-
inal charge, and which are given in the note, seem peculiarly dig-
nified and appropriate, and at the same time to embrace about all
that can properly be said to a jury on this subject.1
1 "In repeating to you what was said on a former occasion to another jury,
that you have the power to decide on the law, as well as the facts of this case,
and are not bound to 6nd according'to our opinion of the law, we feel ourselves
constrained to make some explanations not then deemed necessary, but now
called for from the course of the defence. You may find a general verdict of
guilty or not guilty, as you think proper, or you may find the facts specially, and
leave the guilt or innocence of the prisoner to the judgment of the court. If
your verdict acquit the prisoner, we cannot grant a new trial, however much we
may differ with you as to the law which governs the case; and in this respect a
jury are the judges of the law, if they choose to become so. Their judgment is
final, not because they settle the law, but because they think it not applicable, or
do not choose to apply it to the case.
"But if a jury find a prisoner guilty against the opinion of the court on the
law of the case, a new trial will be granted. No court will pronounce a judg-
ment on a prisoner against what they believe to be the law. On an acquittal
there is no judgment; and the court do not act, and cannot judge, there remain-
ing nothing to act upon.
"This, then, you will understand to be what is meant by your power to decide
on the law, but you will still bear in mind that it is a very old, sound, and valuable
maxim in law, that the court answers to questions of law, and the jury to facts.
Every day's experience evinces the wisdom of this rule." United States v. Wil-
son, Baldw. 108. We quote also from an Alabama case: "When the power of
juries to find a general verdict, and consequently their right to determine without
appeal both law and fact, is admitted, the abstract question whether it is or is not
their duty to receive the law from the court becomes rather a question of casuistry
or conscience than one of law; nor can we think that any thing is gained in the
administration of criminal justice by urging the jury to disregard the opinion of
the court upon the law of the case. It must, we think, be admitted, that the
judge is better qualified to expound the law, from his previous training, than the
jury; and in practice, unless he manifests a wanton disregard of the rights of
the prisoner. — a circumstance which rarely happens in this age of the world
and in this country, — his opinion of the law will be received by the jury as an
authoritative exposition, from their conviction of his superior knowledge of the
subject. The right of the jury is doubtless one of inestimable value, especially
in those cases where it may be supposed that the government has an interest in
the conviction of the criminal; but in this country where the government in all
its branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, is created by the people, and is
in fact their servant, we are unable to perceive why the jury should be invited
or urged to exercise this right contrary to their own convictions of their capacity
to do so, without danger of mistake. It appears to us that it is sufficient that it
[ 373 ]
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[* 325] * One thing more is essential to a proper protection of
accused parties, and that is, that one shall not be subject to
is admitted that it is their peculiar province to-determine facts, intents, and pur-
poses; that it is their right to find a general verdict, and consequently that thej
must determine the law; and whether in the exercise of this right they will dis-
trust the court as expounders of the law, or whether they will receive the kw
from the court, must be left to their own discretion under the sanction of the oath
they have taken." State v. Jones, 5 Ala. 672. But as to this case, see Batre t.
State, 18 Ala. 119.
It cannot be denied that discredit is sometimes brought upon the administra-
tion of justice by juries acquitting parties who are sufficiently shown to be guilty,
and where, had the trial been by the court, a conviction would have been sure to
follow. In such cases it must be supposed that the jury have been controlled br
their prejudices or their sympathies. However that may be, it by no means fol-
lows that because the machinery of jury trial does not work satisfactorily in
every case, we must therefore condemn and abolish the system, or, what is still
worse, tolerate it, and yet denounce it as being unworthy of public confidence.
Jury trial, when considered in all its aspects, — as an instrument in the admin-
istration of justice; as an educator of the people in law and politics; and as a
means of making them feel their responsibility in the government, and the
important part they bear in its administration,—is by far the best system of
trial yet devised; and we must take it with all its concomitants, among which is
a due sense of independence in the jurors. The institution loses its value when
the jury becomes a mere instrument for receiving and echoing back the opinions
of the judge on the case in trial. Concede its defects, and the truth still
remains, that its benefits are indispensable. The remarks of Lord Erskine, the
most distinguished jury lawyer known to English history, may be quoted as
peculiarly appropriate in this connection: "It is of the nature of every thing
that is great and useful, both in the animate and inanimate world, to be wild and
irregular, and we must be content to take them with the alloys which belong to
them, or live without them. . . . Liberty herself, the last and best gift of God
to his creatures, must be taken just as she is. You might pare her down into
bashful regularity, shape her into a perfect model of severe, scrupulous law; but
she would then be Liberty no longer; and you must be content to die under
the lash of this inexorable justice which you have exchanged for the banners of
freedom."
The province of the jury is sometimes invaded by instructions requiring them
to adopt, as absolute conclusions of law, those deductions which they are at
liberty to draw from a particular state of facts, if they regard them as reason-
able: such as that a homicide must be presumed malicious, unless the defendant
proves the contrary; which is a rule contradictory of the results of common
observation; or that evidence of a previous good character in the defendant
ought to be disregarded, unless the other proof presents a doubtful case; which
would deprive an accused party of his chief protection in many cases of false
accusations and conspiracies. See People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9; People r.
Lamb, 2 Keyes, 360; State v. Henry, 5 Jones, N. C. 66; Harrington r. State,
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be twice put in jeopardy * upon the same charge. One [* 326]
trial and verdict must, as a general rule, protect him
against any subsequent accusation of the same offence, whether
the verdict be for or against him, and whether the courts are satis-
fied with the verdict or not. We shall not attempt in this place to
collect together the great number of judicial decisions bearing
upon the question of legal jeopardy, and the exceptions to the gen-
eral rule above stated: for these the reader must be referred to
the treatises on criminal law, where the subject will be found to be
extensively treated. It will be sufficient for our present purpose
to indicate very briefly some general principles.
A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial, before a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon indictment or infor-
mation * which is sufficient in form and substance to sus- [* 327]
tain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his
deliverance.1 And a jury is said to bo thus charged when they
have been impanelled and sworn.2 The defendant then becomes
19 Ohio, n. 8. 269; Remsen v. People, 43 N. Y. 6. Upon the presumption of
malice in homicide, the reader is referred to the Review of the Trial of Professor
Webster, by Hon. Joel Parker, in te Korth American Review, No. 72, p. 178.
See also upon the functions of judge and jury respectively, the cases of Common-
wealth c.Wood, 11 Gray, 86; Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212; Commonwealth
c. Billings, 97 Mass. 405; State r. Patterson, 63 N. C. 520; State o. Newton, 4
Nev. 410.
1 Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 586; State v. Norvell, 2 Yerg. 24;
Williams v. Commonwealth, 2 Grat. 568; People v. McGowan, 17 Wend. 386;
Mounts v. State, 14 Ohio, 295; Price o. State, 19 Ohio, 423; Wright v. State,
6 Ind. 292; State r. Nelson", 26 Ind. 366; State v. Spier, 1 Dev. 491; State c.
Ephraim, 2 Dev. & Bat. 162; Commonwealth ». Tuck, 20 Pick. 356; People v.
Webb, 28 Cal. 467; People v. Cook, 10 Mich. 164; State v. Ned, 7 Port. 217;
State c. Callendine, 8 Iowa, 288. It cannot be said, however, that a party is in
legal jeopardy in a prosecution brought about by his own procurement; and a
former conviction or acquittal is consequently no bar to a second indictment, if
the former trial was brought about by the procurement of the defendant, and the
conviction or acquittal was the result of fraud or collusion on his part. Common-
wealth v. Alderman, 4 Mass. 477; State v. Little, 1 N. H. 257 ; State v. Green,
16 Iowa, 239. See also State o. Reed, 26 Conn. 202. And if a jury is called
and sworn, and then discharged for the reason that it is discovered the defendant
has not been arraigned, this will not constitute a bar. United States t>. Riley, 5
Blatch. 205.
'McFadden v. Commonwealth, 23 Penn. St.. 12; Lee o. State, 26 Ark. 260;
8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 611. A different view is taken in O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 6
Bush, 563.
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entitled to a verdict which shall constitute a bar to a new pros-
ecution; and he cannot be deprived of this bar by a nolle prosequi
entered by the prosecuting officer against his will, or by a discharge
of the jury and continuance of the cause.1
If, however, the court had no jurisdiction of the cause,2 or if the
indictment was so far defective that no valid judgment could be
rendered upon it,3 or if by any overruling necessity the jury are
discharged without a verdict,4 which might happen from the sick-
ness or death of the judge holding the court,5 or of a juror,6 or tbe
inability of the jury to agree upon a verdict after reasonable time
for deliberation and effort;7 or if the term of the court as fixed by
law comes to an end before the trial is finished;8 or the jury are
discharged with the consent of the defendant expressed or implied;9
or if, after verdict against the accused, it has been set aside on
1 People v. Barrett, 2 Caines, 804; Commonwealth v. Tuck, 20 Pick. 365;
Mounts d. State, 14 Ohio, 295; State v. Connor, 5 Cold. 311; State p. Callen-
dine, 8 Iowa, 288; Baker v. State, 12 Ohio, n. s. 214; Grogan v. State, 44 Ala.
9; State v. Alman, 64 N. C. 864 ; contra, Swindel v. State, 32 Texas, 102.
! Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13 Mass. 455; People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161.
* Gerard c. People, 3 Scam. 363; Pritchett v. State, 2 Sneed, 285; People
v. Cook, 10 Mich. 164; Mount v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 93; People v.
McNealy, 17 Cal. 333; Kohlheimer v. State, 39 Miss. 548; State v. Kason, 20
La. An. 48; Black v. State, 36 Geo. 447; Commonwealth v. Bakeman, 105
Mass. 53.
4 United States t>. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579; State ». Ephraim, 2 Dev. & Bat.
166; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 620; People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 205;
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 9 Mass. 194; Hoffman v. State, 20 Md. 42.5; Price
v. State, 36 Miss. 533. In State v. Wiseman, 68 N. C. 203, the officer in charge
of the jury was found to have been conversing with them in a way calculated to
influence them unfavorably towards the evidence of the prosecution, and it was
held that this was such a case of necessity as authorized the judge to permit a
juror to be withdrawn, and that it did not operate as an acquittal.
5 Nugent v. State, 4 Stew. & Port. 72.
• Hec tor v. State, 2 Mo. 166; State v. Curtis, 5 Humph. 601; Mahala v.
State, 10 Yerg. 532; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613.
7 People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187; Commonwealth v. Olds, 5 Lit. 140;
Dobbins v. State, 14 Ohio, N. 8. 493; Miller o. State, 8 Ind. 325; State v.
Walker, 26 Ind. 346; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613; Winsor v. The
Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. 289; State v. Prince, 63 N. C. 529; Moseley v. State, 33
Texas, 671 ; Lester v. State, 33 Geo. 329.
8 State v. Brooks, 3 Humph. 70; State v. Battle, 7 Ala. 259; Mahala v. State,
10 Yerg. 632; State v. Spier, 1 Dev. 491 ; Wright o. State, 5 Ind. 290.
9 State v. Slack, 6 Ala. 676 ; Elijah v. State, 1 Humph. 103; Commonwealth
v. Stowell, 9 Met. 572.
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* his motion for a new trial or on writ of error,1 or the [* 328]
judgment thereon been arrested,2 — in any of these cases
the accused may again be put upon trial upon the same facts before
charged against him, and the proceedings had will constitute no
protection. But where the legal bar has once attached, the gov-
ernment cannot avoid it by varying the form of the charge in a
new accusation: if the first indictment or information were such
that the accused might have been convicted under it on proof of
the facts by which the second is sought to be sustained, then the
jeopardy which attached on the first must constitute a protection
against a trial on the second.3 And if a prisoner is acquitted on
some of the counts in an indictment, and convicted on others, and
a new trial is obtained on his motion, he can be put upon trial a
second time on those counts only on which he was before convicted,
and is for ever discharged from the others.4
Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishments.
It is also a constitutional requirement that excessive bail shall
not be required, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
1 And it seems, if the verdict is so defective that no judgment can be rendered
upon it, it may be set aside even against the defendant's objection, and a new
trial had. State v. Redman, 17 Iowa, 329.
* Casborus v. People, 13 Johns. 351. But where the indictment was good,
and the judgment was erroneously arrested, the verdict was held to be a bap.
State v. Norvell, 2 Yerg. 24. See People v. Webb, 28 Cal. 467. So if the error
was in the judgment and not in the prior proceedings, if the judgment is reversed,
the prisoner must be discharged. See post, p. 330. But it is competent for the
legislature to provide that on reversing the erroneous judgment in such case, the
court, if the prior proceedings are regular, shall remand the case for the proper
sentence. McKee v. People, 32 N. Y. 239. It is also competent, we suppose,
in the absence of express constitutional prohibition, to allow an appeal or writ
of error to the prosecution, in criminal cases. See State v. Tait, 22 Iowa, 141.
Compare People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467.
3 State p. Cooper, 1 Green, 360; Commonwealth p. Roby, 12 Pick. 504;
People v. McGowan, 17 Wend. 386; Price v. State, 19 Ohio, 423; Leslie v. State,
18 Ohio, n. s. 395; State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414.
* Campbell v. State, 9 Yerg. 333; State v. Kettle, 2 Tyler, 475; Morris p.
State, 8 S. & M. 762; Esmon v. State, 1 Swan, 14; Guenther v. People, 24
N. Y. 100; State v. Kattleman, 35 Mo. 105; State p. Ross, 29 Mo. 39; State v.
Martin, 30 Wis. 219; Barnett v. People, 54 1ll. 331. Contra. State v. Behimer,
20 Ohio, x. s. 572. A nolle prosequi on one count of an indictment after a jury
is called and sworn, is a bar to a new indictment for the oflfence charged therein.
Baker p. State, 12 Ohio, if. s. 214.
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Within such bounds as may be prescribed by law, the question
what fine shall be imposed is one addressed to the discretion of the
court. But it is a discretion to be judicially exercised; and there
may be cases in which a punishment, though not beyond any limit
fixed by statute, is nevertheless so clearly excessive as to be erro-
neous in law.1 A fine should have some reference to the
[* 329] party's ability to pay it. * By Magna Charta a freeman
was not to be amerced for a small fault, but according to
the degree of the fault, and for a great crime in proportion to the
heinousuess of it, saving to him his contenement; and after the
same manner a merchant, saving to him his merchandise. And a
villein was to be amerced after the same manner, saving to him his
wainage. The merciful spirit of these provisions addresses itself
to the criminal courts of the American States through the provi-
sions of their constitutions.
It has been decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut that it
was not competent in the punishment of a common-law offence to
inflict fine and imprisonment without limitation. The precedent,
it was said, cited by counsel contending for the opposite doctrine,
of the punishment for a libel upon Lord Chancellor Bacon, was
deprived of all force of authority by the circumstances attending
it; the extravagance of the punishment being clearly referable to
the temper of the times. "The common law can never require a
fine to the extent of the offender's goods and chattels, or sentence
of imprisonment for life. The punishment is both uncertain and
unnecessary. It is no more difficult to limit the imprisonment of
an atrocious offender to an adequate number of years than to pre-
scribe a limited punishment for minor offences. And when there
exists no firmly established practice, and public necessity or con-
venience does not imperiously demand the principle contended for,
it cannot be justified by the common law, as it wants the main
ingredients on which that law is founded. Indefinite punishments
1 The subject of cruel and unusual punishments was somewhat considered in
Barker v. People, 8 Cow. 686, in which case the opinion was expressed by Chan-
cellor Stanford that a forfeiture of fundamental rights — «. g., the right to jury
trial — could not be imposed as a punishment for crime, but that a forfeiture of
the right to hold office might be. In Done v. People, 5 Park. 364, the cruel
punishments of colonial times, such as burning alive and breaking on the wheel,
were enumerated by W. W. Campbell, J., who was of opinion that they must be
regarded as "cruel" if not "unusual," and therefore as being now forbidden
by the Constitution.
[ 378 ]
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 329
are fraught with danger, and ought not to be admitted unless the
written law should authorize them." 1
It is certainly difficult to determine precisely what is meant by
cruel and unusual punishments. Probably any punishment declared
by statute for an offence which was punishable in the same way at
the common law, could not be regarded as cruel or unusual in the
constitutional sense. And probably any new statutory offence may
be punished to the extent and in the mode permitted by the com-
mon law for offences of similar nature. But those degrading pun-
ishments which in any State had become obsolete before its existing
constitution was adopted, we think may well be held forbidden by
it as cruel and unusual. We may well doubt the right to
establish the whipping-post and the pillory in * States [* 330]
where they were never recognized as instruments of pun-
ishment, or in States whose constitutions, revised since public
opinion had banished them, have forbidden cruel and unusual pun-
ishments. In such States the public sentiment must be regarded
as having condemned them as " cruel," and any punishment which,
if ever employed at Nall, has become altogether obsolete, must cer-
tainly be looked upon as " unusual."
A defendant, however, in any case is entitled to have the precise
punishment meted out to him which the law provides, and no
other. A different punishment cannot be substituted on the ground
of its being less in severity. Sentence to transportation for a
capital offence would be void; and as the error in such a case
would be in the judgment itself, the prisoner would be entitled to
his discharge, and could not be tried again.2 If, however, the legal
punishment consists of two distinct and severable things, — as fine,
and imprisonment, — the imposition of either is legal, and the
defendant cannot be heard to complain that the other was not
imposed also.3
1 Per Homier, Ch. J., in State v. Danforth, 3 Conn. 115. Peters, J., in the
same case, pp. 122-124, collects a number of cases in which perpetual imprison-
ment was awarded at the common law, but, as his associates believed, unwar-
rantably.
1 Bourne v. The King, 7 Ad. & El. 68; Lowenberg v. People, 27 N. Y. 336.
See also Whitebread v. The f^ueen, 7 Q. B. 582; Rex v. Fletcher, Russ. & Ry.
58. In this last case the court was equally divided on the question whether the
omission, in a sentence of death, of the subsequent directions which the law pro-
vided for, rendered the sentence void. See further, Hartung v. People, 26 N.Y,
167; Elliott v. People, 13 Mich. 365; Ex parte Page, 49 Mo. 291.
* See Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203.
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The Right to Counsel.
Perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused of
crime, connected with his trial, is that to be defended by counsel.
From very early days a class of men, who have made the laws of
their country their special study, and who have been accepted for
the confidence of the court in their learning and integrity, have
been set apart as officers of the court, whose special duty it should
be to render aid to the parties and the court1 in the application of
the law to legal controversies. These persons, before entering upon
their employment, were to take an oath of fidelity to the courts
whose officers they were, and to their clients ;2 and it was
[* 331] their special * duty to see that no wrong was done their
clients by means of false or prejudiced witnesses, or
through the perversion or misapplication of the law by the court.
Strangely enough, however, the aid of this profession was denied
in the'very cases in which it was needed most, and it has cost a
long struggle, continuing even into the present century, to rid the
English law of one of its most horrible features. In civil causes
1 In Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 498, the court denied the application
of the defendant that Mr. Kantoul should be assigned as his counsel, because,
though admitted to the Common Pleas, he was not yet an attorney of the Supreme
Court, and that court, consequently, had not the usual control over him; and,
besides, counsel was to give aid to the court as well as to the prisoner, and there-
fore it was proper that a person of more legal experience should be assigned.
* "Every countor is chargeable by the oath that he shall do no wrong nor
falsity, contrary to his knowledge, but shall plead for his client the best he can,
according to his understanding." Mirror of Justices, c. 2, § 5. The oath in
Pennsylvania, on the admission of an attorney to the bar, "to behave himself
in the office of an attorney, according to the best of his learning and ability, and
with all good fidelity, as well to the court as to the client; that he will use no
falsehood, nor delay any man's cause, for lucre or malice," is said, by Mr. Shars-
wood, to present a comprehensive summary of his duties as a practitioner.
Sharswood's Legal Ethics, p. 3. The advocate's oath, in Geneva, was as follows:
"I solemnly swear, before Almighty God, to be faithful to the Republic, and to
the canton of Geneva; never to depart from the respect due to the tribunals and
authorities; never to counsel or maintain a cause which does not appear to be
just or equitable, unless it be the defence of an accused person; never to em-
ploy, knowingly, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me, any
means contrary to truth, and never seek to mislead the judges by any artifioe or
false statement of facts or law; to abstain from all offensive personality, and to
advance no fact contrary to the honor and reputation of the parties, if it be not
indispensable to the cause with which I may be charged; not to encourage either
[ 380 ]
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and on the trial of charges of misdemeanor, the parties were
entitled to the aid of counsel in eliciting the facts, and in present-
ing both the facts and the law to the court and jury ; but when the
government charged a person with treason or felony, he
was denied this privilege.1 Only such * legal questions as [* 332]
he could suggest was counsel allowed to argue for him;
and this was but a poor privilege to one who was himself unlearned
in the law, and who, as he could not fail to perceive the monstrous
injustice of the whole proceeding, would be quite likely to accept any
perversion of the law that might occur in the course of it as reg-
ular and proper, because quite in the spirit that denied him a
defence. Only after the Revolution of 1688 was a full defence
the commencement or continuance of a suit from any motives of passion or inter-
est; nor to reject, for any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the
weak, the stranger, or the oppressed." In "The Lawyer's Oath, its Obligations,
and some of the Duties springing out of them," by U. Betbune Duflield, Esq.,
a masterly analysis is given of this oath; and he well says of it: "Here you
have the creed of an upright and honorable lawyer. The clear, terse, and lofty
language in which it is expressed needs no argument to elucidate its principles,
no eloquence to enforce its obligations. It has in it the sacred savor of divine
inspiration, and sounds almost like a restored reading from Sinai's original, but
broken tablets."
1 When an ignorant person, unaccustomed to public assemblies, and perhaps
feeble in body or in intellect, was put upon trial on a charge which, whether true
or false, might speedily consign him to an ignominious death, with able counsel
arrayed against him, and all the machinery of the law ready to be employed in
bringing forward the evidence of circumstances indicating guilt, it is painful to
contemplate the barbarity which could deny him professional aid. Especially
when in most cases he would be imprisoned immediately on being apprehended,
and would thereby be prevented from making even the feeble preparations which
might otherwise have been within his power. A "trial" under such circum-
stances would be only a judicial murder in very many cases. The spirit in which
the old law was administered may be judged of from the case of Sir William
Parkins, tried for high treason before Lord Holt and bis associates in 1095, after
the statute 7 William III. c. 3, allowing counsel to prisoners indicted for treason,
had been passed, but one day before it was to take effect. He prayed to be allowed
counsel, and quoted the preamble to the statute that such allowance was just and
reasonable. His prayer was denied, Lord Holt declaring that he must administer
the law as he found it, and could not anticipate the operation of an act of Parlia-
ment, even by a single day. The accused was convicted and executed. See
Lieber's Hermeneutics, c. 4, § 15; Sedgwick on Stat. & Const. Law, 81. In
proceedings by the Inquisition against suspected heretics the aid of counsel was
expressly prohibited. Lea's Superstition and Force, S77.
[381]
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allowed on trials for treason,1 and not until 1836 was
[* 333] * the same privilege extended to persons accused of other
felonies.2
1 See an account of the final passage of this bill in Macaulay's "England,"
Vol. IV. c. 21. It is surprising, that the effort to extend the same right to all
persons accused of felony was so strenuously resisted afterwards, and that, too,
notwithstanding the best lawyers in the realm admitted its importance and jus-
tice. "I have myself," said Mr. Scarlett, " often seen persons I thought inno-
cent convicted, and the guilty escape, for want of some acute and intelligent
counsel to show the bearings of the different circumstances on the conduct and
situation of the prisoner." House of Commons Debates, April 25, 1826. "It
has lately been my lot," said Mr. Denman, on the same occasion, "to try two
prisoners who were deaf and dumb, and who could only be made to understand
what was passing by the signs of their friends. The cases were clear and sim-
ple; but if they had been circumstantial cases, in what a situation would the
judge and jury be placed, when the prisoner could have no counsel to plead for
him." The cases looked clear and simple, to Mr. Denman; but how could he
know they would not have looked otherwise, had the coloring of the prosecution
been relieved by a counter-presentation for the defence? See Sydney Smith's
article on Counsel for Prisoners, 45 Edinb. Rev. p. 74; Works, Vol. II. p. 3o8.
The plausible objection to extending the right was, that the judge would be coun-
sel for the prisoner, — a pure fallacy at the best, and, with some judges, a fright-
ful mockery. Baron Oarroio, in a charge to a grand jury, said: "It has been
truly said that, in criminal cases, judges were counsel for the prisoners. So,
undoubtedly, they were, as far as they could be, to prevent undue prejudice, to
guard against improper influence being excited against prisoners; but it was im-
possible for them to go further than this, for they could not suggest the course of
defence prisoners ought to pursue; for judges only saw the deposition so short
a time before the accused appeared at the bar of their country, that it was quite
impossible for them to act fully in that capacity."
If one would see how easily, and yet in what a shocking manner, a judge might
pervert the law and the evidence, and act the part of both prosecutor and king's
counsel, while assuming to be counsel for the prisoner, he need not go further
back than the early trials in our own country, and he is referred for a specimen
to the trials of Robert Tucker and others for piracy, before Chief Justice Troti,
at Charleston, S. C, in 1718, as reported in 6 Hargrave's State Trials, 156 d
aeq. Especially may he there see how the statement of prisoners in one case,
to which no credit was given for their exculpation, was used as hearsay evidence
to condemn a prisoner in another case. All these abuses would have been
checked, perhaps altogether prevented, had the prisoners had able and fearless
counsel. But without counsel for the defence, and under such a judge, the
witnesses were not free to testify, the prisoners could not safely make even
the most honest explanation, and the jury, when they retired, could only feel
• By statute 6 & 7 William IV. c. 114; 4 Cooley's Bl. Com. 355; May's
Const. Hist, c 18.
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 334
* With us it is a universal principle of constitutional law, [* 334]
that the prisoner shall be allowed a defence by counsel.
And generally it will be found that the humanity of the law has
provided that, if the prisoner is unable to employ counsel, the
court may designate some one to defend him who shall bo paid by
the government; but when no such provision is made, it is a duty
which counsel so designated owes to his profession, to the court
engaged in the trial, and to the cause of humanity and justice, not
to withhold his assistance nor spare his best exertions, in the
defence of one who has the double misfortune to be stricken by
poverty and accused of crime. No one is at liberty to decline such
an appointment,1 and few, it is to be hoped, would be disposed to
do so.
In guaranteeing to parties accused of crime the right to {lie aid
that returning a verdict in accordance with the opinion of the judge was only
matter of form. Sydney Smith's lecture on "The judge that smites contrary to
the law " is worthy of being carefully pondered in this connection. "If ever a
nation was happy, if ever a nation was visibly blessed by God, if ever a nation
was honored abroad, and left at home under a government (which we can now
conscientiously call a liberal government) to the full career of talent, industry,
and vigor, we are at this moment that people, and this is our happy lot. First,
the Gospel has done it, and then justice has done it; and he who thinks it his
duty that this happy condition of existence may remain, must guard the piety of
these times, and he must watch over the spirit of justice which exists in these
times. First, he must take care that the altars- of God are not polluted, that the
Christian faith is retained in purity and in perfection; and then, turning to
human affairs, let him strive for spotless, incorruptible justice; praising, hon-
oring, and loving the just judge, and abhorring as the worst enemy of mankind
him who is placed there to 'judge after the law, and who smites contrary to the
law."'
1 Vise v. Hamilton County, 19 111. 18. It has been held that, in the absence
of express statutory provisions, counties are not obliged to compensate counsel
assigned by the court to defend poor prisoners. Bacon v. Wayne County, I Mich.
461. But there are several cases to the contrary. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13;
Hall r. Washington County, 2 Greene (Iowa), 473; Carpenter o. Dane County,
9 Wis. 277. But we think a court has a right to require the service whether com-
pensation is to be made or not; and that counsel who should decline to perform
it, for no other reason than that the law does not provide pecuniary compensation,
is unworthy to hold his responsible office in the administration of justice. Said
Chief Justice Hale in one case: "Although sergeants have a monopoly of prac-
tice in the Common Pleas, they have a right to practise, and do practise, at this
bar; and if we were to assign one of them as counsel, and he was to refuse to
act, we should make bold to commit him to prison." Life of Chief Justice Hale
in Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices, Vol. IL
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of counsel, the Constitution secures it, with all its accustomed
incidents. Among these is that shield of protection which is thrown
around the confidence the relation of counsel and client requires,
and which does not permit the disclosure by the former, even in the
courts of justice, of communications which may have been made to
him by the latter witli a view to pending or anticipated litigation.
This is the client's privilege; the counsel cannot waive it; and the
court would not permit the disclosure even if the client were not
present to take the objection.1
[* 335] * Having once engaged in a cause, the counsel is not
afterwards at liberty to withdraw from it without the
consent of his client and of the court; and even though he may
be impressed with a belief in his client's guilt, it will nevertheless
be his duty to see that a conviction is not secured contrary to the
law.2 The worst criminal is entitled to be judged by the laws;
and if his conviction is secured by means of a perversion of the
law, the injury to the cause of public justice will be more serious
and lasting in its results than his being allowed to escape
altogether.8
1 The history and reason of the rule which exempts counsel from disclosing
professional communications are well stated in Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330.
And see 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 130 et seq. The privilege
would not cover communications made, not with a view to professional assist-
ance, but in order to induce the attorney to aid in a criminal act. People r.
Blakely, 4 Park. Cr. R. 176; Bank of Uticac. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 398. And
see the analogous case of Hewitt v. Prince, 21 Wend. 79. Communications
extraneous or impertinent to the subject-matter of the professional consultation
are not privileged. Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185. See Brandon t>. Gowing,
7 Rich. 459.
It has been intimated in New York that the statute making parties witnesses
has done away with the rule which protects professional communications. Mitch-
ell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. R. 249; Note to 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards,
p. 159 (marg.). Supposing this to be so in civil cases, the protection would
still be the same in the case of persons charged with crime, for such persons can-
not be compelled to give evidence against themselves, so that the reason for
protecting professional confidence is the same as formerly.
* If one would consider this duty and the limitations upon it fully, he should
read the criticisms upon the conduct of Mr. Charles Phillips on the trial of Cour-
voisier for the murder of Lord William Russell. See Sharswood, Legal Ethics,
46; Littell, Living Age, Vol. XXIV. pp. 179, 230; Vol. XXV. pp. 289, 306;
West. Rev. Vol. XXXV. p. 1.
3 There may be cases in which it will become the duty of counsel to interpose
between the court and the accused, and fearlessly to brave all consequences
[ 384 ]
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 335
But how persistent counsel may be in pressing for the acquittal
of his client, and to what extent he may be justified in throwing
his own personal character as a weight in the scale of justice, are
questions of ethics rather than of law. No counsel is justifiable
who defends even a just cause with the weapons of fraud and
falsehood, and no man on the other hand can excuse himself for
accepting the confidence of the accused, and then betraying it
by a feeble and heartless defence. And in criminal cases we
think the court may sometimes have a duty to perform in seeing
personal to himself, where it appears to him that in no other mode can the law
be vindicated and justice done to his client; but these cases are so rare, that
doubtless they will stand out in judicial history as notable exceptions to the
ready obedience which the bar should yield to the authority of the court. The
famous scene between Mp. Justice Boiler and Mp. Erskine, on the trial of the
Dean of St. Asaphs for libel, — 5 Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, p. 158;
Erskine's Speeches, by Jas. L. High, Vol. I. p. 242, — will readily occur to the
reader as one of the exceptional cases. Lord Campbell says of Erskine's con-
duet: "This noble stand for the independence of the bar would alone have
entitled Erskine to the statue which the profession affectionately erected to his
memory in Lincoln's Inn Hall. We are to admire the decency and propriety of
his demeanor during the struggle, no less than its spirit, and the felicitous pre-
cision with which he meted out the requisite and justifiable portion of defiance.
His example has had a salutary effect in illustrating and establishing the relative
duties of judge and advocate in England." And elsewhere, in speaking of Mp.
Fox's Libel Act, he makes the following somewhat extravagant remark: "I
have said; and I still think, that this great constitutional triumph is mainly to be
ascribed to Lord Camden, who had been fighting in the cause for half a century,
and uttered his last words in the House of Lords in its support; but had he not
received the invaluble assistance of Erskine, as counsel for the Dean of St.
Asaphs, the Star Chamber might have been re-established in this country.'" And
Lord Brougham says of Erskine: "He was an undaunted man; he was an
undaunted advocate. To no court did he ever truckle, neither to the Court of
the King, neither to the Court of the King's Judges. Their smiles and their
frowns he disregarded alike in the fearless discharge of his duty. He upheld the
liberty of the peers against the one; he defended the rights of the people against
both combined to destroy them. If there be yet amongst us the power of freely
discussing the acts of our rulers; if there be yet the privilege of meeting for the
promotion of needful reforms; if he who desires wholesome changes in our Con-
stitution be still recognized as a patriot, and not doomed to die the death of a
traitor, — let us acknowledge with gratitude that to this great man, under
Heaven, we owe this felicity of the times." Sketches of Statesmen of the Time
of George III. A similar instance of the independence of counsel is narrated
of that eminent advocate, Mp. Samuel Dexter, in the reminiscences of his life by
"Sigma," published at Boston, 1857, p. 61. See Story on Const. (4th ed.)
§ 1064, note.
25 [ 385 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 335
[CH. X.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[* 336] that the prisoner suffers nothing * from inattention or haste
on the part of his counsel, or impatience on the part of
the prosecuting officer or of the court itself. Time may be precious
to the court, but it is infinitely more so to him whose life or whose
liberty may depend upon the careful and patient consideration of
the evidence, when the counsel for the defence is endeavoring to
sift the truth from the falsehood, and to subject the whole to logical
analysis, so as to show that how suspicious soever the facts may be,
they are nevertheless consistent with innocence. Often indeed it
must happen that the impression of the prisoner's guilt, which the
judge and the jury unavoidably receive when the case is opened to
them by the prosecuting officer, will, insensibly to themselves, color
all the evidence in the case, so that only a sense of duty will induce
a due attention to the summing up for the prisoner, which after all
may prove unexpectedly convincing. Doubtless the privilege of
counsel is sometimes abused in these cases; we cannot think an
advocate of high standing and character has a right to endeavor to
rob the jury of their opinion by asseverating his own belief in the
innocence of his client; and cases may arise in which the court
will feel compelled to impose some reasonable restraints upon the
address to the jury,1 but it is better in these cases to err on the
side of liberality; and restrictions which do not leave to counsel,
who are apparently acting in good faith, such reasonable time aud
opportunity as they may deem necessary for presenting their cli-
ent's case fully, may possibly in some cases be so far erroneous in
law as to warrant setting aside a verdict of guilty.2
Whether counsel are to address the jury on questions of law in
criminal cases, generally, is a point which is still in dispute. If
the jury in the particular case, by the constitution or statutes of
the State, are judges of the law, it would seem that counsel should
be allowed to address them fully upon it,3 though the contrary
seems to have been held in Maryland:4 while in Massachusetts,
1 Thus it has heen held, that, even though the jury are the judges of the law
in criminal cases, the court may refuse to allow counsel to read law books to the
jury. Murphy p. State, 6 Ind. 490. And see Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541; Phoe-
nix Insurance Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501.
* In People v. Eeenan, I3 Cal. 581, a verdict in a capital case was set aside
on this ground.
* Lynch p. State, 9 Ind. 541; Murphy v. State, 6 Ind. 490.
* Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236. What was held in that case was, that counsel
should not be allowed to argue the constitutionality of a statute to the jury; and
[ 386 ]
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 336
where it is * expected that the jury will receive the [* 337]
law from the court, it is nevertheless held that counsel
has a right to address them upon the law.1 It is unquestionably
more decorous and more respectful to the bench that argument
upon the law should always be addressed to the court; and such,
we believe, is the general practice. The jury hear the argument,
and they have a right to give it such weight as it seems to them
properly to be entitled to.
For misconduct in their practice the members of the legal
profession may be summarily dealt with by the courts, who will not
fail, in all proper cases, to use their power to protect clients or the
public, as well as to preserve the profession from the contamination
and disgrace of a vicious associate.2 A man of bad reputation may
that tbe Constitution, in making the jury judges of the law as well as of the facts,
did not empower them to decide a statute invalid. This ruling corresponds to
that of Judge Chase in the United States v. Callendar, Whart. State Trials, 688,
710. But see remarks of Perkins, J., in Lynch p. State, 9 Ind. 542.
1 Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263; Commonwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray,
51.
J "As a class, attorneys are supposed to be, and in fact have always been,
the vindicators of individual rights, and the fearless assertors of the principles
of civil liberty, existing, where alone they can exist, in a government, not of par-
ties nor of men, but of laws. On the other hand, to declare them irresponsible
to any power but public opinion and their consciences, would be incompatible with
free government. Individuals of the class may, and sometimes do, forfeit their
professional franchise by abusing it; and a power to exact the forfeiture must be
lodged somewhere. Such a power is indispensable to protect the court, the
administration of justice, and themselves. Abuses must necessarily creep in;
and having a deep stake in the character of their profession, they are vitally
concerned in preventing it from being sullied by the misconduct of unworthy
members of it. No class of community is more dependent on its reputation for
honor and integrity. It is indispensable to the purposes of its creation to assign
it a high and honorable standing; but to put it above the judiciary, whose official
tenure is good behavior, and whose members are removable from office by the
legislature, would render it intractable; and it is therefore necessary to assign it
bat an equal share of independence. In the absence of specific provision to the
contrary, the power of removal is, from its nature, commensurate with the power
of appointment, and it is consequently the business of the judges to deal with
delinquent members of the bar, and withdraw their faculties when they are incor-
rigible." Oibson, Ch. J., In re Austin et al., 5 Rawle, 203. See State v. Kirke,
12 Fla. 278; Rice's Case, 18 B. Monp. 472; Walker p. State, 4 W. Va. 749.
An attorney may be disbarred for a personal attack upon the judge for his
conduct as such; but the attorney is entitled to notice, and an opportunity to be
heard in defence. Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149. See In re Wallace, L. R
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be expelled for that alone ;1 and counsel who has once taken part
in litigation, and been the adviser or become intrusted with the
secrets of one party, will not afterwards be suffered to engage for
an opposing party, notwithstanding the original employment has
ceased, and there i3 no imputation upon his motives.2 And,
[* 338] on the * other hand the court will not allow counsel to lie
made the instrument of injustice, nor permit the client to
exact of him services which are inconsistent with the obligation he
owes to the court and to public justice; a higher and more sacred
obligation than any which can rest upon him to gratify a client's
whims, or to assist in his revenge.3
1 P. C. 283; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364; Withers v. State, 35 Ala. 252;
Matter of Moore el al., 63 N. C. 397; Biggs. Ex parte, 64 N. C. 202; Bradley
v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335; Dickens's Case, 67 Penn. St. 169.
1 For example, one whose reputation for truth and veracity is such that his
neighbors would not believe him when under oath. Matter of Mills, 1 Mich.
393. See In re Percy, 36 N. Y. 651; People p. Ford, 54 1ll. 520. An attprney
convicted and punished for perjury, and disbarred, was refused restoration, not-
withstanding his subsequent behavior had been unexceptionable. Ex park Gar-
bett, 18 C. B. 403.
'In Gaulden v. State, 11 Geo. 47, the late solicitor-general was not suffered
to assist in the defence of a criminal case, because he had, in the course of hu
official duty instituted the prosecution, though he was no longer connected with
it. And See Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392.
'Upon this subject the remarks of* Chief Justice Oibson in Rush v. Cavanaugh,
2 Penn. St. 189, are worthy of being repeated in this connection. The prose-
cutor in a criminal case had refused to pay the charges of the counsel employed
by him to prosecute in the place of the attorney-general, because the counsel,
after a part of the evidence had been put in, had consented that the charge might
be withdrawn. In considering whether this was sufficient reason for the refusal,
the learned judge said: "The material question is, did the plaintiff violate hu
professional duty to bis client in consenting to withdraw his charge . . . instead
of lending himself to the prosecution of one whom he then and has since believed
to be an innocent man?
"It is a popular but gross mistake to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity
to any one except his client, and that the latter is the keeper of his professional
conscience. He is expressly bound by bis official oath to behave himself in hi*
office of attorney with all due fidelity to the court as well as to the client; and
he violates it when he consciously presses for an unjust judgment; much more so
when he presses for the conviction of an innocent man. But the prosecution was
depending before an alderman, to whom, it may be said, the plaintiff was bound
to no such fidelity. Still he was bound by those obligations which, without oaths,
rest upon all men. The high and honorable office of a counsel would be degraded
to that of a mercenary, were he compellable to do the bidding of bis client against
the dictates of his conscience. The origin of the name proves the client to be
[ 388 ]
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The Writ of Habeas Corpus.
It still remains to mention one of the principal safe-
guards to personal liberty, * and the means by which ille- [* 339]
gal restraints upon it are most speedily and effectually
remedied. To understand this guaranty, and the instances in which
the citizen is entitled to appeal to the law for its enforcement,
we must first have a correct idea of what is understood by personal
liberty in the law, and inquire what restraints, if any, must exist to
its enjoyment.
Sir William Blackstone says, personal liberty consists in the
power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person
to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without im-
prisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.1 It appears,
therefore, that this power of locomotion is not entirely unrestricted,
but that by due course of law certain qualifications and limitations
may be imposed upon it without infringing upon constitutional
liberty. Indeed, in organized society, liberty is the creature of law,
and every man will possess it in proportion as the laws, while
subordinate to the counsel as his patron. Besides, had the plaintiff succeeded
in having Crean held to answer, it would have been his duty to abandon the
prosecution at the return of the recognizance. As the office of attorney-general
is a public trust which involves, in the discharge of it, the exercise of ari almost
boundless discretion by an officer who stands as impartial as a judge, it might
be doubted whether counsel retained by a private prosecutor can be allowed to
perform any part of his duty; certainly not unless in subservience to his will and
instructions. With that restriction usage has sanctioned the practice of employ-
ing professional assistants, to whom the attorney-general or his regular substitute
may, if he please, confide the direction of the particular prosecution; and it has
been beneficial to do so where the prosecuting officer has been overmatched or
overborne by numbers. In that predicament the ends of justice may require him
to accept assistance. But the professional assistant, like the regular deputy,
exercises not his own discretion, but that of the attorney-general, whose locum
tenens at sufferance he is; and he consequently does so under the obligation of
the official oath."
1 Bl. Com. 134. Montesquieu says: "In governments, that is, in societies
directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought
to will, and in riot being constrained to do what we ought not to will. We must
have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and
liberty. Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen
could do what they forbid, he would no longer be possessed of liberty, because
all his fellow-citizens would enjoy the same power." Spirit of the Laws, Book
11, c. 3.
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imposing no unnecessary restraints, surround him and every other
citizen with protections against the lawless acts of others.1
If we examine the qualifications and restrictions which the law
imposes upon personal liberty, we shall find that they range them-
selves in two classes; first, those of a public, and, second, those of
a private nature.
The first class are those which spring from the relative duties
and obligations of the citizen to society and to his fellow-citizen.
These may be arranged into sub-classes as follows; 1. Those
imposed to prevent the commission of crime which is threatened;
2. Those in punishment of crime committed; 3. Those in pun-
ishment of contempts of court or legislative bodies, or to render
their jurisdiction effectual; 4. Those necessary to enforce the
duty citizens owe in defence of the State;2 5. Those which may
become important to protect the community against the acts of
those who, by reason of mental infirmity, are incapable of self-
control. All these limitations are well recognized and generally
understood, but a particular discussion of them does not belong to
our subject. The second class are those which spring from the
helpless or dependent condition of individuals in the various rela-
tions of life.
1. The husband, at the common law, is recognized .as having
legal custody of and power of control over the wife, with the right
to direct as to her labor, and to insist upon its performance. The
precise nature of the restraints which may be imposed by the hus-
band upon the wife's actions, it is not easy, from the nature of the
case, to point out and define; but at most they can only be such
1 "Liberty," says Mr. Webster, "is the creature of law, essentially differ-
ent from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and
a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never under-
stood and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome
restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we
have. It is an error to suppose that liberty consists in a paucity of laws. If
one wants few laws, let him go to Turkey. The Turk enjoys that blessing. The
working of our complex system, full of checks and restraints on legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial power, is favorable to liberty and justice. Those checks and
restraints are so many safeguards set around individual rights and interests.
That man is free who is protected from injury." Works, Vol. II. p. 893.
* In Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn. 431, a statute authorizing the members of
a municipal council to arrest and imprison without warrant persons refusing to
obey the orders of fire wardens at a fire was held unwarranted and void.
[ 390 ]
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gentle restraints upon her liberty as improper conduct on her part
may appear to render necessary ;1 and the general tendency of
public sentiment, as well as of the modern decisions, has been in the
direction of doing away with the arbitrary power which the husband
was formerly supposed to possess, and of placing the two
sexes in the marriage relation upon * a footing nearer [* 340]
equality. It is believed that the right of the husband to
chastise the wife, under any circumstances, would not be recog-
nized in this country; and such right of control as the law gives
him would in any case be forfeited by such conduct towards the
wife as was not warranted by the relation, and which should ren-
der it improper for her to live and cohabit with him, or by such
conduct as, under the laws of the State, would entitle her to a
divorce.2 And he surrenders his right of control also, when he
consents to her living apart under articles of separation.3
2. The father of an infant, being obliged by law to support his
child, has a corresponding right to control his actions and to em-
ploy his services during the continuance of legal infancy. The
child may be emancipated from this control before coming of age,
either by the express assent of the father, or by being turned away
from his father's house and left to care for himself;4 though in
neither case would the father be released from an obligation which
the law imposes upon him to prevent the child becoming a public
charge, and which the State may enforce whenever necessary. The
mother, during the father's life, has a power of control subordinate
to his; but on his death5 or conviction and sentence to imprison-
1.2 Kent, 181. See Cochran's Case, 8 Dowl. P. C. 630. The husband, how-
ever, is under no obligation to support his wife except at his own home; and it is
only when he wrongfully sends her away, or so conducts himself as to justify her
in leaving him, that he is bound to support her elsewhere. Rumney v. Keyes,
7 N. H. 570; Allen v. Aldrieh, 9 Fost. 63; Shaw v. Thompson, 16 Pick. 198;
Clement v. Mattison, 3 Rich. 93. In such a case his liability to supply her with
necessaries cannot be restricted by giving notice to particular persons not to trust
her. Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Strange, 1214; Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41.
* Hutcheson v. Peck, 5 Johns. 196; Love v. Moynahan, 16 111. 277.
1 Saunders v. Rodway, 16 Jur. 1005, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 463.
♦ Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201; McCoy v. Huffman, 8 Cow. 841; State e.
Barrett, 45 N. H. 15; Wolcott v. Rickey, 22 Iowa, 171; Fairhurst v. Lewis,
23 Ark. 435; Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320.
• Dedham v. Natick, 16 Mass. 135. See p. 348.
[391]
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ment for felony,1 she succeeds to the relative rights which
father possessed before.
3. The guardian has a power of control over his ward, corre-
sponding in the main to that which the father has over his child,
though in some respects more restricted, while in others it is
broader. The appointment of guardian when made by the courts
is of local force only, being confined to the State in which it is
made, and the guardian would have no authority to change the
domicile of the ward to another State or country. But the appoint-
ment commonly has reference to the possession of property by the
ward, and over this property the guardian possesses a power of
control which is not possessed by the father, as such, over the
property owned by his child.2
4. The relation of master and apprentice is founded on a con-
tract between the two, generally with the. consent of the parent
or party standing in loco parentis to the latter, by which
[* 341] the * master is to teach the apprentice some specified trade
or means of living, and the apprentice, either wholly or
in part in consideration of the instruction, is to perform services
for the master while receiving it. This relation is also statutory
and local, and the power to control the apprentice is assimilated
to that of the parent by the statute law.8
5. The power of the master to impose restraints upon the action
of the servant he employs, is of so limited a nature that practically
it may be said to rest upon continuous voluntary assent. If the
servant misconducts himself, or refuses to submit to proper control,
the master may discharge him, but cannot resort to confinement
or personal chastisement.
6. The relation of teacher and scholar places the former more
nearly in the place of the parent than either of the two preceding
relations places the master. While the pupil is under his care, he
has a right to enforce obedience to his commands lawfully given in
1 Bailey's Case, 6 Dowl. P. C. 811. If, however, there be a guardian ap-
pointed for the child by the proper court, his right to the custody of the child is
superior to that of the parent. Macready u. Wolcott, 33 Conn. 321.
* 1 Cooley's Bl. Com. 462, and cases cited.
3 The relation is one founded on personal trust and confidence, and the master
cannot assign the articles of apprenticeship except by consent of the apprentice
and of his proper guardian. Haley v. Taylor, 3 Dana, 222; Nickerson v. How-
ard, 19 Johns. 113; Tucker v. Magee, 18 Ala. 99.
[ 392 ]
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his capacity of teacher, even to the extent of bodily chastisement
or confinement. And in deciding questions of discipline he acts
judicially, and is not to be made liable, either civilly or criminally,
unless he has acted with express malice, or been guilty of such
excess in punishment that malice may fairly be implied. All pre-
sumptions favor the correctness and justice of his action.1
7. Where parties bail another, in legal proceedings, they are
regarded in law as his jailers, selected by himself, and with the right
to his legal custody for the purpose of seizing and delivering him
up to the officers of the law at any time before the liability of the
bail has become fixed by a forfeiture being judicially declared on
his failure to comply with the condition of the bond.2 This is a
right which the bail may exercise in person or by agent, and with-
out resort to judicial process.3
8. The control of the creditor over the person of his debtor,
through the process which the law gives for the enforcement of his
demand, is now very nearly abolished, thanks to the humane pro-
visions which have been made of late by statute or by constitution.
In cases of torts and where debts were fraudulently contracted, or
where there is an attempt at a fraudulent disposition of property
with intent to delay the creditor, or to deprive him of payment,
the body of the debtor is allowed to be seized and confined ; but the
reader must be referred to the constitution and statutes of his State
for specific information on this subject.
* These, then, are the legal restraints upon personal [* 342]
liberty. For any other restraint, or for any abuse of the
legal rights which have been specified, the party restrained is enti-
tled to immediate process from the courts, and to speedy relief.
The right to personal liberty did not depend in England on any
statute, but it was the birthright of every freeman. As slavery
ceased it became universal, and the judges were bound to protect it
by proper writ when infringed. But in those times when the power
1 State p. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & Bat. 365; Cooper p. McJunkin, 4 Ind.
290; Commonwealth p. Randall, 4 Gray, 38.
• Harp p. Osgood, 2 Hill, 216; Commonwealth p. Brickett, 8 Pick. 188.
The principle may be followed, if necessary, out of the jurisdiction of the court
in which the bail was taken, and arrested there. Parker p. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84.
Even though it be out of the State. Harp p. Osgood, supra. And doors, if
necessary, may be broken in order to make the arrest. Read's case, 4 Conn.
166; Nicolls p. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145.
s Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84; Nicolls p. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145.
[ 393 ]
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of parliament was undefined and in dispute, and the judges held
their offices only during the king's pleasure, it was almost a matter
of course that rights should be violated, and that legal jsuress
should be impracticable, however clear those rights might be. But
in many cases it was not very clear what the legal rights of parties
were. The courts which proceeded according to the course of the
common law, as well as the courts of chancery, had limits to their
authority which could be understood, and a definite course of pro-
ceeding was marked out for them by statute or by custom; and if
they exceeded their jurisdiction and invaded the just liberty of the
subject, the illegality of the process would generally appear in the
proceedings. But there were two tribunals unknown to the com-
mon law, but exercising a most fearful authority, against whose
abuses it was not easy for the most upright and conscientious
judge in all cases to afford relief. These were, 1. The Court of
Star Chamber, which became fully recognized and established in
the time of Henry VII., though originating long before. Its juris-
diction extended to all sorts of offences, contempts of authority
and disorders, the punishment of which was not supposed to be
adequately provided for by the common law; such as slanders of
persons in authority, the propagation of seditious news, refusal to
lend money to the king, disregard of executive proclamations, &c
It imposed fines without limit, and inflicted any punishment in the
discretion of its judges short of death. Even jurors were punished
in this court for verdicts in State trials not satisfactory to the
authorities. Although the king's chancellor and judges were enti-
tled to seats in this court, the actual exercise of its powers appears
to have fallen into the hands of the king's privy council, which sat
as a species of inquisition, and exercised almost any authority it
saw fit to assume.1 The court was abolished by the Long Par-
liament in 1641. 2. The Court of High Commission,
[* 343] established *in the time of Elizabeth, and which exer-
cised a power in ecclesiastical matters corresponding to
that which the Star Chamber assumed in other cases, and in an
equally absolute and arbitrary manner. This court was also abol-
1 See Hallam, Constitutional History, c. 1 and 8; Todd, Parliamentary Gov-
ernment in England, Vol. II. c. 1. The rise and extension of authority of this
court, and its arbitrary character, are very fully set forth in Brodie's Constitu-
tional History of the British Empire, to which the reader is referred for more
particular information.
[ 394 ]
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CH.X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 343
ished in 1641,- but was afterwards revived for a short time in the
reign of James II.
It is evident that while these tribunals existed there could be no
effectual security to liberty. A brief reference to the remarkable
struggle which took place during the reign of Charles I. will per-
haps the better enable us to understand the importance of those
common-law protections to personal liberty to which we shall have
occasion to refer, and also of those statutory securities which have
since been added.
When the king attempted to rule without the parliament, and in
1625 dissolved that body, and resorted to forced loans, the grant of
monopolies, and the levy of ship moneys, as the means of replenish-
ing a treasury that could only lawfully be supplied by taxes granted
by the commons, the privy council was his convenient means of
enforcing compliance with his will. Those who refused to contribute
to the loans demanded were committed to prison. When they
petitioned the Court of the King's Bench for their discharge, the
warden of the fleet made return to the writ of habeas corpus, that
they were detained by warrant of the privy council, informing him of
no particular cause of imprisonment, but that they were committed
by the special command of his majesty. Such a return presented
for the decision of the court the question, "Is such a warrant,
which does not specify the cause of detention, valid by the laws of
England?" The court held that it was, justifying their decision
upon supposed precedents, although, as Mr. Hallam says, " it was
evidently the consequence of this decision that every statute from
the time of Magna Charta, designed to protect the personal lib-
erties of Englishmen, became a dead letter, since the insertion of
four words in a warrant (per gpeciale mandatum regis), which
might become matter of form, would control their remedial effi-
cacy. And this wound was the more deadly in that the notorious
cause of these gentlemen's imprisonment was their withstanding an
illegal exaction of money. Every thing that distinguished our
constitutional laws, all that rendered the name of England valuable,
was at stake in this issue." 1 This decision, among other violent
acts, led to the Petition of Right, one of the principal charters of
English liberty, but which was not assented to by the
king until the judges had * intimated that if he saw [* 344]
1 Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 7. See also Brodie, Const. Hist. Vol. n. o. 1.
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fit to violate it by arbitrary commitments, they would take care
that it should not be enforced by their aid against his will. And
four years later, when the king committed members of parliament
for words spoken in debate, offensive to the royal prerogative, the
judges evaded the performance of their duty on habeas corpus, and
the members were only discharged when the king gave his consent
to that course.1
The Habeas Corpus Act was passed in 1679, mainly to prevent
such abuses and other evasions of duty by judges and ministerial
officers, and to compel prompt action in any case in which illegal
imprisonment was alleged. That act gave no new right to the
subject, but it furnished the means of enforcing those which
existed before.2 The preamble recited that " whereas great delays
have been used by sheriffs, jailers, and other officers, to whose
custody any of the king's subjects have been committed for
criminal or supposed criminal matters, in making returns of writs
of habeas corpus, to them directed, by standing out ou alias or
pluries habeas corpus, and sometimes more, and by other shifts, to
avoid their yielding obedience to such writs, contrary to their duty
and the known laws of the land, whereby many of the king's sub-
jects have been and hereafter may be long detained in prison in
such cases, where by law they are bailable, to their great charge
and vexation. For the prevention whereof, and the more speedy
relief of all persons imprisoned for any such criminal or supposed
criminal matters," the act proceeded to make elaborate and care-
ful provisions for the future. The important provisions of the act
may be summed up as follows: That the writ of habeas corpus
might be issued by any court of record or judge thereof, either in
term-time or vacation, on the application of any person confined,
or of any person for him; the application to be in writing and on
oath, and with a copy of the warrant of commitment attached, if
procurable; the writ to be returnable either in court or at cham-
bers; the person detaining the applicant to make return to the
writ by bringing up the prisoner with the cause of his detention,
and the court or judge to discharge him unless the imprisonment
appeared to be legal, and in that case to take bail if the case
was bailable; and performance of all these duties was made
1 Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 8; Brodie, Const. Hist. Vol. I. c. 8.
5 Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 13; Beeching's Case, 4 B. & C. 136; Matter of
Jackson, 15 Mich. 436.
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compulsory, under heavy penalties. * Thus the duty which [* 345]
the judge or other officer might evade with impunity before,
he must now perform or suffer punishment. The act also provided
for punishing severely a second commitment for the same cause,
after a party had once been discharged on habeas corpus, and also
made the sending of inhabitants of England, Wales, and Berwick-
upon-Tweed abroad for imprisonment illegal, and subject to penalty.
Important as this act was1 it was less broad in its scope than the
remedy had been before, being confined to cases of imprisonment
for criminal or supposed criminal matters;2 but the attempt in
parliament nearly a century later to extend its provisions to other
cases was defeated by the opposition of Lord Mansfield, on the
express ground that it was unnecessary, inasmuch as the common-
law remedy was sufficient;3 as perhaps might have been, had
officers been always disposed to perform their duty. Another
attempt in 1816 was successful.4
The Habeas Corpus Act was not made, in express terms, to
extend to the American colonies, but it was in some expressly, and
in others by silent acquiescence, adopted and acted upon, and all
the subsequent legislation in the American States has been based
upon it, and lias consisted in little more than a re-enactment of its
essential provisions.
What Courts issue the Writ.
The protection of personal liberty is for the most part confided
to the State authorities, and to the State courts the party must
apply for relief on habeas corpus when illegally restrained. There
are only a few cases in which the federal courts can interfere; and
those are cases in which either the illegal imprisonment is under
pretence of national authority, or in which this process becomes
important or convenient in order to enforce or vindicate some right,
or authority under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
1 Mi. Hurd, in the appendix to his excellent treatise on the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, gives a complete copy of the act. See also appendix to Lieber, Civil
Liberty and Self-Government; Broom, Const. Law, 218.
'See Mayor of London's Case, 3 Wils. 198; Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 984.
3 Life of Mansfield by Lord Campbell, 2 Lives of Chief Justices, p. 35; 15
Hansard's Debates, 897 et seq.
4 By Stat. 56 Geo. III. p. 100. See Broom, Const. Law. 224.
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The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that each of the several
federal courts should have power to issue writs of scire fam»,
habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided forbj
statute, which might be necessary for the exercise of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages of law;
and that either of the justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the
district judges, should have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
for the purposes of au inquiry into the cause of commitment:
provided that in no case should such writs extend to
[* 346] * prisoners in jail, unless where they were in custody
under or by color of the authority of the United States,
or were committed to trial before some court of the same, or were
necessary to be brought into court to testify.1 Under this statute
no court of the United States or judge thereof could issue a habeas
corpus to bring up a prisoner in custody under a sentence or exe-
cution of a State court, for any other purpose than to be used as
a witness. And this was so whether the imprisonment was under
civil or criminal process.2
During what were known as the nullification troubles in South
Carolina, the defect of federal jurisdiction in respect to this writ
became apparent, and another act was passed, having for its object,
among other things, the protection of persons who might be prose-
cuted under assumed State authority for acts done under the laws
of the United States. This act provided that either of the justices
of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any District Court of the
United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by
law, should have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases
of a prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, where he or they
shall bo committed or confined on or by any authority of law, for
any act done or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the
United States, or any order, process, or decree of any judge or
court thereof.8
In 1842 further legislation seemed to have become a necessity,
1 1 Statutes at Large, 81.
• Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103.
a 4 Stat, at Large, 634. See Ex parte Robinson, 6 McLean, 355; 8. C. 1
Bond, 39 ; U. S. v. Jailer of Fayette Co., 2 Abb. U. S. 265. Robinson w«a
United States marshal, and was imprisoned under a warrant issued by a State
court for executing process under the Fugitive Slave Law, and was discharged
by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States under this act.
[ 398 ]
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in order to give to the federal judiciary jurisdiction upon this writ
of cases in which questions of international law were involved, and
which, consequently, could only properly be disposedof by the juris-
diction to which international concerns were by the Constitution
committed. The immediate occasion for this legislation was the
arrest of a subject of Great Britain by the authorities of the State
of New York, for an act which his government avowed and took
the responsibility of, and which was the subject of diplomatic cor-
respondence between the two nations. An act of Congress was
consequently passed, which provides that either of the justices of
the Supreme Court, or any judge of any District Court of the
United States in which a prisoner is confined, in addition to the
authority previously conferred by law, shall have power to grant
writs of habeas corpus in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners
in jail or confinement, where he, she, or they, being subjects or
citizens of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, shall be commit-
ted, or confined, or in custody, under or by any authority, or law,
or process founded thereon, of the United States or of any one of
them, for or on account of any act done or omitted under any
alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption,
set up or claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of
any foreign State or sovereignty, the validity or effect whereof
depends upon the law of .nations, or under color thereof.1
In 1867 a further act was passed, which provided that the several
courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of
such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the
authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs
of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained
of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any
treaty or law of the United States.2
These are the cases in which the national courts and judges
have jurisdiction of this writ: in other cases the party must
seek his remedy in the proper State tribunal.3 And although
1 5 Stat, at Large, 539. McLeod's Case, which was the immediate occasion
of the passage of this act, will be found reported in 25 Wend. 482. It was re-
viewed by Judge Talmadge in 26 Wend. 663, and a reply to the review appears
in 3 Hill, 635.
* 14 Stat, at Large, 385.
* Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103; Barry ». Mercein, 5 How. 103; Dekraft v.
Barney, 2 Black, 704. See United States c. French, 1 Gall. 1; Ex parte Barry,
2 How. 65.
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[CH. X.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[*347] the State courts formerly * claimed and exercised the
right to inquire into the lawfulness of restraint under
the national authority,1 it is now settled by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States, that the question of the
legality of the detention in such cases is one for the determination,
exclusively, of the federal judiciary, so that although a State court
or judge may issue this process in any case where illegal restraint
upon liberty is alleged, yet when it is served upon any officer or
person who detains another in custody under the national author-
ity, it is his duty, by proper return, to make known to the State
court or judge the authority by which he holds such person, but
not further to obey the process; and that as the State judiciary
have no authority within the limits of the sovereignty assigned by
the Constitution to the United States, the State court or judge can
proceed no further with the case.2
The State constitutions recognize the writ of habeas corpus as
an existing remedy in the cases to which it is properly applicable,
and designate the courts or officers which may issue it; but they
do not point out the cases in which it may be employed. Upon
this subject the common law and the statutes must be our guide;
and although the statutes will be found to make specific provision
for particular cases, it is believed that in no instance which lias
fallen under our observation bas there been any intention to
restrict tbe remedy, and make it less broad and effectual than it
was at the common law.3
1 See the cases collected in Hurd on Habeas Corpus, B. 2, c. 1, § 5, and in
Abb. Nat. Dig. 609, note.
* Ablcman v. Booth, 21 How. 506. See Norris v. Newton, 5 McLean, 92;
United States v. Rector, 5 McLean, 174; Spangler's Case, 11 Mich. 298; In rt
Hopson, 40 Barb. 34; Ex parte Hill, 5 Nev. 154. Notwithstanding the decision
of Ableman v. Booth, the State courts have frequently since assumed to pa-«s
definitely upon cases of alleged illegal restraint under federal authority, and
this, too, by the acquiescence of the federal officers. As the remedy in the State
courts is generally more expeditious and easy than can be afforded in the. national
tribunals, it is possible that the federal authorities may still continue to acquiesce
in such action of the State courts, in cases where there can be no reason to fear
that they will take different views of the questions involved from those likely to
be held by the federal courts. Nevertheless, while the case of Ableman v. Booth
stands unreversed, the law must be held to be as there declared. It has recently
been approved in Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, Chief Justice Chase dissenting.
* See Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, where this whole subject is fully con-
sidered. The application for the writ is not necessarily made by the party in
[ 400 ]
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 347
We have elsewhere referred to certain rules regarding the
validity of judicial proceedings.1 In the great anxiety on the
part of our legislators to make the most ample provision for
speedy relief from unlawful confinement, authority to issue the
writ of habeas corpus has been conferred upon inferior judicial
officers, who make use of it sometimes as if it were a writ of error,
under which they might correct the errors and irregularities of
other judges and courts, whatever their relative jurisdiction and
dignity. Any such employment of the writ is an abuse.2
Where a * party who is in confinement under judicial [* 348]
process is brought up on habeas corpus, the court or
judge before whom he is returned will inquire: 1. Whether the
court or officer issuing the process under which he is detained had
jurisdiction of the case, and has acted within that jurisdiction in
issuing such process.3 If so, mere irregularities or errors of judg-
ment in the exercise of that jurisdiction must be disregarded on
this writ, and must be corrected either by the court issuing the
person, but may be made by any other person on his behalf, if a sufficient reason
is stated for its not being made by him personally. The Hottentot Venus Case,
13 East, 195; Child's Case, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 259. A wife may have the writ
to release her husband from unlawful imprisonment, and may herself be heard
on the application. Cobbett's Case, 15 Q. B. 181, note; Cobbett V. Hudson,
10 Eng. L. & Eq. 318; s. c. 15 Q. B. 988. Lord Campbell in this case cites
the case of the wife of John Bunyan, who was heard on his behalf when in
prison.
1 See post, p. 397 et seq.
* It is worthy of serious consideration whether, in those States where the
whole judicial power is by the constitution vested in certain specified courts, it
is competent by law to give to judicial officers not holding such courts authority
to review, even indirectly, the decisions of the courts, and to discharge persons
committed under their judgments. Such officers could exercise only a special
statutory authority. Yet its exercise in such cases is not only judicial, but it is
in the nature of appellate judicial powep. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States to issue the writ in cases of confinement under the order of
the District Courts, was sustained in Ex parte Bolhnan and Swartwout, 4 Cranch,
75, and Matter of Metzger, 5 How. 190, on the ground that it was appellate.
See also Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568; Ex
parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704; Matter of Kaine, 14 How. 103; Rowe v. Rowe, 27
Jlich.
3 The validity of the appointment or election of an officer de facto cannot be
inquired into on habeas corpus. Ex parte Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; Russell v.
Whiting, 1 Wins. (N. C.) 463. Otherwise if a mere usurper issues process for
the imprisonment of a citizen. Ex parte Strahl, supra.
26 [ 401 ]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
process, or on regular appellate proceedings.1 2. If the process is
not void for want of jurisdiction, the further inquiry will be made,
whether, by law, the case is bailable, and if so, bail will be taken
if the party offers it; otherwise he will be remanded to the proper
custody.2
This writ is also sometimes employed to enable a party to enforce
a right of control which by law he may have, springing from some
one of the domestic relations; especially to enable a parent to
obtain the custody and control of his child, where it is detained
from him by some other person. The courts, however, do not
generally go farther in these cases than to determine what is for
the best interest of the child; and they do not feel compelled to
remand him to any custody where it appears not to be for the
child's interest. The theory of the writ is, that it relieves from
improper restraint; and if the child is of an age to render it proper
to consult his feelings and wishes, this may be done in any case;'
and it is especially proper in many cases where the parents are
living m separation and both desire his custody. The right of the
father, in these cases, is generally recognized as best; but this
'1 People v. Cassels, 5 Hill, 164; Buslinell's Case, 9 Ohio, n. s. 183 ; Ex parte
Watkins, 7 Pet. 568; Matter of Metzger, 5 How. 191; Petition of Smith, 2 Nev.
338; Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 619; Hammond v. People, 32 111. 472, per
Breese, J. In State v. Shattuck, 45 N. H. 211, Bellows, J., states the rule very
correctly, as follows: "If the court had jurisdiction of the matter embraced in
these causes, this court will not, on habeas corpus, revise the judgment. State t.
Towlc, 42 N. H. 541; Ross and Riley's Case, 2 Pick. 166, and Riley's Case, ib.
171; Adams v. Vose, 1 Gray, 51. If in such case the proceedings arc irregular
or erroneous, the judgment is voidable and not void, and stands good until
revised or annulled in a proper proceeding instituted for that purpose; but when
it appears that the magistrate had no jurisdiction, the proceedings are void, and
the respondent may be discharged on habeas corpus. State v. Towle, before
cited; Kellogg, Ex parte, 6 Vt. 509. See also State r. Richmond, 6 N. H. 232;
Burnham v. Stevens, 33 N. H. 247; Hurst v. Smith, 1 Gray, 49."
1 It is not a matter of course that the party is to be discharged even where
the authority under which he is held is adjudged illegal. For it may appear that
he should be lawfully confined in different custody; in which case, the proper
order may be made for the transfer. Matter of Mason, 8 Mich. 70; Matter of
Ring, 28 Cal. 247; Ex paiie Gibson, 31 Cal. 619. And where he is detained for
trial on an imperfect charge of crime, the court, if possessing power to commit
de novo, instead of discharging him, should proceed to inquire whether there is
probable cause lor holding him for trial, and if so, should order accordingly.
Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 416.
* Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pick. 193.
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 348
must depend very much upon circumstances, and the tender age of
the child may often be a controlling consideration against his
claim. The courts have large discretionary power in these cases,
and the tendency of modern decisions has been to extend, rather
than restrict it.1
There is no common-law right to a trial by jury of the issues of
fact joined on habeas corpus; but the issues both of fact and of law
are tried by the court or judge before whom the proceeding is had ;2
though without doubt a jury trial might be provided for by statute,
and perhaps even ordered by the court in some cases.3
* Right of Discussion and Petition. [* 349]
The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances, is one which " would seem
unnecessary to be expressly provided for in a republican govern-
ment, since it results from the very nature and structure of its
institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically denied
until the spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared, and the people
had become so servile and debased as to be unfit to exercise any of
the privileges of freemen."4 But it has not been thought unim-
portant to protect this right by statutory enactments in England;
and indeed it will be remembered that one of the most notable
attempts to crush the liberties of the kingdom made the right of
petition the point of attack, and selected for its contemplated vic-
tims the chief officers in the episcopal hierarchy. The trial and
acquittal of the seven bishops in the reign of James II. constituted
one of the decisive battles in English constitutional history ;5 and
1 Barry's Case mar almost be said to exhaust all the law on this subject. We
refer to the various judicial decisions made in it, so far as they are reported in
the regular reports. 8 Paige, 47; 25 Wend. 64; People v. Mercein, 3 Hill, 399;
2 How. 65; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 105. See also the recent case of Adams
v. Adams, 1 Duv. 167. For the former rule, see The King v. De Manneville,
5 East, 221; Ex parte Skinner, 9 J. B. Moore, 278. Where the court is satis-
fied that the interest of the child would be subserved by refusing the custody to
either of the parents, it may be confided to a third party. Chetwynd v. Chet-
wynd, L. R. 1 P. & D. 39; In re Goodenough, 19 Wis. 274.
'See Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 297-302, and cases cited; Baker v. Gordon,
23 Ind. 209.
'See Matter of Hakewell, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 395; 8. c. 12 C. B. 223.
4 Story on the Constitution, § 1894.
'See this case in 12 Howell's State Trials, 183; 8 Mod. 212. Also in Broom,
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* 349 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. X.
the right which was then vindicated is " a sacred right which in
difficult times shows itself in its full magnitude, frequently serves
as a safety-valve if judiciously treated by the recipients, and may
give to the representatives or other bodies the most valuable infor-
mation. It may right many a wrong, and the deprivation of it
would at once be felt by every freeman as a degradation. The
right of petitioning is indeed a necessary consequence of the right
of free speech and deliberation, — a simple, primitive, and natural
right. As a privilege it is not even denied the creature in address-
ing the Deity."1 Happily the occasions for discussing and defending
it have not been numerous in this country, and have been confined
to an exciting subject now disposed of.2
[* 350] * Right to hear Arms.
Among the other safeguards to liberty should be mentioned the
right of the people to keep and bear arms.3 A standing army is
peculiarly obnoxious in any free government, and the jealousy of
such an army has at times been so strongly demonstrated in
England as to lead to the belief that even though recruited from
among themselves, it w*as more dreaded by the people as an in-
strument of oppression than a tyrannical monarch or any foreign
power. So impatient did the English people become of the very
army that liberated them from the tyranny of James II. that they
demanded its reduction even before the liberation became complete;
and to this day the British Parliament render a standing army
practically impossible by only passing a mutiny act from session to
session. The alternative to a standing army is " a well-regulated
militia;" but this cannot exist unless the people are trained to
bearing arms. The federal and State constitutions therefore pro-
vide that the right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed;
Const. Law, 408. See also the valuable note appended by Mr. Broom, p. 493,
in which the historical events bearing on the right of petition are noted. Also,
May, Const. Hist. c. 7; 1 Bl. Com. 148.
1 Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, c. 12.
* For the discussions on the right of petition in Congress, particularly with
reference to slavery, see 1 Benton's Abridgement of Debates, 397; 2 ib. 57-60,
182-188, 209, 436-444;' 12 ib. 660-679, 705-743; 13 ib. 5-28, 266-290, 557-
562. Also Benton's Thirty Years' View, Vol. I. c. 135, Vol. II. c. 32, 33, 36,
37. Also the current political histories and biographies.
3 1 Bl. Com. 143.
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CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. * 350
but how far it may be in the power of the legislature to regulate
the right we shall not undertake to say, as happily there neither has
been, nor perhaps is likely to be, much occasion for a discussion of
that question by the courts.1
1 In Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Lit. 90, the statute " to prevent persons wear-
ing concealed arms" was held unconstitutional, as infringing on the right of the
people to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State. But see Nunn ».
State, 1 Kelly, 243; State v. Jumel, 13 La An. 399; Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387;
Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394; Andrews v. State, 3 Heis. 165; 8. c. 8 Am.
Rep. 8, and note. A statute prohibiting the open wearing of arms upon the
person was held unconstitutional in Stockdale t>. State, 32 Geo. 225. And one
forbidding carrying either publicly or privately, a dirk, sword-cane, Spanish
stiletto, belt or pocket pistol, or revolver, was sustained, except as to the last-
mentioned weapon; and as to that it was held that, if the weapon was suitable for
the equipment of a soldier, the right of carrying it could not be taken away. As
hearing also upon the right of self-defence, see Ely v. Thompson 3 A. K. Marsh.
73, where it was held that the statute subjecting free persons of color to corporal
punishment for " lifting their hands in opposition " to a white person was uncon-
stitutional. And see in general, Bishop on Stat. Crimes, Chap. 36, and cases
cited.
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* 351 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[CH. H.
[*351] * CHAPTER XI.
OP THE PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY "THE LAW OP THE LAND."
The protection of the subject in the free enjoyment of his life,
his liberty, and his property, except as they might be declared
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land to be forfeited,
was guaranteed by the twenty-ninth chapter of Magna Charta,
"which alone," says Sir William Blackstone, " would have mer-
ited the title that it bears of the Great Charter." 1 The people of
the American States, holding the sovereignty in their own hands,
have no occasion to exact pledges from any one for a due observ-
ance of individual rights; but the aggressive tendency of power is
such, that they have deemed it of no small importance, that, in
framing the instruments under which their governments are to be
administered by their agents, they should repeat and re-enact this
guaranty, and thereby adopt it as a principle of constitutional
protection. In some form of words, it is to be found in each of
1 4 Bl. Com. 424. The chapter, as it stood in the original charter of John,
was: "Ne corpus liberi hominis capiatur nec imprisonetur nec disseisietur nec
utlagetur nec exuletur, nec aliquo modo destruatur, nec rex eat vel mittat super
eum vi, nisi per judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terra?." No freeman shall
be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or banished, , or any ways
destroyed, nor will the king pass upon him, or commit him to prison, unless by
the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. In the charter of Henry III.
it was varied slightly, as follows: "Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur,
aut disseisietur de libero tenemento suo vel libertatibus vel liberis consuetudini-
bus suis, aut utlagetur aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nec super eum
ibiinus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale" judicium parium suorum, vel per
legem terra:." See Blackstone's Charters. The Petition of Right — 1 Car. I.
c. 1 —prayed, among other things, " that no man be compelled to make oryield
any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent,
by act of Parliament; that none be called upon to make answer for refusal so to
do; that freemen be imprisoned or detained only by the law of the land, or b*y
due process of law, and not by the king's special command, without any charge."
The Bill of Rights — 1 Wm. and Mary, § 2, c. 2—was confined to an enu-
meration and condemnation of the illegal acts of the preceding reign; but the
Great Charter of Henry HI. was then, and is still, in force.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 351
I
the State constitutions ;1 and, though verbal differences
* appear in the different provisions, no change in language, [* 352]
1 The following are the constitutional provisions in the several States: —
Alabama: "that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself, or be deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by due process of law." Art. 1, § 8. —Arkansas: " That no per-
son shall ... be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." Art. 1, § 9. —California: Like that of Alabama. Art. 1, § 8.—
Connecticut: Same as Alabama, substituting "course of law" for "process of
law." Art. 1, § 9. — Delaware: Like that of Alabama, substituting for " process
of law," "the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." Art. 1, § 7. —
Florida: Like that of Alabama. Art. 1, § 9. — Georgia: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law." Art. 1, § 3.
— Illinois: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." Art. 1, § 2. —Iowa, the same. Art. 1, § 9. —Kentucky:
"Nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment
of his peers, or the law of the land." Art. 13, § 12. — Maine: " Nor be deprived
of his life, liberty, property, or privileges, but by the judgment of his peers, or
the law of the land." Art. 1, § 6. — Maryland: "That no man ought to be
taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or out-
lawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." Decla-
ration of Rights, § 23. — Massachusetts: "No subject shall be arrested, impris-
oned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of
the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by
the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." Declaration of Rights, Art.
12. — Michigan: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." Art. 6, § 32. — Minnesota: Like that of
Michigan. Art. 1, § 7.— Mississippi: The same. Art. 1, § 2. — Missouri:
Same as Delaware. Art. 1, § 18. — Nevada: "Nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." Art. 1, § 8.—Neiv Hampshire:
Same as Massachusetts. Bill of Rights, Art. 15, — New York: Same as Nevada.
Art. 1, § 6. — North Carolina: "That no person ought to be taken, imprisoned,
or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in
any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the
law of the land." Declaration of Rights, § 17. — Pennsylvania: Like Delaware.
Art. 9, § 9. — Rhode Island: Like Delaware. Art. 1, § 10. — South Carolina:
Like that of Massachusetts, substituting " person" for " subject." Art. 1, § 14.
— Tennessee: "That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of bis
freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner
destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or the law of the land." Art. 1, § 8. — Texas: "No citizen of this
State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, or privileges, outlawed, exiled,
or in any manner disfranchised, except by due course of the law of the land."
Art. 1, § 16. —West Virginia: "No person, in time of peace, shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Art. 2, § 6. Under
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\ 1
it is thought, has in any case been made with a view to
[* 353] essential * change in legal effect; and the differences in
phraseology will not, therefore, be of importance in our
discussion. Indeed, the language employed is generally nearly
identical, except that the phrase " due process [or course] of law"
is sometimes used, sometimes " the law of the land," and in some
cases both; but the meaning is the same in every case.1 And, by
the fourteenth amendment, the guaranty is now incorporated iu the
Constitution of the United States.2
If now we shall ascertain the sense in which the phrases "due
process of law" and "the law of the land" are employed in the
several constitutional provisions which we have referred to, when
the protection of rights in property is had in view, we shall be
able, perhaps, to indicate the rule, by which the proper conclusion
may be reached in those cases in which legislative action is objected
to, as not being "the law of the land;" or judicial or ministerial
action is contested as not being "due process of law," within the
meaning of these terms as the Constitution employs them.
If we examine such definitions of these terms as are met with
in the reported cases, we shall find them so various, that some
difficulty must arise in fixing upon one which shall be accurate,
complete in itself, and at the same time appropriate in all the
cases. The diversity of definition is certainly not surprising, when
we consider the .diversity of cases for the purposes of which it has
been attempted, and reflect that a definition that is sufficient for
one case and applicable to its facts may be altogether insufficient
or entirely inapplicable in another.
Perhaps no definition is more often quoted than that given by
Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth College Case: "By the law of the
land is most clearly intended the general law; a law which hears
before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
each of the remaining constitutions, equivalent protection to that which these
provisions give, is believed to be afforded by fundamental principles recognized
and enforced by the courts.
1 2 Inst. 60; Bouv. Law. Die. " Due process of Law," "Law of the land;"
State v. Simons, 2 Spears, 767; Vanzant ». Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260; Wally's Heirs
v. Kennedy, ib. 554; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. 311; Murray's Lessee v. Hobo-
ken Land Co., 18 How. 276, per Curtis J.; Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 129,
per Manning, J.; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256; Banning v. Taylor, 24
Penn. St. 292; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 244; Huber v. Reiley, 53 Penn. St. 112.
s See ante, p. 11.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 353
judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall
bold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the
protection of the * general rules which govern society. [* 354]
Every thing which may pass under the form of an enact-
ment is not therefore to be considered the law of the land." 1
The definition here given is apt and suitable as applied to
judicial proceedings, which cannot be valid unless they "proceed
upon inquiry" and "render judgment only after trial." It is
entirely correct, also, in assuming that a legislative enactment is
not necessarily the law of the land. "The words ' by the law of the
land,' as used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute passed
for the purpose of working the wrong. That construction would
render the restriction absolutely nugatory, and turn this part of
the Constitution into mere nonsense. The people would be made
to say to the two houses : ' You shall be vested with the legislative
power of the State, but no one shall be disfranchised or deprived
of any of the rights or privileges of a citizen, unless you pass a
statute for that purpose. In other words, you shall not do the
wrong unless you choose to do it.' "2 But there are many cases in
1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519; Works of Webster, Vol.
V. p. 487. And he proceeds: "If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains
and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly
transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments, decrees and for-
feitures in all possible forms, would be the law of the land. ' Such a strange
construction would render constitutional provisions of the highest importance
completely inoperative and void. It would tend directly to establish the union
of all powers in the legislature. There would be no general permanent law for
courts to administer or men to live under. The administration of justice would
be an empty form, an idle ceremony. Judges would sit to execute legislative
judgments and decrees, not to declare the law or administer the justice of the
country."
'Per Bronson, J., in Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140. See also Jones v. Perry,
10 Yerg. 59; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256; Arrowsmith v. Burlingim, 4
McLean, 498 ; Lane v. Dorman, 8 Scam. 238 ; Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene (Iowa),
15; Woodcock v. Bennett, 1 Cow. 740; Kinney v. Beverley, 2 H. & M. 536;
Commonwealth v. Byrne, 20 Grat. 165. "Those terms, 'law of the land,' do not
mean merely an act of the general assembly. If they did, every restriction upon
the legislative authority would be at once abrogated. For what more can the cit-
izen suffer than to be taken, imprisoned, disseised of his freehold, liberties, and
privileges; be outlawed, exiled, and destroyed, and be deprived of his property,
his liberty, and his life, without crime? Yet all this he may suffer if an act of
the assembly simply denouncing those penalties upon particular persons, or a
particular class of persons, be in itself a law of the land within the sense of the
[ 409 ]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
which the title to property may pass from one person to another,
without the intervention of judicial proceedings, properly so called;
and we have already seen that special legislative acts designed
to accomplish the like end have also been held valid in
[* 355] * some cases. The necessity for "general rules," there-
fore, does not preclude the legislature from establishing
special rules for particular cases, provided the particular cases
range themselves under some general rule of legislative power;
nor is there any requirement of judicial action which demauds
that, in every case, the parties interested shall have a hearing in
court.1
On the other hand we shall find that general rules may some-
times be as obnoxious as special, if they operate to deprive indi-
vidual citizens of vested rights. While every man has a right to
require that his own controversies shall be judged by the same
rules which are applied in the controversies of his neighbors, the
Constitution; for what is in that sense the law of the land must be duly observed
by all, and upheld and enforced by the courts. In reference to the inflictioDof
punishment and devesting the rights of property, it has been repeatedly held in
this State, and it is believed in every other of the Union, that there are limitations
upon the legislative power, notwithstanding these words; and that the clause
itself means that such legislative acts as profess in themselves directly to punish
persons, or to deprive the citizen of his property, without trial before the judicial
tribunals, and a decision upon the matter of right, as determined by the law>
under which it vested, according to the course, mode, and usages of the com-
mon law, as derived from our forefathers, are not effectually ' laws of the land'
for those purposes." Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 15. Mr. Broom says: "It is
indeed an essential principle of the law of England, 'that the subject hath an
undoubted property in his goods and possessions; otherwise there shall remain no
more industry, no more justice, no more valor; for who will labor? who will haz-
ard his person in the day of battle for that which is not his own?' The Bankers
Case, by Tumor, 10. And therefore our customary law is not more solicitous
about any thing than ' to preserve the property pf the subject from the inundation
of the prerogative.' Ibid.'" Broom's Const. Law, p. 228.
1 See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 432, per Selden, J. In James r.
Reynolds, 2 Texas, 251, Chief Justice Hemphill says: "The terms ' law of the
land' . . . are now, in their most usual acceptation, regarded as general public
laws, binding upon all the members of the community, under all circumstances,
and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private individuals oi
classes of individuals." And see Vanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 269, per Peek,
J.; Hard v. Nearing, 44 Barb. 472. Nevertheless there are many cases, as we
have shown, ante, pp. 97, 109, in which private laws may be passed in entire
accord with the general public rules which govern the State; and we shall refer
to more cases further on.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 355
whole community is also entitled, at all times, to demand the pro-
tection of the ancient principles which shield private rights against
arbitrary interference, even though such interference may be under
a rule impartial in its operation. It is not the partial nature of
the rule, so much as its arbitrary and unusual character, which
condemns it as unknown to the law of the land. Mp. Justice
Edwards has said in one case: "Due process of law undoubtedly
means, in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those
rules and forms which have been established for the protection of
private rights."1 And we have met in no judicial decision a state-
ment that embodies more tersely and accurately the correct view
of the principle we are considering, than the following, from an
opinion by Mp. Justice Johnson of the Supreme Court of the
United States: "As to the words from Magna Charta incorporated
in the Constitution of Maryland, after volumes spoken and written
with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at
length settled down to this, — that they were intended to secure
the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of govern-
ment, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights
and distributive justice." 2
* The principles, then, upon which the process is based [* 356]
are to determine whether it is "due process" or not, and
not any considerations of mere form. Administrative and remedial
process may change from time to time, but only with due regard to
the landmarks established for the protection of the citizen. When
the government through its established agencies interferes with the
title to one's property, or with his independent enjoyment of it,
1 Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 209. See also State v. Staten, 6 Cold.
238.
* Bank of Columbia p. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235. "What is meant by 'the
law of the land'? In this State, taking as our guide Zylstra's Case, 1 Bay
384; White v. Kendrick, 1 Brev. 471; State v. Coleman and Maxy, 1 McMull.
502, there can be no hesitation in saying that these words mean the common
law and the statute law existing in this State at the adoption of our constitution.
Altogether they constitute a body of law prescribing the course of justice to
which a free man is to be considered amenable for all time to come." Per
O" Still, J., in State v. Simons, 2 Speers, 767. See also State p. Doherty, 60
Me. 509. It must not be understood from this, however, that it would not be
competent to change either the common law or the statute law, so long as the
principles therein embodied, and which protected private rights, were not departed
from.
[411]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 356
[CH. XL
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
and its action is called in question as not in accordance with the
law of the land, we are to test its validity by those principles of
civil liberty and constitutional protection which have become es-
tablished in our system of laws, and not generally by rules that
pertain to forms of procedure merely. In judicial proceedings the
law of the land requires a hearing before condemnation, and judg-
ment before dispossession ;1 but when property is appropriated by
tlie government to public uses, or the legislature interferes to give
direction to its title through remedial statutes, different considera-
tions from those which regard the controversies between man and
man must prevail, different proceedings are required, and we have
only to see whether the interference can be justified by the estab-
lished rules applicable to the special case. Due process of law in
each particular case means, such an exertion of the powers of gov-
ernment as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and
under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as
those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in
question belongs.2
Private rights may be interfered with by either the legislative, ex-
ecutive, or judicial department of the government. The executive
department in every instance must show authority of law
[* 357] for its action, and occasion does not often arise * for an
examination of the limits which circumscribe its powers.
The legislative department may in some cases constitutionally au-
thorize interference, and in others may interpose by direct action.
Elsewhere we shall consider the police power of the State, and
endeavor to show how completely all the property, as well as all
the people within the State, are subject to control under it, within
certain limits, and for the purposes for which that power is exer-
cised. The right of eminent domain and the right of taxation will
also be discussed separately, and it will appear that under each
the law of the land sanctions devesting individuals of their prop-
1 Vanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260; Lenz v. Charlton, 28 Wis. 478.
8 See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 432, per Selden, J. In State e. Allen,
2 Mt:Cord, 56, the court, in speaking of process for the collection of taxes, say:
"We think that any legal process which was originally founded in necessity, has
been consecrated by time, and approved and acquiesced in by universal consent,
must be considered an exception to the right of trial by jury, and is embraced in
the alternative ' law of the land.'" And see Hard v. Nearing, 44 Barb. 472;
Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 302.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY "THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 357
erty against their will, and by somewhat summary proceedings. In
every government there is inherent authority to appropriate the
property of the citizen for the necessities of the State, and consti-
tutional provisions do not confer the power, though they generally
surround it with safeguards to prevent abuse. The restraints are,
that when specific property is taken, a pecuniary compensation,
agreed upon or determined by judicial inquiry, must be paid; and
in other cases property can only be taken for the support of the
government, and each citizen can only be required to contribute
his proportion to that end. But there is no rule or principle
known to our system under which private property can be taken
from one person and transferred to another, for the private use
and benefit of such other person, whether by general law or by
special enactment. The purpose must be public, and must have
reference to the needs or convenience of the public. No reason of
general public policy will be sufficient, it seems, to validate such
transfers when they operate upon existing vested rights.1
Nevertheless, in many cases and many ways remedial legislation
may affect the control and disposition of property, and in some
cases may change the nature of rights, give remedies where none
existed before, and even devest legal titles in favor of substantial
equities where the legal and equitable rights do not chance to con-
cur in the same persons.
The chief restriction upon this class of legislation is,
that vested rights must not be disturbed; * but in its appli- [* 358]
cation as a shield of protection, the term "vested rights"
is not used in any narrow or technical sense, or as importing a
power of legal control merely, but rather as implying a vested
interest which it is right and equitable that the government should
recognize and protect, and of which the individual could not be
deprived arbitrarily without injustice. The right to private prop-
1 Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, HO; Osborn v. Hart, 24 Wis. 91; 8. c. 1 Am.
Rep. 161. In matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149, it is intimated that the
clause in the Constitution of New York, withholding private property from pub-
lic use except upon compensation made, of itself implies that it is not to be
taken in invitum for individual use. And see matter of John and Cherry Streets,
19 Wend. 676. A different opinion- seems to have been held by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, when they decided in Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63,
that the legislature might authorize the laying out of private ways over the lands
of unwilling parties, to connect the coal-beds with the works of public improve-
ment, the constitution not in terms prohibiting it. See note to p. 531, post.
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1
erty is a sacred right; not, as has been justly said, " introduce as
the result of princes' edicts, concessions and charters, but it was
the old fundamental law, springing from the original frame and
constitution of the realm." 1
But as it is a right which rests upon equities, it has its reason-
able limits and restrictions; it must have some regard to the
general welfare and public policy; it cannot be a right which is to
be examined, settled, and defended on a distinct and separate con-
sideration of the individual case, but rather on broad and general
grounds, which embrace the welfare of the whole community, and
which seek the equal and impartial protection of the interests of all.2
And it may be well at this point to examine in the light of the
reported cases the question, What is a vested right in the constitu-
tional sense? and when we have solved that question, we may be
the better able to judge under what circumstances one may be jus-
tified in resisting a change in the general laws of the State affecting
his interests, and how far special legislation may control his rights
without coming under legal condemnation. In organized society
every man holds all he possesses, and looks forward to all he hopes
for, through the aid and under the protection of the laws; but as
changes of circumstances and of public opinion, as well as other
reasons affecting the public policy, are all the while calling for
changes in the laws, and as these changes must influence more or
less the value and stability of private possessions, and strengthen
or destroy well-founded hopes, and as the power to make very
many of them could not bo disputed without denying the right of
the political community to prosper and advance, it is obvious that
many rights, privileges, and exemptions which usually pertain to
ownership under a particular state of the law, and many reason-
able expectations, cannot be regarded as vested rights in any legal
sense. In many cases the courts, in the exercise of their ordinary
jurisdiction, cause the property vested in one person to be trans-
1 Arg. Nightingale t>. Bridges, Show. 138. See also Case of Alton Woodi,
1 Rep. 45 a; Alcock v. Cook, 5 Bing. 340; Bowman r. Middleton, 1 Bay, 282;
ante, p. 37 and note, p. 175 and note.
8 The evidences of a man's rights — the deeds, bills of sale, promissory notes,
and the like — are protected equally with his lands and chattels, or rights and
franchises of any kind; and the certiScate of registration and right to vote maj
be properly included in the category. State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 243. See Daviw
v. McKeeby, 6 Nev. 369.
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)
ferred to another, either through the exercise of a statutory power,
or by the direct force of their judgments or decrees, or by means
of compulsory 'conveyances. If in these cases the courts have
jurisdiction, they proceed in accordance with "the law of the
land ;" and the right of one man is devested by way of enforcing a
higher and better right in another. Of these cases we do not pro-
pose to speak: constitutional questions cannot well arise concern-
ing them, unless they are attended by circumstances of irregularity
which are supposed to take them out of the general rule. All
vested rights are held subject to the laws for the enforcement
of public duties and private contracts, and for the punishment of
wrongs; and if they become devested through the operation of
those laws, it is only by way of enforcing the obligations of justice
and good order. What we desire to reach in this connection is
the true meaning of the term " vested rights" when employed for
the purpose of indicating the interests of which one cannot be
deprived by the mere force of legislative enactment, or by
any other than the * recognized modes of transferring title [* 359]
against the consent of the owner, to which we have
alluded.
Interests in Expectancy.
And it would seem that a right cannot be regarded as a vested
right, unless it is something more than such a mere expectation
as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present
general laws: it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to
the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or
future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from a de-
mand made by another. Acts of the legislature, as has been well
said by Mr. Justice Woodbury, cannot be regarded as opposed to
fundamental axioms of legislation, "unless they impair rights
which are vested; because most civil rights are derived from pub-
lic laws; and if, before the rights become vested in particular indi-
viduals, the convenience of the State procures amendments or
repeals of those laws, those individuals have no cause of com-
plaint. The power that authorizes or proposes to give, may always
revoke before an interest is perfected in the donee." 1 And Chan-
cellor Kent, in speaking of retrospective statutes, says that while
1 Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 213. See Ride v. Flanders, 89 N. H. 304.
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such a statute, "affecting and changing vested rights, is very
generally regarded in this country as founded on unconstitutional
principles, and consequently inoperative and void," yet that " this
doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial statutes, which
may be of a retrospective nature, provided they do not impair con-
tracts, or disturb absolute vested rights, and only go to confirm
rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy by curing
defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations.
Such statutes have been held valid when clearly just and reason-
able, and conducive to the general welfare, even though they might
operate in a degree upon vested rights." 1
And it is because a mere expectation of property in the future
is not considered a vested right, that the rules of descent are held
subject to change in their application to all estates not already
passed to the heir by the death of the owner. No one is heir to
the living; and the heir presumptive has no other reason to rely
upon succeeding to the property than the promise held out
[* 360] by the statute of descents. But this promise is no * more
than a declaration of the legislature as to its present view
of public policy as regards the proper order of succession, — a view
which may at any time change, and then the promise may properly
be withdrawn, and a new course of descent be declared. The
expectation is not property; it cannot be sold or mortgaged; it is
not subject to debts; and it is not in any manner taken notice of by
the law until the moment of the ancestor's death, when the statute
of descents comes in, and for reasons of general public policy
transfers the estate to persons occupying particular relations to the
deceased in preference to all others. It is not until that moment
that there is any vested right in the person who becomes heir, to
be protected by the Constitution. An anticipated interest in prop-
erty cannot be said to be vested in any person so long as the owner
of the interest in possession has full power, by virtue of his own-
ership, to cut off the expectant right by grant or devise.2
If this be so, the nature of estates must, to a certain extent, be
1 1 Kent, Com. 455. See Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 91; Bridgeport r.
Housatonic R. R. Co., 15 Com. 492; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; Gilman f.
Cutts,- 23 N. H. 382.
* In re Lawrence, 1 Redfield, Sur. Rep. 310. But after property has once
vested under the laws of descent, it cannot be divested by any change in those
laws. Norman v. Heist, 6 M. & S. 171, See post, 379, and notes.
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CH. XL] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 360
subject to legislative control and modification.1 In this country
estates tail have been very generally changed into estates in fee-
simple, by statutes the validity of which is not disputed.2 Such
statutes operate to increase and render more valuable the interest
which the tenant in tail possesses, and are not therefore open to
objection by him.3 But no other person in these cases has any
vested right, either in possession or expectancy, to be affected by
such change; and the expectation of the heir presumptive must be
subject to the same control as in other cases.4
The cases of rights in property to result from the marriage
relation must be referred to the seme principle. At the common
law the husband immediately on the marriage succeeded to certain
rights in the real and personal estate which the wife then pos-
sessed. These rights became vested rights at once, and any sub-
sequent alteration in the law could not take them away.6
But other interests * were merely in expectancy. He [*361]
could have a right as tenant by the courtesy initiate in the
wife's estates of inheritance the moment a child was born of the
marriage, who might by possibility become heir to such estates.
This right would be property, subject to conveyance and to be
taken for debts; and must therefore be regarded as a vested right,
no more subject to legislative interference than other expectant
interests which have ceased to be mere contingencies and become
fixed. But while this interest remains in expectancy merely,—
that is to say, until it becomes initiate, — the legislature must have
1 Smith on Stat, and Const. Construction, 412.
* De Mill v. Lockwood, 3 Blatch. 56.
* On the same ground it has been held in Massachusetts that statutes convert-
ing existing estates in joint tenancy into estates in common were unobjectionable.
They did not impair vested rights, but rendered the tenure more beneficial.
Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 567; Miller v. Miller, 16 Mass. 59; Anable ».
Patch, 3 Pick. 363; Burghardt v. Turner, 12 Pick. 534. Moreover, such stat-
utes do no more tbati either tenant at the common law has a right to do, by con-
veying his interest to a stranger. See Bombaugh v. Bombaugh, 11 S. & R. 192;
Wildes v. Vanvoorhis, 16 Gray, 147.
4 See 1 Washb. Real Pr. 81-84 and notes. The exception to this statement,
if any, must be the case of tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct; where
the estate of the. tenant has ceased to be an inheritance, and a reversionary right
has become vested.
* Weatervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 208.
27 [ 417 ]
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full right to modify or even to abolish it.1 And the same rule will
apply to the case of dower; though the difference in the requisites
of the two estates are such that the inchoate right to dower does
not become property, or any thing more than a mere expectancy at
any time before it is consummated by the husband's death.2 In
neither of these cases does the marriage alone give a vested right.
It gives only a capacity to acquire a right. The same remark
may be made regarding the husband's expectant interest in the
after-acquired personalty of the wife: it is subject to any changes
in the law made before his right becomes vested by the acqui-
sition.3
Change of Remedies.
Again : the right to a particular remedy is not a vested right. This
is the general rule; and the exceptions are of those peculiar cases
in which the remedy is part of the right itself.4 As a general rule
every State has complete control over the remedies which it offers
to suitors in its courts.6 It may abolish one class of courts and
create another. It may give a new and additional remedy for a
1 Hathorn v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 93; Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60. And see the
cases cited in the next note.
* Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9; Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Noel e.
Ewing, 9 Ind. 57; Moore v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 4 Sandf. 456, and 8
N. Y. 110; Pratt v. Teflt, 14 Mich. 191; Reeve, Dom. ReL 103, note. A
doubt as to this doctrine is intimated in Dunn v. Sargeant, 101 Mass. 340.
3 Westervelt e. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 208; Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273; Kelly
v. McCarthy, 3 Bradf. 7. And see Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Clark r.
McCreary, 12 S. & M. 347; Jackson t>. Lyon, 9 Cow. 664; ante, 287-292. If,
however, the wife has a right to personal property subject to a contingency, the
husband's contingent interest therein cannot be taken away by subsequent legis-
lation. Dunn v. Sargeant, 101 Mass. 336. In Sutton v. Asker, 66 N. C. 172, it
was decided that where by the statute the woman's right of dower was subject to
be defeated by the husband's conveyance, a subsequent statute restoring her
common-law rights was inoperative as to all existing marriages.
* See ante, p. 290, and cases cited. The giving of a lien by statute does not
confer a vested right, and it may be taken away by a repeal of the statute.
Watson v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157; Woodbury v. Grimes, 1
Col. 100.
4 Rosier v. Hale, 10 Iowa, 470; Smith v. Bryan, 34 Bl. 377; Lord v. Chad-
bourne, 42 Me. 429; Rockwell v. Hubbell's Adm'rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197;
Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kansas, 123; Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282; McCor-
mick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127.
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right already in existence.1 And it may abolish old reme-
dies and * substitute new. If a statute providing a remedy [* 362]
is repealed while proceedings are pending, such proceed-
ings will be thereby determined, unless the legislature shall other-
wise provide ;2 and if it be amended instead of repealed, the
judgment pronounced in such proceedings must be according to
the law as it then stands.3 And any rule or regulation in regard
to the remedy which does not, under pretence of modifying or regu-
lating it, take away or impair the right itself, cannot be regarded
as beyond the proper province of legislation.4
But a vested right of action is property in the same sense in
which tangible things are property, and is equally protected against
arbitrary interference. Where it springs from contract, or from
the principles of the common law, it is not competent for the leg-
islature to take it away.5 And every man is entitled to a certain
1 Hope v. Jackson, 2 Yerg. 125.; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245; Pas-
cball v. Whitsett, 11 Ala. 472; Commonwealth v. Commissioners, &p., 6 Pick.
508; Whipple v. Farrar, 3 Mich. 436; United States v. Samperyac, 1 Hemp.
118; Sutherland v. De Leon, 1 Texas, 250; Anonymous, 2 Stew. 228. See
also Lewis e. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347; Trustees, &p. v. McCaughey, 2 Ohio,
s. s. 152; Hepburn v. Curts, 7 Watts, 300; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36
Penn. St. 29; Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 303; Brackett p. Norcross, 1 Greenl.
92; Ralston p. Lothain, 18 Ind. 303; White School House v. Post, 31 Conn.
241.
1 Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 Pet. 492; Ludlow v. Jackson, 3 Ohio, 553;
Eaton v. United States, 5 Cranch, 281; Schooner Rachel v. United States, 6
Cranch, 329.
3 See cases cited in last note. Also, Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binney,
601; United States v. Passmore, 4 Dall. 372; Patterson p. Philbrook, 9 Mass.
151; Commonwealth v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350; Commonwealth v. Kimball,
21 Pick. 373; Hartung v. People, 21 N. Y. 99; State v. Daley, 29 Conn. 272;
Rathbun p. Wheeler, 29 Ind. 601; State p. Norwood, 12 Md. 195; Bristol v.
Supervisors, &c, 20 Mich. 95; Sumner v. Miller, 64 N. C. 688.
4 See anie, pp. 287-292.
* Dash p. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477; Streubel v. Milwaukee and M. R. R. Co.,
12 Wis. 67; Clark p. Clark, 10 N. H. 386; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 211;
Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn. 339; Ward v. Brainerd, 1 Aik. -121; Keith v.
Ware, 2 Vt. 174; Lyman v. Mower, ib. 517; Kendall v. Dodge, 3 Vt. 360;
State p. Auditor, &c, 33 Mo. 287; Griffin p. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Norris v.
Doniphan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 385; Terrill v. Rankin, 3 Bush, 453. An equitable
title to lands, of which the legal title is in the State, is under the same constitu-
tional protection that the legal title would be. Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Texas,
452. Where an individual is allowed to recover a sum as a penalty, the right
may be taken away at any time before judgment. Oriental Bank v. Freeze,
[419]
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\
remedy in the law for all wrongs against his person or his property,
and cannot be compelled to buy justice, or to submit to conditions
not imposed upon his fellows as a means of obtaining it.1 Nor can
a party by his misconduct so forfeit aright that it may be taken
from him without judicial proceedings in which the forfeiture shall
be declared in due form. Forfeitures of rights and property can-
not be adjudged by legislative act, and confiscations without a
judicial hearing after due notice would be void as not being due
process of law.2 Even Congress, it has been held, has no power to
protect parties assuming to act under the authority of the general
government, during the existence of a civil war, by depriving
persons illegally arrested by them of all redress in the
[* 363] courts.3 * And if the legislature cannot confiscate property
or rights, neither can it authorize individuals to assume at
6 Shep. 109; Engle r. Sehurtz, 1 Mich. 150; Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454;
Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599; Welch v. Wads worth, 30 Conn. 149;
O'Kelly ». Athens Manuf. Co., 86 Geo. 51 ; United States ». Tyuen, 11 Wall.
88; Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Adler, 56 111. 350; post, 383. See also
Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barb. 309, and 15 N. Y. 9; Coles », Madison County,
Breese, 115; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 111. 881; post, 375-376.
1 Thus, a person cannot be precluded by test oaths from maintaining suits.
McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; ante, 289,.note. See post, 368, 369, note.
* Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 434. See next note. Also Rison v. Farr, 24
Ark. 161; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant's Cas. 406. But no constitutional
principle is violated- by a statute which allows judgment to be entered up against
a defendant who has been served with process, unless within a certain number of
days he files an affidavit of merits. Hunt v. Lucas, 97 Mass. 404.
8 Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370. In this case the act of Congress of March
3, 1863, which provided "that any order of the president or under his authority,
made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, shall be a defence
in all courts, to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, pending or to be
commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment, made, done, or
committed, or acts omitted to be done, under and by virtue of such order, or
under color of any law of Congress,"-was held to be unconstitutional. The same
decision was made in Johnson v, Jones, 44 III. 142. It was said in the first of
these cases that " this act was passed to deprive the citizens of all redress for
illegal arrests and imprisonments; it was not needed as a protection for making
such as are legal, because the common law gives ample protection for making
legal arrests and imprisonments." And it may be added that those acts which
are justified by military or martial law are equally legal with those justified by
the common law. So in Hubbard v. Brainerd, 35 Conn. 563, it was decided that
Congress could not take away a vested right to sue for and recover back an
illegal tax which had been paid under protest to a collector of the national
revenue. See also Bryan v. Walker, 64 N. C. 146. Nor can the right to have
[ 420 ]
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BT " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 363
their option powers of police, which they may exercise in the con-
demnation and sale of property offending against their regulations,
or for the satisfaction of their charges and expenses in its manage-
ment and control, rendered or incurred without the con-
sent of its owners.1 And a statute * which authorizes a [* 364]
party to seize the property of another, without process or
a void tax sale set aside be made conditional on the payment of the illegal tax.
Wilson v. McKenna, 52 111. 44; and other cases cited, post, 368, 369, note.
The case of Norris v. Doniphan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 385, may properly be cited
in this connection. It was there held that the act of Congress of July 17.
1862, "to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize
and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes," in so far as
it undertook to authorize the confiscation of the property of citizens as a pun-
ishment for treason and other crimes, by proceedings in rem in any district in
which the property might be, without presentment and indictment by a grand
jury, without arrest or summons of the owner, and upon such evidence of his
guilt only as would be proof of any fact in admiralty or revenue cases, was
unconstitutional and void, and therefore that Congress had no power to prohibit
the State Courts from giving the owners of property seized the relief they would
he entitled to under the State laws. A statute which makes a constitutional
right to vote depend upon an impossible condition is void. Davies v. McKeeby,
5 Nev. 369. See further State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 243; Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark.
161; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 406. Where no express power of removal
is conferred on the executive, he cannot declare an office forfeited for mis-
behavior; but the forfeiture must be declared in judicial proceedings. Page v.
Hardin, 8 B. Monr. 648; State t>. Pritchard, Law Reg. Aug. 1873, p. 514.
1 The log-driving and booming corporations, which were authorized to be
formed under a general law in Michigan, were empowered, whenever logs or lum-
ber were put into navigable streams without adequate force and means provided
for preventing obstructions, to take charge of the same, and cause it to be run,
driven, boomed, &c, at the owner's expense ; and it gave them a lien on the same
to satisfy all just and reasonable charges, with power to sell the property for
those charges and for the expenses of sale, on notice, either served personally on
the owner, or posted as therein provided. In Ames v. Port Huron Log-Driving
and Booming Co., 11 Mich. 147, it was held that the power which this law
assumed to confer was in the nature of a public office; and Campbell, J., says:
"It is difficult to perceive by what process a public office can be obtained or
exercised without either election or appointment. The powers of government are
parcelled out by the Constitution, which certainly contemplates some official
responsibility. Every officer not expressly exempted is required to take an oath
of office as a preliminary to discharging his duties. It is absurd to suppose that
any official power can exist in any person by his own assumption, or by the
employment of some other private person; and still more so to recognize in such
an assumption a power of depriving individuals of their property. And it is
plain that the exercise of such a power is an act in its nature public, and not
private. The case, however, involves more than the assumption of control. The
[421]
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warrant, and to sell it without notification to the owner, for the
punishment of a private trespass, and in order to enforce a penalty
against the owner, can find no justification in the Constitution.1
corporation, or rather its various agents, must of necessity determine when the
case arises justifying interference; and having assumed possession, it assesses its
own charges; and having assessed them, proceeds to sell the property seized to
pay them, with the added expense of such sale. These proceedings are all ex
parte, and are all proceedings in invitum. Their validity must therefore be
determined by the rules applicable to such cases. Except in those cases where
proceedings to collect the public revenue may stand upon a peculiar footing of
their own, it is an inflexible principle of constitutional right that no person can
legally be devested of his property without remuneration, or against his will,
unless he is allowed a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where he may contest
the claim set up against him, and be allowed to meet it on the law and the facts.
When his property is wanted in specie, for public purposes, there are methods
assured to him whereby its value can be ascertained. Where a debt or penalty
or forfeiture may be eet up against him, the determination of his liability becomes
a judicial question; and all judicial functions are required by the Constitution to
be exercised by courts of justice, or judicial officers regularly chosen. He can
only be reached through the forms of law upon a regular hearing, unless he has
by contract referred the matter to another mode of determination."
1 A statute of New York authorized any person to take into his custody and
possession any animal which might be trespassing upon his lands, and give notice
of the seizure to a justice or commissioner of highways of the town, who should
proceed to sell the animal after posting notice. From the proceeds of the sale,
the officer was to retain his fees, pay the person taking up the animal fifty cents,
and also compensation for keeping it, and the balance to the owner, if he should
claim it within a year. In Rockwell t>. Nearing, 35 N. Y. 807, 308, Porter, J.,
says of this statute: "The legislature has no authority either to deprive the cit-
izen of his property for other than public purposes, or to authorize its seizure
without process or warrant, by persons other than the owner, for the mere pun-
ishment of a private trespass. So far as the act in question relates to animals
trespassing on the premises of the captor, the proceedings it authorizes have not
even the mocking semblance of due process of law. The seizure may be pri-
vately made; the party making it is permitted to conceal the property on his own
premises; he is protected, though the trespass was due to his own connivance or
neglect; he is permitted to take what does not belong to him without notice to
the owner, though that owner is near and known; he is allowed to sell, throngh
the intervention of an officer, and without even the form of judicial proceedings,
an animal in which he has no interest by way either of title, mortgage, pledge, or
lien; and all to the end that he may receive compensation for detaining it with-
out the consent of the owner, and a fee of fifty cents for his services as an
informer. He levies without process, condemns without proof, and sells without
execution." And he distinguishes these proceedings from those in distraining
cattle, damage feasant, which are always remedial, and under which the party was
authorized to detain the property in pledge for the payment of his damages. See
[ 422]
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Limitation Laws.
Notwithstanding the protection which the law gives to vested
rights, it is possible for a party to debar himself of the right to
assert the same in the courts, by his own negligence or
laches. * If one who is dispossessed " be negligent for a [* 365]
long and unreasonable time, the law refuses afterwards to
lend him any assistance to recover the possession merely, both to
punish his neglect (nam leges vigilantibus, non dormientibus sub-
veniunf), and also because it is presumed that the supposed
wrong-doer has in such a length of time procured a legal title,
otherwise he would sooner have been sued."1 Statutes of limita-
tion are passed which fix upon a reasonable time within which a
party is permitted to bring suit for the recovery of his rights, and
which, on failure to do so, establish a legal presumption against
him that he has no rights in the premises. Such a statute is a
statute of repose.2 Every government is under obligation to its
citizens to afford them all needful legal remedies ;3 but it is not
bound to keep its courts open indefinitely for one who neglects or
refuses to apply for redress until it may fairly be presumed that
the means by which the other party might disprove his claim are
lost in the lapse of time.*
When the period prescribed by statute has once run, so as to cut
also opinion by Morgan, J., in the same case, pp. 814-317, and the opinions of
the several judges in Wynehamer v. People, 18 N. Y. 895, 419, 484, and 468.
Compare Campbell v. Evans, 45 N. Y. 356; Cook v. Gregg, 46 N. Y. 439.
1 3 Bl. Com. 188; Broom, Legal Maxims, 857.
* Such a statute was formerly construed with strictness, and the defence under
it was looked upon as unconscionable, and not favored; but Mr. Justice Story
has well said, it has often been matter of regret in modern times that the deci-
sions had not proceeded upon principles better adapted to carry into effect the
real objects of the statute; that instead of being viewed in an unfavorable light
as an unjust and discreditable defence, it had not received such support as would
have made it what it was intended to be, emphatically a statute of repose. It is
a wise and beneficial law, not designed merely to raise a presumption of pay-
ment of a just debt from lapse of time, but to afford security against State
demands after the true state of the transaction may have been forgotten, or be
incapable of explanation by reason of the death or removal of witnesses. Bell
v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 360. See Leffingwell v. Warren,^ Black, 599.
3 Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430.
* Beal v. Nason, 2 Shep. 344; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 860; Stearns e. Git-
tings, 23 111. 387; State r. Jones, 21 Md. 437.
[ 423 ]
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off the remedy which one might have had for the recovery of
property in the possession of another, the title to the property,
irrespective of the original right, is regarded in the law as vested
in the possessor, who is entitled to the same protection in respect
to it which the owner is entitled to in other cases. A subsequent
repeal of the limitation law could not be given a retroactive effect,
so as to disturb this title.1 It is vested as completely and per-
fectly, and is as safe from legislative interference as it would have
been if it had been perfected in the owner by grant, or any species
of assurance.2
All limitation laws, however, must proceed on the theory that
the party, by lapse of time and omissions on his part, has forfeited
his right to assert his title in the law.3 Where they relate
[* 366] to * property, it seems not to be essential that the adverse
claimant should be in actual possession;4 but one who is
himself in the legal enjoyment of his property cannot have his
rights therein forfeited to another, for failure to bring suit against
that other within a time specified to test the validity of a claim
which the latter asserts, but takes no steps to enforce. It has
consequently been held that a statute which, after a lapse of five
years, makes a recorded deed purporting to be executed under a
statutory power conclusive evidence of a good title, could not be
1 Brent v. Chapman, 5 Cranch, 358; Newby's Adm'rs v. Blakey, 3 H. & M.
57; Parish v. Eager, 15 Wis. 582; Baggs's Appeal, 43 Penn. St. 512; Leffing-
well v. Warren, 2 Black, 599. See cases cited in next note.
• See Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 249; Sprecker v. Wakelee, 11 Wis. 432;
Pleasants v. Rohrer, 17 Wis. 657; Moor v. Lisce, 29 Penn. St. 262; Morton t.
Sharkey, MeCabon (Kan.), 113; McKinney v. Springer, 8Blackf. 506; Stippr.
Brown, 2 Ind. 647; Wires ». Farr, 25 Vt. 41; Davis v. Minor, 1 How. (Miss.)
183; Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenl. 326; Woartr.
Winnick, 3 N. H. 473; Martin v. Martin, 35 Ala. 560; Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt.
86; Thompson v. Caldwell, 3 Lit. 137; Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met. 400; Couch e.
McKee, 1 Eng. 495; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. Ill; Girdner v. Stephens, 1
Heis. 280; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 700; Bradford r. Shine's Adm'r, 13 Fla. 393; s. c.
7 Am. Rep. 239. But the statute of limitations may be suspended for a period
as to demands not already barred. Wardlaw v. Buzzard, 15 Rich. 158; Caper-
ton o. Martin, 4 W. Va. 138; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 270; Bender v. Crawford, 83
Tex. 745; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 27Ch
'Stearns v. Gittings, 23 111. 389; per Walker, J., Sturgis v. Crowninshiekl,
4 Wheat. 207, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Pearce ». Patton, 7 B. Monr. 162; Griffin
v. McKenzie, 7 Geo. 163; Coleman v. Holmes, 44 Ala. 125.
* Stearns v. Gittings, 23 111. 389; Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 366
valid as a limitation law against the original owner in possession of
the land. Limitation laws cannot compel a resort to legal pro-
ceedings by one who is already in the complete enjoyment of all
he claims.1
All statutes of limitation, also, must proceed on the idea that
the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the
courts. A statute could not bar the existing right of claimants
without affording this opportunity: if it should attempt to do so, it
would be not a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to
extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its
provisions. It is essential that such statutes allow a reasonable
time after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon
existing causes of action ;2 though what shall be considered a
1 Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329. In Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12, it was
held that this statute could not be enforced as a limitation law in favor of the
party in possession, inasmuch as it did not proceed on the idea of limiting the
time for bringing suit, but by a conclusive rule of evidence sought to pass over
the property to the claimant under the statutory sale in all cases, irrespective
of possession. See also Baker v. Kelly, 11 Minn. 480. The case of Leffingwell
r. Warren, 2 Black, 599, is contra. That case follows Wisconsin decisions. In the
leading case of Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442, the holder of the original title was not
in possession; and what was decided was that it was not necessary for the holder
of the tax title to be in possession in order to claim the benefit of the statute;
ejectment against a claimant being permitted by law when the lands were unoc-
cupied. This circumstance of possession or want of possession in the person
whose right is to be extinguished seems to us of vital importance. How can a
man justly be held guilty of laches in not asserting claims to property, when he
already possesses and enjoys the property? The old maxim is, " That which was
originally void cannot by mere lapse of time be made valid;" and if a void claim
by force of an act of limitation can ripen into a conclusive title as against the
owner in possession, the policy underlying that species of legislation must be
something beyond what has been generally supposed.
* So held of a statute which took effect some months after its passage, and
which, in its operation upon certain classes of cases, would have extinguished
adverse claims unless asserted by suit before the act took effect. Price v. Hop-
kin, 13 Mich. 318. See also Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 423; Proprietors, &c. v.
Laboree, 2 Greenl. 294; Society, &c. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 141; Blackford v.
Peltier, 1 Blackf. 36; Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn. 839; Osborn v. Jaines, 17
Wis. 573; Morton v. Sharkey, McCahon (Kan.), 113; Berry v. Ramsdell, 4
Met. (Ky.) 296. In the last case cited it was held that a statute which only
allowed thirty days in which to bring action on an existing demand was unreason-
able and void. And see what is said in Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kansas, 135. But a
statute giving a new remedy against a railroad company for an injury, may limit
to a short time, e.g., six months, the time for bringing suit. O'Bannon v. Louis-
ville, &c., R. R. Co., 8 Bush, 318.
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* 366 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XL
\
reasonable time must be settled by the judgment of the
[* 367] legislature, into the wisdom of * whose decision in estab-
lishing the period of legal bar it does not pertain to the
jurisdiction of the courts to inquire.1
Alterations in the Rules of Evidence.
It must also be evident that a right to have one's controversia
determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right. These
rules pertain to the remedies which the State provides for its
citizens; and generally in legal contemplation they neither enter
into and constitute a part of any contract, nor can be regarded as
being of the essence of any right which a party may seek to
enforce. Like other rules affecting the remedy, they must there-
fore at all times be subject to modification and control by the
legislature;2 and the changes which are enacted may lawfully be
made applicable to existing causes of action, even in those States
in which retrospective laws are forbidden. For the law as changed
would only prescribe rules for presenting the evidence in legal
controversies in the future; and it could not therefore be called
retrospective even though some of the controversies upon which it
may act were in progress before. It has accordingly been held in
New Hampshire that a statute which removed the disqualification
of interest, and allowed parties to suits to testify, might lawfully
apply to existing causes of action.3 So may a statute which mod-
1 Stearns v. Gittings, 23 HI. 387 ; Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430; Smith v.
Morrison, 22 Pick. 430 ; Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318 ; De Moss v. Newton,
31 Ind. 219. But see Berry v. Ramsdell, cited in preceding note.
It may be remarked here, that statutes of limitation do not apply to the State
unless they so provide expressly. Gibson c. Choteau, 13 Wall. 92. And State
limitation laws do not apply to the United States. United States v. Hoar, 2
Mas. 311 ; People v. Gilbert, 18 Johns. 228. And it has been held that the
right to maintain a nuisance cannot be acquired under the statute. State v.
Franklin Falls Co., 49 N. H. 240.
* Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 533 ; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 319, per
Marshall, Ch. J.; Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 533; Karney v. Paisley, 13 Iowa,
89 ; Commonwealth i>. Williams, 6 Gray, 1 ; Hickox v. Tallman, 38 Barb. 608;
Webb v. Den, 17 How. 576; Pratt v. Jones, 25 Vt. 303. See ante, p. 288 and
note.
3 Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 323. A very full and satisfactory examination of
the whole subject will be found in this case. To the same effect is Southwick v.
Southwick, 49 N. Y. 510.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 367
ifies the common-law rule excluding parol evidence to vary the
terms of a written contract;1 and a statute making the protest of
a promissory note evidence of the facts therein stated.2 These and
the like cases will sufficiently illustrate the general rule, that the
whole subject is under the control of the legislature, which pre-
scribes such rules for the trial and determination as well of exist-
ing as of future rights and controversies as in its judgment will
most completely subserve the ends of justice.8
* A strong instance in illustration of legislative control [* 368]
over evidence will be found in the laws of some of the States
in regard to conveyances of lauds upon sales to satisfy delinquent
taxes. Independent of special statutory rule on the subject, such
conveyances would not be evidence of title. They are executed
under a statutory power; and it devolves upon the claimant under
them to show that the successive steps which under the statute lead
to such conveyance have been taken. But it cannot be doubted that
this rule may be so changed as to make a tax deed prima facie
evidence that all the proceedings have been regular, and that the
purchaser has acquired under them a complete title.4 The burden
of proof is thereby changed from one party to the other; the legal
presumption which the statute creates in favor of the purchaser
being sufficient, in connection with the deed, to establish his case,
unless it is overcome by countervailing testimony. Statutes making
defective records evidence of valid conveyances are of a similar
nature; and these usually, perhaps always, have reference to
records before made, and provide for making them competent
evidence where before they were merely void.6 But they devest no
title, and are not even retrospective in character. They merely
establish what the legislature regards as a reasonable and just rule
1 Gibbs v. Gale, 7 Md. 76.
* Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 553.
* Per Marshall, Cb. J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 249; Webb v.
Den, 17 How. 577; Delaplaine v. Cook, 7 Wis. 54 ; Kendall v. Kingston, 5
Mass. 534 ; Fowler v. Chatterton, 6 Bing. 258.
* Hand «. Ballou, 12 N. Y. 543; Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N. Y. 53; Delaplaine
t>. Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; Adams ». Beale, 19
Iowa, 61; Amberg v. Rogers, 9 Mich. 332; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 289;
Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Wright r. Dunham, 13 Michigan, 414; Abbott ».
Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162; e.c. 46 Mo. 291. The rule once established may be
abolished, even as to existing deeds. Hickox r. Tallman, 38 Barb. 608.
5 See Webb v. Den, 17 How. 577.
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* 368 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XL
\
for the presentation by the parties of their rights before the courts
in the future.
But there are fixed bounds to the power of the legislature over
this subject which cannot be exceeded. As to what shall be evi-
dence, and which party shall assume the burden of proof in civil
cases, its authority is practically unrestricted, so long as its regu-
lations are impartial and uniform; but it has no power to establish
rules which, under pretence of regulating the presentation of evi-
dence, go so far as altogether to preclude a party from exhibiting
his rights. Except in those cases which fall within the familiar
doctrine of estoppel at the common law, or other cases resting
upon the like reasons, it would not, we apprehend, be in the power
of the legislature to declare that a particular item of evidence
should preclude a party from establishing his rights in opposition
to it. In judicial investigations the law of the laud
[* 369J requires an opportunity for a trial;1 and there * can be no
trial if only one party is suffered to produce his proofs.
The most formal conveyance may be a fraud or a forgery; public
officers may connive with rogues to rob the citizen of his property:
witnesses may testify or officers certify falsely, and records may be
collusively manufactured for dishonest purposes; and that legisla-
tion which would preclude the fraud or wrong being shown, aud
deprive the party wronged of all remedy, has no justification in
the principles of natural justice or of constitutional law. A statute,
therefore, which should make a tax-deed conclusive evidence of a
complete title, and preclude the owner of the original title from
showing its invalidity, would be void, because being not a law reg-
ulating evidence, but an unconstitutional confiscation of property.2
1 Tift r. Griffin, 5 Geo. 185; Lenz v. Charlton, 23 Wis 482; Conway t.
Cable, 37 111. 89; ante, 362, note; post, 382-83 and notes.
* Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329 j Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 13; White r.
Flynn, 23 Ind. 46; Corbin v. Hill, 21 Iowa, 70; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo.
102; s. c. 46 Mo. 291. And see the well-reasoned case of McCready v. Sexton,
29 Iowa, 356. Also, Wright ». Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 349. As to how far the
legislature may make the tax deed conclusive evidence that mere irregularities
have not intervened in the proceedings, see Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556;
Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508. Undoubtedly the legislature may dispense
with mere matters of form in the proceedings as well after they have taken place
as before; but this is quite a different thing from making tax deeds conclusive
on points material to the interest of the property owner. See, further, Wantlan
r. White, 19 Ind. 470; People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb. 212; McCready v. Sexton,
[ 428 ]
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 369
And a statute which should make the certificate or opinion of an
officer conclusive evidence of the illegality of an existing contract
would be equally nugatory ;1 though perhaps if parties should
enter into a contract in view of such a statute then existing, its
provisions might properly be regarded as assented to and incorpo-
rated in their contract, and therefore binding upon them.2
Retrospective Laws.
Regarding the circumstances under which a man may be said to
hare a vested right to a defence against a demand made by another,
it is somewhat difficult to lay down a comprehensive rule which
the authorities wiH justify. It is certain that he who lias satisfied
a demand cannot have it revived against him, and he who has
become released from a demand by the operation of the statute,
of limitations is equally protected.3 In botli cases the demand is
mpra. It is not competent for the legislature to compel an owner of land to
redeem it from a void tax sale as a condition on which he shall be allowed to
assert his title against it. Conway v. Cable, 37 111. 82; Hart v. Henderson, 17
Mich. 218; Wilson v. McKenna, 52 111. 44; Reed v. Tyler, 56 111. 292; Dean v.
Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236. But it seems that if the tax purchaser has paid taxes
and made improvements, the payment for these may be made a condition prece-
dent to a suit in ejectment against him. Pope v. Macon, 23 Ark. C44. The case
of Wright p. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 349, is valuable in this connection. "We
apprehend," says Beatty, Ch. J., " that it is beyond the power of the legislature
to restrain a defendant in any suit from setting up a good defence to an action
against him. The legislature could not directly take the property of A. to pay
the taxes of B. Neither can it indirectly do so by depriving A. of the right of
setting up in his answer that his separate property has been jointly assessed with
that of B., and asserting his right to pay his own taxes without being encumbered
with those of B. . . . Due process of law not only requires that a party shall
be properly brought into court, but that he shall have the opportunity when in
court to establish any fact which, according to the usages of the common law
or the provisions of the Constitution, would be a protection to him or his prop-
erty." See Taylor v. Miles, 5 Kansas, 498; S.c. 7 Am. Rep. 558.
1 Young v. Beardsley, 11 Paige, 93. An act to authorize persons whose sheep
are killed by dogs, to present their claim to the selectmen of the town for allowance
and payment by the town, and giving the town after payment an action against
the owner of the dog for the amount so paid, is void, as taking away trial by
jury, and as authorizing the selectmen to pass upon one's rights without giving
him an opportunity to be heard. East Kingston t>. Towle, 48 N. H. 57; 8. c.
2 Am. Rep. 174.
* See post, p. 408, note.
'Ante, p. 865, note 5, and cases cited.
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* 369 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XI.
gone, and to restore it would be to create a new contract for the
parties, — a thing quite beyond the power of legislation. So he
who was never bound, either legally or equitably, cannot have a
demand created against him by mere legislative enactment.1 But
there are many cases in which, by existing laws, defences based
upon mere informalities are allowed in suits upon contracts, or in
respect to legal proceedings, in some of which a regard to sub-
stantial justice would warrant the legislature in interfering to lake
away the defence if it possesses the power to do so.
[* 370] * In regard to these cases, we think investigation of the
authorities will show that a party has no vested right
in a defence based upon an informality not affecting his substantial
equities. And this brings us to a particular examination of a class
of statutes which is constantly coming under the consideration of
the courts, and which are known as retrospective laws, by reason
of their reaching back to and giving some different legal effect to
some previous transaction to that which it had under the law when
it took place.
There are numerous cases which hold that retrospective laws are
not obnoxious to constitutional objection, while in others they have
been held to be void. The different decisions have been based
upon diversities in the facts which make different principles appli-
cable. There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to pass
statutes which reach back to and change or modify the effect of
prior transactions, provided retrospective laws are not forbidden,
eo nomine by the State constitution, and provided further that no
other objection exists to them than their retrospective character.'
Nevertheless legislation of this character is exceedingly liable to
abuse; and it is a sound rule of construction that a statute should
have a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a
legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively.3 And
1 In Medford v. Learned, 16 Mass. 215, it was held that where a pauper had
received support from the parish, to which by law he was entitled, a subsequent
legislative act could not make him liable by suit to refund the cost of the sup-
port. This case was approved and followed in People v. Supervisors of Columbia,
43 N. Y. 135. See ante, p. 362, and note.
• Thornton p. McGrath, 1 Duvall, 849; State p. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; Beach
v. Walker, 6 Conn. 197; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St. 57.
1 Dash v. Vankleek, 7 Johns. 477; Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273; Plumb v.
Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Whitman v. Hapgood, 13 Mass. 464; Medford v. Learned,
16 Mass. 215; Bay v. Gage, 86 Barb. 447; Watkin* v. Haight, 18 John*. 138;
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 370
some of the States have deemed it just and wise to forbid such
laws altogether by their constitutions.1
* A retrospective statute curing defects in legal pro- [* 371]
ceedings where they are in their nature irregularities only,
and do not extend to matters of jurisdiction, is not void on consti-
tutional grounds, unless expressly forbidden. Of this class are
the statutes to cure irregularities in the assessment of property
for taxation and the levy of taxes thereon;2 irregularities in the
Garrett p. Beaumont, 24 Miss. 377; Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 86; Perkins v.
Perkins, 7 Conn. 558; Hastings v. Lane, 3 Shep. 134; Guard p. Rowan, 2 Scam.
499; Sayre p. Wisner, 8 Wend. 661; Quackenbos p. Danks, 1 Denio, 128; Gar-
rett p. Doe, 1 Scam. 335; Thompson p. Alexander, 11 111. 64; State p. Barbee,
3 Ind. 258; Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio, n. s. 588; State p. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422;
Bartruff v. Remey, 15 Iowa, 257; Tyson p. School Directors, 61 Penn. St. 9;
Colony v. Dublin, 32 N. H. 432; Torrey p. Corliss, 32 Me. 33; Atkinson v. Dun-
lop, 50 Me. Ill; Ex parte Graham, 13 Rich. 277; Hubbard p. Brainerd, 35
Conn. 576; Conway v. Cable, 37 111. 82; Clark v. Baltimore, 29 Md. 277;
Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500; State p. The Auditor, 41 Mo. 25; Merwin p.
Bullard, 66 N. C. 398; Haley p. Philadelphia, 68 Penn. St. 137; s. c. 8 Am.
Rep. 163; Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa, 497.
1 See the provision in the Constitution of New Hampshire, considered in
Woart v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 481; Clark p. Clark, 10 N. H. 386; Willard v. Har-
vey, 24 N. H. 351; and Rich p. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; and that in the Consti-
tution of Texas, in De Cordova p. Galveston, 4 Texas, 470. The Constitution
of Ohio provides that "the General Assembly shall have no power to pass retro-
active laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts; provided, however,
that the General Assembly may, by general laws, authorize the courts to carry
into effect the manifest intention of parties and officers, by curing omissions,
defects, and errors in instruments and proceedings, arising out of their want of
conformity with the laws of this State, and upon such terms as shall be just and
equitable." Under this clause it was held competent for the General Assembly
to pass an act authorizing the courts to correct mistakes in deeds of married
women previously executed, whereby they were rendered ineffectual. Goshorn
t. Purcell, 11 Ohio, N. 8. 641. Under a provision in the Constitution of Ten-
nessee that no retrospective law shall be passed, it has been held that a law
authorizing a bill to be filed by slaves, by their next friend, to emancipate them,
although it applied to cases which arose before its passage, was not a retrospective
law within the meaning of this clause. Fisher's Negroes p. Dobbs, 6 Yerg. 119.
An act for the payment of bounties for past services was held not retrospective in
State v. Richland, 20 Ohio, N. s. 369. See further, Society p. Wheeler, 2 Gall.
105; Officer p. Young, 5 Yerg. 320.
That the legislature cannot retrospectively construe statutes and bind parties
thereby, see ante p. 93 et seq.
• Butler p. Toledo, 5 Ohio, n. 8. 225; Strauch p. Shoemaker, 1 W. & S. 175;
McCoy p. Michew, 7 W. & S. 390; Montgomery p. Meredith, 17 Penn. St. 42;
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[CH. XI.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
organization or elections of corporations;1 irregularities in the
votes or other action by municipal corporations, or the like, where
a statutory power has failed of due and regular execution through
the carelessness of officers, or other cause ;2 irregular proceedings
in courts, &c.
The rule applicable to cases of this description is substantially
the following: If the thing wanting, or which failed to be done,
and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings, is something
the necessity for which the legislature might have dispensed with
by prior statute, then it is not beyond the power of the legislature
to dispense with it by subsequent statute. And if the irregularity
consists in doing some act, or in the mode or manner of doing
some act which the legislature might have made immaterial by
prior law, it is equally competent to make the same immaterial by
a subsequent law.
A few of the decided cases will illustrate this principle. In
Kearney v. Taylor3 a sale of real estate belonging to infant tenants
in common had been made by order of court in a partition suit,
and the land bid off by a company of persons, who proposed subdi-
viding and selling it in parcels. The sale was confirmed in their
names, but by mutual arrangement the deed was made to one only,
for convenience in selling and conveying. This deed failed to
convey the title, because not following the sale. The legislature
afterwards passed an act providing that, on proof being made to
the satisfaction of the court or jury before which such deed was
offered in evidence that the land was sold fairly and with-
in* 372] out fraud, *and the deed executed in good faith and for
a sufficient consideration, and with the consent of the
Dunden v. Snodgrass, 18 Penn. St. 151; Williston v. Colkett, 9 Penn. St. 38;
Boardman v. Beckwith, 18 Iowa, 292. And see Walter v. Bacon, 8 Mass. 472;
Locke r. Dane, 9 Mass. 360; Patterson v. Philbrook, 9 Mass. 153; Trustees r.
McCaughy, 2 Ohio, n. s. 152. The right to provide for a reassessment of taxes
irregularly levied is undoubted. See Brevoot v. Detroit, 23 Mich. 322; State
v. Newark, 34 N. J. 237; Musselraan v. Logansport, 29 Ind. 533. But, of course,
if the vice is in the nature of the tax itself, it will continue and be fatal, however
often the process of assessment may be repeated. See post, 382.
1 Syracuse Bank o. Davis, 16 Barb. 188; Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 111. 416.
• See Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Yost's Report, 17 Penn. St. 524;
Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa, 497; Allen e. Archer, 49 Me. 346; Commonwealth
v. Marshall, 69 Penn. St. 328; State v. Union, 4 Vroom, 250.
* 15 How. 494. And see Boyce v. Siuclair, 3 Bush, 261.
[432 ]
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 372
persons reported as purchasers, the deed should have the same
effect as though it had been made to the purchasers. That this
act was unobjectionable in principle was not denied; and it cannot
be doubted that a prior statute, authorizing the deed to be made to
one for the benefit of all and with their assent, would have been
open to no valid objection.1
In certain Connecticut cases it was insisted that sales made of
real estate on execution were void, because the officer had included
in the amount due several small items of fees not allowed by law.
It appeared, however, that, after the sales were made, the legislat-
ure had passed an act providing that no levy should be deemed
void by reason of the officer having included greater fees than
were by law allowable, but that all such levies, not in other respects
defective, should be valid and effectual to transmit the title of the
real estate levied upon. The liability of the officer for receiving
more than his legal fees was at ,the same time left unaffected. In
the leading case the court say: "The law, undoubtedly, is retro-
spective; but is it unjust? All the charges of the officer on the
execution in question are perfectly reasonable, and for necessary
services in the performance of his duty; of consequence they
are eminently just; and so is the act confirming the levies. A
law, although it be retrospective, if conformable to entire jus-
tice, this court has repeatedly decided is to be recognized and
enforced." 2
In another Connecticut case it appeared that certain marriages
had been celebrated by persons in the ministry who were not
empowered to perform that ceremony by the State law, and that
the marriages were therefore invalid. The legislature had after-
wards passed an act declaring all such marriages valid, and the
court sustained the act. It was assailed as an exercise of the
1 See Davis r. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316, and Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41, for
decisions under statutes curing irregular sales by guardians and executors. In
many of the States general laws will be found providing that such sales shall not
be defeated by certain specified defects and irregularities.
* Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 197; Booth v. Booth, 7 Conn. 850. And see
Mather v. Chapman, 6 Conn. 54; Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conn. 319; Welch v.
Wadaworth, 30 Conn. 149; Smith o. Merchand's Ex'rs, 7 S. & R. 260; Under-
wood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R. 97; Bleakney v. Bank of Greencastle, 17 S. & R. 64;
Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penu. St. 474; Ahl
r. Gleim, 52 Penn. St. 432; Selsby v. Redlon, 19 Wis. 17; Parmelee v. Law-
rence, 48 111. 331.
28 [ 433 ]
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* 372 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XL
\
judicial power; but this it clearly was not, as it purported to settle
no controversies, and merely sought to give effect to the desire of
the parties, which they had ineffectually attempted to carry out by
means of the ceremony which proved insufficient. And while it
was not claimed that the act was void in so far as it made
[* 373] effectual the legal relation * of matrimony between the par-
ties, it was nevertheless insisted that rights of property
dependent upon that relation could not be affected by it, inasmuch
as, in order to give such rights, it must operate retrospectively.
The court in disposing of the case are understood to express the
opinion that, if the legislature possesses the power to validate an
imperfect marriage, still more clearly does it have power to affect
incidental rights. "The man and the woman were unmarried,
notwithstanding the formal ceremony which passed between them,
and free in point of law to live in celibacy, or contract marriage
with any other persons at pleasure. It is a strong exercise of
power to compel two persons to marry without their consent, and
a palpable perversion of strict legal right. At the same time the
retrospective law thus far directly operating on vested rights is
admitted to be unquestionably valid, because manifestly just."1
It is not to be inferred from this language that the court under-
stood the legislature to possess power to select individual mem-
bers of the community, and force them into a relation of marriage
with each other against their will. That complete control which
the legislature is supposed to possess over the domestic relations
can hardly extend so far. The legislature may perhaps divorce
parties, with or without cause, according to its own view of jus-
tice or public policy; but for the legislature to marry parties
against their consent, we conceive to be decidedly against "the
law of the land." The learned court must be understood as
speaking here with exclusive reference to the case at bar, in which
the legislature, by the retrospective act, were merely removing a
formal impediment to that marriage which the parties had assented
to, and which they had attempted to form. Such an act, unless
special circumstances conspired to make it otherwise, would cer-
tainly be "manifestly just," and therefore might well be held
1 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 224, per Hosmer, J. The power to validate
void marriages held not to exist in the legislature where, by the constitution, the
whole subject was referred to the courts. White v. White, 105 Mass. 325.
[434]
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CH. XL] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 373
"unquestionably valid." And if the marriage was rendered valid,
the legal incidents would follow of course. In a Pennsylvania
case the validity of certain grading and paving assessments was
involved, and it was argued that they were invalid for the reason
that the city ordinance under which they had been made was inop-
erative, because not recorded as required by law. But the legislat-
ure had passed an act to validate this ordinance, and had declared
therein that the omission to record the ordinance should not affect
or impair the lien of the assessments against the lot owners. In
passing upon the validity of this act, the court express the following
views: "Whenever there is a right, though imperfect, the consti-
tution does not prohibit the legislature from giving a remedy. In
Hepburn v. Curts,1 it was said, ' The legislature, provided it does
not violate the constitutional provisions, may pass retro-
spective laws, * such as in their operation may affect suits [* 374]
pending, and give to a party a remedy which he did not
previously possess, or modify an existing remedy, or remove an
impediment in the way of legal proceedings.' What more has
been done in this case? . . . While (the ordinance) was in force,
contracts to do the work were made in pursuance of it, and the
liability of the city was incurred. But it was suffered to become
of no effect by the failure to record it. Notwithstanding this, the
grading and paving were done, and the lots of the defendants
received the benefit at the public expense. Now can the omission
to record the ordinance diminish the equitable right of the public
to reimbursement? It is at most but a formal defect in the remedy
provided, — an oversight. That such defects may be cured by
retroactive legislation need not be argued." 2
On the same principle legislative acts validating invalid contracts
have been sustained. When these acts go no farther than to bind
a party by a contract which he has attempted to enter into, but
which was invalid by reason of some personal inability on his part
to make it, or through neglect of some legal formality, or in con-
1 7 Watts, 300.
* Schenley p. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St. 29, 57. See also State v. Newark,
8 Dutch. 185; Den v. Downam, 1 Green (N. J.), 185; People v. Seymour, 16
Cal. 332; Grim v. Weisenburg School District, 57 Penn. St. 433; State v. Union,
33 N. J. 355. The legislature has the same power to ratify and confirm an ille-
gally appointed corporate body that it has to create a new one. Mitchell v.
Deeds, 49 111. 416.
[ 435 ]
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sequence of some ingredient in the contract forbidden by law, the
question which they suggest is one of policy, and not of constitu-
tional power.
By statute of Ohio, all bonds, notes, bills, or contracts negotiable
or payable at any unauthorized bank, or made for the purpose of
being discounted at any such bank, were declared to be void.
While this statute was in force a note was made for the purpose of
being discounted atone of these institutions, and was actually dis-
counted by it. Afterwards the legislature passed an act, reciting
that many persons were indebted to such bank, by bonds, bills,
notes, <fec, and that owing, among other things, to doubts of its
right to recover its debts, it was unable to meet its own obligations,
and had ceased business, and for the purpose of winding up its
affairs had made an assignment to a trustee; therefore the said act
authorized the said trustee to bring suits on the said bonds, bills,
notes, &c, and declared it should not be lawful for the defendants
in such suits " to plead, set up, or insist upon, in defence, that the
notes, bonds, bills, or other written evidences of such indebtedness
are void on account of being contracts against or in viola-
[* 375] tion of any statute * law of this State, or on account of
their being contrary to public policy." This law was sus-
tained as a law " that contracts may be enforced," and as in further-
ance of equity and good morals.1 The original invalidity was only
becauso of the statute, and that statute was founded upon reasons
of public policy which had either ceased to be of force, or which
the legislature regarded as overborne by countervailing reasons.
Under these circumstances it was reasonable and just that the
makers of such paper should be precluded from relying upon such
invalidity.2
1 Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347.
* Trustees v. McCaughy, 2 Ohio, n. s. 155; Johnson r. Bentley, 16 Ohio, 97.
See also Syracuse Bank v. Davis, 16 Barb. 188. By statute, notes issued by
unincorporated banking associations were declared void. This statute was after-
wards repealed, and action was brought against bankers on notes previously
issued. Objection being taken that the legislature could not validate the void
contracts, the judge says: "I will consider this case on the broad ground of the
contract having been void when made, and of no new contract having arisen since
the repealing act. But by rendering the contract void it was not annihilated.
The object of the [original] act was not to vest any right in any unlawful banking
association, but directly the reverse. The motive was not to create a privilege,
or shield them from the payment of their just debts, but to restrain them from
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 375
By a statute of Connecticut, where loans of money were made,
and a bonus was paid by the borrower over and beyond the interest
and bonus permitted by law, the demand was subject to a deduc-
tion from the principal of all the interest and bonus paid. A
construction appears to have been put upon this statute by business
men which was different from that afterwards given by the courts;
and a large number of contracts of loan were in consequence
subject to the deduction. The legislature then passed a " healing
act," which provided that such loans theretofore made should not
be held, by reason of the taking of such bonus, to be usurious,
illegal, or in any respect void; but that, if otherwise legal, they
were thereby confirmed, and declared to be valid, as to
principal, interest, and * bonus. The case of Goshen v. [* 376]
Stonington1 was regarded as sufficient authority in sup-
port of this act; and the principle to be derived from that case
was stated to be "that where a statute is expressly retroactive,
and the object and effect of it is to correct an innocent mistake,
remedy a mischief, execute the intention of the parties, and pro-
mote justice, then, both as a matter of right and of public policy
affecting the peace and welfare of the community, the law should
be sustained." 2
violating the law by destroying the credit of their paper, and punishing those
who received it. How then can the defendants complain? As unauthorized
bankers they were violators of the law, and objects not of protection but of pun-
ishment. The repealing act was a statutory pardon of the crime committed by
the receivers of this illegal medium. Might not the legislature pardon the crime,
without consulting those who committed it? . . . How can the defendants say
there was no contract, when the plaintiff produces their written engagement for
the performance of a duty, binding in conscience if not in law P Although the
contract, for reasons of policy, was so far void that an action could not be sus-
tained on it, yet a moral obligation to perform it, whenever those reasons ceased,
remained; and it would be going very far to say that the legislature may not add
a legal sanction to that obligation, on account of some fancied constitutional
restriction." Hess v. Werts, 4 S. & R. 361. See also Bleakney v. Bank of
Greencastle, 17 S. & R. 64; Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Boyce v.
Sinclair, 3 Bush, 264.
1 4 Conn. 224. See ante, p. 272-3.
s Savings Bank v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97. See also Savings Bank v. Bates,
8 Conn. 505; Andrews t>. Russell, 7 Blackf. 474; Grimes v. Doe, 8 Blackf. 371;
Thompson v. Morgan, 6 Minn. 292; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 111. 331. In
Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barb. 309, and 15 N. Y. 9, a statute forbidding the inter-
position of the defence of usury was treated as a statute repealing a penalty.
See, further, Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md. Ch. 66; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn.
[ 437 ]
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* 376 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XI.
After the courts of the State of Pennsylvania had decided ttut
the relation of landlord and tenant could not exist in that State
under a Connecticut title, a statute was passed which provided that
the relation of landlord and tenant "shall exist and be held as
fully and effectually between Connecticut settlers and Pennsylva-
nia claimants as between other citizens of this commonwealth, on
the trial of any case now pending or hereafter to be brought within
this commonwealth, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstand-
ing." In a suit which was pending and had been once tried before
the statute was passed, the statute was sustained by the Supreme
Court of that State, and afterwards by the Supreme Court of the
United States, into which last-mentioned court it had been removed
on the allegation that it violated the obligation of contracts. As its
purpose and effect was to remove from contracts which the parties
had made a legal impediment to their enforcement, there would
seem to be no doubt, in the light of the other authorities we have
referred to, that the conclusion reached was the only just and proper
one.1
In the State of Ohio, certain deeds made by married women were
ineffectual for the purposes of record and evidence, by reason of
the omission on the part of the officer taking the acknowledgment
to state in his certificate that, before and at the time of the grantor
making the acknowledgment, he made the contents known to her
by reading or otherwise. An act was afterwards passed which
provided that " any deed heretofore executed pursuant to
[* 377] * law, by husband and wife, shall be received in evidence
in any of the courts of this State, as conveying the estate
of the wife, although the magistrate taking the acknowledgment of
such deed shall not have certified that he read or made known the
contents of such deed before or at the time she acknowledged the
execution thereof." This statute, though with some hesitation at
first, was held to be unobjectionable. The deeds with the defective
acknowledgments were regarded by the legislature and by the court
149; Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68; Washburn t>. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599; Par-
melee v. Lawrence, 48 111. 331. The case of Gilliland v. Phillips, 1 S. C. n. s.
152, is contra; but it discusses the point but little, and makes no reference to
these cases.
1 Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. 169, and 2 Pet. 380. And see Watson
v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Lessee of Dulany v. Tilghman, 6 G. & J. 461; Payne r.
Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220; Maxey v. Wise, 25 Ind. 1.
[438]
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 377
as being sufficient for the purpose of conveying at least the grantor's
equitable estate; and if sufficient for this purpose, no vested rights
would be disturbed, or wrong be done, by making them receivable
in evidence as conveyances.1
Other cases go much farther than this, and hold that, although
the deed was originally ineffectual for the purpose of conveying the
title, the healing statute may accomplish the intent of the parties by
giving it effect.2 At first sight these cases might seem to go beyond
the mere confirmation of a contract, and to be at least techni-
cally objectionable, as depriving a party of property * with- [* 378]
out an opportunity for trial, inasmuch as they proceeded
upon the assumption that the title still remained in the grantor, and
that the healing act was required for the purpose of divesting him of
1 Chestnut p. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio, 599, overruling Connell v. Connell,
6 Ohio, 358; Good e. Zercher, 12 Ohio, 364; Meddock v. Williams, 12 Ohio,
377; and Silliman p. Cummins, 13 Ohio, 116. Of the dissenting opinion in the
last case, which the court approve in 16 Ohio, 609-10, they say: "That opinion
stands upon the ground that the act operates only upon that class of deeds where
enough bad been done to show that a court of chancery ought, in each case, to
render a decree for a conveyance, assuming that the certificate was not such as
the law required. And where the title in equity was such that a court of chan-
cery ought to interfere and decree a good legal title, it was within the power of
the legislature to confirm the deed, without subjecting an indefinite number to
the useless expense of unnecessary litigation." See also Lessee of Dulany v.
Tilghman, 6 G. & J. 461; Journeay p. Gibson, 56 Penn. St. 57. But the legis-
lature, it has been declared, has no power to legalize and make valid the deed of
an insane person. Routsong v. Wolf, 35 Mo. 174.
* Lessee of Walton v. Bailey, 1 Binn. 477; Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R.
101; Barnet v. Barnet, 15 S. & R. 72; Tate p. Stooltzfoos, 16 S. & R. 35;
Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; Davis
v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316; Dentzel o. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138; Estate of Stick-
noth, 7 Nev. 227; Goshorn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio, n. a. 641. In the last case the
court say: '' The act of the married woman may, under the law, have been void
and inoperative; but in justice and equity it did not leave her right to the prop-
erty untouched. She bad capacity to do the act in a form prescribed by law for
her protection. She intended to do the act in the prescribed form. She at-
tempted to do it, and her attempt was received and acted on in good faith. A
mistake subsequently discovered invalidates the act; justice and equity require
that she should not take advantage of the mistake; and she has therefore no just
right to the property. She has no right to complain if the law which prescribed
forms for her protection shall interfere to prevent her reliance upon them to
resist the demands of justice." Similar language is employed in the Pennsyl-
vania cases. See, further, Dentzel p. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138.
[ 439 ]
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* 378 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XI.
\
it, and passing it over to the grantee.1 Apparently, therefore, there
would seem to be some force to the objection that such a statute
deprives a party of vested rights. But the objection is more specious
than sound. If all that is wanting to a valid contract or convey-
ance is the observance of some legal formality, the party may have
a legal right to avoid it: but this right is coupled with no equity,
even though the case be sucli that no remedy could be afforded the
other party in the courts. The right which the healing act takes
away in such a case is the right in the party to avoid his contract, —
a naked legal right which it is usually unjust to insist upon, and
which no constitutional provision was ever designed to protect.1
As the point is put by Chief Justice Parker of Massachusetts, a
party cannot have a vested right to do wrong;8 or, as stated by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, " Laws curing defects which
would otherwise operate to frustrate what must be presumed to be
the desire of the party affected, cannot be considered as taking
away vested rights. Courts do not regard rights as vested contrary
to the justice and equity of the case."4
The operation of these cases, however, must be carefully restricted
to the parties to the original contract, and to such other persons
as may have succeeded to their rights with no greater equities.
A subsequent bona fide purchaser cannot be deprived of the prop-
erty which he has acquired, by an act which retrospectively deprives
his grantor of the title which he had when the purchase was made.
Conceding that the invalid deed may be made good as between the
parties, yet if, while it remained invalid, and the grantor still
retained the legal title to the land, a third person has purchased
and received a conveyance, witli no notice of any fact
[*879] which should * preclude his acquiring an equitable as
1 This view has been taken in some similar cases. See Russell v. Rumsey,
85 111. 362; Alabama, &c, Ins. Co. v. Boykin, 38 Ala. 510; Orton v. Noonan,
23 Wis. 102; Dade r. Medcalf, 9 Penn. St. 108.
* In Gibson v. Hibbard, 13 Mich. 215, a check, void at the time it was given,
for want of a revenue stamp, was held valid after being stamped as permitted by
a subsequent act of Congress. A similar ruling was made in Harris v. Rutledge,
19 Iowa, 389. The case of State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195, is still stronger.
The curative statute was passed after judgment had been rendered against the
right claimed under the defective instrument, and it was held that it must be
applied by the appellate court. See post, 881.
2 Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245.
4 State v. Newark, 3 Dutch. 197.
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well as a legal title thereby, it would not be in the power of the
legislature to so confirm the original deed as to divest him of the
title he has acquired. The position of the case is altogether
changed by this purchase. The legal title is no longer separated
from equities, but in the hands of the second purchaser is united
with an equity as strong as that which exists in favor of him who
purchased first. Under such circumstances even the courts of
equity must recognize the right of the second purchaser as best,
and as entitled to the usual protection which the law accords to
vested interests.1
If, however, a grantor undertakes to convey more than he pos-
sesses, or contrary to the conditions or qualifications which, for the
benefit of others, are imposed upon his title, or in fraud of
the rights of others whose representative or agent he is, so that the
defect in his conveyance consists not in any want of due formality,
nor in any disability imposed by law, it is not in the power of the
legislature to validate it retrospectively; and we may add, also, that
it would not have been competent to authorize it in advance. In
such case the rights of others intervene, and they are entitled to
protection on the same grounds, though for still stronger rea-
sons, which exist in the case of the bona fide purchasers above re-
ferred to.2
1 Brinton p. Seevers, 12 Iowa, 389; Southard v. Central R.R. Co., 2 Dutch.
22; Thompson p. Morgan, 6 Minn. 292; Meighen v. Strong, 6 Minn. 177; Nor-
man v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 171; Greenough p. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494;
Le Bois p. Bramel, 4 How. 449; McCarthy v. Hoffman, 23 Penn. St 508.
Sherwood p. Fleming, 25 Texas, 408; Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Texas, 452. The
legislature cannot validate an invalid trust in a will, by act passed after the death
of the testator, and after title vested in the heirs. Hilliard v. Miller, 10 Penn.
St. 338. See Snyder v. Bull, 17 Penn. St. 58; McCarthy p. Hoffman, 23 Penn.
St. 507; Bolton p. Johns, 5 Penn. St. 145; State v. Warren, 28 Md. 338. The
cases here cited must not be understood as establishing any different principle
from that laid down in Goshen p. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, where it was held
competent to validate a marriage, notwithstanding the rights of third parties
would be incidentally affected. Rights of third parties are liable to be incident-
ally affected more or less in any case in which a defective contract is made good;
but this is no more than might happen in enforcing a contract or decreeing a
divorce. See post, p. 384. Also, Tallman p. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71.
'In Shouk p. Brown, 61 Penn. St. 327, the facts were that a married woman
held property under a devise, with an express restraint upon her power to
alienate. She nevertheless gave a deed of the same, and a legislative act was
afterwards obtained to validate this deed. Held void. Agnew, J.: "Many
cases have been cited to prove that this legislation is merely confirmatory and
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
We have already referred to the case of contracts by municipal
corporations which, when made, were in excess of their authority,
but subsequently have been confirmed by legislative action. If the
contract is one which the legislature might originally have author-
ized, the case falls within the principle above laid down, and the
right of the legislature to confirm it must be recognized.1 This
valid, beginning with Barnet v. Barnet, 15 S. & R. 72, and ending with Journeay
v. Gibson, 56 Penn. St. 57. The most of them are cases of the defective ac-
knowledgments of deeds of married women. But there is a marked difference
between them and this. In all of them there was a power to convey, and only
a defect in the mode of its exercise. Here there is an absolute want of power to
convey in any mode. In ordinary cases a married woman has both the title and
the power to convey or to mortgage her estate, but is restricted merely in the
manner of its exercise. This is a restriction it is competent for the legislature
to remove, for the defect arises merely in the form of the proceeding, and not in
any want of authority. Those to whom her estate descends, because of the
omission of a prescribed form, are really not injured by the validation. It wss
in her power to cut them off, and in truth and conscience she did so, though sbe
failed at law. They cannot complain, therefore, that the legislature interferes
to do justice. But the case before us is different. [The grantor] had neither
the right nor the power during coverture to cut off" her heirs. She was for-
bidden by the law of the gift, which the donor imposed upon it to suit his own
purposes. Her title was qualified to this extent. Having done an act she had
no right to do, there was no moral obligation for the legislature to enforce. Her
heirs have a right to say . . . 'the legislature cannot take our estate and vest it
in another who bought it with notice on the face of his title that our mother
could not convey to him.' The true principle on which retrospective laws are
supported was stated long ago by Duncan, J., in Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & B.
101; to wit, where they impair no contract, or disturb no vested right, but only
vary remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise fair, which do not vary
existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and when pros-
ecuted." In White Mountains R.R. Co. p. White Mountains R.R. Co. of N. H.,
50 N. H. 50, it was decided that the legislature had no power, as against non-
assenting parties, to validate a fraudulent sale of corporate property. In Alter's
Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 341; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 433; the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania declared it incompetent for the legislature, after the death of a party, to
empower the courts to correct a mistake in his will which rendered it inoperative —
the title having already passed to his heirs. But where it was not known that
the decedent left heirs, it was held competent, as against the State, to cure
defects in a will after the death, and thus prevent an escheat. Estate of
Sticknoth, 7 Nev. 229.
1 See Shaw v. Norfolk R.R. Corp., 5 Gray, 179, in which it was held that the
legislature might validate an unauthorized assignment of a franchise. Also, May
v. Holdridge, 23 Wis. 93, and cases cited, in which statutes authorizing the
reassessment of irregular taxes were sustained. In this case, Paine, J., says:
"This rule must of course be understood with its proper restrictions. The work
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principle is one which has very often been acted upon in the case
of municipal subscriptions to works of internal improvement,
where the original undertaking was without authority of law, and
the authority given was conferred by statute retrospectively.1
It has not usually been regarded as a circumstance of importance
in these cases, whether the enabling act was before or after the cor-
poration had entered into the contract in question; and if the leg-
islature possesses that complete control over the subject of taxation
by municipal corporations which has been declared in many cases,
it is difficult to perceive how such a corporation can successfully
contest the validity of a special statute, which only sanc-
tions a contract previously made by the * corporation, and [* 380]
which, though at the time ultra vires, was nevertheless
for a public and local object, and compels its performance through
an exercise of the power of taxation.2
for which the tax is sought to be assessed must be of such a character that the
legislature is authorized to provide for it by taxation. The method adopted must
be one liable to no constitutional objection. It must be such as the legislature
might originally have authorized had it seen fit. With these restrictions, where
work of this character has been done, I think it competent for the legislature to
supply a defect of authority in the original proceedings, to adopt and ratify the
improvement and provide for a reassessment of the tax to pay for it." And see
Brewster p. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 127; Boyce
p. Sinclair, 3 Bush, 264; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236; Stuart v. Warren,
37 Conn. 225.
1 See, among other cases, McMillan v. Boyles, 6 Iowa, 330; Gould v. Ster-
ling, 23 N. Y. 457; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Bridgeport p. Hou-
satonic R.R. Co., 15 Conn. 475; Board of Commissioners v. Bright, 18 Ind. 93;
Gibbons v. Mobile, &c, R.R. Co., 36 Ala. 410.
• In Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37, it appeared that the city of Mil-
waukee had been authorized to contract for the construction of a harbor, at an
expense not to exceed $100,000. A contract was entered into by the city pro-
viding for a larger expenditure; and a special legislative act was afterwards
obtained to ratify it. The court held that the subsequent legislative ratification
was not sufficient, proprio vigore, and without evidence that such ratification was
procured with the assent of the city, or had been subsequently acted upon or
confirmed by it, to make the contract obligatory upon the city. The court say,
per Dixon, Ch. J.: "The question is, can the legislature, by recognizing the
existence of a previously void contract, and authorizing its discharge by the city,
or in any other way, coerce the city against its will into a performance of it, or
does the law require the assent of the city, as well as of the legislature, in order to
make the obligation binding and efficacious? I must say that, in my opinion, the
latter act, as well as the former, is necessary for that purpose, and that without
it the obligation cannot be enforced. A contract void for want of capacity in one
[ 443 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
• 381
[CH. XT.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[* 381] * Nor is it important in any of the cases to which we
have referred, that the legislative act which cures the
or both of the contracting parties to enter into it is as no contract; it is as if
no attempt at an agreement had ever been made. And to admit that the legis-
lature, of its own choice, and against the wishes of either or both of the contract-
ing parties, can give it life and vigor, is to admit that it is within the scope of
legislative authority to devest settled rights of property, and to take the property
of one individual or corporation and transfer it to another." This reasoning is of
course to be understood in the light of the particular case before the court; that
is to say, a case in which the contract was to do something not within the ordi-
nary functions of local government. See the case explained and defended by the
same eminent judge in Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wis. 413. The cases of Guilford v.
Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615, and 13 N. Y. 143; Brewster v. Syracuse,
19 N. Y. 116; and Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65, especially go much further
than is necessary to sustain the text. See also Bartholomew v. Harwinton, 39
Conn. 408; People v. Mitchell, 35 N. Y. 551; Barbour v. Camden, 51 Me. 608;
Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 474; State c. Sullivan, 43 111. 413; Johnson r.
Campbell, 49 111. 316. In Brewster v. Syracuse, parties had constructed a sewer
for the city at a stipulated price, which had been fully paid to them. The charter
of the city forbade the payment of extra compensation to contractors in any case.
The legislature afterwards passed an act empowering the Common Council of
Syracuse to assess, collect, and pay over the further sum of $600 in addition to
the contract price; and this act was held constitutional. In Thomas v. Leland,
certain parties had given bond to the State, conditioned to pay into the treasury
a certain sum of money as an inducement to the State to connect the Chenango
Canal with the Erie at Utica, instead of at Whitcstown as originally contem-
plated, — the sum mentioned being the increased expense in consequence of the
change. Afterwards the legislature, deeming the debt thus contracted by indi-
viduals unreasonably partial and onerous, passed an act, the object of which was
to levy the amount on the owners of real estate in Utica. This act seemed to
the court unobjectionable. "The general purpose of raising the money by tax
was to construct a canal, a public highway, which the legislature believed would
be a benefit to the city of Utica as such; and independently of the bond, the case
is the ordinary one of local taxation to make or improve a highway. If such an
act be otherwise constitutional, we do not see how the circumstance that a bond
had before been given securing the same money can detract from its validity.
Should an individual volunteer to secure a sum of money, in itself properly
leviable by way of tax on a town or county, there would be nothing in the nature
of such an arrangement which would preclude the legislature from resorting, by
way of tax, to those who are primarily and more justly liable. Even should he
pay the money, what is there in the constitution to preclude his being reimbursed
by a tax?" Here, it will be perceived, the corporation was compelled to assume
an obligation which it had not even attempted to incur, but which private persons,
for considerations which seemed to them sufficient, had taken upon their own
shoulders. We have expressed doubts of the correctness of this decision, ante,
230-31, note, where a number of cases are cited, bearing upon the point
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irregularity, defect, or want of original authority, was passed after
suit brought, in which such irregularity or defect became matter of
importance. The bringing of suit vests in a party no right to a
particular decision ;1 and his case must be determined on the law
as it stands, not when the suit was brought, but when the judgment
is rendered.2 It has been held that a statute allowing amendments
to indictments in criminal cases might constitutionally be applied
to pending suits;3 and even in those States in which retrospective
laws are forbidden, a cause must be tried under the rules of evi-
dence existing at the time of the trial, though different from those
in force when the suit was commenced.4 And if a case is appealed,
and pending the appeal the law is changed, the appellate court
must dispose of the case under the law in force when their deci-
sion is rendered.5
1 Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 309; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Cowgill v.
Long, 15 111. 203; Miller v. Graham, 17 Ohio, n. s. 1; State e. Squires, 26 Iowa,
340; Patterson r. Philbrook, 9 Mass. 151.
* Watson ». Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Mather v. Chapman, 6 Conn. 54; Bristol v.
Supervisors, &c, 20 Mich. 93; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. 169, and
2 Pet. 380.
3 State v. Manning, 11 Texas, 402.
4 Rich o. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304.
6 State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195. In Eaton v. United States, 5 Cranch,
281, a vessel had been condemned in admiralty, and pending an appeal the act
under which the condemnation was declared was repealed. The court held that
the cause must be considered as if no sentence had been pronounced; and if no
sentence had been pronounced, then, after the expiration or repeal of the law,
no penalty could be enforced or punishment inflicted for a violation of the law
committed while it-was in force, unless some special provision of statute was
made for that purpose. See also Schooner Rachel v. United States, 6 Cranch,
329; Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binney, 601; United States v. Passmore, 4
Dall. 372; Commonwealth D.Marshall, 11 Pick. 350; Commonwealth v. Kim-
ball, 21 Pick. 373; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 100; Norris v. Crocker, 13
How. 129; Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541; Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall.
506; United States v. Tyner, 11 Wall. 88; Engle v. Shurtz, 1 Mich. 150. In
the McCardle case the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court
in certain cases was taken away while a case was pending. Per Chase, Ch. J.:
"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law; and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing
the cause. This is not less clear upon authority than upon principle." But where
a State has jurisdiction of a subject, e. g. pilotage, until Congress establishes
regulations, and penalties are incurred under a State act, and afterwards Congress
legislates on the subject, this does not repeal, but only suspends the State law;
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
But the healing statute must in all cases be confined to validating
acts which the legislature might previously have author
[*382] ized. *It cannot make good retrospectively acts or con-
tracts which it had no power to permit or sanction in
advance.1 There lies before us at this time a volume of statutes
of one of the States, in which are contained acts declaring certaiu
tax-rolls valid and effectual, notwithstanding the following irregu-
larities and imperfections: a failure in the supervisor to carry out
separately, opposite each parcel of land on the roll, the taxes
charged upon such parcel, as required by law; a failure ia the
supervisor to sign the certificate attached to the roll; a failure in
the voters of the township to designate, as required by law, in a
certain vote by which they had assumed the payment of bounty
moneys, whether they should be raised by tax or loan; corrections
made in the roll by the supervisor after it had been delivered to
the collector ; the including by the supervisor of a sum to be raised
for township purposes without the previous vote of the township,
as required by law; adding to the roll a sum to be raised which
could not lawfully be levied by taxation without legislative author-
ity; the failure of the supervisor to make out the roll within the
time required by law; and the accidental omission of a parcel of
land which should have been embraced by the roll. In each of
these cases, except the last, the act required by law, and which
failed to be performed, might by previous legislation have been
dispensed with.; and peiliaps in the last case there might be ques-
tion whether the roll was rendered invalid by the omission referred
to, and, if it was, whether the subsequent act could.legalize it.2 But
if township officers should assume to do acts under the power of
taxation which could not lawfully be justified as an exercise of that
power, no subsequent legislation could make them good. If, for
instance, a part of the property in a taxing district should be assessed
at one rate, and a part at another, for a burden resting equally upon
all, there would be no such apportionment as is essential to tax-
ation, and the roll would be beyond the reach of curative legisla-
and a penalty previously incurred may still be collected. Sturgis v. Spofford, 45
N. Y. 446.
1 See ante, 379, and note 1.
* See Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; Dean v. Gleason, 16 Wis. 1; post
515, note.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 382
tion.1 And if persons or property should be assessed for
taxation * in a district which did not include them, the [* 383]
assessment would not only be invalid, but a healing stat-
ute would be ineffectual to charge them with the burden. In such
a case there would be a fatal want of jurisdiction; and even in
judicial proceedings, if there was originally a failure of jurisdiction,
no subsequent law can confer it.3
Statutory Privileges and Exemptions.
The citizen has no vested right in statutory privileges and exemp-
tions. Among these may be mentioned, — exemptions from the per-
formance of public duty upon juries, or in the militia, and the
like; exemptions of property or person from assessment for the
'1 See Billings v. Detten, 15 111. 218; Conway v. Cable, 37111^82; and Thames
Manufacturing Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550, for eases where curative statutes
were held not effectual to reach defects in tax proceedings. As to what defects
may or may not be cured by subsequent legislation, see Allen r. Armstrong,
16 Iowa, 508, Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556, and Abbott v. Lindenbower,
42 Mo. 162. In Tallman v. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71, the constitutional authority
of the legislature to cause an irregular tax to be reassessed in a subsequent year,
where the rights of bona fide purchasers had intervened, was disputed; but the
court sustained the authority as " a salutary and highly beneficial feature of our
systems of taxation," and "not to be abandoned because in some instances it
produces individual hardships." Certainly bona fide purchasers, as between
themselves and the State, must take their purchases subject to all public burdens
justly resting upon them. The case of Conway v. Cable is instructive. It
was there held among other things, — and very justly as we think,—that the
legislature could not make good a tax sale effected by fraudulent combination
between the officers and the purchasers. In Miller v. Graham, 17 Ohio, n. 8. 1,
a statute validating certain ditch assessments was sustained, notwithstanding the
defects covered by it were not mere irregularities; but that statute gave the par-
ties an opportunity to be heard as to these defects.
4 See Wells ». Weston, 22 Mo. 385; People v. Supervisors of Chenango,
11 N. Y. 563; Hughey's Lessee ». Howell, 2 Ohio, 231; Covington v. South-
gate, 15 B. Monr. 491; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; post, 499, 500.
'So held in McDaniel v. Correll, 19 111. 228, where a statute came under
consideration which assumed to make valid certain proceedings in court which
were void for want of jurisdiction of the persons concerned. See also Denny v.
Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361; Nelson v. Rountree, 23 Wis. 367; Griffin's Ex'r r.
Cunningham, 20 Grat. 109, per Joynes, J.; Richards v. Rote, 68 Penn. St.
248; State v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504. Walpole v. Elliott, 18 Ind. 259, is distin-
guishable from these cases. In that case there was not a failure of jurisdiction,
but an irregular exercise of it.
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\
purposes of taxation; exemptions of property from being seized
on attachment, or execution, or for the payment of taxes; exemp-
tion from highway labor, and the like. All these Test upon reasons
of public policy, and the laws are changed as the varying circum-
stances seem to require. The State demands the performance of
military duty by those persons only who are within certain speci-
fied ages; but if, in the opinion of the legislature, the public exi-
gencies should demand military service from all other persons
capable of bearing arms, the privilege of exemption might be
recalled, without violation of any constitutional principle. The
fact that a party had passed the legal age under an existing law,
and performed the service demanded by it, could not protect him
against further calls, when public policy or public necessity was
thought to require them.1 In like manner, exemptions from tax-
ation are always subject to recall, when they have been granted
merely as a privilege, and not for a consideration received by the
public; as iu the case of exemption of buildings for religious or
educational purposes, and the like.2 So, also, are exemptions of
property from execution.3 So, a license to carry Dn a particular
trade for a specified period, may be recalled before the period has
elapsed.4 So, as before stated, a penalty given by statute may be
taken away by statute at any time before judgment is recovered.5
1 Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 443; Swindle v. Brooks, 34 Geo. 67;
Mayer, Ex parte, 27 Texas, 715. And see Dale v. The Governor, 3 Stew. 387.
* See ante, 280, 281, and notes. All the cases concede the right in the legis-
lature to recall an exemption from taxation, when not resting upon contract.
The subject was considered in People c. Roper, 35 N. Y. 629, in which it was
decided that a limited immunity from taxation, tendered to the members of
voluntary military companies, might be recalled at any time. It was held not to
be a contract, but "only an expression of the legislative will for the time being,
in a matter of mere municipal regulation." And s.ee Christ Church v. Philadel-
phia, 24 How. 300; Lord v. Litchfield, 86 Conn. 116.
'Bull v. Conroe, .13 Wis. 238.
4 Of this there can be no question unless a fee was paid for the license; and
well-considered cases hold that it may be even then. See Adams v. Hackett,
5 Gray, b'J7; Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; ante,
p. 283, note.
5 Oriental Bank o. Freeze, 6 Shep. 109. The statute authorized the plaintiflf,
suing for a breach of a prison bond, to recover the amount of his judgment and
costs. This was regarded by the court as in the nature of the penalty; and it
was therefore held competent for the legislature, even after breach, to so modify
the law as to limit the plaintiff's recovery to his actual damages. See ante,
p. 3C2, note 5, and cases cited.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 383
So an offered bounty may be recalled, except as to so much as
was actually earned while the offer was a continuing one;
•and the fact that a party has purchased property or [* 384]
incurred expenses in preparation for earning the bounty
cannot preclude the recall.1 A franchise granted by the Slate with
a reservation of a right of repeal must be regarded as a mere priv-
ilege while it is suffered to continue, but the legislature may take
it away at any time, and the grantees must rely for the perpetuity
and integrity of the franchises granted to them solely upon the
faith of the sovereign grantor.2 A statutory right to have cases
reviewed on appeal may be taken away, by a repeal of the statute,
even as to causes which had been previously appealed.3 A mill-
dam act which confers upon the person erecting a dam the right
to maintain it, and flow the lands of private owners on paying such
compensation as should be assessed for the injury done, may be
repealed even as to dams previously erected.4 These illustrations
must suffice under the present head.
Consequential Injuries.
It is a general rule that no one has a vested right to be pro-
tected against consequential injuries arising from a proper exercise
of rights by others.6 This rule is peculiarly applicable to injuries
resulting from the exercise of public powers. Under the police
power the State sometimes destroys, for the time being, and per-
haps permanently, the value to the owner of his property, without
affording him any redress. The construction of a new way or
the discontinuance of an old one may very seriously affect the
1 East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw City, 19 Mich. 271; s. C.
2 Am. Rep. 82, and 13 Wall. 873. But as to so much of the bounty as was
actually earned before the change in the law, the party earning it has a vested
right which cannot be taken away. People r. State Auditors, 9 Mich. 827. And
it has been held competent in changing a county seat to provide by law for com-
pensation, through taxation to the residents of the old site. Wilkinson v.
Cheatham, 43 Geo. 258.
'Per Smith, J., in Pratt v. Brown, 8 Wis. 611.
1 Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. :506.
4 Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603. But if the party maintaining the dam had
paid to the other party a compensation assessed under the statute, it might be
otherwise.
• For the doctrine damnum absque injuria, see Broom's Maxims, 185; Sedg-
wick on Damages, 30, 112.
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* 384 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XL
value of adjacent property; the removal of a county or State cap-
ital will often reduce very largely the value of all the real estate of
the place from whence it was removed: but in neither case can the
parties, whose interests would be injuriously affected, enjoin the
act, or claim compensation from the public.1 The general laws of
the State may be so changed as to transfer, from one town to
another, the obligation to support certain individuals, who may
become entitled to support as paupers, and the Constitution will
present no impediment.2 The granting of a charter to a new
corporation may sometimes render valueless the franchise of an
existing corporation; but unless the State by contract has pre-
cluded itself from such new grant, the incidental injury
[* 385] * can constitute no obstacle.3 But indeed it seems idle to
specify instances, inasmuch as all changes in the laws of
the State are liable to inflict incidental injury upon individuals,
and, if every citizen was entitled to remuneration for such injury,
the most beneficial and necessary changes in the law might be
found impracticable of accomplishment.
We have now endeavored to indicate what are and what are not
to be regarded as vested rights, and to classify the cases in which
individual interests, in possession or expectancy, are protected
1 See ante, p. 208, and cases cited in note 2. Also, Wilkinson v. Cheatham,
43 Geo. 258.
* Goshen V.Richmond, 4 Allen, 460; Bridgewater p. Plymouth, 97 Mass.
890.
3 The State of Massachusetts granted to a corporation the right to construct
a toll-bridge across the Charles River, under a charter which was to continue for
forty years, afterwards extended to seventy, at the end of which period the bridge
was to become the property of the commonwealth. During the term the cor-
poration was to pay 200?. annually to Harvard College. Forty-two years after
the bridge was opened for passengers, the State incorporated a company for the
purpose of erecting another bridge over the same river, a short distance only
from the first, and which would accommodate the same passengers. The neces-
sary effect would be to decrease greatly the value of the first franchise, if not to
render it altogether worthless. But the first charter was not exclusive in its
terms; no contract was violated in granting the second; the resulting injury was
incidental to the exercise of an undoubted right by the State, and as all the
vested rights of the first corporation still remained, though reduced in value by
the new grant, the case was one of damage without legal injury. Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344, and 11 Pet. 420. See also Turnpike Co.
v. State, 3 Wall. 210; Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35;
English v. New Haven, &c, Co. 82 Conn. 240; Binghampton Bridge Case, 27
N.Y. 87, and 3 Wall. 51.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 385
against being devested by the direct interposition of legislative
authority. Some other cases may now be considered, in which
legislation has endeavored to control parties as to the manner in
which they should make use of their property, or has permitted
claims to be created against it through the action of other parties
against the will of the owners. We do not allude now to the
control which the State may possess through an exercise of the
police power, — a power which is merely one of regulation with a
view to the best interests and the most complete enjoyment of
rights by all, — but to that which, under a claim of State policy,
and without any reference to wrongful act or omission by the owner,
would exercise a supervision over his enjoyment of undoubted
rights, or which, in some cases, would compel him to recognize and
satisfy demands upon his property which have been created without
his assent.
In former times sumptuary laws were sometimes passed, and
they were even deemed essential in republics to restrain the lux-
ury so fatal to that species of government.1 But the ideas which
suggested such laws are now exploded utterly, and no one would
seriously attempt to justify them in the present age. The right of
every man to do what he will with his own, not interfering with the
reciprocal right of others, is accepted among the fundamentals of
our law. The instances of attempt to interfere witli it have not
been numerous since the early colonial days. A notable instance
of au attempt to substitute the legislative judgment for that of the
proprietor, regarding the manner in which he should use and
employ his property, may be mentioned. In the State of Kentucky
an act was at one time passed to compel the owners of wild lands
to make certain improvements upon them within a specified time,
and declared them forfeited to the State in case the statute was not
1 Montesq. Sp. of the Laws, B. 7. Such Laws, though common in some coun-
tries, have never been numerous in England. See references to the legislation
of this character, 4 Bl. Com. 170. Some of these statutes prescribed the num-
ber of courses permissable at dinner or other meal, while others were directed to
restraining extravagance in dress. See Hallam, Mid. Ages, e. 9, pt. II.; and as
to Roman sumptuary laws, Encyc. Metrop. Vol. X. p. 110. Adam Smith said of
such laws, "It is the highest impertinence and presumption in kings and min-
isters to pretend to watch over the economy of private people, and to restrain
their expense, either by sumptuary laws, or by prohibiting the importation of
foreign luxuries." Wealth of Nations, B. 2, c. 3. As to prohibitory liquor laws,
see post, 681-584.
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* 385 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. J
complied with. It would be difficult to frame, consistently with
the general principles of free government, a plausible argument in
support of such a statute. It was not an exercise of the right of
eminent domain, for that appropriates property to some speciBc
public use on making compensation. It was not taxation, for that
is simply an apportionment of the burden of supporting the govern-
ment. It was not a police regulation, for that could not go beyond
preventing an improper use of the land with reference to
[* 386] * the due exercise of rights and enjoyment of legal priv-
ileges by others. It was purely and simply a law to forfeit
a man's property, if he failed to improve it according to a stand-
ard which the legislature had prescribed. To such a power, if
possessed by the government, there could be no limit but the legis-
lative discretion; and if defensible on principle, then a law which
should authorize the officer to enter a man's dwelling and seize
and confiscate his furniture if it fell below, or his food if it ex-
ceeded, an established legal standard, would be equally so. But
in a free country such laws when mentioned are condemned
instinctively.1
But cases may sometimes present themselves in which improve-
ments actually made by one man upon the land of another, even
though against the will of the owner, ought on grounds of strict
equity to constitute a charge upon the land improved. If they
have been made in good faith, and under a reasonable expectation
on the part of the person making them, that he was to reap the
benefit of them, and if the owner has stood by and suffered them
to be made, but afterwards has recovered the land and appropriated
the improvements, it would seem that there must exist against him
at least a strong equitable claim for reimbursement of the expend-
itures made, and perhaps no sufficient reason why provision should
not be made by law for their recovery.
Accordingly in the several States statutes will be found which
undertake to provide for these equitable claims. These statutes are
commonly known as betterment laws; and as an illustration of the
whole class, we give the substance of that adopted in Vermont. It
provided that after recovery in ejectment, where he or those through
whom he claimed had purchased or taken a lease of the land, sup-
1 The Kentucky statute referred to was declared unconstitutional in Gaines r.
Buford, 1 Dana, 499. See also Violett v. Violett, 2 Dana, 826.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 386
posing at the time that the title purchased was good, or the lease
valid to convey and secure the title and interest therein expressed,
the defendant should be entitled to recover of the plaintiff the full
value of the improvements made by him or by those through whom
he claimed, to be assessed by jury, and to be enforced against the
land, and not otherwise. The value was ascertained by estimating
the increased value of the land in consequence of the improve-
ments but the plaintiff at his election might have the value of the
land without the improvements assessed, and the defendant should
purchase the same at that price within four years, or lose the ben-
efit of his claim for improvements. But the benefit of the
law was not given to one who had entered on land * by [* 387]
virtue of a contract with the owner, unless it should
appear that the owner had failed to fulfil such contract on his
part.1
This statute, and similar ones which preceded it, have been
adjudged constitutional by the Supreme Court of Vermont, and
have frequently been enforced. In an early case the court explained
the principle of these statutes as follows: "The action for better-
ments, as they are now termed in the statute, is given on the
supposition that the legal title is found to be in the plaintiff in
ejectment, and is intended to secure to the defendant the fruit of
his labor, and to the plaintiff all that he is justly entitled to, which
is his land in as good a situation as it would have been had no
labor been bestowed thereon. The statute is highly equitable in
all its provisions, and would do exact justice if the value either of
the improvements or of the land was always correctly estimated.
The principles upon which it is founded are taken from the civil
law, where ample provision was made for reimbursing the bona fide
possessor the expense of his improvements, if he was removed from
his possession by the legal owner. It gives to the possessor not
the expense which he has laid out on the land, but the amount
which he has increased the value of the land by his betterments
thereon; or, in other words, the difference between the value of the
land as it is when the owner recovers it, and the value if no improve-
ment had been made. If the owner takes the land together with
the improvements, at the advanced value which it has from the
labor of the possessor, what can be more just than that he should
1 Revised Statutes of Vermont of 1839, p. 216.
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* 387 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XI.
pay the difference? But if he is unwilling to pay this difference,
by giving a deed as the statue provides, he receives the value as it
would have been if nothing had been done thereon. The only
objection which can be made is, that it is sometimes compelling
the owner to sell when he may have been content with the property
in its natural state. But this, when weighed against the loss to
the bona fide possessor, and against the injustice of depriving him
of the fruits of his labor, and giving it to another, who, by his
negligence in not sooner enforcing his claim, has in some measure
contributed to the mistake under which he has labored, is not
entitled to very great consideration."1
[* 388] * The last circumstance stated in this opinion — the
negligence of the owner in asserting his claim—is evi-
dently deemed important in some States, whose statutes only allow
a recovery for improvements by one who has been in possession a
certain number of years. But a later Vermont case dismisses it
from consideration as a necessary ground on which to base the
right of recovery. "The right of the occupant to recover the value
of his improvements," say the court, " does not depend upon the
question whether the real owner has been vigilant or negligent in
the assertion of his rights. It stands upon a principle of natural
justice and equity; viz., that the occupant in good faith, believing
himself to be the owner, has added to the permanent value of the
land by his labor and his money; is in equity entitled to such
added value; and that it would be unjust that the owner of the land
should be enriched by acquiring the value of such improvements,
without compensation to him who made them. This principle of
natural justice has been very widely, we may say universally rec-
ognized." 2
'Brown v. Storm, 4 Vt. 37. This class of legislation was also elaborately
examined and defended by Trumbull, J., in Ross v. Irving, 14 1ll. 171, and in
some of the other cases referred to in the succeeding note. See also Bright p.
Boyd, 1 Story, 478; s. c. 2 Story, 607.
s Whitney v. Richardson, 31 Vt. 306. For other cases in which similar laws
have been held constitutional, see Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374; Fowler
v. Halbert, 4 Bibb, 54; Withington v. Corey, 2 N. H. 115; Bacon p. Callender,
6 Mass. 303; Pacquette v. Pickness, 19 Wis. 219; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa,
261; Scott v. Mather, 14 Texas, 235; Saunders v. Wilson, 19 Texas, 194;
Brackett v. Norcross, 1 Greenl. 92; Hunt's Lessee v. McMahan, 5 Ohio, 132;
Longworth v Worthington, 6 Ohio, 10. See further, Jones v. Carter, 12 Mass.
314; Dothage v. Stuart, 35 Mo. 251; Fenwiek v. Gill, 38 Mo. 510; Howard v.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 389
* Betterment laws, then, recognize the existence of an [* 389]
equitable right, and give a remedy for its enforcement where
none had existed before. It is true that they make a man pay for
improvements which he has not directed to be made; but this leg-
islation presents no feature of officious interference by the govern-
ment with private property. The improvements have been made
by one person in good faith, and are now to be appropriated by
anothep. The parties cannot be placed in statu quo, and the stat-
ute accomplishes justice as near as the circumstances of the case
will admit, when it compels the owner of the land, who, if he
declines to sell, must necessarily appropriate the betterments made
by another, to pay the value to the person at whose expense they
have been made. The case is peculiar; but a statute cannot be
void as an unconstitutional interference with private property which
adjusts the equities of the parties as near as possible according to
natural justice.1
Zeyer, 18 La. An. 407; Pope v. Macon, 23 Ark. 644; Marlow p. Adams, 24 Ark.
109; Crmond v. Martin, 37 Ala. 598; Love v. Shartzer, 31 Cal. 487. For a
contrary ruling, see Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. 376. Mp. Justice Stonj held in
Society, &p. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105, that such a law could not constitutionally
be made to apply to improvements made before its passage; but this decision
was made under the New Hampshire Constitution, which forbade retrospective
laws. The principles of equity upon which such legislation is sustained would
seem not to depend upon the time when the improvements were made. See
Davis's Lessee v. Powell, 13 Ohio, 308. In Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261, it
was held that the legislature could not constitutionally make the value of the
improvements a personal charge against the owner of the land, and authorize a
personal judgment against him. The same ruling was had in McCoy p. Grandy,
3 Ohio, x. s. 463. A statute had been passed authorizing the occupying claimant
at his option, after judgment rendered against him for the recovery of the land,
to demand payment from the successful claimant of the full value of his lasting
and valuable improvements, or to pay to the successful claimant the value of the
land without the improvements, and retain it. The court say: "The occupying
claimant act, in securing to the occupant a compensation for his improvements
as a condition precedent to the restitution of the lands to the owner, goes to the
utmost stretch of the legislative power touching this subject. And the statute
. . . providing for the transfer of the fee in the land to the occupying claimant,
without the consent of the owner, is a palpable invasion of the right of private
property, and clearly in conflict with the Constitution."
1 In Harris v. Inhabitants of Marblehead, 10 Gray, 44, it was held that the
betterment law did not apply to a town which had appropriated private property
for the purposes of a school-house, and erected the house thereon. The law, it
was said, did not apply "where a party is taking land by force of the statute,
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* 389 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XL
\
Unequal and Partial Legislation.
In the course of our discussion of this subject it has been seen
that some statutes are void though general in their scope, while
others are valid though establishing rules for single cases only.
An enactment may therefore be the law of the land without being
a general law. And this being so, it may be important to consider
in what cases constitutional principles will require a statute to be
general in its operation, and in what cases, on the other hand, it
may be valid without being general. We speak now in reference
to general constitutional principles, and not to any peculiar rules
which may have become established by special provisions iu the
constitutions of individual States.
The cases relating to municipal corporations stand upon pecul-
iar grounds from the fact that those corporations are agencies of
government, and as such are subject to complete legislative control.
Statutes authorizing the sale of property of minors and other per-
sons under disability are also exceptional, in that they are applied
for by the parties representing the interests of the owners, and are
remedial in their character. Such statutes are supported by the
presumption that the parties in interest would consent if capable of
doing so; and in law they are to be considered as assenting
[* 390] in * the person of the guardians or trustees of their rights.
And perhaps in any other case, if a party petitions for
legislation and avails himself of it, he may justly be held estopped
from disputing its validity;1 so that the great bulk of private
legislation which is adopted from year to year, may at once be
dismissed from this discussion.
Laws public in their objects may, unless express constitutional
provision forbids,2 be either general or local in their application;
and is bound to see that all the steps are regular. If it did, the party taking
the land might in fact compel a sale of the land, or compel the party to buy the
school-house, or any other building erected upon it." But as a matter of con-
stitutional authority, we see no reason to doubt that the legislature might extend
such a law even to the cases of this description.
1 This doctrine was applied in Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush, 230, to parties
who had obtained a statute for the levy of a tax to refund bounty moneys, which
statute was held void as to other persons.
* See ante, p. 128, note 1, and cases cited. To make a statute a public law
of general obligation, it is not necessary that it should be equally applicable to
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 390
they may embrace many subjects or one, and they may extend to
all citizens, or be confined to particular classes, as minors or mar-
ried women, bankers or traders, and the like. The authority that
legislates for the State at large must determine whether particular
rules shall extend to the whole State and all its citizens, or, on the
other hand, to a subdivision of the State or a single class of its
citizens only. The circumstances of a particular locality, or the
prevailing public sentiment in that section of the State, may
require or make acceptable different police regulations from those
demanded in another, or call for different taxation, and a differ-
ent application of the public moneys. The legislature may there-
fore prescribe or authorize different laws of police, allow the right
of eminent domain to be exercised in different cases and through
different agencies, and prescribe peculiar restrictions upon taxation
in each distinct municipality, provided the State constitution does _
not forbid. These discriminations are made constantly; and the
fact that the laws are of local or special operation only is not
supposed to render them obnoxious in principle. The legislature
may also deem it desirable to prescribe peculiar rules for the
several occupations, and to establish distinctions in the rights,
obligations, duties, and capacities of citizens. The business of
common carriers, for instance, or of bankers, may require special
statutory regulations for the general benefit, and it may be matter
of public policy to give laborers in one business a specific lien for
their wages, when it would be impracticable or impolitic to do
the same by persons engaged in some other employments. If
the laws be otherwise unobjectionable, all that can be required
in these cases is, that they be general in their application to the
class or locality to which they apply; and they are then public in
character, and of their propriety and policy the legislature must
judge.
But a statute would not be constitutional which should proscribe
a class or a party for opinion's sake,1 or which should select
particular * individuals from a class or locality, and sub- [• 391]
ject them to peculiar rules, or impose upon them special
all parts of the State; all that is required is that it shall apply equally to all
persons within the territorial limits described in the act. State v. County Com-
missioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 516.
1 The sixth section of the Metropolitan Police Law of Baltimore (1859) pro-
vided that "no Black Republican, or indorser or supporter of the Helper book,
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* 391 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XI.
obligations or burdens from which others in the same locality or
class are exempt.1
The legislature may suspend the operation of the general laws
of the State; but when it does so the suspension must be general,
and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities.2
shall be appointed to any office" under the Board of Police which it established.
This was claimed to be unconstitutional, as introducing into legislation the prin-
ciple of proscription for the sake of political opinion, which was directly opposed
to the cardinal principles on which the Constitution was founded. The court
dismissed the objection in the following words: "That portion of the sixth sec-
tion which relates to Black Republicans, &c, is obnoxious to the objection urged
against it, if we are to consider that class of persons as proscribed on account of
their political or religfous opinions. But we cannot understand, officially, who
are meant to be affected by the proviso, and therefore cannot express a judicial
opinion on the question." Baltimore ». State, 15 Md. 468. See also p. 484.
This does not seem to be a very satisfactory disposition of so grave a constitu-
tional objection to a legislative act. That courts may take judicial notice of the
fact that the electors of the country are divided into parties with well-known
designations cannot be doubted; and when one of these is proscribed by a name
familiarly applied to it by its opponents, the inference that it is done because of
political opinion seems to be too conclusive to need further support than that
which is found in the act itself. And we know no reason why courts should
decline to take notice of those facts of general notoriety, which, like the names
of political parties, are a part of the public history of the times.
It has been decided that State laws forbidding the intermarriage of whites and
blacks are such police regulations as are entirely within the power of the States,
notwithstanding the provisions of the new amendments to the federal Constitu-
tion. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389. Compare State v. Hairston, 63 N. C. 451;
Ellis v. State, 42 Ala. 525. It is also said colored children may be required to
attend separate schools, if impartial provision is made for their instruction. State
v. Duffy, 7 Nov. 342; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 713. But some States forbid this. People
v. Board of Education, 18 Mich. 400. And when separate schools are not estab-
lished for colored children, they are entitled to admission to the other public
schools. State v. Duffy, supra.
1 Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534. There is no reason, however, why
the law should not take notice of peculiar views held by some classes of people,
which unfit them for certain public duties, and excuse them from the performance
of such duties; as Quakers are excused from military duty, and persons denying
the right to inflict capital punishment are excluded from juries in capital cases.
These, however, are in the nature of exemptions, and they rest upon considera-
tions of obvious necessity.
2 The statute of limitations cannot be suspended in particular cases while
allowed to remain in force generally. Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Davison
v. Johonnot, 7 Met. 393. See ante, 365, note. The general exemption laws
cannot be varied for particular cases or localities. Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis. 238,
244. The legislature, when forbidden to grant divorces, cannot pass special acts
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 391
Privileges may be granted to particular individuals when by so
doing the rights of others are not interfered with; disabilities may
be removed; the legislature as parens patriae, when not forbidden,
may grant authority to the guardians or trustees of incompetent
persons to exercise a statutory control over their estates for their
assistance,, comfort, or support, or for the discharge of legal or
equitable liens upon their property; but every one has a right to
demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute
which, without his consent, singles his case out as one to be
regulated by a different law from that which is applied
*in all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation, [*392]
but would be such an arbitrary mandate as is-not within
the province of free governments. Those who make the laws
"are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied
in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the
favorite at court and the countryman at plough."1 This is a
maxim in constitutional law, and by it we may test the authority
and binding force of legislative enactments.2
authorizing the courts to grant divorces in particular cases for causes not recog-
nized in the general law. Teft v. Teft, 3 Mich. 671; Simonds v. Simonds, 103
Mass. 572. See, for the same principle, Alter's Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 341. The
authority in emergencies to suspend the civil laws in a part of the State only, hy
a declaration of martial law, we do not call in question by any thing here stated.
Nor in what we have here said do we have any reference to suspensions of tbe
laws generally, or of any particular law, under the extraordinary circumstances
of rebellion or war.
1 Locke on Civil Government, § 142; State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 349.
'In Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenl. 326, the validity of a statute granting an
appeal from a decree of the Probate Court in a particular case came under
review. The court say: "On principle it can never be within the bounds of
legitimate legislation to enact a special law, or pass a resolve dispensing with the
general law in a particular case, and granting a privilege and indulgence to one
man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of such general law,
leaving all other persons under its operation. Such a law is neither just nor
reasonable in its consequences. It is our boast that we live under a government
of laws, and not of men; but this can hardly be deemed a blessing, unless those
laws have for their immovable basis the great principles of constitutional equality.
Can it be supposed for a moment that, if the legislature should pass a general
law, and add a section by way of proviso, that it never should be construed to
have any operation or effect upon the persons, rights, or property of Archelaus
Lewis or John Gordon, such a proviso would receive the sanction or even the
countenance of a court of law? And how does the supposed case differ from
the present? A resolve passed after the general law can produce only the same
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* 392
[CH. XI.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
Special courts cannot be created for the trial of the rights
and obligations of particular parties;1 and those cases in which
legislative acts granting new trials or other special relief in judi-
cial proceedings, while they have been regarded as usurpations of
judicial authority, have also been considered obnoxious to the
objection that they undertook to suspend general laws in
[* 393] special * cases. The doubt might also arise whether a
regulation made for any one class of citizens, entirely
arbitrary in its character, and restricting their rights, privileges,
or legal capacities in a manner before unknown to the law, could
be sustained, notwithstanding its generality. Distinctions in these
respects must rest upon some reason upon which they can be
defended, — like the want of capacity in infants and insane per-
sons; and if the legislature should undertake to provide that per-
sons following some specified lawful trade or employment should not
have capacity to make contracts, or to receive conveyances, or to
build such houses as others were allowed to erect, or in any other
way to make such use of their property as was permissible to others,
it can scarcely be doubted that the act would transcend the due
bounds of legislative power, even though no express constitutional
provision could be pointed out with which it would come in conflict.
To forbid to an individual or a class the right to the acquisition or
enjoyment of property in such manner as should be permitted to
the community at large, would bo to deprive them of liberty in
effect as such proviso. In fact, neither can have any legal operation." See also
Durham p. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140; Holden p. James, 11 Mass. 396; Piquet,
Appellant, 5 Pick. 64; Budd v. State, 3 Humph. 483; Wally's Heirs p. Kennedy,
2 Yerg. 554. In the last case it is said: "The rights of every individual must
stand or fall by the same rule or law that governs every other member of the
body politic, or land, under similar circumstances; and every partial or private
law, which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the
same thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitu-
tional and void. Were it otherwise, odious individuals and corporations would
be governed by one law; the mass of the community and those who made the
law by another; whereas the like general law affecting the whole community
equally could not have been passed." See further, Officer p. Young, 5 Yerg. 320;
Griffin p. Cunningham, 20 Grat. 31 (an instructive case); Arnold v. Kelley, 5 W.
Va. 446.
1 As, for instance, the debtors of a particular bank. Bank of the State p.
Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599. Compare Durkee p. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, in which it
was declared that a special exemption of the city of Janesville from the payment
of costs in anv proceeding against it to set aside a tax or tax sale was void.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 393
particulars of primary importance to their " pursuit of happiness ;"1
and those who should claim a right do so ought to be able to
show a specific authority therefor, instead of calling upon others
to show how and where the authority is negatived.
Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably
should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted,
or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any case, it must be
presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible
from this fundamental maxim of government.2 The State, it is
to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict
no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always
obnoxious, and discriminations against persons or classes are still
more so, and, as a rule of construction, are always to be leaned
against as probably not contemplated or designed. It has been
held that a statute requiring attorneys to render services in suits
for poor persons without fee or reward, was to be confined strictly
to the cases therein prescribed; and if by its terms it
* expressly covered civil cases only, it could not be ex- [* 394]
1 Burlamaqui (Politic Law, p. 3, § 15) defines natural liberty as the right which
nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the
manner they judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their acting
within the limits of the law of nature, and so as not to interfere with an equal exer-
cise of the same rights by other men. See 1 Bl. Com. 125. Lieber says: "Lib-
erty of social man consists in the protection of unrestrained action in as high a
degree as the same claim of protection of each individual admits of, or in the most
efficient protection of his rights, claims, interests, as a man or citizen, or of his
humanity manifested as a social being." Civil Liberty and Self-Government.
* In the Case of Monopolies, Darcy v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84, the grant of an
exclusive privilege of making playing cards was adjudged void, inasmuch as " the
sole trade of any mechanical artifice, or any other monopoly, is not only a dam-
age and prejudice to those who exercise the same trade, but also to all other sub-
jects ; for the end of all these monopolies is for the private gain of the patentees."
And see Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19; State v.
Cincinnati, &c, Gas Co., 18 Ohio, N. s. 262. Compare with these, State v.
Milwaukie Gas Light Co. 29 Wis. 454. On this ground it has been denied that
that the State can exercise the power of taxation on behalf of corporations who
undertake to make or to improve the thoroughfares of trade and travel for their
own benefit. The State, it is said, can no more tax the community to set one class
of men up in business than another; can no more subsidize one occupation than
another; can no more make donations to the men who build and own railroads in
consideration of expected incidental benefits, than it can make them to the men
who build stores or manufactories in consideration of similar expected benefits.
People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452.
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[CH. XI.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
tended to embrace defences of criminal prosecutions.1 So where
a constitutional provision confined the elective franchise to " white
male citizens," and it appeared that the legislation of the State
had always treated of negroes, mulattoes, and other colored
persons in contradistinction to white, it was held that although
quadroons, being a recognized class of colored persons, must be
excluded, yet that the rule of exclusion would not be carried
further.2 So a statute making parties witnesses against themselves
cannot be construed to compel them to disclose facts which would
subject them to criminal punishment.3 And a statute which author-
izes summary process in favor of a bank against debtors who have
by express contract made their obligations payable at such bank,
being in derogation of the ordinary principles of private right,
must be subject to strict construction.4 These cases are only illus-
trations of a rule of general acceptance.6
There are unquestionably cases in which the State may grant
privileges to specified individuals without violating any constitu-
tional principle, because, from the nature of the case, it is impos-
sible they should be possessed and enjoyed by all; and if it is
important that they should exist, the proper State authority must
be left to select the grantees. Of this class are grants of the
franchise to be a corporation. Such grants, however, which con-
fer upon a few persons what cannot be shared by the many, and
which, though supposed to.be made on public grounds, are never-
theless frequently of great value to the corporators, and therefore
sought with avidity, are never to be extended by construction
beyond the plain terms in which they are conferred. No rule is
1 Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13.
* People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406. See Bailey p. Fiske, 34 Me. 77; Monroe
v. Collins, 17 Ohio, n. s. 665. The decisions in Ohio were still more liberal, and
ranked as white persons all who had a preponderance of white blood. Gray v.
State, 4 Ohio, 354; Jeffres v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio, 372; Thacker p. Hawk, ib. 376;
Anderson r. Millikin, 9 Ohio, n. s. 406. But see Van Camp p. Board of Educa-
tion, 9 Ohio, n. s. 406. Happily all such questions are now disposed of by con-
stitutional amendments. It seems, however, in the opinion of the Supreme
Court of California, that these amendments do not preclude a State denying to a
race, e. g., the Chinese, the right to testify against other persons. People p.
Brady, 40 Cal. 198; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 604.
3 Broadbent v. State, 7 Md. 416. See Knowles p. People, 15 Mich. 408.
4 Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 241.
6 See 1 Bl. Com. 89, and note.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 394
better settled than that charters of incorporation are to be con-
strued strictly against the corporators.1 The just pre-
sumption in * every such case is, that the State has [*395]
granted in express terms all that it designed to grant
at all. "When a State," says the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
"means to clothe a corporate body with a portion of her own
sovereignty, and to disarm herself to that extent of the power
that belongs to her, it is so easy to say so, that we will never
believe it to be meant when it is not said. ... In the construction
of a charter, to be in doubt is to be resolved; and every resolution
which springs from doubt is against the corporation. If the useful-
ness of the company would be increased by extending [its privi-
leges], let the legislature see to it, but remember that nothing but
plain English words will do it."2
1 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 11 Pet. 544; Perrine v. Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Co, 9 How. 172;
Richmond, &c, R.R. Co. v. Louisa R.R. Co., 13 How. 71; Bradley v. N. Y. &
N. H. R.R. Co., 21 Conn. 294; Parker p. Sunbury & Erie R.R. Co., 19 Penn.
St. 211; Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghampton
Bridge Co., 27 N. Y. 87, and 3 Wall. 51; State v. Krebs, 64 N. C. 6Oi.
* Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Canal Commissioners, 21 Penn. St. 22. And see
Commonwealth v. Pittsburg, &c, R.R. Co., 24 Penn. St. 159; Chenango Bridge
Co. p. Binghampton Bridge Co., 27 N. Y. 93, per Wright, J.; Baltimore v. Bal-
timore, &p., R.R. Co., 21 Md. 50; Richmond v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co.,
21 Grat. 614. We quote from the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Bradley v.
N. Y. & N. H. R.R. Co., 21 Conn. 306: "The rules of construction which
apply to general legislation, in regard to those subjects in which the public at
large are interested, are essentially different from those which apply to private
grants to individuals, of powers or privileges designed to be exercised with
special reference to their own advantage, although involving in their exercise
incidental benefits to the community generally. The former are to be expounded
largely and beneficially for the purposes for which they were enacted; the latter
liberally, in favor of the public, and strictly as against the grantees. The power
in the one case is original and inherent in the State or sovereign power, and is
exercised solely for the general good of the community; in the other it is merely
derivative, is special if not exclusive in its character, and is in derogation of
common right, in the sense that it confers privileges to which the members of the
community at large are not entitled. Acts of the former kind, being dictated
solely by a regard to the benefit of the public generally, attract none of that
prejudice or jealousy towards them which naturally would arise towards those of
the other description, from the consideration that the latter were obtained with a
view to the benefit of particular individuals, and the apprehension that their inter-
ests might be promoted at the sacrifice or to the injury of those of others whose
interests should be equally regarded. It is universally understood' to be one of
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* 396 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XI.
[* 396] * And this rule is not confined to the grant of a corpo-
rate franchise, but it extends to all grants of franchises or
privileges by the State to individuals, in the benefits of which
the people at large cannot participate. "Private statutes," says
Parsons, Ch. J., "made for the accommodation of particular
citizens or corporations, ought not to be construed to affect the
rights or privileges of others, unless such construction results
from express words or from necessary implication." 1 And the
grant of ferry rights, or the right to erect a toll-bridge, and the
the implied and necessary conditions upon, which men enter into society and form
governments, that sacrifices must sometimes be required of individuals for the
general benefit of the community, for which they have no rightful claim to spe-
cific compensation; but, as between the several individuals composing the com-
munity, it is the duty of the State to protect them in the enjoyment of just and
equal rights. A law, therefore, enacted for the common good, and which there
would ordinarily be no inducement to pervert from that purpose, is entitled to be
viewed with less jealousy and distrust than one enacted to promote the interests
of particular persons, and which would constantly present a motive for encroach-
ing on the rights of others."
1 Coolidge v. Williams, 4 Mass. 140. See also Dyer o. Tuscaloosa Bridge
Co., 2 Port. (Ala.) 296; Grant v. Leach, 20 La. An. 329. In Sprague v. Bird-
sail, 2 Cow. 419, it was held that one embarking upon the Cayuga Lake six miles
from the bridge of the Cayuga Bridge Co., and crossing the lake in an oblique
direction so as to land within sixty rods of the bridge, was not liable to pay toll
under a provision in the charter of said company which made it unlawful for any
person to cross within three miles of the bridge without paying toll. In another
case arising under the same charter, which authorized the company to build a
bridge across the lake or the outlet thereof, and to rebuild in case it should be
destroyed or carried away by the ice, and prohibited all other persons from erect-
ing a bridge within three miles of the place where a bridge should be erected by
the company, it was held, after the company had erected a bridge across the lake
and it had been carried away by the ice, that they had no authority afterwards to
rebuild across the outlet of the lake, two miles from the place where the first
bridge was built, and that the restricted limits were to be measured from the
place where the first bridge was erected. Cayuga Bridge Co. v. Magee, 2 Paige,
116; s. c. 6 Wend. 85. In Chapin v. The Paper Works, 30 Conn. 461, it was
held that statutes giving a preference to certain creditors over others should be
construed with reasonable strictness, as the law favored equality. In People v.
Lambier, 5 Denio, 9, it appeared that an act of the legislature had authorized a
proprietor of lands lying in the East River, which is an arm of the sea, to con-
struct wharves and bulkheads in the river, in front of his land, and there was at
the time a public highway through the land, terminating at the river. Held, that
the proprietor could not, by filling up the land between the shore and the bulk-
head, obstruct the public right of passage from the land to the water, but that
the street wac, by operation of law, extended from the former terminus over the
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 396
like, is not only to be construed strictly against the grantees, but
it will not be held to exclude the grant of a similar and competing
privilege to others, unless the terms of the grant render such con-
struction imperative.1
* The Constitution of the United States contains pro- [* 397]
visions which are important in this connection. One of
these is, that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States,2 and
all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to its jurisdiction, are declared to be citizens thereof, and of
the State wherein they reside.3 The States are also forbidden
to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States, or to deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
or to deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.4 Although the precise meaning of " privi-
leges and immunities" is not very definitely settled as yet, it
appears to be conceded that the Constitution secures in each State
to the citizens of all other States the right to remove to, and carry
on business therein; the right by the usual modes to acquire and
hold property, and to protect and defend the same in the law;
the right to the usual remedies for the collection of debts and the
enforcement of other personal rights, and the right to be exempt,
in property and person, from taxes or burdens which the property,
or persons, of citizens of the same State are not subject to.5 To
this extent, at least, discriminations could not be made by State
laws against them. But it is unquestionable that many other
rights and privileges may be made — as they usually are — to
depend upon actual residence: such as the right to vote, to have
the benefit of exemption laws, to take fish in the waters of the
State, and the like. And the constitutional provisions are not
newly made land to the water. Compare Commissioners of Inland Fisheries v.
Holyoke Water Power Co., 104 Mass. 446; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 247.
1 Mills ». St. Clair County, 8 How. 569; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica & S.
R.R. Co., 6 Paige, 554; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 27
N. Y.87; s. c. 8 Wall. 51.
* Const, of United States, art 4, § 2. See ante, pp. 15, 16.
* Const, of United States, 14th Amendment.
4 Const, of United States, 14th Amendment.
* Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 380; Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554;
Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 343; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 281.
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violated by a statute which allows process by attachment against
a debtor not a resident of the State, notwithstanding such process
is not admissiblo against a resident.1 The protection by due
process of law has already been considered. It was not within
the power of the States before the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws;
but there were servile classes not thus shielded, and when these
were made freemen, there were some who disputed their claim to
citizenship, and some State laws were in force which established
discriminations against them.' To settle doubts and preclude all
such laws, the fourteenth amendment was adopted; aud the same
securities which one citizen may demand, all others are now
entitled to.
Judicial Proceedings.
Individual citizens require protection against judicial action as
well as against legislative; and perhaps the question, what consti-
tutes due process of law, is as often made in regard to judicial
proceedings as in any other cases. But it is not so difficult here to
arrive at satisfactory conclusions, since the bounds of the judicial
authority are much better defined than those of the legislative, and
each case can generally be brought to a definite and well-settled
test.
The proceedings in any court are void if it wants jurisdiction of
the case in which it has assumed to act. Jurisdiction is,
[* 398] first, of * the subject-matter; aud, second, of the persous
whose rights are to be passed upon.2
A court has jurisdiction of any subject-matter, if, by the law of
its organization, it has authority to take cognizance of, try, and
determine cases of that description. If it assumes to act in a
case over which the law does not give it authority, the proceeding
and judgment will be altogether void, and rights of property can-
not be devested by means of them.
1 Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. HI.
And see generally the cases cited, ante, p. 16, note.
'Bouvier defines jurisdiction thus: "Jurisdiction is a power constitutionally
conferred upon a court, a single judge, or a magistrate, to take cognizance and
decide causes according to law, and to carry their sentence into execution. The
tract of land within which a court, judge, or magistrate has jurisdiction is called
his territory; and his power in relation to his territory is called his territorial
jurisdiction.'1' 3 Bouv. Inst. 71.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 398
Aud on this point there is an important maxim of the law, that
is to say, that consent will not confer jurisdiction:1 by which is
meant that the consent of parties cannot empower a court to act
upon subjects which are not submitted to its judgment by the Jaw-
The law creates courts, and with reference to considerations of
general public policy defines and limits their jurisdiction; and
this can neither be enlarged nor restricted by the act of the
parties.
Accordingly, where a court by law has no jurisdiction of the
subject-matter of a controversy, a party whose rights are sought
to be affected by it is at liberty to repudiate its proceedings and
refuse to be bound by them, notwithstanding he may once have
consented to its action, either by voluntarily commencing the pro-
ceeding as plaintiff, or as defendant by appearing and pleading to
the merits, or by any other formal or informal action. This right
he may avail himself of at any stage of the case; and the maxim
that requires one to move promptly who would take advantage of
an.irregularity does not apply here, since this is not mere irregu-
lar action, but a total want of power to act at all. Consent is
sometimes implied from failure to object; but there can
be no * waiver of rights by laches in a case where consent [* 399]
would be altogether nugatory.2
In regard to private controversies, the law always encourages
arrangements;3 and the settlements which the parties may make
for themselves, it allows to be made for them by arbitrators mutu-
ally chosen. But the courts of a country cannot have those con-
troversies referred to them by the parties which the law-making
power has seen fit to exclude from their cognizance. If the judges
1 Coffin v. Tracy, 3 Caines, 129; Blin v. Campbell, 14 Johns. 432; Cuylere.
Rochester, 12 Wend. 165; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Preston v. Boston,
12 Pick. 7; Chapman v. Morgan, 2 Greene (Iowa), 374; Thompson v. Steam-
boat Morton, 2 Ohio, n. s. 26; Gilliland v. Administrator of Sellers, t'i. 223;
Dicks c. Hatch, 10 Iowa, 380; Overstreet v. Brown, 4 McCord, 79; Green r.
Collins, 6 Ired. 139; Bostwick v. Perkins, 4 Geo. 47; Georgia R.R. &c. v. Har-
ris, 5 Geo. 527; State v. Bonney, 34 Me. 223; Little v. Fitts, 33 Ala. 343; Ginn
v. Rogers, 4 Gilm. 131; Neill v. Reese, 5 Texas, 23; Ames o. Boland, 1 Minn.
365; Brady v. Richardson, 18 Ind. 1; White v. Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32.
'Bostwick o. Perkins, 4 Geo. 47; Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351; White v.
Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32.
% Moore r. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich. 266; Coyner v. Lynde,
10 Ind. 282.
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should sit to hear such controversies, they would not sit as a court;
at the most they would be arbitrators only, and their action could
not be sustained on that theory, unless it appeared that the parties
had designed to make the judges their arbitrators, instead of
expecting from them valid judicial action as an organized court.
Even then the decision could not be binding as a judgment, but
only as an award; and a mere neglect by either party to object the
want of jurisdiction could not make the decision binding upon him
either as a judgment or as an award. Still less could consent in a
criminal case bind the defendant; since criminal charges are not
the subject of arbitration, and any infliction of criminal punish-
ment upon an individual, except in pursuance of the law of the
land, is a wrong done to the State, whether the individual assented
or not. Those cases in which it has been held that the constitu-
tional right of trial by jury cannot be waived are strongly illustrative
of the legal view of this subject.1
If the parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court by consent,
neither can they by consent empower any individual other than the
judge of the court to exercise its powers. Judges are chosen in
such manner as shall be provided by law; and a stipulation by
parties that any other person than the judge shall exercise his
functions in their case would be nugatory, even though the judge
should vacate his seat for the purposes of the hearing.2
Sometimes jurisdiction of the subject-matter will depend upon
considerations of locality, either of the thing in dispute or of the
parties. At law certain actions are local, and others are
["MOO] transitory. * The first can only be tried where the prop-
erty is which is the subject of the controversy, or in re-
spect to which the controversy has arisen. The United States
courts take cognizance of certain causes by reason only of the fact
that the parties are residents of different States or countries.'
1 Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. 561; Work v. Ohio, 2 Ohio, K. 8. 296; Cancemi
v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; Smith t>. People, 9 Mich. 193; Hill v. People, 16 Mich.
351. See abo State v. Turner, 1 Wright, 20.
• Winchester v. Ayres, 4 Greene (Iowa), 104.
3 See a case where a judgment of a United States court was treated as of no
force, because the court had not jurisdiction in respect to the plaintiff. Vose r.
Morton, 4 Cush. 27. As to third persons, a judgment against an individual may
sometimes be treated as void, when he was not suable in that court or in that
manner, notwithstanding he may have so submitted himself to the jurisdiction as
[ 468 ]
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 400
The question of jurisdiction in these cases is sometimes deter-
mined by the common law, and sometimes is matter of statutory
regulation. But there is a class of cases in respect to which the
courts of the several States of the Union are constantly being
called upon to exercise authority, and in which, while the jurisdic-
tion is conceded to rest on considerations of locality, there has not,
unfortunately, at all times been entire harmony of decision as to
what shall confer jurisdiction. We refer now to suits for divorce
from the bonds of matrimony.
The courts of one State or country have no general authority to
grant divorce, unless for some reason they have control over the
particular marriage contract which is sought to be annulled. But
what circumstance gives such control? Is it the fact that the
marriage was entered into in such country or State? Or that the
alleged breach of the marriage bond was within that jurisdiction?
Or that the parties resided within it either at the time of the
marriage or at the time of the offence? Or that the parties now
reside in such State or country, though both marriage and offence
may have taken place elsewhere? Or must marriage, offence, and
residence, all or any two of them, combine to confer the authority?
These are questions which have frequently demanded the thought-
ful attention of the courts, who have sought to establish a rule
at once sound in principle, and that shall protect as far as possible
the rights of the parties, one or the other of whom, unfortunately,
under the operation of any rule which can be established, it will
frequently be found has been the victim of gross injustice.
We conceive the true rule to be that the actual, bona fide res-
idence of either husband or wife within a State will give
to that * State authority to determine the status of such [* 401]
party, and to pass upon any questions affecting his or her
continuance in the marriage relation, irrespective of the locality of
the marriage, or of any alleged offence; and that any such court
in that State as the legislature may have authorized to take cogni-
zance of the subject may lawfully pass upon such questions, and
annul the marriage for any cause allowed by the local law. But
if a party goes to a jurisdiction other than that of his domicile for
the purpose of procuring a divorce, and has residence there for
to be personally bound. See Georgia R.R. &c. v. Harris, 5 Geo. 527; Hinch-
man v. Town, 10 Mich. 508.
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that purpose only, such residence is not bona fide, and does not
confer upon the courts of that State or country jurisdiction over
the marriage relation, and any decree they may assume to make
would be void as to the other party.1
1 There are a number of cases in which this subject has been considered. In
Inhabitants of Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227, instructions to a jury were
sustained, that if they were satisfied the husband, who had been a ciiizen o!
Massachusetts, removed to Vermont merely for the purpose of procuring a
divorce, and that the pretended cause for divorce arose, if it ever did arise,
in Massachusetts, and that the wife was never within the jurisdiction of the court
of Vermont, then and in such case the decree of divorce which the husband had
obtained in Vermont must be considered as fraudulently obtained, and that it
could not operate so as to dissolve the marriage between the parties. See also
Vischerf. Vischer, 12 Barb. 640; and McGitTert v. McGiffert, 31 Barb. 69. In
Chase v. Chase, 6 Gray, 157, the same ruling was had as to a foreign divorce,
notwithstanding the wife appeared in and defended the foreign suit. In Clark
v. Clark, 8 N. H. 21, the court refused a divorce on the ground that the alleged
cause of divorce (adultery), though committed within the State, was so commit-
ted while the parties had their domicile abroad. This decision was followed in
Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 12 N. H. 200. The court say: "If the defendant never
had any domicile in this State, the libellant could not come here, bringing with
her a cause of divorce over which this court had jurisdiction. If at the time
of the [alleged offence] the domicile of the parties was in Maine, and> the farts
furnished no cause for a divorce there, she could not come here and allege those
matters which had already occurred, as a ground for a divorce under the laws of
this State. Should she under such circumstances obtain a decree of divorce
here, it must be regarded as a mere nullity elsewhere." In Frary r. FrarT.
10 N. H. 61, importance was attached to the fact that the marriage took place
in New Hampshire; and it was held that the court had jurisdiction of the wife's
application for a divorce, notwithstanding the offence was committed in Vermont,
but during the time of the wife's residence in New Hampshire. See also Kimball
v. Kimball, 13 N. H. 225; Bachelder v. Bachelder, 14 N. H. 380; Payson r.
Payson, 34 N. H. 518; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 35 N. H. 474. In Wilcox r. Wil-
cox, 10 Ind. 436, it was held that the residence of the libellant at the time of
the application for a divorce was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, and a decree
dismissing the bill because the cause for divorce arose out of the State was re-
versed. And see Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407. See also Jackson v. Jackson.
1 Johns. 424; Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 263; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121;
Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407. In any of these cases the question of actual
residence will be open to inquiry wherever it becomes important, notwithstanding
the record of proceedings is in due form, and contains the affidavit of residence
required by the practice. L,eith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 20. And see McGiffert r.
McGiffert, 31 Barb. 69; Todd r. Kerr, 42 Barb. 317; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46
N. Y. 30; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247. The Pennsylvania cases agree with
those of New Hampshire, in holding that a divorce should not be granted unless
the cause alleged occurred while the complainant had domicile within the State.
[ 470 ]
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 402
* But to render the jurisdiction of a court effectual in [* 402]
any case, it is necessary that the thing in controversy, or
Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts, 349; Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Penn. St. 449;
McDermott's Appeal, 8 W. & S. 251. And they hold also that the injured party
in the marriage relation must seek redress in the forum of the defendant, unless
where such defendant has removed from what was before the common domicile of
both. Calvin v. Heed, 35 Penn. St. 376; Elder v. Reel, 02 Pt nn. St. 308; s. c.
1 Am. Rep. 414. For cases supporting to a greater or less extent the doctrine
stated in the text, see Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I.
87; Pawling v. Bird's ExYs, 13 Johns. 192; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272;
Harrison v. Harrison, 19 Ala. 499; Thompson v. State, 28 Ala. 12; Cooper v.
Cooper, 7 Ohio, 594; Mansfield v. Mclntyre, 10 Ohio, 28; Smith v. Smith, 4
Greene (Iowa), 266; Yates v. Yates, 2 Beasley, 280; Maguire v. Maguire,
7 Dana, 181 ; Waltz p. Waltz, 18 Ind. 449; Hull v. Hull, 2 Strob. Eq. 174;
Manley v. Manley, 4 Chand. 97; Hubbell v. Hubbell, 3 Wis. 662; Gleason p.
Gleason, 4 Wis. 64; Hare p. Hare, 15 Texas, 35.5. And see Story, Confl.
Laws, § 230 a; Bishop on Mar. and Div. 727 el seg.; ib. (4th ed.) Vol. II. § 155
el seq. The recent cases of Hoffman e. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; s. c. 7 Am. Rep.
299; Elder p. Reel, 62 Penn. St. 308; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 414; and People v.
Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, are very explicit in declaring that where neither party is
domiciled within a particular State, its courts can have no jurisdic tion in respect
to their marital status, and any decree of divorce made therein must he nugatory.
A number of the cases cited hold that the wife may have a domicile separate from
the husband, and may therefore be entitled to a divorce, though the husband
never resided in the State. These cases proceed upon the theory that, although
in general the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife, yet that if he
be guilty of such act or dereliction of duty in the relation as entitles her to have
it partially or wholly dissolved, she is at liberty to establish a separate jurisdic-
tional domicile of her own. Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; Harding p. Alden,
9 Greenl. 140; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Hollister o. Hollister, 6 Penn.
St. 449. The doctrine in New York seems to be, that a divorce obtained in
another State, without personal service of process or appearance of the defend-
ant, is absolutely void. Vischer v. Vischer, 12 Barb. 640; McGiffort v. Mc-
Giffert, 31 Barb. 69; Todd p. Kerr, 42 Barb. 317. See Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio,
n. s. 502; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 415. An appearance by defendant afterwards for
the purposes of a motion to set aside the decree, which motion was defeated on
technical grounds, will not affect the question. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y.
30; 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 299.
Upon the whole subject of jurisdiction in divorce suits, no case in the books
is more full and satisfactory than that of Ditson v. Ditson, supra, which reviews
and comments upon a number of the cases cited, and particularly upon the
Massachusetts cases of Barber B. Root, 10 Mass. 265; Inhabitants of Hanover
r. Turner, 14 Mass. 227; Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181; and Lyon r. Lyon,
2 Gray, 867. The divorce of one party divorces both. Cooper v. Cooper,
7 Ohio, 594. And will leave both at liberty to enter into new marriage relations,
unless the local statute expressly forbids the guilty party from contracting a
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the parties interested, be subjected to the process of the court.
Certain cases are said to proceed in rem, because they take notice
rather of the thing in controversy than of the persons concerned;
and the process is served upon that which is the object of
[* 403] the suit, without * specially noticing the interested parties;
while in other cases the parties themselves are brought
before the court by process. Of the first class admiralty proceed-
ings are an illustration ; the court acquiring jurisdiction by seizing
the vessel or other thing to which the controversy relates. In cases
within this class, notice to all concerned is required to be given,
either personally or by some species of publication or proclamation;
and if not given,'the court which had jurisdiction of the property
will have none to render judgment.1 Suits at the common law,
however, proceed against the parties whose interests are sought to
be affected; and only those persons are concluded by the adjudica-
tion who are served with process, or who voluntarily appear.2 Some
cases also partake of the nature both of proceedings in rem and of
personal actions, since, although they proceed by seizing property,
they also contemplate the service of process on defendant parties.
Of this class are the proceedings by foreign attachment, in which
the property of a non-resident or concealed debtor is seized and
retained by the officer as security for the satisfaction of any judg-
ment that may be recovered against him, but at the same time pro-
second marriage. See Commonwealth v. Putnam, 1 Pick. 136; Baker v. People,
2 Hill, 325.
1 Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 594. See Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y.
199; Nations v. Johnson, 2i How. 204, 205; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 213.
* Jac k v. Thompson, 41 Miss. 49. As to the right of an attorney to notice of
proceedings to disbar him, see notes to pp. 337 and 404. "Notice of some kind
is the vital breath that animates judicial jurisdiction over the person. It is the
primary element of the application of the judicatory power. It is of the essence
of a cause. Without it there cannot be parties, and without parties there may
be the form of a sentence, but no judgment obligating the person." See Little-
ton v. Richardson, 34 N. H. 179; Black v. Black, 4 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 205.
Where, however, a statute provides for the taking of a certain security, and
authorizes judgment to be rendered upon it on motion, without process, the party
entering into the security must be understood to assent to the condition, and to
waive process and consent to judgment. Lewis v. Garrett's Adm'r, 6 Miss. 434;
People v. Van Eps, 4 Wend. 390; Chappee v. Thomas, 5 Mich. 53 ; Gildersleeve
v. People, 10 Barb. 35; People v. Lott, 21 Barb. 130; Pratt v. Donovan, 10
Wis. 378; Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272; Philadelphia v. Com-
monwealth, 52 Penn. St. 451; Whitehurst v. Coleen, 53 111. 247.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 403
cess is issued to be served upon the defendant, and which must be
served, or some substitute for service had before judgment can be
rendered.
In such cases, as well as in divorce suits, it will often happen
that the party proceeded against cannot be found in the State, and
personal service upon him is therefore .impossible, unless it is
allowable to make it wherever he may be found abroad. But any
such service would be ineffectual. No State has authority to
invade the jurisdiction of another, and by service of process com-
pel parties there resident or being to submit their controversies to
the determination of its courts ; and those courts will consequently
be sometimes unable to enforce a jurisdiction which the State
possesses in respect to the subjects within its limits, unless
* a substituted service is admissible. A substituted service [* 404]
is provided by statute for many such cases; generally in
the form of a notice, published in the public journals, or posted, as
the statute may direct; the mode being chosen with a view to bring
it home, if possible, to the knowledge of the party to be affected,
and to give him an opportunity to appear and defend. The right
of the legislature to prescribe such notice, and to give it effect as
process, rests upon the necessity of the case, and has been long
recognized and acted upon.1
But such notice is restricted in its legal effect, and cannot be
made available for all purposes. It will enable the court to give
effect to the proceeding so far as it is one in rem, but when the res
is disposed of, the authority of the court ceases. The statute may
give it effect so as far as the subject-matter of the proceeding is within
the limits, and therefore under the control, of the State; but the
notice cannot be made to stand in the place of process, so as to
1 " It may be admitted that a statute which authorized any debt or damages to
be adjudged against a person upon purely ex parte proceedings, without pretence
of notice, or any provision for defending, would be a violation of the constitu-
tion, and void; but when the legislature has provided a kind of notice by which
it is reasonably probable that the party proceeded against will be apprised of
what is going on against him, and an opportunity is afforded him«to defend, I
am of opinion that the courts have not the power to pronounce the proceedings
illegal." Denio, J., in Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y. 200. See, also,
per Morgan, J., in Rockwell v. Nearing, 35 N. Y. 314; Nations v. Johnson,
24 How. 195; Beard o. Beard, 21 Ind. 32-1; Mason v. Messenger, 17 Iowa, 261;
Cupp v. Commissioners of Seneca Co., 19 Ohio, n. s. 173; Campbell v. Evans,
45 N. Y. 356; Happy v. Mosher, 48 N. Y. 317.
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subject the defendant to a valid judgment against him person
In attachment proceedings, the published notice may be sufficiei
to enable the plaintiff to obtain a judgment which he can enf«
by sale of the property attached, but for any other purpose such
judgment would be ineffectual. The defendant could not be
followed into another State or country, and there have recovery
against him upon the judgment as an established demand. The
fact that process was not personally served is a conclusive objection
to the judgment as a personal claim, unless the defendant caused his
appearance to be entered in the attachment proceedings.1
[* 405] Where a party has property in a State, and * resides else-
where, his property is justly subject to all valid claims that
may exist against him there; but beyond this, due process of law
would require appearance or personal service before the defendant
could be personally bound by any judgment rendered.
The same rule applies in divorce cases. The courts of the State
where the complaining party resides have jurisdiction of the subject-
matter; and if the other party is a non-resident, they must be
authorized to proceed without personal service of process. The
publication which is permitted by the statute is sufficient to justify
a decree in these cases changing the status of the complaining
party, and thereby terminating the marriage;2 and it might be
1 Pawling v. Willson, 13 Johns. 192; Heirs of Holman v. Bank of Norfolk,
12 Ala. 869; Curtis v. Gibbs, 1 Penn. 899; Miller's Ex'r v. Miller, 1 Bailey,
242; Cone v. Cotton, 2 Blaekf. 82; Kilburn v. Woodwortli, 5 Johns. 37; Rob-
inson v. Ward's Ex'r, 8 Johns. 86; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Bartlet r.
Knight, 1 Mass. 401; St. Albans v. Bush, 4 Vt. 58; Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns.
194; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Denison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 508; Aldriuh v.
Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt. 263; Newell v. Newton, 10 Pick.
470; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 161; Armstrong v. Harshaw, 1 Dev. 188;
Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Bates v. Delavan, 5 Paige, 299; Webster
v. Reid. 11 How. 460; Gleason v. Uodd, 4 Met. 333; Green v. Custard, 23 How.
486. In Ex parte Heyfron, 7 How. (Miss.) 127, it was held that an attorney
could not be stricken from the rolls without notice of the proceeding, and oppor-
tunity to be heard. And see ante, p. 337 n. Leaving notice with one's family u
not equivalent to personal service. Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 829. And see
Bimeler v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 586.
* Hull v. Hull, 2 Strob. Eq. 174; Manley v. Manley, 4 Chand. 97; Hubbell
v. Hubbell, 8 Wis. 662; Mansfield v. Mclntyre, 10 Ohio, 28; Ditson v. Ditson,
4 R. I. 97; Harrison v. Harrison, 19 Ala. 499; Thompson v State, 28 Ala. 12;
Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Todd r.
Kerr, 42 Barb. 317. It is immaterial in these cases whether notice was actually
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J CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 405
sufficient also to empower the court to pass upon the question of
the custody and control of the children of the marriage, if they were
then within its jurisdiction. But a decree on this subject could
only be absolutely binding on the parties while the children remained
within the jurisdiction; if they acquire a domicile in another State
or country, the judicial tribunals of that State or country would
have authority to determine the question of their guardianship
there.1
* But in divorce cases, no more than in any other, can [* 406]
the court make a decree for the payment of money by a
defendant not served with process, and not appearing in the case,
which shall be binding upon him personally. It must follow, in
such a case, that the wife, when complainant, cannot obtain a valid
decree for alimony, nor a valid judgment for costs. If the defend-
ant had property within the State, it would be competent to provide
by law for the seizure and appropriation of such property, under
the decree of the court, to the use of the complainant; but the legal
tribunals elsewhere would not recognize a decree for alimony or for
costs not based on personal service or appearance. The remedy of
the complainant must generally, in these cases, be confined to a
dissolution of the marriage, with the incidental benefits springing
therefrom, and to an order for the custody of the children, if within
the State.2
When the question is raised whether the proceedings of a court
may not be void for want of jurisdiction, it will sometimes be
brought home to the defendant or not. And see heirs of Holman v. Bank of
Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369.
1 This must be so on general principles, as the appointment of guardian for
minors is of local force only. See Monell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. lo6; Wood-
worth p. Spring, 4 Allen, 821; Potter v. Hiscox, 30 Conn. 508 ; Kraft v. Wickpy,
4 G. & J. 322. The case of Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412, appears to be
contra, but some reliance is placed by the court on the statute of the State which
allows the foreign appointment to be recognized for the purposes of a sale of the
real estate of a ward.
a See Jackson p. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424; Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140;
Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295; Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & J. 463; Maguire
p. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Townsend p. Griffin, 4 Hair. 440. In Beard v. Beard,
21 Ind. 321, Perkins, J., after a learned and somewhat elaborate examination of
the subject, expresses the opinion that the State may permit a personal judgment
for alimony in the case of a resident defendant, on service by publication
only, though he conceded that there would be no such power in the case of non-
residents.
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[CH. XT.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
important to note the grade of the court and the extent of its
authority. Some courts are of- general jurisdiction, by which is
meant that their authority extends to a great variety of matter?
while others are only of special and limited jurisdiction, by which
it is understood that they have authority extending only to certain
specified cases. The want of jurisdiction is equally fatal in the
proceedings of each; but different rules prevail in showing it. It
is not to be assumed that a court of general jurisdiction has in
any case proceeded to adjudge upon matters over which it had no
authority; and its jurisdiction is to be presumed, whether there
are recitals in its records to show it or not. On the other hand,
no such intendment is made in favor of the judgment of a court of
limited jurisdiction, but the recitals contained in the minutes of pro-
ceedings must be sufficient to show that the case was one which the
law permitted the court to take cognizance of, and that the par-
ties were subjected to its jurisdiction by proper process.1
[*407] "There is also another difference between these two
classes of tribunals in this, that the jurisdiction of the one
may be disproved under circumstances where it would not be
allowed in the case of the other. A record is not commonly suf-
fered to be contradicted by parol evidence; but wherever a fact
showing want of jurisdiction in a court of general jurisdiction can
be proved without contradicting its recitals, it is allowable to do 90,
and thus defeat its effect.2 But in the case of a court of special
and limited authority, it is permitted to go still further, and to show
a want of jurisdiction even in opposition to the recitals contained
in the record.3 This we conceive to be the general rule, though
1 See Dakin v. Hudson, 6 Cow. 221; Cleveland v. Rogers, 6 Wend. 4:58;
People v. Koeber, 7 Hill, 39; Sheldon v. Wright, 1 Seld. 511; Clark o. Holmes,
1 Doug. (Mich.) 390; Cooper u. Sunderland, 3 Iowa, 114; Wall v. Trumbull,
16 Mich. 228; Denning v. Corwin, 11 Wend. 647; Bridge v. Ford, 6 Mass. 641;
Smith v. Rice, 11 Mass. 511; Barrett o. Crane, 16 Vt. 246; Teft v. Griffin,
5 Geo. 185; Jennings v. Stafford, 1 Ired. 404; Hershaw v. Taylor, 3 Jones, 513;
Perrine u. Fair, 2 Zab. 356; State v. Metzger, 26 Mo. 65.
5 See this subject considered at some length in Wilcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich.
165. And see Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 329; Bimelar v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 556;
Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 487.
3 Sheldon v. Wright, 5 N. Y. 497 ; Dyckman v. Mayor, &c, of N. Y., 5 N. Y.
434; Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 390; Cooper v. Sunderland, 8 low*,
114; Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn. 273; Brown t>. Foster, 6 R. I. 564; Fawcett v.
Fowliss, 1 Man. & R. 102. But see Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich. 527, where itwM
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OP THE LAND." * 407
there are apparent exceptions of those cases where the jurisdiction
may be said to depend upon the existence of a certain state of
facts, which must be passed upon by the courts themselves, and in
respect to which the decision of the court once rendered, if there
was any evidence whatever on which to base it, must be held final
and conclusive in all collateral inquiries, notwithstanding it may
have erred in its conclusions.1
held that the entry in the docket of a justice that the parties appeared and pro-
ceeded to trial was conclusive. And see Selin t>. Snyder, 7 S. & R. 72.
1 Britain p. Kinnard, 1 B. & B. 432. Conviction under the Bumboat Act.
The record was fair on its face, but it was insisted that the vessel in question was
not a "boat" within the intent of the act. Dallas, Ch. J.: "The general prin-
ciple applicable to cases of this description is perfectly clear: it is established by
all the ancient, and recognized by all the modern decisions; and the principle is,
that a conviction by a magistrate, who has jurisdiction over the subject-matter,
is, if no defects appear on the face of it, conclusive evidence of the facts stated
in it. Such being the principle, what are the facts of the present case? If the
subject-matter in the present case were a boat, it is agreed that the boat would be
forfeited; and the conviction stated it to be a boat. But it is said that, in order
to give the magistrate jurisdiction, the subject-matter of his conviction must be a
boat; and that it is competent to the party to impeach the conviction by showing
that it was not a boat. I agree, that if he had not jurisdiction, the conviction
signifies nothing. Had he then jurisdiction in this case? By the act of Par-
liament he is empowered to search for and seize gunpowder in any boat on the
river Thames. Now, allowing, for the sake of argument, that ' boat' is a word
of technical meaning, and somewhat different from a vessel, still, it was a matter
of fact to be made out before the magistrate, and on which he was to draw his
own conclusion. But it is said that a jurisdiction limited as to person, place,
and subject-matter is stinted in its nature, and cannot be lawfully exceeded. I
agree: but upon the inquiry before the magistrate, does not the person form a
question to be decided upon the evidence? Does not the place, does not the
subject-matter, form such a question? The possession of a boat, therefore, with
gunpowder on board, is part of the offence charged; and how could the magis-
trate decide, but by examining evidence in proof of what was alleged? The
magistrate, it is urged, could not give himself jurisdiction by finding that to be a
fact which did not exist. But he is bound to inquire as to the fact, and when he
has inquired his conviction is conclusive of it. The magistrates have inquired in
the present instance, and they find the subject of conviction to be a boat. Much
has been said about the danger of magistrates giving themselves jurisdiction; and
extreme cases have been put, as of a magistrate seizing a ship of seventy-four
guns, and calling it a boat. Suppose such a thing done, the conviction is still
conclusive, and we cannot look out of it. It is urged that the party is without
remedy; and so he is, without civil remedy, in this and many other cases; his
remedy is by proceeding criminally; and if the decision were so gross as to call
a ship of seventy-four guns a boat, it would be good ground for a criminal pro-
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* 408 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XI.
\
[* 408] * When it is once made to appear that a court has juris-
diction both of the subject-matter and of the parties, the
[* 409] judgment which * it pronounces must be held conclusive
and binding upon the parties thereto and their privies, not-
withstanding the court may have proceeded irregularly, or erred in
its application of the law to the case before it. It is a general rule
that irregularities in the course of judicial proceedings do not
render them void.1 An irregularity may be denned as the failure
to observe that particular course of proceeding which, conformably
with the practice of the court, ought to have been observed in the
case ;2 and if a party claims to be aggrieved by this, he must apply
ceeding. Formerly the rule was to intend every thing against a stinted jurisdic-
tion: that is not the rule now; and nothing is to be intended but what is fair
and reasonable, and it is reasonable to intend that magistrates will do what is
right." Richardson, J., in the same case, states the real point very clearly:
"Whether the vessel in question were a boat or no was a fact on which the
magistrate was to decide; and the fallacy lies in assuming that the fact which the
magistrate lias to decide is that which constitutes his jurisdiction. If a fact
decided as this has been might be questioned in a civil suit, the magistrate would
never be safe in his jurisdiction. Suppose the case for a conviction under the
game laws of having partridges in possession: could the magistrate, in au action
of trespass, be called on to show that the bird in question was really a partridge?
and yet it might as well be urged, in that case, that the magistrate had no juris-
diction unless the bird were a partridge, as it may be urged in the present case
that he has none unless the machine be a boat. So in the case of a conviction for
keeping dogs for the destruction of game without being duly qualified to do so:
after the conviction had found that the offender kept a dog of that description,
could he, in a civil action, be allowed to dispute the truth of the conviction? In
a question like the present we are not to look at the inconvenience, but at the
law; but surely if the magistrate acts bona fide, and comes to his conclusion as
to matters of fact according to the best of his judgment, it would be highly
unjust if he were to have to defend himself in a civil action; and the more so, as
he might have been compelled by a mandamus to proceed on the investigation.
Upon the general principle, therefore, that where the magistrate has jurisdiction
his conviction is conclusive evidence of the facts stated in it, I think this rule
must be discharged.'' See also Mather v. Hodd, 8 Johns. 44; Mackaboy c.
Commonwealth, 2 Virg. Cas. 208; Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 509; State r. Scott,
1 Bailey, 294; Faeey v. Fuller, 13 Mich. 527; Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228;
Sheldon r. Wright, 5 N. Y. 512; Freeman on Judgments, § 523, and cases cited.
1 Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 509; Edgerton v. Hart, 8 Vt. 208; Carter e.
Walker, 2 Ohio, n. s. 339; Freeman on Judgments, § 135.
* "The doing or not doing that in the conduct of a suit at law, which, con-
formably to the practice of the court, ought or ought not to be done." Bouv.
Law Die. See Dick v. McLaurin, C3 N. C. 185.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 409
to the court in which the suit is pending to set aside the pro-
ceedings, or to give him such other redress as he thinks himself
entitled to; or he must take steps to have the judgment reversed
by removing the case for review to an appellate court, if any such
there be. Wherever the question of the validity of the proceedings
arises in any collateral suit, he will be held bound by them to the
same extent as if in all respects the court had proceeded according
to law. An irregularity cannot be taken advantage of collaterally;
that is to say, in any other suit than that in which the irregularity
occurs, or on appeal or process in error therefrom. And even in
the same proceeding an irregularity may be waived, and will com-
monly be held to be waived if the party entitled to complain of it
shall take any subsequent step in the case inconsistent with an
intent on his part to take advantage of it.1
We have thus briefly indicated the cases in which judicial action
may be treated as void because not in accordance with the
* law of the land. The design of the present work does [* 410]
not permit an enlarged discussion of the topics which sug-
gest themselves in this connection, and which, however interesting
and important, do not specially pertain to the subject of constitu-
tional law.
But a party in any case has a right to demand that the judg-
ment of the court be given upon his suit, and he cannot be bound
by a delegated exercise of judicial power, whether the delegation
be by the courts or by legislative act devolving judicial duties on
ministerial officers.2 Proceedings in any such case would be void;
but they must be carefully distinguished from those cases in which
the court has itself acted, though irregularly. Even the denial of
1 Robinson v. West, 1 Sandf. 19; Malone v. Clark, 2 Hill, 657; Wood v.
Randall, 5 Hill, 285; Baker v. Kerr, 13 Iowa, 384; Loomis v. Wadhams, 8 Gray,
557; Warren v. Glynn, 37 N. U. 340. A strong instance of waiver is where,
on appeal from a court having no jurisdiction of the subject-matter to a court
having general jurisdiction, the parties going to trial without objection are held
bound by the judgment. Randolph Co. v. Ralls, 18 111. 29; Wells v, Scott,
4 Mich. 347; Tower v. Lamb, 6 Mich. 362. In Hoffman v. Locke, 19 Penn. St.
57, objection was taken on constitutional grounds to a statute which allowed
judgment to be entered up for the plaintiff in certain cases, if the defendant
failed to make and file an affidavit of merits; but the court sustained it.
* Hall v. Marks, 34 111. 363; Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409. For the dis-
tinction between judicial and ministerial acta, see Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17
Ind. 173.
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jury trial, in cases where that privilege is reserved by the Consti-
tution, does not render the proceedings void, but only makes them
liable to be reversed for the errop.1
There is also a maxim of law regarding judicial action which
may have an important bearing upon the constitutional validity of
judgments in some cases. No one ought to be a judge in his own
cause; and so inflexible and so manifestly just is this rule, that
Lord Coke has laid it down that "even an act of Parliament made
against natural equity, as to make a man a judge in his own case,
is void in itself; for jura naturce sunt immutabilia, and they are
leges legum."2
1 The several State constitutions preserve the right of trial by jury, with per-
mission in some for the parties to waive the right in civil cases. Those cases
which before the constitution were not triable by jury need not be made so now.
Dane Co. v. Dunning, 20 Wis. 210; Crandall v. James, 6 R. I. 104; Lake
Erie, &p., R. R. Co. p. Heath, 9 Ind. 558; Backus p. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19;
Opinions of Judges, 41 N. H. 551; Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322; Stilwell p.
Kellogg, 14 Wis. 461; Mead v. Walker, 17 Wis. 189; Byers v. Commonwealth,
42 Penn. St. 89; State v. Peterson, 41 Vt. 504; Buffalo, &c. R.R. Co. p.
Burket, 26 Texas, 588; Sands v. Kimbark, 27 N. Y. 147; Howell v. Fry, 19
Ohio, n. s. 556; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co., 102 Mass. 45; Guile
v. Brown, 38 Conn. 243. And where a new tribunal is created without commoo-
law powers, jury trial need not be given. Rhines v. Clark, 51 Penn. St. 96 ; Haines
v. Levin, ib. 412. But the legislature cannot deprive a party of a common-law
right, — e. g., a right of navigation, — and compel him to abide the estimate
of commissioners upon his damages. Haines v. Levin, 51 Penn. St. 412. Where
the constitution gives the right, it cannot be made by statute to depend upon
any condition. Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. C. C. 311; Lincoln p. Smith, 27 Vl
328; Norristown, &c, Co. v. Burket, 26 Ind. 53. Though it has been held that,
if a trial is given in one court without a jury, with a right to appeal and to have
a trial by jury in the appellate court, that is sufficient. Beers p. Beers, 4 Conn.
535; Stewart v. Mayor, &c, 7 Md. 500; Morford v. Barnes, 8 Yerg. 444;
Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329. But we concur in the views of Judge Blatch-
ford, declared by him in the recent unreported case of Matter of Dana, that an
unconditional guaranty of jury trial cannot be satisfied, at least in criminal cases,
with the mere privilege to have a trial by jury on condition of first submitting to
a trial without it, and then, in case of conviction, taking an appeal. The guaranty
clearly intends a trial by jury in the first instance.
In Randall v. Kehlor, 60 Me. 37, objection was taken that the requirement of
the payment of a jury fee was in violation of the right of jury trial, but the
court held otherwise.
* Co. Lit. § 212. See Day v. Savadge, Hobart, 85. We should not venture
to predict, however, that even in a case of this kind, if one could be imagined to
exist, the courts would declare the act of Parliament void; though they would
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•This maxim applies in all cases where judicial functions [*411]
are to be exercised, and excludes all who are interested,
however remotely, from taking part in their exercise. It is not
left to the discretion of a judge, or to his sense of decency, to
decide whether he shall act or not; all his powers are subject to
this absolute limitation; and when his own rights are in question,
he has no authority to determine the cause.1 Nor is it essential
that the judge be a party named in the record; if the suit is
brought or defended in his interest, or if he is a corporator in a
corporation which is a party, or which will be benefited or damni-
fied by the judgment, he is equally excluded as if he were the party
named.2 Accordingly, where the Lord Chancellor, who was a
shareholder in a company in whose favor the Vice-Chancellor had
rendered a decree, affirmed this decree, the House of Lords re-
versed the decree on this ground, Lord Campbell observing: "It
is of the last importance that the maxim that 'no man is to be a
judge in his own cause' should be held sacred. And that is not
to be confined to a cause in which he is a party, but applies to a
cause in which he lias an interest." "We have again and again
set aside proceedings in inferior tribunals, because an individual
who had an interest in a cause took a part in the decision. And
it will have a most salutory effect on these tribunals, when it is
known that this high court of last resort, in a case in which the
Lord Chancellor of England had an interest, considered that his
decree was on that account a decree not according to law, and
should be set aside. This will be a lesson to all inferior tribunals
to take care, not only that in their decrees they are not influenced
by their personal interest, but to avoid the appearance of laboring
under such an influence." 8
It is matter of some interest to know whether the legislatures
of the American States can set aside this maxim of the common
never find such an intent in the statute, if any other could possibly be made
consistent with the words.
1 Washington Insurance Co. v. Price, Ilopk. Ch. 2; Sigourney v. Sibley, 21
Pick. 191; Freeman on Judgments, § 144.
* Washington Insurance Co. v. Price, Hopk. Ch. 2; Dimes v. Proprietors of
Grand Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases, 759; Pearce v. Atwood, 13
Mass. 340; Peck v. Freeholders of Essex, Spencer, 457; Commonwealth v.
McLane, 4 Gray, 427; Dively v. Cedar Rapids, 21 Iowa, 565.
3 Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases,
759.
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* 411 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XT
1
law, and by express enactment permit one to act judicially
[* 412] when * interested in the controversy. The maxim itself,
it is said, in some cases, does not apply where, from neces-
sity, the judge must proceed in the case, there being no other
tribunal authorized to act;1 but we prefer the opinion of Chan-
cellor Sandford of New York, that in such a case it belongs to the
power which created such a court to provide another in which this
judge may be a party; and whether another tribunal is established
or not, he at least is not intrusted with authority to determine his
own rights, or his own wrongs.2
It has been held that where the interest was that of corporator
in a municipal corporation, the legislature might provide that it
should constitute no disqualification where the corporation was a
party. But the ground of this ruling appears to be, that the
interest is so remote, trifling, and insignificant, that it may fairly
be supposed to be incapable of affecting the judgment or of influ-
encing the conduct of an individual.3 And where penalties are
imposed, to be recovered only in a municipal court, the judges or
iurors in which would be interested as corporators in the recovery,
the law providing for such recovery must be regarded as preclud-
ing the objection of interest.4 And it is very common, in a certain
class of cases, for the law to provide that certain township and
county officers shall audit their own accounts for services rendered
the public; but in such case there is no adversary party, unless the
State, which passes the law, or the municipalities which are its
component parts and subject to its control, can be regarded as
such.
But except in cases resting upon such reasons, we do not see
how the legislature can have any power to abolish a maxim which
is among the fundamentals of judicial authority. The people,
indeed, when framing their constitution, may establish so great an
1 Ranger v. Great Western R., 5 House of Lords Cases, 88; Stewart t.
Mechanics and Fanners Bank, 19 Johns. 501.
1 Washington Insurance Co. v. Trice, Hopk. Ch. 2. This subject was con-
sidered in Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 221, and an appointment by a judge of pro-
bate of his wife's brother as administrator of an estate of which her father was
a principal creditor was held void. And see Feople v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83.
* Commonwealth v. Reed, 1 Gray, 475.
* Commonwealth v. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90; Hill v. Wells, 6 Pick. 104; Common-
wealth v. Emery, 11 Cash. 406.
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CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND." * 412
anomaly, if they see fit;1 but if the legislature is intrusted with
apportioning and providing for the exercise of the judicial power,
we cannot understand it to be authorized, in the execution of
this trust, to do that which has never been recognized
as * being within the province of the judicial authority. [* 413]
To empower one party to a controversy to decide it for
himself is not within the legislative authority, because it is not the
establishment of any rule of action or decision, but is a placing of
the other party, so far as that controversy is concerned, out of the
protection of the law, and submitting him to the control of one
whose interest it will be to decide arbitrarily and unjustly.2
Nor do we see how the objection of interest can be waived by
the other party. If not taken before the decision is rendered, it
will avail in an appellate court; and the suit may there be dis-
missed on that ground.3 The judge acting in such a case is not
simply proceeding irregularly, but he is acting without jurisdic-
tion. And if one of the judges constituting a court is disquali-
fied on this ground, the judgment will be void, even though the
proper number may have concurred in the result, not reckoning
the interested party.4
Mere formal acts necessary to enable the case to be brought
before a proper tribunal for adjudication, an interested judge may
do;5 but that is the extent of his power.
1 Matter of Leefe, 2 Barb. Ch. 39.
* See Ames v. Port Huron Log-Driving and Booming Co., 11 Mich. 139;
Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 325.
3 Richardson v. Welcome, 6 Cush. 332; Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand
Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases, 787. And see Sigourney v. Sibley, 21
Pick. 106; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547.
4 In Queen t>. Justices of Hertfordshire, 6 Queen's Bench, 753, it was decided
that, if any one of the magistrates hearing a case at sessions was interested, the
court was improperly constituted, and an order made in the case should be
quashed. It was also decided that it was no answer to the objection, that there
was a majority in favor of the decision without reckoning the interested party,
nor that the interested party withdrew before the decision, if he appeared to have
joined in discussing the matter with the other magistrates. See also the Queen
v. Justices of Suffolk, 18 Q. B. 416; The Queen v. Justices of London, to. 421;
Peninsula R.R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 26.
1 Richardson r. Boston, 1 Curtis, C. C. 251; Washington Insurance Co. v.
Price, Hopk. Ch. 1; Buckingham v. Davis, 9 Md. 324; Heydenfeldt v. Towns,
27 Ala. 430. If the judge who renders judgment in a cause had previously been
attorney in it, the judgment is a nullity. Reams v. Kearns, 5 Cold. 217.
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fcH. an;
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[*414] *CHAPTER XII.
LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS.
The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides, among other things, that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. With jealous
care of what is almost universally regarded a sacred right, essen-
tial to the existence and perpetuity of free government, a provisioa
of similar import has been embodied in each of the State constitu-
tions, and a constitutional principle is thereby established which is
supposed to form a shield of protection to the free expression of
opinion in every part of our land.1
1 The following are the constitutional provisions: Maine: Every citizen mar
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any subject, being responsible
for the abuse of this liberty. No law shall be passed regulating or restraining
the freedom of the press; and, in prosecutions for any publication respecting
the official conduct of men in public capacity, or the qualifications of those who
are candidates for the suffrages of the people, or where the matter published is
proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and
in all indictments for libel, the jury, after having received the direction of the
court, shall have a right to determine, at their discretion, the law and the fact.
Declaration of Rights, § 4,—New Hampshire: The liberty of the press is
essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought, therefore, to be inviola-
bly preserved. Bill of Rights, § 22.— Vermont: That the people have aright
to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments concerning
the transactions of government; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to
be restrained. Declaration of Rights, Art. 13.—Massachusetts: The liberty
of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought not,
therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth. Declaration of Rights, Art.
16. — Rhode Island: The liberty of the press being essential to the security of
freedom in a State, any person may publish his sentiments on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both civil and
criminal, the truth, unless published from malicious motives, shall be sufficient
defence to the person charged. Art. 1, § 20, — Connecticut: No law shall ever
be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press. In all
prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence, and the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction
of the court. Art. 1, §§ 6 and 7.—New York: Every person may freely speak,
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/
* It is to be observed of these several provisions, that [*415]
they recognize certain rights as now existing, and seek to
write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libels, the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury that
the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives and
for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact. Art. 1, § 8. — New Jersey: Every person
may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being respon-
sible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge
the liberty of speech or of the press. In all prosecutions or indictments for
libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to
the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with
good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. Art. 1, § 5. —
Peniuiylvania: That the printing-presses shall be free to every person who
undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch of gov-
ernment, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free
communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man,
and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being re-
sponsible for the abuse of the liberty. In prosecutions for the publication of
papers, investigating the official conduct of officers or men in public capacity,
or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof
may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a
right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in
other cases. Art. 9, § 7, — Delaware: The press shall be free to every citizen
who undertakes to examine the official conduct of men acting in public capacity,
and any citizen may print on any such subject, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty. In prosecutions for publications investigating the proceedings of
officers, or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth
thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury may
determine the facts and the law, as in other cases. Art. 1, § 5. — Maryland:
That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen
of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write, and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege. Declaration of
Rights, Art. 40. — West Virginia: No law abridging the freedom of speech or
of the press shall be passed; but the legislature may provide for the restraint
and punishment of the publishing and vending of obscene books, papers, and
pictures, and of libel and defamation of character, and for the recovery in civil
action, by the aggrieved party, of suitable damages for such libel or defamation.
Attempts to justify and uphold an armed invasion of the State, or an organized
insurrection therein during the continuance of such invasion or insurrection, by
publicly speaking, writing, or printing, or by publishing or circulating such
writing or printing, may be by law declared a misdemeanor, and punished
accordingly. In prosecutions and civil suits for libel, the truth may be given in
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[• 416] protect and perpetuate * them, by declaring that they shall
not be abridged, or that they shall remain inviolate. They
evidence; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous
is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the verdict
shall be for the defendant. Art. 2, §§4 and 5. — Kentucky: That printing-
presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings
of the General Assembly, or any branch of the government, and no law shall
ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts
and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freelv
speak, write, and print, on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty. In all prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the offi-
cial conduct of officers or men in a public capacity, or where the matter pub-
lished is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence;
and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a right to determine the
law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases. Art. 13, §§ 9
and 10. — Tennessee: Nearly the same as Pennsylvania. Art. 1, § 19. — Ohio:
Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed
to restrain or abridge liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it
shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted.
Art. 1, § 11. —Iowa, Art. 1, § 7, and Nevada, Art. 1, § 9. Substantially same as
Ohio. — Illinois: Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel,
both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defence. Art. 2, § 4. — Indiana: No law
shall be passed restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restrict-
ing the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but for
the abuse of that right every person shall be responsible. In all prosecutions
for libel, the truth of the matters alleged to be libellous may be given in jus-
tification. Art. 1, §§ 9 and 10. — Michigan: In all prosecutions for libels, the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury
that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted. The jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the fact. Art. 6, § 25. — Wisconsin: Same as
New York. Art. 1, § 3. — Minnesota: The liberty of the press shall for ever
remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write, and publish their sen-
timents on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right. Art. 1,
§ 3. — Oregon: No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opin-
ion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject what-
ever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right. Art. 1,
§ 8. — California: Same as New York. Art. 1, § 9. — Kansas: The liberty of
the press shall be inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write, or publish
their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right;
and in all civil or criminal actions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to
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CH. XH.] LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS. * 416
do not assume to create new rights, but * their purpose is [* 417]
to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of those already
the jury; and if it 6hall appear that the alleged libellous matter was published
for justifiable ends, the accused party shall be acquitted. Bill of Rights, § 11.
— Missouri: That the free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the
invaluable rights of man; and that every person may freely speak, write, and
print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; that in all
prosecutions for libel, the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the jury
may determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court. Art. 1,
§27. — Nebraska: Same as New York. Art. 1, § 3. — Arkansas: The liberty
of the press shall for ever remain inviolate. The free communication of thoughts
and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and all persons may freely
speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of such right. In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth may be
given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter
charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifi-
able ends, the party shall be acquitted. Art. 1, § 2.—Florida: Every person
may freely speak and write his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right, and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for
libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it appear that the
matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives, the
party shall be acquitted or exonerated. Declaration of Rights, § 10. — Georgia:
Freedom of speech, and freedom of the press, are inherent elements of political
liberty. But while every citizen may freely speak or write or print on any
subject, he shall be responsible for the abuse of the liberty. Art. 1, § 9.—
Louisiana: The press shall be free; every citizen may freely speak, write, and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this
liberty. Title 1, Art. 4. — North Carolina: The freedom of the press is one of
the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore ought never to be restrained; but
every individual shall be held responsible for the abuse of the same. Declaration
of Rights, § 20. — South Carolina: All persons may freely speak, write, and
publish their sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; and no laws shall be enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech
or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the
official conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or when the matter pub-
lished is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evi-
dence; and in all indictments for libel the jury shall be judges of the law and the
facts. Art. 1, §§ 7 and 8. — Alabama: That any citizen may speak, write, and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty. That in prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the
official conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or when the matter published
is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence;
and that in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine
the law and the facts, under the direction of the court. Art. 1, §§ 6 and 13. —
Mississippi: The freedom of speech and of the press shall be held sacred; and
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possessed. Wo are at once, therefore, turned back from these pro-
visions to the pre-existing law, in order that we may ascertain what
the rights are which are thus protected, and what is the extent of
the privileges they undertake to assure.
At the common law, however, it will be found that liberty of the
press was neither well protected nor well denned. The art of print-
ing, in the hands of private persons, has, until within a compar-
atively recent period, been regarded rather as an instrument of
mischief, which required the restraining hand of the government,
than as a power for good, to be fostered and encouraged. Like a
vicious beast it might be made useful if properly harnessed and
restrained. The government assumed to itself the right to deter-
mine what might or might not be published; and censors
[* 418] were appointed * without whose permission it was criminal
to publish a book or paper upon any subject. Through all
the changes of government, this censorship was continued until
after the Revolution of 1688, and there are no instances in English
history of more cruel and relentless persecution than for the pub-
lication of books which now would pass unnoticed by the author-
ities. To a much later day the press was not free to publish even
the current news of the day where the government could suppose
itself to be interested in its suppression. Many matters, the pub-
lication of which now seems important to the just, discreet, and
harmonious working of free institutions, and to the proper obser-
vation of public officers by those interested in the discharge of
their duties, were treated by the public authorities as offences
against good order, and contempts of their authority. By a fiction
not very far removed from the truth, the Parliament was supposed
in all indictments for libel, the jury shall determine the law and the facts, under
the direction of the court. Art. 1, §4. — Texas: Every citizen shall be at lib-
erty to speak, write, or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for
the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the lib-
erty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers,
investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity, or when
the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be
given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in
other cases. Art. 1, §§ 5 and 6. — Virginia: That the freedom of the press is
one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic
governments, and any citizen may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. Art. 1, § 14.
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to sit with closed doors. No official publication of its debates was
provided for, and no other was allowed.1 The brief sketches which
found their way into print were usually disguised under the garb
of discussions in a fictitious parliament, held in a foreign country.
Several times the Parliament resolved that any such publication,
or any intermeddling by letter-writers, was a breach of their priv-
ileges, and should be punished accordingly on discovery of the
offenders. For such a publication in 1747 the editor of the " Gen-
tleman's Magazine" was brought to the bar of the House of
Commons for reprimand, and only discharged on expressing his
contrition. The general publication of Parliamentary debates
dates only from the American Revolution, and even then was still
considered a technical breach of privilege.2
The American Colonies followed the practice of the. parent coun-
try.3 Even the laws were not at first published for general circu-
lation, and it seemed to be thought desirable by the magistrates
to keep the people in ignorance of the precise boundary
* between that which was lawful and that which was pro- [* 419]
hibited, as more likely to make them avoid all doubtful
actions. The magistrates of Massachusetts, when compelled by
public opinion to suffer the publication of general laws in 1649,
1 In 1641, Sir Edward Deering was expelled and imprisoned for publishing a
collection of his own speeches, and the book was ordered to be burned by the
common hangman. See May's Const. Hist. p. 7.
* See May's Constitutional History, p. 7, 9, and 10, for a complete account
of the struggle between the government and the press, resulting at last in the
complete enfranchisement and protection of the latter in the publication of all
matters of public interest, and in the discussion of public affairs. Freedom to
report proceedings and debates was due at last to Wilkes, who, worthless as he
was, proved a great public benefactor in his obstinate defence of liberty of the
press and security from arbitrary search and arrest. A fair publication of a
debate is now held to be privileged; and comments on public legislative proceed-
ings are not actionable, so long as a jury shall think them honest and made in a
fair spirit, and such as are justified by the circumstances. Wason v. Walter,
Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 73.
'The General Court of Massachusetts "appointed two persons, in October,
1662, licensers of the press, and prohibited the publishing any books or papers
which should not be supervised by them, and in 1668 the supervisors having
allowed of the printing 1 Thomas a Kempis de imitatione Christi,' the court inter-
posed, ' it being wrote by a popish minister, and containing some things less safe
to be infused among the people,' and therefore they commended to the licensers
a more full revisal, and ordered the press to stop in the mean time." 1 Hutchin-
son's Mass. 257, 2d ed.
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* 419 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. in.
permitted it under protest, as a hazardous experiment. For pub-
lishing the laws of one session in Virginia, in 1682, the printer
was arrested and put under bonds until the king's pleasure could
be known, and the king's pleasure was declared that no printing
should be allowed in the Colony.1 There were not wanting in-
stances of the public burning of books, as offenders against good
order. Such was the fate of Elliot's book in defence of unmixed
principles of popular freedom,2 and Calef's book against Cotton
Mather, which was given to the flames at Cambridge.3 A single
printing-press was introduced into the Colony so early as 1640;
but the publication even of State documents did not become free
until 1719, when, after a quarrel between Governor Shute and the
House, he directed that body not to print one of their remon-
strances, and, on their disobeying, sought in vain to procure the
punishment of their printer.4 When Dongan was sent out as
Governor of New York in 1683, he was expressly instructed to
suffer no printing,5 and that Colony obtained its first press in 1692,
through a Philadelphia printer being driven thence for publishing
an address from a Quaker, in which he accused his brethren in
office of being inconsistent with their principles in exercising polit-
ical authority.6 So late as 1671, Governor Berkley of Virginia
expressed his thankfulness that neither free schools nor printing
were introduced in the Colony, and his trust that these breeders
of disobedience, heresy, and sects, would long be unknown.'
The public bodies of the united nation did not at once invite
publicity to their deliberations. The Constitutional Convention of
1787 sat with closed doors, and although imperfect reports of the
debates have since been published, the injunction of secrecy upon
its members was never removed.
The Senate for a time followed this example, and the
[*420] first open * debate was had in 1793, on the occasion of the
controversy over the right of Mr. Gallatin to a seat in that
1 1 Hildreth, History of the United States, 561.
• 1 Hutchinson's Mass. (2d ed.) 211; 2 Bancroft, 73; 1 Hildreth, 452; 2
Palfrey's New England, 511, 512.
'1 Bancroft, 97; 2 Hildreth, 166.
4 2 Hildreth, 298.
'2 Hildreth, 77.
6 2 Hildreth, 171.
7 1 Hildreth, 626; 2 Hen. Stat. 517; Wise's Seven Decades of the Union,
310.
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CH. XII.] LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS. * 420
body.1 The House of Representatives sat with open doors from
the first, tolerating the presence of reporters, — over whose admis-
sion, however, the Speaker assumed control, — and refusing iu
1796 the pittance of two thousand dollars for full publication of
debates.
It must be evident from these brief references that liberty of the
press, as now understood and enjoyed, is of very recent origin;a
and commentators seem to be agreed in the opinion that the term
itself means only that liberty of publication without the previous
permission of the government, which was obtained by the abolition
of the censorship. In a strict sense, Mr. Hallam says, it consists
merely in exemption from a licenser.3 A similar view is expressed
by De Lolme. "Liberty of the press," he says, " consists in this:
that neither courts of justice, nor any other judges whatever, are
authorized to take notice of writings intended for the press, but
are confined to those which are actually printed."4 Blackstone
also adopts the same opinion,6 and it has been followed by Ameri-
can commentators of standard authority as embodying correctly
the idea incorporated in the constitutional law of the country by
the provisions in the American Bills of Rights.0
It is conceded on all sides that the common-law rules that sub-
jected the libeller to responsibility for the private injury, or the
public scandal or disorder occasioned by his conduct, are not
abolished by the protection extended to the press in our constitu-
tions. The words of Ch. J. Parker of Massachusetts on this sub-
ject have been frequently quoted, generally recognized as sound
1 "This broke the spell of deliberations in secret conclave; and a few days
afterwards, on the 20th of the same month, a general resolution was adopted by
the Senate, that, after the end of the present annual session, its proceedings in
its legislative capacity should be with open doors, unless in special cases which,
in the judgment of the body, should require secrecy." Life of Madison, by
Rives, Vol. 3, p. 371.
The first legislative body in America to throw open its debates to the publio
was the General Court of Massachusetts, in 1766, on the motion of Otis. Tudor's
Life of Otis, 252.
* It is mentioned neither in the English Petition of Rights nor in the Bill of
Rights; of so little importance did it seem to those who were seeking to redress
grievances in those days.
3 Hallam's Const. Hist, of England, c. 15.
* De Lolme, Const, of England, 254.
* 4 Bl. Com. 151.
'Story on Const. § 1889; 2 Kent, 17 et seq.; Rawle on Const, c. 10.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
in principle, and accepted as authority. "Nor does our constitu-
tion or declaration of rights," he says, speaking of his own State,
"abrogate the common law in this respect, as some have insisted.
The sixteenth article declares that' liberty of the press is essential
to the security of freedom in a State; it ought not therefore to be
restrained in this Commonwealth.' The liberty of the
[* 421] press, not its licentiousness: * this is the construction
which a just regard to the other parts of that instrument,
and to the wisdom of those who founded it, requires. In the
eleventh article it is declared that every subject of the Common-
wealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the
laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property, or character; and thus the general declaration in the
sixteenth article is qualified. Besides, it is well understood and
received as a commentary on this provision for the liberty of the
press, that it was intended to' prevent all such previous restraint!
upon publications as had been practised by other governments, and
in early times here, to stifle the efforts of patriots towards enlight-
ening their fellow-subjects upon their rights and the duties of
rulers. The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he
who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse; like the
right to keep fire-arms, which does not protect him who uses them
for annoyance or destruction." 1
But while we concede that liberty of speech and of the press does
not imply complete exemption from responsibility for every thing
a citizen may say or publish, and complete immunity to ruin the
reputation or business of others so far as falsehood and detraction
may be able to accomplish that end, it is nevertheless believed that
the mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is
secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to
be uttered orally there can be no previous censorship, and the
liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion,
and the phrase itself a byword if, while every man was at liberty
to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might neverthe-
less punish him for harmless publications.
An examination of the controversies which have grown out of
1 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 313. See charge of Chief Justice
McKean of Penn., 5 Hililreth, 166 ; Wharton's State Trials, 323; State r. Letire,
2 Rep. Const. Court, 809; Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates, 267.
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LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS.
the repressive measures resorted to for the purpose of restraining
the free expression of opinion will sufficiently indicate the purpose
of the guaranties which have since been secured against such
restraints in the future. Except so far as those guaranties relate
to the mode of trial, and are designed to secure to every accused
person the right to be judged by the opinion of a jury upon the
criminality of his act, their purpose has evidently been to protect
parties in the free publication of matters of public con-
cern, to * secure their right to a free discussion of public [* 422]
events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at
any time to bring the government and any person in authority to
the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct
in the exercise of the authority which the people have conferred
upon them. To guard against repressive measures by the several
departments of the government, by means of which persons in
power might secure themselves and their favorites from just scru-
tiny and condemnation, was the general purpose; and there was
no design or desire to modify the rules of the common law which
protected private character from detraction and abuse, except so
far as seemed necessary to secure to accused parties a fair trial.
The evils to be guarded against were not the censorship of the
press merely, but any action of the government by means of which
it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters
as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelli-
gent exercise of their rights as citizens.
The constitutional liberty of speech and of the press, as we un-
derstand it, implies a right to freely utter and publish whatever
the citizen may please, and to be protected against any respon-
sibility for so doing, except so far as such publications, from their
blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public
offence, or as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously
affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals.
Or, to state the same thing in somewhat different words, we under-
stand liberty of speech and of the press to imply not only liberty to
publish, but complete immunity from legal censure and punishment
for the publication, so long as it is not harmful in its character,
when tested by such standards as the law affords. For these stand-
ards we must look to the common-law rules which were in force
when the constitutional guaranties were established, and in refer-
ence to which they have been adopted.
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* 422 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XII.
At i he common law an action would lie against any person pub-
lishing a false and malicious communication tending to disgrace or
injure anothep. Falsehood, malice, and injury were the elements
of the action; but as the law presumed innocence of crime or mis-
conduct until the contrary was proved, the falsity of an injurious
publication was presumed until its truth was averred and substan-
tiated by the defendant; and if false, malice in the publication was
also presumed unless the publication was privileged under rules to
be hereafter stated. There were many cases, also, where
[* 423] the law presumed injury, and did not call upon the * com-
plaining party to make any other showing that he was
damnified than such implication as arose from the character of the
communication itself. If it accused him of a criminal offence,
involving moral turpitude, and such as would subject a party
proved guilty of it to punishment by imprisonment;1 if it charged
him with an infectious disease, the effect of the charge, if believed,
being to exclude him from the society of his fellows;2 if the charge
affected the party in his business, office, or means of livelihood, like
1 Alexander v. Alexander, 9 Wend. 141; Wagaman p. Byers, 17 Md. 183;
Castlebcry v. Kelly, 26 Geo. 606; Redway v. Gray, 31 Vt. 292; Hoag p. Hatch,
23 Conn. 585; Burton v. Burton, 3 Greene (Iowa), 316; Wright v. Paige, 36
Barb. 438 ; Simmons v. Holster, 13 Minn. 219. But the charge must be unequiv-
ocal. Van Rensselaer v. Dole, 1 Johns. Cas. 279; Dexter v. Taber, 12 Jobn».
239; Hopkins p. Beedle, 1 Caines, 347; Butterfield v. Buffam, 9 N. H. 156;
Holt v. Scolefield, 6 T. R. 691; Jacobs v. Fyler, 3 Hill, 572; Crone v. Angell,
14 Mich. 340; Bonner v. McPhail, 31 Barb. 106; Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt.536;
Wilson v. Noonan, 23 Wis. 105; Simmons p. Holster, 13 Min. 249. Though it
is not necessary that technical words be employed; if the necessary inference,
taking the words together, is a charge of crime, it is sufficient. Morgan v. Liv-
ingston, 2 Rich. 573; True v. Plumley, 36 Me. 466; Curtis v. Curtis, 10 Bing.
477. It is not essential that the charge should be such as, if true, to subject the
party novo to punishment. It is the disgrace attending the charge that gives the
right of action, and therefore to say that the person is a returned convict is
actionable. Baum v. Clause, 5 Hill, 196; Smith v. Stewart, 5 Penn. St. 372;
Utley p. Campbell, 5 T. B. Monp. 396; Holley p. Burgess, 9 Ala. 728. Or to
accuse him of a crime for which prosecution would be barred by statute of limi-
tations would be actionable. Van Ankin v. Westfall, 14 Johns. 233; Poe c.
Grever, 3 Sneed, 664; Stewart v. Howe, 17 1ll. 71. It has been held that to
charge a man with a purely military offence, v. g., desertion, is not actionable
per se. Hollingsworth p. Shaw, 19 Ohio, N. s. 480; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 411.
'Carlslake v. Mapledorum, 2 T. R. 473; Bloodworth p. Gray, 7 M. & G. 334;
Nichols v. Guy, 2 Iud. 82; Watson v. McCarthy, 2 Kelly, 57.
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CH. XII.] LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS. * 423
charging a trader with insolvency, and the like ;1 or if any injuri-
ous charge holding a party up to public contempt, scorn, or ridicule
was propagated by printing, writing, signs, burlesques, &c.,2— the
law presumed injury, and the charge was said to be actionable per
se. And although it was formerly held that to charge a female
verbally witli want of chastity was not actionable without proof of
special damage,3 yet of late a disposition has been exhibited
to * break away from this rule in favor of one more just [*424]
and sensible,4 and the statutes of several of the States
have either made adultery and incontinence punishable as crimes,
whereby to charge them becomes actionable per se under the com-
mon-law rule, or else in express terms have declared such a charge
actionable without proof of special damage.6
1 Lindsey v. Smith, 7 Johns. 360; Thomas p. Croswell, 7 Johns. 264; Riggs
v. Denniston, 8 Johns. Cas. 198; Fonvard p. Adams, 7 Wend. 204; Sanderson
e. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 398; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 105.
• Janson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 748; Van Ness v. Hamilton, 19 Johns. 367; Clegg
r. Laffer, 10 Bing. 250; Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214.
3 Gascoign v. Ambler, 2 Ld. Raym. 1004; Graves v. Blanchet, 2 Salk. 696;
Wilby v. Elston, 8 C. B. 142; Buys v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. 115; Brooker v. Coffin,
5 Johns. 188; Bradt v. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253; Dyer v. Morris, 4 Mo. 214;
Stanfield v. Boyer, 6 H. & J. 248; Woodbury v. Thompson, 3 N. H. 194; Berry
v. Carter, 4 Stew. & Port. 387; Elliot v. Ailsbury, 2 Bibb, 473; Linney v.
Malton, 13 Texas, 449; Underbill v. Welton, 32 Vt. 40.
* See the cases of Sexton p. Todd, Wright, 317; Wilson p. Runyan, ib. 671; ■
Malone v. Stewart, 15 Ohio, 319; Moberly p. Preston, 8 Mo. 402; Sidgreaves
v. Myatt, 22 Ala. 617; Terry v. Bright, 4 Md. 430; Spencer p. McMasters,
16 111. 405.
5 See Frisbie v. Fowler, 2 Conn. 707; Miller p. Parish, 8 Pick. 384; Robbins
v. Fletcher, 101 Mass. 115; Pledger v. Hitchcock, 1 Kelley, 550; Smally v.
Anderson, 2 T. B. Monr. 56; Williams v. Bryant, 4 Ala. 44; Dailey v. Reynolds,
4 Greene (Iowa), 354; Symonds p. Carter, 32 N. H. 458; McBrayer v. Hill,
4Ired. 136; Morris v. Barkley, 1 Lit 64; Phi lips r. Wiley, 2 Lit. 153; Watts
t. Greenlee, 2 Dev. 115; Drummond p. Leslie, 5 Blackf. 453; Worth v. Butler,
7 Blackf. 251; Richardson p. Roberts, 23 Geo. 215; Buford p. Wible, 32 Perm.
St. 95; Freeman v. Price, 2 Bailey, 115; Regnier p. Cabot, 2 Gil. 34; Ranger
». Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78; Adams p. Rankin, 1 Duvall, 58; Downing p. Wilson,
86 Ala. 717; Cox v. Bunker, Morris, 269; Smith p. Silence, 4 Iowa, 321; Tru-
man p. Taylor, ib. 424; Beardsley v. Bridgeman, 17 Iowa, 242; Patterson p.
Wilkinson, 55 Me. 45. The injustice of the common-law rule is made prominent
'n those cases where it has been held that an allegation that, in conseiuence of
the charge, the plaintiff had fallen into disgrace, contempt, and infamy, and lost
her credit, reputation, and peace of mind (Woodbury v. Thompson, 3 N. H.
194), and that she is shunned by her neighbors (Beach p. Ranney, 2 Hill, 310),
was not a sufficient allegation of special damage to support the action.
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* 424 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XII.
But in any other case a party complaining of a false, malicious,
and disparaging communication might maintain an action therefor,
on averment and proof of special damage;1 though the truth of the
charge, if pleaded and established, was generally a complete de-
fence.2
In those cases in which the injurious charge was propagated by
printing, writing, signs, burlesques, &c, there might also be a
criminal prosecution, as well as a suit for private damages. The
criminal prosecution was based upon the idea that the tendency of
such publications was to excite to a breach of the public peace;3
and it might be supported in cases where the injurious publication
related to whole classes or communities of people, without singling
out any single individual so as to entitle him to a private remedy.4
1 Kelley v. Partington, 3 Nev. & M. 116; Steele ». Southwick, 9 Johns. 214;
Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630; Powers v. Dubois, 17 Wend. 63; Weed v. Foster,
11 Barb. 203; Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio, 347; Stone r. Cooper, 2 Denio, 293.
The damage, however, must be of a pecuniary character. Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill,
309. But very slight damage has been held sufficient to support considerable
recoveries. Williams t>. Hill, 19 Wend. 305; Bradt p. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253;
Olmsted o. Miller, 1 Wend. 506; Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 39; Knight t>.
Gibbs, 1 Ad. & El. 43.
* See 1 Hilliard on Torts, 410; Heard on Libel and Slander, § 151; Towns-
end on Libel and Slander, § 73.
• Commonwealth r. Clap, 4 Mass. 168.
4 In Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 214, suit was brought against a town for
the destruction of a printing press by a mob. The defence was, that plaintiff
had caused the mob by libellous articles published in his paper reflecting upon the
army. Smith, J., says: "The first of these articles charges the United States'
forces in Virginia with cowardice, and holds them up as objects of ridicule there-
for. The fourth article calls the army a ' mob ;1 and although the charges of mur-
der and robbery may perhaps be considered as limited in their application, the
charge of cowardice against the whole army is repeated. The fifth article in
effect charges those bodies of soldiers who passed through, or occupied, Hampton,
Martinsburg, Fairfax, or Germantown, with improper treatment of persons of all
ages and sexes, in each of those places. If such charges had been made against
a single soldier named in the articles, they would prima facie have constituted a
libel. The tendency to expose him to contempt or ridicule could not be doubted,
and the tendency to injure his professional reputation would be equally apparent.
A soldier's character for courage or discipline is as essential to his good stand-
ing as a merchant's reputation for honesty, or a physician's reputation as to pro-
fessional learning or skill, would be in their respective callings. And by military
law, to which the soldier is amenable, we suppose cowardice would be regarded
a crime punishable by severe penalties. As these charges were made against a
body of men, without specifying individuals, it may be that no individual soldier
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/
On similar grounds to publish injurious charges against a
foreign * prince or ruler was also held punishable as a pub- [* 425]
could have maintained a private action therefor. But the question whether the
publication might not afford ground for a public prosecution is entirely different.
Civil suits for libel are maintainable only on the ground that the plaintiff has indi-
vidually suffered damage. Indictments for libel are sustained principally because
the publication of a libel tends to a breach of the peace, and thus to the disturb-
ance of society at large. It is obvious that a libellous attack on a body of men,
though no individuals be pointed out, may tend as much, or more, to create public
disturbances as an attack on one individual; and a doubt has been suggested
whether ' the fact of numbers defamed does not add to the enormity of the act.'
See 2 Bishop on Criminal Law, 3d ed. § 922; Holt on Libel, 216-47; Russell on
Crimes, 1st Am. ed. 305-332. In Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns. 47.r>, where a
majority of the court held that a civil action could not be maintained by an
officer of a regiment, for a publication reflecting on the officers generally, unless
there was an averment of special damage, Thompson, Ch. J., said, p. 478: 'The
offender, in such case, does not go without punishment. The law has provided
a fit and proper remedy, by indictment; and the generality and extent of such
libels make them more peculiarly public offences.' In Ryckman v. Di lavan, 25
Wend. 180, Walworth, Chancellor, — who held, in opposition to the majority of
the Court of Errors, that the plaintiff could not maintain a civil suit, because the
publication reflected upon a class of individuals, and not upon the plaintiff per-
sonally, — said, pp. 195-90: 'There are many cases in the books where the writers
and publishers of defamatory charges, reflecting upon the conduct of particular
classes or bodies of individuals, have been proceeded against by indictment or
information, although no particular one was named or designated therein to whom
the charge had a personal application. All those causes, however, whi ther the libel
is upon an organized body of men, a legislature, a court of justice, a church, or a
company of soldiers, or upon a particular class of individuals, proceed upon the
ground that the charge is a misdemeanor, although it has no particular personal
application to the individual of the body or class libelled; because it tends to
excite the angry passions of the community either in favor of or against the body
or class in reference to the conduct of which the charge is made, or because it
tends to impair the confidence of the people in their government or in the admin-
istration of its laws.' In the course of his opinion, the Chancellor mentions a
Scotch case (Shearlock p. Beardsworth, 1 Murray's Report of Jury Cases) where
a civil suit was maintained, which was ' brought by a lieutenant-colonel, in behalf
of his whole regiment, for defamation, in calling them a regiment of cowards and
blackguards.' In Rex v. Hector Campbell, King's Bench, Hil. Term, 1808
(cited in Holt on Libel, 249, 250), an information was granted for a libel on the
college of physicians; and the respondent was convicted and sentenced. Cases
may be supposed where publications, though of a defamatory nature, have such
a wide and general application that, in all probability, a breach of the peace would
not be caused thereby; but it does not seem to us that the present publication
belongs to that class.
'* Our conclusion is that the jury should have been instructed that the first,
32 [ 497 ]
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lie offence, because tending to embroil the two nations, and to di'
turb tbe peace of the world.1 These common-law rules are wible-
some, and are still in force.
We are not so much concerned, however, with the general rules
pertaining to the punishment of injurious publications, as with
those special cases where, for some reason of general public policy,
the publication is claimed to be privileged, and where, consequently,
it may be supposed to be within the constitutional protection. It
has alway been held, notwithstanding the general rule that malice
is to be inferred from a false and injurious publication, that there
were some cases to which the presumption would not apply, and
where a private action could not be maintained without proof of
express malice. These are the cases which are said to be privi-
leged. The term " privileged," as applied to a communication
alleged to be libellous, means generally that the circumstances
under which it was made were such as to rebut the legal inference
of malice, and to throw upon the plaintiff the burden of offering
some evidence of its existence beyond the mere falsity of the
charge.2 The cases falling within this classification are those in
which a party has a duty to discharge which requires that he should
be allowed to speak freely and fully that which he believes; where
he is himself directly interested in the subject-matter of the
communication, and makes it with a view to the protection or
advancement of his own interest, or where he is communicating
confidentially with a person interested in the communication, and
by way of advice or admonition.3 Many such cases suggest tliein-
fourth, and fifth, articles •were prima facie libellous; and that the publication of
those articles must be regarded as ' illegal conduct,' unless justified or excused
by facts sufficient to constitute a defence to an indictment for libel."
1 27 State Trials, 627; 2 May, Const. History of England, c. 9.
* Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 373, per Selden, J.; Townsend on Libel and
Slander, § 20!>.
3 "When a communication is made in confidence, either by or to a person
interested in the communication, supposing it to be true, or by way of admoni-
tion or advice, it seems to be a general rule that malice (t. e., express malice) is
essential to the maintenance of an action." 1 Starkie on Slander, 321. See
Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & Bl. 344; Somerville v. Hawkins, 10 C. B. 589; Wright
c. Woodgate, 2 Cr. M. & R. 573; Whiteley v. Adams, 15 C. B. n. s. 392. A
paper signed by a number of parties agreeing to join in the expense of prosecut-
ing others, who were stated therein to have "robbed and swindled " them, is
privileged. Klinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 360.
[ 498 J
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LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS. * 425
1 selves which are purely of private concern: such as answers to
inquiries into the character or conduct of one formerly employed
by the person to whom the inquiry is addressed, and of whom the
information is sought with a view to guiding the inquirer in his
own action in determining upon employing the same per-
son ;1 answers to inquiries by one tradesman of another * as [* 426]
to the solvency of a person whom the inquirer has been
desired to trust;2 answers by a creditor to inquiries regarding the
conduct and dealings of his debtor, made by one who had become
surety for the debt;3 communications from an agent to his prin-
cipal, reflecting injuriously upon the conduct of a third person in
a matter connected with the agency;i communications to a near
relative respecting the character of a person with whom the relative
is in negotiation for marriage;5 and as many more like cases as
would fall within the same reasons.6 The rules of law applicable
1 Pattison v. Jones, 8 B. & C. 578; Elara v. Badger, 23 111. 498; Bradley v.
Heath, 12 Pick. 163. Compare Fryer v. Kinnersley, 15 C. B. n. s. 422.
* Smith v. Thomas, 2 Bing. (N. C.) 372; Story o. Challands, 8 C. & P. 234.
But the reports of a mercantile agency to its customers are not privileged.
Taylor v. Church, 8 N. Y. 452; Stroderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188; s. c.
7 Am. Rep. 322. Compare Beardsley v. Tappan, 5 Blatch. 497.
3 Dunman v. Bigg, 1 Campb. 269, note.
* Washburn v. Cooke, 3 Denio, 110. See Easley v. Moss, 9 Ala. 266.
6 Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88. But there is no protection to such a com-
munication from a stranger. Joannes v. Bennett, 5 Allen, 170.
8 As to whether a stranger volunteering to give information injurious to
another, to one interested in the knowledge, is privileged in so doing, see Cox-
head v. Richards, 2 M., G. & S. 569; and Bennett v. Deacon, ib. 628. Where
a confidential relation of any description exists between the parties, the commu-
nication is privileged; as where the tenant of a nobleman had written to inform
him of his gamekeeper's neglect of duty. Cockagne v. Hodgkisson, 5 C. & P.
543. Where a son-in-law wrote to warn his mother-in-law of the bad character
of a man she was about to marry. Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88. Where a
banker communicated with his correspondent concerning a note sent to him for
collection; the court saying that "all that is necessary to entitle such communi-
cation to be privileged is, that the relation of the parties should be such as to
afford reasonable ground for supposing an innocent motive for giving the infor-
mation, and to deprive the act of the appearance of officious intermeddling with
the affairs of others." Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 375. Where one commu-
nicated to an employer his suspicions of dishonest conduct in a servant towards
himself. Amann v. Damm, 8 C. B. n. 8. 597. Where a tradesman published in
a newspaper that his servant had left his employ, and taken upon himself to col-
lect the tradesman's bills. Hatch v. Lane, 105 Mass. 394.
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to these cases are very well settled, and are not likely to be changed
with a view to greater stringency.1
Libels upon the Government.
At the common law it was indictable to publish any thing against
the constitution of the country, or the established system of gov-
ernment. The basis of such a prosecution was the tendency of
publications of this character to excite disaffection with the govern-
ment, and thus induce a revolutionary spirit. The law
[* 427] always, * however, allowed a calm and temperate discus-
sion of public events and measures, and recognized in
every man a right to give every public matter a candid, full, and
free discussion. It was only when a publication went beyond this,
and tended to excito tumult, that it became criminal.2 It cannot
be doubted, however, that the common-law rules on this subject
were administered in many cases with great harshness, and that
the courts, in the interests of repression and at the instigation of
the government, often extended them to cases not within their
reasons. This was especially true during the long and bloody
struggle with France, at the close of the last and beginning of the
present century, and for a few subsequent years, until a rising
public discontent with political prosecutions began to lead to
acquittals, and finally to abandonment of all such attempts to
restrain the free expression of sentiments on public affairs. Such
prosecutions have now altogether ceased in England. Like the
censorship of the press, they have fallen out of the British consti-
tutional system. "When the press errs, it is by the press itself
that its errors are left to be corrected. Repression has ceased to
be the policy of rulers, and statesmen have at length realized the
wise maxim of Lord Bacon, that ' the punishing of wits enhances
their authority, and a forbidden writing is thought to be a certain
spark of truth that flies up in the faces of them that seek to tread
it out.'"3
1 See further, Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & Bl. 344; Shipley v. Todbunter, 7 C.
& P. 680; Lawler v. Earle, 5 Allen, 22; Grimes v. Coyle, 6 B. Monr. 301;
Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa, 302; Gosslin v. Cannon, 1 Harr. 3; Joannes v. Ben-
nett, 5 Allen, 169; State c. Buruham, 9 N. H. 34.
! Regina v. Collins, 9 C. & P. 456, per Liltledale, J. See the proceedings
against Thomas Paine, 27 State Trials, 357.
3 May, Constitutional History, c. 10.
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CH. XII.] LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS. * 427
We shall venture to express a doubt if the common-law princi-
ples on this subject can be considered as having been practically
adopted in the American States. It is certain that no prosecutions
could now be maintained in the United States courts for libels on
the general government, since those courts have no common-law
jurisdiction,1 and there is now no statute, and never was except
during the brief existence of the Sedition Law, which assumed to
confer any such power.
The Sedition Law was passed during the administration of the
elder Adams, when the fabric of government was still new and
untried, and when many men seemed to think that the breath of
heated party discussions might tumble it about their heads. Its
constitutionality was always disputed by a large party, and its
impolicy was beyond question. It had a direct tendency to pro-
duce the very state of things it sought to repress; the
prosecutions * under it were instrumental, among other [* 428]
things, in the final overthrow and destruction of the party
by which it was adopted, and it is impossible to conceive, at the
present time, of any such state of things as would be likely to bring
about its re-enactment, or the passage of any similar repressive
statute.2
When it is among the fundamental principles of the government
that the people frame their own constitution, and that in doing so
they reserve to themselves the power to amend it from time to time,
as the public sentiment may change, it is difficult to conceive of any
sound principle on which prosecutions for libels on the system of
government can be based, except when their evident intent and
purpose is to excite rebellion and civil war.3 It is very easy to lay
down a rule for the'discussion of constitutional questions; that
they are privileged, if conducted with calmness and temperance,
and that they are not indictable unless they go beyond the bounds
1 United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32. See, ante, 19, and cases cited in
note.
2 For prosecutions under this law, see Lyon's Case, Wharton's State Trials,
833; Cooper's Case, t'6. 659; Has well's Case, ib. 684; Calender's Case, ib. 688.
And see 2 Randall, Life of Jefferson, 417-421; 5 Hildreth, History of United
States, 247, 365.
'The author of the Life and Times of Warren very truly remarks that " the
common-law offence of libelling a government is ignored in constitutional systems,
as inconsistent with the genius of free institutions." P. 47.
[501]
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of fair discussion. But what is calmness and temperance, and
what is fair in the discussion of supposed evils in the govern-
ment? And if something is to be allowed "for a little feeling
in men's minds," 1 how great shall be the allowance? The beat of
the discussion will generally be in proportion to the magnitude of
the evil as it appears to the party discussing it: must the question
whether he has exceeded due bounds or not, be tried by judge and
jury, who may sit under different circumstances from those under
which he has spoken, or at least after the heat of the occasion has
passed away, and who, feeling none of the excitement themselves,
may think it unreasonable that any one else should ever have felt
it? The dangerous character of such prosecutions would be the
more glaring if aimed at those classes who, not being admitted to
a share in the government, attacked the constitution in the point
which excluded them. Sharp criticism, ridicule, and the exhibi-
tion of such feeling as a sense of injustice engenders, are to be
expected from any discussion in these cases; but when the very
classes who have established the exclusion as proper and reasonable
are to try as judges and jurors the assaults made upon it,
[* 4 29J they will be very likely to enter upon the * examination
with a preconceived notion that such assaults upon their
reasonable regulations must necessarily be unreasonable. If any
such principle of repression should ever be recognized in the
common law of America, it might reasonably be anticipated that
in times of high party excitement it would lead to prosecutions
by the party in power, to bolster up wrongs and sustain abuses and
oppressions by crushing adverse criticism and discussion. The
evil, indeed, could not be of long continuance; for, judging from
experience, the reaction would be speedy, th6rough, and effectual;
but it would be no less a serious evil while it lasted, the direct
tendency of which would be to excite discontent and to breed a
rebellious spirit. Repression of full and free discussion is danger-
ous in any government resting upon the will of the people. The
people cannot fail to feel that they are deprived of rights, and will
be certain to become discontented, when their discussion of public
measures is sought to be circumscribed by the judgment of others
upon their temperance or fairness. They must be left at liberty
to speak with the freedom which the magnitude of the supposed
1 Regina v. Collins, 9 C. &. P. 460, per Littledale, J.
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wrongs appears in their minds to demand; and if they exceed all
the proper bounds of moderation, the consolation must be, that
the evil likely to spring from the violent discussion will probably
be less, and its correction by public sentiment more speedy, than
if the terrors of the law were brought to bear to prevent the dis-
cussion.
The English common-law rule which made libels on the consti-
tution or the government indictable, as it was administered by the
courts, seems to us unsuited to the condition and circumstances of
the people of America, and therefore never to have been adopted
in the several States. If we are correct in this, it would not be in
the power of the State legislatures to pass laws which should make
mere criticism of the constitution or of the measures of government
a crime, however sharp, unreasonable, and intemperate it might be.
The constitutional freedom of speech and of the press must mean a
freedom as broad as existed when the constitution which guarantees
it was adopted, and it would not be in the power of the legislature
to restrict it, unless it might be in those cases of publications inju-
rious to private character, or public morals or safety, which come
strictly within the reasons of civil or criminal liability at the
common law, but in which, nevertheless, the common law as we
have adopted it failed to provide a remedy. It certainly could not
be said that freedom of speech was violated by a law which
should * make imputing the want of chastity to a female [* 430]
actionable without proof of special damage; for the charge
is one of grievous wrong, without any reason in public policy
demanding protection to the communication, and the case is strictly
analogous to many other cases where the common law made the
party responsible for his false accusations. The constitutional
provisions do not prevent the modification of the common-law rules
of liability for libels and slanders, but they would not permit
bringing new cases within those rules when they do not rest upon
the same or similar reasons.1
1 In Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates, 267, the defendant was indicted in 1805
for-publishing the following in a public newspaper: "A democracy is scarcely
tolerated at any period of national history. Its omens are always sinister, and
its powers are unpropitious. With all the lights of experience blazing before our
eyes, it is impossible not to discover the futility of this form of government. It
was weak and wicked at Athens, it was bad in Sparta, and worse in Rome. It
has been tried in France, and terminated in despotism. It was tried in England,
[ 503 ]
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[* 481] * Criticism upon Officers and Candidates for Office.
There are certain cases where criticism upon public officers,
their actions, character, and motives, is not only recoguized as
and rejected with the utmost loathing and abhorrence. It is on its trial here,
and its issue will be civil war, desolation, and anarchy. No wise man but discerns
its imperfections, no good man but shudders at its miseries, no honest man but
proclaims its fraud, and no brave man but draws his sword against its force.
The institution of a scheme of polity so radically contemptible and vicious is a
memorable example of what the villany of some men can devise, the folly of
others receive, and both establish in spite of reason, reflection, and sensation."
Judge Yeates charged the jury, among other things, as follows: "The seventh
section of the ninth article of the constitution of the State must be our guide
upon this occasion : it forms the solemn compact between the people and the
three branches of the government, — the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers. Neither of them can exceed the limits prescribed to them respectively.
To this exposition of the public will every branch of the common law and of our
municipal acts of assembly must conform; and if incompatible therewith, they
must yield and give way. Judicial decisions cannot weigh against it when re-
pugnant thereto. It runs thus: 'The printing-presses shall be free to every per-
son who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch
of the government; and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof.
The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights
of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In prosecutions for the publication of
papers, investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity,
or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof
may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a
right to determine the law and the facts under the direction of the court, as in
other cases.' Thus it is evident that legislative acts, or of any branch of the
government, are open to public discussion; and every citizen may freely speak,
write, or print on any subject, but is accountable for the abuse of that privilege.
There shall be no licensers of the press. Publish as you please in the first instance,
without control; but you are answerable both to the community and the individ-
ual if you proceed to unwarrantable lengths. No alteration is hereby made in
the law as to private men affected by injurious publications, unless the discussion
be proper for public information. But 'if one uses the weapon of truth wan-
tonly for disturbing the peace of families, he is guilty of a libel.' Per General
Hamilton, in Oroswell's Trial, p. 70. The matter published is not proper for
public information. The common weal is not interested in such a communication,
except to suppress it.
"What is the meaning of the words 'being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty,' if the jury are interdicted from deciding on the case? Who else can
constitutionally decide on it? The expressions relate to and pervade every part
of the sentence. The objection that the determinations of juries may vary at
different times, arising from their different political opinions, proves too much.
[504]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XII.] LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS.
* 432
* legitimate, but large latitude and great freedom of [* 432]
expression are permitted, so long as good faith inspires
The same matter may be objected against them when party spirit runs high, in
other criminal prosecutions. But we have no other constitutional mode of de-
cision pointed out to us, and we are bound to use the method described.
"It is no infraction of the law to publish temperate investigations of the
nature and forms of government. The day is long past since Algernon Sidney's
celebrated treatise on government, cited on this trial, was considered as a trea-
sonable libel. The enlightened advocates of representative republican govern-
ment pride themselves in the reflection that the more deeply their system is
examined, the more fully will the judgments of honest men be satisfied that it is
the most conducive to the safety and happiness of a free people. Such matters
are ' proper for public information.' But there is a marked and evident distinc-
tion between such publications and those which are plainly accompanied with a
criminal intent, deliberately designed to unloosen the social band of union, totally
to unhinge the minds of the citizens, and to produce popular discontent with the
exercise of power by the known constituted authorities. These latter writings
are subversive of all government and good order. 'The liberty of the press
consists in publishing the truth, from good motives and for justifiable ends, though
it reflects on government or on magistrates.' Per General Hamilton, in Cros-
well's Trial, pp. 63, 64. It disseminates political knowledge, and, by adding to
the common stock of freedom, gives a just confidence to every individual. But
the malicious publications which I have reprobated infect insidiously the public
mind with a subtle poison, and produce the most mischievous and alarming con-
sequences by their tendency to anarchy, sedition, and civil war. We cannot,
consistently with our official duty, declare such conduct dispunishable. We be-
lieve that it is not justified by the words or meaning of our constitution. It is
true it may not be easy in every instance to draw the exact distinguishing line.
To the jury it peculiarly belongs to decide on the intent and object of the writing.
It is their duty to judge candidly and fairly, leaning to the favorable side when
the criminal intent is not clearly and evidently ascertained.
"It remains, therefore, under our most careful consideration of the ninth
article of the Constitution, for the jury to divest themselves of all political preju-
dices (if any such they have), and dispassionately to examine the publication which
is the ground of the present prosecution. They must decide on their oaths, as
they will answer to God and their country, whether the defendant, as a factious
and seditious person, with the criminal intentions imputed to him, in order to
accomplish the objects stated in the indictment, did make and publish the writing
in question. Should they find the charges laid against them in the indictment to
he well founded, they are bound to find him guilty. They must judge for them-
selves on the plain import of the words, without any forced or strained construc-
tion of the meaning of the author or editor, and determine on the correctness
of the innuendoes. To every word they will assign its natural sense, but will col-
lect the true intention from the context, the whole piece. They will accurately
weigh the probabilities of the charge against a literary man. Consequences they
will wholly disregard, but firmly discharge their duty. Representative republican
[ 505 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 432
[CH. XII.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
the communication. There are cases where it is clearly the duty
of every one to speak freely what he may have to say concerning
public officers, or those who may present themselves for public
positions. Through the ballot-box the electors approve or con-
demn those who ask their suffrages; and if they condemn, though
upon grounds the most unjust or frivolous, the law affords no
redress. Some officers, however, are not chosen by the people
directly, but designated through some other mode of ap-
[* 433] pointment. But the public have a right to be * heard on
the question of their selection; and they have the right,
for such reasons as seem to their minds sufficient, to ask for their
dismissal afterwards. They have also the right to complain of
official conduct affecting themselves, and to petition for a redress
of grievances. A principal purpose in perpetuating and guarding
the right of petition is to insure to the public the privilege of being
heard in these and the like cases.
In a case in the Court for the Correction of Errors of the State
of New York, a party was prosecuted for a libel contained in a
petition signed by him and a number of other citizens of his
county, and presented to the council of appointment, praying for
the removal of the plaintiff from the office .of district attoruey of
the county, which, the petition charged, he was prostituting to
governments stand on immovable bases, which cannot be shaken by theoretical
systems. Yet if the consciences of the jury shall be clearly satisfied that the pub-
lication was seditiously, maliciously, and wilfully aimed at the independence of
the United States, the Constitution thereof or of this State, they should convict
the defendant. If, on the other hand, the production was honestly meant to in-
form'the public mind, and warn them against supposed dangers in society, though
the subject may have been treated erroneously, or that the censures on democracy
were bestowed on pure unmixed democracy, where the people en masse execute
the sovereign power without the medium of their representatives (agreeably to
our forms of government), as have occurred at different times in Athens, Sparta,
Rome, France, and England, then, however the judgments of the jury may in-
cline them to think individually, they should acquit the defendant. In the first
instance the act would be criminal; in the last it would be innocent. If the jury
should doubt of the criminal intention, then also the law pronounces that he
should be acquitted. 4 Burp. 2552, per Lord Mansfield." Verdict, not guilty.
The fate of this prosecution was the same that would attend any of a similar char-
acter in this country, admitting its law to be sound, except possibly in ca*es of
violent excitement, and when a jury could be made to believe that the defendant
contemplated and was laboring to produce a change of government, not by con-
stitutional means, but by rebellion and civil wap.
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private purposes. The defendant did not justify the truth of this
allegation, and the plaintiff had judgment. On error, the sole
question was, whether the communication was to be regarded as
privileged, that character having been denied it by the court
below. The prevailing opinion in the court of review character-
ized this as "a decision which violates the most sacred and
unquestionable rights of free citizens; rights essential to the very
existence of a free government; rights necessarily connected with
the relations of constituent and representative; the right of peti-
tioning for a redress of grievances, and the right of remonstrating
to the competent authority against the abuse of official functions."
And it was held that the communication was privileged, and could
not support an action for libel, unless the plaintiff could show that
the petition was malicious and groundless, and presented for the
purpose of injuring his character.1 Such a petition, it was said,
although containing false and injurious aspersions, did not prima
facie carry with it the presumption of malice.2 A similar ruling
was made by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, where a party,
was prosecuted for charges against a justice of the peace, con-
tained in a deposition made to be presented to the governor.8
The subsequent case of Howard v. Thompson 4 has enlarged this
rule somewhat, and has required of the plaintiff, in order to sus-
tain his action in any such case, to prove not only malice
in the * defendant, but also a want of probable cause for [* 434]
believing the injurious charges which the petition con-
tained. The action for libel, in such a case, it was said, was in
the nature of an action for malicious prosecution; and in that
action malice and want of probable cause are both necessary ingre-
dients. And it has also been held that in such a case the court
will neither compel the officer to whom it was addressed to pro-
duce the petition in evidence, nor will they suffer its contents to
be proved by parol.6
The rule of protection in these cases does not appear to be dis-
puted, and has been laid down in other cases coming within the
1 Thorn ». Blanchard, 5 Johns. 528, per Clinton, Senator.
* Ibid. p. 526, per VHommedieu, Senator.
» Gray e. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23.
4 21 Wend. 319. See Harris v. Harrington, 2 Tyler, 129; Bodwell v. Osgood,
3 Pick. 379.
6 Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23. See Hare v. Mellor, 3 Lev. 138.
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same reasons.1 The rule, however, is subject to this qualification,
that the petition or remonstrance must be addressed to the body
or officer having the power of appointment or removal, or the
authority to give the redress or grant the relief which is sought;
or at least that the petitioner should really and in good faith
believe he is addressing himself to an authority possessing power
in the premises.2
[* 435] * Such being the rule of privilege when one interested
in the discharge of powers of a public nature is addressing
himself to the body having the authority of appointment, super-
vision, or removal, the question arises whether the same reasons
do not require the like privilege when the citizen addresses himself
to his fellow-citizens in regard to the conduct of persons elevated
to office by their suffrages, or in regard to the character, capacity,
1 In Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Exch. 743, the defendant was prosecuted for slander
in a communication made by him to the vestry, imputing perjury to the plaintiff
as a reason why the vestry should not return him on the list of persons qualified
to serve as constables. The defendant was a parishioner, and his communication
was held privileged. In O'Donaghue v. McGovern, 23 Wend. 26, a communica-
tion from a member of a church to his bishop, respecting the character, moral
conduct, and demeanor of a clergyman of the church, was placed upon the same
footing of privilege. And see Reid v. Delorme, 2 Brev. 70 ; .Chapman v. Calder,
14 Penn. St. 365. A remonstrance to the board of excise, against the granting of
a license to the plaintiff, comes under the same rule of protection. Vanderzee r.
McGregor, 12 Wend. 545. See also Rendition v. Maltby, 1 Car. & Marsh. 402;
Woodward v. Landor, 6 C. & P. 548; Strcety v. Wood, 15 Barb. 105; Bradley
r. Heath, 12 Pick. 163.
8 This principle is recognized in all the cases referred to. See also Fairman r.
Ives, 5 B. & Aid. 642. In that case a petition addressed by a creditor of an offi-
cer in the army to the Secretary of War, bona fide and with a view of obtaining
through his interference the payment of a debt due, and containing a statement of
facts which, though derogatory to the officer's character, the creditor believed to
be true, was held not to support an action. A letter to the Postmaster-General
complaining of the conduct of a postmaster, with a view to the redress of griev-
ances, is privileged. Woodward v. Lander, 6 C. & P. 548; Cook v. Hill, 3 Sandf.
341. And a complaint to a master, charging a servant with a dishonest act which
had been imputed to the complaining party, has also been held privileged. Cow-
ard v. Wellington, 7 C. & P. 531. And see, further. Hosmer v. Loveland, 19
Barb. 111. A petition is privileged while being circulated. Vanderzee r.
McGregor, 12 Wend. 545; Streety r. Wood, 15 Barb. 105. If, however, a
petition is circulated and exhibited, but never presented, the fact that the libel-
lous charge has assumed the form of a petition will not give it protection. State
v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34. And see Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173; Van Wyek
v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190.
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or fitness of those who may present themselves, or be presented by
their friends,— which always assumes their assent,— as candidates
for public positions.
When Morgan Lewis was Governor of the State of New York,
and was a candidate for re-election, a public meeting of his oppo-
nents was called, at which an address was adopted condemning
his conduct in various particulars. Among other things, he was
charged with want of fidelity to his party, pursuing a system of
family aggrandizement in his appointments, signing the charter of
a bank with notice that it bad been procured by fraudulent prac-
tices, publishing doctrines unworthy of a chief magistrate and sub-
versive of the dearest interests of society, attempting to destroy
the liberty of the press by vexatious prosecutions, and calling out
the militia without occasion, thereby putting them to unnecessary
trouble and expense. These seem to have been the more serious
charges. The chairman of the meeting signed the address, and he
was prosecuted by the governor for the libel contained therein.
No justification was attempted upon the facts, and the Supreme
Court held the circumstances to constitute no protection in the
law. We quote from the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice
Tho7)ipson : —
"Where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification
or excuse lies on the defendent, and on failure thereof the law im-
plies a criminal intent.1 If a libel contains an imputation of a crime,
or is actionable without showing special damage, malice is, prima
facie, implied; and if the defendant claims to be exonerated, on
the ground of want of malice, it lies on him to show it was pub-
lished under such circumstances as to rebut this presumption of
law.2 The manner and occasion of the publication have been
relied on for this purpose, and in justification of the libel.
It has * not been pretended but that the address in ques- [* 436]
tion would be libellous if considered as the act of an indi-
vidual; but its being the act of a public meeting, of which the
defendant was a member, and the publication being against a
candidate for a public office, have been strenuously urged as
affording a complete justification. The doctrine contended for by
the defendant's counsel results in the position that every publica-
tion ushered forth under the sanction of a public political meeting,
1 5 Burr. 2667; I T. R. 127.
'IT. R. 110.
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against a candidate for an elective office, is beyond the reach of
legal inquiry. To such a proposition I can never yield my assent.
Although it was urged by the defendant's counsel, 1 cannot
discover any analogy whatever between the proceedings of such
meetings and those of courts of justice, or any other organized
tribunals known in our law for the redress of grievances. That
electors should have a right to assemble, and freely and openly
to examine the fitness and qualifications of candidates for public
offices, and communicate their opinions to others, is a position to
which I most cordially accede. But there is a wide difference
between this privilege and a right irresponsibly to charge a candi-
date witli direct specific and unfounded crimes. It would, iu my
judgment, be a monstrous doctrine to establish, that, when a man
becomes a candidate fur an elective office, he thereby gives to others
a right to accuse him of any imaginable crimes, with impunity.
Candidates have rights as well as electors; and those rights and
privileges must be so guarded and protected as to harmonize one
with the other. If one hundred or one thousand men, when as-
sembled together, undertake to charge a man with specific crimes,
'I see no reason why it should be less criminal than if each one
should do it individually, at different times and places. All that
is required, in the one case or the other, is, not to transcend the
bounds of truth. If a man has committed a crime, any one has a
right to charge him with it, and is not responsible for the accusa-
tion; and can any one wish for more latitude than this? Can it
be claimed a privilege to accuse ad libitum a candidate with the
most base and detestable crimes? There is nothing upon the
record showing the least foundation or pretence for the charges.
The accusations, then, being false, the prima facie presumption of
law is, that the publication was malicious; and the circumstance
of the defendant being associated with others does notjser se rebut
this presumption. How far this circumstance ought to
[* 437] affect the measure of damages * is a question not arising
on the record. It may in some cases mitigate, in others
enhance, them. Every case must necessarily, from the nature of
the action, depend upon its own circumstances, which are to be
submitted to the sound discretion of a jury. It is difficult, and
perhaps impossible, to lay down any general rule on the subject."1
1 Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1, 35. See also Curtis v. Mussey, 6 Grav, 261;
Aldrich v. Printing Co., 9 Minn. 13 5.
[510]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XII.] LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS.
*437
The difficulty one meets with in the examination of this opinion
is in satisfying himself in what manner the privileges of electors,
of which it speaks, are protected by it. It is not discovered that
the citizen who publicly discusses the qualifications and fitness of
the candidate for public office who challenges his suffrage is, by
this decision, so far as suits for recovery of private damages are
concerned, placed on any different footing in the law from that
occupied by one who drags before the public the character of a
private individual. In either case, if the publication proves to be
false, the law, it seems, attaches to it a presumption of malice.
Nothing in the occasion justifies or excuses the act in either case.
It is true it is intimated that it may lie in the sound discretion of
a jury to be moderate in the imposition of damages, but it is also
intimated that the jury would be at liberty to consider the circum-
stances of the public meeting an aggravation. There is abso-
lutely Ho privilege of discussion to the elector under such a rule;
no right to canvass the fitness of candidates beyond what exists
in other cases. Whatever reasons he may give his neighbors for
voting against a candidate, he must be prepared to support by
evidence in the courts. In criminal prosecutions, if he can prove
the truth of his charges, he may be protected in some cases where
he would not be if the person assailed was only a private individ-
ual; because in the latter case he must make a showing of a justi-
fiable occasion for uttering even the truth. But in all cases where
the matter is proper for the public information, the truth justifies
its publication.
The case above quoted has the sanction of a subsequent decision
of the Court for the Correction of Errors, which in like manner
repudiated the claim of privilege.1 The office then in question was
that of Lieutenant-Governor, and the candidate was charged in
public newspapers with habits of intoxication which unfitted him
for the position. And this last decision has since been followed as
authority by the Superior Court of New York; in a case, however,
which does not seem to be analogous, since there the gen-
eral public * was addressed in regard to a candidate for [* 438]
au office which was not elective, but was to be filled by an
appointing board.2
1 King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113.
'Hunt v. Bennett, 4 E. D. Smith, 647; s. c. 19 N. Y. 173. See Duncombe
e. Daniell, 8 C. & P. 213.
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The case of King v. Root1 will certainly strike any one as a very
remarkable one, when the evidence given in the case is considered.
The Lieutenant-Governor was charged in the public press with in-
toxication in the Senate Chamber, exhibited as he was proceeding
to take his seat as presiding officer of that body. When prosecuted
for libel, the publishers justified the charge as true, and brought
a number of witnesses who were present on the occasion, and who
testified to the correctness of the statement. There was therefore
abundant reason for supposing the charge to have been published
in the full belief in its truth. If it was true, there was abundant
reason, on public grounds, for making the publication. Neverthe-
less, the jury were of opinion that the preponderance of evidence
was against the truth of the charge, and being instructed that the
only privilege the defendants had was " simply to publish the truth,
and nothing more," and that the unsuccessful attempt at justifica-
tion — which in fact was only the forming of such an issue, and
putting in such evidence as showed the defendants had reason for
making the charge—was in itself an aggravation of the offence,
they returned a verdict for the plaintiff, with large damages.
Throughout his instructions to the jury by the judge presiding
at the trial, no privilege of discussion whatever is conceded to
the elector, springing from the relation of elector and candidate,
or of citizen and representative, but the case is considered as one
where the accusation was to be defended precisely as if no public
considerations had in any way been involved.2
The law of New York is not placed by these decisions on a foot-
ing very satisfactory to those who claim the utmost freedom of
discussion in public affairs. The courts have considered the sub-
ject as if there were no middle ground between absolute immunity
for falsehood and the application of the same strict rules which
prevail in other cases. Whether they have duly considered the
importance of publicity and discussion on all matters of general
concern in a representative government must be left to the con-
sideration of judicial tribunals, as these questions shall come be-
fore them in the future. It is perhaps safe to say that the
[* 489] general public * sentiment and the prevailing customs
allow a greater freedom of discussion, and hold the elector
1 4 Wend. 113. See the same case in the Supreme Court, 7 Cow. 613.
8 See also Onslow v. Hone, 3 Wil?. 177; Harwood v. Astlev, 1 New Rep. 47.
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less strictly to what he may be able to justify as true than is done
by these decisions.1
A much more reasonable rule — though still, we think, not
sufficiently comprehensive and liberal — was indicated by Pollock,
C. B., in a case where it was urged upon the court that a sermon,
preached but not published, was the subject of criticism in the
enlarged style of commentary which that word seems to introduce
according to the decided cases; and that the conduct of a clergy-
man with reference to the parish charity, and especially the rules
of it, justified any bona fide remarks, whether founded in truth in
point of fact, or justice in point of commentary, provided only they
were an honest and bona fide comment. "My brother Wilde," he
says, " urged upon the court the importance of this question; and
I own I think it is a question of very grave and deep importance.
He pressed upon us that, whenever the public had an interest in
such a discussion, the law ought to protect it, and work out the
public good by permitting public opinion, through the medium of
the public press, to operate upon such transactions. I am not
sure that so extended a rule is at all necessary to the public good.
I do not in any degree complain; on the contrary, I think it quite
right that all matters that are entirely of a public nature — con-
duct of ministers, conduct of judges, the proceedings of all persons
who are responsible to the public at large — are deemed to be pub-
lic property; and that all bona fide and honest remarks upon such
persons, and their conduct, may be made with perfect freedom, and
1 "Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government; when this
support is taken away, the constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny
is erected on its ruins. Republics and limited monarchies derive their strength
and vigor from a popular examination into the action of the magistrates; this
privilege in all ages has been and always will be abused. The best of men could
not escape the censure and envy of the times they lived in. Yet this evil is not so
great as it might appear at first sight. A magistrate who sincerely aims at the
good of society will always have the inclinations of a great majority on his side,
and an impartial posterity will not fail to render him justice. Those abuses of
the freedom of speech are the excesses of liberty. They ought to be repressed;
but to whom dare we commit the care of doing it? An evil magistrate, intrusted
with power to punish for words, would be armed with a weapon the most de-
structive and terrible. Under pretence of pruning off the exuberant branches,
he would be apt to destroy the tree." Franklin, Works by Sparks, Vol. II.
p. 285.
88 [ 513 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
02
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 439
[ch. rn.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
without being questioned too nicely for either truth or justice."1
But these remarks were somewhat aside from the case then before
the learned judge, and though supported by similar remarks from
his associates, yet one of those associates deemed it important to
draw such a distinction as to detract very much from the value of
this privilege. "It seems," he says, "that there is a distinction,
although I must say I really can hardly tell what the limits of it
are, between the comments on a man's public conduct and ou his
private conduct. I can understand that you have a right to com-
ment ou the public acts of a minister, upon the public acts of a
general, upon the public judgments of a judge, upon the public
skill of an actor; I can understand that; but I do not know
where the limit can be drawn distinctly between where the
[* 440] * comment is to cease, as being applied solely to a man's
public conduct, and where it is to begin as applicable to
his private character; because, although it is quite competent for
a person to speak of a judgment of a judge as being an extremely
erroneous aud foolish one, — and no doubt comments of that sort
have great tendency to make persons careful of what they say, —
and although it is perfectly competent for persons to say of an actor
that he is a remarkably bad actor, and ought not to be permitted
to perform such and such parts, because he performs them so ill,
yet you ought not to be allowed to say of an actor that he has dis-
graced himself in private life, nor to say of a judge or a minister
that he has committed felony, or any thing of that description,
which is in no way connected with his public conduct or public
judgment; and therefore there must be some limits, although I do
not distinctly see where those limits are to be drawn. No doubt,
if there are such limits, my brother Wilde is perfectly right in say-
ing that the only ground on which the verdict and damages can go
is for the excess, and not for the lawful exercise of the criticism."1
The radical defect in this rule, as it seems to us, consists in its
assumption, that the private character of a public officer is some-
thing aside from, and not entering into or influencing, his public
conduct; that a thoroughly dishonest man maybe a just minister,
and that a judge who is corrupt and debauched in private life may
1 Gathercole v. Miall, 15 M. & W. 831-333. See Commonwealth p. Clap,
4 Mass. 163, per Parsons, Ch. J.; Townsend on Libel and Slander, § 260.
* Alderson, B., same case, p. 838.
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CH. XII.] LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS. * 440
be pure and upright in his judgments; in other words, that an
evil tree is as likely as any other to bring forth good fruits. Any
such assumption is false to human nature, and contradictory to
general experience; and whatever the law may say, the general
public will still assume that a corrupt life will influence public
conduct, and that a man who deals dishonestly with his fellows as
individuals will not hesitate to defraud them in their aggregate
and corporate capacity, if the opportunity shall be given him.
They are, therefore, interested in knowing what is the character of
their public servants, and what sort of persons are offering them-
selves for their suffrages. And if this be so, it would seem that
there should be some privilege of comment; that that privilege
could only be limited by good faith and just intention; and that of
these it was the province of a jury to judge, in view of the nature
of the charges made and the reasons which existed for making
them.
Recent English cases give considerable latitude of comment to
publishers of public journals, upon subjects in the discussion of
which the public may reasonably be supposed to have an
interest, and they hold the discussions to be * privileged if [* 441]
conducted within the bounds of moderation and reason.1
1 In Kelley v. Sherlock, 1 Law Rep. Q. B. 686, it was held that a sermon
commenting upon public affairs — e. g., the appointment of chaplains for prisons
and the election of a Jew for mayor — was a proper subject for comment in the
papers. And in Kelley v. Tinling, 1 Law Rep. Q. B. 699, a church-warden,
having written to the plaintiff, the incumbent, accusing him of having desecrated
the church by allowing books to be sold in it during service, and by turning the
vestry-room into a cooking-apartment, the correspondence was published without
the plaintiffs permission in the defendant's newspaper, with comments on the
plaintiff's conduct. Held, that this was a matter of public interest, which might
he made the subject of public discussion; and that the publication was therefore
not libellous, unless the language used was stronger than, in the opinion of the
jury, the occasion justified.
In Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73, the proprietor of the " London Times"
was prosecuted for comments in his paper upon a debate in the House of Lords.
The plaintiff had presented a petition to that body, charging Sir Fitzroy Kelly
with having, many years before, made a statement false to his own knowledge, in
order to deceive a- committee of the House of Commons; and praying inquiry,
and his removal from an office he held, if the charge was found true. A debate
ensued, and the charge was wholly refuted. Held, that this was a subject of
great public concern, on which a writer in a public newspaper had full right to
comment; and the occasion was therefore so far privileged that the comments
would not be actionable so long as a jury should think them honest, and made in
[ 515 ]
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And in this country it has been held that where a charge against
an officer or a candidate respects only his qualifications for the
office, and does not impugn his character, it forms no basis for a
recovery of damages. To address to the electors of a district let-
ters charging that a candidate for office is of impaired understand-
ing, and his mind weakened by disease, is presenting that subject
to "the proper and legitimate tribunal tQ try the question."
"Talents and qualifications for office are mere matters of opinion,
of which the electors are the only competent judges." 1
Statements in the Course of Judicial Proceedings.
There are some cases which are so absolutely privileged on rea-
sons of public policy, that no inquiry into motives is permitted in
an action for slander or libel. Of these, the case of a party who
is called upon to give evidence in the course of judicial proceed-
ings is a familiar illustration. No action will lie against a witness
at the suit of a party aggrieved by his false testimony, even though
malice be charged. The remedy against a dishonest witness is
confined to the criminal prosecution for perjury.2 So what a juror
may say to his fellows in the jury room while they are considering
their verdict, concerning one of the parties to the suit who has
been a witness therein, cannot be the subject of an action for
slandep.3 False accusations, however, contained in the affidavits
or other proceedings, by which a prosecution is com-
[* 442] menced for supposed crime, * or in any other papers in
the course of judicial proceedings, are not so absolutely
a fair spirit, and such as were justified by the circumstances disclosed in the
debate. The opinion by Chief Justice Cockburn is very clear and pointed, and
reviews all the previous decisions. See, further, Fairchild v. Adams, II Cash.
549; Terry p. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375.
1 Mayrant v. Richardson, 1 Nott & McCord, 348.
* But a qualification of this rule is made where what is said by the witness is
not pertinent or material to the cause, and he has been actuated by malice in
stating it. White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 166; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 504. He is not,
however, to be himself the judge of what is pertinent or material when questions
are put to him, and no objection or warning comes to him from court or counseL
Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193. See also Warner v. Paine, 2 Sandf. 195; Garr
p. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 358; Perkins v. Mitchell, SI
Barb. 461; Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126; Grove v. Brandenburg, 7 Black, 234;
Cunningham v. Brown, 18 Vt. 123; Dunlap p. Glidden, 81 Me. 435.
'Dunham v. Powers, 42 Vt. 1.
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protected. They are privileged,1 but the party making them is
liable to action, if actual malice be averred and proved.2 Prelim-
inary information, furnished with a view to set on foot an inquiry
into an alleged offence, or to institute a criminal prosecution, is,
in like manner, privileged;3 but the protection only extends to
those communications which are in the course of the proceedings
to bring the supposed offender to justice, or are designed for the
purpose of originating or forwarding such proceedings; and com-
munications not of that character are not protected, even although
judicial proceedings may be pending for the investigation of the
offence which the communication refers to.4 Still less would a
party be justified in repeating a charge of crime, after the person
charged has been examined on his complaint, and acquitted of all
guilt.5
1 Astley v. Younge, Burr. 807; Strauss v. Meyer, 48 111. 385.
• Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El. 380; Kine v. Sewell, 3 M. & W. 297;
Burlingame r. Burlingame, 8 Cow. 141; Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen, 893;
Doyle v. O'Doherty, 1 Car. & Marsh. 418; Wilson p. Collins, 5 C. & P. 373;
Home v. Bentinck, 2 Brod. & Bing. 130; Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns. 180.
In Goslin v. Cannon, 1 Harr. 3, it was held that where a crime had been com-
mitted, expressions of opinion founded upon facts within the knowledge of the
party, or communicated to him, made prudently and in confidence, to discreet
persons, and made obviously in good faith with a view only to direct their watch-
fulness, and enlist their aid in recovering the money stolen, and detecting and
bringing to justice the offender, were privileged. The cause, occasion, object,
and end, it was said, was justifiable, proper, and legal, and such as should actuate
every good citizen.
3 Grimes r. Coyle, 6 B. Monr. 301. The subject of communications privi-
leged on grounds of public policy will be found considered, at some length and
with much ability, in the recent case of Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, Law Rep. 5 C. B.
94. The publication complained of was by a military officer to his superior con-
cerning the qualifications and capacity of the plaintiff as a subordinate military
officer under him; and it was averred that the words were published by the
defendant of actual malice, and without any reasonable, probable, or justifiable
cause, and not bona fide, or in the bona fide discharge of defendant's duty as
superior officer. On demurrer, a majority of the court (Mellor and Lush, JJ.)
held the action would not lie: planting themselves, in part, on grounds of public
policy, and in part, also, on the fact that the military code provided a remedy
for wrongs of the nature complained of; and quoting with approval Johnstone v.
Sutton, 1 T. R. 544, and Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 4 F. & F. 841. Cockbum,
Ch. J., delivered an able dissenting opinion.
4 Dancaster v. Hewson, 2 M. & Ry. 176. As to the privilege connected with
church trials and investigations, see Dunn v. Winters, 2 Humph. 512; York v.
Pease, 2 Gray, 282.
5 Burlingame v. Burlingame, 8 Cow. 141. In Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt. 586,
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Privilege of Counsel.
One of the most important cases of privilege, in a constitutional
point of view, is that of counsel employed to represent a
[* 443] party in * judicial proceedings. The benefit of the consti-
tutional right to counsel depends very greatly on the free-
dom with which he is allowed to act, and to comment on the facts
appearing in the case, and on the inferences deducible therefrom.
The character, conduct, and motives of parties and their witnesses,
as well as of other persons more remotely connected with the pro-
ceedings, enter very largely into any judicial inquiry, and must
form the subject of comment, if they are to be sifted and weighed.
To make the comment of value, there must be the liberty of exam-
ination in every possible light, and of suggesting any view of the
circumstances of the case, and of the motives surrounding it,
which seems legitimate to the person discussing them. It will
often happen, in criminal proceedings, that, while no reasonable
doubt can exist that a crime has been committed, there may be
very great doubt whether the prosecutor or the accused is the guilty
party; and to confine the counsel for the defence to such remarks
concerning the prosecutor as he might justify, if he had made them
without special occasion, would render the right to counsel, in
many cases, of no value. The law justly and necessarily, in view
of the importance of the privilege, allows very great liberty in these
cases, and surrounds them with a protection that is always a com-
plete shield, except where the privilege of counsel has been plainly
and palpably abused.
The rule upon this subject was laid down in these words in an
early English case: "A counsellor hath privilege to enforce any
thing which is informed him by his client, and to give it iu
evidence, it being pertinent to the matter in question, and not to
an action was brought for slander in saying to a witness who was giving bis tes-
timony on a material point in a cause then on trial to which defendant was a
party, " That's a lie," and for repeating the same statement to counsel for the
opposite party afterwards. The words were held not to be privileged. To the
same effect are the cases of McClaughry v. Wetmore, 6 Johns. 82, and Kean
v. McLaughlin, 2 S. & R. 469. See also Torrey v. Field, 10 Vt. 353; Gilbert
v. People, 1 Denio, 41. A report made by a grand jury upon a subject which
they conceive to be within their jurisdiction, but which is not, is nevertheless
privileged. Rectors. Smith, 11 Iowa, 302.
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examine whether it be true or false; for a counsellor is at his peril
to give in evidence that which his client informs him, being perti-
nent to the matter in question; but matter not pertinent to the
issue, or the matter in question, he need not deliver; for he is to
discern in his discretion what he is to deliver, and what not; and
although it be false, he is excusable, it being pertinent to the
matter. But if he give in evidence any thing not material to the
issue, which is scandalous, he ought to aver it to be true; other-
wise he is punishable; for it shall be considered as spoken ma-
liciously and without cause; which is a good ground for the
action. ... So if counsel object matter against a witness which
is slanderous, if there be cause to discredit his testimony, and it be
pertinent to the matter in question, it is justifiable, what
he * delivers by information, although it be false." 1 The [* 444]
privilege of counsel in these cases is the same with that of
the' party himself,2 and the limitation upon it is concisely suggested
in a Pennsylvania case, " that if a man should abuse his privilege,
and, under pretence of pleading his cause, designedly wander from
the point in question, and maliciously heap slander upon his adver-
sary, I will not say that he is not responsible in an action at law." 3
Chief Justice Shaw has stated the rule very fully and clearly:
"We take the rule to be well settled by the authorities that words
spoken in the course of judicial proceedings, though they are such
as impute crime to another, and therefore if spoken elsewhere
would import malice and be actionable in themselves, are not
actionable, if they are applicable and pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry. The question, therefore, in such cases is, not whether
the words spoken are true, not whether they are actionable in
themselves, but whether they were spoken in the course of judi-
cial proceedings, and whether they are relevant or pertinent to
the cause or subject of the inquiry. And in determining what is
pertinent, much latitude must be allowed to the judgment and
discretion of those who are intrusted with the conduct of a cause
in court, and a much larger allowance made for the ardent and
excited feelings with which a party, or counsel who naturally and
1 Brook r. Montagne, Cro. Jac. 90. See this case approved and applied
in Hodgson r. Scarlett, 1 B. & Aid. 232. And see Mackay v. Ford, 5
H. & N. 792.
• Hoar r. Wood, 3 Met. 194, per Shaw, Ch. J.
• McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney, 178, per Tilghman, Ch. J.
[ 519 ]
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almost necessarily identifies himself with his client, may become
animated, by constantly regarding one side only of an interesting
and animated controversy, in which the dearest rights of such
party may become iuvolved. And if these feelings sometimes man-
ifest themselves in strong invectives, or exaggerated expressions,
beyond what the occasion would strictly justify, it is to be recol-
lected that this is said to a judge who hears both sides, in whose
mind the exaggerated statement may be at once controlled and met
by evidence and argument of a contrary tendency from the other
party, and who, from the impartiality of his position, will naturally
give to an exaggerated assertion, not warranted by the occasion,
no more weight than it deserves. Still, this privilege must be
restrained by some limit, and we consider that limit to be this:
that a party or counsel shall not avail himself of his situ-
[* 445] ation to * gratify private malice by uttering slanderous
expressions, either against a party, witness, or third per-
son, which have no relation to the cause or subject-matter of the
inquiry. Subject to this restriction, it is, on the whole, for the
public interest, and best calculated to subserve the purposes of
justice, to allow counsel full freedom of speech in conducting the
cases and advocating and sustaining the rights of their constit-
uents; and this freedom of discussion ought not to be impaired by
numerous and refined distinctions." 1
Privilege of Legislators.
The privilege of a legislator in the use of language in debate is
made broader and more complete than that of the counsel or party
in judicial proceedings by constitutional provisions, which give
him complete immunity, by forbidding his being questioned in any
other place for any thing said in speech or debate.2 In an early
1 Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 197. See also Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El.
880; Ringr. Wheeler, 7 Cow. 725; Mower ». Watson, 11 Vt. 536; Gilbert r.
People, 1 Denio, 41; Hastings t>. Lusk, 22 Wend. 410; Bradley c. Heath, 12
Pick. 1G3. In Hastings v. Lusk, it is said that the privilege of counsel is as
broad as that of a legislative body; however false and malicious may be the
charge made by him affecting the reputation of another, an action of slander will
not lie, provided what is said be pertinent to the question under discussion. And
see Warner v. Paine, 2 Sandf. 195; Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Jennings v.
Paine, 4 Wis. 358.
* There are provisions to this effect in every State constitution except those of
[ 520 ]
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case in Massachusetts, the question of the extent of this constitu-
tional privilege came before the Supreme Court, and was largely
discussed, as well by counsel as by the court. The constitutional
provision then in force in that State was as follows: "The free-
dom of deliberation, speech, and debate in either house cannot be
the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or com-
plaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." The defendant
was a member of the General Court, and was prosecuted for utter-
ing slanderous words to a fellow-member in relation to the plain-
tiff. The member to whom the words were uttered had moved a
resolution, on the suggestion of the plaintiff, for the appointment
of an additional notary-public in the county where the
plaintiff * resided. The mover, in reply to an inquiry [* 446]
privately made by defendant, as to the source of his infor-
mation that such appointment was necessary, had designated the
plaintiff, and the defendant had replied by a charge against the
plaintiff of a criminal offence. The question before the court was,
whether this reply was privileged. The house was in session at
the time, but the remark was not made in course of speech or
debate, and had no other connection with the legislative proceed-
ings than is above shown.
Referring to the constitutional provision quoted, the learned
judge who delivered the opinion of the court in this case thus
expressed himself: "In considering this article, it appears to me
that the privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of the
house as an organized body, as of each individual member com-
posing it, who is entitled to this privilege even against the declared
will of the house. For he does not hold this privilege at the
pleasure of the house, but derives it from the will of the people
expressed in the constitution, which is paramount to the will of
either or both branches of the legislature. In this respect, the
privilege here secured resembles other privileges attached to each
member by another part of the constitution, by which he is ex-
empted from arrest on mesne (or original) process, during his
going to, returning from, or attending the General Court. Of these
North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, Texas, California, and Nevada.
Mr. Cushing, in his work on the law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies,
§ 602, has expressed the opinion that these provisions were unnecessary, and that
the protection was equally complete without them.
[521]
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privileges, thus secured to each member, he cannot be deprived by
a resolve of the house, or by an act of the legislature.
"These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of
protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their repre-
sentatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of
prosecution, civil or criminal. I therefore think the article ought
not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it
may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion,
uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate, but will extend it to
the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every
other act resulting from the nature and in the execution of the
office; and I would define the article as securing to every member
exemption from prosecution for every thing said or done by him,
as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office,
without inquiring whether the exercise was regular according to
the rules of the house, or irregular and against their rules.
[* 447] I do * not confine the member to his place in the house, and
I am satisfied that there are cases in which he is entitled
to this privilege when not within the walls of the representatives'
chambep. He cannot be exercising the functions of his office as
member of a body, unless the body is in existence. The house
must be in session to enable him to claim this privilege, and it is in
session notwithstanding occasional adjournments for short intervals
for the convenience of the members. If a member, therefore, be
out of the chamber, sitting in committee, executing the commission
of the house, it appears to me that such member is within the
reason of the article, and ought to be considered within the privi-
lege. The body of which he is a member is in session, and he, as
a member of that body, is in fact discharging the duties of his office.
He ought, therefore, to be protected from civil or criminal prosecu-
tions for every thing said or done by him in the exercise of his
functions as a representative, in a committee, either in debating
or assenting to or draughting a report. Neither can I deny the
member his privilege when executing the duties of the office, in a
convention of both houses, although the convention may be holden
in the Senate Chamber." And after considering the hardships that
might result to individuals in consequence of this privilege, he
proceeds: "A more extensive construction of the privilege of the
members secured by this article I cannot give, because it could
[ 522 ]
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not be supported by the language or the manifest intent of the
article. When a representative is not acting as a member of the
house, he is not entitled to any privilege above his fellow-citizens;
nor are the rights of the people affected if he is placed on the same
ground on which his constituents stand." And coming more par-
ticularly to the facts then before the court, it was shown that the
defendant was not in the discharge of any official duty at the time
of uttering the obnoxious words; that they had no connection or
relevancy to the business then before the house, but might with
equal pertinency have been uttered at any other time or place,
and consequently could not, even under the liberal rule of pro-
tection whioh the court had laid down, be regarded as within the
privilege.1
* Publication of privileged Communications through the [* 448]
Press.
If now we turn from the rules of law which protect communi-
cations because of the occasion on which they are made and the
duty resting upon the person making them, to those rules which
concern the spreading before the world the same communications,
we shall discover a very remarkable difference. It does not follow
because a counsel may freely speak in court as he believes or is
instructed, that therefore he may publish his speech through the
public press. The privilege in court is necessary to the complete
discharge of his duty to his client; but when the suit is ended,
that duty is discharged, and he is not called upon to appeal from
the court and the jury to the general public. Indeed such an
appeal, while it could not generally have benefit to the client in
view, would be unfair and injurious to the parties reflected upon
by the argument, inasmuch as it would take only a partial and one-
sided view of the case, and the public would not have, as the court
and jury did, all the facts of the case as given in evidence before
them, so that they might be in position to weigh the arguments
fairly and understandingly, and reject injurious inferences not
warranted by the evidence.
The law, however, favors publicity in legal proceedings, so far as
that object can be attained without injustice to the persons imme-
1 Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1. See Jefferson's Manual, § 8; Hosmer p. Love-
land, 19 Barb. Ill; State p. Burnham, 9 N. H. 84.
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diately concerned. The public are permitted to attend nearly all
judicial inquiries, and there appears to be no sufficient reason why
they should not also be allowed to see in print the reports of trials,
if they can thus have them presented as fully as they are in court,
or at least all the material portion of the proceedings stated impar-
tially, so that one shall not, by means of them, derive erroneous
impressions, which he would not have received from hearing the
case in court.
It seems to be a settled rule of law, that a fair and impartial
account of judicial proceedings, which have not been ex parte, but
in the hearing of both parties, is, generally speaking, a justifiable
publication.1 But it is said that, if a party is to be allowed to
publish what passes in a court of justice, he must publish the
whole case, and not merely state the conclusion which he himself
draws from the evidence.2 A plea that the supposed libel
[* 449] was, in * substance, a true account and report of a trial
has been held bad ;3 and a statement of the circumstances
of a trial as from counsel in the case has been held not privileged.4
The report must also be strictly confined to the actual proceedings
in court, and must contain no defamatory observations or comments
from any quarter whatsoever, in addition to what forms strictly and
properly the legal proceedings.6 And if the nature of the case is
such as to make it improper that the proceedings should be spread
before the public, because of their immoral tendency, or of the
blasphemous or indecent character of the evidence exhibited, the
publication, though impartial and full, will be a public offence, and
punishable accordingly.6
1 Hoare v. Silverlock, 9 C. B. 20; Lewis p. Levy, E. B. & E., 537; Ryalls v.
Leader, Law Rep. 1 Exch. 296. And see Stanley p. Webb, 4 Sandf. 21; Cin-
cinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, n. s. 548. But not if the matter
published is indecent or blasphemous. Rex p. Carlisle, 3 B. & Aid. 167: Rex
p. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273. The privilege extends to the publication of testi-
mony taken on an investigation by Congress. Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann.
375.
• Lewis p. Walter, 4 B. & Aid. 611.
• Flint p. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473.
4 Saunders p. Mills, 6 Bing. 213; Flint p. Pike, 4 B. & C, 473. And see
Stanley p. Webb, 4 Sandf. 26; Lewis p. Walter, 4 B. & Aid. 605.
6 Stiles p. Nokes, 7 East, 493; Delegal p. Highley, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 950.
And see Lewis p. Clement, 3 B. & Aid. 702; Pittock p. O'Neill, 63 Penn. St.
253; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 544.
• Rex p. Carlile, 3 B. & Aid. 167; Rex p. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273.
[524 ]
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CH. XII.] LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS. * 449
It lias, however, been held, that the publication of ex parte pro-
ceedings, or mere preliminary examinations, though of a judicial
character, is not privileged; and when they reflect injuriously
upon individuals, the publisher derives no protection from their
having already been delivered in court.1 The reason for
•distinguishing these cases from those where the parties [*450]
are heard is thus stated by Lord Ellenborough, in the early
case of the King v. Fisher:2 " Jurors and judges are still but men;
1 Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556; Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473; Stanley
v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 21; Charlton v. Watton, 6 C. & P. 385; Cincinnati Gazette
Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, n. s. 548; Mathews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 256; Huff
v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120. It seems, however, that if the proceeding has resulted
in the discharge of the person accused, or in a decision that no cause exists for
proceeding against him, a publication of an account of it is privileged. In Curry
v. Walter, 1 B. & P. 525, the Court of Common Pleas held that, in an action for
libel, it was a good defence, under the plea of not guilty, that the alleged libel
was a true account of what had passed upon a motion in the Court of King's
Bench for an information against two magistrates for corruption in refusing to
license an inn; the motion having been refused for want of notice to the magis-
trates. In Lewis v. Levy, El. Bl. & El. 537, the publisher of a newspaper gave
a full report of an examination before a magistrate on a charge of perjury^
resulting in the discharge of the defendant; and the Court of Queen's Bench
sustained the claim of privilege; distinguishing the case from those where the
party was held for trial, and where the publication of the charges and evidence
might tend to his prejudice on the trial. The opinion of Lord Campbell in the
case, however, seems to go far towards questioning the correctness of the deci-
sions above cited. See especially his quotation from the opinion of Lord Denman,
delivered before a committee of the House of Lords in the year 1843, on the
law of libel: "I have no doubt that [police reports] are extremely useful for the
detection of guilt by making facts notorious, and for bringing those facts more
correctly to the knowledge of all parties interested in unravelling the truth. The
public, I think, are perfectly aware that those proceedings are ex parte, and they
become more and more aware of it in proportion to their growing intelligence;
they know that such proceedings arc only in course of trial, and they do not
form their opinion until the trial is had. Perfect publicity in judicial proceed-
ings is of the highest importance in other points of view, but in its effects on
character I think it desirable. The statement made in open court will probably
find its way to the ears of all in whose good opinion the party assailed feels an
interest, probably in an exaggerated form, and the imputation may often rest
upon the wrong person; both these evils are prevented by correct reports." In
the case of Lewis v. Levy, it was insisted that the privilege of publication only
extended to the proceedings of the superior courts of law and equity; but the
court gave no countenance to any such distinction. See also Wason v. Walter,
L. R. 4 Q. B. 73; Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375.
'2 Camp. 563.
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* 450 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XII.
they cannot always control feeling excited by inflammatory lan-
guage. If they are exposed to be thus warped and misled, in-
justice must sometimes be done. Trials at law, fairly reported,
although they may occasionally prove injurious to individuals, have
been held to be privileged. Let them continue so privileged. The
benefit they produce is great and permanent, and the evil that
arises from them is rare and incidental. But these preliminary
examinations have no such privilege. Their only tendency is to
prejudge those whom the law still presumes to be innocent, and to
poison the sources of justice. It is of infinite importance to us
all, that whatever has a tendency to prevent a fair trial should be
guarded against. Every one of us may bo questioned in a court
of law, and called upon to defend his life and character. We would
then wish to meet a jury of our countrymen with unbiassed minds.
But for this there can be no security, if Buch publications are per-
mitted." And in another case it has been said: "It is our boast
that we are governed by that just and salutary rule upon which
security of life and character often depends, that every man is pre-
sumed innocent of crimes charged upon him, until he is proved
guilty. But the circulation of charges founded upon ex parte tes-
timony, of statements made, often under excitement, by persons
smarting under real or fancied wrongs, may prejudice the public
mind, and cause the judgment of conviction to be passed long
before the day of trial has arrived. When that day of
[* 451] trial comes, the rule has been * reversed, and the pre-
sumption of guilt has been substituted for the presump-
tion of innocence. The chances of a fair and impartial trial are
diminished. Suppose the charge to be utterly groundless. If every
preliminary ex parte complaint which may be made before a police
magistrate may, with entire immunity, be published and scattered
broadcast over the land, then the character of the innocent, who
may be the victim of a conspiracy, or of charges proved afterwards
to have arisen entirely from misapprehension, may be cloven down,
without any malice on the part of the publisher. The refutation
of slander, in such cases, generally follows its propagation at dis-
tant intervals, and brings often but an imperfect balm to wounds
which have become festered, and perhaps incurable. It is not to
be denied, that occasionally the publication of such proceedings
is productive of good, and promotes the ends of justice. But, in
[ 626]
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CH. XH.] LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS. * 451
such cases, the publisher must find his justification, not in privi-
lege, but in the truth of the charges." 1
Privilege of Publishers of News.
Among the inventions of modern times, by which the world has
been powerfully influenced, and from which civilization has received
a new and wonderful impulse, must be classed the newspaper.
Beginning with a small sheet, insignificant alike in matter and
appearance, published at considerable intervals, and including but
few in its visits, it has become the daily vehicle, to almost every
family in the land, of information from all quarters of the globe,
and upon every subject. Through it, and by means of the electric
telegraph, the public proceedings of every civilized country, the
debates of the leading legislative bodies, the events of war, the
triumphs of peace, the storms in the physical world, and the agita-
tions in the moral and mental, are brought home to the knowledge
of every reading person, and, to a very large extent, before the day
is over on which the events have taken place. And not public
events merely are discussed and described, but the actions and
words of public men are made public property; and any
person sufficiently notorious * to become an object of pub- [• 452]
lie interest will find his movements chronicled in this index
of the times. Every party lias its newspaper organs; every shade
of opinion on political, religious, literary, moral, industrial, or
financial questions has its representative; every locality has its
press to advocate its claims, and advance its interests, and even the
days regarded as sacred have their special papers to furnish read-
ing suitable for the time. The newspaper is also the medium by
means of which all classes of the people communicate with each
other concerning their wants and desires, and through which they
offer their wares, and seek bargains. As it has gradually increased
in value, and in the extent and variety of its contents, so the
exactions of the community upon its conductors have also in-
creased, until it is demanded of the newspaper publisher, that he
1 Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 30. See this case approved and followed in Cin-
cinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, N. s. 548, where, however, the court
are careful not to express an opinion whether a publication of the proceedings on
preliminary examinations may not be privileged, where the accused is present,
with full opportunity of defence.
[527]
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shall daily spread before his readers a complete summary of the
events transpiring in the world, public or private, so far as those
readers can reasonably be supposed to take an interest in them;
and he who does not comply with this demand must give way to
him who will.
The newspaper is also one of the chief means for the education
of the people. The highest and the lowest in the scale of intelli-
gence resort to its columns for information; it is read by those
who read nothing else, and the best minds of the age make it the
medium of communication with each other on the highest and most
abstruse subjects. Upon politics it may be said to be the chief
educator of the people; its influence is potent in every legislative
body; it gives tone and direction to public sentiment on each
important subject as it arises; and no administration in any free
country ventures to overlook or disregard an element so pervading
in its influence, and withal so powerful.
And yet it may be doubted if the newspaper, as such, has ever
influenced at all the current of the common law, in any particular
important to the protection of the publishers. The railway has
become the successor of the king's highway, and the plastic rules
of the common law have accommodated themselves to the new con-
dition of things; but the changes accomplished by the public press
seem to have passed unnoticed in the law, and, save only where
modifications have been made by constitution or statute, the
publisher of the daily paper occupies to-day the position in the
courts that the village gossip and retailer of scandal occupied two
hundred years ago, with no more privilege and no more pro-
tection.
[* 453] * We quote from an opinion by the Supreme Court of
New York, in a case where a publisher of a newspaper was
prosecuted for libel, and where the position was taken by counsel,
that the publication was privileged: "It is made a point in this
case, and was insisted upon in argument, that the editor of a public
newspaper is at liberty to copy an item of news from another paper,
giving at the same time his authority, without subjecting himself
to legal responsibility, however libellous the article may be, unless
express malice is shown. It was conceded that the law did not,
and ought not, to extend a similar indulgence to any other class of
citizens; but the counsel said that a distinction should be made in
favor of editors, on the ground of the peculiarity of their occupa-
[528]
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tion. That their business was to disseminate useful information
among the people; to publish such matters relating to the current
events of the day happening at home or abroad as fell within the
sphere of their observation, and as the public curiosity or taste
demanded; and that it was impracticable for them at all times to
ascertain the truth or falsehood of the various statements contained
in other journals. We were also told that if the law were not thus
indulgent, some legislative relief might become necessary for the
protection of this class of citizens. Undoubtedly if it be desirable
to pamper a depraved public appetite or taste, if there be any such,
by the republication of all the falsehoods and calumnies upon pri-
vate character that may find their way into the press, — to give
encouragement to the widest possible circulation of these vile and
defamatory publications by protecting the retailers of them,— some
legislative interference will be necessary, for no countenance can
be found for the irresponsibility claimed in the common law. That
reprobates the libeller, whether author or publisher, and subjects
him to both civil and criminal responsibility. His offence is there
ranked with that of the receiver of stolen goods, the perjurer and
suborner of perjury, the disturber of the public peace, the conspir-
ator, and other offenders of like character." And again: "The
act of publication is an adoption of the original calumny, which
must be defended in the same way as if invented by the defendant.
The republication assumes and indorses the truth of the charge,
and when called on by the aggrieved party, the publisher should be
held strictly to the proof. If he chooses to become the indorser
and retailer of private scandal, without taking the trouble to in-
quire into the truth of what he publishes, there is no
ground for * complaint if the law, which is as studious to [* 454]
protect the character as the property of a citizen, holds
him to this responsibility. The rule is not only just and wise in
itself, but, if steadily and inflexibly adhered to and applied by
courts and juries, will greatly tend to the promotion of truth, good
morals, and common decency on the part of the press, by incul-
cating caution and inquiry into the truth of charges against private
character before they are published and circulated throughout the
community."1
1 Hotchkiss r. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 513, per Nelson, Ch. J. And see King r.
Root, 4 Wend. 138, per Walworth, Chancellor. "It baa been urged upon you
that conductors of the public press are entitled to peculiar indulgences and have
S4 [ 529 ] ,
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* 454 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. HI.
If this strong condemnatory language were confined to the cases
where private character is dragged before the public for detraction
and abuse, to pander to a depraved appetite for scandal, its pro-
priety and justice and the force of its reasons would be at once
conceded. But a very large proportion of what the newspapers
spread before the public relates to matters of public coucern, but
in which, nevertheless, individuals figure, and must therefore be
mentioned in any account. To a great extent, also, the informa-
tion comes from abroad; the publisher can have no knowledge
concerning it, and no inquiries which he could make would be
likely to give him more definite information, unless he delays ibe
publication until it ceases to be of value to his readers. Whatever
view the law may take, the public sentiment does not brand the
publisher of a newspaper as libeller, conspirator, or villain, because
the telegraph despatches transmitted to him from all parts of the
world, without any knowledge on his part concerning the facts, are
published iu his paper, in reliance upon the prudence, care, and
honesty of those who have charge of the lines of communication,
and whose interest it is to be vigilant and truthful. The public
demand and expect accounts of every important meeting, of every
important trial, and of all the events which have a bearing upon
trade and business, or upon political affairs. It is impossible that
these shall be given in all cases without matters being mentioned
derogatory to individuals; and if the question were a new one in
the law, it might be worthy of inquiry whether some line of dis-
tinction could not be drawn which would protect the publisher
when giving in good faith such items of news as would be proper,
if true, to spread before the public, and which he gives in the
regular course of his employment, in pursuance of a public demand,
and without any negligence, as they come to him from the
[* 455] * usual and legitimate sources, which he has reason to •
rely upon; at the same time leaving him liable when he
makes his columns the vehicle of private gossip, detraction, and
malice.
especial rights and privileges. The law recognizes no such peculiar rights, priv-
ileges, or claims to indulgence. They have no rights but such as are common to
all. They have just the same rights that the rest of the community have, and no
more. They have the right to publish the truth, but no right to publish false-
hood to the injury of others with impunity." Instructions approved in Sheckell
v. Jackson, 10 Cush. 26. And see Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 216.
. [530]
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The question, however, is not new, and the authorities have
generally held the publisher of a paper to the same rigid responsi-
bility with any other person who makes injurious communications.
Malice on his part is conclusively inferred, if the communications
are false. It is no defence that they have been copied with or
without comment from another paper;1 or that the source of the
information was stated at the time of the publication ;2 or that the
publication was made in the paper without the knowledge of
the proprietor, as an advertisement or otherwise ;3 or that it con-
sists in a criticism on the course and character of a candidate for
public office;4 or that it is a correct and impartial account of a
1 Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 510. Even though they be preceded by the
statement that they are so copied. Sanford v. Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20.
'Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 447; Mapes v. Weeks, 4 Wend. 659; Inman v.
Foster, 8 Wend. 602; Hotchkiss r. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 514.
3 Andres v. Wells, 7 Johns. 260; Huff v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120; s. c. 6 N. Y.
337; Marten v. Van Schaick, 4 Paige, 479 ; Commonwealth t>. Nichols, 10 Met.
259.
* King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113. The action was for a libel, published in the
"New York American," reflecting upon Root, who was candidate lor lieutenant-
governor. We quote from the opinion of the chancellor: "It is insisted that
this libel was a privileged communication. If so, the defendants were under no
obligation to prove the truth of the charge, and the party libelled had no right
to recover, unless he established malice in fact, or showed that the editors knew
the charge to be false. The effect of such a doctrine would be deplorable.
Instead of protecting, it would be destroying the freedom of the press, if it
were understood that an editor could publish what he pleased against candidates
for office, without being answerable for the truth of such publications. No honest
man could afford to be an editor, and no man who had any character to lose
would be a candidate for office under such a construction of the law of libel.
The only safe rule to adopt in such cases is to permit editors to publish what
they please in relation to the character and qualifications of candidates for office,
but holding them responsible for the truth of what they publish." Notwithstand-
ing the deplorable consequences here predicted from too great license to the
press, it is matter of daily observation that the press, in its comments upon public
events and public men, proceeds in all respects as though it were privileged;
public opinion would not sanction prosecutions by candidates for office for
publications amounting to technical libels, but which were nevertheless published
without malice in fact; and the man who has a " character to lose " presents him-
self for the suffrages of his fellow-citizens in the full reliance that detraction by
the public press will be corrected through the same instrumentality, and that
unmerited abuse will react on the public opinion in his favor. Meantime the
press is gradually becoming more just, liberal, and dignified in its dealings with
political opponents, and vituperation is much less common, reckless, and bitter
[631]
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f* 456] public * meeting,1 or of any proceedings in which the
public have an interest, unless they were legislative or
judicial in their character, and where both parties had
[* 457] opportunity to be heard.2 Criticisms on * works of art and
literary productions are allowable, if fair, reasonable, and
now than it was at the beginning of the century, when repression was more often
resorted to as a remedy.
1 Dawson v. Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 229.
* Sanford v. Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20. Bennett was sued for publishing in the
"New York Herald " the speech of a person convicted of murder, made upon the
scaffold as he was about to be executed, and reflecting upon the counsel who had
defended him. The principal question in the case was, whether a statute of the
State, passed after the publication but before the trial, was applicable. The
statute privileged any fair and true report in a newspaper, of a judicial, legis-
lative, or other public official proceeding, or statement, speech, argument, or
debate in the course of the same. The court held the statute not applicable,
both because it was not retrospective in its provisions, and therefore could not
apply to publications previously made, and also because this was not any such
proceeding as the statute contemplated. Upon the question whether the pub-
lication was not privileged, independent of the statute, Denio, J., says: "The
want of legal connection between the words spoken and the proceeding which
was going forward at the same time and place, which has led me to the conclusion
that the statute does not apply, shows that it is not within the reason upon which
the common-law rule is based. That rule assumes that the public may have a
legitimate interest in being made acquainted with the proceedings of courts of
justice and of legislative bodies. The free circulation of such intelligence is of
vast advantage in every country, and particularly here, where all reforms in
legal or administrative polity must proceed from the people at large. But neither
the reason of the rule, nor, as I believe, the rule itself, has any application to a
proceeding in which neither forensic debate nor legislative or administrative
deliberations or determinations have any place. Where the proceeding is a mere
act, with which neither oral nor written communications have any thing more than
an accidental or fortuitous connection, there is no room for the application of the
doctrine of privilege to whatever may be spoken or written at the time and place
where and when it is transpiring. Such transactions are subject to be reported,
described, and published in newspapers or otherwise, like other affairs in which
individuals and communities feel a curiosity, and with the same liability attaching
to the publisher to answer for any injury which may happen to the character of
individuals if, in the course of such publications, libellous imputations are applied
to any one. It is of course perfectly lawful to publish all the circumstances
attending a public execution, including the dying speech of the malefactor; but
it is a necessary condition of that right, that if scandalous imputations are used
by the culprit or any one else which are untrue, he who publishes them afterwards
must be responsible for the wrong and injury thereby occasioned to the person
attacked." Mason, J., in the same case gives a reason for concurring in the
conclusion of the court, which seems to us to possess some force, independent of
[ 532 ]
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temperate; but the artist or author is not to be criticised through
his works, and his personal character is not made the property of
the public by his publications.1 For further privilege it would seem
that publishers of news must appeal to the protection of public
opinion, or they must call upon the legislature for such modifica-
tion of the law as may seem important to their just protection.
The publisher of a newspaper, however, though responsible for
all the actual damage which a party may suffer in consequence of
injurious publications in his paper, cannot properly be made liable
for exemplary or vindictive damages, where the article complained
of was inserted in his paper without his personal knowledge, and
he has been guilty of no negligence in the selection of agents, or
of personal misconduct, and is not shown habitually to make his
paper the vehicle of detraction and malice.2
Publication of Legislative Proceedings.
Although debates, reports, and other proceedings in legislative
bodies are privileged, it does not seem to follow that the publica-
tion of them is always equally privileged. The English decisions
do not place such publications on any higher ground of right than
any other communication through the public press. A member of
Parliament, it is said, has a right to publish his speech, but it
must not be made the vehicle of slander against any individual,
and if it is, it is a libel.3 And in another case: "A member of
the question of privilege. It is that the provisions of law then in force, requir-
ing capital executions to be within the walls of the prison, or in an adjoining
enclosure, and excluding all spectators with limited exceptions, must be regarded
as indicating a legislative policy adverse to the publicity of what passes on such
occasions.
1 The libel suits brought by J. Fenimore Cooper may be usefully consulted in
this connection. Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend. 434; Cooper v. Barber, 24 Wend.
105; Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio, 347 ; Stone p. Cooper, 2 Denio, 293. As to
criticisms on public entertainments, see Fry p. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54, and 28
N. Y. 324; Dibdin v. Swan, 1 Esp. 28; Green v. Chapman, 4 Bing. (N. C.) 92.
As to how far sermons, preached, but not otherwise published, form a proper sub-
ject for comment and criticism by the public press, see Gathercole v. Miall, 15
M. & W. 318.
* Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, and Detroit Free Press v. Same, 16 Mich.
447.
1 Rex p. Lord Abington, 1 Esp. 226. In this case the defendant was fined,
imprisoned, and required to find security for his good behavior, for a libel con-
tained in a speech made by him in Parliament, and afterwards published.
[533 ]
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* 458 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XII.
[* 458] [* the House of Commons] has spoken what he thought
material, and what he was at liberty to speak, in his char-
acter'as a member of that house. So far he is privileged; but he
has not stopped there, but, unauthorized by the house, has chosen
to publish an account of that speech, in what he has pleased to call
a corrected form, and in that publication has thrown out reflections
injurious to the character of an individual." And he was convicted
and fined for the libel.1
The circumstance that the publication was unauthorized by the
house was alluded to in this opinion, but the rule of law would
seem to be unaffected by it, since it was afterwards held that au
order of the house directing a report made to it to be published
did not constitute any protection to the official printer, who had
published it in the regular course of his duty, in compliance with
such order. All the power of the house was not sufficient to
protect its printer in obeying the order to make this publication;
and a statute was therefore passed to protect in the future persons
publishing parliamentary reports, votes, or other proceedings, by
order of either house.2
1 Rex v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 278.
s Stat. 3 and 4 Victoria, c. 9. The case was that of Stockdale v. Hansard,
very fully reported in 9 Al. & El. 1. See also 11 Al. & El. 253. The Messrs.
Hansard were printers to the House of Commons, and had printed by order of
that house the report of the inspectors of prisons, in which a book, published by
Stockdale, and found among the prisoners in Newgate, was described as obscene
and indecent. Stockdale brought an action against the printers for libel, and
recovered judgment. Lord Denman, presiding on the trial, said that " the fart
of the House of Commons having directed Messrs. Hansard to publish all tbeir
parliamentary reports is no justification for them, or for any bookseller who
publishes any parliamentary report containing a libel against any man." The
house resented this opinion and resolved, "that the power of publishing such of
its reports, votes, and proceedings as it shall deem necessary or conducive to the
public interests is an essential incident to the constitutional functions of Parlia-
ment, more especially of this house as the representative portion of it." They
also resolved that for any person to institute a suit in order to call its privileges
in question, or for any court to decide upon matters of privilege inconsistent
with the determination of either house, was a breach of privilege. Stockdale,
however, brought other actions, and again recovered. When he sought to
enforce these judgments by executions, his solicitor and himself were proceeded
against for contempt of the house, and imprisoned. While in prison, Stockdale
commenced a further suit. The sheriffs, who had been ordered by the House of
Commons to restore the money which they had collected, were, on the other
hand, compelled by attachments from the Queen's Bench to pay it over to Stock-
[ 534 ]
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CH. XII.] LIBERTY OF 8PEECH AND OP THE PRESS. * 459
* It has been intimated, however, that what a representa- [* 459]
tive is privileged to address to the house of which he is a
member, he is also privileged to address to his constituents; and
dale. In this complicated state of affairs, the proper and dignified mode of
relieving the difficulty by the passage of a statute making such publications privi-
leged for the future was adopted. For an account of this controversy, in addition
to what appears in the law reports, see May, Law and Practice of Parliament,
156-159, 2d ed.; May, Constitutional History, c. 7. A case in some respects
similar to that of Stockdale v. Hansard is that of Popham v. Pickburn, 7 Hurl.
& Nor. 891. The defendant, the proprietor of a newspaper, was sued for
publishing a report made by a medical officer of health to a vestry board, in
pursuance of the statute, and which reflected severely upon the conduct of the
plaintiff. The publication was made without any comment, and as a part of
the proceedings of the vestry board. It was held not to be privileged, notwith-
standing the statute provided for the publication of the report by the vestry
board, — which, however, had not yet been made. Wilde, B., delivering the
opinion of the court, said: "The defendant has published that of the plaintiff
which is undoubtedly a libel, and which is untrue. He seeks to protect himself
on the ground that the publication is a correct report of a document read at a
meeting of the Clerkenwell vestry, which document must have been published
and sold at a small price by the vestry in a short time. But we are of opinion
this furnishes no defence. Undoubtedly the report of a trial in a court of justice
in which this document had been read would not make the publisher thereof
liable to an action for libel, and reasonably, for such reports only extend that
publicity which is so important a feature of the administration of the law in
England, and thus enable to be witnesses of it not merely the few whom the
court can hold, but the thousands who can read the reports. But no case has
decided that the reports of what takes place at the meeting of such a body as
this vestry are so privileged; indeed the case eited in the argument [Rex v.
Wright, 8 T. R. 293] is an authority that they are not. Then, is the publication
justified by the statute? It is true that the document would have been accessible
to the public in a short time, though not published by the defendant; but this
cannot justify his anticipating the publication, and giving it a wider circulation,
and possibly without an answer which the vestry might have received in some
subsequent report or otherwise, and which would then have been circulated with
the libel. This defence therefore fails.
"It was further contended that this libel might be justified as a matter of
public discussion on a subject of public interest. The answer is: This is not a
discussion or comment. It is the statement of a fact. To charge a man incor-
rectly with a disgraceful act is very different from commenting on a fact relating
to him truly stated; there the writer may, by his opinion, libel himself rather
than the subject of his remarks.
"It is to be further observed that this decision does not determine or affect
the question whether, after the statutory publication, it might or might not be
competent to others to republish these reports, with or without reasonable com-
ments."
[535 ]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
that the bona fide publication for that purpose of his speech is the
house is protected.1 And the practice in this country
[* 460] appears to proceed on * this idea; the speeches and pro-
ceedings in Congress being fully reported by the press,
and the exemption of the member from being called to account for
his speech being apparently supposed to extend to its publication
also. When complete publicity is thus practised, perhaps every
speech published should be regarded as addressed bona fide by the
representative, not only to the house, but also to his constituents.
But whether that view be taken or not, if publication is provided
for by law, as in the case of Congressional debates, the publishing
must be considered as privileged.
The Jury as Judges of the Law.
In a considerable number of the State constitutions it is provided
that, in prosecutions for libel, the jury shall have a right to deter-
mine the law and the fact. In some it is added, "as in other
cases ;" in others, "under the direction of the court." For the
necessity of these provisions we must recur to the rulings of
the English judges in the latter half of the last century, and the
memorable contest in the courts and in Parliament, resulting at
last in the passage of Mp. Fox's Libel Act, declaratory of the rights
of juries in prosecutions for libel.
In the year 1770, Woodfall, the printer of the " Morning Adver-
tiser," was tried before Lord Mansfield for having published in his
paper what was alleged to be a libel on the king; and his lordship
told the jury that all they had to consider was, whether the de-
fendant had published the paper set out in the information, and
whether the innuendoes, imputing a particular meaning to particu-
lar words were true, as that "the K "meant his Majesty
King George III.; but that they were not to consider whether the
publication was, as alleged in the information, false and malicious,
those being mere formal words; and that whether the letter was
libellous or innocent was a pure question of law, upon which the
opinion of the court might be taken by a demurrer, or a motion in
arrest of judgment. His charge obviously required the jury, if
1 Lives of Chief Justices, by Lord Campbell, Vol. III. p. 167; Davison v.
Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 229, 233.
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CH. XII.] LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS. * 460
satisfied the publication was made, and had the meaning attributed
to it, to render a verdict of guilty, whether they believed the pub-
lication false and malicious or not; in other words, to convict the
party of guilt, notwithstanding they might believe the essential
element of criminality to be wanting. The jury, dissatisfied with
these instructions, and unwilling to make their verdict
cover * matters upon which they were not at liberty to [* 461]
exercise their judgment, returned a verdict of " guilty of
printing and publishing only" but this the court afterwards rejected
as ambiguous, and ordered a new trial.1
In Miller's case, which was tried the same year, Lord Mansfield
instructed the jury as follows: "The direction I am going to give
you is with a full conviction and confidence that it is the language
of the law. If you by your verdict find the defendant not guilty,
^the fact established by that verdict is, he did not publish a paper of
that meaning; that fact is established, and there is an end of the
prosecution. You are to try the fact, because your verdict estab-
lishes that fact, that he did not publish it. If you find that,
according to your judgment, your verdict is final, and if you find
it otherwise, it is between God and your consciences, for that is the
basis upon which all verdicts ought to be founded; then the fact
finally established by your verdict, if you find him guilty, is, that
he printed and published a paper of the tenor and of the meaning
Bet forth in the information; that is the only fact finally established
by your verdict; and whatever fact is finally established never can
be controverted in any shape whatever. But you do not by that
verdict give an opinion, or establish whether it is or not lawful to
print or publish a paper of the tenor and meaning in the informa-
tion; for, supposing the defendant is found guilty, and the paper
is such a paper as by the law of the land may be printed and pub-
lished, the defendant has a right to have judgment respited, and to
have it carried to the highest court of judicature."2
Whether these instructions were really in accordance with the
law of England, it would be of little importance now to inquire.
They were assailed as not only destructive to the liberty of the
1 20 State Trials, 895.
* 20 State Trials, 870. For an account of the raising of the same question
in Pennsylvania, so early as 1692, see The Forum, by David Paul Brown, Vol. I.
p. 280.
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* 461 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XII.
\
press, but as taking from the jury that right to cover by their verdict
all the matter charged and constituting the alleged offence, as it
was conceded was their right in all other cases. In no other case
could the jury be required to find a criminal intent which they did
not believe to exist. In the House of Lords they were assailed by
Lord Chatham; and Lord Camden, the Chief Justice of the Common
Pleas, in direct contradiction to Lord Mansfield, declared
[* 462] his instructions not to be the law of England. * Never-
theless, with the judges generally the view of Lord Mant-
field prevailed, and it continued to be enforced for more than
twenty years, so far as juries would suffer themselves to be con-
i trolled by the directions of the courts.
The act known as Mp. Fox's Libel Act was passed in 1792,
against the protest of Lord Thurlow and five other lords, who
predicted from it "the confusion and destruction of the law of
England." It was entitled " An act to remove doubts respecting
the functions of juries in cases of libel," and it declared and
enacted that the jury might give a general verdict of guilty or not
guilty, upon the whole matter put in issue upon the indictment or
information, and should not be required or directed by the court
or judge before whom it should be tried to find the defendant
guilty, merely on the proof of the publication of the paper charged
to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in the indict-
ment or information: Provided, that on every such trial the court
or judge before whom it should be tried should, according to their
discretion, give their opinion and direction to the jury on the
matter in issue, in like manner as in other criminal cases: Pro-
vided also, that nothing therein contained should prevent the jury
from finding a special verdict in their discretion, as in other
criminal cases: Provided also, that in case the jury should find
the defendant guilty, he might move in arrest of judgment on such
ground and in such manner as by law he might have doue before
the passing of the act.
Whether this statute made the jury the rightful judges of the
law as well as of the facts in libel cases, or whether, on the other
hand, it only placed these cases on the same footing as other crim-
inal prosecutions, leaving it the duty of the jury to accept and
follow the instructions of the judge upon the criminal character of
the publication, are questions upon which there are still differences
[ 538 ]
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CH. XII.] LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS. * 462
of opinion. Its friends have placed the former construction upon
it, while others adopt the opposite view.1
In the United States the disposition of the early judges was to
adopt the view of Lord Mansfield as a correct exposition of the
respective functions of court and jury in cases of libel; and on
the memorable trial of Callendar, which led to the impeachment
of Judge Chase, of the United States Supreme Court, the
right of the *jury to judge of the law was the point in [* 463]
dispute upon which that judge first delivered his opinion,
and afterwards invited argument. The charge there was of libel
upon President Adams, and was prosecuted under the Sedition
Law so called, which expressly provided that the jury should have
the right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of
the court, as in other cases. The defence insisted that the Sedition
Law was unconstitutional and void, and proposed to argue that
question to the jury, but were stopped by the court. The question
of the constitutionality of a statute, it was said by Judge Chase,
was a judicial question, and could only be passed upon by the
court; the jury might determine the law applicable to the case
under the statute, but they could not inquire into the validity of
the statute by which that right was given.2
Whatever may be the true import of Mr. Fox's Libel Act, it
would seem clear that a constitutional provision which allows the
jury to determine the law refers the questions of law to them for
their rightful decision. Wherever such provisions exist, the jury,
we think, are the judges of the law; and the argument of counsel
upon it is rightfully addressed to both the court and the jury.
Nor can the distinction be maintained which was taken by Judge
Chase, and which forbids the jury considering questious affecting
the constitutional validity of statutes. When the question before
them is, what is the law of the case, the highest and paramount
law of the case cannot be shut from view. Nevertheless, we con-
ceive it to be proper, and indeed the duty of the judge, to instruct
the jury upon the law in these cases, and it is to be expected that
they will generally adopt and follow his opinion.
Where, however, the constitution provides that they shall be
judges of the law "as in other cases," or may determine the law
1 Compare Forsyth on Trial by Jury, c. 12, with May's Constitutional History
of England, c. 9.
» Wharton's State Trials, 688.
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and the fact "under the direction of the court," we must perhaps
conclude that the intention has been simply to put libel cases on
the same footing with any other criminal prosecutions,1 and that
the jury will be expected to receive the law from the court.
1 "By the last clause of the sixth section of the eighth article of the Consti-
tution of this State, it is declared that, in all indictments for libel, the jury shall
have the right to determine the law and the facts under the direction of the court
as in other cases. It would seem from this that the framers of our Bill of Rights
did not imagine that juries were rightfully judges of the law and fact in criminal
cases, independently of the directions of courts. Their right to judge of the
law is a right to be exercised only under the direction of the courts; and if they
go aside from that direction and determine the law incorrectly, they depart from
their duty, and commit a public wrong; and this in criminal as well as in civil
cases." Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 427. See also State p. Allen, 1
McCord, 525.
The Constitution of Pennsylvania declares that " in all indictments for libels
the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction
of the court, as in other cases." In Pittock v. O'Neill, 63 Penn. St. 256; s. C.
3 Am. Rep. 544, Sharswood, J., says: "There can be no doubt that both in
criminal and civil cases the court may express to the jury their opinion as to
whether the publication is libellous. The difference is that in criminal cases tbey
are not bound to do so, and if they do, their opinion is not binding on the jury,
who may give a general verdict in opposition to it; and if that verdict is for the
defendant, a new trial cannot be granted against his consent. As our declaration
of rights succinctly expresses it, the jury have the right to determine the law and
the facts in indictments for libel as in other cases. But in civil cases the judge is
bound to instruct the jury as to whether the publication is libellous, supposing the
innuendoes to be true; and if that instruction is disregarded, the verdict will be
set aside as contrary to law. In England, the courts have recently disregarded,
to some extent, this plain distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. It
appears to be upon the ground that Mp. Fox's act, though limited in terms to
indictments and informations, was declaratory of the law in all cases of libel;
upon what principle of construction, however, it is not very easy to understand.
It is there the approved practice for the judge in civil actions, after explaining to
the jury the legal definition of a libel, to leave to them the question whether the
publication upon which the action is founded falls within that definition. Folkafd's
Stark. 202; Baylis v. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 920; Parmiter p. Coupland, 6
M. & W. 105; Campbell p. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 781; Cox v. Lee, L. R.
4 Exch. 284. These cases were followed in Shattuck v. Allen, 4 Gray, 540.
Yet it is clearly held that a verdict for the defendant upon that issue will be set
aside, and a new trial granted. Hakewell v. Ingram, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. 413.
'Though in criminal proceedings for libel,' says JarvU, Ch. J., 'there may be no
review, in civil matters there are cases in which verdicts for the defendant are
set aside upon the ground that the matter was a libel, though the jury have found
it was not.' This must be conceded to be an anomaly; and it will be best to
avoid a practice which leads to such a result. The law, indeed, may be con-
[ 540 ]
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CH. HI.] LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OP THE PRESS. * 464
*" Good Motives and Justifiable Ends" [*464]
In civil suits to recover damages for slander or libel, the truth
is generally a complete defence, if pleaded and established.1 In
criminal prosecutions it was formerly not so. The basis of the
prosecution being that the libel was likely to disturb the peace
and order of society, that liability was supposed to be all the
greater if the injurious charges were true, as a man would be
more likely to commit a breach of the peace when the matters
alleged against him were true than if they were false, in which
latter case he might, perhaps, afford to treat them with contempt.
Hence arose the common maxim, "The greater the truth the
greater the libel," which subjected the law on this subject to a
great deal of ridicule and contempt. The constitutional provisions
we have quoted generally make the truth a defence if published
with good motives and for justifiable ends. Precisely what show-
ing shall establish good motives and justifiable occasion must be
settled by future decisions. In one case the suggestion was thrown
out that proof of the truth of the charge alone might be sufficient,2
but this was not an authoritative decision, and it could not be true
in any case where the matter published was not fit to be spread
before the public, whether true or false. It must be held, we think,
that where the defendant justifies in a criminal prosecution, the
burden is upon him to prove, not only the truth of the charge, but
sidered as settled in this State by long practice, never questioned, but incidentally
confirmed in McConkle p. bums, 5 Bmn. 340, and Hays v. Brierly, 4 Watts, 392.
It was held in the case last cited that where words of a dubious import are used,
the plaintiff has a right to aver their meaning by innuendo, and the truth of such
innuendo is for the jury. In New York, siuce the recent English cases, the ques-
tion has been ably discussed and fully considered in Snyder p. Andrews, t> barb.
43; Green v. Telfair, 20 Ibid. 11; Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173; and the law
established on its old foundations."
1 Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen, 76. See ante, 455.
3 Charge of Judge BetU to the jury in King v. Root, 4 Wend. 121: "Should
the scope of proofs and circumstances lead you to suppose the defendants had
no good end iu contemplation, that they were instigated to these charges solely to
avenge personal and political resentments against the plaintiff, stiil, if they have
satisfactorily shown the charges to be true, they must be acquitted of all liability
to damage in a private action on account of the publication. Indeed, if good
motives and justifiable ends must be shown, tuey migbt weil be implied from the
establishment of the truth of a charge, lor the like reason that mabce is mferred
from its falsity."
[541]
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* 464 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. 331.
also the "good motives and justifiable ends" of the publication.
These might appear from the very character of the publication
itself, if it was true; as where it exhibited the misconduct or un-
fitness of a candidate for public office ; but where it related
[* 465] to a * person in private life, and who was himself taking
no such action as should put his character in issue before
the public, some further showing would generally be requisite after
the truth had been proved.1
1 In Commonwealth v. Bonner, 9 Met. 410, the defendant was indicted for s
libel on one Oliver Brown, in the following words: "However, there were few
who, according to the old toper's dictionary, were drunk; yea, in all conscience,
drunk as a drunken man; and who and which of you desperadoes of the town got
them so? Was it you whose groggery was open, and the rat soup measured out
at your bar to drunkards, while a daughter lay a corpse in your house, and even
on the day she was laid in her cold and silent grave, a victim of God's chasten-
ing rod upon your guilty drunkard-manufacturing head? Was it you who refusui
to close your drunkery on the day that your aged father was layl in the narrow
house appointed for all the living, and which must ere long receive your recreant
carcass? We ask again, Was it you? Was it you?" On the trial the defend-
ant introduced evidence to prove, and contended that he did prove, all the facts
alleged in his publication. The court charged the jury that the burden wis
upon the defendant to show that the matter charged to be libellous was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends; that malice is the wilful doing of in
unlawful act, and does not necessarily imply personal ill-will towards the person
libelled. The defendant excepted to the ruling of the court as applied to the
facts proved, contending that, having proved the truth of all the facts alleged in
the libel, and the publication being in reference to an illegal traffic, a public
nuisance, the jury should have been instructed that it was incumbent on the
government to show that defendant's motives were malicious, in the popular sense
of the word, as respects said Brown. By the court, Shatc, Ch. J.: "The court
are of opinion that the charge of the judge of the Common Pleas was strictly
correct. If the publication be libellous, that is, be such as to bring the person
libelled into hatred, contempt, and ridicule amongst the people, malice is pre-
sumed from the injurious act. But by Rev. Stat. c. 133, § 6, ' in every prosecu-
tion for writing or publishing a libel, the defendant may give in evidence, in his
defence upon the trial, the truth of the matter contained in the publication
charged as libellous: provided, that such evidence shall not be deemed a sufficient
justification, unless it shall be further made to appear, on the trial, that the matter
charged to be libellous was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.'
Nothing can be more explicit. The judge, therefore, was right in directing the
jury that, after the publication had been shown to have been made by the defend-
ant, and to be libellous and malicious, the burden was on the defendant, not only
to prove the truth of the matter charged as libellous, but likewise that it was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends. We are also satisfied that
the judge was right in his description or definition of legal malice, that it ia not
[542]
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LIBERTY OP SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.
malice in its popular sense; viz., that of hatred and ill-will to the party libelled,
but an act done wilfully, unlawfully, and in violation of the just rights of another."
And yet it would seem as if, conceding the facts published to be true, the jury
ought to have found the occasion a proper one for correcting such indecent con-
duct by public exposure. See further on this subject, Regina v. New-
man, * 1 El. & Bl. 268 and 558; 8. c. 18 Eng. El. & Eq. 113; Bar- [*466]
thelemy v. People, 2 Hill, 248; State v. White, 7 Ired. 180; State v.
Burnham, 9 N. H. 84; Cole v. Wilson, 18 B. Monr. 217; Hagan v. Hendry, 18
Md. 191; Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Snyder v. Fulton, 34 Md. 128; Com-
monwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick. 337. The fact that the publication is copied from
another source is clearly no protection, if it is not true in fact. Regina v. New-
man, ubi sup. Compare Saunders v. Mills, 6 Bing. 213; Creevy v. Carr, 7 C. &
P. 64. Neither are the motives or good character of the defendant, if he lias
published libellous matter which is false. Barthelemy v. People, 2 Hill, 248;
Commonwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick. 337; Wilson v. Noonan, 27 Wis. 610.
[ 543 ]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[*467] 'CHAPTER XIII.
OP RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.
Whoever shall examine with care the American constitutions will
find nothing more fully stated or more plainly expressed than the
desire of their authors to preserve and perpetuate religious liberty,
and to guard against the slightest approach towards the establish-
ment of inequality in the civil or political rights of citizens, based
upon differences, of religious belief. The American people came
to the work of framing their fundamental laws after centuries of
religious oppression and persecution, sometimes by one party or
sect and sometimes by another, had taught them the utter futility
of all attempts to propagate religious opinions by the rewards,
penalties, or terrors of human laws. They could not fail to per-
ceive, also, that a union of Church and State, like that which
existed in England, if not wholly impracticable in America, was
certainly opposed to the spirit of our institutions, and that any
domineering of one sect over another was repressing to the ener-
gies of the people, and must necessarily tend to discontent and
disordep. Whatever, therefore, may have been their individual
sentiments upon religious questions, or upon the propriety of the
State assuming supervision and control of religious affairs under
other circumstances, the general voice has been, that persons of
every religious persuasion should be made equal before the law,
and that questions of religious belief and religious worship should
be questions between each individual man and his Maker, of which
human tribunals are not to take cognizance, so long as the public
order is not disturbed, except as the individual, by his voluntary
action in associating himself with a religious organization, may
have conferred upon such organization a jurisdiction over him in
ecclesiastical matters.1 These constitutions, therefore, have not
1 The religious societies which exist in America are mere voluntary societies,
having little resemblance to those which constitute a part of the machinery of
government in England. They are for the most part formed under general
laws, which permit the voluntary incorporation of attendants upon religious
[ 544 ]
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OP RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.
established religious toleration merely, but religious equality; in
that particular being far in advance not only of the mother country,
worship, with power in the corporation to hold real and personal estate for the
purposes of their organization, but not for other purposes. Such a society is
"a voluntary association of individuals or families, united for the purpose of
having a common place of worship, and to provide a proper teacher to instruct
them in religious doctrines and duties, and to administer the ordinances of bap-
tism, &c. Although a church or body of professing Christians is almost uniformly
connected with such a society or congregation, the members of the church have
no other or greater rights than any other members of the society who statedly
attend with them for the purposes of divine worship. Over the church, as such,
the legal or temporal tribunals of the State do not profess to have any jurisdic-
tion whatever, except so far as is necessary to protect the civil rights of others,
and to preserve the public peace. All questions relating to the faith and prac-
tice of the church and its members belong to the church judicatories, to which
they have voluntarily subjected themselves. But, as a general principle, those
ecclesiastical judicatories cannot interfere with the temporal concerns of the con-
gregation or society with which the church or the members thereof are con-
nected." Walworth, Chancellor, in Baptist Church v. Wetherell, 3 Paige, 301.
See Ferraria v. Vasconeellos, 31 111. 25; Lawyer v. Clipperly, 7 Paige, 281;
Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Monr. 258; German, &c, Cong. v. Pressler, 17 La. An.
127. Such a corporation is not an ecclesiastical, but merely a private civil cor-
poration, the members of the society being the corporators, and the trustees the
managing officers, with such powers as the statute confers, and the ordinary
discretionary powers of officers in civil corporations. Robertson v. Bullions,
11 N. Y. 249; Miller v. Gable, 2 Dcnio, 492. Compare Watson v. Jones,
13 Wall. 679. The church connected with the society, if any there be, is not
recognized in the law as a distinct entity; the corporators in the society are not
necessarily members thereof, and the society may change its government, faith,
form of worship, discipline, and ecclesiastical relations at will, subject only to the
restraints imposed by their articles of association, and to the general laws of the
State. Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio, 363; Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N. Y. 249;
Parish of Bellport v. Tooker, 29 Barb. 256; Same Case, 21 N. Y. 267; Burrel
v. Associated Reform Church, 44 Barb. 282. The courts of the State have no
general jurisdiction and control over the officers of such corporations in respect
to the performance of their official duties; but as in respect to the property which
they hold for the corporation they stand in position of trustees, the courts may
exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust. Ferraria v. Vasconeellos,
31 111. 25; Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511; Watson v. Avery, 2 Bush, 322. But
the courts will interfere where abuse of trust is alleged only in clear cases,
especially if the abuse alleged be a departure from the tenets of the founders of
a charity. Happy v. Morton, 33 III. 398. The articles of association will deter-
mine who may vote when the State law does not prescribe qualifications. State
v. Crowell, 4 Halst. 390. Should there be a disruption of the society, the title to
the property will remain with that part of it which is acting in harmony with its
own law; seceders will be entitled to no part of it. McGinnis t>. Watson, 41
35 [ 545 ]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
but also of much of the colonial legislation, which, though more
liberal than that of other civilized countries, nevertheless exhib-
ited features of discrimination based upon religious beliefs or pro-
fessions.1
Penn. St. 9; M. E. Church p. Wood, 5 Ohio, 286; Keyser p. Stansifer, 6 Ohio,
368; Shannon p. Frost, 8 B. Monp. 253; Gibson p. Armstrong, 7 B. Monp. 281;
Hadden v. Chorn, 8 B. Monp. 70; Ferraria p. Vasconcellos, 23 Ill. 456. And
this even though there may have been a change in doctrine on the part of the
controlling majority. Keyser p. Stansifer, 6 Ohio, 363. See Petty p. Topker,
21 N. Y. 267; Horton v. Baptist Church, 34 Vt. 309; Eggleston p. Doolittle, 33
Conn. 396; Miller p. English, 1 Zab. 317. The administration of church rules
or discipline the courts of the State do not interfere with, unless civil rights
become involved, and then only for the protection of such rights. Hendrickson
p. Decow, Sax. Ch. 577; Baptist Church p. Wetherell, 8 Paige, 801; German
Reformed Church p: Seither, 3 Penn. St. 291; Watson p. Farris, 45 Mo. 183;
German Reformed Church p. Seibert, 8 Penn. St. 291 ; McGinnis p. Watson, 41
Penn. St. 21. And see Watson p. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, and the recent case of
Chase p. Cheney in the Supreme Court of Illinois.
1 For the distinction between religious toleration and religious equality, see
Bloom p. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 890. And see Madison's views, in his Life by
Rives, Vol. I. p. 140. It was not easy, two centuries ago, to make men
educated in the ideas of those days understand how there could be complete
religious liberty, and at the same time order and due subordination to authority in
the State. "Coleridge said that toleration was impossible until indifference made
it worthless." Lowell, "Among my Books," 836. Roger Williams explained
and defended his own views, and illustrated the subject thus: "There goes many
a ship to sea, with many hundred souls in one ship, whose weal and woe is com-
mon, and is a true picture of a commonwealth, or human combination or society.
It hath fallen out sometimes that both Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks,
may be embarked in one ship; upon which supposal I affirm that all the liberty
of conscience I ever pleaded for turns upon these two hinges: that none of the
Papists, Protestants, Jews, or Turks be forced to come to the ship's prayers or
worship if they practice any. I further add that I never denied that, notwith-
standing this liberty, the commander of this ship ought to command the ship's
course, yea, and also command that justice, peace, and sobriety be kept and
practised, both among the seamen and all the passengers. If any of the seamen
refuse to perform their service, or passengers to pay their freight; if any refuse
to help, in person or purse, towards the common charges or defence; if any
refuse to obey the common laws and orders of the ship, concerning their com-
mon peace and preservation; if any shall mutiny and rise up against their com-
manders and officers; if any should preach or write that there ought to be no
commanders or officers, because all are equal in Christ, therefore no masters nor
officers, no laws nor orders, no corrections nor punishments ; I say I never denied
but in 8ui h cases, whatever is pretended, the commander or commanders may
judge, re.-ist, compel, and punish such transgressors according to their deserts
[ 546 ]
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* Considerable differences will appear in the provisions [*468]
in the State constitutions on the general subject of the
present chapter; some of them being confined to declarations and
prohibitions whose purpose is to secure the most perfect equality
before the law of all shades of religious belief, while some exhibit
a jealousy of ecclesiastical authority by making persons who exer-
cise the functions of clergyman, priest, or teacher of any religious
persuasion, society, or sect, ineligible to civil office;1 and still
others show some traces of the old notion, that truth and a sense
of duty are inconsistent with scepticism in religion.2 There are
and merits." Arnold's History of Rhode Island, Vol. I. p. 254, citing Knowles,
279, 280.
1 There are provisions to this effect, more or less broad, in the Constitutions
of Tennessee, Louisiana, Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky.
* The Constitution of Pennsylvania provides "that no person who acknowl-
edges the being of God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, shall, on
account of bis religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of
trust or profit under this commonwealth." Art. 9, § 4.— The Constitution of North
Carolina: "The following classes of persons shall be disqualified for office:
First. All persons who shall deny the existence of Almighty God," &Ci Art.
6, § 5. —The Constitutions of Mississippi and South Carolina: " No person who
denies the existence of the Supreme Being shall hold any office under this Con-
stitution." — The Constitution of Tennessee: "No person who denies the being
of a God, or of a future state of rewards and punishments, 6hall hold any office
in the civil department of this State." On the other hand the Constitutions of
Georgia, Kansas, Virginia, West Virginia, Maine, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa,
Oregon, Ohio, New Jersey, Nebraska, Minnesota, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas,
and Wisconsin expressly forbid religious tests as a qualification for office or pub-
lic trust. The Constitution of Maryland provides "that no religious lest ought
ever to be required as a qualification for any office of trust or profit in this State,
other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor shall the legis-
lature prescribe any other oath of office than the oath prescribed by this constitu-
tion." Declaration of Rights, Art. 37. — The Constitution of Illinois provides
that " the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination shall for ever be guaranteed; and no person shall be denied any
civil or political right, privilege, or capacity, on account of his religious opinions;
but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense
with oalhs or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. No person shall be required
to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor
shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of
worship." Art. 2, § 3. Some other constitutions contain provisions that liberty
of conscience is not to justify licentiousness or practices inconsistent with the
peace and moral safety of society. The Constitution of Tennessee declares that
"no political or religious test, other than an oath to support the Constitution of
[ 547 ]
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* 468 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XIII.
[* 469] exceptional * clauses, however, not many in number;
and it is believed that, where they exist, they are not
often made use of, to deprive any person of the civil or political
rights or privileges which are placed by law within the reach of his
fellows.
Those things which are not lawful under any of the American
constitutions may be stated thus : —
1. Any law respecting an establishment of religion. The legis-
latures have not been left at liberty to effect a union of Church
and State, or to establish preferences by law in favor of any one
religious persuasion or mode of worship. There is not complete
religious liberty where any one sect is favored by the State and
given an advantage by law over other sects. Whatever establishes
a distinction against one class or sect is, to the extent to which
the distinction operates unfavorably, a persecution; and if based
on religious grounds, a religious persecution. It is not mere toler-
ation which is established in our system, but religious equality.
2. Compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of religious
instruction. Not only is no one denomination to be favored at the
expense of the rest, but all support of religious instruction must
be entirely voluntary. It is not within the sphere of government
to coerce it.1
3. Compulsory attendance upon religious worship. Whoever is
not led by choice or a sense of duty to attend upon the ordinances
of religion is not to be compelled to do so by the State. It is the
province of the State to enforce, so far as it may be found practi-
cable, the obligations and duties which the citizen may be under
or may owe to his fellow-citizen or to society; but those which
spring from the relations between himself and his Maker are to be
enforced by the admonitions of the conscience, and not by the
penalties of human laws. Indeed, as all real worship must essen-
the United States, and of this State, shall ever be required as a qualification to
any "office or public trust under the State;" but afterwards, with singular incon-
sistency, proceeds to disqualify certain classes as above stated.
1 AVe must exempt from this the State of New Hampshire, whose constitution
permits the legislature to authorize "the several towns, parishes, bodies corpo-
rate, or religious societies within this State to make adequate provisions, at their
own expense, for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of
piety, religion, and morality;" but not to tax those of other sects or denominations
for their support. Part 1, Art. 6.
[548]
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tially and necessarily consist in the free-will offering of adoration
and gratitude by the creature to the Creator, human laws are ob-
viously inadequate to incite or compel those internal and voluntary
emotions which shall induce it, and human penalties at most could
only enforce the observance of idle ceremonies, which, when un-
willingly performed, are alike valueless to the participants and
devoid of all the elements of true worship.
4. Restraints upon the free exercise of religion according to the
dictates of the conscience. No external authority is to
place itself * between the finite being and the Infinite [* 470]
when the former is seeking to render the homage that is
due, and in a mode which commends itself to his conscience and
judgment as being suitable for him to render and acceptable to its
object.
5. Restraints upon the expression of religious belief. An ear-
nest believer usually regards it as his duty to propagate his opin-
ions, and to bring others to his views. To deprive him of this
right is to take from him the power to perform what he considers
a most sacred obligation.
These are the prohibitions which in some form of words are to
be found in the American constitutions, and which secure freedom
of conscience and of religious worship.1 No man in religious mat-
1 This whole subject was considered very largely in the case of Minor v. The
Board of Education, in the Superior Court of Cincinnati, involving the right
of the school board of that city to exclude the reading of the Bible from the
public schools. The case was reported and published by Robert Clarke and
Co., Cincinnati, under the title, "The Bible in the Public Schools," 1870. The
point of the case may be briefly stated. The constitution of the State, after
various provisions for the protection of religious liberty, contained this clause:
"Religion, morality and knowledge, however, being essential to good govern-
ment, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws to
protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own
mode of public worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction."
There being no legislation on the subject, except such as conferred large discre-
tionary power on the Board of Education in the management of schools, that body
passed a resolution," that religious instruction and the reading of religious books,
including the Holy Bible, are prohibited in the Common Schools of Cincinnati; it
being the true object and intent of this rule to allow the children of the parents of
all sects and opinions, in matters of faith and worship, to enjoy alike the benefit
of the Common School fund." Certain tax-payers and citizens of said city, on
the pretence that this action was against public policy and morality, and in violation
of the spirit and intent of the provision in the constitution which has been quoted,
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470 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XIII.
ters is to be subjected to the censorship of the State or of any
public authority; and the State is not to inquire into or take notice
of religious belief, when the citizen performs his duty to the State
and to his fellows, and is guilty of no breach of public morals or
public decorum.1
But while thus careful to establish, protect, and defend religious
freedom and equality, the American constitutions contain no pro-
visions which prohibit the authorities from such solemn recog-
nition of a superintending Providence in public transactions and
exercises as the general religious sentiment of mankind inspires,
and as seems meet and proper in finite and dependent
[* 471] beings. Whatever may be the shades * of religious belief,
all must acknowledge the fitness of recognizing in inter-
filed their complaint in the Superior Court, praying that the board be enjoined
from enforcing laid resolution. The Superior Court (Judge Tafl dissenting)
made an order granting the prayer of the complaint: but the Supreme Court, on
appeal, reversed it, holding that the provision in the constitution requiring the
passage of suitable laws to encourage morality and religion, was one addressed
solely to the judgment and discretion of the legislative department; anil that, in
the absence of any legislation on the subject, the Board of Education could not
be compelled to permit the reading of the Bible in the schools.
1 Congress is forbidden, by the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, from making any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Mp. Story says of this provision: "It was
under a solemn consciousness of the dangers from ecclesiastical ambition, the
bigotry of spiritual pride, and the intolerance of sects, exemplified in our do-
mestic, as well as in foreign annals, that it was deemed advisable to exclude
from the national government all power to act upon the subject. The situation,
too, of the different States equally proclaimed the policy as well as the necessity
of such an exclusion. In some of the States, Episcopalians constituted the pre-
dominant sect; iu others, Presbyterians; in others, Congregationalists; in
others, Quakers; and in others again there was a close numerical rivalry among
contending sects. It was impossible that there should not arise perpetual strife
and perpetual jealousy on the subject of ecclesiastical ascendency, if the national
government were left free to create a religious establishment. The only security
was in extirpating the powep. But this alone would have been an imperfect
security, if it had not been followed up by a declaration of the right of the free
exercise of religion, and a prohibition (as we have seen) of all religious tests.
Thus, the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the State
governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and the
State constitutions; and the Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvinist and the
Arminian, the Jew and the infidel, may sit down at the common table ot
the national councils, without any inquisition into their faith or mode of wor-
ship." Story on the Constitution, § 1879.
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OP RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.
tant human affairs the superintending care and control of the great
Governor of the Universe, and of acknowledging with thanksgiving
his boundless favors, or bowing in contrition when visited with the
penalties of liis broken laws. No principle of constitutional law
is violated when thanksgiving or fast days are appointed; when
chaplains are designated for the army and navy; when legislative
sessions are opened with prayer or the reading of the Scriptures,
or when religious teaching is encouraged by a general exemption
of the houses of religious worship from taxation for the support
of State government. Undoubtedly the spirit of the constitution
will require, in all these cases, that care be taken to avoid discrim-
ination in favor of or against any one religious denomina i' n or
sect; but the power to do any of these tliings does not become
unconstitutional simply because of its susceptibility to abuse. This
public recognition of religious worship, however, is not based en-
tirely, perhaps not even mainly, upon a sense of what is due to
the Supreme Being himself as the author of all good and of all
law; but the same reasons of State policy which induce the gov-
ernment to aid institutions of charity and seminaries of instruc-
tion will incline it also to foster religious worship and religious
institutions, as conservators of the public morals, and valuable, if
not indispensable, assistants to the preservation of the public
order.
Nor, while recognizing a superintending Providence, are we
always precluded from recognizing also, in the rules prescribed
for the conduct of the citizen, the notorious fact that the prevail-
ing religion in the States is Christian. Some acts would be offen-
sive to public sentiment in a Christian community, and would tend
to public disorder, which in a Mahometan or Pagan country might
be passed by without notice, or even be regarded as meritorious;
just as some things would be considered indecent, and worthy of
reprobation and punishment as such, in one state of society which
in another would be in accord with the prevailing customs, and
therefore defended and protected by the laws. The criminal laws
of every country are shaped in greater or less degree by the pre-
vailing public sentiment as to what is right, proper, and decorous,
or the reverse; and they punish those acts as crimes which disturb
the peace and order, or tend to shock the moral sense or sense of
propriety and decency, of the community. The moral sense is
largely regulated and controlled by the religious belief; and there-
[551]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
« 471
[CH. XIII.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
fore it is that those things which, estimated hy a Christian stand-
ard, are profane and blasphemous, are properly punished as crimes
against society, since they are offensive in the highest degree to
the general public sense, and have a direct tendency to under-
mine the moral support of the laws, and to corrupt the com-
munity.
[* 472] * It is frequently said that Christianity is a part of the
law of the land. In a certain sense and for certain pur-
poses this is true. The best features of the common law, and
especially those which regard the family and social relations;
which compel the parent to support the child, the husband to sup-
port the wife; which make the marriage-tie permanent and forbid
polygamy,— if not derived from, have at least been improved and
strengthened by the prevailing religion and the teachings of its
sacred Book. But the law does not attempt to enforce the precepts
of Christianity on the ground of their sacred character or divine
origin. Some of those precepts, though we may admit their con-
tinual and universal obligation, we must nevertheless recognize as
being incapable of enforcement by human laws. That standard of
morality which requires one to love his neighbour as himself we
must admit is too elevated to bo accepted by human tribunals as
the proper test by which to judge the conduct of the citizen; and
one could hardly be held responsible to the criminal laws if in
goodness of heart and spontaneous charity he fell something short
of the Good Samaritan. The precepts of Christianity, moreover,
affect the heart, and address themselves to the conscience; while
the laws of the State can regard the outward conduct only: and
for these several reasons Christianity is not a part of the law of the
land in any sense which entitles the courts to take notice of and
base their judgments upon it, except so far as they can find that
its precepts and principles have been incorporated in and made a
component part of the positive law of the State.1
Mr. Justice Story has said in the Girard Will case that, al-
though Christianity is a part of the common law of the State, it is
only so in this qualified sense, that its divine origin and truth are
admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly re-
viled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers or to
1 Andrew v. Bible Society, 4 Sandf. 182; Ayres v. Methodist Church, 3 Sandf.
377; State v. Chandler, 2 Hair. 555; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 387.
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the injury of the public.1 It may be doubted, however, if the pun-
ishment of blasphemy is based necessarily upon an admission of
the divine origin or truth of the Christian religion, or incapable of
being otherwise justified.
Blasphemy has been defined as consisting in speaking evil of the
Deity, with an impious purpose to derogate from the divine majesty,
and to alienate the minds of others from the love and reverence of
God. It is purposely using words concerning the Supreme Being
calculated and designed to impair and destroy the reverence, re-
spect, and confidence due to him, as the intelligent Creator, Gov-
ernor, and Judge of the world. It embraces the idea of detraction
as regards the character and attributes of God, as calumny usually
carries the same idea when applied to an individual. It is a wilful
and malicious attempt to lessen men's reverence of God, by
denying his existence or his attributes as an intelligent Creator,
Governor, and Judge of men, and to prevent their having
confidence in him as such.2 * Contumelious reproaches [*473]
and profane ridicule of Christ or of the Holy Scriptures
have the same evil effect in sapping the foundations of society and
of public order, and are classed under the same head.3
In an early case where a prosecution for blasphemy came before
Lord Hale, he is reported to have said: "Such kind of wicked,
blasphemous words are not only an offence to God and religion,
but a crime against the laws, State, and government, and therefore
punishable in the Court of King's Bench. For to say religion is a
cheat, is to subvert all those obligations whereby civil society is
preserved; that Christianity is a part of the laws of England, and
to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of
the law."4 Eminent judges in this country have adopted this
1 Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 198. Mp. Webster's argument that Chris-
tianity is a part of the law of Pennsylvania, is given in 6 Webster's Works,
p. 175.
* Shaw, Ch. J., in Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 218.
'People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick.
213; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394; State p. Chandler, 2 Harp.
553; Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26; Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Aid. 161;
Cowan p. Milbourn, Law R. 2 Exch. 230.
* The King v. Taylor, 3 Keb. 607, Vent. 293. See also The King v. Wool-
aston, 2 Stra. 844, Fitzg. 64, Raym. 162, in which the defendant was convicted
of publishing libels, ridiculing the miracles of Christ, his life and conversation.
Lord Ch. J. Raymond in that case says: "I would have it taken notice of, that
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\
language, and applied it to prosecutions for blasphemy, where the
charge consisted in malicious ridicule of the Author and Founder
of the Christian religion. The early cases in New York and Mas-
sachusetts 1 are particularly marked by clearness and precision oa
this point, and Mp. Justice Clayton, of Delaware, has also adopted
and followed the ruling of Lord Chief Justice Sale, with such ex-
planations of the true basis and justification of these prosecutions
as to give us a clear understanding of the maxim that Christianity
is a part of the law of the land, as understood and applied by
the courts in these cases.2 Taken with the explanation
[* 474] * given, there is nothing in the maxim of which the
believer in any creed, or the disbeliever of all, can justly
complain. The language which the Christian regards as blas-
phemous, no man in sound mind can feel under a sense of duty to
make use of under any circumstances, and no person is therefore
deprived of a right when he is prohibited, under penalties, from
uttering it.
But it does not follow, because blasphemy is punishable as a
crime, that therefore one is not at liberty to dispute and argue
against the truth of the Christiau religion, or of any accepted
dogma. Its "divine origin and truth" are not so far admitted in
we do not meddle with the difference of opinion, and that we interfere only where
the root of Christianity ia struck at."
1 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 291; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick.
203.
* State p. Chandler, 2 Harp. 555. The case is very full, clear, and instruc-
tive, and cites all the English and American authorities. The conclusion at
which it arrives is, that "Christianity was never considered a part of the com-
mon law, so far as that for a violation of its injunctions, independent of the
established laws of man, and without the sanction of any positive act of Parlia-
ment made to enforce those injunctions, any man could be drawn to answer in a
common-law court. It was a part of the common law, 'so far that any person
reviling, subverting, or ridiculing it might be prosecuted at common law' as
Lord Mansfield has declared; because, in the judgment of our English ancestors
and their judicial tribunals, he who reviled, subverted, or ridiculed Christianity,
did an act which struck at the foundation of our civil society, and tended by its
necessary consequences to disturb that common peace of the land of which (as
Lord Coke had reported) the common law was the preservep. The common law
. . . adapted itself to the religion of the country just so far as was necessary for
the peace and safety of civil institutions; but it took cognizance of offences
against God only, when, by their inevitable effects, they became offences against
man and his temporal security." See, also, what is said on this subject by Duer,
J., in Andrew v. Bible Society, 4 Sandf. 182.
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the law as to preclude their being controverted. To forbid dis-
cussion on tliis subject, except by the various sects of believers,
would be to abridge the liberty of speech and of the press in a
point which, with many, would be regarded as most important of
all. Blasphemy implies something more than a denial of any of
the truths of religion, even of the highest and most vital. A bad
motive must exist; there must be a wilful and malicious attempt
to lessen men's reverence for the Deity, or for the accepted religion.
But outside of such wilful and malicious attempt, there is a broad
field for candid investigation and discussion, which is as much
open to the Jew and the Mahometan as to the professors of the
Christian faith. "No author or printer who fairly and conscien-
tiously promulgates the opinions with whose truths he is impressed,
for the benefit of others, is answerable as a criminal. A malicious
and mischievous intention is, in such a case, the broad boundary
between right and wrong; it is to be collected from the offensive
levity, scurrilous and opprobrious language, and other circum-
stances, whether the act of the party was malicious." 1 Legal
blasphemy implies that the words were uttered in a wanton man-
ner, " with a wicked and malicious disposition, and not in a serious
discussion upon any controverted point in religion." a The courts
have always been careful, in administering the law, to say that
they did not intend to include in blasphemy disputes betweeii
learned men upon particular controverted points.8 The
constitutional * provisions for the protection of religious [* 475]
liberty not only include within their protecting power all
sentiments and professions concerning or upon the subject of
1 Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 894. Ia Ayres v. Methodist
Churcli, 3 Sandf. 377, Duer, J., in speaking of "pious uses," says: "If the
Presbyterian and the Baptist, the Methodist and the Protestant Episcopalian, must
each be allowed to devote the entire income of his real and personal estate, for
ever, to the support of missions, or. the spreading of the Bible, so must the
Roman Catholic; his to the endowment of a monastery, or the founding of a per-
petual mass for the safety of his soul; the Jew his to the translation and publi-
cation of the Mishna or the Talmud, and the Mahometan (if in that colluvies
gentium to which this city [New York], like ancient Rome, seems to be doomed,
such shall be among us), the Mahometan his to the assistance or relief of the
annual pilgrims to Mecca."
• People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 293, per Kent, Ch. J.
3 Rex v. Woolaston, Stra. 834, Fitzg. 64; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 293,
per Kent, Ch. J.
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religion, but they guarantee to every one a perfect right to form
and to promulgate such opinions and doctrines upon religions
matters, and in relation to the existence, power, attributes, and
providence of a Supreme Being as to himself shall seem reasonable
and correct. In doing this he acts under an awful responsibility,
but it is not to any human tribunal.1
1 Per Shaw, Ch. J., in Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 2:M. The lan-
guage of the courts has perhaps not always been as guarded as it should hare
been on this subject. In the King v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26, the defendant
was on trial for blasphemous libel, in saying that Jesus Christ was an impostor,
and a murderer in principle. One of the jurors asked the Lord Chief Justiee
(Abbott), whether a work which denied the divinity of the Saviour was a libel.
The Lord Chief Justice replied that "a work speaking of Jesus Christ in the
language used in the publication in question was a libel, Christianity being a
part of the law of the land." This was doubtless true, as the wrong motive was
apparent; but it did not answer the juror's question. On motion for a new trial,
the remarks of Best, J., are open to a construction which answers the question
in the affirmative: "My Lord Chief Justice reports to us that he told the jury
that it was an indictable offence to speak of Jesus Christ in the manner in which
he is spoken of in the publication for which this defendant is indicted. It cannot
admit of the least doubt that this direction was correct. The 53 Geo. IH. p. 160,
has made no alteration in the common law relative to libel. If, previous to the
passing of that statute, it would have been a libel to deny, in any printed book,
the divinity of the second person in the Trinity, the same publication would be
a libel now. The 53 Geo. IH. p. 160, as its title expresses, is an act to relieve
persons who impugn the doctrine of the Trinity from certain penalties If we
look at the body of the act to see from what penalties such parties are relieved,
we find that they are the penalties from which the 1 W. & M. Sess. 1, p. 18,
exempted all Protestant dissenters, except such as denied the Trinity, and the
penalties or disabilities which the 9 & 10 W. III. imposed on those who denied
the Trinity. The 1 W. & M. Sess. 1, p. 18, is, as it has been usually called, an
act of toleration, or one which allows dissenters to worship God in the mode that
is agreeable to their religious opinions, and exempts them from punishment for
non-attendance at the Established Church and non-conformity to its rights. The
legislature, in passing that act, only thought of easing the conscience of dis-
senters, and not of allowing them to attempt to weaken the faith of the members
of the church. The 9 & 10 W. III. was to give security to the government, by
rendering men incapable of office, who entertained opinions hostile to the estab-
lished religion. The only penalty imposed by that statute is exclusion from
office, and that penalty is incurred by any manifestation of the dangerous opinion,
without proof of intention in the person entertaining it, either to induce others
to be of that opinion, or in any manner to disturb persons of a different per-
suasion. This statute rested on the principle of the test laws, and did not in-
terfere with the common law relative to blasphemous libels. It is not necessary
for me to say whether it be libellous to argue from the Scriptures against the
divinity of Christ ; that is not what the defendant professes to do; he argues
( 556 ]
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* Other forms of profanity, besides that of blasphemy, [* 476]
are also made punishable by statutes in the several States.
The cases these statutes take notice of are of a character no one
can justify, and their punishment involves no question of religious
liberty. The right to use profane and indecent language is recog-
nized by no religious creed, and the practice is reprobated by right-
thinking men of every nation and every religious belief. The
statutes for the punishment of public profanity require no further
justification than the natural impulses of every man who believes
in a Supreme Being, and recognizes his right to the reverence of
his creatures.
The laws against the desecration of the Christian Sabbath, by
labor or sports, are not so readily defensible by arguments the
force of which will be felt and admitted by all. It is no hardship to
any one to compel him to abstain from public blasphemy or other
profanity, and none can complain that his rights of conscience are
invaded by this enforced respect to a prevailing religious sentiment.
But the Jew who is forced to respect the first day of the week,
when his conscience requires of him the observance of the seventh
also, may plausibly urge that the law discriminates against his
religion, and by forcing him to keep a second Sabbath in each
week, unjustly, though by indirection, punishes him for his belief.
The laws which prohibit ordinary employments on Sunday are
to be defended, either on the same grounds which justify the
against the divinity of Christ by denying the truth of the Scriptures. A work
containing such arguments, published maliciously (which the jury in this case
have found), is by the common law a libel, and the legislature has never altered
this law, nor can it ever do so while the Christian religion is considered the
basis of that law." It is a little difficult, perhaps, to determine precisely how
far this opinion was designed to go in holding that the law forbids the public
denial of the truth of the Scriptures. That arguments against it, made in good
faith by those who do not accept it, are legitimate and rightful, we think there
is no doubt; and the learned judge doubtless meant to admit as much when
he required a malicious publication as an ingredient in the offence. However,
when we are considering what is the common law of England and of this country
as regards offences against God and religion, the existence of a State church in
that country and the effect of its recognition upon the law, are circumstances to
be kept constantly in view.
In People v. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. R. 14, the defence of drunkenness was made
to a prosecution for a blasphemous libel. Walworth, Circuit Judge, presiding at
the trial, declared the intoxication of defendant, at the time of uttering the
words, to be an aggravation of the offence rather than an excuse.
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punishment of profanity, or as establishing sanitary regulations,
based upon the demonstration of experience that one day's rest in
seven is needful to recuperate the exhausted energies of
[* 477] body and mind. If * sustained on the first ground, the
view must be that such laws only require the proper defer-
ence and regard which those not accepting the common belief may
justly be required to pay to the public conscience. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania have preferred to defend such legislation on
the second ground rather than the first;1 but it appears to us that
if the benefit to the individual is alone to be considered, the argu-
ment against the law which he may make who has already observed
the seventh day of the week, is unanswerable. But on the other
ground it is clear that these laws are supportable on authority,
notwithstanding the inconvenience which they occasion to those
whose religious sentiments do not recognize the sacred character
of the . rst day of the week.2
1 "It intermeddles not with the natural and indefeasible right of all men to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; it
compels none to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain
any ministry against his consent; it pretends not to control or to interfere with
the rights of conscience, and it establishes no preference for any religious estab-
lishment or mode of worship. It treats no religious doctrine as paramount in
the State; it enforces no unwilling attendance upon the celebration of divine
worship. It says not to the Jew or Sabbatarian, 'You shall desecrate the day
you esteem as holy, and keep sacred to religion that we deem to be so.' It
enters upon no discussion of rival claims of the first and seventh days of the
week, nor pretends to bind upon the conscience of any man any conclusion upon
a subject which each must decide for himself. It intrudes not into the domestic
circle to dictate when, where, or to what god its inmates shall address their
orisons; nor does it presume to enter the synagogue of the Israelite, or the
church of the seventh-day Christian, to command or even persuade their attend-
ance in the temples of those who especially approach the altar on Sunday. It
does not in the slightest degree infringe upon the Sabbath of any sect, or curtail
their freedom of worship. It detracts not one hour from any period of time
they may feel bound to devote to this object, nor does it add a moment beyond
what they may choose to employ. Its sole mission is to inculcate a temporary
weekly cessation from labor, but it adds not to this requirement any religious
obligation." Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Penn. St. 312. See also Charleston
p. Benjamin, 2 Strob. 508; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 887; McGatru k p.
Wason, 8 Ohio St. 566; Hudson p. Geary, 4. R. I. 485.
* Commonwealth v. Wolf, 8 S. & R. 50; Commonwealth p. Fisher, 17 S. &
R. 160; Shover v. State, 5 Eng. 529; Voglesong v. State, 9 Ind. 112; Stater.
Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225. In Simonds's Ex'rs p.
Gratz, 2 Pen. & Watts, 416, it was held that the conscientious scruples of a Jew
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OP RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.
Whatever deference tlie constitution or the laws may require to
be paid in some cases to the conscientious scruples or religious
convictions of the majority, the general policy always is,
to * avoid with care any compulsion which infringes on [* 478]
the religious scruples of any, however little reason may
seem to others to underlie them. Even in the important matter
of bearing arms for the public defence, those who cannot in
conscience take part are excused, and their proportion of this
great and sometimes imperative burden is borne by the rest of the
community.1
Some of the State constitutions have also done away with the
distinction which existed at the common law regarding the admis-
sibility of testimony in some cases. All religions were recognized
by the law to the extent of allowing all persons to be sworn and
to give evidence who believed in a superintending Providence, who
rewards and punishes, and that an oatli was binding on their
conscience.2 But the want of such belief rendered the person
to appear and attend a trial of his cause on Saturday were not sufficient cause
for a continuance. But quare of this. In Frolickstein v. Mayor of Mobile,
40 Ala. 725, it was held that a statute or municipal ordinance prohibiting the
sale of goods by merchants on Sunday, in its application to religious Jews " who
believe that it is their religious duty to abstain from work on Saturdays, and to
work on all the other six days of the week," was not violative of the article in
the State constitution which declares that no person shall, "upon any pretence
whatsoever, be hurt, molested, or restrained in his religious sentiments or per-
suasions.''
1 There are constitutional provisions to this effect in New Hampshire, Ala-
bama, Texas, 11linois, Indiana, Vermont, and Tennessee, and statutory provi-
sions in other States.
* See upon this point the leading case of Ormichund v. Barker, Willes, 538,
and 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 535, where will be found a full discussion of this
subject. Some of the earlier American cases required of a witness that he should
believe in the existence of God, and of a state of rewards and punishments after
the present life. See especially Atwood p. Wclton, 7 Conn. 66. But this rule
did not generally obtain; belief in a Supreme Being who would punish false
swearing, whether in this world or in the world to come, being regarded sufficient.
Cubbison p. McCreary, 7 \V. & S. 262; Blocker v. Burness, 2 Ala. 354; Jones
c. Harris, 1 Strob. 160; Shaw v. Moore, 4 Jones. 25; Hunscum p. Hunscum, 15
Mass. 184; Brock v. Milligan, 10 Ohio, 121; Bennett p. Mate, 1 Swan, 411;
Central R.R. Co. p. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541; Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362.
But one who lacked this belief was not sworn, because there was no mode known
to the law by which it was supposed an oath could be made binding upon his
conscience. Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362.
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incompetent. Wherever the common law remains unchanged, it
must, we suppose, be held no violation of religious liberty to recog-
nize and enforce its distinctions; but the tendency is to do away
with them entirely, or to allow one's unbelief to go to his credi-
bility only, if taken into account at all.1
1 The States of Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Oregon, Wisconsin, Arkansas,
Florida, Missouri, California, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and
New York have constitutional provisions expressly doing away with incompe-
tency from want of religious belief. Perhaps the general provisions in some of
the other constitutions declaring complete equality of civil rights, privileges, and
capacities are sufficiently broad to accomplish the same purpose. Perry's Case,
3 Grat. 632. In Michigan and Oregon a witness is not to be questioned concern-
ing his religious belief. See People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305. In Georgia the code
provides that religious belief shall only go to the credit of a witness, and it has been
held inadmissible to inquire of a witness whether he believed in Christ as the
Savioup. Donkle p. Kohn, 44 Geo. 266. In Maryland no one is incompetent
as a witness or juror "provided he believes in the existence of God, and that,
under His dispensation, such person will be held morally accountable for his acts,
and be rewarded or punished therefor, either in this world or the world to come,''
Const. Dep. of Rights, § 36.
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THE POWER OP TAXATION.
*CHAPTER XIV. [*479]
THE POWER OP TAXATION.
I
The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and
so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare
that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest
in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. It reaches
to every trade or occupation; to every object of industry, use,
or enjoyment; to every species of possession; and it imposes a
burden which, in case of failure to discharge it, may be followed
by seizure and sale or confiscation of property. No attribute of
sovereignty is more pervading, and at no point does the power of
the government affect more constantly and intimately all the
relations of life than through the exactions made under it.
Taxes are defined to be burdens or charges imposed by the
legislative power upon persons or property, to raise money for
public purposes.1 The power to tax rests upon necessity, and is
inherent in every sovereignty. The legislature of every free State
will possess it under the general grant of legislative power,
whether particularly specified in the constitution among the
powers to be exercised by it or not. No constitutional govern-
ment can exist without it, and no arbitrary government without
regular and steady taxation could be any thing but an oppressive
and vexatious despotism, since the only alternative to taxation
would be a forced extortion for the needs of government from such
persons.or objects as the men in power might select as victims.
Chief Justice Marshall has said of this power: "The power of
taxing the people and their property is essential to the very
1 Blackwell on Tax Titles, 1. A tax is a contribution imposed by government
on individuals for the service of the State. It is distinguished from a subsidy
as being certain and orderly, which is shown in its derivation from Greek, rafif,
ordo, order or arrangement. Jacob, Law Die.; Bouvier, Law Die. "The
revenues of a State are a portion that each subject gives of his property in
order to secure, or to have, the agreeable enjoyment of the remaindep." Mon-
tesquieu*, Spirit of the Laws, B. 12, p. 30.
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479 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XIV.
existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on
the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which
the government may choose to carry it. The only security against
the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the
[* 480] government itself. In imposing a * tax, the legislature
acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a suf-
ficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The
people of a State, therefore, give to their government a right of
taxing themselves and their property; and as the exigencies of
the government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the
exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the
legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their
representative, to guard them against its abuse." 1
And the same high authority has said in another case: "The
power of legislation, and consequently of taxation, operates on all
persons and property belonging to the body politic. This is an
original principle, which has its foundation in society itself. It is
granted by all for the benefit of all. It resides in the government
as part of itself, and need not be reserved where property of any
description, or the right to use it in any manner, is granted to in-
dividuals or corporate bodies. However absolute the right of anj
individual may be, it is still in the nature of that right that it
must bear a portion of the public burdens, and that portion must
be determined by the legislature. This vital power may be abused;
but the interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative body,
and its relations with its constituents, furnish the only security
against unjust and excessive taxation, as well as against unwise
taxation." 2 And again, the same judge says it is " unfit for the
judicial department to inquire what degree of taxation is the
legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse, of
the power."3 And the same general views have been frequently
expressed in other cases.4
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 428.
8 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 561.
* McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 430.
4 Kirby c. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 200; Sharpless v. Mayor, &c, 21 Penn. St.
168; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 478; Wingate v. Sluder, 6 Jones, Law, 552;
Hcrrick v. ltaudolph, 13 Vt. 529; Armington v. Barnct, 15 Vt. 745; Thomas r.
Leland, 24 Wend. 65; People v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 425; Portland
Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252.
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THE POWER OP TAXATION.
Notwithstanding the pervading nature of this power, there are
some things under our system of government which, by necessary
implication, are exempted from its exercise. Thus, the States
cannot tax the agencies of the general government; for, if they
could, it would be within their power to impose taxation
to an extent that might cripple, if not wholly defeat, * the [* 481]
operations of the national authorities within their proper
sphere of action. "That the power to tax," says Chief Justice
Marshall, " involves the power to destroy; that the power to de-
stroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that
there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one government a
power to control the constitutional measures of another, which
other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be su-
preme over that which exerts the control,— are propositions not
to be denied." And referring to the argument that confidence in
the good faith of the State governments must forbid our indulging,
the anticipation of such consequences, he adds: "But all inconsis-
tencies are to be reconciled by the magic word, — confidence.
Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy.
To carry it to the excess of destruction would be an abuse, to pre-
sume which would banish that confidence which is essential to all
government. But is this a case of confidence? Would the people
of any one State trust those of another with a power to control the
most insignificant operations of their State government? We know
they would not. Why then should we suppose that the people of
any one State would be willing to trust those of another with a
power to control the operations of a government to which they
have confided their most important and most valuable interests?
In the legislature of the Union alone are all represented. The
legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the
people with the power of controlling measures which concern all,
in the confidence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not a
case of confidence."1
1 McCulloch p. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 431. The case involved the right of the
State of Maryland to impose taxes upon the operations, within its limits, of the
Bank of the United States, created by authority of Congress. "If," continues
the Chief Justice, " we apply the principle for which the State of Maryland con-
tends to the Constitution generally, we shall find it capable of changing totally
the character of that instrument. We shall find it capable of arresting all the
measures of the*government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the States. The
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* 482 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IIV.
[* 482] * It follows as a logical result from this doctrine that
if the Congress of the Union may constitutionally create
a Bank of the United States, as an agency of the national govern-
ment in the accomplishment of its constitutional purposes, any
power of the States to tax such bank, or its property, or the means
of performing its functions, is precluded by necessary implication.1
For the like reasons a State is prohibited from taxing an officer of
the general government for his office or its emoluments, since such
a tax, having the effect to reduce the compensation for the services
provided by the act of Congress, would to that extent conflict
with such act, and tend to neutralize its purpose.2 So the States
may not impose taxes upon the obligations or evidences of debt
issued by the general government upon the loans made to it, un-
less such taxation is permitted by law of Congress, and then only
in the manner such law shall prescribe, — any such tax being an
impediment to the operations of the government in negotiating
loans, and in greater or less degree, in proportion to its magnitude,
American people have declared their Constitution, and the laws made in pursu-
ance thereof, to be supreme; but this principle would transfer the supremacy in
fact to the States. If the States may tax one instrument employed by the gov-
eroment in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every other instru-
ment. They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent
rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-house; they may tax judicial
process; they may tax all the means employed by the government to an excess
which would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the
American people. They did not design to make their government dependent on
the States." In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, it was held competent for
Congress, in aid of the circulation of the national banks, to impose restraints
upon the circulation of the State banks in the form of taxation. Perhaps no
other case goes so far as this, in holding that taxation may be imposed for other
purposes than the raising of revenue, though the levy of duties upon import)
with a view to incidental protection to domestic manufactures is upon a similar
principle.
1 McCullocb p. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. United States Bank, 9
Wheat. 738; Dobbins p. Commissioners of Erie Co., 16 Pet. 435. But the doc-
trine which exempts the instrumentalities of the general government from the
influence of State taxation, being founded on the implied necessity for the use of
such instruments by the government, such legislation as does not impair the use-
fulness or capability of such instruments to serve the government, is not within
the rule of prohibition. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall 353; Thomp-
son v. Pacific R.R. Co., ib. 579.
* Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie Co., 16 Pet. 435.
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tending to cripple and embarrass the national power.1 The tax
upon the national securities is a tax upon the exercise of the
power of Congress " to borrow money on the credit of the United
States." The exercise of this power is interfered with to the
extent of the tax imposed under State authority, and the liability
of the certificates of stock or other securities to taxation by a
State, in the hands of individuals, would necessarily affect their
value in market, and therefore affect the free and unrestrained
exercise of the power. M If the right to impose a tax exists, it is
a right which, in its nature, acknowledges no limits. It may be
carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or corpo-
ration which imposes it, which the will of such State or corporation
may prescribe."2
* If the States cannot tax the means by which the [* 483]
national government performs its functions, neither, on
the other hand, and for the same reasons, can the latter tax the
agencies of the state governments. "The same supreme power
which established the departments of the general government
determined that the local governments should also exist for their
own purposes, and made it impossible to protect the people in
their common interests without them. Each of these several
agencies is confined to its own sphere, and all are strictly subor-
dinate to the constitution which limits them, and independent of
other agencies, except as thereby made dependent. There is
nothing in the Constitution [of the United States] which can be
1 Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2
Black, 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200; Van Allen e. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573;
People r. Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244; Bradley v. People, ib. 459 ; The Banks o.
The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; Bank v. Supervisors, ib. 26. For a kindred doctrine,
see State v. Jackson, 33 N. J. 450.
4 Weston v. Charleston, 4 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2
Black, 631. This principle is unquestionably sound, but a great deal of difficulty
has been experienced in consequence of it, under the law of Congress establishing
the National Banking System, which undertakes to subject the National Banks
to State taxation, but at the same time to guard those institutions against unjust
discriminations, by providing that their shares shall only be taxed at the place
where the bank is located, and in the same manner as shares in the State banks
are taxed. The difficulty is in harmonizing the State and national laws on the
subject, and it will be illustrated in a measure by some of the cases above cited;
though the full extent of the difficulty is only perceived in other cases where the
taxation of State banks is fixed by constitutional provisions, which provide modes
that cannot be harmonized at all with the law of Congress.
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made to admit of any interference by Congress with the secure
existence of any State authority within its lawful bounds. And
any such interference by the indirect means of taxation is quite
as much beyond the power of the national legislature as if the
interference were direct and extreme." 1 It has therefore been
held that the law of Congress requiring judicial process to be
stamped could not constitutionally be applied to the process of
the State courts; since otherwise Congress might impose such
restrictions upon the State courts as would put an end to their
effective action, and be equivalent practically to abolishing them
altogethep.2 And a similar ruling has been made in other cases.
1 Fi6eld v. Close, 15 Mich. 509. "In respect to the reserved powers, the
State is as sovereign and independent as the general government. And if the
means and instrumentalities employed by that government to carry into operation
the powers granted to it are necessarily, and for the sake of self-preservation,
exempt from taxation by the States, why are not those of the States depending
upon their reserved powers, for like reasons, equally exempt from Federal tax-
ation? Their unimpaired existence in the one case is as essential as in the othep.
It is admitted that there is no express provision in the Constitution that prohibiu
the general government from taxing the means and instrumentalities of the Sutes.
nor is there any prohibiting the States from taxing the means and instrumentalities
of that government. In both cases the exemption rests upon necessary implication,
and is upheld by the great law of self-preservation; as any government, whose
means employed in conducting its operations, if subject to the control of another
and distinct government, can only exist at the mercy of that government. Of what
avail are these means if another power may tax them at discretion?" Per Nelson,
J., in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 124.
* Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 279; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 Wis. 369; Fifield
v. Close, 15 Mich. 505; Union Bank p. Hill, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 325; Smith p.
Short, 40 Ala. 796. "State governments," it is said in the Indiana case,
"are to exist with judicial tribunals of their own. This is manifest all the way
through the Constitution. This being so, these tribunals must not be subject to be
encroached upon or controlled by Congress. This would be incompatible with
their free existence. It was held, when Congress created a United States Bank,
and is now decided, when the United States has given bonds for borrowed money1
that as Congress had rights to create such fiscal agents, and issue such bonds, it
would be incompatible with the full and free enjoyment of those rights to allow
that the States might tax the bank or bonds; because, if the right to so tax them
was conceded, the States might exercise the right to the destruction of congres-
sional powep. The argument applies with full force to the exemption of State
governments from Federal legislative interference.
"There must be some limit to the power of Congress to lay stamp taxes.
Suppose a State to form a new, or to amend her existing constitution; could
Congress declare that it should be void, unless stamped with a Federal stamp?
Can Congress require State legislatures to stamp their bills, journals, laws, &p.
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THE POWER OP TAXATION.
* Strong as is the language employed to characterize the [* 484]
taxing power in some of the cases which have considered
in order that they shall be valid? Can it require the executive to stamp all
commissions? If so, where is he to get the money? Can Congress compel the
State legislatures to appropriate it? Can Congress thus subjugate a State by
legislation? We think this will scarcely be pretended. Where, then, is the line
of dividing power in this particular? Could Congress require voters in State
and corporation elections to stamp their tickets to render them valid? Under
the old Confederation, Congress legislated upon States, not upon the citizens
of the State. The most important change wrought in the government by the
Constitution was that legislation operated upon the citizens directly, enforced by
Federal tribunals and agencies, not upon the States. Another established con-
stitutional principle is, that the government of the United States, while sovereign
within its sphere, is still limited in jurisdiction and power to certain specified
subjects. Taking these three propositions then as true, — 1. States are to exist
with independent powers and institutions within their spheres; 2. The Federal
government is to exist with independent powers and institutions within its sphere;
3. The Federal government operates within its sphere upon the people in their
individual capacities, as citizens and subjects of that government, within its
sphere of power, and upon its own officers and institutions as a part of itself, —
taking these propositions as true, we say, it seems to result as necessary to har-
mony of operation between the Federal and State governments, that the Federal
government must be limited, in its right to lay and collect stamp taxes, to the
citizens and their transactions as such, or as acting in the Federal government,
officially or otherwise; and cannot be laid upon and collected from individuals
or their proceedings when acting, not as citizens transacting business with each
other as such, but officially or in the pursuit of rights and duties in and through
State official agencies and institutions. When thus acting, they are not acting
under the jurisdiction nor within the power of the United States; not acting as
subjects of that government, not within its sphere of power over them; and
neither they nor their proceedings are subject to interference from the United
States. Can Congress regulate or prescribe the taxation of costs in a State
court? The Federal government may tax the governor of a State, or the
clerk of a State court, and his transactions as an individual, but not as a State
officer. This must be so, or the State may be annihilated at the pleasure of
the Federal government. The Federal government may perhaps take by tax-
ation most of the property in a State, if exigencies require; but it has not a
right, by direct or indirect means, to annihilate the functions of the State gov-
ernment."
The case of Hoyt «. Benner, 22 La. Am. 858, is opposed to those above
cited as to the power of the government to tax the process of State courts,
but the soundness of those decisions was really conceded by Congress in repeal-
ing the.provision of law that provided for the tax, and was recognized by Judge
Clifford, in Day r. Buffington, Am. Law Rev., Oct., 1870, p. 176.
It has been repeatedly decided that the act of Congress which provided that
certain papers not stamped should not be received in evidence must be limited in
[ 567]
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this subject, subsequent events have demonstrated that it was by
no means extravagant. An enormous national debt hat
[* 485] not only made * imposts necessary \vhich in some cases
reach several hundred per cent of the original cost of the
articles upon which they are imposed, but the systems of State
banking which were in force when the necessity for contracting
that debt first arose have been literally taxed out of existence by
burdens avowedly imposed for that very purpose.1 If taxation is
thus unlimited in its operation upon the objects within its reach.it
cannot be extravagant to say that the agencies of government are
necessarily excepted from it, since otherwise its exercise might
altogether destroy the government through the destruction of its
agencies. That which was predicted as a possible event has been
demonstrated by actual facts to be within the compass of the
power; and if considerations of policy were important, it might
be added that, if the States possessed the authority to tax the
agencies of the national government, they would hold within their
its operation to the Federal courts. Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452; Green
v. Holway, 101 Mass. 250; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 839; Clemens r. Conrad, 19 Mich.
170; Haight ». Grist, 64 N. C. 739; Griffin v. Ranney, 35 Conn. 239; People t.
Gates, 43 N. Y. 40; Bowen v. Byrne, 55 111. 467; Hale o. Wilkinson, 21 Grsi.
75; Atkins v. Plympton, 44 Vt. 21; Bumpas v. Taggart, 26 Ark. 398; s. c. I
Am. Rep. 623; Sammons v. Holloway, 21 Mich. 162; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 165;
Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240; Sporrer r. Eifler, 1 Heisk. 633; McEWain t.
Mudd, 44 Ala. 48; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 106; Burnson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415;
S. C. 4 Am. Rep. 497; Davis v. Richardson, 45 Miss. 499; a. c. 7 Am. Kef
732; Hunter v. Cobb,.6 Bush, 239; Craig v. Dimmock, 47 111. 308; Mooret.
Moore, 47 N. Y. 467; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 466. Several of these cases have gone
still farther, and declared that Congress cannot preclude parties from entering
into contracts permitted by the State laws, and that to declare them void was not
a proper penalty for the enforcement of tax laws. Congress cannot make void»
tax deed issued by a State. Sayles v. Davis, 22 Wis. 225. Nor require a stamp
upon the official bonds of State officers. State v. Garton, 32 Ind. 1. Nor tax tie
salary of a State officer. Day v. Buffington, Am. Law Rev. Oct. 1870, 176;
8. C. in error, 11 Wall. 113 ; Freedman v. Sigcl, 10 Blatch. 327. Nor forbid tie
recording of an unstamped instrument under the State laws. Moore r. Quirk,
105 Mass. 49; 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 499. "Power to tax for State purposes isu
much an exclusive power in the States, as the power to lay and collect taxes to
pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of tie
United States is an exclusive power in Congress." Clifford, J., Ward v. Marr-
land, 12 Wall. 427.
1 The constitutionality of this taxation was sustained by a divided court it
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.
[568 ]
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THE POWER OP TAXATION.
hands a constitutional weapon which factious and disappointed
parties would be able to wield with terrible effect when the policy
of the national government did not accord with their views ; while,
on the other hand, if the national government possessed a corre-
sponding power over the agencies of the State governments, there
would not be wanting men who, in times of strong party excite-
ment, would be willing and eager to resort to this power as a
means of coercing the States in their legislation upon the subjects
remaining under their control.
There are other subjects which are or may be removed from the
sphere of State taxation by force of the Constitution of the United
States, or of the legislation of Congress under it. That instru-
ment declares that "no State shall, without the consent of Con-
gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."
This prohibition has led to some difficulty in its practical applica-
tion. Imports, as such, are not to be taxed generally, but it was
not the purpose of the Constitution to exclude permanently from
the sphere of State taxation all property brought into the country
from abroad; and the difficulty met with has been in indicating
with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes the point of time at
which articles imported cease to be regarded as imports within the
meaning of the prohibition. In general terms it has been said
that when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported
that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of
property in the country, it has perhaps lost its distinctive character
as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the
State; but that while remaining the property of the importer, in
his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it
was * imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on im- [* 486]
ports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution.1 And
in the application of this rule it was declared that a State law
winch, for revenue purposes, required an importer to take a license
and pay fifty dollars before he should be permitted to sell a pack-
age of imported goods, was equivalent to laying a duty upon
imports. It has also been held in another case, that a stamp duty
imposed by the legislature of. California upon bills of lading for
gold or silver, transported from that State to any port or place out
1 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 441, per Marshall, Ch. J.
[569]
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* 486 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XIV.
of the State, was in effect a tax upon exports, and the law w
consequently void.1
Congress also is vested with power to regulate commerce; but
this power is not so far exclusive as to prevent regulations by the
States also, when they do not conflict with those established by
Congress.2 The States may unquestionably tax the subjects of
commerce; and no necessary conflict with that complete control
which is vested in Congress appears until the power is so exercised
as to defeat or embarrass the congressional legislation. Where
Congress has not acted at all upon the subject, the State taxation
cannot be invalid on this ground; but when national regulations
exist, under which rights are established or privileges given, the
State can impose no burdens which shall in effect make the enjoy-
ment of those rights and privileges contingent upon the payment
of tribute to the State.8
It is also believed that that provision in the Constitu-
[* 487] tion of the * United States, which declares that "the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of the citizens of the several States," 4 will pre-
clude any State from imposing upon the property within its limits
belonging to citizens of other States any higher burdens by way of
taxation than are imposed upon the like property of its own citi-
zens. This is the express decision of the Supreme Court of
1 Almy v. People, 24 How. 169. See also Brumagim ». Tillinghast, 18 Cal.
265; Garrison v. Tillinghast, to. 404.
* Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. See also Wilson r. Blackbird
Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245.
* In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 141, it was held that a license fee of fifty
dollars, required by the State of an importer before he should be permitted to
sell imported goods, was unconstitutional, as coming directly in conflict with the
regulations of Congress over commerce. For further discussion of this subject,
see New York o. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Lin Sing r.
Washburn, 20 Cal. 534; Erie Railway Co. v. New Jersey, 2 Vroom, 531, revers-
ing same case in 1 Vroom; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 3 Grant,
128; Hinsen o. Lott, 40 Vt. 133; Commonwealth ». Erie R.R., 62 Penn. St.
286; Osborn v. Mobile, 44 Ala. 493; Woleott v. People, 17 Mich. 6a In
Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, it was held that a State law imposing a tax of
one dollar on each person leaving the State by public conveyance was not void is
coming in conflict with the control of Congress over commerce, though set aside
on other grounds. This general subject underwent some discussion in the recent
case of Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 ; and also in Case of State Freight Tax,
15 Wall. 232, and Case of tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284.
* Art. 4, § 2.
[ 570 ]
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CH. XIV.] THE POWER OP TAXATION. * 487
Alabama,1 following in this particular the dictum of an eminent
Federal judge at an early day,2 and the same doctrine has been
recently affirmed by the Federal Supreme Court.3
Having thus indicated the extent of the taxing power, it is neces-
sary to add that certain elements are essential in all taxation, and
that it will not follow as of course, because the power is so vast,
that every thing which may be done under pretence of its exercise
will leave the citizen without redress, even though there be no con-
flict with express constitutional inhibitions. Every thing that may
be done under the name of taxation is not necessarily a tax; and
it may happen that an oppressive burden imposed by the govern-
ment, when it comes to be carefully scrutinized, will prove, instead
of a tax, to be an unlawful confiscation of property, unwarranted
by any principle of constitutional government.
In the first place, taxation having for its only legitimate object
the raising of money for public purposes and the proper needs of
government, the exaction of moneys from the citizens for other
purposes is not a proper exercise of this power, and must therefore
be unauthorized. In this place, however, we do not use the word
public in any narrow and restricted sense, nor do we mean to be
understood that whenever the legislature shall overstep the legit-
imate bounds of their authority, the case will be such that the
courts can interfere to arrest their action. There are many cases
of unconstitutional action by the representatives of the people
which can be reached only through the ballot-box; and there are
other cases where the line of distinction between that which is
allowable and that which is not is so faint and shadowy that the
decision of the legislature must be accepted as final, even though
the judicial opinion might be different. But there are still
other cases where * it is entirely possible for the legisla- [* 488]
ture so clearly to exceed the bounds of due authority that
we cannot doubt the right of the courts to interfere and check
what can only be looked upon as ruthless extortion, provided the
nature of the case is such that judicial process can afford relief.
1 Wiley ». Parmer, 14 Ala. 627.
* Washington, J., in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 880. And see Camp-
bell r. Morris, 8 H. & McH. 554; Ward v. Morris, 4 H. & McH. 340; and other
cases cited, ante, p. 16, note. See also Oliver ». Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268.
» Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 430. Case of State Tax on foreign held bonds,
15 Wall. 300.
[571]
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An unlimited power to make any and every thing lawful which the
legislature might see fit to call taxation, would be, when plainly
stated, an unlimited power to plunder the citizen.1
It must always be conceded that the proper authority to deter-
mine what should and what should not properly constitute a public
burden is the legislative department of the State. This is not only
true for the State at large, but it is true also in respect to each
municipality or political division of the State; these inferior cor-
porate existences having only such authority in this regard as the
legislature shall confer upon them.2 And in determining this
question, the legislature cannot be held to any narrow or technical
rule. Certain expenditures are not only absolutely necessary to
the continued existence of the government, but as a matter of
policy it may sometimes be proper and wise to assume other bur-
dens which rest entirely on considerations of honor, gratitude, or
charity. The officers of government must be paid, the laws print-
ed, roads constructed, and public buildings erected; but with a
view to the general well-being of society, it may also be important
that the children of the State should be educated, the poor kept
from starvation, losses in the public service indemnified, and incen-
tives held out to faithful and fearless discharge of duty in the
future, by the payment of pensions to those who have been faithful
public servants in the past. There will therefore be necessary
expenditures, and expenditures which rest upon considerations of
policy alone; and in regard to the one as much as to the other,
the decision of that department to which alone questions of State
policy are addressed must be accepted as conclusive.
Very strong language has been used by the courts, in some of
1 Tyson o. School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9; Morford v. linger, 8 Iowa, 92;
Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 421; Hansen v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28; Allen v. Jay,
60 Me. 139; Ferguson ». Landraw, 5 Bush, 230; People v. Township Board of
Salem, 21 Mich. 459; Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 353; s. c. 8 Am. Rep.
255. "It is the clear right of every citizen to insist that no unlawful or unauthor-
ized exaction shall be made upon bim under the guise of taxation. If any such
illegal encroachment is attempted, he can always invoke the aid of the judicial
tribunals for his protection, and prevent his money or other property from being
taken and appropriated for a purpose and in a manner not authorized by the Con-
stitution and laws." Per Bigelow, Ch. J., in Freeland r. Hastings, 10 Allen, 575.
See Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 379 ; People v. Suprs. of Saginaw, 26 Mich. 22.
* Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123. See anie, p. 230, and cases cited in
note to p. 489.
[ 572 ]
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the cases on this subject. In a case where was questioned
the * validity of the State law confirming township action [*489]
which granted gratuities to persons enlisting in the mili-
tary service of the United States, the Supreme Court of Connec-
ticut assigned the following reasons in its favor: —
"In the first place, if it be conceded that it is not competent for
the legislative power to make a gift of the common property, or of
a sum of money to be raised by taxation, where no possible public
benefit, direct or indirect, can be derived therefrom, such exercise
of the legislative power must be of an extraordinary character
to justify the interference of the judiciary; and this is not that
case.
"Second. If there be the least possibility that making the gift
will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a
question of policy, and not of natural justice, and the determination
of the legislature is conclusive. And such is this case. Such gifts
to unfortunate classes of society, as the indigent blind, the deaf
and dumb, or insane, or grants to particular colleges or schools, or
grants of pensions, swords, or other mementos for past services,
involving the general good indirectly and in slight degree, are fre-
quently made and never questioned.
"Third. The government of the United States was constituted
by the people of the State, although acting in concert with the
people of the other States, and the general good of the people of
this State is involved in the maintenance of that general govern-
ment. In many conceivable ways the action of the town might
not only mitigate the burdens imposed upon a class, but render the
service of that class more efficient to the general government, and
therefore it must be presumed that the legislature found that the
public good would be thereby promoted.
"And fourth. It is obviously possible, and therefore to be
intended, that the General Assembly found a clear equity to justify
their action."1
1 Booth p. Woodbury, 82 Conn. 128. See to the same effect Speer v. School
Directors of Blairville, 50 Penn. St. 150. The legislature is not obliged to con-
sult the will of the people concerned in ordering the levy of local assessments
for the public purposes of the local government. Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monp.
350; Slack p. Maysville, &c, R.R. Co., 13 B. Monp. 26; Cypress Fond Drain-
ing Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met (Ky.) 353. Compare People p. Common Council of
Detroit, 27 Mich.
[ 573 ]
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And the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has said: "To justify the
court in arresting the proceedings and in declaring the tax void,
the absence of all possible public interest in the purposes for which
the funds are raised must be clear and palpable; so clear and pal-
pable as to be perceptible by every mind at the first blush. .. It is
not denied that claims founded in equity and justice, in the
[* 490] * largest sense of those terms, or in gratitude or charity, will
support a tax. Such is the language of the authorities."1
But we think it clear in the words of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, that "the legislature cannot ... in the form of a tax
take the money of the citizen and give to an individual, the public
interest or welfare being in no way connected with the transaction.
The objects for which money is raised by taxation must be public,
and such as subserve the common interest and well-being of the
community required to contribute." 2 Or, as stated by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, " the legislature has no constitutional right
to . . . levy a tax, or to authorize any municipal corporation to
do it, in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. No such
authority passed to the assembly by the general grant of the legis-
lative power. This would not be legislation. Taxation is a mode
of raising revenue for public purposes. When it is prostituted to
objects in no way connected with the public interest or welfare, it
ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder. Transferring money
from the owners of it into the possession of those who have no tide
to it, though it be done under the name and form of a tax, is
unconstitutional for all the reasons which forbid the legislature to
usurp any other power not granted to them." 3 And by the same
court, in a still later case, where the question was whether the
legislature could lawfully require a municipality to refund to a
bounty association the sums which they had advanced to relieve
themselves from an impending military conscription," such an en-
actment would not be legislation at all. It would be in the nature
of judicial action, it is true, but wanting the justice of notice to
1 Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652; Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wis.
411; Springe. Russell, 7 Greenl. 273; Williams v. School District, 33.
8 Per Dixon, Ch. J., in Brodhead r. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652. See also
Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282; Opinions of Judges, 58 Me. 590; Moulton t.
Raymond, 60 Me. 121; post, 494 aud note.
* Per Black, Ch. J., in Sharpless v. Mayor, &c, 21 Penn. St. 168. See
Opinions of Judges, 58 Me. 690.
[ 574 ]
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THE POWER OF TAXATION.
parties to be affected by the hearing, trial, and all that gives sanc-
tion and force to regular judicial proceedings; it would much more
resemble an imperial rescript than constitutional legislation: first,
in declaring an obligation where none was created or previously
existed; and next, in decreeing payment, by directing the money ,
or property of the people to be sequestered to make the payment.
The legislature can exercise no such despotic functions."1
'Tyson v. School Directors of Halifax, 51 Penn. St. 9. See also Grim v.
Weisenburg School District, 57 Penn. St. 433. The decisions in Miller v.
Grandy, 13 Mich. 540, Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9, and Shackford
v. Newington, 46 N. H. 415, so far as they hold that a bounty law is not to be
held to cover moneys before advanced by an individual without any pledge of
the public credit, must be held referable, we think, to the same principle. We
are aware that there are some cases, the doctrine of which seems opposed to
those we have cited, but perhaps a careful examination will enable us to harmo-
nize them all. One of these is Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb.
615, and 13 N. Y. 143. The facts in that case were as follows: Cornell and
Clark were formerly commissioners of highways of the town of Guilford, and as
such, by direction of the voters of the town, had sued the Butternut and Oxford
Turnpike Road Company. They were unsuccessful in the action, and were,
after a long litigation, obliged to pay costs. The town then refused to reimburse
them these costs. Cornell and Clark sued the town, and, after prosecuting the
action to the court of last resort, ascertained that they had no legal remedy.
They then applied to the legislature, and procured an act authorizing the ques-
tion of payment or not by the town to be submitted to the voters at the succeed-
ing town meeting. The voters decided that they would not tax themselves for
any such purpose. Another application was then made to the legislature, which
resulted in a law authorizing the county judge of Chenango County to appoint
three commissioners, whose duty it should be to hear and determine the amount
of costs and expenses incurred by Cornell and Clark in the prosecution and
defence of the suits mentioned. It authorized the commissioners to make an
award, which was to be filed with the county clerk, and the board of supervisors
were then required, at their next annual meeting, to apportion the amount of
the award upon the taxable property of the town of Guilford, and provide for
its collection in the same manner as other taxes are collected. The validity
of this act was affirmed. It was regarded as one of those of which Denio, J.,
says "the statute book is full, perhaps too full, of laws awarding damages and
compensation of various kinds to be paid by the public to individuals, who had
failed to obtain what they considered equitably due to them by the decision of
administrative officers acting under the provisions of former laws. The courts
have no power to supervise or review the doings of the legislature in such cases."
It is apparent that there was a strong equitable claim upon the township in this
case for the reimbursement of moneys expended by public officers under the direc-
tion of their constituents, and perhaps no principle of constitutional law was
violated by the legislature thus changing it into a legal demand, and compelling
[ 675]
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[*491] *The Supreme Court of Michigan has proceeded upon
the same principle in a recent case. The State is forbid-
its satisfaction. Mp. Sedgwick criticises this act, and says of it that it "may be
called taxation, but in truth it is the reversal of a judicial decision." Sedg. on
Stat, and Const. Law, 414. There are very many claims, however, j-esting in
equity, which the courts would be compelled to reject, but which it would be
very proper for the legislature to recognize, and provide for by taxation. Brew-
ster v. City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116. Another case, perhaps still stronger
than that of Guilford p. The Supervisors, is Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65.
Persons at Utica had given bond to pay the extraordinary expense that would
be caused to the State by changing the junction of the Chenango Canal from
Whitesborough to Utica, and the legislature afterwards passed an act requiring
the amount to be levied by a tax on the real property of the city of Utica.
The theory of this act may be stated thus: The canal was a public way. The
expense of constructing all public ways may be properly charged on the commu-
nity specially or peculiarly benefited by it. The city of Utica was specially and
peculiarly benefited by having the canal terminate there; and as the expense of
construction was thereby increased, it was proper and equitable that the property
to be benefited should pay this difference, instead of the State at large. The
act was sustained by the courts, and it was well remarked that the fact that a
bond had been before given securing the same money could not detract from its
validity. Whether this case can stand with some others, and especially with that
of Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 83, we have elsewhere expressed a doubt,
and it must be conceded that, for the legislature in any case to compel a munici-
pality to assume a burden, on the ground of local benefit or local obligation,
against the will of the citizens, is the exercise of an arbitrary power little in
harmony with the general features of our republican system, and only to be jus-
tified, if at all, in extreme cases. The general idea of our tax system is, that
those shall vote the burdens who are to pay them; and it would be intolerable
that a central authority should have power, not only to tax localities, for local pur-
poses of a public character which they did not approve, but also, if it so pleased,
to compel them to assume and discharge private claims not equitably chargeable
upon them. See the New York cases above referred to criticised in State p.
Tappan, 29 Wis. 674, 680. See also Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 416. The cases of
Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monp. 880; Sharp's Ex. v. Dunavan, 17 B. Monp. 228;
Maltus p. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.) 553, will throw some light on this general sub-
ject The case of Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 350, is
also instructive. The Cypress Pond Draining Company was incorporated to
drain and keep drained the lands within a specified boundary, at the cost of the
owners, and was authorized by the act to collect a tax on each acre, not exceed-
ing twenty-five cents per acre, for that purpose, for ten years, to be collected by
the sheriff. With the money thus collected, the board of managers, six in num-
ber, named in the act, was required to drain certain creeks and ponds within
said boundary. The members of the board owned in the aggregate 3,840 acres,
the larger portion of which was low land, subject to inundation, and of little or
no value in its then condition, but which would be rendered very valuable by
[576 ]
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CH. XIV.] THE POWER OF TAXATION. * 491
den by the * constitution to engage in works of public im- [* 492]
provement, except in the expenditure of grants or other
property made to it for this purpose. The State, witli this prohibi-
tion in force, entered into a contract with a private party for the
construction by such party of an improvement in the
Muskegon River, for which the State was to pay * the [* 493]
contractor fifty thousand dollars, from the Internal Im-
provement Fund. The improvement was made, but the State
officers declined to draw warrants for the amount, on the ground
that the fund from which payment was to have been made was
exhausted. The State then passed an act for the levying of tolls
upon the property passing through the improvement sufficient to
pay the contract price within five years. The court held this act
void. As the State had no power to construct or pay for such a
work from its general fund, and could not constitutionally have
agreed to pay the contractors from tolls, there was no theory on
which the act could be supported, except it was that the State had
misappropriated the Internal Improvement Fund, and therefore
ought to provide payment from some other source. But if the
State had misappropriated the fund, the burden of reimbursement
would fall upon the State at large ; it could not lawfully be imposed
upon a single town or district, or upon the commerce of a single
town or district. The burden must be borne by those upon whom
it justly rests, and to recognize in the State a power to compel
some single district to assume and discharge a State debt would
be to recognize its power to make an obnoxious district or an ob-
noxious class bear the whole burden of the State government. An
act to that effect would not be taxation, nor would it be the exer-
cise of any legitimate legislative authority.1. And it may be said
the contemplated draining. The corporate boundary contained 14,621 acres,
owned by sixty-eight persons. Thirty-four of these, owning 5975 acres, had
no agency in the passage of the act, and no notice of the application therefor,
gave no assent to its provisions, and a very small portion of their land, if any,
would be benefited or improved in value by the proposed draining; and they
resisted the collection of the tax. As to these owners the act of incorporation
was held unconstitutional and inoperative. See also The City of Covington v.
Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 491; Lovingston r. Wider, 58 111. 302; Curtis v.
Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401; People v. Bacheller,
Albany Law Journal, Aug. 23, 1873; People v. Common Council of Detroit, 27
Mich.
1 Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269. See also People v. Springwells, 25 Mich.153.
37 [ 577 ]
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* 493 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XIV.
of such an act, that, so far as it would operate to make those.,*
would pay the tolls pay more than their proportion of the
[* 494] State obligation, it * was in effect taking their property for
the private benefit of other citizens^of the State, and was
obnoxious to all the objections against the appropriation of private
property for private purposes which could exist in any other case.
And the Supreme Court of Iowa has said: "If there be such a
flagrant and palpable departure from equity in the burden imposed;
if it be imposed for the benefit of others, or for purposes in which
those objecting have no interest, and are therefore not bound to
contribute, it is no matter in what form the power is exercised,—
whether in the unequal levy of a tax, or in the regulation of the
boundaries of the local government, which results in subjecting the
party unjustly to local taxes, — it must be regarded as coming
within the prohibition of the constitution designed to protect pri-
"Uniformity in taxation implies equality in the burden of taxation." Bankt.
Hines, 3 Ohio, S. s. 15. "This equality in the burden constitutes the very sub-
stance designed to be secured by the rule." Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10
Wis. 258. See also Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273; State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660.
The reasoning of these cases seems not to have been satisfactory to the New Yon;
Court of Appeals. See Gordon v. Comes, 47 N. Y. 614, in which an act was sus-
tained which authorized "and required" the village of Brockport to'levy a tu
for the erection of a State Normal School building at that place. No recent cast,
we think, has gone so far as this. Compare State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 674;
Mayor of Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310. "There can be no doubt that, as>
general rule, where an expenditure is to be made for a public object, the execution
of which will be substantially beneficial to every portion of the Commonweaka
alike, and in the benefits and advantages of which all the people will equally
participate, if the money is to be raised by taxation, the assessment would
be deemed to come within that class which was laid to defray one of the general
charges of government, and ought therefore to be imposed as nearly as possible
with equality upon all persons resident and estates lying within the Common-
wealth. . . . An assessment for such a purpose, if laid in any other manner,
could not in any just or proper sense be regarded as ' proportional' within tk
meaning of the Constitution." Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen, 504,
per Bigelow, Ch. J. This case holds that local taxation for a State purpose may
be permitted in consideration of local benefits, and only differs in principle from
Gordon v. Cornes, in that the one permitted what the other required. The case
of Marks v. Trustees of Pardue University, 37 Ind. 165, follows Merrick r.
Amherst. Taxation not levied according to the principles upon which the right
to tax is based, is an unlawful appropriation of private property to public usei
City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 498; People ». Township Board of
Salem, 20 Mich. 452; Tide Water Co. v. Costar, 3 C. E. Green, 519; H&mmett
v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146; s. O. 8 Am. Rep. 615.
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ff.lrrjfe. XIV.] THE POWER OP TAXATION. * 494
vate rights against oppression however made, and whether under
color of recognized power or not." 1
When, therefore, the legislature assumes to impose a pecuniary
burden upon the citizen in the form of a tax, two questions may
always be raised: First, whether the purpose of such burden may
properly be considered public on any of the grounds above indi-
cated ;2 and second, if public, then whether the burden is one which
should properly be borne by the district upon which it is imposed.
If either of these questions is answered in the negative, the legis-
lature must be adjudged to harve assumed an authority not con-
ferred in the general grant of legislative power, and which is
therefore unconstitutional and void. "The power of taxation,"
says an eminent writer, "is a great governmental attribute, with
which the courts have very wisely shown extreme unwillingness to
interfere; but if abused, the abuse should share the fate of all
other usurpations." 3 In the case of burdens thus assumed by the
legislature on behalf of the State, it is not always that a speedy
and safe remedy can be properly afforded in the courts. It would
certainly be a very dangerous exercise of power for a court to
attempt to stay the collection of State taxes because an illegal
demand was included in the levy; and indeed, as State taxes are
not usually levied for the purpose of satisfying specific demands,
but a gross sum is raised which it is calculated will be sufficient
for the wants of the year, the question is not one usually of the
unconstitutionality of taxation, but of the misappropriation of
moneys which have been raised by taxation. But if the State
should order a city, township, or village to raise money by taxa-
tion to establish one of its citizens in business, or for any other
object equally removed from the proper sphere of government, or
should undertake to impose the whole burden of the govern-
ment upon a fraction of the State, the usurpation of authority
1 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 92. See Durant v. Kauffman, 34 Iowa, 194.
* Though the legislature first decides that the use is public, the decision is not
conclusive. They cannot make that a public purpose which is not so in fact.
Gove v. Eppiug, 41 N. H. 539; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Freeland p.
Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 379; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me.
124; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 651 ; Ferguson v. Landraw, 5 Bush, 230; Kelly
p. Marshall, 69 Penn. St. 319; People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401; Curtis v. Whip-
ple, 24 Wis. 350.
3 Sedgwick on Const, and Stat. Law, 414.
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[ch. x:
[* 495] would not only be * plain and palpable, but the proper
remedy would also be plain, and no court of competent
jurisdiction could feel at liberty to decline to enforce the paramount
law.
In the second place, it is of the very essence of taxation that it
be levied with equality and uniformity, and to this end, that there
should be some system of apportionment. Where the burden i
common, there should be common contribution to discharge it.1
Taxation is the equivalent for the protection which the government
affords to the persons and property of its citizens; and as all are
alike protected, so all alike should bear the burden, in proportion
to the interests secured. Taxes by the poll are justly regarded as
odious, and are seldom resorted to for the collection of revenue;
and when taxes are levied upon property there must be an appor-
tionment with reference to a uniform standard, or they degenerate
into mere arbitrary exactions. Iu this particular the State consti-
tutions have been very specific, though in providing for equality and
uniformity they have done little more than to state in concise lan-
guage a principle of constitutional law which, whether declared or
not, would inhere in the power to tax.
Taxes may assume the form of duties, imposts, and excises:
and those collected by the national government are very largely of
this character. They may also assume the form of license fees, for
permission to carry on particular occupations, or to enjoy special
franchises. They may be specific; such as are often levied upon
corporations, in reference to the amount of capital stock, or to the
business done, or profits earned by them. Or they may be direct,
upon property, iu proportion to its value, or upon some other basis
of apportionment, which the legislature shall regard as just, and
which shall keep in view the general idea of uniformity. The taxes
collected by the States are mostly of the latter class, and it is to
them that the constitutional principles we shall have occasion to
discuss will more particularly apply.
As to all taxation apportioned upon property, there must be
taxing districts, and within these districts the rule of absolute
uniformity must be applicable. A State tax is to be apportioned
1 2 Kent, 231; Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273 ; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich.
269; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268; Tidewater Co. v. CosUr, 5
C. E. Green, 519.
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(
through the State, a county tax through the county, a city tax
through the city; while in the case of local improvements, benefit-
ing in a special and peculiar manner some portion of the State or
of a county or city, it is competent to arrange a special taxing
district, within which the expense shall be apportioned.
School districts and road districts are * also taxing dis- [* 496]
tricts for the peculiar purposes for which they exist, and
villages may have special powers of taxation distinct from the
townships of which they form a part. Whenever it is made a
requirement of the State constitution that taxation shall be upon
property according to value, such a requirement implies an assess-
ment of valuation by public officers at such regular periods as
shall be provided by law, and a taxation upon the basis of such
assessment until the period arrives for making it anew. Thus, the
Constitutions of Maine and Massachusetts require that there should
be a valuation of estates within the Commonwealth to be made
at least every ten years;1 the Constitution of Michigan requires
the annual assessments which are made by township officers to be
equalized by a State board, which reviews them for that purpose
every five years; 2 and the Constitution of Rhode Island requires
the legislature "from time to time" to provide for new valuations
of property for the assessment of taxes in such manner as they
may deem best.8 Some other Constitutions contain no provisions
upon this subject; but the necessity for valuation is nevertheless
implied, though the mode of making it, and the periods at which
it shall be made, are left to the legislative discretion.
There are some kinds of taxes, however, that are not usually
assessed according to the value of property, and some which could .
not be thus assessed. And there is probably no State which does
not levy other taxes than those which are imposed upon property.4
Every burden which the State imposes upon its citizens with a view
to a revenue, either for itself or for any of the municipal govern-
ments, or for the support of the governmental machinery in any
of tiie political divisions, is levied under the power of taxation,
whether imposed under the name of tax, or under some other
1 Constitution of Maine, art. 9, § 7; Constitution of Mass., Part 2, c. 1, § 1,
art. 4.
* Constitution of Mich., art. 14, § 13.
* Constitution of Rhode Island, art. 4, § 15.
* See Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind. 223.
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designation. The license fees which are sometimes required to
be paid by those who follow particular employments are, when
imposed for purposes of revenue, taxes; the tolls upon the per-
sons or property making use of the works of public improvement
owned and controlled by the State, are a species of tax; stamp
duties when imposed are taxes, and it is not uncommon, as we
have already stated, to require that corporations shall pay
[* 497] a certain sum annually, in proportion to their * capital
stock, or by some other standard, and which is the mode
regarded by the State as most convenient and suitable for the
taxation of such organizations. It is evident, therefore, that the
constitutional requirements sometimes met with, that taxation upon
property shall be according to value, do not include every species
of taxation; but all special cases like those we have here referred
to are, by implication, excepted.
But in addition to these cases, there are others where taxes are
levied directly upon property, which are nevertheless held not to
be within the constitutional provisions. Assessments for the open-
ing, making, improving, or repairing of streets, the draining of
swamps, and the like local works, have been generally made upon
property, with some reference to the supposed benefits which the
property would receive therefrom. Instead, therefore, of making
the assessment include all the property of the municipal organiza-
tion in which the improvement is made, a new aud special taxing
district is created, whose bounds are confined to the limits within
which property receives a special and peculiar benefit, in conse-
quence of the improvement. Even within this district the assess-
ment is sometimes made by some other standard than that of
value; and it is evident that if it be just to create the taxing
district with reference to special benefits, it would be equally just
and proper to make the taxation within the district have reference
to the benefit each parcel of property receives, rather than to its
relative value. The opening or paving of a street may increase
the value of all property upon or near it; and it may be just that
all such property should contribute to the expense of the improve-
ment: but it by no means follows that each parcel of the property
will receive from the improvement a benefit in proportion to the
previous value. One lot upon the street may be greatly increased
in value, another at a little distance may be but slightly benefited;
and if no constitutional provision interferes, there is consequently
[ 582]
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THE POWER OP TAXATION.
abundant reason why the tax levied within the taxing district
should have reference, not to value, but to benefit.
It has been objected, however, to taxation upon this basis, that
inasmuch as the district upon which the burden is imposed is com-
pelled to make the improvement for the benefit of the general
public, it is, to the extent of the tax levied, an appropriation of
private property for the public use; and as the persons taxed, as a
part of the public, would be entitled of right to the enjoyment of
the improvement when made, such right of enjoyment could not
be treated as compensation for the exaction made, and such exac-
tion would therefore be opposed to those constitutional principles
which declare the inviolability of private property. But those
principles have no reference to the taking of property under the
right of taxation. When the constitution provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation made therefore, it has reference to * an [* 498]
appropriation thereof under the right of eminent domain.
Taxation and eminent domain indeed rest substantially on the
same foundation, as each implies the taking of private property for
the public use on compensation made; but the compensation is
different in the two cases. When taxation takes money for the
public use, the tax-payer receives, or is supposed to receive, his
just compensation in the protection which government affords to
his life, liberty, and property, and in the increase in the value of
his possessions by the use to which the government applies the
money raised by the tax,1 and either of these benefits will support
the burden.
But if these special local levies are taxation, do they come under
the general provisions on the subject of taxation to be found in
our State constitutions? The Constitution of Michigan provides
that "the legislature shall provide an uniform rule of taxation,
except on property paying specific taxes; and taxes shall be levied
upon such property as shall be prescribed by law;"2 and again:
"All assessments hereafter authorized shall be on property at its
cash value." 3 The first of these provisions has been regarded as
1 People p. Mayor, &p., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 422; Williams v. Mayor, &c,
of Detroit, 2 Mich. 565; Scovills v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, n. s. 126; Northern
Indiana R.R. Co. p. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. s. 165; Washington Avenue, 69 Penn.
St. 853 ; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 255.
• Art. 14, § 11.
3 Art. 14, § 12.
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confiding to the discretion of the legislature the establishment of
the rule of uniformity by which taxation was to be imposed; and
the second as having reference to the annual valuation of property
for the purposes of taxation, which it is customary to make in that
State, and not to the actual levy of a tax. And a local tax, there-
fore, levied in the city of Detroit, to meet the expense of paving a
public street, and which was levied, not in proportion to the value
of property, but according to an arbitrary scale of supposed benefit,
was held not invalid under the constitutional provision.1
So the Constitution of Illinois provides that " the General As-
sembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value
of his or her property; such value to be ascertained by some per-
son or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the
General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise,"2 &c. The
charter of the city of Peoria provided that, when a public
[* 499] street * was opened or improved, commissioners should be
appointed by the county court to assess upon the property
benefited the expense of the improvement in proportion to the
benefit. These provisions were held to be constitutional, on the
ground that assessments of this character were not such taxation
as was contemplated by the general terms which the constitution
employed.3 And a similar view of these local assessments has
been taken in other cases.4
1 Williams v. Mayor, &c, of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560. And see Woodbridge t>.
Detroit, 8 Mich. 274. * Art 9, § 2.
* City of Peoria v. Kidder, 26 111. 357. See also Canal Trustees t>. Chicago,
12 111. 406. In the subsequent case of Chicago e. Larned, 34 111. 203, it was
decided, after very full argument and consideration, that, while taxation for these
local assessments might constitutionally be made in proportion and to the extent
of the benefits received, it could not be made on the basis of frontage. This case
was followed in Wright v. Chicago, 46 111. 44.
* People v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 419; Matter of Mayor, &c, of
New York, 11 Johns. 77; Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Livingston v. Mayor, &c, of
New York, 8 Wend. 85; Matter of Furman St., 17 Wend. 649 ; Nichols ». Bridge-
port, 23 Conn. 189; Schenley v. City of Alleghany, 25 Penn. St. 128; Wray v. Pitts-
burg, 46 Penn. St. 865; Hammett o. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146; s. c. 3 Am.
Rep. 615; Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 353; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 255; McBride
v. Chicago, 22 111. 574; Chicago v. Larned, 34 111. 203; City of Lexington v.
McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513; Barnes p. Atchison, 2 Kansas, 454; Hinea r. Leav-
enworth, 3 Kansas, 186; St. Joseph t>. O'Donoghue, 31 Mo. 345; Egyptian Levee
Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; St. Joseph v. Anthony, 30 Mo. 537 ; Burnet v. Sacra-
-
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THE POWER OP TAXATION.
But whatever may be the basis of the taxation, the requirement
that it shall be uniform is universal. It applies as much to these
local assessments as to any other species of taxes. The difference
is only in the character of the uniformity, and in the basis on which
it is established. But to render taxation uniform in any case, two
things are essential. The first of these is that each taxing district
should confine itself to the objects of taxation within its limits.
Otherwise there is, or may be, duplicate taxation, and of course
inequality. Assessments upon real estate not lying within the
taxing districts would be void,1 and assessments for per-
sonal property * made against persons not residing in the [* 500]
district would also be void, unless made with reference to
the actual presence of the property in such district.2
mento, 12 Cal. 76; Teatman v. Crandell, 11 La. An. 220; Wallace v. Shelton, 14
La. An. 498 ; Richardson v. Morgan, 16 La. An. 429; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, n. a.
243 ; Marion v. Epler, t'6.250; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, N. 8. 333;
Northern Ind. R.R. Co. v. Connolly, 10 Ohio, N. s. 159; Baker v. Cincinnati,
11 Ohio, N. s. 534; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, n. s. 636; State r. Dean, 3
Zab. 335 ; State v. Mayor, &c., of Jersey City, 4 Zab. 662; Bond o. Kenosha, 17
Wis. 289; City of Fairfield ». Ratcliff, 20 Iowa, 396; Municipality No. 2 v.
White, 9 La. An. 447; Cumming v. Police Jury, ib. 503; Northern Liberties v.
St. John's Church, 13 Penn. St. 107; McGee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40; Goodrich
e. Winchester, &c, Turnpike Co., 26 Ind. 119; Emery e. Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345;
Palmer v. Stumpb, 29 Ind. 329; Dergan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223. In Alabama
a recent decision has been made the other way. The constitution provides that
"all taxes levied on property in this State shall be assessed in exact proportion
to the value of such property; provided, however, that the General Assembly
may levy a poll tax not to exceed one dollar and fifty cents on each poll, which
shall be applied exclusively in aid of the public school fund." This, it was
decided, would preclude the levy of a local assessment for the improvement of a
street by the foot front. Mayor of Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310. The cases
of Weeks o. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, and Lumsden v. Cross, ib. 282, recognize
the fact that these local burdens are generally imposed under the name of assess-
ments instead of taxes, and that therefore they are not covered by the general
provisions in the constitution of the State on the subject of -taxation. And see
Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 284; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599. An exemption
of church property from taxation will not preclude its being assessed for improv-
ing streets in front of it. See post, 514, note.
1 But sometimes, when a parcel of real estate lies partly in two districts,
authority is given by law to assess the whole in one of these districts, and the
whole parcel may then be considered as having been embraced within the district
where taxed, by an enlargement of the district bounds to include it. Saunders v.
Springstein, 4 Wend. 429.
* People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. Y. 663; Mygatt v. Washburn,
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In Wells v. City of Weston,1 the Supreme Court of Missouri
deny the right of the legislature to subject property located in one
taxing district to taxation in another, upon the express ground
that it is .in substance the arbitrary taxation of the property of
one class of citizens for the benefit of another class. The case was
one where the legislature sought to subject real estate lying out-
side the limits of a city to taxation for city purposes, on the theory
that it received some benefit from the city government, and ought
to contribute to its support. In Kentucky2 and Iowa3 decisions
have been made which, while affirming the same principle as the
case above cited, go still further, and declare that it is not
competent for the legislature to increase the limits of a city, in
order to include therein farming lands, occupied by the owner for
agricultural purposes, and not required for either streets or houses,
or other purposes of a town, and solely for the purpose of increas-
ing the city revenue by taxation. The courts admit that the
extension of the limits of a city or town, so as to include its actual
enlargement, as manifested by houses and population, is to be
deemed a legitimate exercise of the taxing power, but they declare
that an indefinite or unreasonable extension, so as to embrace
lands or farms at a distance from the local government, does not
rest upon the same authority. And although it may be a delicate
as well as a difficult duty for the judiciary to interpose, the court
had no doubt but strictly there are limits beyond which the legis-
lative discretion cannot go. "It is not every case of injustice or
oppression which may be reached; and it is not every case which
will authorize a judicial tribunal to inquire into the minute opera-
tion of laws imposing taxes, or defining the boundaries of local
jurisdictions. The extension of the limits of the local authority
may in some cases be greater than is necessary to include the
adjacent population, or territory laid out into city lots,
[* 501] without a * case being presented in which the courts
would be called upon to apply a nice and exact scrutiny as
to its practical operation. It must be a case of flagrant injustice
15 N. Y. 316; Brown v. Smith, 24 Barb. 419 ; Hartland v. Church, 47 Me. 169;
Lessee of Hughey v. Horrell, 2 Ohio, 231.
1 22 Mo. 385.
* City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monp. 491; Arbegust p. Louisville,
3 Bush, 271.
3 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.
[586 ]
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THE POWER OP TAXATION.
and palpable wrong, amounting to the taking of private properly
without such compensation in return as the tax-payer is at liberty
to consider a fair equivalent for the tax." This decision has been
subsequently recognized and followed as authority, in the last-
named State.1
The second essential is that there should be uniformity in the
manner of the assessment, and approximate equality in the amount
of exactions within the district; and to this end that all the objects
of taxation within the district should be embraced. The correct-
ness of this principle will be conceded, but whether in practice it
has been applied or not, it may not always be easy to determine.
"With the single exception of specific taxes," says Ohrwtiancy,
J., in Woodbridge v. Detroit,2 " the terms ' tax ' and ' assessment'
both, I think, wheu applied to property, and especially to lands,
always include the idea of some ratio or rule of apportionment, so
that of the whole sum to be raised, the part paid by one piece of
property shall bear some known relation to, or be affected by, that
paid by anothep. Thus, if one hundred dollars are to be raised
from tracts A, B, and C, the amount paid by A will reduce by so
much that to be paid by B and C, and so of the others. In the case
of specific taxes, as well as duties and imposts, though the amount
paid by one is not affected by that paid by another, yet there is a
known and fixed relation of one to the other, a uniform rate by
which it is imposed upon the whole species or class of property or
persons to which the specific tax applies; and this is so of duties
and imposts, whether specific or ad valorem. To compel individuals
to contribute money or property to the use of the public, without
1 Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 404;
Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 28'2. These cases were cited and followed in Bradshaw
p. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16. These cases, however, do not hold the legislative act
which enlarges the city limits to be absolutely void, but only hold that they
will limit the exercise of the taxing power as nearly as practicable to the line
where the extension of the boundaries ceases to be beneficial to the proprietor
in a municipal point of view. For this purpose they enter into an inquiry of
fact, whether the lands in question, in view of their relative position to the grow-
ing and improved parts of the town, and partaking more or less of the benefits
of municipal government, are proper subjects of municipal taxation; and if not,
they enjoin the collection of such taxes. It would seem as if there must be
great practical difficulties — if not some of principle — in making this disposition
of such a case. ,
* 8 Mich. 301. See also Chicago p. Larned, 34 1ll. 203; Creote v. Chicago,
56 1ll. 422.
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* 501 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XIV.
reference to any common ratio, and without requiring the
[* 502] sum * paid by one piece or kind of property, or by one
person, to bear any relation whatever to that paid by
another, is, it seems to me, to lay a forced contribution, not a tax,
duty, or impost, within the sense of these terms, as applied to
the exercise of powers by any enlightened or responsible govern-
ment."
In the case of Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County,1 an
important and interesting question arose, involving the very point
now under discussion. The Constitution of Wisconsin provides
that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform," which, if we are
correct in what we have already stated, is no more than an affirm-
ance of a settled principle of constitutional law. The city of
Janesville included within its territorial limits, not only the land
embraced within the recorded plat of the village of Janesville and
its additions, but also a large quantity of the adjacent farming or
agricultural lands. Conceiving the owners of these lands too
greatly and unequally burdened by taxation for the support of the
city government, the legislature passed an act declaring that " in
no case shall the real and personal property within the territorial
limits of said city, and not included within the territorial limits of
the recorded plat of the village of Janesville, or of any additions to
said village, which may be used, occupied, or reserved for agricul-
tural or horticultural purposes, be subject to an annual tax to
defray the current expenses of said city, exceeding one-half of one
per cent, nor for the repair and building of roads and bridges, and
the support of the poor, more than one-half as much on each
dollar's valuation shall be levied for such purposes as on the prop-
erty within such recorded plats, nor shall the same be subject to
any tax for any of the purposes mentioned in § 3 of c. 5 of [the city
charter], nor shall the said farming or gardening lands be subject
to any tax, other than before mentioned, for any city purpose what-
ever." Under the charter the property of the city was liable to an
annual tax of one per cent to defray the current expenses of the
city; and also an additional tax of such sum as the common
council might deem necessary for the repair and building of roads
and bridges, and for the support of the poor. Thus it will be
perceived that the legislature, within the same taxing district,
1 9 Wis. 410.
[ 588 ]
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CH. XIV.] THE POWER OP TAXATION. * 502
undertook to provide that a portion of the property should be taxed
at one rate in proportion to value, and another portion at a much
lower rate; while from taxation for certain proper local purposes
the latter class was exempted altogether.
* " It was contended in argument," say the court, " that [* 503]
as those provisions fixed one uniform rate without the
recorded plats, and another within them, thus taxing all the prop-
erty without alike, and all within alike, they do not infringe the
Constitution. In other words, that for the purpose of taxation, the
legislature have the right arbitrarily to divide up and classify
the property of the citizens, and, having done so, they do not
violate the constitutional rule of uniformity, provided all the prop-
erty within a given class is rated alike.
"The answer to this argument is, that it creates different rules
of taxation, to the number of which there is no limit, except that
fixed by legislative discretion, while the constitution establishes
but one fixed, unbending, uniform rule on the subject. It is be-
lieved that if the legislature can, by classification, thus arbitrarily,
and without regard to value, discriminate in the same municipal
corporation between personal and real property within, and per-
sonal and real property without, a recorded plat, they can also by
the same means discriminate between lands used for one purpose
and those used for another, such as lands used for growing wheat
and those used for growing corn, or any other crop; meadow-lands
and pasture-lands, cultivated and uncultivated lands; or they can
classify by the description, such as odd-numbered lots and blocks
and even numbered ones, or odd and even-numbered sections.
Personal property can be classified by its character, use, or descrip-
tion, or, as in the present case, by its location, and thus the rules
of taxation may be multiplied to an extent equal in number to the
different kinds, uses, descriptions, and locations of real and per-
sonal property. We do not see why the system may not be carried
further, and the classification be made by the character, trade,
profession, or business of the owners. For certainly this rule of
uniformity can as well be applied to such a classification as any
other, and thus the constitutional provision be saved intact. Such
a construction would make the constitution operative only to the
extent of prohibiting the legislature from discriminating in favor
of particular individuals, and would reduce the people, while con-
sidering so grave and important a proposition, to the ridiculous
[ 589 ]
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attitude of saying to the legislature, 'You shall not discriminate
between single individuals or corporations; but you may divide
the citizens up into different classes, as the followers of different
trades, professions, or kinds of business, or as the owners
[* 504] of * different species or descriptions of property, and legis-
late for one class, and against another, as much as you
please, provided you serve all of the favored or unfavored classes
alike ;' thus affording a direct and solemn sanction to a system of
taxation so manifestly and grossly unjust that it will not find an
apologist anywhere, at least outside of those who are the recipients
of its favop. We do not believe the framers of that instrument
intended such a construction, and therefore cannot adopt it." 1
The principle to be deduced from the Iowa and Wisconsin cases,
assuming that they do not in any degree conflict, seems to be this:
The legislature cannot arbitrarily include within the limits of a
village, borough, or city, property and persons not properly charge-
able with its burdens, and for the sole purpose of increasing the
corporate revenues by the exaction of the taxes. But whenever
the corporate boundaries are established, it is to be understood
that whatever property is included within those limits has been
thus included by the legislature, because it justly belongs there, as
being within the circuit which is benefited by the local government,
and which ought consequently to contribute to its burdens. The
legislature cannot, therefore, after having already, by including the
property within the corporation, declared its opinion that such
property should contribute to the local government, immediately
turn about and establish a basis of taxation which assumes that the
1 Per Dixon, Ch. J., 9 Wis. 421. Besides the other cases referred to, see,
on this same general subject, Lin Sing p. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534; State v. Mer-
chants Ins. Co., 12 La An. 802; Adams v. Somerville, 2 Head, 363; McComb
v. Bell, 2 Minn. 295; Attorney-General v. Winnebago Lake and Fox River P. R.
Co., 11 Wis. 35; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; O'Kane v. Treat, 25 111.
557; Philadelphia Association, &p. v. Wood, 39 Penn. 73; Sacramento p.
Crocker, 16 Cal. 119. There was a provision in the charter of Covington that a
street might be paved with the Nicholson pavement at the expense of the adjoining
owners, when the owners of the larger part of the frontage should petition therefop.
An amendatory act authorized it as to a portion of a certain street without such
a petition; thus permitting a special improvement on that street, at the expense
of the owners of adjoining lots, on a different principle from that adopted for the
city generally. In Howell v. Bristol, tS Bush, 493, this amendment was held in-
consistent with the fundamental principles of taxation, and consequently void.
[590 ]
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property is not in fact urban property at all, but is agricultural
lands, and should be assessed accordingly. The rule of apportion-
ment must be uniform throughout the taxing district, applicable to
all alike; but the legislature have no power to arrange the taxing
districts arbitrarily, and without reference to the great fundamental
principle of taxation, that the burden must be borne by those upon
whom it justly rests. The Kentucky and Iowa decisions hold that,
in a case where they have manifestly and unmistakably done so,
the courts may interfere and restrain the imposition of municipal
burdens on property which does not properly belong within the
municipal taxing district at all.
* This rule of uniformity has perhaps been found most [* 505]
difficult of application in regard to those cases of taxation
which are commonly known under the head of assessments, and
which are made either for local improvement and repair, or to
prevent local causes resulting in the destruction of health or prop-
erty. In those cases where it has been held that such assessments
were not covered by the constitutional provision that taxation
should be laid upon property in proportion to value, it has, neverthe-
less, been decided that the authority to make them must be referred
to the taxing power, and not to the police power of the State,
under which sidewalks have sometimes been ordered to be con-
structed. Apportionment of the burden was therefore essential,
though it need not be made upon property in proportion to its
value. But the question then arises: What shall be the rule of
apportionment? Can a street be ordered graded and paved, and
the expense assessed exclusively upon the property which, in the
opinion of the assessors, shall be peculiarly benefited thereby, in
proportion to such benefit? Or may a taxing district be created
for the purpose, and the expense assessed in proportion to the area
of the lots? Or may the street be made a taxing district, and the
cost levied in proportion to the frontage? Or may each lot owner
be required to grade and pave in front of his lot? These are grave
questions, and they have not been found of easy solution.
The case of The People v. The Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn,1 is a
leading case, holding that a statute authorizing a municipal corpora-
tion to grade and improve streets, and to assess the expense among
the owners and occupants of lands benefited by the improvement, in
1 4 N. Y. 410; reversing same case, 6 Barb. 209.
«
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proportion to the amount of such benefit, is a constitutional and
valid law. The court in that case concede that taxation cannot
be laid without apportionment, but hold that the basis of apportion-
ment in these cases is left by the constitution with the legislature.
The application of any one rule or principle of apportionment to
all cases would be manifestly oppressive and unjust. Taxation is
sometimes regulated by one principle, and sometimes by another;
and very often it has been apportioned without reference to local-
ity, or to the tax-payer's ability to contribute, or to any proportion
between the burden and the benefit. "The excise laws, and taxes
on carriages and watches, are among the many examples
[* 506] of * this description of taxation. Some taxes affect classes
of inhabitants only; All duties on imported goods are
taxes on the class of consumers. The tax on one imported article
falls on a large class of consumers, while the tax on another affects
comparatively a few individuals. The duty on one article con-
sumed by one class of inhabitants is twenty per cent of its value,
while on another, consumed by a different class, it is forty per
cent. The duty on one foreign commodity is laid for the purpose
of revenue mainly, without reference to the ability of its consumers
to pay, as in the case of the duty on salt. The duty on another is
laid for the purpose of encouraging domestic manufacture of the
same article, tints compelling the consumer to pay a higher price
to one man than he could otherwise have bought the article for
from anothep. These discriminations may be impolitic, and in
some cases unjust; but if the power of taxation upon importations
had not been transferred by the people of this State to the Federal
government, there could have been no pretence for declaring them
to be unconstitutional in State legislation.
"A property tax for the general purposes of the government,
either of the State at large or of a county, city, or other district, is
regarded as a just and equitable tax. The reason is obvious. It
apportions the burden according to the benefit more nearly than
any other inflexible rule of general taxation. A rich man derives
more benefit from taxation, in the protection and improvement of
his property, than a poor man, and ought therefore to pay more.
But the amount of each man's benefit in general taxation cannot
be ascertained and estimated with any degree of certainty; and for
that reason a property tax is adopted, instead of an estimate of
benefits. In local taxation, however, for special purposes, the
[ 592 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XIV.]
* 506
THE POWER OP TAXATION.
local benefits may in many cases be seen, traced, and estimated
to a reasonable certainty. At least this has been supposed and
assumed to be true by the legislature, whose duty it is to pre-
scribe the rules on which taxation is to be apportioned, and whose
determination of this matter, being within the scope of its lawful
power, is conclusive."
The reasoning of this case has been generally accepted as satis-
factory, and followed in subsequent cases.1
1 Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. s. 126; Hill e. Higdon, 5 Ohio, n. s. 243;
Marion v. Epler, ib. 260; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, n. s. 636; City of Peoria
v. Kidder, 26 1ll. 351; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, x. s. 333;
Garrett p. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 463; Bradley v.
McAtee, 7 Bush, 667 ; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 309; Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass. 461;
Sessions p. Crnnkilton, 20 Ohio, n. s. 349 ; State v. Fuller, 84N. J. 227. The
legislation in Ohio on the subject has authorized the cities and villages, in open-
ing and improving streets, to assess the expense either upon the lots abutting on
the street in proportion to the street front, or upon the lands in proportion to
their assessed value. In a case whore the former mode was resorted to, and an
assessment made upon property owned by the Northern Indiana Railroad Com-
pany for its corporate purposes, Peck, J., thus states and answers an ohjection
to the validity of the tax: " But it is said that assessments, as distinguished from
general taxation, rest solely upon the idea of equivalents; a compensation pro-
portioned to the special benefits derived from the improvement, and that, in the
case at bar, the railroad company is not, and in the nature of things cannot be,
in any degree benefited by the improvement. It is quite true that the right to
impose such special taxes is based upon a presumed equivalent; but it by no
means follows that there must be in fact such full equivalent in every instance,
or that its absence will render the assessment invalid. The rule of apportion-
ment, whether by the front foot or a percentage upon the assessed valuation, must
be uniform, affecting all the owners and all the property abutting on the street
alike. One rule cannot be applied to one owner, and a different rule to another
ownep. One could not be assessed ten per cent, another five, another three,
and another left altogether unassessed because he was not in fact benefited. It
is manifest that the actual benefits resulting from the improvement may be as
various almost as the number of the owners and the uses to which the property
may be applied. No general rule, therefore, could be laid down which would do
equal and exact justice to all. The legislature have not attempted so vain a thing,
bnt have prescribed two different modes in which the assessment may be made,
and left the city authorities free to adopt eithep. The mode adopted by the
council becomes the statutory equivalent for the benefits conferred, although in
fact the burden imposed may greatly preponderate. In such case, if no fraud
intervene, and the assessment does not substantially exhaust the owner's interest
in the land, his remedy would seem to be to procure, by a timely appeal to the
city authorities, a reduction of the special assessment, and its imposition, in whole
38 [ 593 ]
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[* 507] * On the other hand, and on the like reasoning, it hag
been held equally competent to make the street a taxing
district, and assess the expense of the improvement upon the lots
in proportion to the frontage.1 Here also is apportionment by a
rule which approximates to what is just, but which, like any other
rule that can be applied, is only an approximation to absolute
equality. But if, in the opinion of the legislature, it is the
proper rule to apply to any particular case, the courts must en-
force it.
[* 508] * But a very different case is presented when the legis-
lature undertakes to provide that each lot upon a street
shall pay the whole expense of grading and paving the street along
its front. For while in such a case there would be something
having the outward appearance of apportionment, it requires but
slight examination to discover that it is a deceptive semblance
only, and that the measure of equality which the constitution
requires is entirely wanting. If every lot owner is compelled to
construct the street in front of his lot, his tax is neither increased
or in part, upon the public at large." Northern Indiana R.R. Co. v. Connelly,
10 Ohio, N. s. 165. And see Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493.
1 Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich.- 560; Northern Ind. R.R. Co. ». Connelly.
10 Ohio, n. s. 159; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282. And see St. Joseph r.
O'Donoghue, 31 Mo. 145; Burnet v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Scoville v. Cleve-
land, 1 Ohio, N. 8. 133; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, n. s. 246; Ernst v. Kunkle, ib.
520; Hints v. Leavenworth, 3 Kansas, 186; Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn.
St. 388; Wray o. Pittsburg, ib. 865; Palmer v. Stumpb, 29 Ind. 329. In Ham-
mett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146, 8. c. 3 Am. Rep. 615, while the cases here
cited are approved, it is denied that a street already laid out and in good con-
dition can be taken and improved for a public drive or carriage way at the expense
of the adjacent owners; this not being an improvement,for local but for general
purposes. Compare Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 358; s. c. 8 Am. Rep.
255; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174 (case of water-rents); Willard e. Presbury, 14
Wall. 676 ; Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 89; s. C. 2 Am. Rep. 76 ; La Fayette
v. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140; Chambers t>. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497; Bradley v. McAtec,
7 Bush, 667 ; 8. c. 3 Am. Rep. 309. In Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 353,
S. c. 8 Am. Rep. 255, it is denied that this principle can be applied to the country
and to farming lands. Agnew, J., says: "To apply it to the country, or to farm
lands, would lead to such inequality and injustice as to deprive it of all soundness
as a rule, or as a substitute for a fair and impartial valuation of benefits in pursu-
ance of law; so that at the very first blush every one would pronounce it palpably
unreasonable and unjust." We commend the. able opinion in this case as a Tery
satisfactory and very thorough examination of the principles on which local assess-
ments are supported.
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nor diminished by the assessment upon his neighbors; nothing is
divided or apportioned between him and them; and each particu-
lar lot is in fact arbitrarily made a taxing district, and charged
with the whole expenditure therein, and thus apportionment
avoided. If the tax were for grading the street simply, those lots
which were already at the established grade would escape alto-
gether, while those on either side, which chanced to be above and
below, must bear the whole burden, though no more benefited by
the improvement than the others.1 It is evident, therefore, that a
law for making assessments on this basis could not have in view
such distribution of burdens in proportion to benefits as ought to
be a cardinal idea in every tax law.2 It would be nakedly an arbi-
trary command of the law to each lot owner to construct the street
in front of his lot at his own expense, according to a prescribed
standard; and a power to issue such command could never be
exercised by a constitutional government, unless we are at liberty
to treat it as a police regulation, and place the duty to make the
streets upon the same footing as that to keep the sidewalks free
from obstruction and fit for passage. But any such idea is clearly
inadmissible.3
1 In fact, lots above and below an established grade are usually less benefited
by the grading than the others; because the improvement subjects them to new
burdens, in order to bring the general surface to the grade of the street, which
the others escape.
* The case of Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 38, is opposed to the reasoning of
the text; but the learned Judge who delivers the opinion concedes that he is
unable to support his conclusions on the authorities within his reach.
3 See City of Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513, and opinions of
Campbell and Christiancy, JJ., in Woodbridge p. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274. The case
of Weeks p. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 258, seems to be contra. We quote from the
opinion of the court by Paine, J. After stating the rule that uniformity in taxation
implies equality in the burden, he proceeds: "The principle upon which these
assessments rest is clearly destructive of this equality. It requires every lot owner
to build whatever improvements the public may require on the street in front of
his lot, without reference to inequalities in the value of the lots, in the expense of
constructing the improvements, or to the question whether the lot is injured or
benefited by their construction. Corner lots are required to construct and keep
in repair three times as much as other lots; and yet it is well known that the
difference in value bears no proportion to this difference in burden. In front of
one lot the expense of building the street may exceed the value of the lot; and
its construction may impose on the owner additional expense, to render his lot
accessible. In front of another lot, of even much greater value, the expense is
comparatively slight. These inequalities are obvious; and I have always thought
[ 595 ]
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* 509 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CB. XIv.
[* 509] * In many other cases, besides the construction, im-
provement, and repair of streets, may special taxing
the principle of such assessments was radically wrong. They have been very
extensively discussed, and sustained upon the ground that the lot should pay
because it receives the benefit. But if this be true, that the improvements in
front of a lot are made for the benefit of the lot only, then the right of the public
to tax the owner at all for that purpose fails; because the public has no right to
tax the citizen to make him build improvements for his own benefit merely. It
must be for a public purpose; and it being once established that the construction
of streets is a public purpose that will justify taxation, I think it follows, if tbe
matter is to be settled on principle, that the taxation should be equal and uniform,
and that to make it so the whole taxable property of the political division in which
the improvement is made should be taxed by a uniform rule for the purpose of
its construction.
"But in sustaining these assessments when private property was wanted for a
street, it has been said that the State could take it, because the use of a street
was a public use; in order to justify a resort to the power of taxation, it is said
the building of a street is a public purpose. But then, having got the land to
build it on, and the power to tax by holding it a public purpose, they immediately
abandon that idea, and say that it is a private benefit, and make the owner of the
lot build the whole of it. I think this is the same in principle as it would be to
say that the town, in which the county seat is located, should build the county
buildings, or that the county where the capital is should construct the public
edifices of the State, upon the ground that, by being located nearer, they derived
a greater benefit than others. If the question, therefore, was, whether the sys-
tem of assessment could be sustained upon principle, I should have no hesitation
in deciding it in the negative. I fully agree with the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in the case of Municipality No. 2 v. White, 9 La. An. 447,
upon this point.
"But the question is not whether this system is established upon sound prin-
ciples, but whether the legislature has power, under the constitution, to establish
such a system. As already stated, if the provision requiring the rule of taxation
to be uniform was the only one bearing upon the question, I should answer this
also in the negative. But there is another provision which seems to me so im-
portant, that it has changed the result to which I should otherwise have arrived.
That provision is § 3 of art. 11, and is as follows: 'It shall be the duty of the
legislature, and they are hereby empowered, to provide for the organization of
cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assess-
ment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning. their credit, so as to
prevent abuses in assessments and taxation, and in contracting debts by such
municipal corporations.1
"It cannot well be denied that if the word ' assessment,' as used in this sec-
tion, bad reference to this established system of special taxation for municipal
improvements, that then it is a clear recognition of the existence and legality of
the powep." And the court, having reached the conclusion that the word did
have reference to such an established system, sustain the assessment, adding:
[ 596 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XIV.]
• 509
THE POWER OP TAXATION.
districts be created, with a * view to local improvements. [* 510]
The cases of drains to relieve swamps, marshes, and other
low lands of their stagnant water, and of levees to prevent lands
being overflowed by rivers, will at once suggest themselves. In
providing for such cases, however, the legislature exercises another
power besides the power of taxation. On the theory that the
drainage is for the sole purpose of benefiting the lands of individ-
uals, it might be difficult to defend such legislation. But if the
stagnant water causes or threatens disease, it may be a nuisance,
which, under its power of police, the State would have authority
"The same effect was given to the same clause in the Constitution of Ohio, by
the Supreme Court of that State, in a recent decision in the case of Hill v. Higdon,
5 Ohio, n. s. 243. And the reasoning of Chief Justice Ranney on the question
I think it impossible to answer."
If the State of Wisconsin had any settled and known practice, designated as
assessments, under which each lot owner was compelled to construct the streets
in front of his lot, then the constitution as quoted may well be held to recognize
such practice. In this view, however, it is still difficult to discover any "restric-
tion " in a law which perpetuates the arbitrary and unjust custom, and which still
permits the whole expense of making the street in front of each lot to be imposed
upon it. The only restriction which the law imposes is, that its terms exclude
uniformity, equality, and justice, which surely could not be the restriction the
constitution designed. Certainly the learned judge shows very clearly that such
a law is unwarranted as a legitimate exercise of the taxing power; and as it
cannot be warranted under any other power known to constitutional government,
the authority to adopt it should not be found in doubtful words. The case of
Hill v. Higdon, referred to, is different. There the expense of improving the
street was assessed upon the property abutting on the street, in proportion to the
foot front. The decision there was, that the constitutional provision that "laws
shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, &c, and also all real and
personal property, according to its true value in money," had no reference to
these local assessments, which might still be made, as they were before the con-
stitution was adopted, with reference to the benefits conferred. The case, there-
fore, showed a rule of apportionment which was made applicable throughout the
taxing district, to wit, along the street so far as the improvement extended.
The case of State v. City of Portage, 12 Wis. 562, holds that a law authorizing
the expense of an improvement to be assessed upon the abutting lots, in pro-
portion to their front orvsize, would not justify and sustain city action which
required the owner of each lot to bear the expense of the improvement in front
of it
It has been often contended that taxation by frontage was in effect a taking of
property for the public use, but the courts have held otherwise. People v.
Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174; Warren v.
Henley, 31 Iowa, 39; Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 353; B.C. 8 Am.
Rep. 255.
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* 510 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. LCfl. XIV.
to abate. The laws for this purpose, so far as they have fallen
under our observation, have proceeded upon this theory.
[* 511] Nevertheless, when the State incurs * expense in the exer-
cise of its police power for this purpose, it is proper to
assess that expense upon the portion of the community specially
and peculiarly benefited. The assessment is usually made with
reference to the benefit to property; and it is difficult to frame or
to conceive of any other rule of apportionment that would operate
so justly and so equally in these cases. There may be difficulty
in the detail; difficulty in securing just and impartial assessments;
but the principle of such a law would not depend for its sound-
ness upon such considerations.1
1 See Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, N. s. 333; French v. Kirk-
land, 1 Paige, 117 ; Philips v. Wickham, ib. 590. In Woodruff v. Fisher, 17
Barb. 224, Hand, J., speaking of one of these drainage laws, says: "If the
object to be accomplished by this statute may be considered a public improve-
ment, the power of taxation seems to have been sustained upon analogous prin-
ciples. [Citing People v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Thomas e.
Leland, 24 Wend. 65; and Livingston r. Mayor, &c, of New York, 8 Wend.
101.] But if the object was merely to improve the property of individuals, I
think the statute would be void, although it provided for compensation. The
water privileges on Indian River cannot be taken or affected in any way solely
for the private advantage of others, however numerous the beneficiaries. Sev-
eral statutes have been passed for draining swamps, but it seems to me thit
the principle above advanced rests upon natural and constitutional law. The
professed object of this statute is to promote public health. And one question
that arises is, whether the owners of large tracts of land in a state of nature can
be taxed to pay the expense of draining them, by destroying the dams, &c, of
other persons away from the drowned lands, and for the purposes of public
health. This law proposes to destroy the water power of certain persons against
their will, to drain the lands of others, also, for all that appears, against tbeir
will; and all at the expense of the latter, for this public good. If this taxation is
illegal, no mode of compensation is provided, and all is illegal." "The owners
of these lands could not be convicted of maintaining a public nuisance because
they did not drain them; even though they were the owners of the lands upon
which the obstructions are situated. It does not appear by the act or the com-
plaint that the sickness to be prevented prevails among inhabitants on the wet
lands, nor whether these lands will be benefited or injured by draining; and cer-
tainly, unless they will be benefited, it would seem to be partial legislation to tax
a certain tract of land, for the expense of doing to it what did not improve it,
merely because, in a state of nature, it may be productive of sickness. Street
assessments are put upon the ground that the land assessed is improved, and its
value greatly enhanced." The remarks of Green, J., in Williams o. Mayor, &c,
of Detroit, 2 Mich. 567, may be here quoted: "Every species of taxation, in
every mode, is in theory and principle based upon an idea of compensation, ben-
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* In certain classes of cases, it has been customary to [* 512]
call upon the citizen to appear in person and perform ser-
vice for the State, in the nature of police duties. The burden of
improving and repairing the common highways of the country,
except in the urban districts, is generally laid upon the people in
the form of an assessment of labor. The assessment may be upon
each citizen, in proportion to his property; or, in addition to the
property assessment, there may be one also by the poll. But
though the public burden assumes the form of labor, it is still tax-
ation, and must therefore be levied on some principle of uniform-
ity. But it is a peculiar species of taxation; and the general terms
"tax," or "taxation," as employed in the State constitutions,
would not generally be understood to include it. It has been de-
cided that the clause in the Constitution of Illinois, that "the
mode of levying a tax shall be by valuation, so that every person
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property he or she
has in his or her possession," did not prevent the levy of poll-taxes
in highway labor. "The framers of the constitution intended to
direct a'uniform mode of taxation on property, and not to prohibit
any other species of taxation, but to leave the legislature the power
to impose such other taxes as would be consonant to public justice,
and as the circumstances of the country might require. They prob-
ably intended to prevent the imposition of an arbitrary tax on prop-
efit, or advantage to the person or property taxed, either directly or indirectly.
If the tax is levied for the support of the government and general police of the
State, for the education and moral instruction of the citizens, or the construction
of works of internal improvement, he is supposed to receive a just compensation
in the security which the government affords to his person and property, the means
of enjoying his possessions, and their enhanced capacity to contribute to his
comfort and gratification, which constitute their value."
It has been held incompetent, however, for a city which has itself created a
nuisance on the property of a citizen, to tax him for the expense of removing or
abating it. Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 258.
In Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495, it was held that a special
assessment for the purpose of reclaiming a district from inundation might prop-
erly be laid upon land in proportion to its area, and that the constitutional pro-
vision that taxation should be levied on property in proportion to its valuation
did not preclude this mode of assessment. The same ruling was made in Louisi-
ana cases. Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. An. 329; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La. An.
220; Wallace ». Shelton, 14 La. An. 498; Bishop v. Marks, 15 La. An. 147;
Richardson r. Morgan, 16 La. An. 429; McGeheer. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40; Jones
r. Boston, 104 Mass. 461.
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erty, according to kind and quantity, and without reference to
value. The inequality of the mode of taxation was the object to
be avoided. We cannot believe that they intended that all Je
public burdens should be borne by those having property in pos-
session, wholly exempting the rest of the community, who,
[*513] by the * same constitution were made secure in the exer-
cise of the rights of suffrage, and all the immunities of
the citizen." 1 And in another case, where an assessment of high-
way labor is compared with one upon adjacent property for widen-
ing a street, — which had beeu held not to be taxation, as that term
was understood in the Constitution,— it is said: "An assessment
of labor for the repair of roads and streets is less like a tax than
is such an assessment. The former is not based upon, nor has it
any reference to, property or values owned by the person of whom
it is required, whilst the latter is based alone upon the property
designated by the law imposing it. Nor is an assessment a capi-
tation tax, as that is a sum of money levied upon each poll. This
rate, on the contrary, is a requisition for so many days' labor, which
may be commuted in money. No doubt, the number of days' levied,
and the sum which may be received by commutation, must be uni-
form within the limits of the district or body imposing the same.
This requisition for labor to repair roads is not a tax, and hence
this exemption is not repugnant to the constitution." 2
It will be apparent from what has already been said, that it is
not essential to the validity of taxation that it be levied according
to rules of abstract justice.3 It is only essential that the legis-
lature keep within its proper sphere of action, and not impose
burdens under the name of taxation which are not taxes in fact;
and its decision as to what is proper, just, and politic, must then
be final and conclusive. Absolute equality and strict justice are
unattainable in tax proceedings. The legislature must be left to
1 Sawyer v. City of Alton, 3 Scam. 130.
* Town of Pleasant v. Kost, 29 111. 494.
1 Frellsen v. Mahan, 21 La. An. 79; People v. Whyler, 41 Cal. 351; War-
ren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 43. In this last case, Beck, J., criticises the position
taken ante, pp. 507, 508, that the cost of a local improvement cannot be imposed
on the adjoining premises irrespective of any apportionment, and appears to sup-
pose our views rest upon the injustice of such a proceeding. This is not strictly
correct; it may or may not be just in any particular case; but taxation necessa-
rily implies apportionment, and even a just burden cannot be imposed as a tax
without it.
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XIV.] THE POWER OP TAXATION. * 513
decide for itself how nearly it is possible to approximate so desir-
able a result. It must happen under any tax law that some prop-
erty will be taxed twice, while other property will escape taxation
altogethep. Instances will also occur where persons will be taxed
as owners of property which has ceased to exist. The system in
vogue for taking valuations of property fixes upon a certain time
for that purpose, and a party becomes liable to be taxed upon
what he possesses at the time the valuing officer calls upon him.
Yet changes of property from person to person are occurring while
the valuation is going on, and the same parcel of property is found
by the assessor in the hands of two different persons, and is twice
assessed, while another parcel for similar reasons is not assessed
at all. Then the man who owns property when the as-
sessment is * taken may have been deprived of it by acci- [* 514]
dent or other misfortune before the tax becomes payable;
but the tax is nevertheless a charge against him. And when the
valuation is only made once in a series of years, the occasional
hardships and inequalities in consequence of relative changes in
the value of property from various causes become sometimes very
glaring. Nevertheless, no question of constitutional law is in-
volved in these cases, and the legislative control is complete.1
The legislature must also, except when an unbending rule has
been prescribed for it by the constitution, have power to select in
its discretion the subjects of taxation. The rule of uniformity re-
quires an apportionment among all the subjects of taxation within
the districts; but it does not require that every thing which the
1 In Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 418, objection was taken to an assessment made
for a local improvement under a special statute, that the commissioners, in deter-
mining who should be liable to pay the tax, and the amount each should pay,
were to be governed by the last assessment of taxable property in the county.
It was insisted that this was an unjust criterion, for a man might have disposed
of all the taxable property assessed to him in the last assessment before this tax
was actually declared by the commissioners. The court, however, regarded the
objection as more refined than practical, and one that, if allowed, would at once
annihilate the power of taxation. "In the imposition of taxes, exact and critical
justice and equality are absolutely unattainable. If we attempt it, we might have
to divide a single year's tax upon a given article of property among a dozen dif-
ferent individuals who owned it at different times during the year, and then be
almost as far from the desired end as when we started. The proposition is Uto-
pian. The legislature must adopt some practicable system; and there is no more
danger of oppression or injustice in taking a former valuation than in relying
upon one to be made subsequently."
[ 601 ]
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* 514 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XIV.
legislature might make taxable shall be made so in fact. Many
exemptions are usually made from taxation from reasons the co-
gency of which is at once apparent. The agencies of the national
government, we have seen, are not taxable by the States; and the
agencies and property of States, counties, cities, boroughs, towns,
and villages are also exempted by law, because, if any portion of
the public expenses was imposed upon them, it must in some form
be collected from the citizens before it can be paid. No beneficial
object could therefore be accomplished by any such assessment.
The property of educational and religious institutions is also gen-
erally exempted from taxation by law upon very similar considera-
tions, and from a prevailing belief that it is the policy and the
interest of the State to encourage them.1 If the State
[*515] *may cause taxes to be levied from motives of charity or
gratitude, so for the like reasons it may exempt the objects
of charity and gratitude from taxation. Property is sometimes
released from taxation by contract with the State and corporations,
and specified occupations are sometimes charged with specific
taxes in lieu of all taxation of their property. A broad field is here
opened to legislative discretion. As matter of State policy it
might also be deemed proper to make general exemption of suffi-
cient of the tools of trade or other means of support to enable
the poor man, not yet a pauper, to escape becoming a public bur-
den. There is still ample room for apportionment after all such
exemptions .have been made. The constitutional requirement of
equality'and uniformity only extends to such objects of taxation
as the legislature shall determine to be properly subject to the
burden.2 The power to determine the persons and the objects to
be taxed is trusted exclusively to the legislative department;3
1 As in the case of other special privileges, exemptions from taxation are to
be strictly construed. Trustees of M. E. Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3; State v.
Mills, 34 N. J. 177. It has been generally held that an exemption from taxation
would not exempt the property from being assessed for a local improvement.
Matter of Mayor, &c, 11 Johns. 77; Baltimore p. Cemetery Co., 7 Md. 517;
La Fayette v. Orphan Asylum, 2 La. An. 1; Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Penn.
St. 69; Le Fever p. Detroit, 2 Mich. 586; Lockwood p. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20;
Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush, 508; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 480.
* State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; People v. Colman, 3 Cal. 46 ; Durach's Appeal,
62 Penn. St. 494.
3 Wilson v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 4 E. D. Smith, 675; Hill p. Higdon,
5 Ohio, n. s. 245; State v. Parker, 33 N. J. 313. Notwithstanding a require-
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but over all those the burden must be spread, or it will be
unequal and unlawful as to those who are selected to make the
payment.1
ment that " the rule of taxation shall be uniform," the legislature may levy
specific State taxes on corporations, and exempt them from municipal taxation.
So held on the ground of stare decisis. Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454.
1 In the case of Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, a somewhat peculiar exemp-
tion was made. It appears that several lots in the city upon which a new
hotel was being constructed, of the value of from $150,000 to $200,000, were
purposely omitted to be taxed, under the direction of the Common Council, " in
view of the great public benefit which the construction of the hotel would be to
the city." Paine, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "I have no
doubt this exemption originated in motives of generosity and public spirit. And
perhaps the same motives should induce the tax-payers of the city to submit to
the slight increase of the tax thereby imposed on each, without questioning its
strict legality. But they cannot be compelled to. No man is obliged to be
more generous than the law requires, but each may stand strictly upon his legal
rights. »That this exemption was illegal, was scarcely contested. I shall, there-
fore, make no effort to show that the Common Council had no authority to
suspend or repeal the general law of the State, declaring what property shall be
taxable and what exempt. But the important question presented is, whether,
conceding it to have been entirely unauthorized, it vitiates the tax assessed upon
other property. And upon this question I think the following rule is established,
both by reason and authority. Omissions of this character, arising from mistakes
of fact, erroneous computations, or errors of judgment on the part of those to
whom the execution of the taxing laws is intrusted, do not necessarily vitiate
the whole tax. But intentional disregard of those laws, in such manner as to
impose illegal taxes on those who are assessed, does. The first part of the rule
is necessary to enable taxes to be collected at all. The execution of these laws
is necessarily intrusted to men, and men are fallible, liable to frequent mistakes
of fact and errors of judgment. If such errors, on the part of those who are
attempting in good faith to perform their duties, should vitiate the whole tax, no
tax could ever be collected. And, therefore, though they sometimes increase
improperly the burdens of those paying taxes, that part of the rule which holds
the tax not thereby avoided is absolutely essential to a continuance of govern-
ment. But it seems to me clear that the other part is equally essential to the
just protection of the citizen. If those executing these laws may deliberately
disregard them, and assess the whole tax upon a part only of those who are
liable to pay it, and have it still a legal tax, then the laws afford no protection,
and the citizen is at the mercy of those officers, who, by being appointed to exe-
cute the laws, would seem to be thereby placed beyond legal control. I know
of no considerations of public policy or necessity that can justify carrying the
rule to that extent. And the fact that in this instance the disregard of the law
proceeded from good motives ought not to affect the decision of the question.
It is a rule of law that is to be established; and, if established here because the
motives were good, it would serve as a precedent where the motives were bad,
[ 603 ]
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In some of the States it has been decided that the par-
[* 516] ticular * provisions inserted in their constitutions to insure
uniformity are so worded as to forbid exemptions. Thus
the Constitution of Illinois provided that "the General Assembly
shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every person
and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his
or her property." 1 Under this it has been held that exemption
by the legislature of persons residing in a city from a tax levied
to repair roads beyond the city limits, by township authority,—
the city being embraced within the township which, for that pur-
pose, was the taxing district, — was void.2 It is to be observed of
these cases, however, that they would have fallen within the
general principle laid down in Knowlton v. Supervisors of
[* 517] Rock Co.,3 and the legislative acts * under consideration
might perhaps have been declared void on general prin-
ciples, irrespective of the peculiar wording of the constitution.
These cases, notwithstanding, as well as others in Illinois, recog-
nize the power ill the legislature to commute for a tax, or to con-
tract for its release for a consideration. The Constitution of Ohio
provides1 that "laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all
moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock com-
panies, or otherwise; and also all real and personal property,
according to its true value in money." Under this section it was
held not competent for the legislature to provide that lands within
the limits of a city should not be taxed for any city purpose,
except roads, unless the same were laid off into town lots and
and the power usurped for purposes of oppression." pp. 263-265. See also
Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt. 460; State v. Collector of Jersey City, 4 Zab. 108;
Insurance Co. 8. Yard, 17 Penn. St. 331; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick.
75; Hersey v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 185; Crosby v. Lyon, 37 Cal.
2-12. But it seems that an omission of property from the tax-roll by the assessor,
unintentionally, through want of judgment and lack of diligence and business
habits, will not invalidate the roll. Dean v. Gleason, 16 Wis. 1. In Scofield
v. Watkins, 22 111. 72, and Merritt v. Farriss, ib. 811, it appears to be decided
that even in the case of intentional omissions, the tax-roll would not be invali-
dated, but the parties injured would be left to their remedy against the assessor.
See also Dunhanio. Chicago, 55 111. 361.
1 Art. 9, § 2, of the old Constitution.
• O'Kane v. Treat, 25 111. 561; Hunsaker ». Wright, 30 111. 116. See also
Trustees v. McConnell, 12 111. 138.
3 9 Wis. 410.
4 Art. 12, § 2.
[ 604 ]
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recorded as such, or into out-lots not exceeding five acres each.1
Upon this case we should make the same remark as upon the
Illinois cases ahove referred to.
It is, moreover, essential to valid taxation that the taxing offi-
cers be able to show legislative authority for the burden they
assume to impose in every instance. Taxes can only be voted by
the people's representatives. They are in every instance an appro-
priation by the people to the government, which the latter is to
expend in furnishing the people protection, security, and such
facilities for enjoyment as it properly pertains to government to
provide. This principle is a chief corner-stone of Anglo-Saxon
liberty; and it has operated not only as an important check on
government, in preventing extravagant expenditures, as well as
unjust and tyrannical action, but it has been an important guaranty
of the right of private property. Property is secure from the law-
less grasp of the government, if the means of existence of the gov-
ernment depend upon the voluntary grants of those who own the
property. Our ancestors coupled their grants witli demands for
the redress of grievances; but in modern times the surest protec-
tion against grievances has been found to be to vote specific taxes
for the specific purposes to which the people's representatives are
willing they shall be devoted;2 and the persons exercising the
functions of government must then become petitioners if they
desire money for other objects. And then these grants are only
made periodically. Only a few things, such as the salaries of
officers, the interest upon the public debt, the support
*of schools, and the like, are provided for by permanent [* 518]
laws; and not always is this done. The government is
dependent from year to year on the periodical vote of supplies.
And this vote will come from representatives who are newly
chosen by the people, and who will be expected to reflect their
views regarding the public expenditures. State taxation, there-
fore, is not likely to be excessive or onerous, except when the
people, in times of financial ease, excitement, and inflation, have
allowed the incurring of extravagant debts, the burden of which
remains after the excitement has passed away.
But it is as true of the political divisions of the State as it is of
1 Zanesville v. Auditor of Muskingum County, 5 Ohio, N. 8. 589.
! Hoboken v. Phinney, 5 Dutch. 66.
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the State at large, that legislative authority must be shown for
every levy of taxes.1 The power to levy taxes by these divisions
comes from the State. The State confers it, and at the same time
exercises a parental supervision by circumscribing it. Indeed, on
general principles, the power is circumscribed by the rule that the
taxation by the local authorities can only be for local purposes.3
Neither the State nor the local body can authorize the imposition
of a tax on the people of a county or town for an object in which
the people of the county or town are not concerned. And by some
of the State constitutions it is expressly required that the State,
in creating municipal corporations, shall restrict their power of
taxation over the subjects within their control. These require-
ments, however, impose an obligation upon the legislature which
only its sense of duty can compel it to perform.3 It is evident
that if the legislature fail to enact the restrictive legislation, the
courts have no power to compel such action. Whether in any case
a charter of incorporation could be held void on the ground that
it conferred unlimited powers of taxation, is a question that could
not well arise, as a charter is probably never granted which does
not impose some restrictions; and where that is the case, it must
be inferred that those were all the restrictions the legislature
deemed important, and that therefore the constitutional duty of
the legislature has been performed.4
1 Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59;
Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, n. s. 273.
• Foster v. Kenosha, 12 Wis. 616. See ante, p. 213.
5 In Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, n. s. 248, Itanney, J., says of this provision:
"A failure to perform this duty may be of very serious import, but lays no
foundation for judicial correction." And see Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, n. S.
638.
4 The Constitution of Ohio requires the legislature to provide by general laws
for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their
power of taxation, assessment, &c. The general law authorizing the expense of
grading and paving streets to be assessed on the grounds bounding and abutting
on the street, in proportion to the street front, was regarded as being passed in
attempted fulfilment of the constitutional duty, and therefore valid. The chief
restriction in the case was, that it did not authorize assessment in any other or
different mode from what had been customary. Northern Indiana R.R. Co. t.
Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. a. 165. The statute also provided that no improvement
or repair of a street or highway, the cost of which was to be assessed upon the
owners, should be directed without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members
elected to the municipal council, or unless two-thirds of the owners to be charged
[ 606 ]
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* When, however, it is said to be essential to valid [* 519]
taxation that there be legislative authority for every tax
that is laid, it is not meant that the legislative department of the
State must have passed upon the necessity and propriety
of every particular tax; * but those who assume to seize [* 520]
the property of the citizen for the satisfaction of the tax
must be able to show that that particular tax is authorized, either
by general or special law. The power inherent in the government
to tax lies dormant until a constitutional law has been passed call
ing it into action, and is then vitalized only to the extent provided
by the law. Those, therefore, who act under such law should be
careful to keep within its limits, lest they remove from their acts
should petition in writing therefor. In Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. 8. 639,
Peck, J., says: "This may be said to be a very imperfect protection; and in
some cases will doubtless prove to be so; but it is calculated and designed, by
the unanimity or the publicity it requires, to prevent any flagrant abuses of the
power. Such is plainly its object; and we know of no rights conferred upon
courts to interfere with the exercise of a legislative discretion which the consti-
tution has delegated to the law-making power." And see Weeks v. Milwaukee,
10 Wis. 242. The Constitution of Michigan requires the legislature, in providing
for the incorporation of cities and villages, to " restrict their power of taxation,"
&c. The Detroit Metropolitan Police Law made it the duty of the Board of
Police to prepare and submit to the city controller, on or before the first day of
May in each year, an estimate in detail of the cost and expense of maintaining
the police department, and the Common Council was required to raise the same
by general tax. These provisions, it was claimed, were in conflict with the
constitution, because no limit was fixed by them to the estimates that might be
made. In People v. Mahaney, ,13 Mich. 498, the court say: "Whether this
provision of the constitution can be regarded as mandatory in a sense that would
make all charters of municipal corporations and acts relating thereto which are
wanting in this limitation invalid, we do not feel called upon to decide in this
case, since it is clear that a limitation upon taxation is fixed by the act before us.
The constitution has not prescribed the character of the restriction which shall
be imposed, and from the nature of the case it was impossible to do more than
to make it the duty of the legislature to set some bounds to a power so liable to
abuse. A provision which, like the one complained of, limits the power of tax-
ation to the actual expenses as estimated by the governing board, after first
limiting the power of the board to incur expense within narrow limits, is as much
a restriction as if it confined the power to a certain percentage upon taxable
property, or to a sum proportioned to the number of inhabitants in the city.
Whether the restriction fixed upon would as effectually guard the citizen against
abuse as any other which might have been established was a question for the
legislative department of the government, and does not concern us on this
inquiry."
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the shield of its protection. While we do not propose to enter
upon any attempt to point out the various cases in which a failure
to obey strictly the requirements of the law will render the pro-
ceedings void, and in regard to which a diversity of decision would
be met with, we think we shall be safe in saying that, in cases of
this description, which propose to dispossess the citizen of his
property against his will, not only will any excess of taxation
beyond what the law allows render the proceedings void, but anj
failure to comply with such requirements of the laws as are made
for the protection of the owner's interest will also render them
void.
There are several cases in which taxes have been levied but
slightly in excess of legislative power, in which it has been urged
in defence of the proceedings that the law ought not to take notice
of such unimportant matters; but an excess of jurisdiction is never
unimportant. In one case in Maine the excess was eighty-seven
cents only in a tax of $225.75, but it was held sufficient to render
the proceedings void. We quote from Mellen, Ch. J., delivering
the opinion of the court: "It is contended that the sum of eighty-
seven cents is such a trifle as to fall within the range of the maxim
de mi?iimis, &c.; but if not, that still this small excess does not
vitiate the assessment. The maxim is so vague in itself as to
form a very unsafe ground of proceeding or judging; and it may
be almost as difficult to apply it as a rule in pecuniary concerns as
to the interest which a witness lias in the event of a cause; and
in such case it cannot apply. Any interest excludes him. The
assessment was therefore unauthorized and void. If the line
which the legislature has established be once passed, we know of
no boundary to the discretion of the assessors." 1 The same view
has been taken by the Supreme Court of Michigan, by
[* 521] which the * opinion is expressed that the maxim de
minimis lex non curat should be applied with great caution
to proceedings of this character, and that the excess could not be
held unimportant and overlooked where, as in that case, each
dollar of legal tax was perceptibly increased thereby.2 Perhaps
1 Huse v. Merriam, 2 Greenl. 376. See Joyner v. School District, 3 Cush.
667; Kemper v. McClelland, 19 Ohio, 824; School District o. Merrills, 12 Conn.
437; Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl. 336; Wells p. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393; Kins-
worthy v. Mitchell, 21 Ark. 146.
* Case p. Dean, 16 Mich. 12.
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however, a slight excess, not the result of intention, but of
erroneous calculations, may be overlooked, in view of the great
difficulty in making all such calculations mathematically correct,
and the consequent impolicy of requiring entire freedom from all
errors.1
Wherever a tax is invalid because of excess of authority, or
because the requisites in tax proceedings which the law lias pro-
vided for the protection of the tax-payer are not complied with,
any sale of property based upon it will be void also. The owner is
not deprived of his property by " the law of the land," if it is taken
to satisfy an illegal tax. And if property is sold for the satis-
faction of several taxes, any one of which is unauthorized, or for
any reason illegal, the sale is altogether void.2 And the general
1 This was the view taken by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Kelley p.
Corson, 8 Wis. 182, where an excess of $8.61 in a tax of $6,654.57 was held not
to be fatal; it appearing not to be the result of intention, and the court thinking
that an accidental error no greater than this ought to be disregarded.
'This has been repeatedly held. Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl. 335; Lacy v.
Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 188; Thurston v. Little, 3 Mass.
429; Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547; Stetson p. Kemp ton, 13 Mass. 283;
Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144; Hayden v. Foster, 13 Pick. 492; Torrey v.
Millbury, 21 Pick. 70; Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 418; Drew v. Davis, 10 Vt.
506; Doe v. McQuilkin, 8 Blackf. 335; Kemper v. McClelland, 19 Ohio, 324.
This is upon the ground that the sale being based upon both the legal and the
illegal tax, it is manifestly impossible afterwards to make the distinction, so that
the act shall be partly a trespass and partly innocent. But when a party asks
relief in equity before a sale against the collection of taxes, a part of which are
legal, he will be required first to pay that part, or at least to so distinguish them
from the others that process of injunction can be so framed as to leave the legal
taxes to be enforced; and failing in this, his bill will be dismissed. Conway v.
Waverley, 15 Mich. 257; Palmer p. Napoleon, 16 Mich. 176; Hcrsey v. Super-
visors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 182; Bond p. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 288; Myrick v.
La Crosse, ib. 442.
As to the character and extent of the irregularities which should defeat the
proceedings for the collection of taxes, we could not undertake to speak here.
We think the statement in the text, that a failure to comply with any such re-
quirements of the law as are made for the protection of the owner's interest will
prove fatal to a tax sale, will be found abundantly sustained by the authorities,
while many of the cases go still further in making irregularities fatal. It appears
to us that where the requirement of the law which has failed of observance was
one which had regard simply to the due and orderly conduct of the proceedings,
or to the protection of the public interest, as against the officer, so that to the tax-
payer it is immaterial whether it .was complied with or not, a failure to comply
ought not to be recognized as a foundation for complaint by him. But those safe-
39 ' [ 609 ]
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* 522 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XIV.
rule is applicable here, that where property is taken under statu-
tory authority in derogation of common right, every requisite of
the statute having a semblance of benefit to the owner must be
complied with or the proceeding will be ineffectual.1
guards which the legislature has thrown around the estates of citizens, to protect
them against unequal, unjust, and extortionate taxation, the courts are not it
liberty to do away with by declaring them non-essential. To hold the require-
ment of the law in regard to them directory only, and not mandatory, is in effect
to exercise a dispensing power over the laws. Mr. Blackwell, in his treatise on
tax titles, has collected the cases on this subject industriously, and perhaps we
shall be pardoned for saying also with a perceptible leaning against that species
of conveyance. As illustrations how far the courts will go, in some cases, to sus-
tain irregular taxation, where officers have acted in good faith, reference is made
to Kellcy c. Corson, 11 Wis. 1; Hersey v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis.
185. See also Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 497, where the court endeavors to lay
down a general rule as to the illegalities which should render a tax roll invalid.
A party bound to pay a tax, or any portion thereof, cannot get title to the land
by neglecting payment and allowing a sale to be made at which he becomes the
purchaser. McMinn v. Whelan, 27 Cal. 800. See Butler v. Porter, 13 Mich.
292.
1 See ante, 74-78. Also Newell v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y. 486; Westfkll c.
Preston, 49 N. Y. 353.
[610]
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*CHAPTER XV. [*523]
THE EMINENT DOMAIN.
Every sovereignty possesses buildings, lands, and other property,
which it holds for the use of its officers and agents, to enable them
to perform their public functions. It may also have property from
the rents, issues, and profits, or perhaps the sale, of which
it is expected the State will derive a revenue. Such property
constitutes the ordinary domain of the State. In respect to its
use, enjoyment, and alienation, the same principles apply which
govern the management and control of like property of individuals;
and the State is in fact but an individual proprietor, whose title
and rights are to be tested, regulated, and governed by the same
rules that would have pertained to the ownership of the same
property by any of its citizens. There are also cases in which
property is peculiarly devoted to the general use and enjoyment of
the individual citizens who compose the organized society, but the
regulation and control of which are vested in the State by virtue of
its sovereignty. The State may be the proprietor of this property,
and retain it for the common use', as a means of contributing to
the general health, comfort, or happiness of the people; but gener-
ally it is not strictly the owner, but rather the governing and
supervisory trustee of the public rights in such property, vested
with the power and charged with the duty of so regulating, pro-
tecting, and controlling them, as to secure to each citizen the
privilege to make them available for his purposes, eo far as may
be consistent with an equal enjoyment by every other citizen of
the same privilege.1 In some instances these rights are of such
1 In The Company of Free Fishers, &e. p. Gann, 20 C. B., n. s. 1, it was
held that the ownership of the crown in the bed of navigable waters is for the
benefit of the subject, and cannot be used in any such manner as to derogate
from or interfere with the right of navigation, which belongs by law to all the
subjects of the realm. And that consequently the grantees of a particular por-
tion, who occupied it for a fishery, could not be lawfully authorized to charge and
collect anchorage dues from vessels anchoring therein. As regards public and
[ 611 ]
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a nature, or the circumstances are such, that the most feasible
mode of enabling every citizen to participate therein may seem to
be, for the State to transfer its control, wholly or partially, to
individuals, either receiving by way of augmentation of the pub-
lic revenues a compensation therefor, or securing in return a
release to the citizens generally from some tax or charge
[* 524] which would have rested upon them in * respect to such
rights, had the State retained the usual control in its
own hands, and borne the incidental burdens.
The rights of which we here speak are considered as pertaining
to the State by virtue of an authority existing in every sovereignty,
and which is called the eminent domain. Some of these are com-
plete without any action on the part of the State; as is the case
with the rights of navigation in its seas, lakes, and public rivers,
the rights of fishery in public waters, and the right of the State to
the precious metals which may be mined within its limits.1 Others
only become complete and are rendered effectual through the State
displacing, either partially or wholly, the rights of private owner-
ship and control; and this it accomplishes either by contract with
the owner, by accepting his gift, or by appropriating his property
against his will through an exercise of its superior authority. Of
these, the common highway furnishes an example; the public
rights therein being acquired either by the grant or dedication of
the owner of the land over which they run, or by a species of
forcible dispossession when the public necessity demands the way,
and the private owner will neither give nor sell it. All these
rights rest upon a principle which in every sovereignty is essential
to its existence and perpetuity, and which, so far as when called
into action it excludes pre-existing individual rights, is sometimes
spoken of as being based upon an implied reservation by the
government when its citizens acquire property from it or under its
protection. And as there is not often occasion to speak of the
eminent domain except in reference to those cases in which the
exclusive rights of fishery in this country, see Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush.
63; Lakeman v. Burnham, 7 Gray, 440; Angell on Watercourses, § 65 a. and
cases cited.
1 1 Bl. Com. 294; 8 Kent, 378, note. In California it has been decided that
a grant of public lands by the government carries with it to the grantee the tide
to all mines. Boggs v. Merced, &c, Co., 14 Cal. 279; Moore v. Smaw, 17 CaJ.
199.'
[612 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XV.]
* 524
THE EMINENT DOMAIN.
government is called upon to appropriate property against the will
of the owners, the right itself is generally denned as if it were
restricted to such cases, and is said to be that superior right of
property pertaining to the sovereignty by which the private prop-
erty acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken or
its use controlled for the public benefit without regard to the
wishes of its owners. More accurately, it is the rightful authority,
which exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those
rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common,
and to appropriate and control individual property for the public
benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may
demand.1
* When the existence of a particular power in the gov- [* 525]
ernment is recognized on the ground of necessity, no
delegation of the legislative power by the people can be held to
vest authority in the department which holds it in trust, to bargain
away such power, or to so tie up the hands of the government as
to preclude its repeated exercise, as often and under such circum-
stances as the needs of the government may require. For if this
were otherwise, the authority to make laws for the government and
welfare of the State might be so exercised, in strict conformity
with its constitution, as at length to preclude the State performing
1 Vattel, p. 20, § 34; Bynkershoek, lib. 2, p. 15; Ang. on Watercourses,
§ 457 ; 2 Kent, 338-40; Redf. on Railw. p. 11, § 1. "The right which belongs
to the society or to the sovereign of disposing, in case of necessity, and for the
public safety, of all the wealth contained in the State, is called the eminent
domain." McKinley, J., in Pollard's Lessee v. Hogan, 3 How. 223. "Not-
withstanding the grant to individuals, the "highest and most exact idea of prop-
erty remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their
sovereign capacity; and they have a right to resume the possession of the prop-
erty, in the manner directed by the constitution and laws of the State, when-
ever the public interest requires it. This right of resumption may be exercised,
not only where the safety, but also where the interest or even the expediency
of the State is concerned; as where the land of the individual is wanted for a
road, canal, or other public improvement." Walworth, Chancellor, in Beekman
v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige, 73. The right is inherent in
all governments, and requires no constitutional provision to give it force. Brown
p. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 143. "Title to property is
always held upon the implied condition that it must be surrendered to the
government, either in whole or in part, when the public necessities, evidenced
according to the established forms of law, demand." Eogeboom, J., in People
p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 32 Barb. 112. And see Heyward p. Mayor, &c,
of New York, 7 N. Y. 314.
[613]
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its ordinary and essential functions, and the agent chosen to
govern the State might put an end to the State itself. It must
follow that any legislative bargain in restraint of the complete,
continuous, and repeated exercise of the right of eminent domain is
unwarranted and void; and that provision of the Constitution of
the United States which forbids the States violating the obligation
of contracts could not be so construed as to render valid and
effectual such a bargain, which originally was in excess of proper
authority. Upon this subject we shall content ourselves with
referring in this place to what has been said in another connec-
tion.1
As under the peculiar American system the protection and
regulation of private rights, privileges, and immunities in general
properly pertain to the State governments, and those governments
are expected to make provision for those conveniences and neces-
sities which are usually provided for their citizens through the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, the right itself, it would
seem, must pertain to those governments also, rather than to the
government of the nation; and such has been the conclusion of
the authorities. In the new territories, however, where the gov-
ernment of the United States exercises sovereign author-
[* 52G] ity, it possesses, * as incident thereto, the right of eminent
domain, which it may exercise directly or through the
territorial governments; but this right passes from the nation to
the newly formed State whenever the latter is admitted into the
Union.2 So far, however, as the general government may deem it
1 See ante, p. 281. •
8 Pollard's Lessee r. Hogan, 3 How. 212; Goodtitle v. Kibbee, 9 How. 471;
Doe t>. Beebe, 13 How. 25; United States v. The Railroad Bridge Co., 6 McLean,
517; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229. The States have sometimes assumed
authority, under the eminent domain, to appropriate the property of individuals
in order to donate it to the general government for national purposes; but the
right to do this would seem doubtful. The authority of the general government
to appropriate private property for its needs is unquestionable; but every sov-
ereignty must judge of its needs for itself, and the right to decide upon and sup-
ply them by dispossessing private rights cannot, as it seems to us, be assumed by
any other authority without the incorporation of some new principle into the lav
of eminent domain. The following decisions have been made on this subject
In Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 478, proceedings in Maryland, under its laws, to
appropriate lands for the purpose of supplying the city of Washington with
water, were sustained. The opinion affirms the right generally to employ the
State eminent domain for the purposes of the general government; but the court
[614]
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important to appropriate lands or other property for its own pur-
poses, and to enable it to perform its functions, — as must some-
times be necessary in the case of forts, light-houses, military posts
or roads, and other conveniences and necessities of government, —
the general government may still exercise the authority, as well
within the States as within the territory under its exclusive
jurisdiction, and its right to do so may be supported by the same
attach importance to the fact that in ceding its portion of the District of Colum-
bia to the United States, " the State never intended to abandon all interest in the
District. The relation, therefore, between the District of Columbia, composed
of territory ceded by Maryland for certain purposes only, and the State of whose
soil it forms a part, is more intimate and close than that which it bears to any
other State." Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229, was a proceeding in the State
court, on the application of the United States by its agent, to condemn lands for
the purposes of a light-house. The right to maintain it was contested, but sus-
tained. A similar decision was made in Burt p. Merchants Ins. Co., 106 Mass.
356. Considerable reliance is placed in the opinion on the course of legislation
in that State upon the subject, which it was said to be too late to question; and
it is noticeable that the learned judge (Chapman, Ch. J.) who delivered the opin-
ion makes no allusion to any necessity for State action in such a case; an omission
that could hardly have occurred, had he been considering the case unembarrassed
by legislative precedents. In Trombley v. Auditor-General, 23 Mich. 471, an act
of the legislature authorizing the Governor to take proceedings to condemn lands
for the use of the general government was held invalid, on the grounds that every
sovereignty possesses inherent authority to appropriate the property of its citi-
zens or subjects for public uses, and must be the judge of its own needs. The
facts in that case would illustrate very forcibly some of the difficulties of any
other view. Those were that after the Governor, at the request of an agent of
the general government, had taken proceedings to condemn lands for a light-house,
and had had the damages assessed, he was notified by the Federal authorities
that they had decided not to take the land. . By the terms of the law, however,
the damages, when assessed, were to be paid from the State treasury, and the
owner now demanded payment; so that the aid of the court was invoked, not to
enable the United States to obtain lands it wanted, but to compel the State to
pay for lands for the United States which were not wanted. The case differs
from the others in the important particular that in this the State authorities were
the acting parties, while in the others the Federal authorities were the petitioners.
In the one the State was seeking to condemn lands for the nation; in the others
the nation was employing State laws and State courts to condemn lands for itself.
Even if the latter may be done, some curious results might follow in some cases.
Some of the State constitutions require the necessity for the taking of property
to be affirmed by a jury; and it would be singular, to say the least, if the right
of the United States to take lands for important national purposes, after the
taking had been decided upon by the proper national authority, could be made
to depend upon a finding of its necessity by twelve men selected by lot in one of
the States.
[615]
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reasons which support the right in any case; that is to say, the
absolute necessity that the means in the government for perform-
ing its functions and perpetuating its existence should not be
liable to be controlled or defeated by the want of consent of
private parties, or of any other authority.
What Property is subject to the Right.
Every species of property which the public needs may require,
and which government cannot lawfully appropriate under any other
right, is subject to be seized and appropriated under the right
of eminent domain.1 Lands for the public ways; timber, stone,
and gravel with which to make or improve the public ways ;2 build-
ings standing in the way of contemplated improvements, or which
for any other reason it becomes necessary to take, remove, or
destroy for the public good ;8 streams of water ;4 corporate fran-
1 People v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 32 Barb. 102; Bailey ». Miltenberger,
31 Penn. St. 37.
* Wheeloek v. Young, 4 Wend. 647 ; Lyon v. Jerome, 15 Wend. 569; Jerome
v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315; Bliss v. Hosmer, 15 Ohio, 44; Watkins v. Walker
Co., 18 Texas, 585. In Eldridge t>. Smith, 34 Vt. 484, it was held competent
for a railroad company to appropriate lands for piling the wood and lumber used
on the road, and brought to it to be transported thereon.
* Wells v. Somerset, &e., K.R. Co., 47 Me. 345. But the destruction of a pri-
vate house during a fire to prevent the spreading of a conflagration has beeohehi
not to be an appropriation under the right of eminent domain, but an exercise of
the police power. Sorocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69. "The destruction was author-
ized by the law of overruling necessity; it was the exercise of a natural right
belonging to every individual, not conferred by law, but tacitly excepted from
all human codes." Per Sherman, Senator, in Russell v. Mayor, &c, of New
York, 2 Denio, 473. See also Stone v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 25 Wend.
157; McDonald v. Redwing, 13 Minn. 38. But see Hale v. Lawrence, 1 Z»b.
714; Same v. Same, 3 Zab. 590.
* Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162. In this case a stream was appro-
priated in order to supply a town with water. The appropriation might, of
course, be made for any other object of public utility; and a stream may even
be diverted from its course to remove it out of the way of a public improvement
when not appropriated. See Johnson ». Atlantic, &c, R.R. Co., 35 N. H. 569;
Baltimore, &c, R.R. Co. v. Magruder, 34 Md. 79; 8. c. 6 Am. Rep. 310.
But in general, in constructing a public work, it is the duty of those concerned
to avoid diverting streams, and to construct the necessary culverts, bridges, &c,
for that purpose. March v. Portsmouth, &c, R.R. Co., 19 N. H. 372; Baugh-
ton v. Carter, 18 Johns. 405; Rowe v. Addison, 34 N. H. 306 ; Proprietors, &c.
[616]
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chises ;1 and generally, it may be said, legal and equitable
rights of * every description are liable to be thus appro- [* 527]
priated. From this statement, however, must be excepted
money, or that which in ordinary use passes as such, and which
the government may reach by taxation, and also rights in action,
which can only be available when made to produce money ; neither
of which can it be needful to take under this powep.2
p. Nashua & Lowell R.R. Co., 10 Cush. 388; Haynes p. Burlington, 38 Vt. 361.
And see Pettigrew p. Janesville, 25 Wis. 23; Arimond p. Green Bay Co., 31
Wis. 316; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130. As to the obligation of a railroad
company to compensate parties whose lands are flooded by excavations or em-
bankments of the company, see Brown v. Cayuga, &c, R.R. Co., 12 N. Y-.
486; Norris v. Vt. Cent. R.R. Co., 28 Vt. 99. Compare Eaton v. Boston, C.
& M. R.R. Co., 51 N. H. 504, where it was decided that a corporation which
flooded a man's land by removing a natural protection in the construction of
their road was liable for the injury, even though their road was constructed with
due care, with Bellinger v. N. Y. Central R.R. Co., 22 N. Y. 42, and other
cases cited, post, pp. 570, 571.
1 Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35; Crosby p. Han-
over, 36 N. H. 420; Boston Water Power Co. p. Boston, and Worcester R R.
Co., 23 Pick. 360; Central Bridge Corporation v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; West
River Bridge v. Dix, 6 Plow. 507; Richmond R.R. Co. v. Louisa R.R. Co., 13
How. 81, per Orier, J.; Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio
R.R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1; State p. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Red River Bridge Co. e.
Clarksville, 1 Sneed, 176 ; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745; White River Turn-
pike Co. v. Vermont Central R.R. Co., 21 Vt. 594; Newcastle, &c, R.R. Co. v.
Peru and Indiana R.R. Co., 3 Ind. 464; Springfield v. Connecticut River R.R.
Co., 4 Cush. 63; Forward v. Hampshire, &c, Canal Co., 22 Pick. 462; Com-
monwealth v. Pittsburg, &c, R.R.Co., 58 Penn. St. 50. "The only true rule of
poliuy as well as of law is, that a grant for one public purpose must yield to
another more urgent and important, and this can be effected without any infringe-
ment on the constitutional rights of the subject. If in such cases suitable and
adequate provision is made by the legislature for the compensation of those
whose property or franchise is injured or taken away, there is no violation of
public faith or private right. The obligation of the contract created by the orig-
inal charter is thereby recognized." Per Bigdovo, J., in Central Bridge Corpo-
ration v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 482. This subject receives a very full and satisfactory
examination by Judges Pearson and Sharswood, in Commonwealth v. Pennsyl-
vania Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 329.
* Property of individuals cannot be appropriated by the State under this
power for the mere purpose of adding to the revenues of the State. Thus it has
been held in Ohio, that in appropriating the water of streams for the purposes
of a canal, more could not be taken than was needed for that object, with a view
to raising a revenue by selling or leasing it. "The State, notwithstanding the
sovereignty of her character, can take only sufficient water from private streams
[617]
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Legislative Authority requisite.
The right to appropriate private property to public uses
[* 528] lies * dormant in the State, until legislative action is had,
pointing out the occasions, the modes, conditions, and
agencies for its appropriation.1 Private property can only be
taken pursuant to law; but a legislative act declaring the neces-
sity, being the customary mode in which that fact is determined,
must be held to be for this purpose "the law of the laud," and no
further finding or adjudication can be essential, unless the consti-
tution of the State has expressly required it.2 When, however,
for the purposes of the canal. So far the law authorizes the commissioners to
invade private right as to take what may be necessary for canal navigation, and
to this extent authority is conferred by the constitution, provided a compensation
be paid to the owner. The principle is founded on the superior claims of a whole
community over an individual citizen; but then in those cases only where private
property is wanted for public use, or demanded by the public welfare. We know
of no instances in which it has or can be taken, even by State authority, for the
mere purpose of raising a revenue by sale or otherwise; and the exercise of such
a power would be utterly destructive of individual right, and break down all the
distinctions between meum and tuum, and annihilate tbem for ever at the pleasure
of the State." Wood, J., in Buckingham v. Smith, 10 Ohio, 296. To the same
effect is Cooper v. Williams, 5 Ohio, 392.
Taking money under the right of eminent domain, when it must be compen-
sated in money afterwards, could be nothing more nor less than a forced loan,
only to be justified as a last resort in a time of extreme peril, where neither the
credit of the government nor the power of taxation could be made available. It
is impossible to lay down rules for such a case, except such as the law of over-
ruling necessity, which for the time being sets aside all the rules and protections
of private right, shall then prescribe. See post, p. 530, note.
1 Barrow v. Page, 5 Hayw. 97.
* "Whatever may be the theoretical foundation for the right of eminent
domain, it is certain that it attaches as an incident to every sovereignty, and
constitutes a condition upon which all property is holden. When the public
necessity requires it, private rights to property must yield to the paramount
right of the sovereign power. We have repeatedly held that the character of the
work for which the property is taken, and not the means or agencies employed
for its construction, determines the question of power in/the exercise of this right.
It requires no judicial condemnation to subject private property to public uses.
Like the power to tax, it resides in the legislative department to whom the dele-
gation is made. It may be exercised directly or indirectly by that body; and it
can only be restrained by the judiciary when its limits have been exceeded, or its
authority has been abused or perverted." Kramer v. Cleveland and Pittsburg
R.R. Co., 5 Ohio, n. a. 146.
[ 618 ]
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action is had for this purpose, there must be kept in view that
general as well as reasonable and just rule, that, whenever in
pursuance of law the property of an individual is to be devested
by proceedings against his will, a strict compliance must be had
with all the provisions of law which are made for his protection
and benefit, or the proceeding will be ineffectual.1 Those pro-
visions must be regarded as in the nature of conditions precedent,
which are not only to be observed and complied witli before the
right of the property owner is disturbed, but the party claiming
authority under the adverse proceeding must show affirmatively
such compliance. For example, if by a statute prescribing the
mode of exercising the right of eminent domain, the damages to
be assessed in favor of the property owner for the taking of his
land are to be so assessed by disinterested freeholders of the mu-
nicipality, the proceedings will be ineffectual unless they show on
their face that the appraisers were such freeholders and inhabi-
tants.2 So if a statute' only authorizes proceedings in invitum
after an effort shall have been made to agree with the owner on
the compensation to bo paid, the fact of such effort and its failure
must appear.3 So if the statute vests the title to lands
appropriated in the State or in * a corporation on payment [* 529]
therefor being made, it is evident that, under the rule
stated, the payment is a condition precedent to the passing of the
title.4 And where a general railroad law authorized routes to be
1 Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c, R.R. Co., 18 111. 1; Stanford v. Worn, 27
Cal. 171.
* Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Judson v. Bridgeport, 25 Conn. 428;
People v. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57.
3 Reitenbaugh v. Chester Valley R.R. Co., 21 Penn. St. 100; West Va.
Transportation Co. v. Volcanic Oil and Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382. But it was
held in this case that if the owner appears in proceedings taken for the assess-
ment of damages, and contests the amount without objecting the want of any
such attempt, the court must presume it to have been made.
* Stacy v. Vermont Central R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 44. By the section of the statute
under which the land was appropriated, it was provided that when land or other
real estate was taken by the corporation, for the use of their road, and the parties
were unable to agree upon the price of the land, the same should be ascertained
and determined by the commissioners, together with the costs and charges
accruing thereon, and upon the payment of the same, or by depositing the amount
in a bank, as should be ordered by the commissioners, the corporation should be
deemed to be seised and possessed of the lands. Held, that, until the payment
was made, the company had no right to enter upon the land to construct the
[ 619 ]
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surveyed by associated persons desirous of constructing roads, and
provided that if the legislature, on being petitioned for the purpose,
should decide by law that a proposed road would be of sufficient
utility to justify its construction, then the company, when organ-
ized, might proceed to take land for the way, it was held that,
until the route was approved by the legislature, no authority could
be claimed under the law to appropriate land for the purpose.1
These cases must suffice as illustrations of a general rule, which
indeed would seem to be too plain and obvious to require either
illustration or discussion.2
[* 530] * So the powers granted by such statutes are not to be
enlarged by intendment, especially where they are being
exercised by a corporation by way of appropriation of land for its
corporate purposes. "There is no rule more familiar or better set-
tled than this: that grants of corporate power, being in derogation
of common right, are to be strictly construed; and this is espe-
cially the case where the power claimed is a delegation of the right
of eminent domain, one of the highest powers of sovereignty per-
road, or to exercise any act of ownership over it; and that a court of equity
would enjoin them from exercising any such right, or they might be prosecuted
in trespass at law. This case follows Baltimore and Susquehanna R.R. Co. c.
Nesbit, 10 How. 395, and Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend.
10, where the statutory provisions were similar. In the case in Howard it is
said: "It can hardly be questioned that without acceptance in the mode pre-
scribed [i. e., by payment of the damages assessed], the company were not bound;
that if they had been dissatisfied with the estimate placed on the land, or could
have procured a more eligible site for the location of their road, they would have
been at liberty, before such acceptapce, wholly to renounce the inquisition. The
proprietors of the land could have no authority to coerce the company into its
adoption." Daniel, J., 10 How. 399.
1 Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c, R.R. Co., 13 HI. 1. "The statute sirs
that, after a certain other act shall have been passed, the company may then
proceed to take private property for the use of their road; that is equivalent to
saying that that right shall not be exercised without such subsequent act. The
right to take private property for public use is one of the highest prerogatives of
the sovereign power; and here the legislature has, in language not to be mis-
taken, expressed its intention to reserve that power until it could judge for itself
whether the proposed road would be of sufficient public utility to justify the use
of this high prerogative. It did not intend to cast this power away, to be gath-
ered up and used by any who might choose to exercise it." fl>id, p. 4.
* See further the cases of Atlantic and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Sullivant, 5 Ohio,
N. 8. 277; Parsons v. Howe, 41 Me. 218; Atkinson v. Marietta and Cincinnati
R.R. Co., 15 Ohio, n. b. 21.
[ 620 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XV.]
*530
THE EMINENT DOMAIN.
taining to the State itself, and interfering most seriously and often
vexatiously with the ordinary rights of property."1 It has accord-
ingly been held that where a railroad company was authorized by
law to " enter upon any land to survey, lay down, and construct its
road," "to locate and construct branch roads," &c.,to appropriate
land "for necessary side tracks," and "a right of way over ad-
jacent lands sufficient to enable such company to construct and
repair its road," and the company had located, and was engaged
in the construction of its main road along the north side of a town,
it was not authorized under this grant of power to appropriate a
temporary right of way for a term of years along the south side of
the town, to be used as a substitute for the main track whilst the
latter was in process of construction.2 And substantially the same
strict rule is applied when the State itself seeks to appropriate pri-
vate property; for it is not unreasonable that the property owner
should have the right to insist that the State, which selects the
occasion and prescribes the conditions for the appropriation of his
property, should confine its action strictly within the limits which
it has marked out as sufficient. So high a prerogative as that of
devesting one's estate against his will should only be exercised
where the plain letter of the law permits it, and under a careful
observance of the formalities prescribed for the owner's protection.
The Purpose.
The definition given of the right of eminent domain implies
that the purpose for which it may be exercised must not be a mere
private purpose; and it is conceded on all hands that the legisla-
ture has no power, in any case, to take the property of one indi-
vidual and pass it over to another without reference to some use
to which it is to be applied for the public benefit.3 "The right of
1 Currier v. Marietta and Cincinnati R.R. Co., 11 Ohio, n. s. 231; Miami
Coal Co. v. Wigton, 19 Ohio, N. s. 560. See ante, pp. 394-396.
* Currier v. Marietta and Cincinnati R.R. Co., 11 Ohio, N. s. 228. And see
Gilmer v. Lime Point, 19 Cal. 47; Bensley v. Mountain Lake, &c, Co., 13 Cal.
306; Brunnig v. N. O. Canal and Banking Co., 12 La. An. 541; West Virginia
Transportation Co. p. Volcanic Oil and Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382.
* In a work of this character, we have no occasion to consider the right of
the government to seize and appropriate to its own use the property of individuals
in time of war, through its military authorities. That is a right which depends
on the existence of hostilities, and the suspension, partially or wholly, of the
[621]
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eminent domain," it has been said, " does not imply a right in the
sovereign power to take the property of one citizen and transfer it
to another, even for a full compensation, where the public interest
will be in no way promoted by such transfep.1 It seems
[* 531] not to be allowable, therefore, to authorize * private roads
to be laid out across the lands of unwilling parties by an
exercise of this right. The easement in such a case would be the
property of him • for whom it was established; and although the
owner would not be deprived of the fee in the land, the beneficial
use and exclusive enjoyment of his property would in greater or
less degree be interfered with. Nor would it be material to inquire
what quantum of interest would pass from him: it would be suffi-
cient that some interest, the appropriation of which detracted from
his right and authority, and interfered with his exclusive posses-
sion as owner, had been taken against his will; and if taken for a
purely private purpose, it would be unlawful.2 Nor could it be of
civil laws. For recent cases in which it has been considered, see Mitchell p.
Harmony, 13 How. 128; Wilson v. Crockett^ 43 Mo. 216; Williams p, Wicker-
man, 44 Mo. 484; Yost p. Stout, 4 Cold. 205; Sutton p. Tiller, 6 Cold. 593;
Taylor v. Nashville, &c, R.R. Co., t'6. 646; Coolidge p. Guthrie, 8 Am. Law
Reg. (n. s.) 22; Echols v. Staunton, 3 W. Va. 574; Wilson p. Franklin, 63 N. C.
259; Ferguson v. Loar, 5 Bush, 689.
1 Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige, 73; Hepburn's
Case, 3 Bland, 95; Sadler p. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Pittsburg v. Scott, 1 Penn.
St. 139; Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149; Matter of John and Cherry
Streets, 19 Wend. 659; Cooper p. Williams, 5 Ohio, 393 ; Buckingham p. Smith,
10 Ohio, 296; Reeves p. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, n. s. 333. See this
subject considered on principle and authority by Senator Tracy in Bloodgood p.
Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 55 et seq. See also Embury p. Conner,
3 N. Y. 511; Kramer p. Cleveland and Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 5 Ohio, n. s. 146;
Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603; Concord R.R. p. Greeley, 17 N. H. 47; N. Y.
and Harlaem R.R. Co. p. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 385.
'Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 142, per Bronson, J.; Clack v. White, 2 Swan,
540; White p. White, 5 Barb. 474; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Pittsburg
p. Scott, 1 Penn. St. 139; Nesbitt p. Trumbo, 39 HI. 110; Osborn v. Hart, 24
Wis. 90; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 161; Tyler p. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; Bankhead v. Brown,
25 Iowa, 540. A neighborhood road is only a private road, and taking land for it
would not be for a public use. Dickey p. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373. To avoid this
difficulty, it is provided by the constitutions of some of the States that private
roads may be laid out under proceedings corresponding to those for the establish-
ment of highways. There are provisions to that effect in the Constitutions of
New York, Georgia, and Michigan. But in Harvey p. Thomas, 10 Watts, 65,
it was held that the right might be exercised in order to the establishment of
private ways from coal fields to connect them with the public improvements,
[ 622 ]
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importance that the public would receive incidental benefits, such
as usually spring from the improvement of lands or the establish-
ment of prosperous private enterprises: the public use implies a
possession, occupation, and enjoyment of the land by the public at
large, or by public agencies ;1 and a due protection to the rights of
private property will preclude the government from seizing it in
the hands of the owner, and turning it over to another on vague
grounds of public benefit to spring from the more profitable use to
which the latter may devote it.
We find ourselves somewhat at sea, however, when we
undertake to define,* in the light of the judicial decisions, [*532]
what constitutes a public use. It has been said by a
learned jurist that, " if the public interest can be in auy way pro-
there being nothing in the constitution forbidding it. See also the Pocopson
Road, 16 Penn. St. 15. But this doctrine is directly opposed to Young v.
McKenzie, 3 Georgia, 44; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 14G; Buffalo and N. Y.
R.R. Co. v. Brainerd, 9 N. Y. 108; Bradley v. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co.,
21 Conn. 305; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, n. s. 344, and many
other cases: though possibly convenient access to the great coal fields of the
State might be held to be so far a matter of general concern as to support an
exercise of the power on the ground of the public benefit. In Eldridge v. Smith,
34 Vt. 484, it was held that the manufacture of railroad cars was not so legit-
imately and necessarily connected with the management of a railroad that the
company would be authorized to appropriate lands therefor. So, also, of land
for the erection of dwelling-houses to rent by railroad companies to their employes.
But under authority to a railroad company to take land for constructing and
operating its road, it may take what is needful for depot grounds. N. Y. and
Harlaem R.R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546; 8. c. 7 Am. Rep. 385.
In the text we have stated what is unquestionably the result of the authorities;
though if the question were an open one, it might well be debated whether the
right to authorize the appropriation of the property of individuals did not rest
rather upon grounds of general public policy than upon the public purpose to
which it was proposed to devote it. There are many cases in which individuals
or private corporations have been empowered to appropriate the property of
others when the general good demanded it, though the purpose was no more
public than it is in any case where benefits are to flow to the community generally
from a private enterprise. The case of appropriations for mill-dams, railroads,
and drains to improve lands are familiar examples. These appropriations have
been sanctioned under an application of the term "public purpose," which might
also justify the laying out of private roads, when private property could not
otherwise be made available. Upon this general subject, the reader is referred
to an article by Hon. J. V. Campbell in the "Bench and Bar," for July, 1871.
1 Per Tracy, Senator, in Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18
Wend. 60.
[ 623 ]
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moted by the taking of private property, it must rest in the wis-
dom of the legislature to determine whether the benefit to the
public will be of sufficient importance to render it expedient for
them to exercise the right of eminent domain, and to authorize an
interference with the private rights of individuals for that pur-
pose.1 It is upon this principle that the legislatures of several of
the States have authorized the condemnation of the lands of indi-
viduals for mill, sites, when from the nature of the country such
mill sites could not be obtained for the accommodation of the in-
habitants without overflowing the lands thus condemned. Upon
the same principle of public benefit, not only the agents of the
government, but also individuals and corporate bodies have been
authorized to take private property for the purpose of making pub-
lic highways, turnpike roads, and canals; of erecting and con-
structing wharves and basins; of establishing ferries; of draining
swamps and marshes, and of bringing water to cities and villages.
In all such cases the object of the legislative grant of power is the
public advantage expected from the contemplated improvement,
whether such improvement is to be effected directly by the agents
of the government, or through the medium of corporate bodies, or
of individual enterprise."2
It would not be entirely safe, however, to apply with much lib-
erality the language above quoted, that, " where the public interest
can be in any way promoted by the taking of private property,"
the taking can be considered for a public use. It is certain that
there are very many cases in which the property of some individual
owners would be likely to be better employed or occupied to the
advancement of the public interest in other hands than in their
own; but it does not follow from this circumstance alone that they
may rightfully be dispossessed. It may be for the public benefit
that all the wild lands of the State be improved and cultivated, all
the low lands drained, all the unsightly places beautified, all di-
lapidated buildings replaced by new; because all these things tend
to give an aspect of beauty, thrift, and comfort to the country, and
thereby to invite settlement, increase the value of lands, and gratify
the public taste; but the common law has never sanctioned an
1 2 Kent Com. 340.
* Walworth, Chancellor, in Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co., 3
Paige, 73. And see Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 251.
[624]
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appropriation of property based upon these considerations alone;
and some further element must therefore be involved be-
fore the appropriation can be regarded as sanctioned * by [* 533]
our constitutions. The reason of the case and the settled
practice of free governments must be our guides in determining
what is or is not to be regarded a public use; and that only can
be considered such where the government is supplying its own
needs, or is furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to those
matters of public necessity, convenience, or welfare, which, on
account of their peculiar character, and the difficulty — perhaps
impossibility — of making provision for them otherwise, it is alike
proper, useful, and needful for the government to provide.
Every government is expected to make provision for the public
ways, and for this purpose it may seize and appropriate lands.
And as the wants of traffic and travel require facilities beyond
those afforded by the common highway, over which any one may
pass with his own vehicles, the government may establish the
higher grade of highways, upon some of which only its own vehi-
cles can be allowed to run, while others, differently constructed,
shall be open to use by all on payment of toll. The common high-
way is kept in repair by assessments of labor and money ; the tolls
paid upon turnpikes, or the fares on railways, are the equivalents
to these assessments; and when these improved ways are required
by law to be kept open for use by the public impartially, they also
may properly be called highways, and the use to which land for
their construction is put be denominated a public use. The gov-
ernment also provides court-houses for the administration of jus-
tice; buildings for its seminaries of instruction;1 aqueducts to
convey pure and wholesome water into large towns;2 it builds
levees to prevent the country being overflowed by the rising
streams ;3 it may cause drains to be constructed to relieve swamps
and marshes of their stagnant water;4 and other measures of gen-
1 Williams v. School District, 33 Vt. 271. See Hooper v. Bridgewater, 102
Mass. 512.
* Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444; Kane v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 240: Gardner v.
Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Ham t>. Salem, 10 Mass. 350.
3 Mithoff v. Carrollton, 12 La. An. 185; Cash v. Whitworth, 13 La. An. 401;
Inge v. Police Jury, 14 La. An. 117.
4 Anderson o. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood
County, 8 Ohio, n. s. 344. See a clear statement of the general principle and
its necessity in the last-mentioned case. The drains, however, which can be
40 [ 625 ]
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* 533 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XV.
eral utility, in which the public at large are interested, and which
require the appropriation of private property, are also within the
power, where they fall within the reasons underlying the cases
mentioned.1
[* 534] * Whether the power of eminent domain can rightfully
be exercised in the condemnation of lands for manufac-
turing purposes, where the manufactories are to be owned and
occupied by individuals is a question upon which the authorities
are at variance. Saw-mills, grist-mills, and various other manu-
factories, are certainly a public necessity; and while the country
is new, and capital not easily attainable for their erection, it some-
times seems to be essential that government should offer large
inducements to parties who will supply this necessity. Before
steam came into use, water was almost the sole reliance for motive
power; and as reservoirs were generally necessary for this pur-
pose, it would sometimes happen that the owner of a valuable mill
site was unable to render it available, because the owners of lauds
which must be flowed to obtain a reservoir would neither consent
to the construction of a dam, nor sell their lands except at extrav-
agant and inadmissible prices. The legislatures in some of the
States have taken the matter in hand, and have surmounted the
difficulty, sometimes by authorizing the land to be appropriated,
and at other times by permitting the erection of the dam, but re-
quiring the mill owner to pay annually to the proprietor of the
authorized to be cut across the land of unwilling parties, or for which individuals
can be taxed, must not be mere private drains, but must have reference to tie
public health, convenience, or welfare. Reeves v. Treasurer, &c, supra. And
see People v. Nearing, 27 N. Y. 306. It is competent under the eminent douiaia
to appropriate and remove a dam owned by private parties, in order to recliio
a considerable body of lands flowed by means of it, paying the owner of the
dam its value. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.
1 Such, for instance, as the construction of a public park, which, in large
cities, is as much a matter of public utility as a railway or a supply of pure
water. See Matter of Central Park Extension, 16 Abb. Pr. Rep. 56; Owners
of Ground v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 15 Wend. 374. Brooklyn Park Coui'rst.
Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 70. Or sewers in cities. Hit
dreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345. A city may be authorized to appropriate land!
in order to fill them up, and thereby abate a nuisance upon them. Dingier r.
Boston, 100 Mass. 544. A private corporation may be empowered to exercise
the right of eminent domain to obtain a way along which to lay pipe for the
transportation of oil to a railroad or navigable water. West Va. Transportation
Co. v. Volcanic Oil and Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382.
[ 626 ]
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land the damages caused by the flowing, to be assessed in some
impartial mode.1 The reasons for such statutes have been grow-
ing weaker with the introduction of steam power and the progress
of improvement, but their validity has repeatedly been recognized
in some of the States, and probably the same courts would con-
tinue still to recognize it, notwithstanding the public necessity may
no longer appear to demand such laws.2 The rights granted by
these laws to mill owners are said by Chief Justice Shaw, of Massa-
chusetts, to be "granted for the better use of the water power,
upon considerations of general policy and the general good ; "3 and
in this view, and in order to render available a valuable property
which might otherwise be made of little use by narrow,
selfish, and * unfriendly conduct on the part of individuals, [* 535]
such laws may perhaps be sustained on the same grounds
which support an exercise of the right of eminent domain to pro-
tect, drain, and render valuable the lauds which, by the overflow
of a river, might otherwise be an extensive and worthless swamp.4
1 See Angell on Watercourses, p. 12, for references to the statutes on this
subject.
* "The encouragement of mills has always been a favorite object with the
legislature; and though the reasons for it may have ceased, the favor of the
legislature continues." Wolcott Woollen Manufacturing Co. v. Upham, o Pick.
294.
* French v. Braintree Manufacturing Co., 23 Pick. 220.
4 Action on the case for raising a dam across the Merrimac River, by which a
mill stream emptying into that river, above the site of said dam, was set back
and overflowed, and a mill of the plaintiff situated thereon, and the mill privi-
lege, were damaged and destroyed. Demurrer to the declaration. The defend-
ant company were chartered for the purpose of constructing a dam across the
Merrimac River, and constructing one or more locks and canals, in connection
with said dam, to remove obstructions in said river by falls and rapids, and to
create a water power to be used for mechanical and manufacturing purposes.
The defendants claimed that they were justified in what they had done, by an
act of the legislature exercising the sovereign power of the State, in the right of
eminent domain; that the plaintiff's property in the mill and mill privilege was
taken and appropriated under this right ; aud that his remedy was by a claim of
damages under the act, and not by action at common law as for a wrongful and
unwarrantable encroachment upon his right of property. Shaw, Ch. J.: "It is
contended that if this act was intended to authorize the defendant company to
take the mill power and mill of the plaintiff, it was void because it was not taken
for public use, and it was not within the power of the government in the exercise
of the right of eminent domain. This is the main question. In determining it,
we must look to the declared purposes of the act; and if a public use is declared,
[ 627 ]
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[* 536] * On the other hand, it is said that the legislature of New
York has never exercised the right of eminent domain in
favor of mills of any kind, and that " sites for steam-engines, hotels,
it will be so held, unless it manifestly appears by the provisions of the act that
they can have no tendency to advance and promote such public use. The
declared purposes are to improve the navigation of the Merrimac River, and to
create a large mill power for mechanical and manufacturing purposes. In general,
whether a particular structure, as a bridge, or a lock, or canal, or road, is for
the public use, is a question for the legislature, and which may be presumed to
have been correctly decided by them. Commonwealth v. Breed, 4 Pick.«J63.
That the improvement of the navigation of a river is done for the public use
has been too frequently decided and acted upon to require authorities. And so
to create a wholly artificial navigation by canals. The establishment of a great
mill power for manufacturing purposes, as an object of great public interest,
especially since manufacturing has come to be one of the great industrial pur-
suits of the commonwealth, seems to have been regarded by the legislature, and
sanctioned by the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth, and in our judgment
rightly so, in determining what is a public use, justifying the exercise of right of
eminent domain. See St. 1825, p. 148, incorporating the Salem Mill Dam Cor-
poration; Boston and Roxbury Mill Dam Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467.
The acts since passed, and the cases since decided on this ground, are very
numerous. That the erection of this dam would have a strong and direct ten-
dency to advance both these public objects, there is no doubt. We are, therefore,
of opinion that the powers conferred on the corporation by this act were so done
within the scope of the authority of the legislature, and were not a violation of
the Constitution of the Commonwealth." Hazen p. Essex Company, 12 Cush.
477. See also Boston and Roxbury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467;
Fiske v. Framingham Manufacturing Co., t'6. 67; Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerg.
41. The courts of Wisconsin have sustained such laws. Newcome V. Smith,
1 Chand. 71; Thieu v. Voegtlander, 3 Wis. 465; Pratt v. Brown, ib. 603. Bat
with some hesitation of late. See Fisher p. Horricon Co., 10 Wis. 351; Curtis p.
Whipple, 24 Wis. 350. And see the note of Judge liedfield to Allen p. Inhabi-
tants of Jay, Law Reg., Aug., 1873, p. 493. And those of Connecticut. Olmstead
v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532. And of Maine. Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317.
And of Minnesota. Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 365. And they have been
enforced elsewhere without question. Burgess v. Clark, 13 Ired. 109; McAfee's
Heirs v. Kennedy, 1 Lit. 92; Smith p. Connelly, 1 T. B. Monp. 58; Shackleford
v. Coffey, 4 J. J. Marsh. 40; Crenshaw p. Slate River Co., 6 Rand. 245. The
whole subject was very fully considered and the validity of such legislation
affirmed in Great Falls Manuf. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N. H. 444. And see Ash
v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591. In Loughbridge p. Harris, 42 Geo. 500, an act
for the condemnation of land for a grist mill was held unconstitutional, though
the tolls were regulated and discrimination forbidden. In Newell p. Smith, 15
Wis. 101, it was held not constitutional to authorize the appropriation of the
property, and leave the owner no remedy except to subsequently recover its
value in an action of trespass.
[ 628 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XV.]
* 536
THE EMINENT DOMAIN.
churches, and other public conveniences, might as well be taken by
the exercise of this extraordinary powep." 1 A. somewhat similar
view has been taken by the Supreme Court of Alabama.2 It is quite
possible that, in any State in which this question would be entirely
a new one, and where it would not be embarrassed by long acqui-
escence, or by either judicial or legislative precedents, it might be
held that these laws are not sound in principle, and that there is
110 such necessity, and consequently no such imperative reasons
of public policy, as would be essential to support an exercise of the
right of eminent domain.3 But accepting as correct the decisions
which have been made, it must be conceded that the term "public
use," as employed in the law of eminent domain, has a meaning
much controlled by the necessity, and somewhat different from
that which it bears generally.4
1 Hay v. Colioes Company, 3 Barb. 47.
'Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311. In this case, however, it was assumed
that lands for the purposes of grist-mills which grind for toll, and were required
to serve the public impartially, might, under proper legislation, be taken under
the right of eminent domain. The case of Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Geo.
500, is contra. In Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648, it was held not competent,
where the mills were subject to no such requirement. See the case, 8 Am.
Rep. 398. And see note by Redfield, Am. Law Reg. Aug. 1873, p. 493.
5 See this subject in general discussed in a review of Angell on AVatercourses,
2 Am. Jurist, p. 25.
* In People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich., the court consider the
question whether a use which is regarded as public for the purposes of an exer-
cise of the right of eminent domain, is necessarily so for the purposes of taxation.
They say: "Reasoning by analogy from one of the sovereign powers of gov-
ernment to another is exceedingly liable to deceive and mislead. An object may
be public in one sense and for one purpose, when in a general sense and for
other purposes it would be idle or misleading to apply the same term. All
governmental powers exist for public purposes, but they are not necessarily
to be exercised under the same conditions of public interest. The sovereign
police power which the State possesses is to be exercised only for the general
public welfare, but it reaches to every person, to every kind of business, to
every species of property within the Commonwealth. The conduct of every
individual, and the use of alt property and of all rights is regulated by it, to
any extent found necessary for the preservation of the public order, and also
for the protection of the private rights of one individual against encroachment
by others. The sovereign power of taxation is employed in a great many cases
where the power of eminent domain might be made more immediately efficient
and available, if constitutional principles could suffer it to be resorted to; but
each of these has its own peculiar and appropriate sphere, and the object which
[ 629 ]
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The Taking of Property.
Although property can only be taken for a public use, and the
legislature must determine in what cases, it has been long settled
that it is not essential the taking should be to or by the State
is public for the demands of the one is not necessarily of a character to permii
the exercise of the other.
"If we examine the subject critically, we shall find that the most important
consideration in the case of eminent domain is the necessity of accomplishing
some public good which is otherwise impracticable; and we shall also find that
the law does not so much regard the means as the need. The power is much
nearer akin to that of the public police than to that of taxation; it goes but a
step farther, and that step is in the same direction. Every man has an abstract
right to the exclusive use of his own property for his own enjoyment in such
manner as he shall choose; but if he should choose to create a nuisance upOD it,
or to do any thing which would preclude a reasonable enjoyment of adjacent
property, the law would interfere to impose restraints. He is said to own his
private lot to the pentre of the earth, but he would not be allowed to excavate
it indefinitely, lest his neighbor's lot should disappear in the excavation. The
abstract right to make use of his own property in his own way is compelled to
yield to the general comfort and protection of the community, and to a proper
regard to relative rights in others. The situation of his property may even be
such that he is compelled to dispose of it because the law will not suffer his
regular business to be carried on upon it. A needful and lawful species of
manufacture may so injuriously affect the health and comfort of the vicinity that
it cannot be tolerated in a densely settled neighborhood, and therefore the owner
of a lot in that neighborhood will not be allowed to engage in that manufacture
upon it, even though it be his regular and legitimate business. The butcber in
the vicinity of whose premises a village has grown up, finds himself compelled
to remove his business elsewhere, because his right to make use of his lot ill
place for the slaughter of cattle has become inconsistent with the superior right
of community to the enjoyment of pure air and the accompanying blessings
and comforts. The owner of a lot within the fire limits of a city may be com-
pelled to part with the property, because he is unable to erect a brick or stone
structure upon it, and the local regulations will not permit one of wood. Eminent
domain only recognizes and enforces the superior right of the community against
the selfishness of individuals in a similar way. Every branch of needful industry
has a right to exist, and community has a right to demand that it be permitted
to exist; and if for that purpose a peculiar locality already in possession of
an individual is essential, the owner's right to undisturbed occupancy must yield
to the superior interest of the public. A railroad cannot go around the farm of
every unwilling person, and the business of transporting persons and property
for long distances by rail, which has been found so essential to the general
enjoyment and welfare, could never have existed if it were in the power of any
unwilling person to stop the road at his boundary, or to demand unreasonable
[ 630 ]
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CH. XV.] THE EMINENT DOMAIN. * 536
itself, if by any other agency, in the opinion of the legislature, the
use can be made equally effectual for the public benefit. There
are many cases in which the appropriation consists simply in
throwing the property open to use by such persons as may see fit
to avail themselves of it; as in the case of common highways and
public parks. In these cases the title of the owner is not dis-
turbed, except as it is charged with this burden; and the State
defends the easement, not by virtue of any title in the property,
but by means of criminal proceedings when the general
right is disturbed.* But in other cases it seems impor- [*537]
tant to take the title; and in many of these it is conven-
ient, if not necessary, that the taking be, not by the State, but by
the municipality for which the use is specially designed, and to
whose care and government it will be confided. When property is
needed for a district school-house, it is proper that the district
appropriate it; and it is strictly in accordance witli the general
theory as well as with the practice of our government for the State
to delegate to the district the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for this special purpose. So a county may be authorized
to take lands for its court-house or jail; a city, for its town hall, its
reservoirs of water, its sewers, and other public works of like im-
portance. In these cases no question of power arises; the taking
is by the public; the use is by the public; and the benefit to ac-
crue therefrom is shared in greater or less degree by the whole
public.
If, however, it be constitutional to appropriate lands for mill
dams or mill sites, it ought also to be constitutional that the tak-
terms as a condition of passing him. The law interferes in these cases, and
regulates the relative rights of the owner and of the community with as strict
regard to justice and equity as the circumstances will permit. It does not
deprive the owner of his property, but it compels him to dispose of so much of
it as is essential on equitable terms. While, therefore, eminent domain estab-
lishes no industry, it so regulates the relative rights of all that no individual
shall have it in his power to preclude its establishment." On this general subject
see Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, in which it was very fully and carefully
considered.
What is a public use is a question for the courts; though where a use has
been declared public by the legislature, the courts will hold it to be such unless
the contrary clearly appears. Bankhead v. Brown, 25 1ll. 540. See Olmstead v.
Camp, 33 Conn. 551; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; Loughbridge v. Harris, 42
Geo. 500.
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ing be by individuals instead of by the State or any of its organized
political divisions; since it is no part of the business of the gov-
ernment to engage in manufacturing operations which come in
competition with private enterprise; aiid the cases must be very
peculiar and very rare where a State or municipal corporation
could be justified in any such undertaking. And although the
practice is not entirely uniform on the subject, the general senti-
ment is adverse to the construction of railways by the State, and
the opinion is quite prevalent, if not general, that they can be
better managed, controlled, and operated for the public benefit in
the hands of individuals than by State or municipal officers or
agencies.
And while there are unquestionably some objections to compel-
ling a citizen to surrender his property to a corporation, whose cor-
porators, in receiving it, are influenced by motives of private gain
and emolument, so that to them the purpose of the appropriation
is altogether private, yet conceding it to be settled that these facil-
ities for travel and commerce are a public necessity, if the legisla-
ture, reflecting the public sentiment, decide that the general benefit
is better promoted by their construction through individuals or
corporations than by the State itself, it would clearly be pressing a
constitutional maxim to an absurd extreme if it were to be held
that the public necessity should only be provided for in the
[* 538] way which is least consistent with the public * interest.
Accordingly, on the principle of public benefit, not onlj
the State and its political divisions, but also individuals and cor-
porate bodies, have been authorized to take private property for the
construction of works of public utility, and when duly empowered
by the legislature so to do, their private pecuniary interest does
not preclude their being regarded as public agencies in respect to
the public good which is sought to be accomplished.1
1 Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige, 73; Wilson r.
Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 251; Buonaparte v. Camden and Amboy
R.R. Co., 1 Bald. 205; Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend.
1; Lebanon v. Olcott, 1 N. H. 339; Petition of Mount Washington Road Co.,
35 N. H. 141; Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427;
Stevens v. Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. 466: Boston Mill Dam v. Newman, 12
Pick. 467; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt
750; White River Turnpike v. Central Railroad, 21 Vt. 590; Rileigh, &c,
R.R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Bat. 451; Whiteman's Ex'r v. Wilmington, &c,
R.R. Co., 2 Harr. 514; Bradley v. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co., 21 Conn. 294;
[ 632 ]
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The Necessity for the Taking.
The authority to determine in any case whether it is needful to
permit the exorcise of this power must rest with the State itself;
and the question is always one of strictly political character, not
requiring any hearing upon the facts or any judicial determination.
Nevertheless, when a work or improvement of local importance
only is contemplated, the need of which must be determined upon
a view of the facts which the people of the vicinity may be sup-
posed best to understand, the question of necessity is generally
referred to some local tribunal, and it may even be submitted to a
jury to decide upon evidence.1 But parties interested have no con-
stitutional right to be heard upon the question, unless the State
constitution clearly and expressly recognizes and provides for it.
On general principles, the final decision rests with the legislative
department of the State; and if the question is referred to any
tribunal for trial, the reference and the opportunity for being heard
are matters of favor and not of right. The State is not under any
obligation to make provision for a judicial contest upon that ques-
tion. And where the case is such that it is proper to delegate to
individuals or to a corporation the power to appropriate property,
it is also competent to delegate the authority to decide upon the
necessity for the taking.2
Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Eaton v. Boston, C. & M. R.R. Co., 51
N. H. 504.
1 Iron R.R. Co. v. Ironton, 19 Ohio, N. s. 299. The constitutions of some of
the States require the question of the necessity of any specific appropriation to
be submitted to a jury; and this requirement cannot be dispensed with. Mans-
field, &c, R.R. Co. v. Clark, 23 Mich. 519.
s People r. Smith, 21 N. Y. 597; Ford v. Chicago and N. W. R.R. Co., 14
Wis. 617; Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 152; Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend.
484; Hays v. Risher, 32 Penn. St. 169; North Missouri R.R. Co. v. Lackland,
25 Mo. 51.3; Same v. Gott, ib. 540; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540. In the
case first cited, Denio, J., says: "The question is, whether the State, in.the
exercise of the power to appropriate the property of individuals to a public use,
where the duty of judging of the expediency of making the appropriation, in a
class of cases, is committed to public officers, is obliged to afford to the owners
of the property an opportunity to be heard before those officers when they sit for
the purpose of making the determination. I do not speak now of the process for
arriving at the amount of compensation to be paid to the owners, but of the
determination whether, under the circumstances of a particular case, the prop-
erty required for the purpose shall be taken or not; and I am of opinion that the
[ 633 ]
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[* 539] * How much Property may he taken.
The taking of property must always be limited to the
necessity of the case, and consequently no more can be
[* 540] appropriated in any * instance than the proper tribunal
shall adjudge to be needed for the particular use for which
State is not under any obligation to make provision for a judicial contest upon
that question. The only part of the constitution which refers to the subject is
that which forbids private property to be taken for public use without compen-
sation, and that which prescribes the manner in which the compensation shall be
ascertained. It is not pretended that the statute under consideration violates
either of those provisions. There is, therefore, no eonstilutional injunction on
the point under consideration. The necessity for appropriating private property
for the use of the public or of the government is not a judicial question. The
power resides in the legislature. It may be exercised by means of a statute
which shall at once designate the property to be appropriated and the purpose of
the appropriation; or it may be delegated to public officers, or, as it has been
repeatedly held, to private corporations established to carry on enterprises in
which the public are interested. There is no restraint upon the power, except
that requiring compensation to be made. And where the power is committed to
public officers, it is a subject of legislative discretion to determine what pruden-
tial regulations shall be established to secure a discreet and judicious exercise of
the authority. The constitutional provision securing a trial by jury in certain
cases, and that which declares that no citizen shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law, have no application to the case. The jury trial can
only be claimed as a constitutional right where the subject is judicial in its char-
acter. The exercise of the right of eminent domain stands on the same ground
with the power of taxation. Both are emanations from the law-making power.
They are attributes of political sovereignty, for the exercise of which the legis-
lature is under no necessity to address itself to the courts. In imposing a tax,
or in appropriating the property of a citizen, or of a class of citizens, for a public
purpose, with a proper provision for compensation, the legislative act is itself
due process of law; though it would not be if it should undertake to appropriate
the property of one citizen for the use of another, or to confiscate the property
of one person or class of persons, or a particular description of property upon
some view of public policy, where it could not be said to be taken for a public
use. It follows from these views that it is not necessary for the legislature, in
the-exercise of the right of eminent domain, either directly, or indirectly through
public officers or agents, to invest the proceedings with the forms or substance
of judicial process. It may allow the owner to intervene and participate in the
discussion before the officer or board to whom the power is given of determining
whether the appropriation shall be made in a particular case, or it may provide
that the officers shall act upon their own views of propriety and duty, without the
aid of a forensic contest. The appropriation of the propriety is an act of public
administration, and the form and manner of its performance is such as the legis-
lature in its discretion shall prescribe."
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the appropriation is made. When a part only of a man's premises
is needed by the public, the necessity for the appropriation of that
part will not justify the taking of the whole, even though com-
pensation be made therefor. The moment the appropriation goes
beyond the necessity of the case, it ceases to be justified on the
principles which underlie the right of eminent domain.1
If, * however, the statute providing for such appropriation [* 541]
is acted upon, and the property owner accepts the compen-
sation awarded to him under it, he will be precluded by this
implied assent from afterwards objecting to the excessive appro-
priation.2 And where land is taken for a public work, there is
1 By a statute of New York it was enacted that whenever a part only of a lot
or parcel of land should be required for the purposes of a city street, if the com-
missioners for assessing compensation should deem it expedient to include the
whole lot in the assessment, they should have power so to do; and the part not
wanted for the particular street or improvement should, upon the confirmation of
the report, become vested in the corporation, and might be appropriated to pub-
lic uses, or sold in case of no such appropriation. Of this statute it was said by
the Supreme Court of New York: "If this provision was intended merely to
give to the corporation capacity to take property under such circumstances with
the consent of the owner, and then to dispose of the same, there can be no objec-
tion to it; but if it is to be taken literally, that the commissioners may, against
the consent of the owner, take the whole lot, when only a part is required for
public use, and the residue to be applied to private use, it assumes a power
which, with all respect, the legislature did not possess. The constitution, by
authorizing the appropriation of property to public use, impliedly declares that
for any other use private property shall not be taken from one and applied to the
private use of another. It is in violation of natural right; and if it is not in
violation of the letter of the constitution, it is of its spirit, and cannot be sup-
ported. This power has been supposed to be convenient when the greater part
of a lot is taken, and only a small part left, not required for public use, and that
small part of but little value in the hands of the owner. In such case the cor-
poration has been supposed best qualified to take and dispose of such parcels, or
goers, as they have sometimes been called; and probably this assumption of
power has been acquiesced in by the proprietors. I know of no case where the
power has been questioned, and where it has received the deliberate sanction of
this court. Suppose a case where only a few feet, or even inches, are wanted,
from one end of a lot to widen a street, and a valuable building stands upon the
other end of such lot; would the power be conceded to exist to take the whole
lot, whether the owner consented or not? The quantity of the residue of any
lot cannot vary the principle. The owner may be very unwilling to part with
only a few feet; and I hold it equally incompetent for the legislature to dispose
of private property, whether feet or acres are the subject of this assumed power."
Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 151, per Savage, Ch. J.
* Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511. There is clearly nothing in constitutional
[ 635 ]
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nothing in the principle we have stated which will preclude the
appropriation of whatever might be necessary for incidental con-
veniences; such as the workshops or depot buildings of a railway
company,1 or materials to be used in the construction of their road,
and so on. Express legislative power, however, is needed for
these purposes; it will not follow that, because such things are
convenient to the accomplishment of the general object, the public
may appropriate them without express authority of law; but the
power to appropriate must be expressly conferred, and the public
agencies seeking to exercise this high prerogative must be careful
to keep within the authority delegated, since the public necessity
cannot be held to extend beyond what has been plainly declared
on the face of the legislative enactment.
What constitutes a Taking of Property.
Any proper exercise of the powers of government, which does
not directly encroach upon the property of an individual, or disturb
him in its possession or enjoyment, will not entitle him to compen-
sation, or give him a right of action.2 If, for instance, the
[* 542] * State, under its power to provide and regulate the public
highways, should authorize the construction of a bridge
across a navigable river, it is quite possible that all proprietary
interests in land upon the river might be injuriously affected; but
principles which would preclude the legislature from providing that a man's prop-
erty might be taken with his assent, whether the assent was evidenced by deed or
not; and if he accepts payment, he must be deemed to assent. The more recent
case of House v. Rochester, 15 Barb. 517, is not, we think, opposed to Embury
v. Conner, of which it makes no mention.
1 Chicago B. and Q. U.K. Co. v. Wilson, 17 111. 123; Low v. Galena and C. U.
R.R. Co., 18 111. 324; Giesy v. Cincinnati, W. and Z. R.R. Co., 4 Ohio, n. s.
808.
2 Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co., 1 W. & S. 34G; Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nav-
igation Co., 14 S. & R. 71; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S.
101; Davidson v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co., 3 Cush. 91; Gould v. Hudson
River R.R. Co., 12 Barb. G16, and 6 N. Y. 522; Radcliff v. Mayor, &c, of
Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195; Murray o. Menifee, 20 Ark. 501; Hooker v. New
Haven and Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146; People if. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 193;
Fuller v. Eddings, 11 Rich. Law, 239; Eddings v. Seabrook, 12 Rich. Law, 504;
Richardson v. Vermont Central R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 465; Kennett's Petition, 4
Post. 139; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247; Richmond, &c, Co. v. Rog-
ers, 1 Duvall, 135; Harvey v, Lackawana, &c, R.R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 428;
Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Penn. St. 21.
[ 636 ]
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such injury could no more give a valid claim against the State for
damages, than could any change in the general laws of the State,
which, while keeping in view the general good, might injuriously
affect particular interests.1 So if, by the erection of a dam in order
to improve navigation, the owner of a fishery finds it diminished in
value,2 or if by deepening the channel of a river to improve the
navigation a spring is destroyed,3 or by a change in the grade of
a city street the value of adjacent lots is diminished,4—in these
1 Davidson v. Boston and Maine R.R. Co., 3 Cusli. 91.
* Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 14 S. & R. 71.
3 Commonwealth v. Richter, 1 Ponn. St. 4(37. It is justly said by Mr. Justice
Miller, in Pumpelly r. The Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 180, that the decisions " that
for,the consequential injury to the property of an individual from the prosecution
of improvement of roads, streets, rivers, and other highways for the public good,
there is no redress," " have gone to the extreme and limit of sound judicial con-
struction in favor of this principle, and in some cases beyond it; ami it remains
true that where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of
water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed
on it, so as effectually to destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking within the
meaning of the constitution." This whole subject is most elaborately considered
by Smith, J., in Eaton t>. Boston, C. & M. R.R. Co., 51 N. H. 604. It was
decided in that case that, notwithstanding a party had received compensation for
the taking of his land for a railroad, he was entitled to a further remedy at the
common law for the flooding of his land in consequence of the road being cut
through a ridge on the land of another; and that this flooding was a taking of his
property within the meaning of the constitution. The cases to the contrary are
all considered by the learned judge, who is able to adduce very forcible reasons
for his conclusions. Compare Aldrich v. Cheshire R.R. Co., 21 N. II. 869 ; West
Branch, &c, Canal Co. v. Mulliner, 68 Penn. St. 357; Bellinger v. N. Y. Cen-
tral R.R. Co., 23 N. Y. 42; Hatch v. Vt. Central R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 49.
4 British Plate Manufacturing Co. v. Meredith, 4 T. R. 794; Matter of Fur-
man Street, 17 Wend. 649 ; Radcliff's Ex'rs v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y.
195; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; Wilson r. Mayor, &c, of New York, 1 Denio,
595; Murphy.w. Chicago, 29 111. 279; Roberts v. Chicago, 26 111. 249; Charlton
v. Alleghany City, 1 Grant, 208; La Fayette v. Bush, 19 Ind. 326; Macy v.
Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267; Vincennes v. Richards, 23 Ind. 381; Green v. Read-
ing, 9 Watts, 382; O'Conner v. Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St. 187; In re Ridge
Street, 29 Penn. St. 391; Callendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; Creal v. Keokuk, 4
Greene (Iowa), 47; Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135; Skinner v. Hartford
Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523 ; Benden v. Nashua, 17 N. H. 477; Goszler v. George-
town, 6 Wheat. 703. The cases of McComb v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 474, and 18
Ohio, 229; and Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. s. 459, are contra. Those
cases, however, admit that a party whose interests are injured by the original
establishment of a street grade can have no claim to compensation ; but they hold
that when the grade is once established, and lots are improved in reference to it,
[ 637 ]
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and similar cases the law affords no redress for the injury. 60
if, in consequence of the construction of a public work, an injury
occurs, but the work was constructed on proper plan and without
negligence, and the injury is caused by accidental and extraor-
dinary circumstances, the injured party cannot demand com-
pensation.1
[* 543] * This principle is peculiarly applicable to those cases
where property is appropriated under the right of eminent
domain. It must frequently occur that a party will find his rights
seriously affected though no property to which he has lawful claim
is actually appropriated. As where a road is laid out along the line
of a man's land without taking any portion of it, in consequence of
which he is compelled to keep up the whole of what before was a
partition fence, one-half of which his neighbor was required to sup-
port.2 No property being taken in this case, the party has 110 relief,
unless the statute shall give it. The loss is damnum absque injuria.
So a turnpike company, whose profits will be diminished by the
construction of a railroad along the same general line of travel, ia
not entitled to compensation.3 So where a railroad company, in
constructing their road in a proper manner on their own land,
raised a high embankment near to and in front of the plaintiff's
the corporation has no right to change the grade afterwards, except on payment
of the damages.
1 As in Sprague 0. Worcester, 13 Gray, 193, where, in consequence of the
erection of a bridge over a stream on which a mill was situated, the mill was
injured by an extraordinary rise in the stream; the bridge, however, being in all
respects properly constructed. And in firouse v. Cayuga, &c, R.R. Co., 12
N. Y. 480, where bridge proprietors were held liable for similar injuries on the
ground of negligence. And compare Norris v. Vt. Central R.R. Co., 28 Vt.
102, with Mellen v. Western R.R. Corp., 4 Gray, 301. And see note 1, supra.
* Kennett's Petition, 4 Fost. 139. See Eddings v. Seabrook, 12 Rich. Law,
504; Slatter v. Des Moines Valley R. R. Co. 29 Iowa, 154.
8 Troy and Boston R.R. Co. v. Northern Turnpike Co., 16 Barb. 100. See
La Fayette Plank Road Co. v. New. Albany and Salem R.R Co., 13 Lid. 90;
Richmond, &c Co. v. Rogers, 1 Duvall, 135. So an increased competition with
a party's business caused by the construction or extension of a road is not a ground
of claim. Harvey v. Lackawana, &c, R.R. Co., 47 Penn. St 428. "Every
great public improvement must, almost of necessity, more or less, affect individ-
ual convenience and property; and when the injury sustained is remote and con-
sequential, it is damnum absque injuria, and is to be borne as a part of the price
to be paid for the advantages of the social condition. This is founded upon the
principle that the general good is to prevail over partial individual convenience."
Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 149.
[ 638 ]
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house, so as to prevent his passing to and from the same with the
same convenience as before, this consequential injury was held to
give no claim to compensation.1 So the owner of dams erected
by legislative authority is without remedy, if they are after-
wards rendered valueless by the construction of a canal.2
•And iu New York it has been held that, as the land [* 5-14]
where the tide ebbs and flows, between high and low
water mark, belongs to the public, the State may lawfully authorize
a railroad company to construct their road along the water front
below high-water mark, and that the owner of the adjacent bank
1 Richardson v. Vermont Central R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 465. But qucere if this
could be so, if the effect were to prevent access from the lot to the highway. In
certain Indiana cases it is said that the right of the owner of adjoining land to
the use of the highway is as much property as the land itself; that it is appurte-
nant to the land, and is protected by the constitution. Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind.
38; Protzman v. Indianapolis, &c, R.R. Co., 9 Ind. 409; New Albany and
Salem R.R. Co. r. O'Dailey, 13 Ind. 403. The same doctrine is recognized in
Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. 6. 459, and Street Railway v. Cumminsville,
14 Ohio, n. 8. 523. In the Vermont case above cited it was held that an exca-
vation by the company on their own land, so near the line of the plaintiff's that
his land, without any artificial weight thereon, slid into the excavation, would
render the company liable for the injury; the plaintiff being entitled to the
.lateral support for his land.
8 Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Wright, 9 W. & S. 9; Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 101. In any case, if parties exercising the right of
eminent domain shall cause injury to others by a negligent or improper construc-
tion of their work, they may be liable in damages. Rowe v. Granite Bridge
Corporation, 21 Pick. 348; Sprague v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 193. And if a
public work is of a character to necessarily disturb the occupation and enjoyment
of his estate by one whose land is not taken, he may have an action on the case
for the injury, notwithstanding the statute makes no provision for compensation.
As where the necessary, and not simply the accidental, consequence was, to flood
a man's premises with water, thereby greatly diminishing their value. Hooker v.
New Haven and Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146; 8. c. 15 Conn. 312 ; Evansville,
&c, R.R. Co. b. Dick, 9 Ind. 433; Robinson o. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co., 27
Barb. 512; Trustees of Wabash and Erie Canal v. Spears, 10 Ind. 441; Eaton
v. Boston, C. & M. R.R. Co., 51 N. H. 504. So where, by blasting rock in
making an excavation, the fragments are thrown upon adjacent buildings so as
to render their occupation unsafe. Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; Tremain
v. Same, ib. 163; Carman v. Steubenville and Indiana R.R. Co., 4 Ohio, n. s.
399; Sunbury and Erie R.R. Co. v. Hummel, 27 Penn. St. 99. There has been
some disposition to hold private corporations liable for all incidental damages
caused by their exercise of the right of eminent domain. See Tinsman v. Bel-
videre and Delaware R.R. Co., 2 Dutch. 148; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis.
255.
[ 639 ]
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could claim no compensation for the consequential injury to his
interests.1 So the granting of a ferry right with a landing on
private property within a highway terminating on a private stream
is not an appropriation of property,2 the ferry being a mere
continuation of the highway, and the landing place upon the
private property having previously been appropriated to public
uses.
These cases must suffice as illustrations of the principle stated,
though many others might be referred to. On the other hand, any
injury to the property of an individual which deprives the owner of
the ordinary use of it is equivalent to a taking, and entitles him to
compensation.3 Water front on a stream where the tide does not
ebb and flow is property, and if taken must be paid for as such.4
So with an exclusive right of wharfage upon tide water.5 So with
the right of the owner of land to use an adjoining street,
[* 545] whether he is owner of the land over which the * street is
laid out or not.6 So with the right of pasturage in streets,
which belongs to the owners of the soil.7 So a partial destruction
1 Gould v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 6 N. Y. 522. And see Stevens v. Pater-
son, &c, R.R. Co., 34 N. J. 532; Tomlin v. Dubuque, &c., R.R. Co., 32
Iowa, 106; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 176. So far as these cases hold it competent to
cut off a riparian proprietor from access to the navigable water, they seem to ns
to justify an appropriation of his property without compensation; for even those
courts which hold the fee in the soil under navigable waters to be in the State
admit valuable riparian rights in the adjacent proprietor. See Yates c. Milwau-
kee, 10 Wall. 497.
* Murray v. Menifee, 20 Ark. 561.
3 Hooker v. New Haven and Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146.
♦ Varick ». Smith, 9 Paige, 547. See Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497.
6 Murray v. Sharp, 1 Bosw. 539.
• Lackland v. North Missouri R.R. Co., 31 Mo. 180. See supra, p. 543,
note.
'Tonawanda R.R. Co. r. Munger, 5 Denio, 255; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn.
165. In this case it was held that a by-law of a town giving liberty to the inhab-
itants to depasture their cows in the public highways under certain regulations,
passed under the authority of a general statute empowering towns to pass such
by-laws, was of no validity, because it appropriated the pasturage, which was
private property, to the public use, without making compensation. The contrary
has been held in New York as to all highways laid out while such a statute was
in existence; the owner being held to be comjjensated for the pasturage as well
as for the use of the land for other purposes, at the time the highway was laid
out. Griffin v. Martin, 7 Barb. 297; Hardcnburgh v. Lockwood, 25 Barb. 9.
See also Kerwliacker v. Cleveland C. and C. R.R. Co., 3 Ohio, N. s. 177; where
[ 640 ]
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or diminution of value of property by an act of the government
which directly and not merely incidentally affects it, is to that
extent an appropriation.1
It sometimes becomes important, where a highway has been
laid out and opened, to establish a different and higher grade of
way upon the same line, with a view to accommodate an increased
public demand. The State may be willing to surrender the control
of the streets in these cases, and authorize turnpike, plank-road, or
railroad corporations to occupy them for their purposes; and if it
shall give such consent, the control, so far as is necessary to the
purposes of the turnpike, plank-road, or railway, is thereby passed
over to the corporation, and their structure in what was before a
common highway cannot be regarded as a public nuisance.2 But
the municipal organizations in the State have no power to give
such consent, without express legislative permission; the general
control of their streets which is commonly given by municipal
charters not being sufficient authority for this purpose.3 When
it was held that by ancient custom in that State there was a right of pasturage
by the public in the highways.
1 See Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. 211; Eaton v. Boston, C. & M. R.R. Co.,
51 N. H. 504.
s See Commonwealth v. Erie, & N. E. R.R. Co., 27 Penn. St. 389; Ten-
nessee, &c, R.R. Co. p. Adams, 3 Head, 596.
3 Lackland v. North Missouri R.R. Co., 31 Mo. 180; New York and Harlem
R.R. Co. v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 1 Hilt. 562; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y.
611; State p. Cincinnati, &c, Gas Co., 18 Ohio, n. s. 262. In inhabitants of Spring-
field v. Connecticut River R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 71, it was held that legislative author-
ity to construct a railroad between certain termini, without prescribing its precise
course and direction, would not prima facie confer power to lay out the road on
and along an existing public highway. Per Shaw, Ch. J.: "The whole course
of legislation on the subject of railroads is opposed to such a construction. The
crossing of public highways by railroads is obviously necessary, and of course
warranted; and numerous provisions are industriously made to regulate such
crossings, by determining when they shall be on the same and when on different
levels, in order to avoid collision, and when on the same level what gates, fences,
and barriers shall be made, and what guards shall be kept to insure safety.
Had it been intended that railroad companies, under a general grant, should
have power to lay a railroad over a highway longitudinally, which ordina-
rily is not necessary, we think that would have been done in express terms,
accompanied with full legislative provisions for maintaining such barriers and
modes of separation as would tend to make the use of the same road, for both
modes of travel, consistent with the safety of travellers on both. The absence
of any such provision affords a strong inference that, under general terms, it was
41 [ 641 ]
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* 545 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XT.
[* 546] however, the * public authorities have thus assented, it
may be found that the owners of the adjacent lots, who
are also owners of the fee in the highway subject to the public
easement, may be unwilling to assent to the change, and may find
or believe their interests seriously and injuriously affected thereby.
The question may then arise, Is the owner of the laud, who has
been once compensated for the injury he has sustained in the
appropriation of his land as a highway entitled to a new assess-
ment for any further injury he may sustain in consequence of the
street being subjected to a change in the use not contemplated at
the time of the original taking, but nevertheless in furtherance of
the samo general purpose?
When a common highway is made a turnpike or a plank-road,
upon which tolls are collected, there is much reasou for holding
that the owner of the soil is not entitled to any further compensa-
tion. The turnpike or the plank-road is still an avenue for public
travel, subject to be used in the same manner as the ordinary high-
way was before, and if properly constructed is generally expected
to increase rather than diminish the value of property along its
line; and though the adjoining proprietors are required to pay
toll, they are supposed to be, and generally are, fully compensated
for this burden by the increased excellence of the road, and by
their exemption from highway labor upon it.1 But it is different
when a highway is appropriated for the purposes of a railroad.
"It is quite apparent that the use by the public of a high-
[* 547] way, and the use thereof by a * railroad company, is essen-
tially different. In the one case every person is at liberty
to travel over the highway in any place or part thereof, but he
has no exclusive right of occupation of any part thereof except
while he is temporarily passing over it. It would be trespass (or
him to occupy any part of the highway exclusively for any longer
not intended that such a power should be given." See also Commonwealth r.
Erie and N. E. R.R Co., 27 Penn. St. 339; Attorney-General v. Morris and
Essex R.R. Co., 4 C. E. Green, 586.
1 See Commonwealth o. Wilkinson, 16 Pick. 175; Benedict t>. Goit, 3 Barb.
459; Wright r. Carter, 3 Dutch. 76; State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. 207; Chajrria
Falls and Cleveland Plank-Road Co. v. Cane, 2 Ohio, N. s. 419; Douglifl
r. Turnpike Co., 22 Md. 219. But see* Williams t>. Natural Bridge Plan's
Road Co., 21 Mo. 680. In Murray v. County Commissioners of Berkshire.
12 Met. 455, it was held that owners of lands adjoining a turnpike were not
entitled to compensation when a turnpike was changed to a common highway.
[ 642 ]
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period of time than was necessary for that purpose, and the stop-
pages incident thereto. But a railroad company takes exclusive
and permanent possession of a portion of the street or highway.
It lays down its rails upon, or imbeds them in, the soil, and thus
appropriates a portion of the street to its exclusive use, and for
its own particular mode of conveyance. In the one case, all
persons may travel on the street or highway in their own com-
mon modes of conveyance. In the other, no one can travel on or
over the rails laid down, except the railroad company and with
their cars specially adapted to the tracks. In one case the use is
general and open alike to all. In the other, it is peculiar and
exclusive.
"It is true that the actual use of the street by the railroad may
not be so absolute and constant as to exclude the public also from
its use. With a single track, and particularly if the cars used
upon it were propelled by horse-power, the interruption of the pub-
lic easement in the street might be very trifling and of no prac-
tical consequence to the public at large. But this consideration
cannot affect the question of the right of property, or of the in-
crease of the burden upon the soil. It would present simply
a question of degree in respect to the enlargement of the ease-
ment,, and would not affect the principle, that the use of a
street for the purposes of a railroad imposed upon it a new
burden." 1
1 Wager v. Troy Union R.R. Co., 25 N. Y. 532, approving Williams p. New
York Central R.R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Carpenter v. Oswego and Syracuse R.R.
Co., 24 N. Y. 655; Mahon v. New York Central R.R. Co., ib. 658; Starr v.
Camden and Atlantic R.R. Co., 4 Zab. 592. In inhabitants of Springfield v.
Connecticut River R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 71, where, however, the precise question
here discussed was not involved, Chief Justice Shaw, in comparing railroads
with common highways, says: "The two uses are almost, if not wholly, incon-
sistent with each other, so that taking the highway for a railroad will nearly
supersede the former use to which it had been legally appropriated." See also
Presbyterian Society of Waterloo v. Auburn and Rochester R.R. Co., 3 Hill,
667; Craig p. Rochester, &c, R.R. Co., 39 Barb. 494; Schurmeicr p. St. Paul,
&c, R.R. Co., 10 Minn. 82; Gray v. First Division, &c, 13 Minn. 365; Cen-
tral R R. Co. v. Hetfield, 5 Dutch. 206; South Carolina R.R. Co. v. Steiner, 44
Geo. 546. The cases of Philadelphia and Trenton R.R. Co.. 6 Whart. 25, and
Morris and Essex R.R. Co. v. Newark, 2 Stockt. 352, are opposed to the New
York cases. And see Wolfe v. Covington, Ac, R.R. Co., 15 B. Monp. 404; Com.
v. Erie and N. E. R.R. Co., 27 Penn. St. 339; Snyder v. Pennsylvania R.R.
Co., 55 Penn. St. 344; Peddicord v. Baltimore, Ac, R.R. Co., 34 Md. 463.
[ 643 ]
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[* 548] * The case from which we here quote is approved in
recent cases in Wisconsin, where importance is attached
to the different effect the common highway and the railroad will
have upon the value of adjacent property. "The dedication to the
public as a highway," it is said, "enhances the value of the lot,
and renders it more convenient and useful to the ownep. The use
by the railroad company diminishes its value, and renders it incon-
venient and comparatively useless. It would be a most unjust and
oppressive rule which would deny the owner compensation under
such circumstances." 1
It is not always the case, however, that the value of a lot of
land will be enhanced by the laying out of a common highway
across it, or diminished by the construction of a railway over the
Bame line afterwards. The constitutional question cannot depend
upon the accidental circumstance that the new road will or will
not have an injurious effect; though that circumstance is properly
referred to, since it is difficult to perceive how a change of use
which may possibly have an injurious effect not contemplated in
the original appropriation can be considered any thing else than
the imposition of a new burden upon the owner's estate. In Con-
necticut, where the authority of the legislature to authorize a rail-
road to be constructed in a common highway without compensation
to land owners is also denied, importance is attached to the terms
of the statute under which the original appropriation was made,
and which are regarded as permitting the taking for the purposes
of a common highway, and for no othep. The reasoning of the
court appears to us sound; and it is applicable to the statutes of
the States generally.2
1 Ford v. Chicago and Northwestern R.R. Co., 14 Wis. 616; followed in
Pomcroy v. Chicago and M. R.R. Co., 16 Wis. 640.
s Imlay v. Union Branch R.R. Co., 26 Conn. 255. "When land is condemned
for a special purpose," say the court, "on the score of public utility, the seques-
tration is limited to that particular use. Land taken for a highway is not thereby
converted into a common. As the property is not taken, but the use only, lbe
right of the public is limited to the use, the specific use, for which the proprietor
has been devested of a complete dominion over his own estate. These are propo-
sitions which are no longer open to discussion. But it is contended that land
once taken and still held for highway purposes may be used for a railway without
exceeding the limits of the easement already acquired by the publip. If this ii
true, if the new use of the land is within the scope of the original sequestration
or dedication, it would follow that the railway privileges are not an encroach-
[ 644 ]
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* It would appear from the cases cited that the weight [* 549]
of judicial authority is against the power of the legislat-
ment on the estate remaining in the owner of the soil, and that the new mode of
enjoying the public easement will not enable him rightfully to assert a claim to
damages therefor. On the contrary, if the true intent and efficacy of the original
condemnation was not to subject the land to such a burden as will be imposed
upon it when it is confiscated to the uses and control of a railroad corporation, it
cannot be denied that in such a case the estate of the owner of the soil is injuri-
ously affected by the supervening servitude; that his rights are abridged, and
that in a legal sense his land is again taken for public uses. Thus it appears that
the court have simply to decide whether there is such an identity between a high-
way and a railway, that statutes conferring a right to establish the former include
an authority to construct the latter.
"The term ' public highway,' as employed in such of our statutes as convey
the right of eminent domain, has certainly a limited import. Although, as sug-
gested at the bar, a navigable river or a canal is, in some sense, a public highway,
yet an easement assumed under the name of a highway would not enable the
public to convert a street into a canal. The highway, in the true meaning of
the word, would be destroyed. But as no such destruction of the highway is
necessarily involved in the location of a railroad track upon it, we are pressed
to establish the legal proposition that a highway, such as is referred to in
these statutes, means or at least comprehends a railroad. Such a construction
is possible only when it is made to appear that there is a substantial practical
or technical identity between the uses of land for highway and for railway
purposes.
"No one can fail to see that the terms ' railway 1 and 'highway ' are not con-
vertible, or that the two uses, practically considered, although analogous, are
not identical. Land as ordinarily appropriated by a railroad company is incon-
venient, and even impassable, to those who would use it as a common highway.
Such a corporation does not hold itself bound to make or to keep its embank-
ments and bridges in a condition which will facilitate the transitu* of such vehi-
cles as ply over an ordinary road. A practical dissimilarity obviously exists
between a railway and a common highway, and is recognized as the basis of a
legal distinction between them. It is so recognized on a large scale when
railway privileges are sought from legislative bodies, and granted by them.
If the terms 'highway ' and ' railway' are synonymous, or if one of them includes
the other by legal implication, no act could be more superfluous than to require
or to grant authority to construct railways over localities already occupied as
highways.
"If a legal identity does not subsist between a highway and a railway, it is
illogical to argue that, because a railway may be so constructed as not to inter-
fere with the ordinary uses of a highway, and so as to be consistent with the
highway right already existing, therefore such a new use is included within the
old use. It might as well be urged, that if a common, or a canal, laid out over
the route of a public road, could be so arranged as to leave an ample road-
way for vehicles and passengers on foot, the land should be held to be origi-
[ 645 j
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* 549 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XV.
[* 550] ure to appropriate a * common highway to the purposes
of a railroad, unless at the same time provision ia made
nally condemned for a canal or a common, as properly incident to the highway
use.
"There is an important practical reason why courts should be slow to recog-
nize a legal identity between the two uses referred to. They are by no means
the same thing to the proprietor whose land is taken; on the contrary, they sug-
gest widely different standards of compensation. One can readily conceive of
cases where the value of real estate would be directly enhanced by the opening
of a highway through it; while its confiscation for a railway at the same or a sub-
sequent time would be a gross injury to the estate, and a total subversion of the
mode of enjoyment expected by the owner when he yielded his private rights to
the public exigency.
"But essential distinctions also exist between highway and railway powers, as
conferred by statute, — distinctions which are founded in the very nature of the
powers themselves. In the case of the highway, the statute provides that, after
the observance of certain legal forms, the locality in question shall be forever
subservient to the right of every individual in the community to pass over the
thoroughfare so created at all times. This right involves the important implica-
tion that he shall so use the privilege as to leave the privilege of all others as
unobstructed as his own, and that he is therefore to use the road in the manner
in which such roads are ordinarily used, with such vehicles as will not obstruct,
or require the destruction of the ordinary modes of travel thereon. He is not
anthorized to lay down a railway track, and run his own locomotive and car upon
it. No one ever thought o regarding highway acts as conferring railway privi-
leges, involving a right in every individual, not only to break up ordinary travel,
but also to exact tolls from the public for the privilege of using the peculiar con-
veyances adapted to a railroad. If a right of this description is not conferred
when a highway is authorized by law, it is idle to pretend that any proprietor is
devested of such a right. It would seem that, under such circumstances, the
true construction of highway laws could hardly be debatable, and that the ab-
sence of legal identity between the two uses of which we speak was patent and
entire.
"Again, no argument or illustration can strengthen the self-evident proposi-
tion that, when a railway is authorized over a public highway, a right is created
against the proprietor of the fee, in favor of a person, an artificial person, to
whom he before bore no legal relation whatevep. It is understood that when
such an easement is sought or bestowed, a new and independent right will accrue
to the railroad corporation as against the owner of the soil, and that, without any
reference to the existence of the highway, his land will forever stand charged
with the accruing servitude. Accordingly, if such a highway were to be discon-
tinued according to the legal forms prescribed for that purpose, the railroad cor-
poration would still insist upon the express and independent grant of an easement
to itself, enabling it to maintain its own road on the site of the abandoned road-
way. We are of opinion, therefore, as was distinctly intimated by this court in
a former case (see opinion of Hinman, J., in Nicholson v. N. Y. and N. H.
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for compensation to the owners of the fee. * These cases, [* 551]
however, have had reference to the common railroad, oper-
ated by steam. In one of the New York cases1 it is intimated,
and in another case in the same State it was directly decided, that
the ruling should be the same in the case of the street railway
operated by horse-power.3 There is generally, however, a very
great difference in the two cases, and some of the considerations
to which the courts have attached importance could have no appli-
cation in many cases of common horse railways. A horse railway,
as a general thing, will interfere very little with the ordinary use
of the way by the public, even upon the very line of the road ; and
in many cases it would be a relief to an overburdened way, rather
than an impediment to the previous use. In Connecticut, after it
had been decided, as above shown, that the owner of the fee sub-
ject to a perpetual highway was entitled to compensation when the
highway was appropriated for an ordinary railroad, it was also held
that the authority to lay and use a horse-railway track in a public
street was not a new servitude imposed upon the land for which
the owner of the fee would be entitled to damages, but that it was
a part of the public use to which the land was originally subjected
when taken for a street.3 The same distinction between horse rail-
ways and those operated by steam is also taken in recent New York
cases.4 But whether the mere difference in the motive-power will
make different principles applicable, is a question which the courts
will probably have occasion to consider further. Conceding that
the interests of individual owners will not generally suffer, or their
use of the highway be incommoded by the laying down and use of
the track of a horse railway upon it, there are nevertheless cases
where it might seriously impede, if not altogether exclude, the
general travel and use by the ordinary modes, and very greatly
reduce the value of all the property along the line. Suppose, for
R.R. Co., 22 Conn. 85), that to subject the owner of the soil of a highway to a
further appropriation of his land to railway uses is the imposition of a new ser-
vitude upon his estate, and is an act demanding the compensation which the law
awards when land is taken for public purposes." And see South Carolina R.R.
Co. v. Steiner, 44 Geo. 546,
1 Wager v. Troy Union R.R. Co., 25 N. Y. 532.
8 Craig ». Rochester City and Brighton R.R. Co., 39 Barb. 449.
3 Elliott o. Fair Haven and Westville R.R. Co., 32 Conn. 586.
4 Brooklyn Central, &c, R.R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 33 Barb. 422;
People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; s. c. 27 N. Y. 188.
[ 647 ]
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* 551 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XT.
instance, a narrow street in a city, occupied altogether by whole-
sale houses, which require constantly the use of the whole street
in connection with their business, and suppose this to be turned
over to a street-railway company, whose line is such as to make
the road a principal avenue of travel, and to require such
[* 552] * constant passage of cars as to drive all drayage from the
street. The corporation, under these circumstances, will
substantially have a monopoly in the use of the street; their
vehicles will drive the business from it, and the business propertj
will become comparatively worthless. And if property owners are
without remedy in such case, it is certainly a very great hardship
upon them, and a very striking and forcible instance and illustra-
tion of damage without legal injury.
When property is appropriated for a public way, and the pro-
prietor is paid for the public easement, the compensation is gen-
erally estimated, in practice, at the value of the land itself.1 If,
therefore, no other circumstances were to be taken into the ac-
count in these cases, the owner, who has been paid the value of
his land, could not reasonably complain of any use to which it
might afterwards be put by the public. But, as pointed out in the
Connecticut case,2 the compensation is always liable either to ex-
ceed or to fall below the value of the land taken, in consequence
of incidental injuries or benefits to the owner as proprietor of the
land which remains. These injuries or benefits will be estimated
with reference to the identical use to which the property is appro-
priated; and if it is afterwards put to another use, which causes
greater incidental injury, and the owner is not entitled to further
compensation, it is very evident that he has suffered a wrong by
the change which could not have been foreseen and provided
against. And if, on the other hand, he is entitled in any case to
an assessment of damages in consequence of such an appropriation
of the street affecting his rights injuriously, then he must be enti-
tled to such an assessment in every case, and the question involved
will be, not as to the right, but only of the quantum of damages.
The horse railway either is or is not the imposition of a new bur-
den upon the estate. If it is not, the owner of the fee is entitled
to compensation in no case; if it is, he is entitled to have an
assessment of damages in every case.
1 Murray v. County Commissioners, 12 Met. 457, per Shaw, Ch. J.
* Imlay v. Union Branch K.R. Co., 26 Conn. 257.
[ 648 ]
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In New York, where, by law, when a public street is laid out or
dedicated, the fee in the soil becomes vested in the city, it has
been held that the legislature might authorize the construction of
a horse railway in a street, and that neither the city nor the owners
of lots were entitled to compensation, notwithstanding it
was * found as a fact that the lot owners would suffer in- [* 553]
jury from the construction of the road. The city was not
entitled, because, though it held the fee, it held it in trust for the
use of all the people of the State, and not as corporate or munici-
pal property; and the land having been originally acquired under
the right of eminent domain, and the trust being pullici juris, it
was under the unqualified control of the legislature, and any
appropriation of it to public use by legislative authority could not
be regarded as an appropriation of the private property of the city.
And so far as the adjacent lot owners were concerned, their inter-
est in the streets, as distinct from that of other citizens, was only
as having a possibility of reverter after the public use of the land
should cease; and the value of this, if any thing, was inappreci-
able, and could not entitle them to compensation.1
So in Indiana, where the title in fee to streets in cities and
villages is vested in the public, it is held that the adjacent land
owners are not entitled to the statutory remedy for an assessment
of damages in consequence of the street being appropriated to the
use of a railroad; and this without regard to the motive power by
which the road is operated. At the same time it is also held that
the lot owners may maintain an action at law if, in consequence of
the railroad, they are cut off from the ordinary use of the street.2
1 People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; s. c. 27 N. Y. 188. The same ruling as to
the right of the city to compensation was had in Savannah, &c, R.R. Co. v.
Mayor, &c, of Savannah, 45 Geo. 602i And see Brooklyn Central, &c,
R.R. Co. p. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., "33 Barb. 420; Brooklyn and Newtown
R.R. Co. v. Coney Island R.R. Co., 35 Barb. 364; New York v. Kerr,
38 Barb. 369; Chapman p. Albany and Schenectady R.R. Co., 10 Barb.
360 Although, in the case of People v. Kerr, the several judges seem gener-
ally to have agreed on the principle as stated in the text, it is not very clear
how much importance was attached to the fact that the fee to the street was in
the city, nor that the decision would have been different if that had not been the
case.
'Protzman v. Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co., 9 Ind. 467; New Albany
and Salem R.R. Co. e. ODaily, 13 Ind. 353; Same v. Same, 12 Ind. 551. See
also Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio, n. s. 523; State v. Cincinnati Gas,
&p., Co., 18 Ohio, N. s. 292.
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So in Iowa it is held that where the title to city streets is in the
corporation in trust for the public, the legislature may authorize
the construction of an ordinary railroad through the same, with the
consent of the city, and without awarding compensation to lot
owners ;1 or even without the consent of the municipal authorities,
and without entitling the city to compensation.2 So in 11linois, in
a case where a lot owner had filed a bill in equity to restrain the
laying down of the track of a railroad, by consent of the common
council, to be operated by steam in one of the streets of Chicago,
it was held that the bill could not be maintained; the title to the
street being in the city, which might appropriate it to any proper
city purpose.3
1 Millburn v. Cedar Rapids, &c, R.R. Co., 12 Iowa, 246.
* Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, &c, RR. Co., 24 Iowa, 455.
3 Moses v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne, and Chicago R.R. Co., 21 1ll. 522. We
quote from the opinion of Caion, Ch. J.: "By the city charter, the common
council is vested with the exclusive control and regulation of the streets of the
city, the fee-simple title to which we have already decided is vested in the munic-
ipal corporation. The city charter also empowers the common council to direct
and control the location of railroad tracks within the city. In granting this
permission to locate the track in Beach Street, the common council acted under
an express power granted by the legislature. So that the defendant has all the
right which both the legislature and the common council could give it, to occupy
the street with its track. But the complainant assumes higher ground, and
claims that any use of the street, even under the authority of the legislature
and the common council, which tends to deteriorate the value of his property on
the street, is a violation of that fundamental law which forbids private property
to be taken for public use without just compensation. This is manifestly an
erroneous view of the constitutional guaranty thus invoked. It must necessarily
happen that streets will be used for various legitimate purposes, which will, to a
greater or less extent, incommode persons residing or doing business upon them,
and just to that extent damage their property; and yet such damage is incident
to all city property, and for it a party can claim no remedy. The common
council may appoint certain localities where hacks and drays shall stand waiting
for employment, or whpre wagons loaded with hay or wood, or other commodi-
ties, shall stand waiting for purchasers. This may drive customers away from
shops or stores in the vicinity, and yet there is no remedy for the damage. A
street is made for the passage of persons and property; and the law cannot
define what exclusive means of transportation and passage shall be used. Uni-
versal experience shows that this can best be left to the determination of the
municipal authorities, who are supposed to be best acquainted with the wants
and necessities of the citizens generally. To say that a new mode of passage
shall be banished from the streets, no matter how much the general good may
require it, simply "because streets were not so used in the days of Blackstone,
C650 ]
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* It is not easy, as is very evident, to trace a clear line [* 554]
of authority running through the various decisions bear-
ing upon the * appropriation of the ordinary highways and [* 555]
streets to the use of railroads of any grade or species;
but a strong inclination is apparent to hold that, when the fee in
the public way is taken from the former owner, it is taken for any
public use whatever to which the public authorities, with the legis-
lative assent, may see fit afterwards to devote it, in furtherance
would hardly comport with the advancement and enlightenment of the present
age. Steam has but lately taken the place, to any extent, of animal power for
land transportation, and for that reason alone shall it be expelled the streets?
For the same reason camels must be kept out, though they might be profitably
employed. Some fancy horse or timid lady might be frightened by such uncouth
objects. Or is the objection not in the motive-power, but because the carriages
are larger than were formerly used, and run upon iron, and are confined to a
given track in the street? Then street railroads must not be admitted; they
have large carriages which run on iron rails, and are confined to a given track.
Their momentum is great, and may do damage to ordinary vehicles or foot pas-
sengers. Indeed we may suppose or assume that streets occupied by them are
not so pleasant for other carriages or so desirable for residences or business
stands, as if not thus occupied. But for this reason the property owners along
the street cannot expect to stop such improvements. The convenience of those
who live at a greater distance from the centre of a city requires the use of such
improvements, and for their benefit the owners of property upon the street must
submit to the burden, when the common council determine that the public good
requires it. Cars upon street railroads are now generally, if not universally, pro-
pelled by horses, but who can say how long it will be before it will be found safe
and profitable to propel them with steam, or some other power besides horses?
Should we say that this road should be enjoined, we could advance no reason for
it which would not apply with equal force to street railroads; so that consistency
would require that we should stop all. Nor would the evil which would result
from the rule we must lay down stop here. We must prohibit every use of a
street which discommodes those who reside or do business upon it, because their
property will else be damaged. This question has been presented in other
States, and in some instances, where the public have only an easement in the
street, and the owner of the adjoining property still holds the fee in the street,
it has been sustained; but the weight of authority, and certainly, in our appre-
hension, all sound reasoning, is the other way."
All the cases from which we have quoted assume that the use of the street by
the railroad company is still a public use; and probably it would not be held that
an appropriation of a street, or of any part of it, by an individual or company,
for his or their own private use, unconnected with any accommodation of the
public, was consistent with the purpose for which it was originally acquired. See
Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La. An. 842; Green v. Portland, 32 Me. 431.
[651]
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of the general purpose of the original appropriation ;1 and if .his
is so, the owner must be held to be compensated at the time of the
original taking for any such possible use; and he takes his chances
of that use, or any change in it, proving beneficial or deleterious
to any remaining property he may own, or business he may be
engaged in; and it must also be held that the possibility that the
land may, at some future time, revert to him, by the public use
ceasing, is too remote and contingent to be considered as property
at all.2 At the same time it must be confessed that it is difficult
to determine precisely how far some of the decisions made have
been governed by the circumstance that the fee was or was not in
the public, or, on the other hand, have proceeded on the theory
that a railway was only in furtherance of the original pur-
[* 556] pose of the appropriation, and not * to be regarded as the
imposition of any new burden, even where an easement
only was originally taken.3
1 On this subject see, in addition to the other cases cited, West p. Bancroft,
82 Vt. 367; Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410; Ohio and Lexington R.R. Co. v.
Applegate, 8 Dana, 289; Hinchman v. Paterson Horse R. Co., 2 C. E. Green, 76.
When, however, land is taken or dedicated specifically for a street, it would seem,
although the fee is taken, it is taken for the restricted use only; that is to say,
for such uses as streets in cities are commonly put to. See State v. Laverack,
34 N. J. 201; Railroad Co. p. Shurmeir, 7 Wall. 272.
'As to whether there is such possibility of reverter, see Heyward v. Mayor,
&c, of New York, 7 N. Y. 314; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 211, per Wright, J.;
Plitt p. Cox, 43 Penn. St. 486.
3 There is great difficulty, as it seems to us, in supporting important dis-
tinctions upon the fact that the fee was originally taken for the use of the
public instead of a mere easement. If the fee is appropriated or dedicated, it is
for a particular use only; and it is a conditional fee, — a fee on condition that
the land continue to be occupied for that use. The practical difference in the
cases is, that when the fee is taken, the possession of the original owner is
excluded; and in the case of city streets where there is occasion to devote them
to many other purposes besides those of passage, but nevertheless not incon-
sistent, such as for the laying of water and gas pipes, and the construction of
sewers, this exclusion of any private right of occupation is important, and will
sometimes save controversies and litigation. But to say that when a man has
declared a dedication for a particular use, under a statute which makes a dedi-
cation the gift of a fee, he thereby makes it liable to be appropriated to other
purposes, when the same could not be done if a perpetual easement had been
dedicated, seems to be basing important distinctions upon a difference which
after all is more technical than real, and which in any view does not affect the
distinction made. The same reasoning which has sustained the legislature in
authorizing a railroad track to be laid down in a city street would support its
[ 652 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XV.]
*556
THE EMINENT DOMAIN.
Perhaps the true distinction in these cases relates, not to the
motive-power of the railway, or to the question whether the fee-
simple or a mere easement was taken in the original appropria-
tion, but depends upon the question whether the railway constitutes
a thoroughfare, or, on the other hand, is a mere local convenience.
When land is taken or dedicated for a town street, it is unques-
tionably appropriated for all the ordinary purposes of a town
street; not merely the purposes to which such streets were for-
merly applied, but those demanded by new improvements and new
wants. Among these purposes is the use for carriages which run
upon a grooved track; and the preparation of important streets in
large cities for their use is not only a frequent necessity, which must
be supposed to have been contemplated, but it is almost as much a
matter of course as the grading and paving. The appropriation of
a country highway for the purposes of a railway, on the other hand,
is neither usual nor often important; and it cannot with any justice
be regarded as within the contemplation of the parties when
* the highway is first established. And if this is so, it is [* 557]
clear that the owner cannot be considered as compensated
for the new use at the time of the original appropriation.
The cases thus far considered are those in which the original uso
is not entirely foreign to the purpose of the new appropriation ; and
it is the similarity that permits the question which has been dis-
cussed. Were the uses totally different, there could be no question
action in authorizing it to be made into a canal; and the purpose of the original
dedication or appropriation would thereby be entirely defeated. Is it not more
consistent with established rules to hold that a dedication or appropriation to one
purpose confines the use to that purpose; and when it is taken for any other, the
original owner has not been compensated for the injury he may sustain in conse-
quence, and is therefore entitled to it now? Notwithstanding a dedication which
vests the title in the public, it must be conceded that the interest of the adjacent
lot owners is still property. "They have a peculiar interest in the street, which
neither the local nor the general public can pretend to claim; a private right of
the nature of an incorporeal hereditament, legally attached to their contiguous
grounds and the erections thereon; an incidental title to certain facilities and
franchises assured to them by contracts and by law, and without which their
property would be comparatively of little value. This easement, appurtenant to
the lots, unlike any right of one lot owner in the lot of another, is as much
property as the lot itself." Crawford p. Delaware, 7 Ohio, x. s. 459. See some
very pertinent and sensible remarks on the same subject by Ranney, J., in Street
Railway p. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio, n. s. 541.
[ 653 ]
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whatever that a new assessment of compensation must be made
before the appropriation could be lawful.1
1 Where lands were appropriated by a railroad company for their purpose!,
and afterwards leased out for private occupation, it was held that the owner of
the fee was entitled to maintain a writ of entry to establish his title and recover
damages for the wrongful use. Proprietors of Locks, &c. v. Nashua and Lowell
R.R. Co., 104 Mass. 1; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 181. Where land has been taken
for a street, it cannot be appropriated for the erection of a market building with-
out making compensation. State v. Mayor, &c, of Mobile, 5 Port. 279; State
v. Laverack, 34 N. J., 201. The opinion of Beasley, Ch. J., in the New Jersey
case, will justify liberal quotations. He says (p. 204): "I think it undeniable
that the appropriation of this land to the purposes of a market was an additional
burthen upon it. Clearly it was not using it as a street. So far from that, what
the act authorized to be done was incongruous with such use; for the market was
an obstruction to it, considered merely as a highway. . . . When, therefore, the
legislature declared that these streets in the city of Paterson might be used for
market purposes, the power which was conferred in substance was an authority
to place obstructions, in these public highways. The consequence is that there is
no force in the argument, which was the principal one pressed upon our attention,
that the use of these streets for the purpose now claimed is as legitimate as the
use of a public highway by a horse-railroad, which latter use has been repeatedly
sanctioned by the courts of the State. The two cases, so far as relates to prin-
ciple, stand precisely opposite. I have said that a market is an obstruction to >
street, that it is not a use of it as a street, but, if unauthorized, is a nuisance.
To the contrary of this, a horse-railroad is a new mode of using a street as such,
and it is precisely upon this ground that it has been held to be legal. The cases
rest upon this foundation. That a horse-railway was a legitimate use of a highway
was decided in Uinchman v. Paterson Horse Railroad Co., 2 C. E. Greene, 76;
md, in his opinion, Chancellor Greene assigns the following as the reasons of bis
judgment: 'The use of the road is nearly identical with that of the- ordinary
highway. The motive power is the same. The noise and jarring of the street
by the cars is not greater, and ordinarily less than that produced by omnibuses
and other vehicles in ordinary use. Admit that the nature of the use, as respects
the travelling public, is somewhat variant, how does it prejudice the land-owner?
Is his property taken? Are his rights as a land-owner affected? .Does it interfere
with the use of his property any more than the ordinary highway?' It is dear
that this reasoning can have no appropriate application to a case in which it
appears that the use of the street is so far from being nearly identical with that
of the ordinary highway that in law it has always been regarded as an injury
to such public easement, and on that account an indictable offence.
"I regard, then, a right to hold a market in a street as an easement additional
to, and in a measure inconsistent with, its ordinary use as a highway. The question
therefore is presented, Can such easement be conferred by the legislature on tbe
public without compensation to the land-owner? I have already said that from
the first it has appeared to me this question must be answered in the negative. I
think the true rule is, that land taken by the public for a particular use cannot be
[ 654 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XV.]
* 557
THE EMINENT DOMAIN.
Although the regulation of a navigable stream will give to the
persons incidentally affected, no right to compensation, yet if the
stream is diverted from its natural course, so that those entitled to
its benefits are prevented from making use of it as before, the
applied under such a sequestration to any other use to the detriment of the land-
owner. This is the only rule which will adequately protect the constitutional
right of the citizen. To permit land taken for one purpose, and for which the
land-owner has been compensated, to be applied to another and additional pur-
pose, for which he has received no compensation, would be a mere evasion of the
spirit of the fundamental law of the State. Land taken and applied for the
ordinary purpose of a street would often be an improvement of the adjacent
property: an appropriation of it to the uses of a market would, perhaps, as often
be destructive of one half the value of such property. Compensation for land,
therefore, to be used as a highway, might, and many times would be, totally
inadequate compensation if such land is to be used as a public market place.
Few things would be more unjust than, when compensation has been made for
land in view of one of these purposes, to allow it to be used without compensa-
tion for the other. The right of the public in a highway consists in the privilege
of passage, and such privileges as are annexed as incidents by usage or custom,
as the right to make sewers and drains and to lay gas and water pipes.
These subordinate privileges are entirely consistent with the primary use of the
highway, and are no detriment to the land-owner. But I am not aware of any'
case in which it has been held that the public has any right in a highway which
is incongruous with the purpose for which it was originally created, and which
at the same time is injurious to the proprietor of the soil. Such certainly has
not been the course of judicial decision in our own courts. Indeed the cases
appear to be all ranged on the opposite side. I have shown that the legalization
of the use of a street by a horse-railroad has been carefully placed on the ground
that such an appropriation of the street was merely a new mode of its legitimate
and ordinary use. The rationale adopted excludes by necessary implication the
hypothesis that the dedication of a street to a new purpose, inconsistent with its
original nature, would be legal with respect to the uncompensated land-owner.
But beyond this it has been expressly declared that such superadded use would
be illegal. In the opinion of Mr. Justice Haines, in Starr v. Camden and Atlan-
tic R.R. Co., 4 Zab. 592, it is very explicitly held that the constitution of this
State would prevent the legislature from granting to a railroad company a right
to use a public highway as a bed for their road without first making compensation
to the owner of the soil. And in the case of Hinchman v. The Paterson Horse-
Railroad Co. already cited, Chancellor Greene quotes these views, and gives the
doctrine the high sanction of his own approval. See also the Central R.R. Co.
t>. Hetfiild, 5 Dutch. 206."
The learned judge then distinguishes Carter v. Wright, 3 Dutch. 76, and
quotes, as sustaining his own views, State r. Mayor, &c, of Mobile, 5 Porter,
279; Trustees of Presbyterian Society v. Auburn and Rochester R.R. Co.,
8 Hill, 569; Williams v. N. Y. C. R.R. Co., 16 N. Y. Ill; Angell on High-
way8. §^243 et seq., and cases cited.
[ 655 ]
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deprivation of this right is a taking which entitles them to compen-
sation, notwithstanding the taking may be for the purpose of
creating another and more valuable channel of navigation.1 The
owners of land over which such a stream flows, although they do
not own the. flowing water itself, yet have a property in the use of
that water as it flows past them, for the purpose of producing
mechanical power, or for any of the other purposes for which
they can make it available, without depriving those below them
of the like use, or encroaching upon the rights of those above;
and this property is equally protected with any of a more tangible
character.2
What Interest in Land can be taken under the Right of Eminent
Domain.
Where land is appropriated to the public use under the right of
eminent domain, and against the will of the owner, we have seen
how careful the law is to limit the public authorities to their pre-
cise needs, and not to allow the dispossession of the owner from
any portion of his freehold which the public use does not require.
This must be so on the general principle that the right being based
on necessity cannot be any broader than the necessity which sup-
ports it. For the same reason, it would seem that, in respect to
the land actually taken, if there can be any conjoint occupation of
the owner and the public, the former should not be altogether ex-
cluded, but should be allowed to occupy for his private purposes
to any extent not inconsistent with the public use. As a general
rule, the laws for the exercise of the right of eminent domaiu
do not assume to go further than to appropriate the use,
[* 558] and the title * in fee still remains in the original owner.
In the common highways, the public have a perpetual
easement, but the soil is the property of the adjacent owner, and
he may make any use of it which does not interfere with the public
right of passage, and the public can use it only for the purposes
usual with such ways.3 And when the land ceases to be used by
1 People v. Canal Appraisers, 13 Wend. 355. And see Hatch v. Vermont
Central R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 49; Bellinger v. New York Central R.R. Co., 23
N. Y. 42; Gardner t>. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
■ Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 284; s. c. 35 N. Y. 454; Gardner p. Newburg,
2 Johns. Ch. 162.
3 In Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390, a person who stood in the public wav
[ 656 ]
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the public as a way, the owner will again become restored to his
complete and exclusive possession, and the fee will cease to be
encumbered with the easement.1
It seems, however, to be competent for the State to appropriate
the title to the land in fee, and so to altogether exclude any use by
the former owner, except that which every individual citizen is en-
titled to make, if in the opinion of the legislature it is needful that
the fee be taken.2 The judicial decisions to this effect proceed
upon the idea that, in some cases, the public purposes cannot be
fully accomplished without appropriating the complete title; and
where this is so in the opinion of the legislature, the same reasons
which support the legislature in their right to decide absolutely
. and finally upon the necessity of the taking will also support their
decision as to the estate to be taken. The power, it is said in one
case, " must of necessity rest in the legislature, in order to secure
the useful exercise and enjoyment of the right in question. A
case might arise where a temporary use would be all that the public
interest required. Another case might require the permanent and
apparently the perpetual occupation and enjoyment of the property
by the public; and the right to take it must be coextensive with
the necessity of the case, and the measure of compensation should
of course be graduated by the nature and the duration of the
estate or interest of which the owner is deprived." 3 And it was
therefore held, where the statute provided that lands might be
compulsorily taken in fee-simple for the purposes of an almshouse
extension, and they were taken accordingly, that the title of the
original owner was thereby entirely devested, so that when the
and abused the occupant of an adjoining lot was held liable in trespass as being
unlawfully there, because not using the highway for the purpose to which it was
appropriated.
1 Dean v. Sullivan R.R. Co., 2 Fost. 321; Blake v. Rich, 34 N. H. 282;
Henry v. Dubuque and Pacific R.R Co., 2 Iowa, 288; Weston p. Foster, 7 Met.
299; Quimby p. Vermont Central R.R. Co., 23 Vt. 387; Giesy v. Cincinnati,
&c, R.R. Co., 4 Ohio, n. s. 327.
* This, however, is forbidden by the Constitution of 11linois of 1870, in the
case of land taken for railroad tracks. Art. 2, § 13. And we think it would be
difficult to demonstrate the necessity for appropriating the fee in case of any
thoroughfare; and if never needful, it ought to be held incompetent.
3 Heyward p. Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 N. Y. 314. See also Dingley v.
Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Brooklyn Park Com'rs p. Armstrong, 2 Lans. 429; s. c.
on appeal, 45 N. Y. 234; and 6 Am. Rep. 70.
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* 558 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IY.
[* 559] land ceased to * be used for the public purpose, the
title remained in the municipality which had appropriated
it, and did not revert to the former owner or his heirs.1 And it
does not seem to be uncommon to provide that, in the case of
some classes of public ways, and especially of city and village
streets, the dedication or appropriation to the public use shall vest
the title to the laud in the State, county, or city; the purposes for
which the land may be required by the public being so numerous
and varied, and so impossible of complete specification in advance,
that nothing short of a complete ownership in the public is deemed
sufficient to provide for them. In any case, however, an easement
only would bo taken, unless the statute plainly contemplated and
provided for tho appropriation of a larger interest.2
Compensation for Property taken.
It is a primary requisite, in the appropriation of lands for public
purposes, that compensation shall be made therefor. Eminent
domain differs from taxation in that, in the former case, the citizen
is compelled to surrender to the public something beyond his due
proportion for the public benefit. The public seize and appropriate
his particular estate, because it has special need for it, and not
because it is right, as between him and the government, that he
should surrender it.3 To him, therefore, the benefit and protection
he receives from the government are not sufficient compensation;
for those benefits are the equivalent for the taxes he pays, and the
other public burdens he assumes in common with the community at
large. And this compensation must be pecuniary in its character,
because it is in the nature of a payment for a compulsory purchase.'
1 Heyward v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 N. Y. 314. And see Baker r.
Johnson, 2 Hill, 348; Wheeler v. Rochester, &c., R.R. Co.. 12 Barb. JJJ|
Hunger v. Tonawanda R.lt. Co., 4 N. Y. 349; Rexford v. Knight, 11 1«*.T.
308; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 1 Pen. & Watts, 462; De Varaigue o. Fos,:!
Blatch. 96; Coster v. N. J. R.R. Co., 3 Zab. 227; Plitt v. Cox, 43 Perm. St.
486; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; s. c. 6 Am. Bep. 70.
s Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498; Rust v. Lowe, 6 Mass. 90; Jict-
son v. Rutland and B. R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 151; Jackson v. Hathaway, Is
Johns. 447.
3 People v. Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. S. 419; Woodbridge v. Detroit,
8 Mich. 278; Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 130.
4 The effect of the right of eminent domain against the individual " amouoti
to nothing more than a power to oblige him to sell and convey when the public
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THE EMINENT DOMAIN.
*The time when the compensation must be made may [*560]
d epend upon the peculiar constitutional provisions of tlie
State. In some of the States, by express constitutional direction,
compensation must be made before the property is taken. No
c onstitutional principle, however, is violated by a statute which
all ows private property to be entered upon and temporarily occu-
pied for the purpose of a survey and other incipient proceedings,
with a view to judging and determining whether the public needs
require the appropriation or not, and, if so, what the proper loca-
tion shall be; and the party acting under this statutory author-
ity would neither be bound to make compensation for the temporary
possession, nor be liable to action of trespass.1 When, however,
the land has been viewed, and a determination arrived at to ap-
propriate it, the question of compensation is to be considered; and
in the absence of any express constitutional provision fixing the
time and the manner of making it, the question who is to take the
property — whether the State, or one of its political divisions or
municipalities, or, on the other hand, some private corporation —
may be an important consideration.
When the property is taken directly by the State, or by any
municipal corporation by State authority, it has been repeatedly
held not to be essential to the validity of a law for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain, that it should provide for making
compensation before the actual appropriation. It is sufficient if
provision is made by the law by which the party can obtain com-
pensation, and that an impartial tribunal is provided for assess-
ing it.2 The decisions upon this point assume that, when the
necessities require it." Johnson, J., in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 145. And
see Bradshaw p. Rogers, 20 Johns. 103, per Spencer, Ch. J.; People p. Mayor,
&c, of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Carson v. Coleman, 3 Stockt. 106; Young p.
Harrison, 6 Geo. 131; United States v. Minnesota, &c, R.It. Co., 1 Minn. 127;
Railroad Co. p. Ferris, 26 Texas, 603; Curran v. Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427; State
v. Graves, 19 Md. 351.
1 Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 14 Wend. 51, and 18 Wend.
9; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247; Nichols v. Somerset, &c, R.R. Co., 43 Me.
356; Mercer p. McWilliams, Wright (Ohio), 132; Walther p. Warner, 25 Mo.
277; Fox v. W. P. R.R. Co., 31 Cal. 538.
* Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9; Rogers p. Brad-
shaw, 20 Johns. 744; Calking p. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667; Case v. Thompson, 6
Wend. 634; Fletcher p. Auburn and Syracuse R.R. Co., 25 Wend. 462; Rex-
ford p. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Taylor p. Marcy, 25 1ll. 518; Callison v. Hedrick,
[ 659 ]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[* 561] State * has provided a remedy by resort to which the party
can have his compensation assessed, adequate means are
afforded for its satisfaction; since the property of the municipality,
or of the State, is a fund to which he can resort without risk of
loss.1 It is essential, however, that the remedy be one to which
the party can resort on his own motion; if the provision be such
that only the public authorities appropriating the land are author-
ized to take proceedings for the assessment, it must be held to be
void.2 But if the remedy is adequate, and the party is allowed to
pursue it, it is not unconstitutional to limit the period in which he
15 Grat. 214; Jackson v. Winn's Heirs, 4 Lit. 323; People v. Green, 3 Mick
496; Lyon ». Jerome, 26 Wend. 497, per Verplanek, Senator; Gardner v. Xe»-
burg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Charlestown Branch R.R. Co. e. Middlesex, 7 Met 78;
Harper v. Richardson, 22 Cal. 251; Baker v. Johnson, 2 Hill, 342; People c.
Harden, 6 Hill, 359; Long r. Fuller, 68 Penn. St. 170 (case of a school district).
"Although it may not be necessary, within the constitutional prorision, that the
amount of compensation should be actually ascertained and paid before property
is thus taken, it is, I apprehend, the settled doctrine, cren as against the Stat*
itself, that at least certain and adequate prorision must first be made by
(except in cases of public emergency), so that the owner can coerce payment
through the judicial tribunals or otherwise, without any unreasonable or unneces-
sary delay; otherwise the law making the appropriation is no better than blank
paper. Bloodgood c. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9. The pro-
visions of the statute prescribing the mode of compensation in cases like the
present, when properly understood and administered, come fully up to this
great fundamental principle; and even if any doubt could be entertained about
the true construction, it should be made to lean in favor of the one that is found
to be most in conformity with the constitutional requisite." People v. Harden,
6 Hill, 359. "A provision for compensation is an indispensable attendant upon
the due and constitutional exercise of the power of depriving an individual of
his property." Gardner v. N^wburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 168; Buffalo, &c, R.R. Co.
v. Ferris, 26 Texas, 588; Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 613; Haverhill Bridge
Proprietors v. County Com'rs, 103 Mass. 120; 8. c. 4 Am. Rep. 518; LangforJ
v. Com'rs of Ramsay Co., 16 Minn. 380; Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Telegraph
Co., 46'Geo. 43.
1 In Commissioners, &c. v. Bowie, 34 Ala. 461, it was held that a provision
by law that compensation when assessed should be paid to the owner by the
county treasurer sufficiently secured its payment. And see Talbot v. Hudson.
16 Gray, 417.
2 Shepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit R.R. Co., 6 Wis. 605; Powers r. Bears.
12 Wis. 220. See McCann v. Sierra Co., 7 Cal. 121; Colton v. Rossi, 9 &L
595; Ragatz v. Dubuque, 4 Iowa, 343. But in People r. Hayden, 6 Hill. 359.
where the statute provided for appraisers who were to proceed to appraise the
land as soon as it was appropriated, the proper remedy of the owner, if they
failed to perform this duty, was held to be to apply for a mandamus.
[ 660 ]
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CH. XV.] THE EMINENT DOMAIN. * 561
shall resort to it, and to provide that, unless he shall take pro-
ceedings for the assessment of damages within a specified time, all
right thereto shall be barred.1 The right to compensation, when
property is appropriated by the public, may always be
waived ;2 and a failure to apply for and * have the com- [* 562]
pensation assessed, when reasonable time and opportunity
and a proper tribunal are afforded for the purpose, may well be
considered a waivep.
Where, however, the property is not taken by the State, or by a
municipality, but by a private corporation which, though for this
purpose to be regarded as a public agent, appropriates it for the
benefit and profit of its members, and which may or may not be
sufficiently responsible to make secure and certain the payment,
in all cases, of the compensation which shall be assessed, it is cer-
tainly proper, and it has sometimes been questioned whether it
was not absolutely essential, that payment be actually made before
the owner could be devested of his freehold.3 Chancellor Kent has
expressed the opinion, that compensation and appropriation should
be concurrent. "The settled and fundamental doctrine is, that
government has no right to take private property for public pur-
poses, without giving just compensation; and it seems to bo neces-
sarily implied that the indemnity should, in cases which will admit
of it, be previously and equitably ascertained, and be ready for
reception, concurrently in point of time with the actual exercise of
the right of eminent domain."4 And while this is not an inflex-
ible rule unless in terms established by the constitution, it is so
just and reasonable that statutory provisions for taking private
property very generally make payment precede or accompany the
appropriation, and by several of the State constitutions this is
expressly required.6 And on general principles, it is essential
1 People v. Green, 3 Mich. 496; Charlestown Branch R.R. Co. v. Middlesex,
7 Met. 78; Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Taylor p. Marcy, 25 Ill. 518;
Callison v. Hedrick, 15 Grat. 244; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Harper
v. Richardson, 22 Cal. 251; Cupp v. Commissioners of Seneca, 19 Ohio,
n. s. 173.
• Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 149; Brown v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 31. •
3 This is the intimation in Shepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit R.R. Co., 6
Wis. 605; Powers v. Bears. 12 Wis. 220; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Dron-
berger v. Reed, 11 Ind. 420. But see Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667.
4 2 Kent, 399, note.
4 The Constitution of Florida provides "that private propertv shall not be
[661]
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* 562 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IT.
that an adequate fund be provided from which the owner of the
property can certainly obtain compensation; it is not competent to
deprive him of his property, and turn him over to an action at law
against a corporation which may or may not prove respon-
[* 5G3] sible, * and to a judgment of uncertain efficacy.1 For
the consequence would be, in some cases, that the party
might lose his estate without redress, in violation of the inflexible
maxim upon which the right is based.
What the tribunal shall be which is to assess the compensation
must be determined either by the constitution or by the statute
which provides for the appropriation. The case is not one where,
as a matter of right, the party is entitled to a trial by jury, un-
less the constitution has provided that tribunal for the purpose.5
Nevertheless, the proceeding is judicial in its character, and the
party in interest is entitled to have an impartial tribunal, and the
usual rights and privileges which attend judicial investigations.
It is not competent for the State itself to fix the compensation
through the legislature, for this would make it the judge in its
own cause.3 And, if a jury is provided, the party must have the
ordinary opportunity to appear when it is to be impanelled, that
he may make any legal objections.4 And he lias the same right to
notice of the time and place of assessment that he would have in
taken or applied to public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor."
Art. 1, § 14. See also, to the same effect, Constitution of Georgia, art. 1, § 17;
Constitution of Iowa, art. 1, § 18; Constitution of Kansas, art. 12, § 4; Consti-
tution of Kentucky, art. 13, § 14; Constitution of Minnesota, art. 1, § 13;
Constitution of Mississippi, art. 1, § 13; Constitution of Nevada, art. 1, § S;
Constitution of Ohio, art. 1, § 19. The Constitution of Indiana, art. 1, § 21,
and that of Oregon, art. 1, § 19, require compensation to be first made, except
when the property is appropriated by the State.
1 Sliepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit R.R. Co., 6 Wis. 605; Walther r.
Warner, 25 Mo. 277; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Curran v. Shattuck,
24 Cal. 427; Memphis and Charleston R.R. Co. v. Payne, 37 Miss. 700;
Henry v. Dubuque and Pacific R.R. Co., 10 Iowa, 540; Ash i\ Cummings, 50
N. H. 591; Carr ». Georgia R.R. Co., 1 Kelly, 532; Southwestern RR. Co. r.
Telegraph Co., 46 Geo. 43.
» Petition of Mount Washington Co., 35 N. H. 134.
3 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344; s. c. 11 Pet. 571,
per McLean, J.
* People o. Tallman, 36 Barb. 222 ; Booneville v. Ormrod, 26 Miss. 193. A
jury, without further explanation in the law, must be understood as one of twelve
persons. Lamb o. Lane, 4 Ohio, N. 8. 167.
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THE EMINENT DOMAIN.
any other case of judicial proceedings, and the assessment will
be invalid if no such notice is given.1 These are just as well as
familiar rules, and they are perhaps invariably recognized in legis-
lation.
It is not our purpose to follow these proceedings, and to atteitfpt
to point out the course of practice to be observed, and which is so
different under the statutes of different States. An inflexible rule
should govern them all, that the interest and exclusive right of the
owner is to be regarded and protected so far as may be consistent
with a recognition of the public necessity. While the owner is
not to be disseised until compensation is provided, neither, on the
other hand, when the public authorities have taken such steps as
to finally settle upon the appropriation, ought he to be left
in a * state of uncertainty, and compelled to wait for com- [* 564]
pensation until some future time, when they may see fit
to occupy it. The land should either be his or he should be paid
for it. Whenever, therefore, the necessary steps have been taken
on the part of the public to select the property to be taken, locate
the public work, and declare the appropriation, the owner becomes
absolutely entitled to the compensation, whether the public pro-
ceed at once to occupy the property or not. If a street is legally
established over the land of an individual, he is entitled to demand
payment of his damages, without waiting for the street to be
opened.2 And if a railway line is located across his land, and the
damages are appraised, his right to payment is complete, and he
cannot be required to wait until the railway company shall actu-
ally occupy his premises, or enter upon the construction of the
road at that point. It is not to be forgotten, however, that the
proceedings for the assessment and collection of damages are stat-
utory, and displace the usual remedies; that the public agents who
1 Hood v. Finch, 8 Wis. 381; Dickey v. Tennison. 27 Mo. 373.
* Philadelphia v. Dickson, 38 Penn. St. 247; Philadelphia v. Dyer, 41 Penn.
St. 463; Hallock v. Franklin County, 2 Met. 559; Harrington r. County Com-
missioners, 22 Pick. 268; Blake v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 66; Higgins r. Chicago,
18 111. 276; County of Peoria v. Harvey, ib. 364; Shaw r. Charlestown, 3 Allen,
538; Hampton v. Coffin, 4 N. H. 517; Clough v. Unity, 18 N. H. 77. And
where a city thus appropriates land for a street, it would not be allowed to set
up in defence to a demand for compensation its own irregularities in the pro-
ceedings taken to condemn the land. Higgins v. Chicago, 18 111. 276; Chicago
r. Wheeler, 25 111. 478.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
keep within the statute are not liable to common-law action ;1 tlv
it is only where they fail to follow the statute that tiny render
themselves liable as trespassers;2 though if they construct their
work in a careless, negligent, and improper manner, by means of
which carelessness, negligence, or improper construction a party is
injured in his rights, ho may have an action at the common law as
in other cases of injurious negligence.3 ,
[*565] * The principle upon which the damages are to be
assessed is always an important consideration in these
cases; and the circumstances of different appropriations are some-
times so peculiar that it has been found somewhat difficult to
establish a rule that shall always be just and equitable. If the
whole of a man's estate is taken, there can generally be little diffi-
culty in fixing upon the measure of compensation; for it is appar-
ent that, in such a case, he ought to have the whole market value
of his premises, and he cannot reasonably demand more. The
question is reduced to one of market value, to be determined upon
the testimony of those who have knowledge upon that subject,
or whose business or experience entitles their opinions to weight
It may be that, in such a case, the market value may not seem to
the owner an adequate compensation; for he may have reasons
peculiar to himself, springing from association, or other cause,
which make him unwilling to part with the property on the esti-
mate of his neighbors; but such reasons are incapable of being
taken into account in legal proceedings, where the question is one
of compensation in money, inasmuch as it is manifestly impossible
to measure them by any standard of pecuniary value. Concede
to the government a right to appropriate the property on paying
for it, and we are at once remitted to the same standards for esti-
mating values which are applied in other cases, and which neces-
1 East and West India Dock, &c, Co. v. Gattke, 15 Jap. 61; Kimble p.
White Water Valley Canal, 1 Ind. 285; Mason v. Kennebec, &c, R.R. Co., 31
Me. 215; Aldrich v. Cheshire R.R. Co., 1 Fost. 359; Brown v. Beatty, 84 Miss.
227; Pettibone v. La Crosse and Milwaukee R.R. Co., 14 Wis. 443; Vilas v.
Milwaukee and Mississippi R.R. Co., 15 Wis. 233.
* Dean v. Sullivan R.R. Co., 2 Fost. 316; Furniss v. Hudson River R.R. Co.,
5 Sandf. 551.
5 Lawrence v. Great Northern R. Co., 20 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 293; Bagnall p.
London and N. W. R., 7 H. & N. 423; Brown p. Cayuga and Susquehanna
R.R. Co., 12 N. Y. 487.
[664]
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CH. XV.] THE EMINENT DOMAIN. * 565
sarily measure the worth of property by its value as an article of
sale, or as a means of producing pecuniary returns.
When, however, only a portion of a parcel of land is appropri-
ated, just compensation may perhaps depend upon the effect which
the appropriation may have on the owner's interest in the remain-
der, to increase or diminish its value, in consequence of the use to
which that taken is to be devoted, or in consequence of the con-
dition in which it may leave the remainder in respect to conven-
ience of use. If, for instance, a public way is laid out through a
tract of land which before was not accessible, and if in conse-
quence it is given a front, or two fronts, upon the street, which
furnish valuable and marketable sites for building lots, it may be
that the value of that which remains is made, in consequence of
taking a part, vastly greater than the whole was before, and that
the owner is benefited instead of damnified by the appropriation.
Indeed, the great majority of streets in cities and villages are
dedicated to the public use by the owners of lands, with-
out any other * compensation or expectation of compensa- [* 566]
tion than the increase in market value which is expected
to be given to such lands thereby; and this is very often the case
with land for other public improvements, which are supposed to be
of peculiar value to the locality in which they are made. But
where, on the other hand, a railroad is laid out across a man's
premises, running between his house and his outbuildings, neces-
sitating, perhaps, the removal of some of them, or upon such a
grade as to render deep cuttings or high embankments necessary,
and thereby greatly increasing the inconveniences attending the
management and use of the land, as well as the risks of accidental
injuries, it will often happen that the pecuniary loss which he
would suffer by the appropriation of the right of way would greatly
exceed the value of the land taken, and to pay him that value only
would be to make very inadequate compensation.
It seems clear that, in these cases, it is proper and just that the
injuries suffered and the benefits received, by the proprietor, as
owner of the remaining portion of the land, should be taken into
account in measuring the compensation. This, indeed, is generally
conceded; but what injuries shall be allowed for, or what benefits
estimated, is not always so apparent. The question, as we find it
considered by the authorities, seems to be, not so much what the
value is of that which is taken, but whether what remains is.
[ 665 ]
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reduced in value by the appropriation, and, if so, to what extent;
in other words, what pecuniary injury the owner sustains by a part
of his land being appropriated. But, in estimating either the
injuries or the benefits, those which the owner sustains or receives
in common- with the community generally, and which are not
peculiar to him and connected with his ownership, use, and enjoy-
ment of the particular parcel of land, should be altogether ex-
cluded, as it would be unjust to compensate him for the one, or
to charge him with the other, when no account is taken of such
incidental benefits and injuries with other citizens who receive.or
feel them equally with himself, but whose lands do not chance to
be taken.1
1 In Somerville and Easton R.R. Co. ads. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495, a motion »u
made for a new trial on an assessment of compensation for land taken by a rail-
road company, on the ground that the judge in his charge to the jury informed
them " that they were authorized by law to ascertain and assess the damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff to his other lands not taken and occupied by the defend-
ants; to his dwelling-house, and other buildings and improvements, by reducing
their value, changing their character, obstructing their free use, by subjecting his
buildings to the hazards of fire, his family and stock to injury and obstruction in
their necessary passage across the road, the inconvenience caused by embank-
ments or excavations, and, in general, the effect of the railroad upon his adjacent
lands, in deteriorating their value, in the condition they were found, whether
adapted for agricultural purposes only, or for dwellings, stores, shops, or other
like purposes."
"On a careful review of this charge," says the judge, delivering the opinion
of the court, " I cannot see that any legal principle was violated, or any unsound
doctrine advanced. . The charter provides that the jury shall assess the value of
the land and materials taken by the company, and the damages. The damages
here contemplated are not damages to the land actually occupied or covered by
the road, but such damages as the owner may sustain in his other and adjacent
lands not occupied by the company's road. His buildings may be reduced in
value by the contiguity of the road, and the use of engines upon it. His landa
and buildings, before adapted and used for particular purposes, may, from the
same cause, become utterly unfitted for such purposes. The owner may be in-
commoded by high embankments or deep excavations on the line of the road, his
buildings subjected to greater hazard from fire, his household and stock to injury
or destruction, unless guarded with more than ordinary care. It requires no
special experience or sagacity to perceive that such are the usual and natural
effects of railroads upon the adjoining lands, and which necessarily deteriorate
not only their marketable but their intrinsic value. The judge, therefore, did
not exceed his duty in instructing the jury that these were proper subjects for
their consideration in estimating the damages which the plaintiff might sustain by
reason of the location of this road upon and across his lands." And in the same
. case it was held that the jury, in assessing compensation, were to adopt as the
[ 666 ]
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* The question, then, in these cases, relates first to the [* 567]
value of the land appropriated; which is to be assessed
with reference to what * it is worth for sale, in view of the [* 568]
uses to which it may be applied, and not simply in refer-
ence to its productiveness to the owner in the condition in which
he has seen fit to leave it.1 Second, if less than the whole estate
is taken, then there is further to be considered how much the por-
standard of value for the lands taken, not such a price as they would bring at a
forced sale in the market for money, but such a price as they could be purchased
at, provided they were for sale, and the owner asked such prices as, in the opinion
of the community, they were reasonably worth; that it was matter of universal
experience that land would not always bring at a forced sale what it was reason-
ably worth, and the owner, not desiring to sell, could not reasonably be required
to take less. In Sater v. Burlington and Mount Pleasant Plank-Road Co., 1 Iowa,
393, Isbell, J., says: "The terms used in the constitution, 'just compensation,'
are not ambiguous. They undoubtedly mean a fair equivalent; that the person
whose property is taken shall be made whole. But while the end to be attained
is plain, the mode of arriving at it is not without its difficulty. On due consid-
eration, we see no more practical rule than to first ascertain the fair marketable
value of the premises over which the proposed improvement is to pass, irrespective
of such improvement, and also a like value of the same, in the condition in which
they will be immediately after the land for the improvement has been taken,
irrespective of the benefit which will result from the improvement, and the dif-
ference in value to constitute the measure of compensation. But in ascertaining
the depreciated value of the premises after that part which has been taken for
public use has been appropriated, regard must be bad only to the immediate, and
not remote, consequence of the appropriation; that is to say, the value of the
remaining premises is not to be depreciated by heaping consequence on conse-
quence. While we see no more practical mode of ascertainment than this, yet
it must still be borne in mind that this is but a mode of ascertainment; that,
after all, the true criterion is the one provided by the constitution, namely, just
compensation for the property taken." See this rule illustrated and applied in
Henry v. Dubuque and Pacific R.R. Co., 2 Iowa, 800, where it is said: "That
the language of the constitution means that the person whose property is taken
for public use shall have a fair equivalent in money for the injury done him by
such taking; in other words, that he shall be made whole so far as money is a
measure of compensation, we are equally cleap. This just compensation should
be precisely commensurate with the injury sustained by having the property
taken; neither more nor less." And see the recent Kentucky cases of Richmond,
&p., Co. v. Rogers, 1 Duvall, 135; Robinson p. Robinson, to. 162.
1 Matter of Furman Street, 17 Wend. 669 ; Tide-Water Canal Co. v. Archer,
9 Gill & J. 480; State v. Burlington, &c, R.R. Co., 1 Iowa, 386; Parks p.
Boston, 15 Pick. 206; First Parish, l8sp. v. Middlesex, 7 Gray, 106; Dickenson
v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369.
[ 667 ]
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tion not taken is increased or diminished in value in consequence
of the appropriation.1
1 Denton r. Polk, 9 Iowa, 594; Parks ». Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Dickenson r.
Fitcbburg, 13 Gray, 546; Harvey v. Lackawana, &c, R.R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 428;
Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 258; Pacific R.R. Co. ». Chrystal, it.;Ai\
Somerville and Eastern R.R. Co. ads. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495; Carpenter o. Lan-
dalT, 42 N. H. 218; Troy and Boston R.R. Co. v. Lee, 13 Barb. 169; Tide-
Water Canal Co. c. Archer, 9 Gill and J. 480; Winona and St. Paul R.R. Co.
v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515; Nicholson v. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co., 22 Conn.
74; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189. "Compensation is an equivalent for
property taken, or for an injur)'. It must be ascertained by estimating the
actual damage the party has sustained. That damage is the sum of the actual
value of the property taken, and of the injury done to the residue of the property
by the use of that part which is taken. The benefit is, in part, an equivalent to
the loss and damage. The loss and damage of the defendant is the value of the
land the company has taken, and the injury which the location and use of the
road through his tract may cause to the remainder. The amount which maybe
assessed for these particulars the company admits that it is bound to pay. But
as a set-off, it claims credit for the benefit the defendant has received from the
construction of the road. That benefit may consist in the enhanced value of the.
residue of his tract. When the company has paid the defendant the excess of
his loss or damage over and above the benefit and advantage he has derived from
the road, he will have received a just compensation. It is objected that the
enhanced salable value of the land should not be assessed as a benefit to the
defendant, because it is precarious and uncertain. The argument admits that
the enhanced value, if permanent, should be assessed. But whether the appreci-
ation is permanent and substantial, or transient and illusory, is a subject about
which the court is not competent to determine. It must be submitted to a jury,
who will give credit to the company according to the circumstances. The argu-
ment is not tenable, that an increased salable value is no benefit to the owner of
land unless he sells it. This is true if it be assumed that the price will decline.
The chance of this is estimated by the jury, in the amount which they may assess
for that benefit. The sum assessed is therefore (so far as human foresight can
anticipate the future) the exponent of the substantial increase of the value of the
land. This is a benefit to the owner, by enlarging his credit and his ability to
pay his debts or provide for his family, in the same manner and to the same extent
as if his fortune was increased by an acquisition of property." Greenville and
Columbia R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. 437. And see Pennsylvania RR. Co.
v. Reiley, 8 Penn. St. 445; Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. 153; Upton r.
South Reading Branch R.R., 8 Cush. 600; Proprietors, &c. v. Nashua and Lowell
R.R. Co., 10 Cush. 385; Mayor, &c, of Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369; St.
Louis, &c, R.R. Co. o. Richardson, 45 Mo. 468; Little Miami R.R. Co. t.
Collett, 6 Ohio, n. s. 182; Bigelow v. West Wisconsin R.R. Co., 27 Wis. 487.
In Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 358, the right to assess benefits was referred
to the taxing power; but this seems not necessary, and indeed somewhat difficult
on principle. See Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana, 30-34.
[ 668]
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* But, in making tins estimate, there must be excluded [* 569]
from consideration those benefits which the owner receives
only in common with the community at large in conse-
quence of his ownership of other property,1 * and also those [* 570]
incidental injuries to other property, such as would not
give to other persons a right to compensation,2 while allowing those
1 Dickenson v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Newby v. Platte
County, 25 Mo. 258; Pacific R.R. Co. ». Chrystal, to. 5-14; Carpenter v. Lan-
daff, 42 N. H. 218; Mount Washington Co.'s Petition, 35 N. H. 134; Penrice
v. Wallis, 37 Miss. 172; Palmer Co. ». Ferrill, 17 Pick. 58; Meacham v. Fitch-
burg R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 291, where the jury were instructed that, if they were
satisfied that the laying out and constructing; of the railroad had occasioned any
benefit or advantage to the lands of the petitioner through which tin; ro.id passed,
or lands immediately adjoining or connected therewith, rendering the part not
taken for the railroad more convenient or useful to the petitioner, or giving it
some peculiar increase in value compared with other lands generally in the
vicinity, it would be the doty of the jury to allow for such benefit, or increase of
value, by way of set-off, in favor of the railroad company; but, on the other
hand, if the construction of the railroad, by increasing the convenience of the
people of the town generally as a place for residence, and by its anticipated and
probable effect in increasing the population, business, and general prosperity of
the place, had been the occasion of an increase in the salable value of real estate
generally near the station, including the petitioner's land, and thereby occasion-
ing a benefit or advantage to him, in common with other owners of real estate in
the vicinity, this benefit was too contingent, indirect, and remote to be brought
into consideration in settling the question of damages to the petitioner for taking
his particular parcel of land. Upton v. South Reading Branch R.R. Co., 8 Cush.
600. It has sometimes been objected, with great force, that it was unjust, and
oppressive to set off benefits against the loss and damage which the owner of the
property sustains, because thereby he is taxed for such benefits, while his neigh-
bors, no part of whose land is taken, enjoy the same benefits without the loss;
and the courts of Kentucky have held it to be unconstitutional, and that full com-
pensation for the land taken must be made in money Sutton o. Louisville, 5
Dana, 28; Rice v. Turnpike Co., 7 Dana, 81; Jacob v. Louisville, 9 Dana, 114.
And some other States have established, by their constitutions, the rule that ben-
efits shall not be deducted. Sec Deaton v. County of Polk, 9 Iowa, 596; Giesy
t. Cincinnati, W. and Z. R.R. Co., 4 Ohio, n. s. 308; Woodfolk v. Nashville
R.R. Co., 2 Swan, 422. But the cases generally adopt the doctrine stated in
the text; and if the owner is paid his actual damages, he has no occasion to
complain because his neighbors are fortunate enough to receive a benefit. Green-
ville and Columbia R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. 438; Mayor, &c, of Lexington
v. Long, 31 Mo. 869.
4 Somerville, &c., R.R. Co. ads. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495; Dorian v. East Bran-
dywine, &c, R.R. Co., 46 Penn. St. 520; Proprietors, &c. v. Nashua and Lowell
R.R. Co., 10 Cush. 385; Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. t>. Thompson, 18 B.
Monr. 735; Winona and St. Peter's R.R. Co. v. Denman, 10 Minn. 267.
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which directly affect the value of the remainder of the land not
taken; such as the necessity for increased fencing, and the like.1
And if an assessment on these principles makes the benefits equal
the damages, and awards the owner nothing, he is nevertheless to
be considered as having received full compensation, and conse-
quently as not being in position to complain.2
The statutory assessment of compensation will cover all conse-
quential damages which the owner of the land sustains by means
of the construction of the work, except such as may result
[* 571] from * negligence or improper construction,8 and for which
an action at the common law will lie, as already stated.
1 Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Reiley, 8 Penn. St. 445; Greenville and Columbis
R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. 439; Dearborn v. Railroad Co., 4 Fost. 179; Car-
penter v. LandafT, 42 N. H. 220; Dorian v. East Brandywine, &c., R.R. Co.,
46 Penn. St. 520; Winona and St. Peter's R.R. Co. c. Denman, 10 Minn. 267;
Mount Washington Co.'s Petition, 35 N. H. 134. Where a part of a meeting-
house lot was taken for a highway, it was held that the anticipated annoyance to
worshippers by the use of the way by noisy and dissolute persons on the Sabbatk
could form no basis for any assessment of damages. First Parish in Wobum r.
Middlesex County, 7 Gray, 106.
'.White v. County Commissioners of Norfolk, 2 Cush. 361; Whitman v. Bos-
ton and Maine R.R. Co., 3 Allen, 133; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189.
But it is not competent for the commissioners who assess the compensation to
require that which is to be made to be in whole or in part in any thing else than
money. An award of "one hundred and fifty dollars, with a wagon-way and
stop for cattle,"' is void, as undertaking to pay the owner in part in convenience
to be furnished him, and which he may not want, and certainly cannot be com-
pelled to take instead of money. Central Ohio R.R. Co. v. Holler, 7 Ohio,
n. s. 225.
3 Philadelphia and Reading R.R. Co. v. Yeiser, 8 Penn. St. 36C; O'Connor
v. Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St. 187; Aldrich v. Cheshire R.R. Co., 1 Fost. 359;
Dearborn v. Boston, Concord, and Montreal R.R. Co., 4 Fost. 179; Eaton r
Boston R.R. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Dodge v. County Commissioners, 3 Met. 380;
Brown v. Providence, W. and B. R.R. Co., 5 Gray, 35; Mason p. Kennebec
and Portland R.R. Co., 31 Me. 215; Bellinger v. N. Y. Central R.R. Co., 23
N. Y. 42; Hatch v. Vt. Central R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 49; Slatten v. Des Moinea
Valley R.R. Co., 29 Iowa, 154. A corporation appropriating property under the
right of eminent domain is always liable for any abuse of the privilege or neglect
of duty under the law under which they proceed. Fehr v. Schuylkill Nav. Co..
G9 Penn. St. 161; Eaton v. Boston, C. and M. R.R. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Tore
Haute, &c, R.R. Co. v. McKinley, 33 Ind. 274.
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•CHAPTER XVI. [*572]
THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATES.
On questions of conflict between national and State authority,
and on questions whether the State exceeds its just powers in deal-
ing with the property and restraining the actions of individuals, it
often becomes necessary to consider the extent and proper bounds
of a power in the States, which, like that of taxation, pervades
every department of business and reaches to every interest and
every subject of profit or enjoyment. We refer to what is known
as the police power.
The police of a State, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its
system of internal regulation, by which it is sought not only to
preserve the public order and to prevent offences against the State,
but also to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen
those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are
calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably con-
sistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.1
In the present chapter we shall take occasion to speak of the
police power principally as it affects the use and enjoyment of
property; the object being to show the universality of its presence,
1 Blackstone defines the public police and economy as "the due regulation
and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a. State, like
members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior
to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be
decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations." 4 Bl. Com.
162. Jeremy Bentham, in his General View of Public Offences, has this defini-
tion: "Police is in general a system of precaution, either for the prevention of
crimes or of calamities. Its business may be distributed into eight distinct
branches: 1. Police for the prevention of offences; 2. Police for the prevention
of calamities; 3. Police for the prevention of endemic diseases; i. Police of
charity; 5. Police of interior communications; 6. Police of public amusements;
7. Police for recent intelligence; 8. Police for registration." Edinburgh Ed. o£
Works, Part IX. p. 157.
[671]
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and to indicate, so far as may be practicable, the limits which set-
tled principles of constitutional law assign to its interference.
"We think it is a settled principle," says Chief Justice
[* 573] Shaw, * " growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil
society, that every holder of property, however absolute
and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property,
nor injurious to the rights of the community. AU property in this
Commonwealth is . . . held subject to those general regulations
which are necessary to the common good and general welfare.
Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as
shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. This is very dif-
ferent from the right of eminent domain,— the right of a govern-
ment to take and appropriate private property whenever the public
exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of pro-
viding a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude
to is rather the police power; the power vested in the legislature
by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Common-
wealth, and of the subjects of the same. It is much easier to per-
ceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to
mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise." 1
"This police power of the State," says another eminent judge,
"extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the
State. According to the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
1 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84. See also Commonwealth p. Tewks-
bury, 11 Met. 57; Hart v. Mayor, &c, of Albany, 9 Wend. 571; New Albany
and Salem R.R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3; Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.K. Co.
v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84 j Ohio and Mississippi R.R. Co. v. McClelland, 25
111. 140; People v. Draper, 25 Barb. 874; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 390;
Police Commissioners v. Louisville, 3 Bush, 597; Wynehamer v. People, 13
N. Y. 402.
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Icedas, which being of universal application, it must, of course, be
within the range of legislative action to define the mode and man-
ner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure
others." And again: [By this] "general police power of the
State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the * State; of the perfect right [* 574]
in the legislature to do which, no question ever was, or,
upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far
as natural persons are concerned."1
In the American constitutional system, the power to establish
the ordinary regulations of police has been left with the individual
States, and cannot be assumed by the national government.2
Neither can the national government through any of its depart-
ments or officers assume any supervision of the police regulations
of the States, so long as they do not invade the sphere of national
sovereignty, and obstruct or impede the exercise of any authority
which the constitution has confided to the nation.3 But on the
1 Redfield, Ch. J., in Thorpe p. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 149.
See the maxim, Sic utere, &c, —" Enjoy your own property in such manner as
not to injure that of another," — in Broom, Legal Maxims, 5th Am. ed. p. 327.
See also Turbeville v. Stampe, 1 Ld. Raym. 264, and 1 Salk. 13; Jeffries v.
Williams, 5 Exch. 792; Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739; Pixley v. Clark,
35 N. Y. 520.
'So decided in United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41, in which a section of the
Internal Revenue Act of 1867 — which undertook to make it a misdemeanor to
mix for sale naphtha and illuminating oils, or to sell oil of petroleum inflammable
at a less temperature than 110° Fahrenheit — was held to be a mere police regu-
lation, and as such void within the States.
3 See this subject considered at large in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, and
the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. Congress has no power to authorize a busi-
ness within a State which is prohibited by the State. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall.
471, per Chase, Ch. J. A claim has recently been advanced at New Orleans,
that the Civil Rights Bill, in connection with the new amendments to the national
Constitution, has so far enlarged the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, as to
authorize them, at the suit of citizens of a State, to review one of its statutes
purporting to establish a police regulation, and to adjudge it void if in their
opinion it wrongfully abridged the right of citizens to follow a lawful employ-
ment; but this claim has not been sustained either in the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, or in the Federal Supreme Court. See Live Stock, &c, Association
v. Crescent City, &c, Co., recently decided in the latter court; Story on Const.
Appendix to Vol. 2.
In State p. Hairston, 63 N. C. 451, it was decided that the recent amend-
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other hand it is easy to see that the power in the States might be
so employed as to interfere with the jurisdiction of the general
government; and some of the most serious questions regarding the
police of the States concern the cases in which authority has been
conferred upon Congress. In those cases it has sometimes been
claimed that the ordinary police jurisdiction is by necessary impli-
cation excluded, and that, if it were not so, the State would be
found operating within the sphere of the national powers, and
establishing regulations which would either abridge the rights
which the national Constitution undertakes to render absolute, or
burden the privileges which are conferred by law of Congress, and
which therefore cannot properly be subject to the interference or
control of any other authority. But any accurate statement of the
theory upon which the police power rests will render it apparent
that a proper exercise of it by the State cannot come in conflict
with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. If
the power extends only to a just regulation of rights with a view
to the due protection and enjoyment of all, and does not deprive
any one of that which is justly and properly his own, it is obvious
that its possession by the State, and its exercise for the regulation
of the property and actions of its citizens, cannot well constitute at
invasion of national jurisdiction, or afford a basis for an appeal to
the protection of the national authorities.
The occasions to consider this subject in its bearings upon ik
clause of the Constitution of the United States which forbids tie
States passing any laws violating the obligation of contracts have
been frequent and varied; and it has been held without dissent
that this clause does not so far remove from State control tbe
rights and properties which depend for their existence or enforce
ment upon contracts, as to relieve them from the operation of sud
general regulations for the good government of the State and tla
protection of the rights of individuals as may be deemed important.
All contracts and all rights, it is declared, are subject to this power;
and not only may regulations which affect them be established br
the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change froc
time to time, as the general well-being of the community mif
ments to the national Constitution have not had the effect to repeal a State In
forbidding marriages between white persons and negroes. And see fln/«iSI.
note.
[674]
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require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience
may demonstrate the necessity.1
1 In the case of Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, a
question arose under a provision in the Vermont General Railroad Law of 1849,
which required each railroad corporation to erect and maintain fences on the line
of their road, and also cattle guards at all farm and road crossings, suitable and
sufficient to prevent cattle and other animals from getting upon the railroad, and
which made the corporation and its agents liable for all damages which should
be done by their agents or engines to cattle, horses, or other animals thereon, if
occasioned by the want of such fences and cattle guards. It was not disputed
that this provision would be valid as to such corporations as might be afterwards
created within the State; but in respect to those previously in existence, and
whose charters contained no such provision, it was claimed that this legislation
was inoperative, since otherwise its effect would be to modify, and to that extent
to violate, the obligation of the charter-contract. "The case," say the court,
"resolves itself into the narrow question of the right of the legislature, by gen-
eral statute, to require all railways, whether now in operation or hereafter to be
chartered or built, to fence their roads upon both sides, and provide sufficient
cattle guards at all farm and road crossings, under penalty of paying all damages
caused by their neglect to comply with such requirements . . . We think the
power of the legislature to control existing railways in this respect may be found
in the general control over the police of the country, which resides in the law-
making power in all free States, and which is, by the fifth article of the bill of
rights of this State, expressly declared to reside perpetually and inalienably in
the legislature; which is, perhaps, no more than the enunciation of a general
principle applicable to all free States, and which cannpt therefore be violated so
as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by express grant to any mere
public or private corporation. And when the regulation of the police of a city or
town, by general ordinances, is given to such towns and cities, and the regula-
tion of their own internal police is given to railroads to be carried into effect by
their by-laws and other regulations, it is of course always, in all such cases, sub-
ject to the superior control of the legislature. That is a responsibility which
legislatures cannot devest themselves of if they would.
"So far as railroads are concerned, this police power which resides primarily
and ultimately in the legislature is twofold: 1. The police of the roads, which,
in the absence of legislative control, the corporations themselves exercise over
their operatives, and to some extent over all who do business with them, or come
upon their grounds, through their general statutes, and by their officers. We
apprehend there can be no manner of doubt that the legislature may, if they
deem the public good requires it, of which they are to judge, and in all doubtful
cases their judgment is final, require the several railroads in the State to establish
and maintain the same kind of police which is now observed upon some of the
more important roads in the country for their own security, or even such a police
as is found upon the English railways, and those upon the continent of Europe.
No one ever questioned the right of the Connecticut legislature to require trains
upon all of their railroads to come to a stand before passing draws in bridges; or
[675]
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[* 575] * Perhaps the most striking illustrations of the principle
here stated will be found among the judicial decisions
[* 576] which have held * that the rights insured to private cor-
porations by their charters, and the manner of their exer-
cise, are subject to such new regulations as from time to time maj
be made by the State with a view to the public protection, health,
of the Massachusetts legislature to require the same thing before passing another
railroad. And by parity of reasoning may all railways be required so to conduct
themselves as to other persons, natural or corporate, as not unreasonably to injure
them or their property. And if the business of railways is specially dangerous,
they may be required to bear the expense of erecting such safeguard* as will
render it ordinarily safe to others, as is often required of natural persons under
such circumstances.
"There would be no end of illustrations upon this subject. ... It maybe
extended to the supervision of the track, tending switches, running upon the
time of other trains, running a road with a single track, using improper rails, not
using proper precaution by way of safety-beams in case of the breaking of axle-
trees, the number of brakemen upon a train with reference to the number of cars,
employing intemperate or incompetent engineers and servants, running beyond
a given rate of speed, and a thousand similar things, most of which have bees
made the subject of legislation or judicial determination, and all of which maybe.
Hegeman p. Western R. Co., 16 Barb. 353.
"2. There is also the general police power of the State, by which persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in
the legislature to do whieh^no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general
principles, ever can be, made, so far as natural persons are concerned. And it is
certainly calculated to excite surprise and alarm that the right to do the same in
regard to railways should be made a serious question." And the court proceed
to consider the various cases in which the right of the legislature to regulate nut-
ters of private concern with reference to the general public good has been acted
upon as unquestioned, or sustained by judicial decisions, and quote, as pertinent
to the general question of what laws are prohibited on the ground of impairing
the obligation of contracts, the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629, that " the framers of the Constitution
did not intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions,
adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is
not to be so construed." See, to the same effect, Suydam r. Moore, 8 Barb.
358; Waldron r. Rensselaer and Saratoga R.R. Co., 8 Barb. 390; Galena and
Chicago U. R.R. Co. v. Loomis, 13 111. 548; Fitchburg R.R. p..Grand Junction
R.R. Co., 1 Allen, 552; Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me. 560; Peters v. Iron Mountain
R.R. Co., 23 Mo. 107; Grannahan p. Hannibal, Ac, R.R. Co., 30 Mo. 546;
Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. r. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 81; Galena and
Chicago U. R.R. Co. p. Appleby, 28 111. 283; Blair v. Milwaukee, &c, R.R
Co., 20 Wis. 254; State p. Mathews, 44 Mo. 523; Commissioners, &c. p. Hol-
yoke Water Power Co., 104 Mass. 446.
[ 676]
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and safety, and in order to guard properly the rights of other indi-
viduals and corporations. Although these charters are to be re-
garded as contracts, and the rights assured by them are inviolable,
it does not follow that these rights are at once, by force of the
charter-contract, removed from the sphere of State regulation, and
that the charter implies an undertaking, on the part of the
State, that in the same way in which their exercise is * per- [* 577]
missible at first, and under the regulations then existing,
and those only, may the corporators continue to exercise their
rights while the artificial existence continues. The obligation of
the contract by no means extends so far; but, on the contrary,
the rights and privileges which come into existence under it are
placed upon the same footing with other legal rights and privileges
of the citizen, and subject in like manner to proper rules for their
due regulation, protection, and enjoyment.
The limit to the exercise of the police power in these cases must
be this: the regulations must have reference to the comfort, safety,
or welfare of society; they must not be in conflict with any of the
provisions of the charter; and they must not, under pretence of
regulation, take from the corporation any of the essential rights
and privileges which the charter confers. In short, they must be
police regulations in fact, and not amendments of the charter in
curtailment of the corporate franchise.1 The maxim, Sic utere tuo
ut alienum non Icedas, is that which lies at* the foundation of the
1 Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 63; Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c,
R.R. Co., 4 Harr. 389; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Pingrey v. Washburn,
1 Aiken, 268; Miller v. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co., 21 Barb. 513; People v.
Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 307. In Benson v. Mayor, &c,
of New York, 10 Barb. 245, it is said, in considering a ferry right granted to a
city: "Franchises of this description are partly of a public and partly of a pri-
vate nature. So far as the accommodation of passengers is concerned, they are
publici juris; so far as they require capital and produce revenue, they are privati
juris. Certain duties and burdens are imposed upon the grantees, who are com-
pensated therefor by the privilege of levying ferriage and security from spoliation
arising from the irrevocable nature of the grant. The State may legislate touch-
ing them, so far as they are publici juris. Thus, laws may be passed to punish
neglect or misconduct in conducting the ferries, to secure the safety of passengers
from danger and imposition, &c But the State cannot take' away the ferries
themselves, nor deprive the city of their legitimate rents and profits." And
see People v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 32 Barb. 102, 116; Commonwealth
v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41; Hegemen o. Western R.R, 13
N. Y. 1.
[ 677 ]
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power; and to whatever enactment affecting the management and
business of private corporations it cannot fairly be applied, the
power itself will not extend. It has accordingly been held that
where a corporation was chartered with the right to take toll from
passengers over their road, a subsequent statute authorizing a
certain class of persons to go toll free was void.1 This was nota
regulation of existing rights, but it took from the corpora-
ls* 578] tion that * which they before possessed, namely, the right
to tolls, and conferred upon individuals that which before
they had not, namely, the privilege to pass over the road free of
toll. "Powers," it is said in another case, "which can only be
justified on this specific ground [that they are police regulations],
and which would otherwise be clearly prohibited by the constitu-
tion, can be such only as are so clearly necessary to the safety,
comfort, and well-being of society, or so imperatively required by
the public necessity, as to lead to the rational and satisfactory con-
clusion that the framers of the constitution could not, as men of
ordinary prudence and foresight, have intended to prohibit their
exercise in the particular case, notwithstanding the language of
the prohibition would otherwise include it." 2 And it was there-
fore held that an act subsequent to the charter of a plank-road
company, and not assented to by the corporators, which subjected
them to a total forfeiture of their franchises for that which by the
charter was cause for partial forfeiture only, was void as violating
the obligation of contracts.3 And even a provision in a corporate
charter, empowering the legislature to alter, modify, or repeal it,
would not authorize a subsequent act which, on pretence of amend-
ment, or of a police regulation, would have the effect to appropriate
a portion of the corporate property to the public use.4 And where
1 Pingrey ». Washburn, 1 Aiken, 268. Of course the charter reserved do
right to make such an amendment.
* Christiancy, J., in People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co., 9
Mich. 307. Compare Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41.
3 Ibid. And see State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189. Compare Camden, &c, R.R-
Co. v. Briggs, 2 N. J. 623; and the opinion of Bates, Chancellor, in the case of
Philadelphia, &c, R.R. Co. v. Bowers, just decided in the Delaware Court of
Appeals, in which an act regulating freights and fares, where no such power wis
reserved in the charter, was held void.
4 The reservation of a right to amend or repeal would not justify an act
requiring a railroad company to cause a proposed new street or highway to be
taken across their track, and to cause the necessary embankments, excavation!,
[ 678 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XVI.] THE POLICE POWER OP THE STATES. * 578
by its charter the corporation was empowered to construct over a
river a certain bridge, which must necessarily constitute an ob-
struction to the navigation of'the river, a subsequent amendment
making the corporation liable for such obstruction was held void,
as in effect depriving the corporation of the very right which the
charter assured to it.1 So where the charter reserved to the legis-
lature the right of modification after the corporators had been
reimbursed their expenses in constructing the bridge,
with twelve per cent interest thereon, * an amendment [*579]
before such reimbursement, requiring the construction of
a fifty-foot draw for the passage of vessels, in place of one of thirty-
two feet, was held unconstitutional and void.2 So a power to a
municipal corporation to regulate the speed of railway carriages
would not authorize such regulation except in the streets and pub-
lic grounds of the city; such being the fair construction of the
power, and the necessity for this police regulation not extending
further.3
On the other hand, the right to require existing railroad corpo-
rations to fence their track, and to make them liable for all beasts
killed by going upon it, has been sustained on two grounds: first,
as regarding the division fence between adjoining proprietors, and
in that view being but a reasonable provision for the protection of
domestic animals; and second, and chiefly, as essential to the pro-
tection of persons being transported in the railway carriages.4
and other work to be done for that purpose at their own expense; thus not only
appropriating a part of their property to another public use, but compelling them
to fit it for such use. Miller v. N. Y. and Erie R.R Co., 21 Barb. 513.
1 Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c, R.R. Co., 4 Harr. 389. Compare Common-
wealth v. Penn. Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41; 8. c. 5 Am. Rep. 329.
• Washington Bridge Co. r. State, 18 Conn. 53.
» State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170. In Buffalo and Niagara Falls R.R. Co.
c. Buffalo, 5 Hill, 209, it was held that a statutory power in a city to regulate the
running of cars within the corporate limits would justify an ordinance entirely
prohibiting the use of steam for propelling cars through any part of the city.
And see Great Western R.R. Co. v. Decatur, 33 111. 381; Branson v. Philadel-
phia. 47 Penn. St. 329; Whitson v. Franklin, 34 Ind. 396.
4 Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 156; New Albany and
Salem R.R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3; Same v. Maiden, ib. 10; Same r. McNam-
ara, 11 Ind. 543; Ohio and Mississippi R.R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 111. 145;
Madison and Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 230; Indianapolis and
Cincinnati R.R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; Same v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84;
Corwin v. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42; Horn v. Atlantic and St. Law-
[ 679 ]
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Having this double purpose in view, the owner of beasts killed or
injured may maintain an action for the damage suffered, notwith-
standing he may not himself be free from negligence.1 But it
would, perhaps, require an express legislative declaration that the
corporation should be liable for the beasts thus destroyed
[* 580] to * create so great an innovation in the common law. The
general rule, where a corporation has failed to obey the
police regulations established for its government, would not make
the corporation liable to the party injured, if his own negligence
contributed with that of the corporation in producing the injury.1
rence R.R. Co., 35 N. H. 169, and 36 to. 440; Fawcett v. York and NorthMid-
land R. Co., 15 Jur. 173; Smith v. Eastern R.R. Co., 35 N. H. 856; Bulkier t.
N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co., 27 Conn. 479; Jones v. Galena, &C..R.R. Co., 16
Iowa, 6 ; Winona, &c., R.R. Co. v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515 ; Bradley e. Buffalo,
&c, R.R. Co., 34 N. Y. 429; Sawyer v. Vermont. &c, R.R. Co., 105 Mia.
196; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Riblet, 66 Penn. St. 164; s. c. 5 Am. Rep.
360. As to the degree of care required of railroad companies in keeping up their
fences, compare Antisdel». Chicago, &c, R.R. Co., 26 Wis. 145; Lemmon c. Chi-
cago, &c, R.R. Co., 32 Iowa, 161; Chicago, &c, R.R. Co. c. Barrie, 55 111. 226,
and cases cited therein. A statute making railroad companies liable for injuries
by fire communicated by their locomotive engines was sustained as to companies
previously in existence, in Lyman v. Boston and Worcester R.R. Co., 4 Cush,
288. And see Camden and Amboy R.R. Co. v. Briggs, 2 Zab. 623; Trice r.
Hannibal, &c, R.R. Co., 49 Mo. 188.
1 Corwin c. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42; Indianapolis and Cincin-
nati R.R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; Jeffersonville, &c, R.R. Co. r. Nich-
ols, 30 Ind. 321; Same v. Parkhurst, 34 Ind. 501; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb.
358; Fawcett t>. York and North Midland R. Co., 15 Jur. 173; Waldron I.
Rensselaer and Schenectady R.R. Co., 8 Barb. 390; Home v. Atlantic and
St. Lawrence R.R. Co., 35 N. H. 169; O'Bannon v. Louisville, &c, R.R. Co.,
8 Bush, 348; Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Arnold, 47 LI. 178; Hinman p. Chicago,
&c, R.R. Co., 28 Iowa, 491.
a Jackson v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 150. And see Marsh
v. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co., 14 Barb. 864; Joliet and N. I. R.R. Co. t. Jones,
20 111. 221; Tonawanda R.R. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 255, and 4 N. Y. 255;
Price v. New Jersey R.R. Co., 31 N. J. 229; Drake r. Philadelphia, &c, R.R.
Co., 51 Penn. St. 240. In Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. t>. KercbeTa!,16
Ind. 84, it was held that a clause in the charter of a railroad corporation which
declared that when the corporators should have procured a right of way as therein
provided, they should be seised in fee-simple of the right to the land, and should
have the sole use and occupation of the same, and no person, body corporate or
politic, should in any way interfere therewith, molest, disturb, or injure any of
the rights and privileges thereby granted, &c, would not take from the State the
power to establish a police regulation making the corporation liable for cattle
killed by their cars.
[680]
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The State may also regulate the grade of railways, and prescribe
how, and upon what grade, railway tracks shall cross each other;
and it may apportion the expense of making the necessary cross-
ings between the corporations owning the roads.1 And it may
establish regulations requiring existing railways to ring the bell
or blow the whistle of their engines immediately before passing
highways at grade, or other places where their approach might be
dangerous to travel.2 And it has even been intimated that it
might be competent for the State to make railway corporations
liable as insurers for the safety of all persons carried by them, in
the same manner that they are by law liable as carriers of goods;
though this would seem to be pushing the police power to
an 'extreme.8 But those statutes which have recently [*581]
become common, and which give an action to the repre-
1 Fitchburg R.R. Co. v. Grand Junction R.R. Co., 1 Allen, 552, and 4 Allen,
198.
* "The legislature has the power, by general laws, from time to time, as the
public exigencies may require, to regulate corporations in their franchises, so as
to provide for the public safety. The provision in question is a mere police
regulation, enacted for the protection and safety of the public, and in no manner
interferes with or impairs the powers conferred on the defendants in their act of
incorporation." Galena and Chicago U. R.R. Co. r. Loomis, 13 111. 548. And
see Stuyvesantt). Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 Cow. 604; Benson v. Mayor, &c,
of New York, 10 Barb. 240; Bulkley t>. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co., 27 Conn.
486; Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me. 560; 8. c. 49 Me. 156; Galena and Chicago U.
R.R. Co. v. Dill, 22 111. 264; Same v. Appleby, 28 111. 283; Ohio and Missis-
sippi R.R. Co. o. McClelland, 25 111. 145; Clark's Adm'r v. Hannibal and
St. Jo. R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 202; Chicago, &c, R.R. Co. v. Triplett, 38 111.
482; Commonwealth o. Eastern R.R Co., 103 Mass. 254; s. C. 4 Am. Rep.
555.
s Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 152. Carriers of goods
are liable as insurers, notwithstanding they may have been guiltless of negligence,
because such is their contract with the shipper when they receive bis goods for
transportation; but carriers of persons assume no such obligations at the common
law; and where a company of individuals receive from the State a charter which
makes them carriers of persons, and chargeable as such for their own default or
negligence only, it may well be doubted if it be competent for the legislature
afterwards to impose upon their contracts new burdens, and make them respond
in damages where they have been guilty of no default. In other words, whether
that could be a proper police regulation which did not assume to regulate the
business of the carrier with a view to the just protection of the rights and inter-
ests of others, but which imposed a new obligation, for the benefit of others, upon
a party guilty of no neglect of duty. But perhaps such a regulation would not go
further than that in Stanley v. Stanley, 26 Me. 191, where it was held competent
[681]
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* 581 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. ITI.
sentatives of persons killed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default
of another, may unquestionably be made applicable to corporations
previously chartered, and may be sustained as only giving a rem-
edy for a wrong for which the common law had failed to make
provision.1 And it cannot be doubted that there is ample power
in the legislative department of the State to adopt all necessary
legislation for the purpose of enforcing the obligations of railway
companies as carriers of persons and goods to accommodate the
public impartially, and to mako every reasonable provision for
carrying with safety and expedition.2
Those statutes which regulate or altogether prohibit the sale of
intoxicating drinks as a beverage have also been, by some persons,
supposed to conflict with the Federal Constitution. Such of these,
however, as assume to regulate only, and to prohibit sales by other
persons than those who should be licensed by the public author-
ities, have not suggested any serious question of constitutional
power. They are but the ordinary police regulations, such as the
State may make in respect to all classes of trade or employment.3
But those which undertake altogether to prohibit the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage have been assailed
for the legislature to pass an act making the stockholders of existing banks liable
for all corporate debts thereafter created ; or in Peters v. Iron Mountain R.R. Co.,
23 Mo. 107, and Grannahan t>. Hannibal, &c, R.R. Co., 30 Mo. 54G, wherein
act was sustained which made companies previously chartered liable for the debts
of contractors to the workmen whom they had employed.
1 Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Geo. 356; Coosa River Steamboat Co.
v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120. In Boston, Concord, and Montreal R.R. v. State, 35
N. H. 215, a statute making railroad corporations liable to indictment and fine,
in case of the loss of life by the negligence or carelessness of the proprietors or
their servants, was adjudged constitutional, as applicable to corporations pre-
viously in existence.
1 On this subject in general, see Redf. on Railw. c. 32, c. 2; Louisville, &c,
R.R. Co. v. Burke, 6 Cold. 45; New Albany and Salem R.R. Co. v. Tilton, li
Ind. 3; Buckley o. N. Y. & N. H. R.R. Co., 27 Conn. 479 j Ohio & Mississippi
R.R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 111. 144; Bradley v. Buffalo, &c, R.R. Co., 34 N. Y.
429; Boston, C, & M. R.R. Co. v. State, 32 N. H. 215; Pennsylvania R.R.
Co. v. Riblet, 66 Penn. St. 164; 8. c. 5 Am. Rep. 360. And see other cases
cited, ante, p. 578-79, notes.
* Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326; Bancroft t>. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; Thomasson c.
State, 15 Ind. 449; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Metropolitan Board of Excise
v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 111. 59; Kettering v. Jack-
sonville, 50 111. 39; State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. 612.
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as violating express provisions of the national Constitu-
tion, and also as * subversive of fundamental rights, and [* 582]
therefore not within the grant of legislative power.
That legislation of this character was void, so far as it affected
imported liquors, or such as might be introduced from one State
into another, because in conflict with the power of Congress over
commerce, was strongly urged in the License Cases before the Su-
preme Court of the United States; but that view did not obtain
the assent of the court. The majority of the court expressed the
opinion — which, however, was obiter in those cases — that the in-
troduction of imported liquors into a State, and their sale in the
original packages as imported, could not be forbidden, because to
do so would be to forbid what Congress, in its regulation of com-
merce, and in the levy of imposts, had permitted;1 but it was
conceded by aU, that when the original package was broken up for
use or for retail by the importer, and also when the commodity
had passed from his hands into the hands of a purchaser, it ceased
to be an import, or a part of foreign commerce, and thereby
became subject to the laws of the State, and might be taxed for
State purposes, and the sale regulated by the State like any other
property.2 It was also decided, in these cases, that the power of
Congress to regulate commerce between the States did not ex-
clude regulations by the States, except so far as they might come
in conflict with those established by Congress; and that, conse-
quently, as Congress had not undertaken to regulate commerce in
liquors between the States, a law of New Hampshire could not be
held void which punished the sale, in that State, of gin purchased
in Boston and sold in New Hampshire, notwithstanding the sale
was in the cask in which it was imported, but by one not licensed
by the selectmen.3
It would seem, from the views expressed by the several mem-
bers of the court in these cases, that the State laws known as Pro-
1 Taney, Ch. J., 5 How. 574; McLean, J., ib. 589; Catron, J., ib. 608. And
see Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 ; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 335. Bradford
v. Stevens, 10 Gray, 379; State c. Robinson, 49 Me. 285.
* Daniel, J., held that the right to regulate was not excluded, even while the
packages remained in the hands of the importer unbroken (p. 612). See also the
views of Grier, J. (p. 631).
3 See also Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326; Jones o. People, 14 111. 196; State v.
Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 202; Commonwealth p. Clapp,
5 Gray, 97: Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 84 K. Y. 657.
[ 683 ]
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hibitory Liquor Laws, the purpose of which is to prevent
[* 583] altogether * the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
drinks as a beverage, so far as legislation can accomplish
that object, cannot be held void as in conflict with the power of
Congress to regulate commerce, and to levy imposts and duties.
And it has been held that they were not void, because tending to
prevent the fulfilment of contracts previously made, and thereby
violating the obligation of contracts.1
The same laws have also been sustained, when the question of con-
flict with State constitutions, or with general fundamental princi-
ples, lias been raised. They are looked upon as police regulations
established by the legislature for the prevention of intemperance,
pauperism, and crime, and for the abatement of nuisances.* It
has also been held competent to declare the liquor kept for sale a
nuisance, and to provide legal process for its condemnation and
destruction, and to seize and condemn the building occupied as a
dram shop on the same ground.3 And it is only where, in framing
such legislation, care has not been taken to observe those principles
of protection which surround the persons and dwellings of indi-
viduals, securing them against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and giving them a right to trial before condemnation, that the
courts have felt at liberty to declare that it exceeded the proper
1 People p. Hawley, 3 Mich. 830; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179.
* Commonwealth v. Kendall, 12 Cush. 414; Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray,
97; Commonwealth p. Howe, 13 Gray, 26; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 202; One
House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172; Ztunhoff v. State, to. 526; State v.
Donehey, 8 Iowa, 396; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Reynolds v. Geary. 26
Conn. 179; Oviatt v. Pond. 29 Conn. 479; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; Peo-
ple v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Jones v. People, 14 11l. 196 : State v. Prescott, 27
Vt. 194; Lincoln p. Smith, ib. 328; Gill v. Parker, 31 Vt. 610. Compare
Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501; Mcshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484; Wynehamer p.
People, 13 N. Y. 378. In Reynolds p. Geary, 26 Conn. 179, it was held that
the State law forbidding suit* for the price of liquors sold was to be applied to
contracts made out of the State, and lawful where made.
5 One House p. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172. See also Lincoln v. Smith, 27
Vt. 828; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; State p. Robinson, 33 Maine, 568;
License Cases, 5 How. 589. But see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378;
Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 332. A statute providing for the appointment
of guardians for drunkards is competent under the police power, and its oper-
ation would not be an unlawful deprivation of property. Devin v. Scott, 34 Ind.
67.
[684]
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CH. XVI.] THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATES. * 583
province of police regulation.1 Perhaps there is no instance in
which the power of the legislature to make such regulations as
may destroy the value of property, without compensation to the
owner, appears in a more striking light than in the case of these
statutes. The trade in alcoholic drinks being lawful, and
the * capital employed in it being fully protected by law, [*584]
the legislature then steps in, and, by an enactment based
on general reasons of public utility, annihilates the traffic, destroys'
altogether the employment, and reduces to a nominal value the
property on hand. Even the keeping of that, for the purposes of
sale, becomes a criminal offence; and, without any change what-
ever in his own conduct or employment, the merchant of yesterday
becomes the criminal of to-day, and the very building in which he
lives and conducts the business which to that moment was lawful
becomes the subject of legal proceedings, if the statute shall so
declare, and liable to be proceeded against for a forfeiture.2 A
statute which can do this must be justified upon the highest rea-
sons of public benefit; but, whether satisfactory or not, they address
themselves exclusively to the legislative wisdom.
Within the last two or three years, new questions have arisen in
regard to these laws, and other State regulations, arising out of
the imposition of burdens on various occupations by Congress, with
a view to raising revenue for the national government. These bur-
dens are imposed in the form of what are called license fees; and
it has been claimed that, when the party paid the fee, he was
thereby licensed to carry on the business, despite the regulations
which the State government might make upon the subject. This
view, however, has not been taken by the courts, who have re-
garded the congressional legislation imposing a license fee as only
a species of taxation, without the payment of which the business
could not lawfully be carried on, but which, nevertheless, did not
propose to make any business lawful which was not lawful before,
or to relieve it from any burdens or restrictions imposed by the
1 Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 125; Fisher r. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1. But see
Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484; Wynehamer v. People, 18 N. Y. 378.
* In a number of the States statutes have recently been passed to make the
owners of premises on which traffic in intoxicating liquors is carried on re-
sponsible for all damages occasioned by such traffic. It is believed to be entirely
competent for the legislature to pass such statutes; but whether they can apply in
cases where leases had previously been made, must be a serious question.
[ 685 ]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
* 584
[ch. xn.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
regulations of the State. The licenses give no authority, and are
mere receipts for taxes.1
Numerous other illustrations might be given of the power in
the States to make regulations affecting commerce, which are sus-
tainable as regulations of police. Among these, quarantine regu-
lations and health laws of every description will readily suggest
themselves, and these are or may be sometimes carried to the ex-
tent of ordering the destruction of private property when infected
with disease or otherwise dangerous.2 These regulations
[* 585] * liave generally passed unchallenged. The right to pass
inspection laws, and to levy duties so far as may be neces-
1 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; PHrvear p. Commonwealth, ib. 475;
Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 10 Allen, 200; Block v. Jacksonville, 36 1ll.
301. As to when license fees are taxes, see ante, 201 and note.
* See remarks of Grier, J., in License Cases, 5 How. 632; Meeker v. Van
Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397. A liquor law may annul a previous license, and not
be invalid on that ground. Metropolitan Board of Excise p. Barric, 34 N. Y.
667; ante, p. 283, note. Under the police power, the dealing in liquors even for
lawful purposes may be restricted to persons approved for moral charactep. In re
Ruth, 32 Iowa, 250.
It is usual, either by general law or by municipal charters, to confer very exten-
sive powers upon local boards of health, under which, when acting in good faith,
they may justify themselves in taking possession of, purifying, or even destroying,
the buildings or other property of the citizen, when the public health or comfort
demands such strong measures. See Harrison p. Baltimore, 1 Gill, 2fi4; Van
Wormer v. Albany, 15 Wend. 262; Coe v. Shultz, 47 Barb. 64.
They may forbid offensive trades being carried on in populous districts. Ex
parte Shradcn, 33 Cal. 279; Metropolitan Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661;
Live Stock, &c, Association v. Crescent City, &c, Co., 16 Wallace; Wyne-
hamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 402; Coe v. Shultz, 47 Barb. 64; Ashbrook p. Com-
monwealth, 1 Bush, 139; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 95; Potter's Dwarris on Stat.
458.
If they forbid the keeping of swine in certain parts of a city, their regulations
will be presumed reasonable and needful. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass.
221, citing with approval Pierce v. Bartrum, Cowp. 269. And though they can-
not be vested with authority to decide finally upon one's right to property when
they proceed to interfere with it as constituting a danger to health, yet they are
vested with quasi judicial power in deciding upon what constitutes a nuisance, and
all presumptions favor their action. See Van Wormer v. Albany, 15 Wend. 262;
Kennedy p. Phelps, 10 La. An. 227; Metropolitan Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y.
661. And they may unquestionably be vested with very large power to establish
pest-houses, and make very stringent regulations to prevent the spread of con-
tagious diseases. As to the power of the public authorities to establish a public
slaughter-house, or to require .all slaughtering of beasts to be done at one estab-
lishment, see Milwaukee v. Gross, 21 Wis. 241; Live Stock, &c, Association p.
[ 686 ]
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sary to render them effectual, is also undoubted, and is expressly
recognized by the Constitution.1 But certain powers which still
more directly affect commerce may sometimes be exercised where
the purpose is not to interfere with congressional legislation, but
merely to regulate the times and manner of transacting business
with a view to facilitate trade, secure order, and prevent con-
fusion.
An act of the State of New York declared that the harbor-
masters appointed under the State laws should have authority to
regulate and station all ships and vessels in the stream of the East
and North rivers, within the limits of the city of New York, and
the wharves thereof, and to remove from time to time such vessels
as were not employed in receiving and discharging their cargoes,
to make room for such others as required to be more immediately
accommodated, for the purpose of receiving and discharging theirs;
and that the harbor-masters or either of them should have author-
ity to determine how far and in what instances it was the duty of
the masters and others, having charge of ships or vessels, to
accommodate each other in their respective situations; and it
imposed a penalty for refusing or neglecting to obey the directions
of the harbor-masters or either of them. In a suit brought against
the master of a steam vessel, who had refused to move his vessel
a certain distance as directed by one of the harbor-masters, in order
to accommodate a new arrival, it was insisted on the defence that
the act was an unconstitutional invasion of the power of Congress
over commerce, but it was sustained as being merely a regulation
prescribing the manner of exercising individual rights over prop-
erty employed in commerce.2
Crescent City, &c, Co., 16 Wallace. Compare as to right to establish monopo-
lies, Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344.
A regulation forbidding the growing of rice within a city, on the ground of
injurious effect upon health, was held valid in Green v. Savannah, 6 Geo. 1.
1 Art. 1, § 10, clause 2.
* Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 351. Woodworth, J., in this case states very
clearly the principle on which police regulations, in such cases, are sustainable:
"It seems to me the power exercised in this case is essentially necessary for the
purpose of protecting the rights of all concerned. It is not, in the legitimate
sense of the term, a violation of any right, but the exercise of a power indispen-
sably necessary, where an extensive commerce is carried on. If the harbor is
crowded with vessels arriving daily from foreign parts, the power is incident to
such a state of things. Disorder and confusion would be the consequence, if
[ 687 ]
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[* 586] * The line of distinction between that which constitutes
an interference with commerce, and that which is a mere
police regulation, is sometimes exceedingly dim and shadowy, and
it is not to be wondered at that learned jurists differ when endeav-
oring to classify the cases which arise. It is not doubted that
Congress has the power to go beyond the general regulations of
commerce which it is accustomed to establish, and to descend to
the most minute directions, if it shall be deemed advisable; and
that to whatever extent ground shall be covered by those directions,
the exercise of State power is excluded. Congress may establish
police regulations, as well as the States; confining their operation
to the subjects over which it is given control by the Constitution.
But as the general police power can better be exercised under the
supervision of the local authority, and mischiefs are not likely to
spring therefrom so long as the power to arrest collision resides in
the national courts, the regulations which are made by Congress
do not often exclude the establishment of others by the State
covering very many particulars. Moreover, the regulations of
commerce are usually, and in some cases must be, general and
uniform for the whole country; while in some localities, State and
local policy will demand peculiar regulations with reference to
special and peculiar circumstances.
there was no control. . . . The right assumed under the law would not be upheld, if
exerted beyond what may be considered a necessary police regulation. The line
between what would be a clear invasion of right on the one hand, and regulations
not lessening the value of the right, and calculated for the benefit of all, must be
distinctly marked. . . . Police regulations are legal and binding, because for the
general benefit, and do not proceed to the length of impairing any right, in the
proper sense of that term. The sovereign power in a community, therefore, may
and ought to prescribe the manner of exercising individual rights over property.
It is for the better protection and enjoyment of that absolute dominion which the
individual claims. The power rests on the implied right and duty of the supreme
power to protect all by statutory regulations; so that, on the whole, the benefit of
all is promoted. Every public regulation in a city may, and does in some sense,
limit and restrict the absolute right that existed previously. But this is not
considered as an injury. So far from it, the individual, as well as others, is
supposed to be benefited. It may, then, be said that such a power is incident to
every well-regulated society, and without which it could not well exist." See
Cooley p. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 289; Owners of James Gray p. Owners
of The John Frazer, 21 How. 184; Benedict v. Vanderbilt, 1 Robertson, 194;
Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Port Wardens v. The Ward, 14 La. An.
289; Gilman e. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 726, 731; Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N. Y.
292.
[ 688]
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The State of Maryland passed an act requiring all importers of
foreign goods, by the bale or package, <fec, to take out a license,
for which they should pay fifty dollars, and, in case of neglect or
refusal to take out such license, subjected them to certain forfeit-
ures and penalties. License laws are of two kinds: those which
require the payment of a license fee by way of raising a revenue,
and are therefore the exercise of the power of taxation;
and those * which are mere police regulations, and which [* 587]
require the payment only of such license fee as will cover
the expense of the license and of enforcing the regulation.1 The
Maryland act seems to fall properly within the former of these
classes, and it was held void as in conflict with that provision of
the Constitution which prohibits a State from laying any impost,
&c, and also with the clause which declares that Congress shall
have the power to regulate commerce. The reasoning of the court
was this: Sale is the object of all importation of goods, and the
power to allow importation must therefore imply the power to au-
thorize the sale of the thing imported; that consequently a penalty
inflicted for selling an article in the character of importer was in
opposition to the act of Congress, which authorized importation;
that a power to tax an article in the hands of the importer the
instant it was landed was the same in effect as a power to tax
it whilst entering the port; that consequently the law of Maryland
was obnoxious to the charge of unconstitutionality, on the ground
of its violating the two provisions referred to.2 And a State law
which required the master of every vessel engaged in foreign
commerce to pay a certain sum to a State officer, on account of
every passenger brought from a foreign country into the State,
or before landing any alien passenger, was held void for similar
reasons.3
On the other hand, a law of the State of New York was sus-
tained which required, under a penalty, that the master of every
vessel arriving from a foreign port should report to the mayor or
1 Ash v. People,* 11 Mich. 347. See ante, p. 201. Also Dillon, Mun. Corp.
§§ 291-294 and notes.
• Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419.
* Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; see also Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534,
where a State law imposing a special tax on every Chinese person over eighteen
years of age for each month of his residence in the State was held unconstitu-
tional, as in conflict with the power of Congress over commerce.
44 [ 689 ]
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recorder of the city of New York an account of his passengers;
the object being to prevent New York from being burdened by an
influx of persons brought thither in ships from foreign countries
and the other States, and for that purpose to require a report of
the names, places of birth, &c, of all passengers, that the neces-
sary steps might be taken by the city authorities to prevent them
from becoming chargeable as paupers.1 And a State regulation of
pilots and pilotage was held unobjectionable, though it was con-
ceded that Congress had full power to make regulations
[* 588] on the same * subject, which, however, it had not exer-
cised.2 These several cases, and the elaborate discussions
with which the decisions in each were accompanied, together with
the leading case of Gibbons v. Ogden,3 may be almost said to ex-
haust the reasoning upon the subject, and to leave little to be done
by those who follow beyond the application of such rules for classi-
fication as they have indicated.
We have elsewhere referred to cases in which laws requiring all
persons to refrain from their ordinary callings on the first day of
the week have been held not to encroach upon the religious liberty
of those citizens who do not observe that day as sacred. Neither
are they unconstitutional as a restraint upon trade and commerce,
or because they have the effect to destroy the value of a lease of
property to be used on that day, or to make void a contract for
Sunday services.4
The highways within and through a State are constructed by the
State itself, which has full power to provide all proper regulations
of police to govern the action of persons using them, and to make
from time to time such alterations in these ways as the proper
authorities shall deem proper.5 A very common regulation is that
parties meeting shall turn to the right; the propriety of which
none will question. So the speed of travel may be regulated with
1 City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102. See also State v. The Constitution,
42 Cal. 581.
» Cooley n. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. See Baniai>y v. State, 21 Iai
450; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Cisco c. Roberts, 36 N. Y. 292.
3 9 Wheat. 1. And see Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713.
* Lindcnmuller «. People, 33 Barb. 576. And see Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal.
678; Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal. 130; ante, 477, and notes; post, 596.
5 As to the right to change the grade of a street from time to time without
liability to parties incidentally injured, see ante, 207.
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a view to safe use and general protection, and to prevent a public
nuisance.1 So beasts may be prohibited from running at large,
under the penalty of being seized and sold.2 And it has been held
competent under the same power to require the owners of urban
property to construct and keep in repair and free from obstructions
the sidewalks in front of it, and in case of their failure to do so to
authorize the public authorities to do it at the expense of the prop-
erty,3 the courts distinguishing this from taxation, on the
* ground of the peculiar interest which those upon whom [* 589]
the duty is imposed have in its performance, and their
peculiar power and ability to perform it with the promptness which
the good of the community requires.4 For the like reasons it has
been held competent, where a district of country was liable to be
inundated by the overflow of a large river, to require the owners
of lands lying upon the river to construct levees on the river front
at their own expense, and, on their failure to comply with this
regulation, to cause such levees to be constructed under the direc-
tion of the public authorities, and the expense assessed upon the
land of such owners.5 And the right of eminent domain is some-
times exercised in order to drain considerable tracts of country,
1 Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 473; Commonwealth v. Stodder,
2 Cush. 562; Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 433; People v. Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469;
People v. Roe, ib. 470; Washington v. Nashville, 1 Swan, 177; State v. Foley,
31 Iowa, 527.
• McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Monr. 433; Municipality v. Blanc, 1 La. An. 385;
Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ired. 268; Gooselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296;
Roberts v. Ogle, 30 111. 459; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen, 206.
1 Godard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Bonsall v. Mayor of Lebanon, 19 Ohio,
418; Paxson t>. Sweet, 1 Green (N. J.), 196; Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met. 180;
Washington v. Mayor, &c, of Nashville, 1 Swan, 177 ; Mayor, &c v. Medbury, 6
Humph. 368; Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 309, per Christiancy, J.; Matter
of Dorrance St., 4 R. I. 230; Deblois v. Barker, ib. 445; Hart v. Brooklyn, 36
Barb. 226. So in Pennsylvania it has been held competent to require the owners
of city lots, in front of which sewers are constructed, to pay the expense thereof
in proportion to the street front. Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn. St. 400;
Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Penn. St. 255. And see Boston v. Shaw, 1 Met. 130;
Hildreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345; Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn. 363; State v.
Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 441.
4 See especially the case of Godard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504, for a clear and
strong statement of the grounds on which such legislation can be supported. Also
Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 687.
4 Crowley o. Copley, 2 La. An. 329. Compare Sessions v. Crunklinton, 20
Ohio, N. s. 349.
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for the twofold reason, that the standing water threatens the pub-
lic health, and also precludes the cultivation and improvement of
the soil.1
Navigable waters are also a species of public highway, and as
such come under the control of the States. The term "navi-
gable," at the common law, was only applied to those waters where
the tide ebbed and flowed, but all streams which were of sufficient
capacity for useful navigation, though not called navigable, were
public, and subject to the same general rights which the public
exercised in highways by land.2 In this country there has been a
very general disposition to consider all streams public which are
useful as channels for commerce, wherever they are found of suf-
ficient capacity to float the products of the mines, the forests, or
the tillage of the country through which they flow, to market.3
And if a stream is of sufficient capacity for the floating of rafts
and logs in the condition in which it generally appears by nature,
it will be regarded as public, notwithstanding there may
[*590] be times when it becomes too dry and *shallow for the
purpose. "The capacity of a stream, which generally
appears by the nature, amount, importance, and necessity of the
business done upon it, must be the criterion. A brook, although
it might carry down saw-logs for a few days, during a freshet, is
not therefore a public highway. But a stream upon which and its
tributaries saw-logs to an unlimited amount can be floated every
spring, and for the period of from four to eight weeks, and for the
distance of one hundred and fifty miles, and upon which unques-
tionably many thousands will be annually transported for many
years to come, if it be legal so to do, has the character of a public
1 See7 Reeves v. Treasurer, &p., 8 Ohio, n. s. 333; ante, 510, 511, 533, and
notes.
* Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 26; Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 283.
• Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9; Knox v. Chaloner, 42 Me. 150; Lancey
v. Clifford, 54 Me. 489; Gerrish v. Brown, 51 Me. 256; Scott v. Willson, 3
N. H. 321; Shaw p. Crawford, 10 Johns. 236; Munson p. Hungerford, 6 Barb.
265; Browne v. Scofield, 8 Barb. 239; Morgan p. King, 18 Barb. 284, 30 Barb.
9, and 35 N. Y. 454; Cates p. Wadlington, 1 McCord, 580; Commonwealth p.
Chapin, 5 Pick. 199 ; Moore v. Sanbourne, 2 Mich. 519; Lorman p. Benson, 8
Mich. 18; Depew v. Board of Commissioners, &e., 5 Ind. 8; Board of Commis-
sioners v. Pidge, tp. 13; Stuart v. Clark, 2 Swan, 9; Elder v. Barrus, 6 Humph.
364; Dalrymple p. Mead, 1 Grant's Cases, 197; Commissioners of Homochitto
River v. Withers, 29 Miss. 21; Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 578; McManus p. Car-
michael, 3 Iowa, 1; Weise v. Smith, 3 Oregon, 445; s.c. 8 Am. Rep. 621.
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stream for that purpose. So far the purpose is useful for trade
aud commerce, and to the interests of the community. The float-
ing of logs is not mentioned by Lord Hale [in De Jure Maris],
aud probably no river in Great Britain was, in his day, or ever
will be, put to that use. But here it is common, necessary, and
profitable, especially while the country is new; and if it be con-
sidered a lawful mode of using the river, it is easy to adapt well-
settled principles of law to the case. And they are not the less
applicable because this particular business may not always con-
tinue; though if it can of necessity last but a short time, and the
river can be used for no other purpose, that circumstance would
have weight in the consideration of the question." 1 But if the
stream was not thus useful in its natural condition, but has been
rendered susceptible of use by the labors of the owner of the soil,
the right of passage will be in the nature of a private way, and the
public do not acquire a right to the benefit of the owner's labor,
unless he sees fit to dedicate it to their use.2
All navigable waters are for the use of all the citizens; and
there cannot lawfully be any exclusive private appropriation of any
portion of them.3 The question what is a navigable stream would
seem to be a mixed question of law and fact;4 and though it is
said that the legislature of the State may determine
whether a * stream shall be considered a public highway [* 591]
or not,6 yet if in fact it is not one, the legislature cannot
make it so by simple declaration, since, if it is private property,
1 Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 288; Moore v. Sanbourne, 2 Mich. 519; Brown
e. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9; Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552; Weise c. Smith, 3 Or.
445; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 621; contra, Hubbard v. Bell, 54 HI. 110.
s Wadsworth's Adm'r v. Smith, 11 Me. 278; Ward v. Warner, 8 Mich. 521.
3 Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 1 Pick. 180; Kean v. Stetson, 6 Pick. 492;
Arnold r. Mundy, 1 Ilalst. 1; Bird v. Smith, 8 Watts, 434. They are equally
for the use of the public in the winter when covered with ice; and one who cuts
a hole in the ice in an accustomed way, by means of which one passing upon
the ice is injured, is liable to an action for the injury. French v. Camp, 6
Shep. 433. An obstruction to a navigable stream is a nuisance which any
one having occasion to use it may abate. Inhabitants of Arundel v. McCulloch,
10 Mass. 70; State v. Moffett, 1 Greene Clowa), 247; Selman v. Wolfe, 27
Texas, 68.
4 See Treat p. Lord, 42 Me. 552; Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445; s. c. 8 Am.
Rep. 621.
4 Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. 211; American River Water Co. v. Amsden,
6 (Jal. 443 ; Baker v. Lewis, 33 Penn. St. 301.
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the legislature cannot appropriate it to a public use without pro-
viding for compensation.1
The general right to control and regulate the public use of nav-
igable waters is unquestionably in the State; but there are certain
restrictions upon this right growing out of the power of Congress
over commerce. Congress is empowered to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States; and wherever
a river forms a highway upon which commerce is conducted with
foreign nations or between States, it must fall under the control
of Congress, under this power over commerce. The circumstance,
however, that a stream is navigable, and capable of being used for
foreign or inter-State commerce, does not exclude regulation by
the State, if in fact Congress has not exercised its power in regard
to it;2 or having exercised it, the State law does not come in con-
flict with the congressional regulations, or interfere with the rights
which are permitted by them.
The decisions of the Federal judiciary in regard to navigable
waters seem to have settled the following points: —
1. That no State can grant an exclusive monopoly for the navi-
gation of any portion of the waters within its limits upon which
commerce is carried on under coasting licenses granted under the
authority of Congress,3 since such a grant would come directly in
conflict with the power which Congress has exercised. But a State
law granting to an individual an exclusive right to navigate the
upper waters of a river, lying wholly within the limits of the State,
separated from tide water by falls impassable for purposes
[* 592] of * navigation, and not forming a part of any continuous
track of commerce between two or more States, or with a
1 Morgan p. King, 18 Barb. 284; s. c. 35 N. Y. 454.
* Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245. In this ease it was
held that a State law permitting a creek navigable from the sea to be dammed so
as to exclude vessels altogether was not opposed to the Constitution of the United
States, there being no legislation by Congress with which it would come in con-
flict. And see Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 518; and 18 How. 421.
1 Gibbons p. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. The case was the well-known historical
one, involving the validity of the grant by the State of New York to Robert
Fulton and his associates of the exclusive right to navigate the waters of that
State with vessels propelled by steam. This subject is further considered in Gil-
man v. Philadelphia, 8 Wall. 713; and in The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, in
which the meaning of the term " navigable waters of the United States " is defined.
And see Craig p. Kline, 65 Penn. St. 399; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 636.
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foreign country, does not come within the reason of this decision,
and cannot be declared void as opposed to the Constitution of the
United States.1
2. The States have the same power to improve navigable waters
which they possess over other highways ;2 and where money has
been expended in making such improvement, it is competent for
the State to impose tolls on the commerce which passes through
and has the benefit of the improvement, even where the stream is
one over which the regulations of commerce extend.3
3. The States may authorize the construction of bridges over
navigable waters, for railroads as well as for every other species of
highway, notwithstanding they may to some extent interfere with
the right of navigation.4 If the stream is not one which is subject
to the control of Congress, the State law permitting the erection
cannot be questioned on any ground of public inconvenience. The
legislature must always have power to determine what public ways
are needed, and to what extent the accommodation of travel over
one way must yield to the greater necessity for another. But if the
stream is one over which the regulations of Congress extend, the
question is somewhat complicated, and it becomes necessary to
consider whether such bridge will interfere with the regulations or
not. But the bridge is not necessarily unlawful, because it may
constitute, to some degree, an obstruction to commerce, if it is
properly built, and upon a proper plan, and if the general traffic
of the country will be aided rather than impeded by its construc-
tion. There are many cases where a- bridge over a river may be
vastly more important than the navigation; and there are other
1 Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568. The exclusive right granted in this case was
to the navigation of the Penobscot River above Old Town, which was to continue
for twenty years, in consideration of improvements in the navigation to be made
by the grantees. Below Old Town there were a fall and several dams on the
river, rendering navigation from the sea impossible. And see McReynoIds v.
Smallhouse, 8 Bush, 447.
* The improvement of a stream by State authority will give no right of action
to an individual incidentally injured by the improvement. Zimmerman t. Union
CW Co., 1 W. & S. 346.
* Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co., 3 McLean, 226; Kellogg v. Union Co., 12 Conn. 7;
Thames Bank v. Lovell, 18 Conn. 600; McReynoIds r. Smallhouse, 8 Bush,
447.
4 See Commonwealth o. Breed, 4 Pick. 460; Depew t>. Trustees of W. and E.
Canal, 5 Ind. 8; Dover t;. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H. 200; Illinois, &c, Co.
r. Peoria, &c, Association, 38 111. 467.
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cases where, although the traffic upon the river is impor-
[* 593] tant, yet an * inconvenience caused by a bridge with draws
would be much less seriously felt by the public, and be a
much lighter burden upon trade and travel than a break in a line
of railroad communication necessitating the employment of a ferry.
In general terms it may be said that the State may authorize such
constructions, provided they do not constitute material obstructions
to navigation; but whether they are to be regarded as material
obstructions or not is to be determined in each case upon its owu
circumstances. The character of the structure, the facility afforded
for vessels to pass it, the relative amount of traffic likely to be
done upon the stream and over the bridge, and whether the traffic
by rail would be likely to be more incommoded by the want of the
bridge than the traffic by water with it, are all circumstances to be
taken into account in determining this question. It is quite evi-
dent that the same structure might constitute a material obstruc-
tion on the Ohio or the Mississippi, where vessels are constantly
passing, which would be unobjectionable on a stream which a boat
only enters at intervals of weeks or months. The decision of the
State legislature that the erection is not an obstruction is not con-
clusive; but the final determination will rest with the Federal
courts, who have jurisdiction to cause the structure to be abated,
if it be found to obstruct unnecessarily the traffic upon the watep.
Parties constructing the bridge must be prepared to show, not
only the State authority, and that the plan and construction are
proper, but also that it accommodates more than it impedes the
general commerce.1
4. The States may lawfully establish ferries over navigable
waters, and grant licenses for keeping the same, and forbid un-
licensed persons from running boats or ferries without such
license. This also is only the establishment of a public way,
and it can make no difference whether or not the water is entirely
within the State, or, on the other hand, is a highway for inter-
State or foreign commerce.2
•
1 See this subject fully considered in the Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 518.
See also Columbus Insurance Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 72; Same p.
Curtenius, ib. 209; Jolly v. Terre Haute Draw-Bridge Co., t'6. 237; U. S. v.
New Bedford Bridge, 1 W. & M. 401; Commissioners of St. Joseph Co.
v. Pidge, 5 Ind. 13.
* Conway v. Taylor's Ex'r, 1 Black, 603; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43.
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5. The State may also authorize the construction of
dams across * navigable waters; and where no question [* 594]
of Federal authority is involved, the legislative permission
to ere'ct a dam will exempt the structure from being considered a
nuisance,1 and it would seem also that it must exempt the party
constructing it from liability to any private action for injury to
navigation, so long as he keeps withiu the authority granted, and
is guilty of no negligence.2
6. To the foregoing it may be added that the State has the same
power of regulating the speed and general conduct of ships or
other vessels navigating its water highways, that it has to regulate
the speed and conduct of persons and vehicles upon the ordinary
highway; subject always to the restriction that its regulations
must not come in conflict with any regulations established by Con-
gress for the foreign commerce or that between the States.3
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in
which police power is or may be exercised, because the various cases
in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict
with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the pub-
lic order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And
there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public
authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their
property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have
In both these cases the State license law was sustained as against a vessel enrolled
and licensed under the laws of Congress. And see Fanning v. Gregorie, 16 How.
534. Ferry rights may be so regulated as to rates of ferriage, and ferry fran-
chises and privileges so controlled in the hands of grantees and lessees, that
they shall not be abused to the serious detriment or inconvenience of the public.
Where this power is given to a municipality, it may be recalled at any time.
People t). Mayor, &c, of New York, 82 Barb. 102.
1 Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Brown v. Common-
wealth, 3 S. & R. 273; Bacon v. Arthur, 4 Watts, 437; Hogg v. Zanesville Co.,
5 Ohio, 410; Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257. And see Flanagan v. Phil-
adelphia, 42 Penn. St. 219; Depew v. Trustees of W. and E. Canal, 5 Ind. 8;
Woodburn r. Kilbourne Manuf. Co., 1 Bissell, 546; Hinchman v. Patterson, &c,
R.R. Co., 2 Green (N. J.), 75.
• See Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c, R.R. Co., 4 Harr. 889; Roush v. Walter,
10 Watts, 86; Parker c. Cutler Mill Dam Co., 7 Sbep. 358; Zimmerman v.
Union Canal Co., 1 W. & S. 846; Depew v. Trustees of W. and E. Canal, 5
Ind. 8.
3 People c. Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469; People v. Roe, 1 Hill, 470. As to the right
to regulate fisheries in navigable waters, see Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409; Phippa
v. State, 22 Md. 380; People v. Reed, 47 Barb. 235.
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fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but
where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the
interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description
is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private
property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the
ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any
other great public xialamity.1 Here the individual is in no
[* 595] degree in * fault, but his interest must yield to that
"necessity " which " knows no law." The establishment
of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages, within
which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not
be erected or repaired, may also, in some cases, be equivalent to
a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose
have been sustained notwithstanding this result.2 Wharf lines
may also be established for the general good, even though they
prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on that which
constitutes private property.3 And, whenever the legislature deem
it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of
stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regula-
tions to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to
the owners of the soil equally with other persons. Such regula-
tions are only " a just restraint of an injurious use of property,
which the legislature have authority " to impose.4
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden,
where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault of the
1 Saltpetre Case, 12 Coke, 13; Mayor, &e., of New York v. Lord, 18 Wend.
129; Russell v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 2 Denio, 461; Sorocco p. Geary, 3
Cal. 69; Hale v. Lawrence, 1 Zab. 714; American Print Works v. Lawrence, ib.
248; Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397; McDonald v. Redwing, 13 Minn.
38; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 756-759. And see Jones v. Richmond, 18 Grat. 517,
for a case where the municipal authorities purchased and took possession of the
liquors of a city about to be occupied by a capturing military force, and destroyed
it to prevent the disorders that might be anticipated from free access to intox-
icating drinks under the circumstances. And as to appropriation by military
authorities, see Harmony v. Mitchell, 1 Blatch. 549; s. c. in error, 13 How.
115.
* Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates, 493; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 3 Fairf. 403;
Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 11 Mich. 425: Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow.
352, per Woodworih, J.
* Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53. See Hart p. Mayor, &c, of Albany,
9 Wend. 571.
4 Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55.
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CH. XVI.] THE POLICE POWER OP THE STATES. * 595
owner, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable
has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health
or the public safety. Mill-dams are sometimes destroyed upon this
ground ;1 and churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban
population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger of
becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery
purposes.2 The keeping of gunpowder in unsafe quantities in
cities or villages;3 the sale of poisonous drugs, unless labelled;
allowing unmuzzled dogs to be at large when danger of hydropho-
bia is apprehended ;4 or the keeping for sale unwholesome
* provisions, or other deleterious substances, — are all sub- [* 596]
ject to be forbidden under this powep. And, generally, it
may be said that each State has complete authority to provide
for the abatement of nuisances, whether they exist by the fault of
individuals or not,6 and even though in their origin they may have
been permitted or licensed by law.6
The preservation of the public morals is peculiarly subject to
legislative supervision, which may forbid the keeping, exhibition,
or sale of indecent books or pictures, and cause their destruction
if seized; or prohibit or regulate the places of amusement that
1 Miller v. Craig, 3 Stockt. 175. And offensive manufactures maybe stopped.
Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64. See League p. Journeay, 26 Texas, 172; ante,
584, and cases cited in note.
* Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5 Cow. 538;
Coates v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 7 Cow. 604; Kincuid's Appeal, 66 Penn.
St. 411; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 377. And see ante, 584, note.
* Foote v. Fire Department, 5 Hill, 99; Williams v. Augusta, 4 Geo. 509.
And see License Cases, 5 How. 589, per McLean, J.; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray,
27, per Shaw, Ch. J.
4 Morey p. Brown, 42 N. H. 373. Dogs, which are animals in which the
owner has no absolute property, are subject to such regulations as the legislature
may prescribe, and it is not unconstitutional to authorize their destruction, with-
out previous adjudication, when found at large without being licensed and collared
according to the statutory regulation. Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136. And
see Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 298; Morey v. Brown, supra. As a measure of
internal police, the State has the power to encourage the keeping of sheep, and
to discourage the keeping of dogs, by imposing a penalty upon the owner of a
dog for keeping the same. Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind. 62.
* See Miller p. Craig, 3 Stockt. 175; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242.
But under this power it would not be competent for a city to tax a lot owner for
the expense of abating a nuisance on bis lot which the city itself had created.
Weeks v. Milwaukee, t'6. See Barring v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 95.
6 See cases of repealing licenses, ante, p. 283 and note.
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may be resorted to for the purpose of gaming;1 or forbid altogether
the keeping of implements made use of for unlawful games; or
prevent the keeping and exhibition of stallions in public places.2
And the power to provide for the compulsory observance of the
first day of the week is also to be referred to the same authority.3
So the markets are regulated, and particular articles allowed to
be sold in particular places only, or after license;4 weights and
measures are established, and dealers compelled to conform to the
fixed standards under penalty,6 and persons following particular
occupations of a nature requiring special public supervision, such
as auctioneers, draymen, hackmen, hucksters, victuallers, and the
like, are required to take out licenses, and to conform to such rules
and regulations as are deemed important for the public convenience
and protection.6 These instances are more than sufficient to illus-
trate the pervading nature of this power, and we need uot weary
1 Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Commonwealth p. Colton,
8 Gray, 488; State p. Hay, 29 Me. 457; State p. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426.
* Nolin v. Mayor of Franklin, 4 Yerg. 163. A city may forbid the keeping
of swine within its densely settled portions. Commonwealth p. Patch, 97
Mass. 221.
3 Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Penn. St. 312; City Council p. Benjamin, 2
Strobh. L. 508; State p. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; St. Louis v. Cafferata. 24 Mo. 94;
Adams p. Hamel, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 73; Vogelsong p. State, 9 Ind. 112; Sbover
p. State, 5 Eng. 259; Bloom p. Richards, 2 Ohio, n. s. 387; Lindenmuller p.
People, 33 Barb. 548; Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678; Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal.
130; Hudson v. Geary, 4 R. I. 485; Frolickstein p. Mobile, 40 Ala. 725.
* Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick. 168; Buffalo p. Webster, 10 Wend. 99; Bush
p. Seabury, 8 Johns. 418; Ash p. People, 11 Mich. 347; State p. Leiber, 1l
Iowa, 407; Le Claire p. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 210; White p. Kent, 11 Ohio, ir. s.
550. The power is continuing, and markets once established may be changed st
the option of the authorities, and they cannot even by contract deprive themselves
of this powep. Gale p. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Gall p. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio,
N. s. 563; Cougot p. New Orleans, 16 La. An. 21.
* Guillotte p. New Orleans. 12 La. An. 432; Page p. Fazackerly, 36 Barb.
892; Raleigh p. Sorrell, 1 Jones, L. 49; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 323, 324, and
cases cited.
« Commonwealth p. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 291-296.
As to license fees, and when they are taxes, see ante, 201, 495; Mayor, &c, of
Mobile p. Yuille, 3 Ala. 139. The sale of pure milk and pure water mixed may
be made a penal offence. Commonwealth p. Waite, 11 Allen, 264. As to market
regulations in general, see Wartman p. Philadelphia, 33 Penn. St. 202; Spauld-
ing p. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71; Gall p. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio, n. s. 563; Municipality
p. Cutting, 4 La. An. 335; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 313-318.
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the reader with further enumeration. Many of them have been
previously referred to under the head of municipal by-laws.
Whether the prohibited act or omission shall be made a criminal
offence, punishable under the general laws, or subject to punish-
ment under municipal by-laws, or, on the other hand, the party be
deprived of all remedy for any right which, but for the
* regulation, he might have had against other persons, are [* 597]
questions which the .legislature must decide. It is suffi-
cient for us to have pointed out that, in addition to the power to
punish misdemeanors and felonies, the State has also the authority
to make extensive and varied regulations as to the time, mode, and
circumstances in and under which parties shall assert, enjoy, or
exercise their rights, without coming in conflict with any of those
constitutional principles which are established for the protection of
private rights or private property.
[ 701 ]
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[*598] 'CHAPTER XVII.
THE EXPRESSION OP THE POPULAR WILL.
Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the
exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they have
not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They retain
in their own hands a power to control the governments they create
so far as they have thought it needful to do so, and the three de-
partments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed,
changed, or abolished by them. But this control and direction
must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon.
The voice of the people, in their sovereign capacity, can only be of
legal force when expressed at the times and under the conditions
which they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the
constitution, or which, consistently with the constitution, have
been prescribed and pointed out for them by the legislature; and
if by any portion of the people, however large, an attempt should
be made to interfere with the regular working of the agencies of
government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed
by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it would be
revolutionary in character, and must be .resisted and repressed bj
the officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate govern-
ment.1
1 "The maxim which lies at the foundation of our government is that ill
political power originates with the people. But since the organization of gov-
ernment it cannot be claimed that either the legislative, executive, or judicial
powers, either wholly or in part, can be exercised by them. By the institution
of government, the people surrender the exercise of all these sovereign func-
tions of government to agents chosen by themselves, who at least theoretically
represent the supreme will of their constituents. Thus all power possessed
by the people themselves is given and centred in their chosen representatives."
Davis, Ch. J., in Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 291.
Under some of the constitutions certain votes can only be carried by a major-
ity of the electors voting favorably. This must be understood to mean, a majority
of those voting at the election on any question. Taylor p. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107.
Compare Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544; State v. Mayor, &c, 87 Mo. 270;
State o. Binder, 38 Mo. 450; Bayard p. Klinge, 16 Minn. 249.
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CH. XVII.] THE EXPRESSION OP THE POPULAR WILL. * 598
The authority of the people is exercised through elections, by
means of which they choose legislative, executive, and judicial
officers, to whom are to be intrusted the exercise of powers of gov-
ernment. In some cases also they pass upon other questions spe-
cially submitted to them, and adopt or reject a measure according
as a majority vote for or against it. It is obviously impossible
that any considerable people should in general meeting consider,
mature, and adopt their own laws; but when a law has been per-
fected, and it is deemed desirable to take the expression of public
sentiment upon it, or upon any other single question, the ordinary
machinery of elections is adequate to the end, and the expression
is easily and without confusion obtained by submitting such law or
such question for an affirmative or negative vote. In this manner
constitutions and amendments thereof are adopted or rejected, and
matters of local importance in many cases, like the location of a
county seat, the contracting of a local debt, the erection of a public
building, the acceptance of a municipal charter, and the like, are
passed upon and determined by the people whom they
concern, * under constitutional or statutory provisions [* 599]
which require or permit it.
The Right to participate in Elections.
In another place we have said that, though the sovereignty is in
the people, as a practical fact it resides in those persons who by
the constitution of the State are permitted to exercise the elective
franchise.1 Each State establishes its own regulations on this
subject; subject only to the fifteenth amendment to the national
Constitution, which forbids that the right of citizens to vote shall
be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. Participation in the elective franchise is
a privilege rather than a right, and it is granted or denied on
grounds of general policy; the prevailing view being that it should
be as general as possible consistent with the public safety. Aliens
are generally excluded, though in some States they are allowed to
vote after residence for a specified period, provided they have
declared their intention to become citizens in the manner pre-
scribed by law. The fifteenth amendment, it will be seen, does
not forbid denying the franchise to citizens except upon certain
1 Ante, p. 29.
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specified grounds, and it is matter of public history that its pur-
pose was to prevent discriminations in this regard as against the
newly enfranchised slaves. Minors, who equally with adult per-
sons are citizens, are still excluded, as are also women, and some-
times persons who have been convicted of infamous crimes.1 In
some States laws will be found in existence which, either generally
or in particular cases, deny the right to vote to those persons who
lack a specified property qualification, or who do not pay taxes. In
some States idiots and lunatics are also expressly excluded; and
it has been supposed that these unfortunate classes, by the common
political law of England and of this country, were excluded with
women, minors, and aliens from exercising the right of suffrage,
even though not prohibited therefrom by any express constitutional
or statutory provision.2 Wherever the constitution has prescribed
the qualifications of electors, they cannot be changed or added to
by the legislature,3 or otherwise than by an amendment of the
constitution.
One of the most common requirements is, that the party offer-
ing to vote shall reside within the district which is to be affected
by the exercise of the right. If a State officer is to be chosen,
the voter should be a resident of the State; and if a county, city,
or township officer, he should reside within such county, city, or
1 Story on Const. 4th. ed. § 1972.
* See Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, § 24. Also § 27, and notes referring
to legislative cases. Drunkenness is regarded as temporary insanity. Ibid.
Idiots and lunatics are expressly excluded by the Constitutions of Delaware,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,
Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Texas, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Paupers are excluded ia
New York, California, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Delaware, Texas, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.
Persons under guardianship are excluded in Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Florida, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Persons under
interdiction are excluded in Louisiana; and persons excused from paying taxes at
their own request, in New Hampshire. Capacity to read is required in Connecti-
cut, and capacity to read and write in Massachusetts.
'See Green v. Shumway, 89 N. Y. 418; Brown v. Grover, 6 Bush, 1; Quinn
v. State, 35 Ind. 485; Huber v. Reiley, 58 Penn. St. 112; ante, 64, note 8.
Compare State p. Neal, 42 Mo. 119. Where a disqualification to vote is made
to depend upon the commission of crime, the election officers cannot be made
the triers of the offence. Huber p. Reiley, supra; State v. Symonds, 59 Me.
151.
[ 704 ]
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township. This is the general rule; and for the more convenient
determination of the right to vote, and to prevent fraud, it is now
generally required that the elector shall only exercise
within the municipality where he has * his residence his [* 600J
right to participate in either local or general elections.
Requiring him to vote among his neighbors, by whom he will be
likely to be generally known, the opportunities for illegal or fraud-
ulent voting will be less than if the voting were allowed to take
place at a distance and among strangers. And wherever this is
the requirement of the constitution, any statute permitting voters
to deposit their ballots elsewhere must necessarily be void.1
A person's residence is the place of his domicile, or the place
where his habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removing therefrom.2 The words "inhabitant," "citizen," and
"resident," as employed in different constitutions to define the
qualifications of electors, mean substantially the same thing; and
one is an inhabitant, resident, or citizen at the place where he
has his domicile or home.3 Every person at all times must be
considered as having a domicile somewhere, and that which he
has acquired at one place is considered as continuing until
another is acquired at a different place. It has been held that
a student in an institution of learning, who has residence there
for purposes of instruction, may vote at such place, provided he
1 Opinions of Judges, 30 Conn. 591; Hulseman v. Rems, 41 Penn. St 396;
Chase v. Miller, ib. 403; Opinions of Judges, 44 N. H. 633; Bourland v. Hil-
dreth, 26 Cal. 161; People c. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127; Opinions of Judges,
37 Vt. 665; Day v. Jones, 31 Cal. 201. The case of Morrison v. Springer, 15
Iowa, 301, is not in harmony with those above cited. So far as the election of
representatives in Congress and electors of president and vice-president is con-
cerned, the State constitutions cannot preclude the legislature from prescribing
the " times, places, and manner of holding" the same, as allowed by the national
Constitution, — art. 1, § 4, and art. 2, § 1, — and a statute permitting such
election to be held out of the State would consequently not be invalid. Opinions
of Justices, 45 N. H. 595; Opinions of Judges, 37 Vt. 665. There are now con-
stitutional provisions in New York, Michigan, Missouri, Connecticut, Maryland,
Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania, which permit
soldiers in actual service to cast their votes where they may happen to be sta-
tioned at the time of voting. It may also be allowed in Ohio. Lehman v.
McBride, 15 Ohio, n. s. 573.
* Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Rue High's Case, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 523;
Story, Confl. Laws, § 43.
1 Cusbing's Law and Practice .of Legislative Assemblies, § 36.
45 [705 ]
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is emancipated from his father's family, and for the time has no
home elsewhere.1
1 Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350;
VVilbraham v. Ludlow, 99 Mass. 587. "The questions of residence, inhabitancy,
or domicile — for although not in all respects precisely the same, they are nearly
so, and depend much upon the same evidence — are attended with more difficulty
than almost any other which are presented for adjudication. No exact definition
can be given of domicile; it depends upon no one fact or combination of circum-
stances; but, from the whole taken together, it must be determined in each par-
ticular case. • It is a maxim that every man must have a domicile somewhere, and
also that he can have but one. Of course it follows that his existing domicile
continues until he acquires another; and pt'ce verm, by acquiring a new domicile he
relinquishes his former one. From this view it is manifest that very slight circum-
stances must often decide the question. It depends upon the preponderance
of the evidence in favor of two or more places; and it may often occur that the
evidence of facts tending to establish the domicile in one place would be entirely
conclusive, were it not for the existence of facts and circumstances of a still more
conclusive and decisive character, which fix it beyond question in anothep. So,
on the contrary, very slight circumstances may fix one's domicile, if not con-
trolled by more conclusive facts fixing it in another place. If a seaman, without
family or property, sails from the place of his nativity, which may be con-
sidered his domicile of origin, although he may return only at long intervals,
or even be absent many years, yet if he does not by some actual residence or
other means acquire a domicile elsewhere, he retains his domicile of origin."
Shaw, Ch. J., Thorndike p. City of Boston, 1 Met. 245. And see Alston
p. Newcomer, 42 Miss. 186. In Inhabitants of Abington p. Inhabitants of
North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170, it appeared that a town line ran through the
house occupied by a party, leaving a portion on one side sufficient to form a
habitation, and a portion on the other not sufficient for that purpose. Held,
that the domicile must be deemed to be on the side first mentioned. It was
intimated also that where a house was thus divided, and the party slept habitually
on one side, that circumstance should be regarded as a preponderating one to fix
his residence there, in the absence of other proof. And see Rex p. St. Olave's,
1 Strange, 51.
By the constitutions of several of the States, it is provided, in substance, that
no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his
presence or absence, while employed in the service of the United States; nor
while a student in any seminary of learning; nor while kept at any almshouse
or asylum at public expense, nor while confined in any public prison. See Const,
of New York, 11linois, Indiana, California, Michigan, Rhode Island, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, and Wisconsin. In several of the other States there
are provisions covering some of these cases, but not all. A provision that no
person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his pres-
ence or absence in the service of the United States, does not preclude one from
acquiring a residence in the place where, and in the time while he is present in
such service. People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123. If a man takes up his permanent
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* Conditions to the Exercise of the Elective Franchise. [*601]
While it is true that the legislature cannot add to the constitu-
tional qualifications of electors, it must nevertheless devolve upon
that body to establish such regulations as will enable all persons
entitled to the privilege to exercise it freely and securely, and ex-
clude all who are not entitled from improper participation therein.
For this purpose the times of holding elections, the manner of
conducting them and of ascertaining the result, are prescribed,
and heavy penalties are imposed upon those who shall vote ille-
gally, or instigate others to do so, or who shall attempt to preclude
a fair election or to falsify the result. The propriety, and indeed
the necessity, of such regulations is undisputed. In some of the
States it has also been regarded as important that lists of voters
should be prepared before the day of election, in which should be
registered the name of every person qualified to vote. Under
such a regulation, the officers whose duty it is to administer the
election laws are enabled to proceed with more deliberation in the
discharge of their duties, and to avoid the haste and confusion
that must attend the determination upon election day of the vari-
ous and sometimes difficult questions concerning the right of indi-
viduals to exercise this important franchise. Electors, also, by
means of this registry, are notified in advance what persons claim
the right to vote, and are enabled to make the necessary examina-
tion to determine whether the claim is well founded, and to exer-
cise the right of challenge if satisfied any person registered is
unqualified. When the constitution has established no such rule,
and is entirely silent on the subject, it has sometimes been claimed
that the statute requiring voters to be registered before the day of
election, and excluding from the right all whose names do not
appear upon the list, was unconstitutional and void, as adding
abode at the place of an institution of learning, the fact of his entering it as a
student will not preclude his acquiring a legal residence there; but if he is domi-
ciled at the place for the purposes of instruction only, it is deemed proper and
right that he should neither lose his former residence nor gain a new one in con-
sequence thereof.
That persons residing upon lands within a State, but set apart for some national
purpose, and subjected to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, are not
voters, see Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio, n. s. 806.
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another test to the qualifications of electors which the
[* 602] constitution * has prescribed, and as having the effect,
where electors are not registered, to exclude from voting
persons who have an absolute right to that franchise by the funda-
mental law.1 This position, however, has not been generally ac-
cepted as sound by the courts. The provision for a registry
deprives no one of his right, but is only a reasonable regulation
under which the right may be exercised.2 Such regulations must
always have been within the power of the legislature, unless for-
bidden. Many resting upon the same principle are always pre-
scribed, and have never been supposed to be open to objection.
Although the constitution provides that all male citizens twenty-
one years of age and upwards shall be entitled to vote, it would
not be seriously contended that a statute which should require all
such citizens to go to the established place for holding the polls,
and there deposit their ballots, and not elsewhere, was a violation
of the constitution, because prescribing an additional qualification,
namely, the presence of the elector at the polls. All such reason-
able regulations of the constitutional right which seem to the legis-
lature important to the preservation of order in elections, to guard
against fraud, undue influence, and oppression, and to preserve
the purity of the ballot-box, are not only within the constitutional
power of the legislature, but are commendable, and at least some
of them absolutely essential. And where the law requires such a
registry, and forbids the reception of votes from any persons not
registered, an election in a township where no such registry has
ever been made will be void, and cannot be sustained by making
proof that none in fact but duly qualified electors have voted. It
is no answer that such a rule may enable the registry officers, by
neglecting their duty, to disfranchise the electors altogether; the
remedy of the electors is by proceedings to compel the perform-
ance of the duty; and the statute, being imperative and manda-
tory, cannot be disregarded.3 The danger, however, of any such
1 See Page v. Allen, 58 Penn. St. 838.
'Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342; State
p. Bond, 38 Mo. 425; State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566; Byler v. Asher, 47 III.
101; Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa, 270; Ensworth v. Albin, 46 Mo. 450. As
to the conclusiveness of the registry, see Hyde p. Brush, 34 Conn. 454.
3 People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342. The law does not become unconstitu-
tional, because of the fact that, by the neglect of the officers to attend to the
registry, voters may be disfranchised. Ibid.; Ensworth p. Albin, 46 Mo. 450.
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CH. XVII.] THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL. * 602
misconduct on the part of officers is comparatively small, when the
duty is intrusted to those who are chosen in the locality where the
registry is to be made, and who are consequently immediately
responsible to those who are interested in being registered.
All regulations of the elective franchise, however, must be rea-
sonable, uniform, and impartial; they must not have for their
purpose directly or indirectly to deny or abridge the constitutional
right of citizens to vote, or unnecessarily to impede its exercise;
if they do, they must be declared void.1
In some other cases preliminary action by the public authorities
may be requisite before any legal election can be held.
If an * election is one which a municipality may hold or [* 603]
not at its option, and the proper municipal authority de-
cides against holding it, it is evident that individual citizens must
acquiesce, and that any votes which may be cast by them on the
assumption of right must be altogether nugatory.2 The same
would be true of an election to be held after proclamation for that
purpose, and which must fail if no such proclamation has been
made.3 Where, however, both the time and the place of an elec-
tion are prescribed by law, every voter has a right to take notice of
the law, and to deposit his ballot at the time and place appointed,
notwithstanding the officer, whose duty it is to give notice of the
1 Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 488; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, n. s. 665.
Under the Constitution of Ohio, the right of suffrage is guaranteed to "white
male citizens "; and by a long series of decisions it was settled that persons hav-
ing a preponderance of white blood were "white" within its meaning. It was
also settled that judges of election were liable to an action for refusing to receive
the vote of a qualified electop. A legislature unfriendly to the construction of
the constitution above stated, passed an act which, while prescribing penalties
against judges of election who should refuse to receive or sanction the rejection
of a ballot from any person knowing him to have the qualifications of an elector,
concluded with a proviso that the act and the penalties thereto " shall not apply
to clerks or judges of election for refusing to receive the votes of persons having
a distinct and visible admixture of African blood, nor shall they be liable to
damages by reason of such rejection." Other provisions of the act plainly dis-
criminated against the class of voters mentioned, and it was held to be clearly
unreasonable, partial, calculated to subvert or impede the exercise of the right
of suffrage by this class, and therefore void. Monroe v. Collins, supra.
'Opinions of Judges, 7 Mass. 52o; Opinions of Judges. 15 Mass. 537.
3 People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26; McKune v. Weller, 11 Cal. 49; People v.
Martin, 12 Cal. 409; Jones v. State, 1 Kansas, 273; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold.
588.
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* 603 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XVn.
election, has failed in that duty. The notice to be thus given is
only additional to that which the statute itself gives, and is pre-
scribed for the purpose of greater publicity; but the right to hold
the election comes from the statute, and not from the official notice.
It has therefore been frequently held that when a vacancy exists in
an office, which the law requires shall be filled at the next general
election, the time and place of which are fixed, and that notice of
the general election shall also specify the vacancy to be filled, an
election at that time and place to fill the vacancy will be valid, not-
withstanding the notice is not given; and such election cannot be
defeated by showing that a small portion only of the electors were
actually aware of the vacancy or cast their votes to fill it.1 But
this would not be the case if either the time or the place were
not fixed by law, so that notice became essential for that pur-
pose.2
1 People r. Cowles, 13 N. T. 350; People v. Brenahm, 3 Cal. 477; State c.
Jones, 19 Ind. 356; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; Dishon v. Smith, 10
Iowa, 212; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis. 235; State v. Goetze, 22 Wis. 363. The
Case of Foster ». Scarff, 15 Ohio, n. s. 532, would seem to be contra. A gen-
eral election was to be held, at which by law an existing vacancy in the office of
Judge of Probate was required to be filled. The sheriff, however, omitted all
mention of this office in his notice of election, and the voters generally were not
aware that a vacancy was to be filled. Nominations were made for the other
offices, but none for this, but a candidate presented himself for whom less than a
fourth of the vot«rs taking part in the election cast ballots. It was held that the
election to fill the vacancy was void.
* State v. Young, 4 Iowa, 561. An act had been passed for the incorporation
of the city of Washington, and by its terms it was to be submitted to the people
on the 16th of the following February, for their acceptance or rejection, at an
election to be called and holden in the same manner as township elections under
the general law. The time of notice for the regular township elections was, bv
law, to be determined by the trustees, but for the first township meeting fifteen
days1 notice was made requisite. An election was holden, assumed to be under
the act in question; but no notice was given of it, except by the circulation, on
the morning of the election, of an extra newspaper containing a notice that an
election would be held on that day at a specified place. It was held that the
election was void. The act contemplated some notice before any legal vote
could be taken, and that which was given could not be considered any notice at
all. This case differs from all of those above cited, where vacancies were to be
filled at a general election, and where the law itself would give to the.electors all
the information which was requisite. In this case, although the time was fixed,
the place was not; and, if a notice thus circulated on the morning of election
could be held sufficient, it might well happen that.the electors generally would fail
[710]
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* Tlie Manner of Exercising the Right. [* 604]
The mode of voting in this country, at all general elections, is
almost universally by ballot.1 "A ballot may be defined to be a
piece of paper, or other suitable material, with the name written or
printed upon it of the person to be voted for; and where the suf-
frages are given in this form, each of the electors in person depos-
its such a vote in the box, or other receptacle provided for the
purpose, and kept by the proper officers."2 The distinguishing
feature of this mode of voting is, that every voter is thus enabled
to secure and preserve the most complete and inviolable secrecy in
regard to the persons for whom he votes, and thus escape the in-
fluences which, under the system of oral suffrages, may be brought
to bear upon him with a view to overbear and intimidate, and thus
prevent the real expression of public sentiment.3
to be informed, so that their right to vote might be exercised. See also Barry
v. Lauek, 5 Cold. 588.
'The ballot was also adopted in England in 1872.
* Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 103.
3 "In this country, and indeed in every country where officers are elective-,
different modes have been adopted for the electors to signify their choice. The
most common modes have been either by voting viva voce, that is, by the elector
openly naming the person he designates for the office, or by ballot, which is
depositing in a box provided for the purpose a paper on which is the name of
the person he intends for the office. The principal object of this last mode is to
enable the elector to express his opinion secretly, without being subject to be
overawed, or to any ill-will or persecution on account of his vote for either of
the candidates who may be before the public. The method of voting by tab-
lets in Rome was an example of this manner of voting. There certain officers
appointed for that purpose, called Diribitores, delivered to each voter as many
tablets as there were candidates, one of whose names was written upon every
tablet. The voter put into a chest prepared for that purpose which of these
tablets he pleased, and they were afterwards taken out and counted. Cicero
defines tablets to be little billets, in which the people brought their suffrages.
The clause in the constitution directing the election of the several State officers
was undoubtedly intended to provide that the election should be made by this
mode of voting to the exclusion of any other. In this mode the freemen can
individually express their choice, without being under the necessity of publicly
declaring the object of their choice; their collective voice can be easily ascer-
tained, and the evidence of it transmitted to the place where their votes are to
be counted, and the result declared with as little inconvenience as possible."
Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 541. In this case it was held that a. printed ballot was
within the meaning of the constitution which required all ballots for certain
[711]
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[* 605] * In order to secure as perfectly as possible the benefits
anticipated from this system, statutes have been passed,
in some of the States, which prohibit ballots being received or
counted unless the same are written or printed upon white paper,
without any marks or figures thereon intended to distinguish one
ballot from anothep.1 These statutes are simply declaratory of a
State officers to be " fairly written." To the same effect is Henshaw v. Foster,
9 Pick. 312.
1 See People v. Kilduff, 15 1ll. 500. In this case it was held that the common
lines on ruled paper did not render the ballots void. See also Druliner v. State,
29 Ind. 308, in which it was decided that a caption to the ticket folded inside was
unobjectionable. To the same effect is Millholland p. Bryant, 39 Ind. 363.
In the recent case of Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 90, the Supreme Court of
Indiana declared to be void the following enactment: "It shall be the duty of
the inspector of any election held in this State, on receiving the ballot of any
voter, to have the same numbered with figures, on the outside or back thereof,
to correspond with the number placed opposite the name of such voter on the
poll lists kept by the clerks of said election." Pettit, J., delivering the opinion
of the court, after quoting several authorities, among others Commonwealth p.
Woelper, 3 S. & R. 29; People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45; People p. Cicotte, 16
Mich. 283; Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 535, and the text above, says: "It is believed
that these authorities establish, beyond doubt, that the ballot implies absolute and
inviolable secrecy, and that the principle is founded in the highest considerations
of public policy. When our present constitution was framed, voting by ballot
was in vogue in nearly every State in the Union. That mode of voting had been
known and understood for centuries. The term ballot, as designating a mode of
election, was then well ascertained and clearly defined. The eminent framers of
the constitution certainly employed this term with a full knowledge of its mean-
ing. Many of the most distinguished members of the constitutional convention
of 1850 were members of the legislature of 1852, the first that met under the
present constitution. That they regarded the ballot system as securing inviolable
secrecy, is clearly shown by the following law, which they then helped to enact:
'If any judge, inspector, clerk, or other officer of an election, shall open or
mark, by folding or otherwise, any ticket presented by such elector at such elec-
tion, or attempt to find out the names thereon, or suffer the same to be done by
any other person, before such ticket is deposited in the ballot-box, he shall be
fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars.' 2 G. & II. 473, sep. 60.
If the constitution secures to the voter, in popular elections, the protection and
immunity of secrecy, there can be no doubt- that section 2 of the act of 1869,
which authorized the inspector to number ballots, is clearly in conflict with it and
is void. I am not unmindful of the rule that all doubts are to be solved in
favor of the constitutionality of legislative enactments. This rule is well estab-
lished, and is founded in the highest wisdom. But my convictions are clear that
our constitution was intended to, and does, secure the absolute secrecy of a bal-
lot, and that the act in question, which directs the numbering of tickets, to cop-
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constitutional principle that inheres in the system of voting by
ballot, and which ought to be inviolable whether declared or not.
In the absence of such a statute, all devices by which party man-
agers are enabled to distinguish ballots in the hand of the voter,
and thus determine whether he. is voting for or against them, are
opposed to the spirit of the Constitution, inasmuch as they tend to
defeat the design for which voting by ballot is established, and,
though they may not render an election void, they are exceedingly
reprehensible, and ought to be discountenanced by all good citizens.
The system of ballot-voting rests upon the idea that every elector
is to be entirely at liberty to vote for whom he pleases and with
what party he pleases, and that no one is to have the right, or be
in position, to question him for it, either then or at any subsequent
time.1 The courts have held that a voter, even in case of a con-
tested election, cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he
voted; and for the same reason we think others who may acci-
dentally, or by trick or artifice, have acquired knowledge
on the subject should not be allowed to testify * to such [* 606]
knowledge, or to give any information in the courts upon
the subject. Public policy requires that the veil of secrecy should
be impenetrable, unless the voter himself voluntarily determines
to lift it ;2 his ballot is absolutely privileged; and to allow evidence
respond with the numbers opposite the names of the electors on the poll lists, is
in palpable conflict not only with the spirit, but with the substance of the consti-
tutional provision. This act was intended to, and does, clearly identify every
man's ticket, and renders it easy to ascertain exactly how any particular person
voted. That secrecy which is esteemed by all authority to be essential to the free
exercise of suffrage, is as much violated by this law as if it had declared that the
election should be viva voce."
1 "The right to vote in this manner has usually been considered an important
and valuable safeguard of the independence of the humble citizen against the
influence which wealth and station might be supposed to exercise. This object
would be accomplished but very imperfectly if the privacy supposed to be secured
was limited to the moment of depositing the ballot. The spirit of the system
requires that the elector should be secured then and at all times thereafter against
reproach or animadversion, or any other prejudice on account of having voted
according to his own unbiassed judgment; and that security is made to consist
in shutting up within the privacy of his own mind all knowledge of the manner
in which he has bestowed his suffrage." Per Denio, Ch. J., in People v. Pease,
27 N. Y. 81.
'"The ballot," says Cicero, "is dear to the people, for it uncovers men's
faces, and conceals their thoughts. It gives them the opportunity of doing what
[713]
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of its contents when he has not waived the privilege, is to encour-
age trickery and fraud, and would in effect establish this remark-
able anomaly, that, while the law from motives of public policy
establishes the secret ballot with a view to conceal the elector's
action, it at the same time encourages a system of espionage, by
means of which the veil of secrecy may be penetrated and the
voter's action disclosed to the public.1
they like, and of promising all that they are asked." Speech in defence of
Plaucius. Forsyth's Cicero, Vol. I. p. 889.
1 See this subject fully considered in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283. And
see also State v. Hilniantel, 23 Wis. 422. A very loose system prevails in the
contests over legislative elections, and it has been held that when a voter refuses
to disclose for whom he voted, evidence is admissible of the general reputation
of the political character of the voter, and as to the party to which hp belonged
at the time of the election. Cong. Globe, XVI. App. 456. This is assuming
that the voter adheres strictly to party, and always votes the " straight ticket";
an assumption which may not be a very violent one in the majority of cases, but
which is scarcely creditable to the manly independence and self-reliance of any
free people; and however strongly disposed legislative bodies may be to act upon
it, we are not prepared to see any such rule of evidence adopted by the courts.
If a voter chooses voluntarily to exhibit his ballot publicly, perhaps there is no
reason why those to whom it was shown should not testify to its contents; but in
other cases the knowledge of its contents is his own exclusive property, and he
can neither be compelled to part with it, nor, as we think, is any one else who
accidentally or surreptitiously becomes possessed of it, or to whom the ballot
has been shown with a view to information, advice, or alteration, at liberty to
make the disclosure. Such third person might be guilty of no legal offence if
he should do so; but he is certainly invading the constitutional privileges of his
neighbor, and we are aware of no sound principle of law which will justify a
court in compelling or even permitting him to testify to what he has seen.
And as the law does not compel a voter to testify, " surely it cannot be so incon-
sistent with itself as to authorize a judicial inquiry upon a particular subject, and
at the same time industriously provide for the concealment of the only material
facts upon which the results of such an inquiry must depend." Per Denio,
Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 81. It was held in People v. Cicotte, 16
Mich. 283, that until it was distinctly shown that the elector waived his privilege
of secrecy, any evidence as to the character or contents of his ballot was inad-
missible. It was also held that where a voter's qualification was in question, but
his want of right to vote was not conceded, the privilege was and must be the
the same; as otherwise any person's ballot might be inquired into by simply
asserting his want of qualification. In State p. Olin, 23 Wis. 319, it was decided
that where persons who had voted at an election had declined to testify concern-
ing their qualifications, and how they had voted, it was competent to prove their
declarations that they were unnaturalized foreigners, and had voted a particular
way. Compare State p. Hilmantel, 23 Wis. 422.
[714]
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Every ballot should be complete in itself, and ought not to re-
quire extensive evidence to enable the election officer to
determine * the voter's intention. Perfect certainty, how- [* 607]
ever, is not required in these cases. It is sufficient if an
examination leaves no reasonable doubt upon the intention, and
technical accuracy is never required in any case. The cardinal
rule is to give effect to the intention of the voter, whenever it is not
left in uncertainty ;1 but if an ambiguity appears upon its face, the
elector cannot be received as a witness to make it good by testify-
ing for whom or for what office he intended to vote.2
The ballot in no case should contain more names than are au-
thorized to be voted for, for any particular office at that election;
and, if it should, it must be rejected for the obvious impossibility
of the canvassing officers choosing from among the names on the
ballot, and applying the ballot to some to the exclusion of others.
The choice must be made by the elector himself, and be expressed
by the ballot. Accordingly, where only one supervisor was to be
chosen, and a ballot was deposited having upon it the names of two
persons for that office, it was held that it must be rejected for am-
biguity.8 It has been decided, however, that if a voter shall write
a name upon a printed ballot, in connection with the title to an
office, this is such a designation of the name written for that office
as sufficiently to demonstrate his intention, even though he omit to
strike off the printed name of the opposing candidate. The writing
in such a case, it is held, ought to prevail as the highest evidence
1 People v. Matteson, 17 111. 169; People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; State v.
Elwood, 12 Wis. 551; People v. Bates, 11 Mich. 362.
* People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409. The mental purpose of an elector is not
provable; it must be determined by his acts. People c. Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309.
And where the intent is to be gathered from the ballot, it is a question of law,
and cannot be submitted to the jury as one of fact. People v. McManus, 34
Barb. 620.
'People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409. See also Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis.
420; People r. Loomis, 8 Wend. 396; People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y.
67. Such a vote, however, could not be rejected as to candidates for other offices
regularly named upon the ballot; it would be void only as to the particular office
for which the duplicate ballot was cast. Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420.
If the name of a candidate for an office is given -more than once, it is proper to
count it as one ballot, instead of rejecting it as illegally thrown. People v.
Holden, 28 Cal. 123.
[715]
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* 607 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XVII.
of the voter's intention, and the failure to strike off the printed
name will be regarded as an accidental oversight.1
[* 608J * The name on the ballot should be clearly expressed,
and ought to be given fully. Errors in spelling, however,
will not defeat the ballot, if the sound is the same ;2 nor abbrevia-
tions,3 if such as are in common use and generally understood, so
that there can be no reasonable doubt of the intent. And it would
seem that where a ballot is cast which contains only the initials of
the Christian name of the candidate, it ought to be sufficient, as it
designates the person voted for with the same certainty which is
commonly met with in contracts and other private writings, and
the intention of the voter cannot reasonably be open to
[* 609] any doubt.4 As the law knows only * one Christian name,
1 People v. Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309. This ruling suggests this query: Suppose
at an election where printed slips containing the names of candidates, with I
designation of the office, are supplied to voters, to be pasted over the names of
opposing candidates, — as is very common, — a ballot should be found in the boi
containing the names of a candidate for one office, — say the county clerk, — with
a designation of the office pasted over the name of a candidate for some other
office, —say coroner; so that the ballot would contain the names of two persons
for county clerk, and of none for coroner. In such a case, is the slip the highest
evidence of the intention of the voter as to who should receive his suffrage for
county clerk, and must it;be counted for that office? And if so, then does not
the ballot also show the intention of the elector to cast his vote for the person for
coroner whose name is thus accidentally pasted over, and should it not be counted
for that person? The case of People u. Saxton would seem to be opposed to
People i>. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409, where the court refused to allow evidence to be
given to explain the ambiguity occasioned by the one name being placed upon
the ticket, without the other being erased. "The intention of the elector cannot
be thus inquired into, when it is opposed or hostile to the paper ballot which be
has deposited in the ballot-box. We might with the same propriety permit it to
be proved that he intended to vote for one man, when bis ballot was cast for
another; a species of proof not to be tolerated." Per Whittlesay, J. The
case of People r. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 28:5, is also opposed to People r. Saxton.
In the Michigan case, a slip for the office of sheriff was pasted over the name of
the candidate for another county office, so that the ballot contained the names
of two candidates for shei-Hf. It was argued that the slip should be counted as
the best evidence of the voter's intention; but the court held that the ballot could
be counted for neither candidate, because of its ambiguity.
• People v. Mayworm, 5 Mich. 146; Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 430.
3 People v. Furguson, 8 Cow. 102. See also upon this subject, People r.
Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67; and People v. Tisdale, 1 Dong. (Mich.)
65.
4 In People v. Furguson, 8 Cow. 102, it was held, that, on the trial of a con-
[ 716 ]
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the giving of an initial to a middle name when the party
has none, or the giving of a wrong initial, will * not ren- [* 610]
tested election case before a jury, ballots cast for H. F. Yates should be counted
for Henry F. Yates, if, under the circumstances, the jury were of the opinion
they were intended for him; and to arrive at that intention, it was competent to
prove that he generally signed bis name H. F. Yates; that he had before held
the same office for which these votes were cast, and was then a candidate again;
that the people generally would apply the abbreviation to him, and that no
other person was known in the county to whom it would apply. This ruling was
followed in People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409, and in People v. Cook, 14 Barb.
259, and 8 N. Y. 67. The courts also held, in these cases, that the elector
voting the defective ballot might give evidence to enable the jury to apply it, and
might testify that he intended it for the candidate the initials of whose name he
had given. In Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 429, a rule somewhat different
was laid down. In that case, Matthew H. Carpenter was candidate for the office
of prosecuting attorney; and besides the perfect ballots there were others, cast
for "D. M. Carpenter," "M. D. Carpenter," "M. T. Carpenter," and "Car-
pentep." The jury found that there was no lawyer in the county by the name of
D. M. Carpenter, M. D. Carpenter, M. T. Carpenter, or whose surname was
Carpenter, except the relator, Matthew H. Carpenter; that the relator was a
practising attorney of the county, and eligible to the office, and that the votes
above mentioned were all given and intended by the electors for the relatop.
The court say: "How was the intention of the voter to be ascertained? By
reading the name on the ballot, and ascertaining who was meant and intended by
that name? Is no evidence admissible to show who was intended to be voted
for under the various appellations, except such evidence as is contained in the
ballot itself? Or may you gather the intention of the voter from the ballot,
explained by the surrounding circumstances, from facts of a general public nature
connected with the election, and the different candidates which may aid you in
coming to the right conclusion? These facts and circumstances might, perhaps,
be adduced so clear and strong as to lead irresistibly to the inference that a vote
given for Carpenter was intended to be cast for Matthew II. Carpentep. A con-
tract may be read by the light of the surrounding circumstances, not to contra-
dict it, but in order more perfectly to understand the intent and meaning of the
parties who made it. By analogous principles, we think that these facts, and
others of like nature connected with the election, could be given in evidence, for
the purpose of aiding the jury in determining who was intended to be voted fop.
In New York, courts have gone even farther than this, and held, that not only
facts of public notoriety might be given, in evidence to show the intention of the
elector, but that the elector who cast the abbreviated ballot may be sworn as to
who was intended by it. People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. 102. But this is pushing
the doctrine to a great extent; further, we think, than consideration of public
policy and the well-being of society will warrant; and to restrict the rule, and
say that the jury must determine from an inspection of the ballot itself, from the let-
ters upon it, aside from all extraneous facts, who was intended to be designated
bv the ballot, is establishing a principle unnecessarily cautious and limited. In
[717]
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* 610 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XK
der the ballot nugatory;1 nor will a failure to give the addi-
tion to a name — such as "Junior " — render it void, as that is a
mere matter of description, not constituting a part of the name,
and if given erroneously may be treated as surplusage.2 But
the present case, the jury, from the evidence before them, found that the votes
[above described] were, when given and cast, intended, by the electors who gave
and cast the same respectively, to be given and cast for Matthew EL Carpenter,
the relator. Such being the case, it clearly follows that they should be counted
for him." See also State v. Elwood, 12 Wis. 561; and People v. Pease, 27 N. Y.
84, per Denio, Ch. J.
On the other band, it was held, in Opinions of Judges, 38 Maine, 559, that
vote* could not be counted for a person of a different name from that expressed
by the ballot, even though the only difference consisted in the initial to the mid-
dle name. But see People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67. And in
People v. Tisdale, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 65, followed in People v. Uiggins, 3 Mich.
233, it was held that no extrinsic evidence was admissible in explanation or sup-
port of the ballot; and that, unless it showed upon its face for whom it un-
designed, it must be rejected. And it was also held, that a ballot for "J. A.
Dyer" did not show, upon its face, that it was intended for the candidate James
A. Dyer, and therefore could not be counted with the ballots cast for him by his
full name. This rule is convenient of application, but it probably defeats the
intention of the electors in every case to which it is applied, where the rejected
votes could influence the result, — an intention, too, which we think is so apparent
on the ballot itself, that no person would be in real doubt concerning it. In
People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 64, in which Moses M. Smith was a candidate for
county treasurer, Seidell, J., Bays: "According to well-settled rules, the board
of canvassers erred in refusing to allow to the relator the nineteen votes given
for Moses Smith and M. M. Smith"; and although we think this doctrine cor-
rect, the cases he cites in support of it (8 Cow. 102, and 5 Denio, 409) would
only warrant a jury, not the canvassers, in allowing them; or, at least, those cast
for M. M. Smith. The case of People v. Tisdale was again followed in People
t'. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 2i<3; the majority of the court, however, expressing the
opinion that it was erroneous in principle, but that it had (for twenty-five yean)
been too long the settled law of the State to be disturbed, unless by the legis-
lature.
1 People t>. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, 8 N. Y. 67. But see Opinions of Judge*,
38 Maine, 597.
* People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67. In this case, the jury found,
as matter of fact, that ballots given lor Benjamin Welch were intended for Ben-
jamin Welch, Jr.; and the court held, that, as a matter of law, they should
have been counted lbr him. It was not decided, however, that the canvassers
were at liberty to allow the votes to Benjamin Welch, Jr.; and the judge, deliv-
ering the prevailing opinion in the Court of Appeals, says (p. 81), that the State
canvassers cannot be charged with error in refusing to add to the votes for Ben-
jamin Welch, Jr., those which were given for Benjamin Welch, without the junior.
"They had not the means which the court possessed, on the trial of this issue, of
[718]
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CH. XVII.] THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL.
• 610
where the * name upon the ballot is altogether different [*611]
from that of a candidate, and not the same in sound and
not a mere abbreviation, the evidence of the voter cannot be re-
ceived to show for whom it was intended.1
Upon the question how far extrinsic evidence is admissible by
way of helping out any imperfections in the ballot, no rule can be
laid down which cau be said to have a preponderating weigiit of
obtaining, by evidence aliunde, the several county returns, the intention of the
voters, and the identity of the candidate with the name on the defective ballots.
[Their judicial power extends no further than to take notice of such facts of pub-
lic notoriety as that certain well-known abbreviations are generally used to
designate particular names, and the like." So far as this case holds, that the
canvassers are not chargeable with error in not counting the ballots with the name
Benjamin Welch for Benjamin Welch, Jr., it is, doubtless, correct. But suppose
the canvassers had seen fit to do so, could the court hold they were guilty of
usurpation in thus counting and allowing them? Could not the canvassers take
notice of such facts of general public notoriety as everybody else would take
notice of? Or must they shut their eyes to facts which all other persons must
see? The facts are these: Benjamin Welch, Jr., and James M. Cook are the
candidates, and the only candidates, for State Treasurer. These facts are noto-
rious, and the two political parties make determined efforts to elect one or the
other. Certain votes are cast for Benjamin Welch, with the descriptive word
"junior" omitted. The name is correct, but, as thus given, it may apply to some
one else; but it would be to a person notoriously not a candidate. Under these
circumstances, when the facts of which it would be necessary to take notice have
occurred under their own supervision, and are universally known, so that the
result of a contest in the courts could not be doubtful, is there any reason why
the canvassers should not take notice of these facts, count the votes which a jury
would subsequently be compelled to count, and thus save the delay, expense,
vexation, and confusion of a contest? If their judicial power extends to a deter-
mination of what are common and well-known abbreviations, and what names
spelled differently are idem sonans, why may it not also extend to the facts, of
which there will commonly be quite as little doubt, as to who are the candidates
at the election over which they preside? It seems to us, that, in every case
where the name given on the ballot, though in some particulars imperfect, is not
different from that of the candidate, and tacts of general notoriety leave no doubt
in the minds of canvassers that it was intended for him, the canvassers should be
at liberty to do what a jury would afterwards be compelled to do, — count it for
such candidate.
1 A vote for "Pence" cannot be shown to have been intended for " Spence."
Hart v. Evans, 8 Peun. St. 13. Where, however, wrong initials were given to
the Christian name, the ballots were allowed to the candidate; the facts of public
notoriety being such as to show that they were intended for hiin. Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420. This case goes farther in permitting mistakes in ballots
to be corrected on parol evidence than any other in the books.
[719]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
authority in its support. We think evidence of such facts as may
be called the circumstances surrounding the election — such as
who were the candidates brought forward by the nominating con-
ventions; whether other persons of the same names resided in the
district from which the officer was to be chosen, and if so whether
they were eligible or had been named for the office ; if a ballot was
printed imperfectly, how it came to be so printed, and the like —
is admissible for the purpose of showing that an imperfect ballot
was meant for a particular candidate, unless the name is so differ-
ent that to thus apply it would be to contradict the ballot itself;
or unless the ballot is so defective that it fails to show any inten-
tion whatever: in which cases it is not admissible. And
[* 612] we also * think that in any case to allow a voter to testify
by way of explanation of a ballot otherwise fatally defec-
tive, that he voted the particular ballot, and intended it for a par-
ticular candidate, is exceedingly dangerous, invites corruption and
fraud, and ought not to be suffered. Nothing is more easy than
for reckless parties thus to testify to their intentions, without the
possibility of disproving their testimony if untrue; and if one
falsely swears to having deposited a particular ballot, unless the
party really depositing it sees fit to disclose his knowledge, the
evidence must pass unchallenged, and the temptation to suborna-
tion of perjury, when public offices are at stake, and when it may
be committed with impunity, is too great to allow such evidence to
be sanctioned. While the law should seek to give effect to the in-
tention of the voter, whenever it can be fairly ascertained, yet this
intention must be that which is expressed in due form of law, not
that which remains hidden in the elector's breast; and where the
ballot, in connection with such facts surrounding the election as
would be provable if it were a case of contract, does not enable
the proper officers to apply it to one of the candidates, policy, coin-
ciding in this particular with the general rule of law as applicable
to other transactions, requires that the ballot shall not be counted
for such candidate.1
The ballot should also/sufficiently show on its face for what office
the person named upon it is designated; but here again technical
1 This is substantially the New York rule as settled by the later decisions, if
we may accept the opinion of Denio, Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 84, «
taking the correct view of those decisions. See People v. Cieotte, 16 Mich. 283,
for a discussion of this point.
[ 720 ]
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accuracy is not essential, and the office is sufficiently named if it
be so designated that no reasonable doubt can exist as to what is
meant. A great constitutional privilege — the highest under the
government — is not to be taken away on a mere technicality, but
the most liberal intendment should bo made in support of the elec-
tor's action wherever the application of the common-sense rules
which are applied in other cases will enable us to understand and
render it effectual.1
* Where more than one office is to be filled at an election, [* 613]
the law may either require all the persons voted for, for
the several offices, to be so voted for by each elector on the same
ballot, or it may provide a different receptacle for the ballots for
some one office or set of offices from that which is to receive the
others. In such a case each elector will place upon the ballot to
be deposited in each the names of such persons as he desires to
vote for, for the different offices to be filled at the election for which
that box is provided. If, for instance, State and township officers
are to be chosen at the same election, and the ballots are to be
kept separate, the elector must have different ballots for each; and
1 In People p. Matteson, 17 1ll. 167, it was held that where "police magis-
trates" were to be chosen, votes cast for " police justices " should be counted, as
they sufficiently showed upon their face the intention of the voters. So where
the question was'submitted to the people, whether a part of one county should
be annexed to another, and the act of submission provided that the electors might
express their choice by voting "for detaching R ," or "against detaching
R ," it was held that votes cast for "R attached," and for "R
detached," and "for division," and "against division," were properly counted
by the canvassers, as the intention of the voters was clearly ascertainable from
the ballots themselves with the aid of the extrinsic facts of a public nature con-
nected with the election. State v. Elwood, 12 Wis. 551. So where trustees of
common schools were to be voted for, it was held that votes for trustees of public
schools should be counted; there being no trustees to be voted for at that elec-
tion except trustees of common schools. People v. McManus, 34 Barb. 620. In
Phelps p. Goldthwaite, 16 Wis. 146, where a city and also a county superinten-
dent of schools were to be chosen at the same election, and ballots were cast for
"superintendent of schools," without further designation, parol evidence of sur-
rounding circumstances was admitted to enable the proper application to be
made of the ballots to the respective candidates. In Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio,
N. s. 271, an act providing for an election on the question of the removal of a
county seat to the "town " of Bowling Green, was held not invalid by reason of
Bowling Green being in law not a "town," but an incorporated village. In
voting for a county seat it was held proper to count votes cast for a town by its
popular, which differed from its legal name. State v. Cavers, 22 Iowa, 343.
46 [ 721 ]
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if he should designate persons for a township office on the State
ballot, such ballot would, to that extent, be void, though the im-
proper addition would not defeat the ballot altogether, but would
be treated as surplusage, and the ballot be held good as a vote for
the State officers designated upon it.1 But an accidental error in
depositing the ballot should not defeat it. If an elector should
deliver the State and township ballots to the inspector of election,
who by mistake should deposit them in the wrong boxes respec-
tively, this mistake is capable of being corrected without confusion
when the boxes are opened, and should not prevent the ballots
being counted as intended. And it would seem that, in any case,
the honest mistake, either of the officer or the elector, should not
defeat the intention of the latter, where it was not left in doubt by
his action.2
The elector is not under obligation to vote for every office to be
filled at that election; nor where several persons are to be chosen
to the same office is he required to vote for as many as
[* 614] are to be * elected. He may vote for one or any greater
number, not to exceed the whole number to be chosen.
In most of the States a plurality of the votes cast determines the
election. In others, as to some elections, a majority; but in de-
termining upon a majority or plurality, the blank votes, if any, are
not to be counted; and a candidate may therefore be chosen with-
out receiving a plurality or majority of voices of those who actually
participated in the election. Where, however, two offices of the
same name were to be filled at the same election, but the notice
of election specified one only, the political parties each nominated
one candidate, and, assuming that but one was to be chosen, no
elector voted for more than one, it was held that the one having a
majority was alone chosen ; the opposing candidate could not claim
to be also elected, as having received the second highest number of
votes, but as to the other office there had been a failure to hold au
election.3
1 See People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67.
* People v. Bates, 11 Mich. 362. See Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175;
McKinney p. O'Connor, 26 Texas, 5.
3 People v. Kent County Canvassers, 11 Mich, 111.
[ 722 ]
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The Freedom of Elections.
To keep every election free of all the influences and surround-
ings which might bear improperly upon it, or might impel the
electors to cast their suffrages otherwise than as their judgments
would dictate, has always been a prominent object in American
legislation. We have referred to fundamental principles which
protect the secrecy of the ballot, but in addition to these there
are express constitutional and statutory provisions looking to the
accomplishment of the same general purpose. It is provided by
the constitutions of several of the States that bribery of an elector
shall constitute a disqualification of the right to vote or to hold
office;1 the treating of an elector, with a view to influence his
vote, is in some States made an indictable offence;2 courts are not
allowed to be held, for the two reasons, that the electors ought to
be left free to devote their attention to the exercise of this
high trust, and that * suits if allowed on that day might [* 615]
be used as a means of intimidation ;3 legal process in
some States, and for the same reasons, is not permitted to be
served on that day; intimidation of voters by threats or otherwise
is made punishable;4 and generally all such precautions as the
people in framing their organic law, or the legislature afterwards,
have thought might be made available for the purpose, have been
1 See the Constitutions of Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, West Virginia,
Oregon, California, Kansas, Texas, Arkansas, Rhode Island, Alabama, Florida,
New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Nevada, Tennessee, Con-
necticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Wisconsin. And it has been held on gen-
eral principles that if an elector is induced to vote in a particular way by the
payment or promise of any money or other valuable consideration for such vote,
his vote should be rejected as illegal. State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 327.
* State v. Rutledge, 8 Humph. 32. And see the provision in the Constitution
of Vermont on this subject. A resort to this species of influence would gen-
erally, at the present time, prejudice the candidate's interests instead of advancing
them, but such has not always been the case. Mp. Madison, after performing
valuable service for the State in its legislature, was defeated when offering him-
self for re-election, in the very crisis of the Revolution, by the treating of his
opponent. See his Life by Rives, Vol. I. p. 179.
'But it was held in New York that the statute of that State forbidding the
holding of courts on election days did not apply to the local elections. Matter of
Election Law, 7 Hill, 194; Redfield v. Florence, 2 E. D. Smith, 339.
* As to what shall constitute intimidation, see Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates,
429.
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provided with a view to secure the most completely free and un-
biassed expression of opinion that shall be possible.
Betting upon elections is illegal at the common law, on grounds
of public policy ;1 and all contracts entered into with a view im-
properly to influence an election would be void for the same rea-
son.2 And with a just sense of the danger of military interference,
where a trust is to be exercised, the highest as well as the most
delicate in the whole machinery of government, it has not been
thought unwise to prohibit the militia being called out on election
days, even though for no other purpose than for enrolling and or-
1 Bonn v. Riker, 4 Johns. 426; Lansing v. Lansing, 8 Johns. 454; Ball p.
Gilbert, 12 Met. 397; Laval v. Myers, 1 Bailey, 486; Smyth p. McMasters, 2
Browne, 182; McAllister v. Hoffman, 16 S. & R. 147; Stoddard v. Martin, 1
R.L1; Wroth p. Johnson, 4 H. & M. 284; Tarelton v. Baker, 18 Vt. 9; Davis
v. Holbrook, 1 La. An. 176; Freeman p. Hardwick, 10 Ala. 316; Wheeler r.
Spencer, 15 Conn. 28; Russell p. Pyland, 2 Humph. 131; Porter p. Sawyer, 1
Hair. 517; Hickerson v. Benson, 8 Mo. 8; Machir v. Moore, 2 Grat. 257; Rust
v. Gott, 9 Cow. 169; Brush e. Keeler, 5 Wend. 250.
* In Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill, 27, it was held that an agreement by the
defendant to pay the plaintiff $1000, in consideration that the latter, who had
built a log-cabin, would keep it open for political meetings to further the suc-
cess of certain persons nominated for members of Congress, &c, by one of the
political parties, was illegal within the statute of New York, which prohibited
contributions of money "for any other purpose intended to promote the election
of any particular person or ticket, except for defraying the expenses of printing
and the circulation of votes, handbills, and other papers." This case is criticised
in Hurley v. Van Wagner, 28 Barb. 109, and it is possible that it went further
than either the statute or public policy would require. In Nichols v. Mudgett,
32 Vt. 546, the defendant being indebted to the plaintiff, who was a candidate for
town representative, the parties agreed that the former should use hia influence
for the plaintiff's election, and do what he could for that purpose, and that if the
plaintiff was elected, that should be a satisfaction of his claim. Nothing was
specifically said about the defendant's voting for the plaintiff, but he did vote for
him, and would not have done so, nor favored his election, but for this agree-
ment. The plaintiff was elected. Held, that the agreement was void, and con-
stituted, no bar to a recovery upon the demand. See also Meachem p. Dow, 32
Vt. 721, where it was held that a note executed in consideration of the payee's
agreement to resign public office in favor of the maker, and use influence in favor
of the latter's appointment as his successor, was void in the hands of the payee.
In Pratt v. People, 29 11l. 54, it was held that an agreement between two electors
that they should " pair off," and both abstain from voting, wae illegal, and the
inspectors could not refuse to receive a vote of one of the two, on the ground of
his agreement.
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CH. XVII.] THE EXPRESSION OP THE POPULAR WILL. * 615
ganizing them.1 The ordinary police is the peace force of the
State, and its presence suggests order, individual safety, and pub-
lic security; but when the military appear upon the stage, even
though composed of citizen militia, the circumstances must be
assumed to be extraordinary, and there is always an appearance
of threatening and dangerous compulsion which might easily in-
terfere seriously with that calm and unimpassioned discharge of
the elector's duty which the law so justly favors. The soldier in
organized ranks can know no law but such as is given him by his
commanding officer; and when he appears at the polls, there is
necessarily a suggestion of the presence of an enemy against
whom he may be compelled to exercise the most extreme and de-
structive force; and that enemy must generally be the party out
of power, while the authority that commands the force directed
against them will be the executive authority of the State for the
time being wielded by their opponents. It is consequently of the
highest importance that the presence of a military force at the polls
be not suffered except in serious emergencies, when disorders exist
or are threatened for the suppression or prevention of which the
ordinary peace force is insufficient; and any statute which should
provide for or permit such presence as a usual occurrence or ex-
cept in the last resort, though it might not be void, would never-
theless be a serious invasion of constitutional right, and should
not be submitted to in a free government without vigorous remon-
strance.2
'.
1 See Hyde c. Melvin, 11 Johns. 521.
'The danger, and we may say also, the folly of military interference with the
deliberations or action of electors except in the last necessity, was fearfully illus-
trated in the case of the " Manchester Massacre," which occurred in 1819. An
immense meeting of radical parliamentary reformers, whose objects and purposes
appeared threatening to the government, was charged upon by the military, with
some loss of life, and with injury to the persons of several hundred people. As
usual in such cases, the extremists, of one party applauded tbe act and compli-
mented the military, while the other party was exasperated in the last degree, by
what seemed to them an unnecessary, arbitrary, and unconstitutional exercise of
force. The most bitter and dangerous feeling was excited throughout the country
by this occurrence, and it is not too much to say that if disorders were threaten-
ing before, the government had done nothing in this way to strengthen its authority,
or to insure quiet or dispassionate action. No one had been conciliated; no one
had been reduced to more calm and deliberate courses; but, on the other hand,
even moderate men had been exasperated and inclined to opposition by this
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[* 616J * The Elector not to be deprived of hi» Vote.
That one entitled to vote shall not be deprived of the privilege
by the action of the authorities, is a fundamental principle.
It lias been held, on constitutional grounds, that a law creating
a new county, but so framed as to leave a portion of its territory
unorganized, so that the voters within such portion could not par-
ticipate in the election of county officers, was inoperative and void.1
So a law submitting to the voters of a county the question of re-
moving the county seat is void if there is no mode under the law
by which a city within the county can participate in the election.1
And although the failure of one election precinct to hold an elec-
tion, or to make a return of the votes cast, might not render the
whole election a nullity, where the electors of that precinct were
at liberty to vote had they so chosen, or where, having voted but
failed to make return, it is not made to appear that the votes not
returned would have changed the result,8 yet if any action was
required of the public authorities preliminary to the election, and
that which was taken was not such as to give all the electors the
opportunity to participate, and no mode was open to the electors
by which the officers might be compelled to act, it would seem
that such neglect, constituting as it would the disfranchisement of
the excluded electors pro hac vice, must on general principles
render the whole election nugatory; for that cannot be called an
election or the expression of the popular sentiment where a part
only of the electors have been allowed to be heard, and the others,
without being guilty of fraud or negligence, have been excluded.1
violent, reckless, and destructive display of coercive power. See Hansard's
Debates, Vol. XLI. pp. 4, 61, 230.
1 People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 471. For similar reasons the act for the
organization of Schuyler County was held invalid in Lanning p. Carpenter, 20
N. Y. 477.
* Attorney-General v. Supervisors of St. Clair, 11 Mich. 63. For a similar
principle see Foster v. Scarff, 15 Ohio, N. s. 532.
5 See Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42; Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. ».
County Court of Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637. Also Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68.
4 Sue Fort Dodge v. District Township, 17 Iowa, 85; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold.
588. In People t>. Salomon, 46 111. 415, it was held that where an act of the
legislature, before it shall become operative, is required to be submitted to the
vote of the legal electors of the district to be affected thereby, if the election
which is attempted to be held is illegal within certain precincts containing a
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If the inspectors of elections refuse to receive the vote of an
elector duly qualified, they may be liable both civilly and crimi-
nally for so doing: criminally, if they were actuated by improper
and corrupt motives; and civilly, it is held in some of the States,
even though there may have been no malicious design in
so doing;1 * but other cases hold that, where the inspec- [* 617]
tors are vested by the law with the power to pass upon
the qualifications of electors, they exercise judicial functions in so
doing, and are entitled to the same protection as other judicial
officers in the discharge of their duty, and cannot be made liable
except upon proof of express malice.2 Where, however, by the
law under which the election is held, the inspectors are to receive
the voter's ballot, if ho takes the oath that he possesses the con-
stitutional qualifications, the oath is the conclusive evidence on
which the inspectors are to act, and they are not at liberty to
refuse to administer the oath, or to refuse the vote after the oath
has been taken. They are only ministerial officers in such a
case, and have no discretion but to obey the law and receive
the vote.3
The Conduct of the Election.
The statutes of the different States point out specifically the
mode in which elections shall be conducted; but, although there
are great diversities of detail, the same general principles govern
them all. As the execution of these statutes must very often fall
majority of the voters of the district, then the act will not be deemed to have
been submitted to the required vote, and the result will not be declared upon the
votes legally cast, adverse to what it would have been had no illegality inter-
vened.
'Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236; Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. 244, note; Lin-
coln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; Gates v. Neal,
23 Pick. 308; Blanchard p. Stearns, 5 Met. 298; Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio,
372; Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duvall, 63; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, n. s. 665;
Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.
* Carter v. Harrison, 5 Blackf. 138; Rail p. Potts, 8 Humph. 225; Peavey v.
Robbins, 3 Jones, Law, 339; Gordon v. Farrar, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 411; Caulfield
p. Bullock, 18 B. Monp. 494; Morgan v. Dudley, ib. 693; Friend p. Hamill, 34
Md. 298; Goetcheus p. Matthewson, 5 Lans. 214.
3 Spriggins v. Houghton, 2 Scam. 377; State p. Robb, 17 Ind. 536; People v.
Pease, 30 Barb. 588. And see People v. Gordon, 5 Call. 235; Chrisman p. Bruce,
1 Duvall, 63; Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.
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to the hands of men unacquainted with the law and unschooled in
business, it is inevitable that mistakes shall sometimes occur, and
that very often the law will fail of strict compliance. Where an
election is thus rendered irregular, whether the irregularity shall
avoid it or not must depend generally upon the effect the failure
to comply strictly with the law may have had in obstructing the
complete expression of the popular will, or the production of sat-
isfactory evidence thereof. Election statutes are to be tested like
other statutes, but with a leaning to liberality, in view of the great
public purposes which they accomplish; and except where they
specifically provide that a thing shall be done in the man-
[* 618] ner indicated and not otherwise, * their provisions designed
merely for the information and guidance of the officers
must be regarded as directory only, and the election will not be
defeated by a failure to comply with them, providing the irregu-
larity has not hindered any who were entitled from exercising the
right of suffrage, or rendered doubtful the evidences from which
the result was to be declared. In a leading case the following
irregularities were held not to vitiate the election:. the accidental
substitution of another book for the holy evangelists in the admin-
istration of an oath, both parties being ignorant of the error at
the time; the holding of the election by persons who were not
officers de jure, but who had colorable authority, and acted de facto
in good faith;1 the failure of the board of inspectors to appoint
clerks of the election; the closing of the outer door of the room
where the election was held at sundown, and then permitting the
persons within the room to vote; it not appearing that legal voters
were excluded by closing the door, or illegal allowed to vote; and
the failure of the inspectors or clerks to take the prescribed oath
of office. And it was said, in the same case, that any irregularity
in conducting an election which does not deprive a legal voter of
his vote, or admit a disqualified voter to vote, or cast uncertainty
on the result, and has not been occasioned by the agency of a
party seeking to derive a benefit from it, should be overlooked in
a proceeding to try the right to an office depending on such elec-
1 As to what constitutes an officer de facto, the reader is referred to the care-
ful opinion in State v. Carroll, 88 Conn. 449; 8. c. 9 Am. Rep. 409. Also to
Fowler ». Beebe, 9 Mass. 231; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 131; Commonwealth
o. McCombs, 56 Penn. St. 486; Ex parte Strang, 21 Ohio, N. 8. 610; Kimball
v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151, and authorities referred to in these cases severally.
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CH. XVII.] THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL. * 618
tion.1 This rule is an eminently proper one, and it furnishes a
very satisfactory test as to what is essential and what not
in election laws.2 And where a party contests * an election [* 619]
on the ground of these or any similar irregularities, he
ought to aver and be able to show that the result was affected by
1 People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67. To the same effect, see
Clifton v. Cook, 7 Ala. 114; Truehart r. Addicks, 2 Texas, 217; Dishon v.
Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420; State v. Jones, 19
Ind. 356; People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Gorham v. Campbell, 2 Cal. 135;
People v. Bates, 11 Mich. 362; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 112; People v.
McManus, 34 Barb. 620 ; Whipley v. McCune, 12 Cal. 352; Bourland v. Hildreth,
26 Cal. 161; Day v. Kent, 1 Oregon, 123; Piatt v. People, 29 111. 54; Ewing v.
Fillcy, 43 Penn. St. 384; Howard v. Shields, 16 Ohio, n. s. 184; State v. Stumpf,
21 Wis. 579; McKinnoy v. O'Connor, 26 Texas, 5; Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal.
173. In Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42, it was held, that, where the statute required
the inspectors to certify the result of the election on the next day thereafter, or
sooner, the certificate made the second day thereafter was sufficient, the statute
as to time being directory merely. In People v. McManus, 34 Barb. 620, it
was held that an election was not made void by the fact that one of the three
inspectors was by the statute disqualified from acting, by being a candidate at
the election, the other two being qualified. In Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal. 173,
it was decided that where the judges of an election could not read, and for that
reason a person who was not a member of the board took the ballots from the
box, and read them to the tellers, at the request of the judges, the election was
not affected by the irregularity.
* This rule has certainly been applied with great liberality, in some cases. In
People r. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233, it was held that the statute requiring ballots to
be sealed up in a package, and then locked up in the ballot-box, with the orifice
at the top sealed, was directory merely, and that ballots which had been kept in
a locked box, but without the orifice closed or the ballots sealed up, were admis-
sible in evidence in a contest for an office depending upon this election. This
case was followed in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, and it was held that whether
the ballots were more satisfactory evidence than the inspector's certificates, where
a discrepancy appeared between them, was a question for the jury. In Morril
v. Haines, 2 N. H. 246, the statute required State officers to be chosen by a
check-list, and by delivery of the ballots to the moderator in person; and'it was
held that the requirement of a check-list was mandatory, and the election in the
town was void if none was kept. The decision was put upon the ground that
the check-list was provided as an important guard against indiscriminate and
illegal voting, and the votes given by ballot without this protection were there-
fore as much void as if given viva voce. An election adjourned without warrant
to another place, as well as an election held without the officers required by law,
is void. Commonwealth v. County Commissioners, 5 Rawle, 75. An unauthor-
ized adjournment of the election for dinner — it appearing to have been in good
faith, and no one having been deprived of his vote thereby — will not defeat the
election. Fry v. Booth, 19 Ohio, n. s. 25.
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them.1 Time and place, however, are of the substance of every
election,2 and a failure to comply with the law in these particulars
is not generally to be treated as a mere irregularity.3
What is a Sufficient Election.
Unless the law under which the election is held expressly re-
quires more, a plurality of the votes cast will be sufficient to elect,
notwithstanding these may constitute but a small portion
[*620] of those * who are entitled to vote,4 and notwithstanding
the voters generally may have failed to take notice of the
law requiring the election to be held.6
If several persons are to be chosen to the same office, the requi-
site number who shall stand highest on the list will be elected.
But without such a plurality no one can be chosen to a public
office; and if the person receiving the highest number of votes was
1 Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175; People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283 ; Tay-
lor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107.
• Dickey v. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343; Knowles v. Yeates, 31 Cal. 82.
1 The statute of Michigan requires the clerks of election to keep lists of the
persons voting, and that at the close of the polls the first duty of the inspectors
shall be to compare the lists with the number of votes in the box, and if the
count of the latter exceeds the former, then to draw out unopened and destroy a
sufficient number to make them correspond. In People p. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283,
it appeared that the inspectors in two wards of Detroit, where a surplus of votes
had been found, had neglected this duty, and had counted all the votes without
drawing out and destroying any. The surplus in the two wards was sixteen.
The actual majority of one of the candidates over the other on the count as it
stood (if certain other disputed votes were rejected) would be foup. It was held
that this neglect of the inspectors did not invalidate the election; that had the
votes been drawn out, the probability was that each candidate would lose a num-
ber proportioned to the whole number which he had in the box; and this being a
probability which the statute providing for the drawing proceeded upon, the court
should apply it afterwards, apportioning the excess of votes between the candi-
dates in that proportion.
4 Augustin v. Eggleston, 12 La. An. 366; Gillespie p. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.
See also State v. Mayor, &c, of St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 270; State v. Binder, 38
Mo. 450.
'People p. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508. Even if the majority expressly dissent,
yet if they do not vote, the election by the minority will be valid. Oldknow p.
Wainwright, 1 W. Bl. 229; Rex p. Foxcroft, 2 Burp. 1017; Rex p. Withers,
referred to in same case. Minority representation in certain cases has been
introduced in New York, Pennsylvania, and 11linois, and the principle is likely
to find favor elsewhere.
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CH. XVII.] THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL. * * 620
ineligible, the votes cast for him will still be effectual so far as to
prevent the opposing candidate being chosen, and the election
must be considered as having failed.1
The admission of illegal votes at an election will not necessarily
defeat it, but to warrant its being set aside on that ground it
should appear that the result would have been different had they
been excluded.2 And the fact that unqualified persons are allowed
to enter the room, and participate in an election, does not justify
legal voters in refusing to vote, and treating the election as void,
but it will be held valid if the persons declared chosen had a
plurality of the legal votes actually cast.3 So it is held that an
exclusion of legal votes—not fraudulently, but through error in
judgment — will not defeat an election; notwithstanding the error
in such a case is one which there was no mode of correcting, even
by the aid of the courts, since it cannot be known with certainty
afterwards how the excluded electors would have voted, and it
would obviously be dangerous to receive and rely upon their sub-
sequent statements as to their intentions, after it is ascer-
tained precisely what effect their * votes would have upon [* 621]
the result.4 If, however, the inspectors of election shall
exclude legal voters, not because of honest error in judgment, but
1 State v. Giles, 1 Chand. 112; Opinions of Judges, 38 Maine, 597; State v.
Smith, 14 Wis. 497; Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; Fish v. Collens, 21 La.
An. 289; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 135. In People v. Molliter, 23 Mich. 841, a
minority candidate claimed the election on the ground that the votes cast for his
opponent, though a majority, were ineffectual because the name was abbreviated.
Held, that they were at least effectual to preclude the election of a candidate who
received a less numbeV. But it has been held that if the ineligibility is notorious,
so that the electors must be deemed to have voted with full knowledge of it, the
votes for the ineligible candidate must be declared void, and the next highest
candidate is chosen. Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93; Carson v. McPhetridge, 15
Ind. 327; People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451. So if the law which creates the dis-
qualification expressly declares all votes cast for the disqualified person void,
they must be treated as mere blank votes, and cannot be counted for any
purpose.
* Ex parte Murphy, 7 Cow. 153; First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick.
148; Blandford School District v. Gibbs, 2 Cush. 39; People v. Cicotte, 16
Mich. 283; Judkins v. Hill, 60 N. H. 140. Votes received illegally will be
rejected by the court in an action to try title to an office. State v. Hilmantel,
21 Wis. 566.
* First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.
4 Newcum v. Kirtley, 13 B. Monr. 615. See Burke o. Supervisors of Monroe,
4 W. Va. 371.
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wilfully and corruptly, and to an extent that affects the result, or
if by riots or otherwise legal voters are intimidated and prevented
from voting, or for any other reasons the electors have not had
opportunity for the expression of their sentiments through the
ballot-box, the election should be set aside altogether, as having
failed in the purpose for which it was called.1 Errors of judgment
are inevitable, but fraud, intimidation, and violence the law can
and should protect against. A mere casual affray, however, or
accidental disturbance, without any intention of overawing or
intimidating the electors, cannot be considered as affecting the
freedom of the election;2 nor in any case would electors be justi-
fied in abandoning the ground for any light causes, or for improper
interference by others where the officers continue in the discharge
of their functions, and there is opportunity for the electors to
vote.3 And, as we have already seen, a failure of an election in
one precinct, or disorder or violence which prevent a return from
that precinct, will not defeat the whole election, unless it appears
that the votes which could not be returned in consequence of the
violence would have changed the result.4 It is a little difficult at
times to adopt the true mean between those things which should
and those which should not defeat an election; for while on the
one hand the law should seek to secure the due expression of his
will by every legal voter, and guard against any irregularities or
misconduct that may tend to prevent it, so, on the other hand, it
is to be borne in mind that charges of irregularity and misconduct
are easily made, and that the dangers from throwing elections
open to be set aside or controlled by oral evidence, are perhaps as
great as any in our system. An election honestly conducted under
the forms of law ought generally to stand, notwithstanding indi-
vidual electors may have been deprived of their votes, or unquali-
fied voters have been allowed to participate. Individuals may
1 Where one receives a majority of all the votes cast, the opposing candidate
cannot be declaped elected on evidence that legal voters sufficient to change the
result offered to vote for him, but were erroneously denied the right; but the
election may be declared to have failed, and a new election be ordered. Renner
v. Bennett, 21 Ohio, n. s. 431. See also Matter of Long Island R.R. Co., 19
Wend. 37; People v. Phillips, 1 Denio, 389; State p. McDaniel, 22 Ohio, w. s.
354.
* Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 184.
'See First Pariah in Sudbury p. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.
* Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42. Sec ante, p. 616 and note.
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suffer wrong in such cases, and a candidate who was the real
choice of the people may sometimes be deprived of his election;
but as it is generally impossible to arrive at any greater
certainty of "result by resort to oral evidence, public [*622]
policy is best subserved by allowing the election to stand,
and trusting to a strict enforcement of the criminal laws for
greater security against the like irregularities and wrongs in the
future.
The Canvass and the Return.
If the election is purely a local one, the inspectors who have had
charge of the election canvass the votes and declare the result. If,
on the other hand, their district is one precinct of a larger district,
they make return in writing of the election over which they have
presided to the proper board of the larger district; and if the
election is for State officers, this district board will transmit the
result of the district canvass to the proper State board, who will
declare the general result. In all this the several boards act for
the most part ministerially only, and are not vested with judicial
powers to correct the errors and mistakes that may have occurred
with any officer who preceded them in the performance of any duty
connected with the election, or to pass upon any disputed fact
which may affect the result.1 Each board is to receive the returns
transmitted to it, if in due form, as correct, and is to ascertain and
declare tire result as shown by such returns ;2 and if other matters
are introduced into the return than those which the law provides,
they are to that extent unofficial, and such statements must be
disregarded.8 If a district or State board of canvassers assumes
1 State v. Charleston, 1 S. C. (n. 8.) 30. And see cases cited in the next
note.
9 Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42; Brower v. O'Brien, 2 Ind. 423; People v. Hil-
liard, 29 I1L 413 ; People v. Jones, 19 Ind. 357; Ballou r. York County Com'rs,
13 Shcp. 491; Mayo v. Freeland, 10 Mo. 629; Thompson v. Circuit Judge,
9 Ala. o38; People v. Kilduff. 16 III. 492; O'Farrell c. Colby, 2 Minn. 180;
People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People v. Van Slyck, 4 Cow. 297; Morgan
v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; People v. Cook,
14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67 ; Hartt v. Harvey, 32 Barb. 55; Attorney-General
v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567; Attorney-General v. Ely, ib. 420; State v. Governor,
1 Dutch. 331; State v. Clerk of Passaic, ib. 354; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan,
68; People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45.
• Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42.
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to reject returns transmitted to it on other grounds than those
appearing upon its face, or to declare persons elected who are not
shown by the returns to have received the requisite plurality, it is
usurping functions, and its conduct will be reprehensible, if not
even criminal. The action of such boards is to be carefully con-
fined to an examination of the papers before them, and a
[* 623] determination of the * result therefrom, in the light of
such facts of public notoriety connected with the election
as every one takes notice of, and which may enable them to apply
such ballots as are in any respect imperfect to the proper candi-
dates or offices for which they are intended, provided the intent is
sufficiently indicated by the ballot in connection with such facts, so
that extraneous evidence is not necessary for this purpose. If
canvassers refuse or neglect to perform their duty, they may be
compelled by mandamus;1 though as these boards are created
for a single purpose only, and are dissolved by an adjournment
without day, it has been held that, after such adjournment, man-
damus would be inapplicable, inasmuch as there is no longer any
board which can act;2 and the board themselves, having once
performed and fully completed their duty, have no power after-
wards to reconsider their determination and come to a different
conclusion.3
Contesting Elections.
As the election officers perform for the most part ministerial
functions only, their returns, and the certificates of election which
are issued upon them, are not conclusive in favor of the officers
who would thereby appear to be chosen, but the final decision must
rest with the courts.4 This is the general rule, and the exceptions
1 Clark v. McKenzie, 7 Bush, 523; Burke v. Supervisors of Monroe, 4 W.
Va. 371; State v. County Judge, 7 Iowa, 186; Magee v. Supervisors, 10 Cal.
876.
* Clark v. Buchanan, 2 Minn. 316; People p. Supervisors, 12 Barb. 217.
Contra, State v. Gibbs, 13 Fla. 55.
• Hadley v. Mayor, &c, 33 N. Y. 603; State v. Warren, 1 Houston, 43;
State v. Harrison, 38 Mo. 540. If they recount and give the certificate to
another, such action is a mere nullity. Bowen v. Hixon, 45 Mo. 340; People
v. Robertson, Mich. Sup. Court, July, 1873.
4 State v. Justices of Middlesex, Coxe, 244; Hill p. Hill, 4 McCord, 277;
Wammack v. Holloway, 2 Ala. 31; State p. Clerk of Passaic, 1 Dutch. 354;
Marshall p. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68; Attorney-General v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567; At-
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are of those cases where the law under which the canvass is made
declares the decision conclusive, or where a special statutory board
is established with powers of final decision.1 And it mat-
ters not how * high and important the office; an election [* 624]
to it is only made by the candidate receiving the requisite
plurality of the legal votes cast; and if any one, without having
r eceived such plurality, intrudes into an office, whether with or
without a certificate of election, the courts have jurisdiction to
oust, as well as to punish him for such intrusion.2
torney-General r. Ely, ib. 420; People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People
v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 211; State v. Johnson, 17
Ark. 407; State r. Fetter, 12 Wis. 566; State v. Avery, 14 Wis. 122; People v.
Jones, 20 Cal. 50; Newcum v. Kirtley, 13 B. Monr. 515 ; People t». Van Slyck, 4
Cow. 297; People o. Vail, 20 Wend. 12; People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409; Peo-
ple r. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67; People v. Matteson, 17 111. 167;
Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; Calaveras County r. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325.
An illegal election may be contested and set aside even though but one person
was voted for. Ex parte Ellyson, 20 Grat. 10.
1 See Grier v. Shackleford, Const. Rep. 642; Batman r. Megowan, 1 Met.
(Ky.) 533; People v. Goodwin, 22 Mich. 496; State p. Marlow, 15 Ohio, n. 8.114.
For the proceedings in the State of New York in the canvass of votes for governor
in 1792, where the election of John Jay to that office was defeated by the rejec-
tion of votes cast for him for certain irregularities, which under the more recent
judicial decisions ought to have been overlooked, see Hammond's Political His-
tory of New York, c. 3. The law then in force made the decision of the State
canvassers final and conclusive.
* Barstow, being Governor of Wisconsin, was candidate for re-election against
Bashford. A majority of the votes was cast for Bashford, but certain spurious
returns were transmitted to the State canvassers, which, together with the legal
returns, showed a plurality for Barstow, and he was accordingly declared chosen.
Proceedings being taken against him by quo warranto in the Supreme Court,
Barstow objected to the jurisdiction, on the ground that the three departments of
the State government, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, were equal,
co-ordinate, and independent of each other, and that each department must be
and is the ultimate j udge of the election and qualification of its own member or
members, subject only to impeachment and appeal to the people; that the question
who is rightfully entitled to the office of governor could in no case become a
judicial question; and that as the constitution provides no means for ousting a
successful usurper of either of the three departments of the government, that
power rests exclusively with the people, to be exercised by them whenever they
think the exigency requires it. A strange doctrine in this country of laws! but
which, of course, received no countenance from the able court to which it was
addressed. In People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, the opinion is expressed by two
of the judges, that one claiming a public office has a constitutional right to a trial
by jury, and that this right cannot be taken away from him by any law which
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Where, however, the question arises collaterally, and not in a
direct proceeding to try the title to the office, the correctness of
the decision of the canvassers cannot' be called in question, but
must be conclusively presumed to be correct;1 and where the
election was to a legislative office, the final decision, as well by
parliamentary law as by constitutional provisions, rests with the
legislative body itself, and the courts, as we have heretofore seen,2
cannot interfere.
The most important question which remains to be mentioned,
relates to the evidence which the courts are at liberty to receive,
and the facts which it is proper to spread before the jury
[* 625] for their * consideration when an issue is made upon an
election for trial at law.
The questions involved in every case are, first, has there been
an election? and second, was the party who has taken possession
of the office the successful candidate at such election, by having
received a majority of the legal votes cast? These are ques-
tions which involve mixed considerations of law and fact, and
the proper proceeding in which to try them in the courts is by quo
warranto, when no special statutory tribunal is created for the
purpose.3
Upon the first question, we shall not add to what we have
already said. When the second is to be considered, it is to be
constantly borne in mind that the point of inquiry is the will of the
electors as manifested by their ballots; and to this should all the
evidence be directed, and none that does not bear upon it should
be admissible.
We have already seen that the certificates or determinations of
the various canvassing boards, though conclusive in collateral
inquiries, do not preclude an investigation by the courts into the
facts which they certify. They are prima facie evidence, however,
shall undertake to make the decision of the canvassing board conclusive. But see
Ewing v. Filley, 48 Penn. St. 384; Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Penn. St. 332.
1 Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72; Hadley p. Mayor, &c, 33 N. Y. 603;
Howard p. Diarmid, 26 Ark. 100. And see Hulseman v. Rens, 41 Penn. St. 396,
where it was held that the court could not interfere summarily to set aside a
certificate of election, where it did not appear that the officers had acted cor-
ruptly, notwithstanding it was shown to be based in part upon forged returns.
* See ante, p. 133. See also Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Penn. St. 341.
* People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 167; People v. Cover, 50 11l. 100.
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even in the courts;1 and this is so, notwithstanding alterations
appear; the question of their fairness in such a case being for the
jury.2 But back of this prima facie case the courts may go, and
the determinations of the State board may be corrected by those of
the district boards, and the latter by the ballots themselves when
the ballots are still in existence and have been kept as required by
law.3 If, however, the ballots have not been kept as required by
law, and surrounded by such securities as the law has prescribed
with a view to their safe preservation as the best evidence of the
election, it would seem that they should not be received in evi-
dence at all,4 or, if received, that it should be left to the jury to
determine, upon all the circumstances of the case, whether they
constitute more reliable evidence than the inspectors' certificate,6
which is usually prepared immediately on the close of
* the election, and upon actual count of the ballots as [* 626]
then made by the officers whose duty it is to do so.
Something has already been said regarding the evidence which -
can be received where the elector's ballot is less complete and
perfect in its expression of intention than, it should have been.
There can be no doubt under the authorities that, whenever a
question may arise as to the proper application of a ballot, any
evidence is admissible with a view to explain and apply it which
would be admissible under the general rules of evidence for the
purpose of explaining and applying other written instruments.
But the rule, as it appears to us, ought not to go further. The
evidence ought to be confined to proof of the concomitant circum-
stances; such circumstances as may be proved in support or
explanation of a contract, where the parties themselves would not
be allowed to give testimony as to their actual intention, when
1 Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68; Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72;
Calaveras County v. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325.
* State v. Adams, 2 Stew. 231. See State v. Hilmantel, 23 Wis. 422.
'People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; State
v. Clerk of Passaic, 1 Dutch. 354; State v. Judge, &c, 13 Ala. 805; People v.
Cook, 14 Barb. 259; s. c. 8 N. Y. 67; People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; At-
torney-General o. Ely, 4 Wis. 420. The ballot is always the best evidence of
the voter's action. Wheat v. Ragsdale, 27 Ind. 191; People v. Holden, 28 Cal.
123.
4 People o. Sackett, 14 Mich. 320. But see People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233.
s People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.
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unfortunately the intention was ineffectually expressed.1 And we
have seen that no evidence is admissible as to how parties intended
to vote who were wrongfully prevented or excluded from so doing.
Such a case is one of wrong without remedy, so far as candidates
are concerned.2 There is more difficulty, however, when the
question arises whether votes which have been cast by incom-
petent persons, and which have been allowed in the canvass, can
afterwards be inquired into and rejected because of the want of
qualification.
If votes were taken viva voce, so that it could always be deter-
mined with absolute certainty how every person had voted, the
objections to this species of scrutiny after an election had been
held would not be very formidable. But when secret balloting is
the policy of the law, and no one is at liberty to inquire how any
elector has voted, except as he may voluntarily have waived his
privilege, and when consequently the avenues to correct informa-
tion concerning the votes cast are carefully guarded against ju-
dicial exploration, it seems exceedingly dangerous to permit auy
question to be raised upon this subject. For the evidence volun-
tarily given upon any such question will usually come from those
least worthy of credit, who, if they have voted without legal right
in order to elect particular candidates, will be equally
[* 627] ready to testify * falsely, if their testimony can be made
to help the same candidates; especially when, if they give
evidence that they voted the opposing ticket, there cau usually be
no means, as they will well know, of showing the evidence to be
untrue.3 Moreover, to allow such scrutiny is to hold out strong
temptation to usurpation of office, without pretence or color of
right; since the nature of the case, and the forms and proceed-
ings necessary to a trial are such that, if an issue may be made on
the right of every individual voter, it will be easy, in the case of
1 People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 84, per Denio, Ch. J., commenting upon previ-
ous New York cases. See also Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420.
* See ante, 620.
* It has been decided in Wisconsin that where an unqualified person is called
to prove that he voted at an election, and declines to testify, the fact of his having
voted may be proved, and then his declarations may be put in evidence to. show
how he voted. State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 319. This may give the incompetent
voter a double vote. First, he votes for the ticket of his choice, and then, on a
contest, he declares he voted the other way, and a deduction is made from the
opposite vote accordingly.
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important elections, to prolong a contest for the major part if not
the whole of an official term, and to keep perpetually before the
courts the same excitements, strifes, and animosities which char-
acterize the hustings, and which ought, for the peace of the com-
munity, and the safety and stability of our institutions, to terminate
with the close of the polls.1
Upon this subject there is very little judicial authority, though
legislative bodies, deriving their precedents from England, where
the system of open voting prevails, have always been, accustomed
to receive such evidence, and have indeed allowed a latitude of
inquiry which makes more to depend upon the conscience of the
witnesses, and of legislative committees, in some cases, than upon
the legitimate action of the voters. The question of the right to
inquire into the qualifications of those who had voted at an elec-
tion, on a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto, was directly
presented in one case to the Supreme Court of New York, and the
court was equally divided upon it.'- On error to the Court of
Appeals, a decision in favor of the right was rendered with the
concurrence of five judges, against three dissentients.3 The same
question afterwards came before the Supreme Court of Michigan,
and was decided the same way, though it appears from the opin-
ions that the court were equally divided in their views.4 To these
cases we must refer for a full discussion of the reasons influencing
the several judges; but future decisions alone can give the ques-
tion authoritative settlement.5
1 This is one reason, perhaps, why in the case of State officers a statutory
tribunal is sometimes provided with powers of summary and final decision.
• People v. Pease, 30 Barb. 588.
» People v. Pease, 29 N. Y. 45.
4 People v. Cicotte, 1G Mich. 283. See further the case of State v. Hilmantel,
23 Wis. 422, where it was decided that those who had voted illegally might be
compelled to testify for whom they voted. The question was discussed but briefly,
and as one of privilege merely.
* Considerable stress was laid by the majority of the New York Court of
Appeals on the legislative practice, which, as it seems to us, is quite too loose in
these cases to constitute a safe guide. Some other rulings in that case also seem
more latitudinarian than is warranted by sound principle and a due regard to the
secret ballot system which we justly esteem so important. Thus, Selden, J.,
says: "When a voter refuses to disclose or fails to remember for whom he voted,
I think it is competent to resort to circumstantial evidence to raise a presump-
tion in regard to that fact. Such is the established rule in election cases before
legislative committees, which assume to be governed by legal rules of evidence
[ 739]
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(Cush. Leg. Assem. §§ 199 and 200); and within that rule it was proper, in
connection with the other circumstances stated by the witness Loftis, to ask him
for whom he intended to vote; not, however, on the ground that his intention,
as an independent fact, could be material, but on the ground that it was a cir-
cumstance tending to raise a presumption for whom he did vote." Now a«, in
the absence of fraud or mistake, you have arrived at a knowledge of how the
man voted, when you have ascertained how, at the time, he intended to vote, it
is difficult to discover much value in the elector's privilege of secrecy under this
ruling. And if " circumstances" may be shown to determine how he probably
voted, in cases where he insists upon his constitutional right to secrecy, then, as
it appears to us, it would be better to abolish altogether the secret ballot than to
continue longer a system which falsely promises secrecy, at the same time that it
gives to party spies and informers full license to invade the voters privilege in
secret and surreptitious ways, and which leaves jurors, in the absence of any
definite information, to act upon their guesses, surmises, and vague conjectures
as to the contents of a ballot.
Upon the right to inquire into the qualifications of those who have voted, in a
proceeding by quo warranto to test the right to a public office, Justice Chris-
tiancy, in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 311, expresses his views as follows: —
"I cannot go to the extent of holding that no inquiry is admissible in any case
into the qualification of voters or the nature of the votes given. Such a rule, I
admit, would be easy of application, and, as a general rule, might not be produc-
tive of a great amount of injustice, while the multitude of distinct questions of
fact in reference to the great number of voters whose qualifications may be con-
tested, is liable to lead to some embarrassment, and sometimes to protracted
trials, without a more satisl'actory result than would have been attained under a
rule which should exclude all such inquiries. Still, I cannot avoid the conclusion
that in theory and spirit our constitution and our statutes recognize as valid
those votes only which are given by electors who possess the constitutional quali-
fications; that they recognize as valid such elections only as are effected by the
votes of a majority of such qualified electors; and though the election boards of
inspectors and canvassers, acting only ministerially, are bound in their decisions
by the number of votes deposited in accordance with the forms of law regulating
their action, it is quite evident that illegal votes may have been admitted by the
perjury or other fault of the voters, and that the majority to which the inspectors
have been constrained to certify and the canvassers to allow has been thus wrong-
fully and illegally secured; and I have not been able to satisfy myself that in
such a case, these boards, acting thus ministerially, and often compelled to admit
votes which they know to be illegal, were intended to constitute tribunals of last
resort for the determination of the rights of parties claiming an election. If this
were so, and there were no legal redress, I think there would be much reason to
apprehend that elections would degenerate into mere contests of fraud.
"The person having the greatest number of the votes of legally qualified
electors, it seems to me, has a constitutional right to the office; and if no inquiry
can be had into the qualification of any voter, here is a constitutional right de-
pending upon a mode of trial unknown to the constitution, and, as I am strongly
inclined to think, oppoed to its provisions. I doubt the competency of the
[740]
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CH. XVII.] THE EXPRESSION OP THE POPULAR WILL. * 629
legislature, should they attempt it, which I think they have not, to make the
decision of inspectors or canvassers final under our constitution."
The opposite view is expressed by Justice Campbell as follows (ib. p. 294): —
"The first inquiry is whether an election can be defeated as to any candidate
by showing him to have received illegal votes. The authorities upon election
questions are, in this country, neither numerous nor satisfactory. In England,
where votes are given viva voce, it is always easy to determine how any voter has
given his voice. And in some States of the Union, a system seems to prevail
of numbering each ballot as given, and also numbering the voter's name on the
poll list, so as to furnish means of verification when necessary. It has always
been held, and is not disputed, that illegal votes do not avoid an election, unless
it can be shown that their reception affects the result. And where the illegality
consists in the casting of votes by persons unqualified, unless it is shown for
whom they voted, it cannot be allowed to change the result.
"The question of the power of courts to inquire into the action of the author-
ities in receiving or rejecting votes is, therefore, very closely connected with the
power of inquiring what persons were voted for by those whose qualifications are
denied. It is argued for the relator that neither of these inquiries can be made.
No use can fairly be made in such a controversy as the present of decisions or
practice arising out of any system of open voting. The ballot system was de-
signed to prevent such publicity, and not to encourage it. And the course
adopted by legislative bodies cannot be regarded as a safe guide for courts of
justice. There is little uniformity in it, and much of it is based on English pre-
cedents belonging to a different practice. The view taken of contested elections
by these popular bodies is not always accurate, or consistent with any settled
principles.
"There is no case so far as I have been able to discover, under any system of
voting by closed ballot, which has held that any account could be taken of re jected
votes in a suit to try title for office. The statutes here, and probably elsewhere,
require the election to be made out by the votes given. But it is plain enough
that in most cases it would be quite as easy to determine for whom a rejected
voter would have voted as for whom any other actually did vote. In many cases
it would be easier, because the vote is always ready and tendered with better
opportunities of observation than are given where it is received and deposited.
But the element of uncertainty has been regarded as sufficient to cause the rejec-
tion of any such inquiry, and, in most cases, probably it would not be admissible
under the statutes. But the policy which leads to this result must have some
bearing upon the construction of the whole system.
"So far as I have been able to discover by means of the somewhat imperfect
indexes on this head, there is but one case in which the decision has turned upon
the propriety of allowing inquiry into the qualifications of voters, and the iden-
tification of their tickets when claimed to be disqualified. That case was the
case of People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45. In the Supreme Court the judges,
although arriving at a general result, were equally divided on this point. In the
Court of Appeals, the judges elected to that tribunal were also equally divided,
and the majority of the Supreme Court judges, belonging to it by rotation,
turned the scale, and decided that the inquiry was proper. The decision was
based chiefly upon English authorities; the previous New York decisions hav-
[ 741 ]
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ing turned principally on other errors which rest upon somewhat different
grounds.
"New York, so far as may be inferred from the absence of decisions else-
where, seems, until recently, to have been the only State preserving the ballot
system, in which the right to office by election is open to examination on the
merits to any considerable extent. The courts of that State have gone farther
than any others in opening the door to parol proof. Some of the Western
States have, upon the authority of the New York cases, permitted some of these
matters to be litigated, but they are not in any majority. And it is quite mani-
fest that the decisions have not in general acted upon any careful consideration
of the important questions of public policy underlying the ballot system, which
are so forcibly explained by Denio, Ch. J., in his opinion in People v. Pease;
and it is a little remarkable that in New York, while so many doors have been
opened by the decisions, the law requires all the ballots, except a single speci-
men of each kind, to be destroyed; thus leaving the number of votes of each
kind, in all cases, to be determined by the inspectors, and rendering any cor-
rection impossible. I think the weight of reasoning is in favor of the view of
Judge Denio in the New York case, that no inquiry can be made into the legality
of votes actually deposited by a voter upon any ground of personal right as an
elector.
"The reasons why such an inquiry should be prevented do not necessarily rest
on any assumption that the inspectors act throughout judicially, although under
our registration system that objection has a force which would not otherwise be
so obvious. Neither do they rest in any degree upon the assumption that one
rule or another is most likely to induce perjury, as very hastily intimated in
People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. 102. But a very strong ground for them is found
in the fact that our whole ballot system is based upon the idea that, unless invio-
lable secrecy is preserved concerning every voter's action, there can be no safety
against those personal or political influences which destroy individual freedom of
choice.
"It is altogether idle to expect that there can be any such protection where
the voter is only allowed to withhold his own oath concerning the ticket he has
voted, while any other prying meddler can be permitted in a court of justice to
guess under oath at its contents. If the law could permit an inquiry at all, there
is no reason whatever for preventing an inquiry from the voter himself, who
alone can actually know how he voted, and who can suffer no more by being
compelled to answer than by having the fact established otherwise. The reason
why the ballot is made obligatory by our constitution is to secure every one the
right of preventing any one else from knowing how he voted, and there is no
propriety in any rule which renders such a safeguard valueless.
"It has always been the case that the rules of evidence have, on grounds of
public policy, excluded proof tending to explain how individuals have acted in
positions where secrecy was designed for their protection or that of the public.
No grand juror could be permitted to disclose as a witness the ballots given by
himself or others upon investigations of crime. Informers cannot be compelled
to disclose to whom they have given their information. And many official facts
are denied publicity. In all of these cases, the rule is not confined to one person
any more than to another; for public policy is against publication from any
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CH. XVII.] THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL. * 631
source. And if, as is clear, a man is entitled to keep his own vote secret, it is
difficult to see how any testimony whatever can be allowed, from any source, to
identify and explain it.
"The statutes contain some provisions bearing upon these topics with consid-
erable force. By sec. 47 of the Compiled Laws, every voter is compelled to
deliver bis ballot folded; and, by sec. 52, the inspector is prohibited from either
opening or permitting it to be opened.
"The devices adopted for creating different appearances in the ballots of
different parties are such palpable evasions of the spirit of the law as to go very
far towards destroying the immunity of the voter, and in some States it has
been found desirable to attempt by statute the prevention of such tricks; but the
difficulty of doing this effectually is exemplified in People v. Kiiduff, 15 111. 492,
where the evidence seems to have shown that a uniform variation may be entirely
accidental. Unless some such difference exists, it would be idle to attempt any
proof how a person voted, and it would be better to do away at once with the
whole ballot than to have legal tribunals give any aid or countenance to indirect
violations of its security; and the evidence received in the present case exempli-
fies the impropriety of such investigations. In some instances, at least, the only
proof that a voter, complained of as illegal, cast his ballot for one or the other
of these candidates, was, that he voted a ticket externally appearing to belong to
one of the two political parties, and containing names of both State and county
officers. To allow such proof to be received in favor of or against any particular
candidate on the ticket, is to allow very remote circumstances indeed to assume
the name of evidence. And the necessity of resorting to such out-of-the-way
proofs only puts in a clearer light the impropriety and illegality of entering upon
any such inquiry, when the law sedulously destroys the only real proofs, and will
not tolerate a resort to them. And the whole State is much more interested than
any single citizen can be, in emancipating elections from all those sinister influ-
ences, which have so great a tendency to coerce or deceive electors into becoming
the mere instruments of others. *
"But there are further provisions bearing more directly on the propriety and
necessity of allowing no inquisition into individual votes.
"County officers are among those included under sec. 31 of the Compiled
Laws, which declares that ' the persons having the greatest number of votes shall
be deemed to have been duly elected.1 The law does not confine this to votes
cast by authorized voters, and can only be applied to votes cast and recorded in
the manner provided by law. And although this section, standing alone, might
be open to construction, yet, when the whole law is taken together, there are
provisions not to be reconciled with any rule allowing single voters and their
votes to be made the subject of inquiry. It will not be denied, that an inquiry
into the legality of a particular voter's qualifications, after his vote has been
cast, is of a strictly judicial nature; and it cannot be proper or legal to allow
such an inquiry in one case, and not in another. But it will be found not only
that the rejection of votes from the count is required to be in such a way as to
preclude any consideration of the person giving or putting them in, but that
there are cases where even a legal inquiry into the ballots themselves is pre-
vented.
"In the first place, when two or more ballots are so folded together as to
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present tbe appearance of one, and if counted will make tbe ballots exceed the
names on the poll-list, they are to be destroyed. And whenever, for any other
reason, the number of ballots found in tbe box exceed.i the number of names on
the corrected poll-lists, the inspectors are required to draw out and destroy un-
opened a number equal to the excess. This is, of course, upon the assumption
that the excess has probably been caused by fraud, and assumes that no man'i
vote ought to be counted, unless the testimony of the poll-lists shows that be
actually handed in his ballot. It is, therefore, altogether likely, upon any theorj
of probabilities, that, in drawing out these extra ballots, they will really be bal-
lots lawfully put in, and this probability is in the ratio furnished by a comparison
of numbers between lawful and unlawful votes. In other words, it is more than
likely to punish the innocent, instead of the guilty. The true method of arriving
at the truth would be to inquire what vote each voter on the list actually cast, and
destroy the remainder. The absurdity of this process upon such a large scale
is such as to need no pointing out. But unless something very like it is done in
such a case as the present, the result obtained by any partial inquiry will be no
better than guesswork. AVhere votes are thrown out, no one can tell whether
the illegal voter whose vote is sought to be assailed has not already had his vote
cancelled. The adoption of the principle of allotment is the most sensible and
practicable measure which could be devised, and I cannot conceive how it can be
improved upon by any subsequent search.
"But when the inspectors have made their returns to the county canvassers,
and by those returns a tie vote appears between two or more candidates, who are
highest on the list, their right to the office is to be determined by lot, and the
person drawing the successful slip is to be ' deemed legally elected to the office in
question.' Compiled Laws, §§ 76, 132, 183.
"In case the State canvassers (who can only connt the votes certified to tbem)
find a tie vote, the legislature has power to choose between the candidates. Con-
stitution, art. H, § 5. In these cases, there can be no further scrutiny; and in
the case of State officers, if such a scrutiny were had, no end could be reached
within any reasonable time, and there would be a practical impossibility in attempt-
ing to conduct it in any time within the official term, 0r to approach accuracy in
a count of some thousand or more ballot-boxes before a jury. Yet State offi-
cers are not less important to the private elector, and, of course, are not to the
community at large, than local. And the nearer a vote approaches a tie, the
more likely it is that a rigid scrutiny might change its character. There is no
more reason for preventing investigation behind the ballots in the one case than
in the other.
"The statute also takes very efficient measures to prevent any needless litiga-
tion by shutting out any preliminary resort to the means of information. If the
officers do their duty, no one else can ever know whether their count is correct
or not, until a suit is brought and issue joined upon it. The ballots are required
to be sealed up, and not opened except for the inspection of the proper author-
ities, in case of a contest. The only ballots open to public inspection are those
which are rejected upon the canvass for defects apparent on their face. These
ballots are not sealed up with the rest, but are filed; while, therefore, it can be
determined by inspection whether votes which have been thrown out should have
been counted, the law does not seem to favor any unnecessary disturbance of the
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official returns, and any one who assumes to dispute an election is compelled to
begin his suit before he can have access to the means of proof. This is not the
usual course of litigation, and the rule has a strong bearing upon the policy to
be deduced from the law.
"Under our statute, there is no general provision which makes the canvass
for local officers conclusive in all cases, and therefore the rule is recognized
that the election usually depends upon the ballots, and not upon the returns.
These being written and certain, the result of a recount involves no element
of difficulty or ambiguity, beyond the risk of mistakes in counting or footing
up numbers, which may, in some respects, be more* likely in examining the
ballots of a whole county than in telling off those of a town or ward, but which
involves no great time or serious disadvantage. But the introduction of parol
evidence concerning single voters in a considerable district, can rarely reach
all cases of illegality effectually, and must so multiply the issues as to seriously
complicate the inquiry. And when we consider, that, for many years, legisla-
tion has been modified for the very purpose of suppressing illegal voting, and
when we know that hundreds of elections must have been turned by the ballots
of unqualified voters, the absence of any body of decisions upon the subject
is very strong proof that inquiry into private ballots is felt to be a violation
of the constitutional safeguard on which we pride ourselves as distinguishing
our elections from those which we are wont to regard as conducted on unsafe
principles."
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INDEX.
A.
ABBREVIATIONS,
when ballots rendered ineffectual by, 608, 609.
AB INCONVENIENTI,
doctrine of, in construction, 67-71.
ACCUSATIONS OF CRIME,
are actionable, per se, 423.
self, not to be compelled, 313-317.
how made with a view to investigation and trial, 309.
(See Personal Liberty.)
varying form of, cannot subject party to second trial, 328. •
ACCUSED PARTIES,
testimony of, in their own behalf, 317, 318 and notes.
confessions of, 314, 315.
(See Personal Liberty.)
ACTION,
against election officers for refusing to receive votes, 616.
for negligent or improper construction of public works, 571.
for property taken under right of eminent domain, 559-564.
(See Eminent Domain.)
for exercise of legislative power by municipal bodies, 208.
for slander and libel, rules for, 422-425.
modification of, by statute, 430.
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
rights in, cannot be created by mere legislative enactment, 369.
nor taken away by legislature, 362.
nor appropriated under right of eminent domain, 527.
nor forfeited, except by judicial proceedings, 362, 363.
statutory penalties may be taken away before recovery of judgment,
362, n.; 383, n.
limitation to suits, 364-367.
statutes for, are unobjectionable in principle, 365.
subsequent repeal of statute cannot revive rights, 293, 365.
principle on which statutes are based, 365.
cannot apply against a party not in default, 366.
must give parties an opportunity for trial, 366.
for causing death by negligence, &c, 581.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
748
INDEX.
ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE,
(See Statutes.)
ADJOURNMENT OF SUIT,
from regard to religious scruples of party, 477, n.
ADJOURNMENT OF THE LEGISLATURE,
on its own motion, 132.
by the governor, 132.
ADMINISTRATORS,
(See Executors and Administrators.)
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION,
exercise of, by the Revolutionary Congress, 6.
conferred upon courts of United States, 11.
ADMISSIONS,
of accused parties as evidence, 313-318.
(See Confessions.)
ADVERTISEMENT,
notice to foreign parties by, 404.
not effectual to warrant a personal judgment, 404, 405.
AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT,
not to be taxed, 18, 482-485.
AGREEMENTS,
(See Contracts.)
ALABAMA,
divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.
revenue bills in, 131, n.
legislative rules concerning pardons, 116, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
protection of person and property by law of the land, 351, n.
liberty of speech and the press, 417, n.
legislature may make rules respecting pardons, 116, n.
privileges of members, 134, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478.
ALIENS,
exclusion of, from suffrage, 29, 30, 599.
ALIMONY,
payment of, cannot be ordered by legislature, 114.
decree for, not valid unless process served, 405.
AMBASSADORS,
jurisdiction of United States courts in respect to, 11.
AMENDMENT,
of money bills, may be made by Senate, 131.
of indictments, 272.
of statutes, 151, 152.
republication of statute amended, 151.
by implication, 152.
at the same session of their passage, 152.
of defective proceedings by legislation, 293, 371-381.
of State constitutions, 21.
(See State Constitutions.)
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AMERICAN COLONIES,
(See Colonies.)
AMUSEMENT,
regulation of places of, 596.
APPEAL,
right of, may be taken away, 384.
effect of change in the law pending an appeal, 381.
APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE,
(See Office.)
APPORTIONMENT,
of powers between the States and the nation, 2.
between the departments of the State government, 33-87,[39,'90-92.
of taxes, 495.
(See Taxation.)
APPRAISAL,
of private property taken by the public, 559-570.
APPRAISEMENT LAWS,
how far invalid, 290.
APPRENTICE,
control of master over, 340.
APPROPRIATION,
of private property to public use, 525.
(See Eminent Domain.)
ARBITRARY ARRESTS,
illegality of, 300, 302.
(See Personal Liberty.)
ARBITRARY EXACTIONS,
distinguished from taxation, 490, 491.
ARBITRARY POWER,
unknown among common-law principles, 22.
cannot be exercised under pretence of taxation, 490, 508.
ARBITRARY RULES,
of construction, danger of, 59, 61, 62, 83.
of presumption, 326, n.
ARBITRATION,
submission of controversies to, 399.
ARGUMENTUM AB INCONVENIENTI,
in constitutional construction, 70, 71, n.
ARKANSAS,
divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.
legislative rules concerning pardons, 116, n.
special acts for sale of lands of infants, &c, forbidden, 98, n.
revenue bills in, 131, n.
privilege of members in, 134, n.
protection of person, &c, by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of speech and of the press, 414, n.
legislature may regulate granting of pardons, 116, n.
exclusion from office for want of religious belief, 468, n.
ARMS,
right to bear, 350.
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ARMS, — continued.
exemption from bearing of persons conscientiously opposed, 478.
ARMY,
quartering in private houses, 308.
jealousy of standing army, 350.
ARREST,
privilege of legislators from, 134.
on criminal process. (See Crimes.)
of judgment, new trial after, 328 and n.
ART, WORKS OF,
criticism of, how far privileged, 457.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,
adoption of, 7.
why superseded, 7, 8.
ASSESSMENTS,
for local improvements, generally made in reference to benefits, 497.
special taxing districts for, 497.
not necessarily made on property according to value, 497.
are made under the power of taxation, 498.
not covered by the general constitutional provisions respecting taxation,
498.
not unconstitutional to make benefits the basis for, 499, 505, 511.
apportionment necessary in cases of, 499.
may be made in reference to frontage, 507.
but each lot cannot be compelled to make the improvement in front of it,
508.
for drains, levees, &c, 510.
in labor for repair of roads, 512.
ATTAINDER,
meaning of the term, 259.
bills of, not to be passed by State legislatures, 15, 33, 259.
cases of such bills, 259-264.
bills of pains and penalties included in, 261.
ATTORNEYS,
exclusion of, from practice is a punishment, 263, 264.
right to notice of proceedings therefor, 337, n., 404, n.
laws requiring service from, without compensation, 393, 394.
punishment of, for misconduct, 337.
(See Counsel.)
AUTHORS,
not to be assailed through their works, 457.
criticism of works of, how far privileged, 457.
B.
BALL,
accused parties entitled to, 309-311.
unreasonable, not to be demanded, 310.
on habeas corpus. 348.
control of bail over principal, 341.
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BAILMENT,
(See Common Carriers.)
BALLOT,
correction of abuses by, 193; n.
system of voting by, generally prevails, 604.
right of the elector to secrecy, 605.
must be complete in itself, 606.
abbreviated names, 608.
how far open to explanation, 611, 626.
(See Elections.)
BANKRUPTCY.
power of Congress over, 10.
legislation by the States, 18, 293, 294.
revival of debts barred by discharge, 293.
BEARING ARMS,
persons conscientiously opposed to, are excused, 478.
constitutional right of, 350.
BEASTS,
police regulations regarding, 596.
regulations making railway companies liable for killing, 579.
BENEFITS,
may be taken into account in assessments for local improvements, 499,
505, 511.
what may be deducted when private property is taken by the public, 565.
BETTERMENT LAWS,
principle of, 386.
are constitutional, 387.
owner cannot be compelled to improve his lands, 385.
not applicable to lands appropriated by the public, 389, n.
BETTING ON ELECTIONS,
illegality of, 615.
BEVERAGES,
police regulations to prevent the sale of intoxicating, 581.
BILL OF RIGHTS (English),
a declaratory statute, 23, 257.
BILL OF RIGHTS (Xational),
not originally inserted in Constitution, 256.
reasons for omission, 266.
objections to Constitution on that ground, 257-259.
afterwards added by amendments, 259.
BILL OF RIGHTS (State),
generally found in constitution, 35.
classes of provisions in, 35, 36.
what prohibitions not necessary, 175.
BILLS, LEGISLATIVE,
constitutional provisions for three readings, 80, 81, 139, 140.
title of, to express object, 81, 141-151.
(See Legislature of the State.)
BILLS OF ATTAINDER,
not to be passed by State legislature, 15, 33, 259.
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INDEX.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER,— continued.
meaning of attainder, 259.
cases of such bills, 259- 264.
BILLS OF CREDIT,
States not to emit, 15.
BILLS OF PAINS AND PENALTIES,
included in bills of attainder, 261.
BLASPHEMY,
punishment of, does not violate religious liberty, 471-476.
nor the liberty of speech, 422.
published in account of judicial proceedings is not privileged, 449.
BOATS, /
ferry, licensing of, 593.
speed of, on navigable waters may be regulated by States, 594.
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS,
not to be affected by retrospective legislation, 378, 379, 382, n.
BONDS,
issue of, by municipalities in aid of internal improvements, 119, 213-219.
BOOKS,
criticism of, how far privileged, 457.
indecent, sale of, may be prohibited, 596.
BOUNTIES,
when earned, become vested rights, 383, 384.
payment of, to soldiers by municipal corporations, 219-229.
BOUNTY SUBSCRIPTIONS,
by municipal corporations, how far valid, 219-229.
BRIDGES,
erection of, by State authority over navigable waters, 592.
(See Navigable Waters.)
BUILDINGS,
condemnation and forfeiture of, as nuisances, 583, 584.
destruction of, to prevent spread of fires, 526, n.
appropriation of, under right of eminent domain, 526.
BURLESQUES,
libels by means of, 423.
BY-LAWS,
of municipal corporations, 198-203.
must be reasonable, 200-203.
must be certain, 202.
must not conflict with constitution of State or nation, 198.
nor with statutes of State, 198.
imposing license fees, 201.
'c.
CALIFORNIA,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
privileges of members, 134, n.
title of acts to express their object, 142, n.
protection of property, &c, by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in, 416.
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CANALS,
appropriation of private property for, 533.
when are private property, 590.
CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE,
criticism of, how far privileged, 431-441, 455.
ineligibility of, how to affect election, 620.
CANVASSERS,
act ministerially in counting and returning votes, 622.
whether they may be compelled by mandamus to perform duty, 623.
certificate of, conclusive in collateral proceedings, 624.
(See Elections.)
CARRIERS,
police regulations making them liable for beasts killed, 570.
change of common-law liability of, by police regulations, 580, 581.
may be made responsible for death caused by negligence, &c, 581.
CATTLE,
police regulations making railway companies liable for killing, 579.
CEMETERIES,
further use of, may be prohibited when they become nuisances, 595.
CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS,
in England and America, 417-419, 420.
CENTRALIZATION,
American system the opposite of, 189.
CHARACTER,
bad, of attorney, sufficient reason to exclude him from practice, 837.
slander of, 422-424.
good, of defendant in libel suit, no defence to false publication, 466.
benefit of, in criminal cases, 325, n.
CHARTERS,
of liberty, 24, n.
colonial, swept away by Revolution, 26.
exceptions of Connecticut and Rhode Island, 26.
municipal, do not constitute contracts, 193.
control of legislature over, 192, 193.
construction of, 195, 211.
(See Municipal Corporations.)
of private corporations are contracts, 279.
police regulations affecting, 577-579.
strict construction of, 394-396.
amendment of, 279, 577, n.
CHASTITY,
accusation of want of, not actionable per se, 423, 424.
statutory provisions on the subject, 424.
CHILDREN,
control of parent, &c, over, 339, 340.
obtaining possession of, by habeas corpus, 848.
decree for custody of, in divorce suits, 405.
CHRISTIANITY,
its influence in the overthrow of slavery, 297, 298, and n.
48
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INDEX.
CHRISTIANITY, — continued.
in what sense part of the law of the land, 472-475.
(See Religious Liberty.)
CHURCH ENDOWMENTS,
not to be taken away by legislature, 275, n.
CHURCH ESTABLISHMENTS,
forbidden by State constitutions, 469.
CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS,
powers and control of, 467, n.
discipline of members, 434, n.
CITIES AND VILLAGES,
(See Municipal Corporations.)
CITIZENS,
who are, 11.
of the several States, privileges and immunities of, 11, 15, 16, 391-397.
discriminations in taxation of, 397, 487.
jurisdiction of United States courts in respect to, 11, 12, 294.
CIVIL RIGHTS,
discriminations not to be made in, on account of religious beliefs, 467-470.
(See Citizens; Class Legislation.)
CLASS LEGISLATION,
private legislation which grants privileges, 389-397.
party petitioning for, estopped from disputing validity, 390.
public laws may be local in application, 390.
special rules for particular occupations, 390, 393.
proscription for opinion's sake unconstitutional, 390.
suspensions of laws must be general, 391, 392.
each individual entitled to be governed by general rules, 391, 392.
discriminations should be based upon reason, 393.
equality of rights, &c, the aim of the law, 393.
strict construction of special burdens and privileges, 393-397.
discriminations not to be made on account of religious beliefs, 467-470.
COINING MONEY,
power over, 10.
COLLUSION,
conviction by, no bar to new prosecution, 327, n.
COLONIES,
union of, before Revolution, 5.
authority of the Crown and Parliament in, 5.
Revolutionary Congress and its powers, 6, 7.
controversy with the mother country, 23, 24.
legislatures of, 25.
substitution of constitutions for charters of, 26.
censorship of the press in, 418.
COLOR,
not to be a disqualification fo suffrage, 11, 599.
COMMERCE,
power of Congress to regulate, 10.
State regulations valid when they do not interfere with those of Congress,
581-587. (See Police Power.)
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COMMERCE, — continued.
State taxation of subjects of, 586, 587.
(See Taxation.)
in intoxicating drinks, how far State regulations may affect, 581-584.
COMMITTEES OF THE LEGISLATURE,
collection of information by, 135.
contempts of witnesses how punished, 185.
employment of counsel before, 189.
COMMON CARRIERS,
police regulations regarding, 576-581.
(See Railway Companies.)
COMMON LAW,
Federal courts acquire no jurisdiction from, 19, 20, 427.
pre-existing the Constitution, 21.
what it consists in, 21.
its general features, 22.
modification of, by statutes, 22, 23.
colonists in America claimed benefits of, 23, 24.
how far in force, 23, n.
evidences of, 24.
decisions under, as precedents, 51, 52.
gradual modification of, 54, 55.
to be kept in view in construing constitutions, 60.
statutes in derogation of, 61, n.
not to control constitutions, 61.
municipal by-laws must harmonize with, 202.
rules of liability for injurious publications, 417, 422-425.
modification of, by statute, 430.
modification by police regulations of common-law liability of carriers,
579-581.
COMMON RIGHT,
statutes against, said to be void, 165, n, 166, 167, n.
COMPACTS BETWEEN STATES,
must have consent of Congress, 15.
are inviolable under United States Constitution, 275, and n.
COMPENSATION,
for private property appropriated by the public, 659.
(See Eminent Domain.)
what the tax-payer receives as an equivalent for taxes, 498.
COMPLAINTS,
for purposes of search-warrant, 304.
of crime how made, 309.
COMPULSORY TAXATION,
by municipal bodies, 231-233.
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENTS,
full faith and credit to be given in each State to those of other States, 16,17.
parties and privies estopped by, 47-54, 408.
but not in controversy with new subject-matter, 49.
strangers to suit not bound by, 48.
irregularities do not defeat, 409.
(See Jurisdiction.)
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INDEX.
CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION,
power of the States to adopt, 117.
CONDITIONS,
what may be imposed on right of suffrage, 362, n., 601, 602.
(See Elections.)
precedent to exercise of right of eminent domain, 528, 529.
CONFEDERACY OF 1643,
brought about by tendency of colonies to union, 5.
CONFEDERATE DEBT,
not to be assumed or paid, 11.
CONFEDERATION, ARTICLES OF,
adoption of, 6, 7.
authority to supersede, 8, n.
CONFESSIONS,
dangerous character of, as evidence, 314.
must appear to have been made voluntarily, 313, 314.
excluded if solicitations or threats have been used, 315. •
will not prove the corpus delicti, 315.
CONFIDENCE,
communications in, when privileged, 425, 426.
between attorney and client, is client's privilege, 334, and n.
CONFIRMING INVALID PROCEEDINGS,
of a judicial nature, 107, 108.
admissible when defects are mere irregularities, 371.
(See Retrospective Laws.)
CONFISCATIONS,
require judicial proceedings, 363, 364.
during the Revolutionary War, 262.
CONFLICT OF LAWS,
in divorce cases, 401, and n.
(See Unconstitutional Laws.)
CONFRONTING WITH WITNESSES,
in criminal cases, 318 and n., 319, n.
CONGRESS OF 1690,
brought together by tendency of colonies to union, 5.
CONGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION,
powers assumed and exercised by, 5-7.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
general powers of, 10-12.
enabling acts by, for formation of State constitutions, 30, 31.
cannot divest vested rights, 362.
exercise of power of eminent domain by, 525.
regulations of commerce by, are supreme, 581, 591.
(See Police Power.)
CONNECTICUT,
charter government of, 26.
protection of property by law of the land, 852, n.
freedom of speech and of the press in, 414, n.
CONSCIENCE, FREEDOM OF,
(See Religious Liberty, 467-478.)
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CONSENT,
conviction by collusion no bar to new prosecution, 327.
cannot confer jurisdiction of subject-matter upon courts, 398.
cannot authorize jury trial by less than twelve jurors, 319, n.
is a waiver of irregularities in legal proceedings, 409.
waiver of constitutional privileges by, 181, 319, n., 390, and n.
CONSEQUENTIAL INJURIES,
caused by exercise of legal right give no ground of complaint, 384.
do not constitute a taking of property, 542-544.
are covered by assessment of damages when property taken by the public,
570.
but not such as result from negligence or improper construction, 571.
CONSTITUTION,
definition of, 2, 3.
object of, in the American system, 37.
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND,
theory of, 3, 4.
power of Parliament under, 3.
developed by precedents, 50, n.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
origin of, 5-7.
ratification of, 7, 8.
government of enumerated powers, formed by, 9, 10, 173.
general powers of the government under, 10-12.
judicial powers under, 11-13, 19.
(See Courts of the United States.)
prohibition by, of powers to the States, 15, 294, 599.
guaranty of republican government to the States, 17.
implied prohibitions on the States, 18.
and on municipal corporations, 198.
reservation of powers to States and people, 19.
difference between, and State constitutions, 9, 10, 173.
construction of, 9, 10, 19.
amendment of State constitutions how limited by, 33.
protection of person and property by, as against State action, 256-294.
bill of rights not at first inserted in, and why, 256.
addition of, afterwards, 257-259.
bills of attainder prohibited by, 259-264.
(See Bills of Attainder.)
ex post facto laws also forbidden, 264-273.
(See Ex post facto Laws.)
laws impairing obligation of contracts forbidden, 273-294.
what is a contract, 273-279.
what charters of incorporation are, 279.
whether release of taxation is contract, 280, 283.
whether States can relinquish right of eminent domain, 281, 525.
or the police power, 282, 283, 525.
general laws of the States not contracts, 284.
what the obligation of the contract consists in, 525.
power of the States to control remedies, 287-294.
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INDEX.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,—continued.
and to pass insolvent laws, 293, 294.
(See Obligation of Contracts.)
police regulations by the States, when in conflict with, 579, 689.
(See Police Power.)
taxation of the subjects of commerce by the States, 586, 587.
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES,
compared with that of the United States, 9, 173.
formation and amendment of, 21-37.
construction of, 38-84.
not the source of individual rights, 87.
(See State Constitutions; Construction of State Constitutions.)
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS,
or formation and amendment of State constitutions, 30-32.
proceedings of, as bearing on construction of constitution, 66.
of 1787 sat with closed doors, 419.
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS,
meaning of the term, 2, 3.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES,
may be waived generally, 181. (See Waiver.)
. CONSTRUCTION,
meaning of and necessity for, 38.
of United States Constitution and laws by United States courts, 12.
of State constitution and laws by State courts, 13, 14, 294.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
meaning of the term " construction," 38, n.
necessity for, 38.
questions of, arise whenever powers to be exercised, 39.
who first to decide upon, 39-41. •
in certain States judges may be called upon for opinions in advance, 40.
in what cases construction by legislature or executive to be final, 41-43.
in what cases not, 42, 48.
when questions of, are addressed to two or more departments, 42, 43.
final decision upon, rests generally with judiciary, 43-46, 53, 54.
reasons for this, 44.
this does not imply pre-eminence of authority in the judiciary, 4o, n.
the doctrine of res adjudicata, 47-54.
decisions once made binding upon parties and privies, 47, 48.
force of judgment does not depend on reasons given, 49.
strangers to suit not bound by, 49.
nor the parties in a controversy about a new subject-matter, 49.
the doctrine of stare decisis, 47-54.
only applicable within jurisdiction of court making the decision, 51,51
importance of precedents, 51, n.
when precedents to be disregarded, 52.
when other departments to follow decisions of the courts, and when
not, 53, 54.
uniformity of construction, importance of, 54, 55.
not to be affected by changes in public sentiment, 54, 55.
words of the instrument to control, 55-57, 65, 83, n., 130.
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CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS, — continued.
intent of people in adopting it to govern, 55-57.
intent to be found in words employed, 55, and n., 57.
whole instrument to be examined, 57, 59, n.
words not to be supposed employed without occasion, 57, 58.
effect to be given to whole instrument, 58.
irreconcilable provisions, 58, and n.
general intent as opposed to particular intent, 58, and n.
words to be understood in their ordinary sense, 58, 59, 83, n.
of art, to be understood in technical sense, 60.
importance of the history of the law to, 59, 65.
common law to be kept in view, 59-62.
but not to control constitution, 61.
whether provisions in derogation of, should be strictly construed,
61, n.
arbitrary rules of, dangerous, 59, 61, 62, 83.
and especially inapplicable to constitutions, 58.
same word presumed employed in same sense throughout, 62.
this not a conclusive rule, 62.
operation to be prospective, 62, 63.
implied powers to carry into effect express powers, 63, 64.
power granted in general terms is co-extensive with the terms, 64.
when constitution prescribes conditions to a right, legislature cannot add
others, 64.
mischief to be remedied, consideration of, 65.
prior state of the law to be examined, 65.
proceedings of constitutional convention may be consulted, 66.
reasons why unsatisfactory, 66, 67.
weight of contemporary and practical construction, 67.
the argument ab inconvenienti, 67-70, 72, n.
deference to construction by executive officers, 69.
plain intent not to be defeated by, 69-73.
injustice of provisions will not render them void, 72, 73.
nor authorize courts to construe them away, 73.
doubtful cases of, duty of officers acting in, 73, 74.
directory and mandatory statutes, doctrine of, 74-78.
not applicable to constitutions, 78-82.
has been sometimes applied, 79-81.
authorities generally the other way, 82.
CONSTRUCTION OK STATUTES,
to be such as to give them effect, if possible, 184.
conflict with constitution not to be presumed, 185, 186.
directory and mandatory, 74-78.
contemporary and practical, weight to be given to, 67-71.
to be prospective, 370.
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION,
force and effect of, 67-71.
CONTEMPTS,
of the legislature, punishment of, 133-135.
of legislative committees, 135.
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INDEX.
CONTESTED ELECTIONS,
right of the courts to determine upon, 623.
(See Elections.)
CONTESTED FACTS,
cannot be settled by statute, 96, 104, 105.
CONTESTED SEATS,
• legislative bodies to decide upon, 133.
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
powers assumed and exercised by, 5-7.
CONTINGENT LEGISLATION,
authority of the States to adopt, 117, 121, n., 122, n.
CONTRACTS,
for lobby services, illegal, 136.
to influence elections, are void, 615.
cannot be made for individuals by legislative act, 369, and n.
charters of municipal corporations do not constitute; 192, 193.
of private corporations are, 279.
of municipal corporations ultra vires void, 196.
invalid, may be validated by legislature. 372-383.
obligation of, not to be violated, 126, 273.
(See Obligation of Contracts.)
COPYRIGHT,
Congress may secure to authors, 10.
CORPORATE CHARTERS,
(See CHarters.)
CORPORATE FRANCHISES,
may be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 526.
CORPORATE PROPERTY,
legislative control of, 235.
CORPORATIONS,
private, may be authorized to take lands for public use, 536-538.
irregular organization of, may be validated, 371, 374, n.
(See CHarters; Municipal Corporations.)
CORRESPONDENCE,
private, inviolability of, 307, n.
COUNSEL,
constitutional right to, 330-338.
oath of, 330, 331, n.
duty of, 331, 335, 338, n.
denial of, in England, 331-333.
court to assign for poor persons, 334.
whether those assigned may refuse to act, 334.
privilege of, is the privilege of the client, 334, and n.
independence of, 334, 335, n., 337, n.
not at liberty to withdraw from cause, except by consent, 335.
how far he may.go in pressing for acquittal, 335, 336.
duty of, as between the court and the prisoner, 335, n.
whether to address the jury on the law, 336, 337.
summary punishment of, for misconduct, 337.
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COUESEL, — continued.
limitation of client's control over, 338, and n.
(See Attorneys.)
may be employed before legislative committees, 136, n.
but not as lobbies, 136, n.
not liable to action for what be may say in judicial proceedings, 442-445.
unless irrelevant to the case, 444.
not privileged in afterwards publishing his argument, if it contains injuri-
ous reflections, 448.
newspaper publisher not justified in publishing speech of a criminal reflect-
ing on his counsel, 456.
COUNTERFEITING,
Congress may provide for punishment of, 10, 18.
States also may punish. 18.
COUNTIES AND TOWNS,
difference from chartered incorporations, 240.
(See Municipal Corporations.)
COUNTY SEAT,
change of, 384.
COURTS,
duty of, to refuse to execute unconstitutional laws, 71, n., 81, 82,159, et seq.
contested elections to be determined by, 623.
not to be directed by legislature in decisions, 94, 95.
action of, not to be set aside by legislature, 95.
must act by majorities, 96.
not to be open on election days, 614.
power to declare laws unconstitutional a delicate one, 159, 160.
will not be exercised by bare quorum, 161.
nor unless necessary, 163.
nor on complaint of one not interested, 163, 164.
nor of one who has assented, 164.
will not declare laws void because solely of unjust provisions, 164-168.
nor because in violation of fundamental principles, 169, 170.
nor because conflicting with the spirit of the constitution, 171-174.
nor unless a clear repugnancy between the laws and the constitution,
173-176,
special, for trial of rights of particular individuals, 392.
of star chamber, 342.
of high commission, 342.
martial, 319, n.
of the United States, to be created by Congress, 10.
general powers of, 11.
removal of causes to, from State courts, 12, 13.
to follow State courts as to State law, 13, 14.
to decide finally upon United States laws, &c, 12, 294.
require statutes to apportion jurisdiction, 19.
have no common-law jurisdiction, 19, 20.
in what cases may issue writs of habeas corpus, 345, 346.
CREDIT,
bills of, 15.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
03
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
762
INDEX.
CREDITOR,
control of debtor by, 341.
CRIMES,
legislative convictions of, prohibited, 15, 33, 259.
ex post facto laws prohibited, 15, 33, 264.
punishment of, by servitude, 299.
search warrants for evidence of. (See Searches axd Seizures.)
accusations of, how made, 309.
presumption of innocence, 309, 311.
right of accused party to bail, 309-311.
• prisoner refusing to plead, 311.
trial to be speedy, 311, 812. •
and public, 312.
and not inquisitorial, 313.
prisoner's right to moke statement, 313-318.
confessions as evidence, 313-318.
prisoner to be confronted with the witnesses, 318.
exceptional cases, 318.
to'be by jury, 309, 319.
jury must consist of twelve, 319.
right to jury cannot be waived, 319.
prisoner's right to challenges, 319.
jury must be from vicinage, 319, 320.
must unanimously concur in verdict, 320.
must be left free to act, 320.
judge not to express opinion upon the facts, 320.
nor to refuse to receive the verdict, 320.
but is to give instruction in the law, 322.
how far jury may judge of the law, 321-324.
acquittal by jury is final, 321, 322.
accused not to be twice put in jeopardy, 325-328.
what is legal jeopardy, 326, 327.
when nolle prosequi equivalent to acquittal, 327.
when jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.
second trial after verdict set aside, 327, 328.
cruel and unusual punishments prohibited, 328-330.
counsel to be allowed, 330-338.
oath of, 330, 331, n.
duty of, 331, 335, 338, n.
denial of, in England, 331-333.
court to designate for poor persons, 334.
whether one may refuse to act, 334.
privilege of, is the privilege of the client, 334, and n.
not at liberty to withdraw from case, except by consent, 335.
how far he may go in pressing for acquittal, 335, 336.
duty of, as between the court and the prisoner, 335, n.
whether to address the jury on the law, 336, 337.
summary punishment of, for misconduct, 337, 404, n.
not to be made the instrument of injustice, 338.
habeas corpus for imprisoned parties, 838-348.
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CRIMES, —continued.
accusations of, are libellous, per se, 424-426.
but privileged if made in course of judicial proceedings, 441, 444.
violations of police regulations of States, 596.
CRITICISM,
of works of art and literary productions is privileged, 457.
but not the personal character of the author, 457.
of public entertainments and sermons, 457, n.
CROWN OF GREAT BRITAIN,
succession to, may be changed by Parliament, 86.
union of the colonies under, 5.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS,
constitutional prohibition of, 328-330.
what are, 329, 330.
CUMULATIVE PUNISHMENTS,
for counterfeiting money, 18.
under State and municipal laws, 199.
CURTESY, ESTATE BY THE,
power of legislature to modify or abolish, 360, 361.
CUSTODY,
of wards, apprentices, servants, and scholars, 340.
of wife by husband, 339.
of children by parents, 340, 348.
of principal by his bail, 341.
CUSTOMS,
(See Common Law; Duties and Imposts.)
D.
DAM,
to obtain water power, condemnation of land for, 532, 534-536.
effect of repeal of act permitting, 383, n.
erection of, across navigable waters by State authority, 593, 594.
destruction of, when it becomes a nuisance, 595.
DAMAGES,
in libel cases, increased by attempt at justification, 438.
when exemplary, not to be awarded, 457.
for property taken by the public, must be paid, 559.
(See Eminent Domain.)
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA,
what consequentia injuries are, 384, 543.
DEATH,
common carriers may be made liable for causing, 581."
DEBATES,
in Parliament, formerly not suffered to be published, 418.
in American legislative bodies, publication of, 419, 420, 457, 460.
privileges of members in, 445-447.
(See Freedom of Speech and op the Press.)
DEBT,
public, declared inviolable, 11.
confederate, not to be assumed or paid, 11.
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INDEX.
DEBT, — continued.
imprisonment for, may be abolished as to pre-existing obligations, 287.
imprisonment for, now generally abolished, 341.
DEBTOR,
control of creditor over, 341.
DEBTS BY THE STATE,
prohibition of, whether it precludes indebtedness by municipalities, 217,
218.
DECENTRALIZATION,
the peculiar feature in American government, 189.
DECISIONS,
judicial, binding force of, 47-54.
(See Judicial Proceedings.)
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
was a declaratory statute, 257.
(See Bill of RigHts.)
DECLARATORY STATUTES,
in English constitutional law, 22-24.
are not encroachments upon judicial power, 93-95.
judgments not to be reversed by means of, 94, 95.
purpose and proper force of, 93-95.
DEDICATION,
of lands to public use, 238, n., 565.
DEEDS.
invalid, may be confirmed by legislature, 377, 378.
but not to prejudice of bona fide purchasers, 378, 379.
DEFENCES,
not based upon equity, may be taken away by legislature, 370-383.
under statute of limitations are vested rights, 365.
DEFINITIONS,
of a State, 1.
of a nation, 1.
of a people, sovereignty and sovereign State, 1.
of a constitution, 2.
of an unconstitutional law. 3, 4.
of construction and interpretation, 38. n.
of legislative power, 90-92, 94.
of judicial power, 91, 92, 94.
of declaratory statutes, 93.
of due process of law, 353.
of law of the land, 3.53.
of personal liberty, 339.
of natural liberty, 393, n.
of liberty of the press, 420, 422.
of liberty of speech, 422.
of religious liberty, 467, 468.
of taxation, 479.
of the eminent domain, 524.
of police power, 572.
of domicile, 600, n.
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DELAWARE,
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 131, n.
protection of property and person by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in, 415, n.
disqualification of religious teachers for office, 468, n.
religious tests forbidden, 469, n.
DELEGATION OF POWER,
by the legislature not admissible, 116-125.
except as to powers of local government, 191.
by municipal corporations invalid, 204.
DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT,
division of powers between, 33-37, 39, 87-94.
equality of, 45, n., 47, n.
DESECRATION OF THE SABBATH,
constitutional right to punish, 476, 588.
DIRECTORY STATUTES,
what are, and what are mandatory, 74, 78.
'doctrine of, not admissible as to constitutional provisions, 78-83.
DISCRETIONARY POWERS,
what are, 39-43.
department to which they are confided decides finally upon, 39-43, 115, n.
DISCRIMINATIONS,
cannot be made in taxation between citizens of different States, 487.
in legislation between different classes, 389-397.
in the privileges and immunities of citizens, 11, 15, 16, 397, 599.
not to be made on account of religious belief, 467-470.
DISCUSSION,
right of, 349.
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
DISFRANCHISEMENT,
of voters, may render a statute void, 616.
what classes excluded from suffrage, 28-30, 73, 599.
DISTRICTS,
for schools, powers of, 240, 247, 248.
exercise by, of power of eminent domain, 537.
for taxation, necessity for, 495, 497.
not to tax property outside, 499.
taxation to be uniform within, 502.
DIVISION OF POWERS,
between sovereign States, 2.
between the States and the Union, 2.
among departments of State government, 33-37, 39, 87.
DIVISION OF TOWNSHIPS, &c,
question of, may be submitted to people, 119.
disposition of property and debts on, 193, n.
DIVORCE,
question of, is properly judicial, 109.
power of the legislature over, 109, 110.
general doctrine of the courts on the subject, 111.
conflicting decisions, 112, 113.
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INDEX.
DIVORCE, — continued.
legislative divorce cannot go beyond dissolution of the status, 114.
constitutional provisions requiring judicial action, 110, n.
laws for, do not violate contracts, 284.
and may be applied to pre-existing causes, 266, n.
what gives jurisdiction in cases of, 400, 401.
actual residence of one party in the State sufficient, 400, 401.
conflict of decisions on this subject, 401, 402.
not sufficient if residence merely colorable, 401.
necessity for service of process, 402.
cannot be served out of State, 403.
substituted service by publication, 403, 404.
restricted effect of such notice, 405, 406.
order as to custody of children, 405.
alimony not to be awarded if defendant not served, 406.
DOGS,
police regulation of, 595.
DOMAIN,
ordinary, of the State, distinguished from eminent domain, 523.
DOMICILE,
gives jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400.
but must be bona fide, 401.
of wife, may be different from that of husband, 401, n.
of one party, may give jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400.
of voters, meaning of, 599, 600.
DOUBLE PUNISHMENT,
for same act under State and municipal law, 199.
for counterfeiting money, 18.
DOUBLE TAXATION,
sometimes unavoidable, 513.
DOUBTFUL QUESTIONS,
of constitutional law, duty in case of, 73, 74, 182-186.
DOWER,
legislative control of estates in, 360, 861.
DRAINS,
appropriating property for purposes of, 583.
special assessments for, 491, n., 610, 511.
ordered under police power, 589.
DRUNKENNESS.
does not excuse crime, 476, n.
is a temporary insanity, 599, n.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
meaning of the term, 353, 869, n.
(See Law op the Land.)
DUPLICATE PUNISHMENTS,
by States and United States, 18.
by States and municipal corporations, 199.
DUTIES AND IMPOSTS,
to be uniform throughout the United States, 10.
what the States may lay, 15.
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DWELLING-HOUSE,
is the owner's castle, 22, 299.
homicide in defence of, 308.
quartering soldiers in, prohibited, 308.
DYING DECLARATIONS,
admissible in evidence on trials for homicide, 318.
inconclusive character of the evidence, 318.
E.
EASEMENTS,.
acquirement by the public under right of eminent domain, 524.
private, cannot be acquired under this right, 530, 531.
(See Eminent Domain.)
ECCLESIASTICAL CORPORATIONS,
powers and control of, 467, u.
ELECTIONS,
on adoption of State constitutions, 27-31.
people exercise the sovereignty by means of, 598.
who to participate in, 599.
constitutional qualifications cannot be added to by legislature, 64,
exclusion of married women, aliens, minors, idiots, &c, 599.
conditions necessary to participation, 599, 601, 602.
presence of voter at place of domicile, 599.
what constitutes residence, 599, 600.
registration may be made a condition, 601.
preliminary action by the authorities, notice, &c, 602.
mode of exercising the right, 601.
the elector's privilege of secrecy, 601-606.
a printed ballot is " written," 604.
ballot must be complete in itself, 606.
technical accuracy not essential, 607.
.explanations by voter inadmissible, 607.
must not contain too many names, 607.
name should be given in full, 608.
sufficient if idem sonant, 608.
what abbreviations sufficient, 608, 609.
erroneous additions not to affect, 610.
extrinsic evidence to explain imperfections, 611.
ballot must contain name of office, 612.
but need not be strictly accurate, 612.
different boxes for different ballots, 613.
elector need not vote for every office, 613.
plurality of votes cast to elect, 614, 620.
effect if highest candidate is ineligible, 620.
freedom of elections, 614.
bribery or treating of voters, 614.
miliiiu not to be called out on election day, 615.
courts not to be open on election day, 614.
bets upon election are illegal, 615.
contracts to influence election are void, 615.
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INDEX.
ELECTIONS — continued.
elector not to be deprived of his vote, 862, n., 616.
statutes which would disfranchise voters, 616.
failure to hold election in one precinct, 616.
liability of inspectors for refusing to receive vote, 616.
elector's oath when conclusive on inspector, 617.
conduct of the election, 617.
effect of irregularities upon, 617, 618.
what constitutes a sufficient election, 619.
not necessary that a majority participate, 620. •
admission of illegal votes not to defeat, 620.
unless done fraudulently, 621.
effect of casual affray, 621.
canvass and return, 622.
canvassers are ministerial officers, 622.
canvassers not to question returns made to them, 622.
whether they can be compelled by mandamus to perform duty, 623.
contesting elections in the courts, 628.
canvassers' certificate as evidence, 624.
courts may go behind certificate, 624.
what surrounding circumstances may be given in evidence, 626.
whether qualification of voters may be inquired into, 627.
to legislative body, house to decide upon, 133.
EMANCIPATION,
of slaves in Great Britain and America, 11, 295-299.
of children by parents, 340.
EMINENT DOMAIN,
distinguished from ordinary domain of States, 523.
definition of, 524.
right of, rests upon necessity, 524.
cannot be bargained away, 281, 525.
general right is in the States, 525. •
for what purposes nation may exercise right, 525, 526.
all property subject to right, 526.
exception of money and rights in action, 527.
legislative authority requisite to, 527.
legislature may determine upon the necessity, 528, 538.
conditions precedent must be complied with, 528, 529.
statutes for exercise of, not to be extended by intendment, 530.
the purpose must be public, 530, 531.
private roads cannot be laid out under, 530, 531.
what constitutes public purpose, 532, 533.
whether erection of mill-dams is, 534-536.
property need not be taken to the State, 536.
individuals or corporations may be public agents for the purpose, 537,538.
the taking to be limited to the necessity, 539-541.
statute for taking more than is needed is ineffectual, unless owner assents,
540, 541.
what constitutes a taking of property, 541.
incidental injuries do not, 542-544.
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EMINENT DOMAIN,— continued.
any deprivation of use of property does, 544.
water front and right to wharfage is property, 544.
right to pasturage in streets is property, 545.
taking of common highway for higher grade of way, 545.
if taken for turnpike, &c, owner not entitled to compensation, 546.
difference when taken for a railway, 546-548.
owner entitled to compensation in such case, 549, 550.
whether he is entitled in case of street railway, 551.
decisions where the fee of the streets is in the public, 552, 555.
distinction between a street railway and a thoroughfare, 656.
right to compensation when course of a stream is diverted, 557.
whether the fee in the land can be taken, 557-559.
compensation must be made for property, 559.
must be pecuniary, 559.
preliminary surveys may be made without liability, 560.
need not be first made when property taken by State, &c, 560.
sufficient if party is given a remedy by means of which he may obtain
it, 560, 661.
time for resorting to remedy may be limited, 561.
waiver of right to compensation, 561, 562.
when property taken by individual or private corporation, compen-
sation must be first made, 562.
tribunal for assessment of, 563.
time when right to payment is complete, 563, 564.
principle on which compensation to be assessed, 565.
allowance of incidental injuries and benefits, 556.
not those suffered or received in common with public at large, 569,
570.
if benefits equal damages, owner entitled to nothing, 570.
assessment of damages covers all consequential injuries, 570.
for injuries arising from negligence, &c, party may have action, 571.
ENABLING ACT,
to entitle Territory to form State constitution, 27, 28, 30.
ENGLAND,
(See Great Britain.)
ENUMERATED POWERS,
United States, a government of, 9.
EQUALITY,
of protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, 11.
of the several departments of the government, 45, n.
of rights and privileges, the aim of the law, 393.
grants of special privileges construed strictly, 393-396.
religious, 467-478.
(See Religious Liberty.)
EQUITABLE TITLES,
may be thanged by legislature into legal, 377 and n., 878.
ERRONEOUS JUDGMENTS,
may be overruled, 52.
when they should not be, 52.
49
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INDEX.
ERRORS,
waiver of, in legal proceedings, 409.
judgments, &c, not void by reason of, 408.
curing by retrospective legislation, 370-383.
in conduct of elections, effect of, 613, 617-619.
ESSENTIAL POWERS OF GOVERNMENT,
taxation, eminent domain, &c, cannot be bartered away, 280, 284, 525.
ESTABLISHMENTS,
religious, are forbidden by State constitutions, 469.
ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS,
special legislative authority to sell lands for payment of debts is consti-
tutional, 97-106.
such acts forbidden by some constitutions, 98, n.
legislature cannot adjudicate upon debts, 103, 104.
ESTATES IN LAND,
subject to change by the legislature before they become vested, 360.
but not afterwards, 93, n.
ESTOPPEL,
by judgment only applies to parties and privies, 48.
does not depend on reasons given by the court, 48, 49.
does not apply in controversy about new subject-matter, 49.
of the State by its legislation, 73, n., 254, n.
of individuals by legislation, 96, 390, and n.
EVASION,
of constitutional provisions, 139, n.
EVIDENCE,
by recitals in statutes, 96.
complete control of legislature over rules of, 288, 867-369.
conclusive rules of, not generally admissible, 368, S69.
confessions of accused parties as, 313-318.
dying declarations, when are, 318.
search-warrants to obtain, not constitutional, 305, 307, n.
correspondence not to be violated to obtain, 807, n.
accused party not compelled to give, against himself, 313.
by accused parties in their own favor, 317, n.
against accused parties, to be given publicly, and in their presence, 312,
318.
communications by client to counsel not to be disclosed, 334.
in State courts, State laws control, 484, n.
to explain imperfections in ballots, 611, 624.
EVIL TO BE REMEDIED,
weight of, in construing constitutions, 65, 83, n.
what in view in requiring title of act to state the object, 142-144.
EXAMINATIONS,
of accused parties, when to be evidence against them, 813, 314.
EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENTS,
constitutional prohibition of, 330.
EXCESSIVE TAXATION,
renders tax proceedings and sales void, 620.
EXCISE TAXES,
Congress may lay, 10.
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EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES,
not to be taken by implication, 393-396.
strict construction of, 282, n., 393-396.
are subject to right of eminent domain, 281.
EXECUTION,
exemptions from, may" be increased without violating pre-existing con-
tracts, 287.
and may be recalled, 383.
imprisonment upon, may be abolished, 287.
EXECUTIVE,
construction of constitution by, 39-43.
weight of practical construction by, 69.
power of, to pardon and reprieve, 115 and n., 116 and n.
approval or veto of laws by, 153, 154.
EXECUTIVE POWER,
what is, 91.
not to be exercised by legislature, 87, 114-116.
of the United States, 11.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,
special statute, authorizing sales by, 97-106.
propriety of judicial action in these cases, 97.
legislature cannot adjudicate upon debts, 104.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
against publisher of newspaper, 457.
EXEMPTIONS,
from taxation, when not repealable, 127, 280, 383, n.
power of the legislature to make, 514.
from public duties, &c, may be recalled, 220, 383.
of property, from right of eminent domain, 281.
of property, from police power of the State, 282.
from execution, may he increased without violating contracts, 287.
of debtor from imprisonment, 287, 341.
privilege of, may be made to de end upon residence, 897.
laws for, not to be suspended for individual cases, 391, n.
EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS,
publication of, not privileged, 449-451.
EXPECTANCY,
interest in, are not vested rights, 359-361.
EXPOSITORY ACTS,
(See Declaratory Statutes.)
EX POST FACTO LAWS,
States not to pass, 15, 33, 264.
meaning of the term, 264.
only applies to criminal laws, 264.
classification of, 265.
laws in mitigation of punishment are not, 267.
what is in mitigation, and what not, 267-272.
modes of procedure in criminal cases may be changed, 272.
punishment of second offences, 273.
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INDEX.
EXPRESSION OF POPULAR WILL,
must be under forms of law, 598.
(See Elections.)
EXPULSION,
of legislative members for misconduct, 133, 134.
EXTRADITION, •
of criminals as between the States, 15, n.
of persons accused of libel, 320, n.
F.
FACT AND LAW,
province of judge and jury respectively, 320-324.
in libel cases, 460.
FAST DAYS,
appointment of, does not violate religious liberty, 471.
FEDERAL COURTS,
(See Courts of the United States.)
FEDERALIST,
on the power to supersede the Articles of Confederation, 8, n.
reasons of, for dispensing with national bill of rights, 256.
reference in, to laws violating obligation of contracts, 273.
FEE,
whether the public may appropriate, in taking lands, 557-559.
FEMALES,
accusation of want of chastity not actionable, per se, 423, 424.
statutes on the subject, 424.
excluded from suffrage, 599.
(See Married Women.)
FERRY FRANCHISES,
granted to municipal corporations, may be resumed, 277, 278.
strict construction of, 396.
grants of, by the State across navigable waters, 593.
police regulations respecting, 677.'
FEUDAL SYSTEM,
Mackintosh's definition of, 22 and n.
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT,
provisions of, 11, 699.
FINE,
remission of, 115, n.
FIRE,
destruction of buildings to prevent spread of, 526, n., 594.
precautions against, by establishing fire limits, 594.
FISHERY,
public rights of, in navigable waters, 524.
restrictions upon, 202, and n.
FLORIDA,
legislative divorces forbidden in, 110, n.
special statutes for sale of lands of minors, &c, forbidden, 97,
legislature may make rules respecting pardons, 116.
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FLORIDA, — continued.
protection of property, &c, by law of the land, 852, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 416.
religious belief not to disqualify a witness, 478.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.
FOREIGNERS, (See Aliens.)
FORFEITURES,
under municipal by-laws, 204, n.
must be judicially declared, 263, 264, 292.
FORMS,
prescribed by constitution are essential, 78-83, 177.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
protections of, 11, 294, and n., 397.
FOURTH OF JULY,
celebration of, at public expense, 211.
FOX'S LIBEL ACT,
provisions of, 462.
import and purpose of, 462, 463.
FRANCHISES,
of incorporation, when they constitute contracts, 279.
granted to municipal bodies may be resumed, 239, 276.
repeal of, where right to repeal is reserved, 384, 578.
strict construction of, 195, 394-396.
police regulations respecting, 576-581.
may be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 526.
FRAUD,
as affecting decrees of divorce, 401, and n.
FREEDMEN,
made citizens, 294, 599.
FREEDOM, ,
maxims of, in the common law, 21, 22.
gradually acquired by servile classes in Great Britain, 295, 299.
(See Personal Liberty.)
FREEDOM OF ELECTIONS,
provisions to secure, 614, 615.
bribery and treating of electors, 614.
militia not to be called out on election day, 614.
courts not to be open on election day, 614.
betting on elections illegal, 615.
contracts to influence elections void, 615.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
Hamilton's reasons why protection of, by bill of rights not important, 256.
opposing reasons by Jefferson, 258, n.
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
definition of, 422.
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
fugitives from justice,
to be delivered up by the States, 15, 16.
FUNDAMENTAL LAW, .
constitutions are, 2.
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INDEX.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
bills of, in State constitutions, 35.
in the national Constitution, 256-259.
in England, 23, 257.
are before constitutions, 36, 37.
statutes in violation of, 169-176.
under fourteenth amendment, 11, 294, 397.
G.
GAMING IMPLEMENTS,
keeping of, for unlawful games, may be prohibited, 596.
GENERAL INTENT,
when to control particular intent, 58, n.
GENERAL LAWS,
required instead of special by some constitutions, 128, 129, n.
in cases of divorce, 110, n.
due process of law does not always require, 353-355, 389-393.
submission of, to vote of people invalid, 116-125.
suspension of, 391.
changes in, give citizens no claim to remuneration, 358.
respecting remedies, power to change, 267-273, 287-294, 361-367.
GENERAL WARRANTS,
illegality of, 299-303.
GEORGIA,
divorce cases to be adjudged by the courts, 110, n.
revenue bills in, 131, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in, 417, n.
religious liberty in, 468, 478, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 351, n.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.
GOOD MOTIVES AND JUSTIFIABLE ENDS,
defence of, in libel cases, 464.
burden of proof on defendant to show, 464.
GOVERNMENT,
constitutional, what is, 2, 3.
republican, to be guaranteed to the States, 17.
of ihe United States, origin of, 5-8.
GOVERNOR,
approval or veto of laws by, 153, 154.
messages to legislature, 155.
power to prorogue or adjourn legislature, 132.
power to convene legislature, 155.
legislative encroachment on powers of, 114-116.
power to pardon, 115, n.
power to reprieve, 116, n.
GRADE OF RAILROADS,
legislature may establish for crossings, 580.
GRADE OF STREETS,
change of, gives parties no right to compensation, 207.
special assessments for grading, 497, 505-509.
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GRAND JURY,
criminal accusations by, 309.
presentments by, are privileged, 442 n.
GRANTS,
are contracts, and inviolable, 274.
by States, cannot be resumed, 274, 275, n.
of franchises, strict construction of, 195, 894-396.
when they constitute contracts, 279.
to municipal bodies, may be recalled, 276.
GREAT BRITAIN,
how it became a constitutional government, 3, n., 50, n.
power of Parliament to change constitution, 3.
meaning of unconstitutional law in, 4.
control over American colonies, 5, 23-25.
statutes of, how far in force in America, 23, 24.
bill of rights of, 23, 257.
habeas corpus act of, 23, 344.
local self-government in, 189.
declaration of rights of, 257.
bills of attainder in, 260, 261.
money bills to originate in the Commons, 132, n.
emancipation of slaves in, 295-299.
prosecutions for libel in, 427, 460-462.
(See Parliament.)
GUARDIANS,
special statutes authorizing sales by, 97-106.
propriety of judicial action in such cases, 97.
control of ward by, 340.
appointment of, in divorce suits, 405.
authority of, is local, 405, n.
GUNPOWDER,
police regulations concerning, 595.
H.
HABEAS CORPUS,
writ of, a principal protection to personal liberty, 338, 342.
personal liberty, meaning of, 339.
restraints upon, to prevent or punish crime, &c, 339.
growing out of relation of husband and wife, 339.
of parent and child, 340.
of guardian and ward, 340.
of master and apprentice, 340.
of master and servant, 341.
of teacher and scholar, 341.
of principal and bail, 341.
of creditor and debtor, 341.
insecurity of, formerly, in England, 342, 343.
habeas corpus act, and its purpose, 23, 344.
general provisions of, 344, 345.
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INDEX.
HABEAS CORPUS, — continued.
adoption of, in America, 345.
writ of, when to be issued by national courts, 345, 346.
generally to issue from State courts, 346.
return to, where prisoner held under national authority, 347.
cases for, determined by common law, 347.
not to be made a writ of error, 347.
what to be inquired into under, 348.
to obtain custody of children, 348.
HARBOR REGULATIONS,
establishment of, by the States, 585.
wharf lines may be prescribed, 595.
HARDSHIP,
of particular cases not to control the law, 71, 72, n.
unjust provisions not necessarily unconstitutional, 72, 73, 513.
HEARING,
right to, in judicial proceedings, 361, 402-406.
in cases of appropriation of lands, 560-563.
HEALTH,
police regulations for protection of, 584, 595.
draining swamps, &c, in reference to, 510, 589.
HEIRSHIP,
right to modify, 359.
HIGH SEAS,
not subject to exclusive appropriation, 2.
States no authority upon, 128.
HIGHWAYS,
establishment of, under right of eminent domain, 524.
when owner entitled to compensation in such case, 564.
appropriation of, to purposes of turnpike, railroad, &p., whether it
entitles owner to compensation, 545-557.
(See Eminent Domain.)
regulations of, by States under police power, 588, 594.
HOMESTEADS,
exemption of, from execution, 288, n.
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
power of legislature to divorce, 109-114.
jurisdiction in divorce cases, 401-406.
(See Divorce.)
control of husband over wife, 339.
obligation of husband to support wife, 339, n.
right as between, to custody of children, 348.
property rights, how far subject to legislative control, 360, 361.
validating invalid marriage by legislation, 372.
L
IDEM SONANS,
ballots sufficient in cases of, 608.
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IDIOTS,
exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.
special legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106, 389.
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS,
have no obligation, 286.
legalization of, 293, 374-377.
for lobby legislative services, 136, and n.
designed to affect elections, 615.
ILLINOIS,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
special legislative sessions, 155, n.
when statutes of, to take effect, 156.
title to bill to express the object, 142, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 416.
religious tests forbidden, 469, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478,
IMMUNITIES,
of citizens of the several States, 15, 16, 397.
citizens not to be deprived of, 11.
IMPAIRING CONTRACTS,
(See Obligation of Contracts.)
IMPEACHMENT,
of judges for declaring law unconstitutional, 160.
IMPLICATION,
amendments by, not favored, 152.
repeals by, 152.
grant of powers by, in State constitutions, 63, 64.
corporations established by, 197.
IMPLIED POWERS,
of municipal corporations, what are, 194-209.
granted by State constitutions, 63, 64.
IMPLIED PROHIBITIONS,
to the States by the national Constitution, 18.
upon legislative power, 164-177.
IMPORTS,
State taxation of, 586, 587.
IMPOSTS,
to be uniform throughout the Union, 10.
what the States may lay, 15.
taxation by, 495.
IMPRESSMENT OF SEAMEN,
not admissible in America, 299.
IMPRISONMENT,
for legislative contempt must terminate with the session, 134.
for debt may be abolished as to existing contracts, 287.
unlimited, cannot be inflicted for common-law offence, 329.
relief from. (See Habeas Corpus.)
IMPROVEMENTS,
owner of land cannot be compelled to make, 385, 532.
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IMPROVEMENTS, — continued.
betterment laws, 885-389.
local, assessments for the making of, 497-510.
(See Assessments.)
INCHOATE RIGHTS,
power of the legislature in regard to, 359-861.'
INCIDENTAL INJURIES,
by change in the law, give no claim to compensation, 384.
(See Eminent Domain.)
INCOMPETENT PERSONS,
legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106, 389.
exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.
INCONTINENCE,
accusation of, against female, not actionable, per se, 423, 424.
statutory provisions respecting, 424.
INCORPORATIONS,
charters of private, are contracts, 279.
charters of municipal, are not, 192, 276.
control of, by police regulations, 577-579.
(See Charters; Municipal Corporations.)
INDEBTEDNESS BY STATE,
prohibition of, whether it precludes debts by towns, counties, &c, 217,218.
INDECENT PUBLICATIONS,
sale of, may be prohibited, 596.
parties not free to make, 422.
INDEMNIFICATION,
of officers of municipal corporation where liability is incurred in supposed
discharge of duty, 209, 210.
power of legislature to compel, 211.
not to be made in case of refusal to perform duty, 212.
INDEMNITY,
for property taken for public use.
(See Eminent Domain.)
for consequential injuries occasioned by exercise of legal rights, 384.
INDEPENDENCE,
declaration of, by Continental Congress, 6.
new national government established by, 6.
celebration of, at public expense, 211.
of the traverse jury, 320.
of the bar, 334, 335, n., 337, n.
INDIANA,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
when laws to take effect without governor's signature, 154, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
privileges of members, 134, n.
prohibition of special laws where general can be made applicable,
129, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
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INDIANA, — continued.
religious tests for office forbidden, 469, n.
exemption from bearing arms of persons conscientiously opposed, 478, n.
republication of amended statutes, 151, 152.
INDICTMENT,
criminal accusations to be by, 809.
trial on defective, 272, n., 827.
(See Crimes.)
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
provisions for protection of, in State constitutions, 35, 36.
in national Constitution, 256-259.
do not owe their origin to constitutions, 36, 37.
English statutes declaratory of, 22, 23, 257.
(See Personal Liberty.)
INELIGIBILITY,
of highest candidate, how to affect election, 620.
INFANTS,
excluded from suffrage, 29, 30, 599.
special statutes authorizing sale of lands of, 97-106, 389.
custody of, by parents, 340, 848.
emancipation of, 340.
control of, by masters, guardians, and teachers, 340, 341.
INFERIOR COURTS,
duty of, to pass upon constitutional questions, 162, n.
distinguished from courts of general jurisdiction, 406.
disproving jurisdiction of, 406, 407.
INFORMALITIES,
right to take advantage of, may be taken away by legislation, 370-383.
do not defeat jurisdiction of court, 408.
waiver of, in legal proceedings, 409.
INHABITANT,
meaning of, in election laws, 599, 600.
INITIALS,
to Christian name of candidate, whether sufficient in ballot, 609.
INJUSTICE,
of constitutional provisions, cannot be remedied by the court, 72, 73.
of statutes, does not render them unconstitutional, 164-168.
in taxation, sometimes inevitable, 513.
INNOCENCE,
of accused parties, presumption of, 309-311.
only to be overcome by confession in open court, or verdict, 811.
conclusive presumptions against, 826, n.
INQUISITORIAL TRIALS,
not permitted where the common law prevails, 313.
accused parties not compellable to give evidence against themselves,
313-317.
INSANITY,
defence of, in criminal cases, 309, n.
INSOLVENT LAWS,
right of the States to pass, 293, 294.
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INDEX.
INSOLVENT LAWS, — continued.
Congressional regulations supersede, 294.
what contracts cannot be reached by, 294.
creditor making himself a party to proceedings is bound, 294.
INSPECTION LAWS,
of the States, imposts or duties under, 15.
constitutionality of, 584, 585.
INSURRECTIONS,
employment of militia for suppression of, 11.
INTENT,
to govern in construction of constitutions, 55.
whole instrument to be examined in seeking, 57, 58.
in ineffectual contracts, may be given effect to by retrospective legislation,
372-383.
question of, in libel cases, 460-466.
in imperfect ballot, voter cannot testify to, 607.
what evidence admissible on question of, 611, 626.
INTEREST,
in party, essential to entitle him to question the validity of a law, 163.
in judge, precludes his acting, 175, 410-413.
of money, illegal reservation of, may be legalized, 375, 376.
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS,
giving municipal corporations power to subscribe to, is not delegating
legislative power, 119 and n.
constitutionality of municipal subscriptions to, 213-219.
special legislative authority requisite, 215.
negotiable securities issued without authority are void, 215.
prohibition to the State engaging in, whether it applies to municipalities,
216-219.
retrospective legalization of securities, 379, 380.
INTERNATIONAL LAW,
equality of States under, 1.
INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS,
States no jurisdiction over, 128.
INTERPRETATION,
meaning of, 38, n.
(See Construction or State Constitutions.)
INTIMIDATION,
of voters, secrecy as a protection against, 604, 605.
securities against, 614, 615.
INTOXICATING DRINKS,
power of States to require licenses for sale of, 581-584.
power of States to prohibit sales of, 581-584.
payment of license fee to United States does not give right to sell as
against State laws, 584.
furnishing to voters, 614.
INTOXICATION,
not an excuse for crime, 476, n.
is temporary insanity, 599.
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INTRODUCTION OF BILLS,
for revenue purposes, 131, 132.
generally, 137, 138.
INVASIONS,
employment of militia to repel, 11.
INVENTIONS,
securing right in, to inventors, 10.
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,
gradual abolition of, in England, 295-299.
as a punishment for crime, 299.
(See Personai. Liberty.)
IOWA,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
special legislative sessions, 155, n.
when statutes of, to take effect, 158.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
legislative regulations of pardons, 116, n.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599.
religious tests for office forbidden, 469.
religious belief not to be test of competency of witness, 478.
IRREGULARITIES, .
in judicial proceedings, not inquirable into on habeas corpus, 347, 348.
do not render judicial proceedings void, 408.
waiver of, 409.
may be cured by retrospective legislation, 370-383.
effect of, upon elections, 617-619.
IRREPEALABLE LAWS,
legislature cannot pass, 125-127, 284.
Parliament cannot bind its successors, 126.
laws which constitute contracts are inviolable, 127.
whether essential powers of government can be bartered away, 280-284,
525.
municipal corporations cannot adopt, 206-208.
J.
JEOPARDY,
party not to be twice put in, for same cause, 325-328.
what constitutes, 326, 327.
whim jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.
when nolle prosequi is an acquittal, 327.
second trial after verdict set aside, 327, 328.
acquittal on some counts is a bar pro tanto to new trial, 328.
varying form of the charge, S27.
duplicate punishments under State and municipal laws, 199.
JOURNAL OF THE LEGISLATURE,
is a public record, 135.
is evidence whether a law is properly adopted, 135, 136.
presumption of correct action where it is silent, 135, 136.
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INDEX.
JUDGE,
disqualification of interest, 410-413.
not to urge opinion upon the jury, 320.
to instruct the jury on the law, 322.
JUDGE-MADE LAW,
objectionable nature of, 56, n.
JUDGMENTS,
conclusiveness of those of other States, 17.
general rules as to force and effect, 47-54.
must apply ;he law in force when rendered, 381.
are void if jurisdiction is wanting, 382, 398, 406, 413.
irregularities do not defeat, 347, 348, 408.
(See Judicial Proceedings; Jurisdiction.)
JUDICIAL DECISIONS,
of federal courts conclusive on questions of federal jurisdiction, 12.
of State courts followed in other cases, 13.
general rules as to force and effect of, 47-54.
JUDICIAL POWER,
of the United States, 19.
I.See Courts op the United States.)
not to be exercised by State legislatures, 87-114, 392.
what it is, 90-92, 347, n.
declaratory statutes not an exercise of, 93-95.
such statutes not to be applied to judgments, 94.
instances of exercise of, 95, 96.
is apportioned by legislature, 89, n.
legislature may exercise, in deciding contested seats, 133.
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS,
confirmation of invalid, by legislature, 107, 108, 370.
are void if court has no jurisdiction of the case, 897.
jurisdiction of subject-matter, what is, 398.
consent will not confer, 398.
if wanting, objection may be taken at any time, 398.
law encourages voluntary settlements and arrangements, 899.
arbitrations distinguished from, 399.
transitory and local actions, 399, 400.
jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400, 401.
necessity for service of process, or substitute therefor, 402—404.
proceedings in rem and in personam, 403.
bringing in parties by publication, 404.
no personal judgment in such case, 404, 406.
decree for custody of children, effect of, 405.
contesting jurisdiction, 406, 407.
courts of general and special jurisdiction, 406, 407.
record of, how far conclusive, 406, 407.
irregularities do not defeat, 347, 348, 408.
waiver of, 409.
judicial power cannot be delegated, 410.
right to jury trial in civil cases, 410, n.
judge not to sit when interested, 410-413.
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JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, — continued.
statements in course of, how far privileged, 441-445.
publication of accounts of trials privileged, 448, 449.
but must be fair and full, 448, 449.
and not ex; arte, 449-451.
and not contain indecent or blasphemous matter, 449.
JUDICIARY,
construction of constitution by, 44-46.
equality of, with legislative department, 45, n.
independence of, 46, n.
when its decisions to be final, 44-54.
(See Courts; Judicial Power; Judicial Proceedings.)
JURISDICTION,
of courts, disproving, 17, 406, 407.
want of, cannot be cured by legislation, 107.
of subject-matter, what it consists in, 398.
not to be conferred by consent, 398, 409.
if wanting, objection may be taken at any time, 398.
in divorce cases, what gives, 400, 401.
necessity for service of process, 402-404.
irregularities do not affect, 347, 348, 408.
interest in judge, effect of, 410-413.
general and special distinguished, 406, 407.
where it exists, proceedings not to be attacked collaterally, 408, 409.
in tax proceedings, 499.
of federal courts, 10-14, 19, 20, 294, 427.
in cases of habeas corpus, 345, 346.
JURY,
independence of, 320, 321 and n., 325, n.
JURY TRIAL,
the mode for the trial of criminal accusations, 309, 319!
importance of, 320, n.
must be speedy, 311. •
and public, 312.
and not inquisitorial, 313.
prisoner to be confronted with witnesses, 318.
to be present during trial, 319.
jury-to consist of twelve, 319, 562, n.
challenges of, 319.
must be from vicinage, 24, 319, 320.
must be left free to act, 320.
how far to judge of the law, 321-324, 414, n.
in libel cases, 460-463.
acquittal by, is final, 321, 322.
judge to instruct jury on the law, 322.
but not to express opinion on facts, 320.
nor to refuse to receive verdict, 320.
accused not to be twice put in jeopardy, 825-828.
what is legal jeopardy, 326, 327.
when jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.
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INDEX.
JURY TRIAL, — continued.
when nolle prosequi equivalent to verdict, 327.
second trial after verdict set aside, 327, 328.
right to counsel, 330-338.
constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases, 19, n., 410, n.
in case of municipal corporations, 233, n.
JUST COMPENSATION,
what constitutes, when property taken by the public, 559-570.
(See Eminent Domain.)
JUSTIFICATION,
in libel cases by showing truth of charge, 424, 464.
showing of good motives and justifiable occasion, 464-466.
unsuccessful attempt at, to increase damages, 438.
K.
KANSAS,
requirement of general laws when they can be made applicable, 129.
power to grant divorces vested in courts, 110, n.
privilege of members of legislature from arrest, 134, n.
title of acts to express the object, 141, n.
legislative regulation of pardons, 116, n.
republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.
religious test for office forbidden, 469.
KENTUCKY,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
title of act? to express the object, 141, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 468, n.
protection to property by law of the land, 351, n.
L.
LAW,
common, how far in force, 23, n.
(See Common Law.)
and fact, respective province of court and jury as to, 320-324, 460-463.
the jury as judges of, 821-324, 460-463.
LAW-MAKING POWER,
(See Legislatures of tHe States.)
LAW OF THE LAND,
protection of, insured by magna charta, 351.
American constitutional provisions, 11, 15, 351, n.
meaning of the term, 353-357, 369, n.
vested rights protected by, 357.
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LAW OP THE LAND, — continued.
meaning of vested rights, 358, 370, 378.
subjection of, to general laws, 358.
interests in expectancy are not, 859-361.
rights acquired through the marriage relation, 360, 361.
legal remedies not the subject of vested rights, and may be changed,
361, 362.
statutory privileges are not, 383.
rights in action are, 362.
forfeitures must be judicially declared, 363, 364.
limitation laws may be passed, 364-367, 369.
rules of evidence may be changed, 367-369.
retrospective laws, when admissible, 369-384.
cannot create rights in action, 369.
nor revive debts barred by statute of limitations, 369.
may cure informalities, 370-383.
may perfect imperfect contracts, 293, 371-381.
may waive a statutory forfeiture, 375, n., 376, n.
may validate imperfect deeds, 376-379.
but not as against bona fide purchasers, 378, 379.
cannot validate proceedings the legislature could not have authorized,
381-383.
cannot cure defects of jurisdiction in courts, 882.
consequential injuries give no right to complain, 384.
sumptuary laws inadmissible, 385.
betterment laws, 385-389.
unequal and partial laws, 389-397.
invalid judicial proceedings, 397.
what necessary to give courts jurisdiction, 397-400.
consent cannot confer, 398-400.
in divorce cases, 400, 401, 405.
process must be served or substitute had, 402-404.
proceedings in rem and in personam, 403.
bringing in parties by publication, 403, 404.
no personal judgment in such case, 404, 406.
process cannot be served in another State, 403.
jurisdiction over guardianship of children in divorce cases, 405.
courts of general and special jurisdiction, and the rules as to ques-
tioning their jurisdiction, 406, 407.
irregular proceedings do not defeat jurisdiction, 408.
waiver of irregularities, 409.
judicial power cannot be delegated, 410.
judge cannot sit in his own cause, 410-413.
objection to his interest cannot be waived, 413.
right to jury trial in civil cases, 19, n., 410, n.
(See Taxation; Eminent Domain; Police Power.)
LAWS, ENACTMENT OF,
(See Statutes.)
LAWS IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,
(See Obligation of Contracts.)
50
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INDEX.
LAWS, EX POST FACTO,
(See Ex Post Facto Laws; Retrospective Laws.)
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS,
publication of accounts of, how far privileged, 448-451.
statements in course of, when privileged, 441-445.
(See Judicial Proceedings.)
LEGAL TENDER,
only gold and silver to be made, by the States, 15.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT,
not to exercise executive or judicial powers, 87-116.
equality of, with other departments, 45, n., 47, n.
(See Legislatures of tHe States.)
LEGISLATIVE DIVORCES,
whether they are an exercise of judicial power, 109-114.
impropriety of, 110, 114, n.
LEGISLATIVE MOTIVES,
not to be inquired into by courts, 135, 136, 186, 187, 208.
presumption of correctness of, 186, 187, 208.
LEGISLATIVE POWERS,
enactments in excess of, are void, 3, 174.
distingu'shed from judicial, 91.
cannot be delegated, 116-125.
exercise of, will not give right of action, 208.
cannot extend beyond territorial limits, 127.
grant of, will not warrant exercise of executive or judicial powers,
87-116.
LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS,
privilege of publication of, 457-460.
members not to be questioned for words in course of, 445-447.
LEGISLATORS,
contested elections of, to be decided by house, 133.
duty of, not to violate constitution, 185.
presumed correctness of motives, 186, 187.
privilege of, in debate, 445-447.
right of, to publish speeches, 457-460.
LEGISLATURES, COLONIAL,
statutes adopted by, in force at Revolution, 25.
LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES,
power to originate amendments to State constitution, 31, and n.
construction of constitution by, 39-43.
deference due to judicial construction by, 53.
powers of, compared with those of Parliament, 85, 86, 172, 173.
not to exercise executive or judicial powers, 87, 116, 174-176.
complete legislative power vested in, 87, 168, 172, 173.
specification of powers in constitution unnecessary, 88.
declaratory statutes not the exercise of judicial power, 93-95.
cannot set aside judgments, grant new trials, &p., 95, 96, 392.
how far may bind parties by recital of facts in statutes, 96.
power of, to grant divorces, 109-114.
delegation of legislative power inadmissible, 116-125.
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LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES, — continued.
but conditional legislation is not, 117.
nor making charters subject to acceptance, 118, 119.
nor conferring powers of local government, 118-125, 191.
irrepealable legislation cannot be passed, 126-127, 284.
but exemptions from taxation may be made, 127, 280, 514.
power of, limited to territory of the State, 127.
discretionary powers of, how restricted, 129.
courts no control over, 129.
enactment of laws by, 130-158.
must be under the constitutional forms, 130, 131.
parliamentary common law of, 130, 131, 134.
division of, into two houses, 131, 132.
when to meet, 132.
proroguement by executive, 132.
rules of order of, 133.
election and qualification of members, determination of, 133.
contempts of, may be punished by, 133, 134.
but not by committees, 135.
members of, may be expelled, 133.
their privilege from arrest, &c, 134.
committees of, for collection of information, &c, 135.
power of, to terminate with session, 135.
journals of, to be evidence, 135, 136.
action of, to be presumed legal and correct, 135, 136.
motives of members not to be questioned, 135, 186, 187, 208.
"lobby" services illegal, 136, and n.
bills, introduction and passage of, 137-141.
three several readings of, 80, 81, 139, 140.
yeas antl nays to be entered on journal, 140.
vote on passage of, what sufficient, 141.
title of, formerly no part of it, 141.
constitutional provisions respecting, 81, 82, 141, n.
purpose of these, 142.
they are mandatory, 150, 151.
particularity required in stating object, 144, 145.
what is embraced by title, 148-150.
effect if more than one object embraced, 147, 148.
effect if act is broader than title, 148-150.
amended statutes, publication of, at length, 151, 152.
repeal of statutes at session when passed, 152.
signing of bills by officers of the houses, 152.
approval and veto of bills by governor, 153, 154.
governor's messages to, 155.
special sessions of, 155.
when acts to take effect, 155-158.
power of the courts to declare statutes unconstitutional, 159-188.
full control of, over municipal corporations, 192, 193, 226, 233.
legalization by, of irregular municipal action, 221.
of invalid contracts, 293, 371-381.
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INDEX.
LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES, — continued.
of irregular sales, taxation, &c, 370-383.
not to pass bills of attainder, 15, 33, 259.
nor ex post facto laws, 15, 33, 264.
nor laws violating obligation of contracts, 15, 33, 127, 273.
(See Obligation of Contracts.)
insolvent laws, what may be passed, 293, 294.
right to petition, 349.
vested rights protected against, 351-397.
(See Law of tHe Land.)
control by, of remedies in criminal cases, 267-273.
in civil cases, 287-294, 361-367.
control of rules of evidence, 288, 367-369.
may change estates in land, 359-361.
and rights to property under the marriage relation, 360, 361.
limitation laws may be passed by, 364-367.
retrospective legislation by, 369-383.
(See Retrospective Legislation.)
privileges granted by, may be recalled, 383.
consequential injuries from action of, 384.
sumptuary laws, 385.
betterment laws, 386-389.
unequal and partial legislation, 389-397.
general laws not always essential, 389, 390.
special rules for particular occupations, 390.
proscriptions for opinion's sake, 390, 891.
suspensions of laws in special cases, 891, 392.
special remedial legislation, 389, 391.
special franchises, 393-397.
restrictions upon suffrage, 394.
power of, to determine for what purposes taxes may be levied, 488-492,
517.
cannot authorize property to be taxed out of its district, 499-504.
must select the subjects of taxation, 514.
may determine necessity of appropriating private property to public use,
528, 538, 539.
authority of, requisite to the appropriation, 528.
cannot appropriate property to private use, 530, 531.
LETTERS,
legal inviolability of, 307, n.
LEVEES,
establishment of, under police power, 589.
special assessments for, 510.
LIBEL,
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
LIBERTY,
personal,
(See Personal Liberty.)
of the press,
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
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LIBERTY, — continued.
religious,
(See Religious Liberty.)
of discussion, 349.
of bearing arms, 350.
of petition, 349.
charters of, 24, n.
LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.
Hamilton's reasons why protection of, by bill of rights, was not important,
256.
opposing reasons by Jefferson, 258, n.
Congress to pass no law abridging, 414.
State constitutional provisions respecting, 414, n.
these create no new rights, but protect those already existing, 415, 416.
liberty of the press neither well defined nor protected at the common law, ,
417.
censorship of publications, 417-419.
debates in Parliament not suffered to be published, 418.
censorship in the Colonies, 418, 419.
secret sessions of Constitutional Convention, 419.
and of United States Senate, 420.
what liberty of speech and of the press consists in, 420, 421, 422.
general purpose of the constitutional provisions, 421, 422.
rules of common-law liability for injurious publications, 422-425.
modification of, by statute, 430.
privileged cases, 425, 426.
libels upon the government indictable at the'common law, 426.
prosecutions for, have ceased in England, 427.
sedition law for punishment of, 427.
whether now punishable in America, 428-430.
criticism upon officers and candidates for office, 431-441.
statements in the course of judicial proceedings, 441-445.
privilege of counsel, 442-445.
privilege of legislators, 445-447.
publication of privileged communications through the press, 448-460.
publication of speeches of counsel, &c, not privileged, 448.
fair and impartial account of judicial trial is, 448.
but not of ex parte proceedings, 448, 449.
whole case must be published, 448, 449.
must be confined to what took place in court, 449.
must not include indecent or blasphemous matter, 449.
privilege of publishers of news, 451-457.
publishers generally held to same responsibility as other persons, 455.
not excused by giving source of information, 455.
nor because the publication was without their personal knowledge, 455.
nor by its being a criticism on a candidate for office, 455.
nor by its constituting a fair account of a public meeting, 455, 456.
criticisms by, on works of art and literary productions, 456, 457.
exemplary damages against publishers, 457.
publication of legislative proceedings, how far privileged, 457.
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INDEX.
LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS, — continued.
rule in England, 457, -158.
the case of Stockdale p. Hansard, 458, n.
publication of speeches by members, 457, 459, 460.
the jury as judges of the law in libel eases, 460.
Woodfall's and Miller's cases, 460, 461.
Mp. Fox's Libel Act, 462.
the early rulings on the subject in America, 462, 463.
provisions on the subject in State constitutions, 463.
the truth as a defence when good motives and justifiable ends in the pub-
lication can be shown, 464.
burden of proof on the defendant to show them, 464.
that publication was copied from another source is not sufficient, 466.
motives or character of defendant no protection, if publication is false,
, 466.
LICENSE,
of occupations in general, 596.
for ferry across navigable waters, 593.
revoking, where a fee was received therefor, 283, n.
LICENSE FEES,
when are taxes, 201, 495.
limited generally to necessary expenses, &c, 201.
payment of, to United States, does not give rights as against State laws.
584.
LICENSER,
of intended publications, 417-419.
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
LICENTIOUSNESS,
distinguished from liberty, 339, n.
LIFE,
action for taking, through negligence, &c, 581.
not to be taken but by due process of law, 11, 15, 291, n.
LIMITATION,
of time to apply for compensation for property taken by public, 561.
LIMITATION LAWS,
may cut off vested rights, 364-367.
opportunity to assert rights must first be given, 365, 366.
cannot operate upon party in possession, 366.
legislature to determine what is reasonable time, 366.
suspension of, 365, n., 391, n.
legislature cannot revive demands barred by, 365.
legislature may prescribe form for new promise, 293.
do not applv to State or nation, 367, n.
LIMITATIONS TO LEGISLATIVE POWER,
are only such as the people have imposed by their constitutions, 87.
(See Legislatures of tHe States.)
LITERARY PRODUCTIONS,
copyright to, Congress may provide for, 10.
privilege of criticism of, 457.
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LOBBY SERVICES,
contract for, unlawful, 136, and n., 212, n.
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT,
State constitutions framed in reference to, 35.
the peculiar feature of the American system, 189.
(See Municipal Corporations.)
LOCAL TAXATION,
(See Taxation.)
LOCALITY OF PROPERTY,
may give jurisdiction to courts, 404, 406.
taxation dependent upon, 499-504, 516.
LOG-ROLLING LEGISLATION,
constitutional provisions to prevent, 142-144.
LORDS DAY,
laws for observance of, how justified, 476, 477.
LOUISIANA,
divorces not to be granted by special laws, 110, n.
revenue bills in, 131, n.
title of acts to express their object, 142, n.
liberty of the press in, 417, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 468, n.
republication of amended statutes, 152.
exclusions from suffrage, 599, n.
LUNATICS,
excluded from suffrage, 599.
special statutes for sale of lands of, 97-106.
M.
MAGNA CEAIiTA,
grant of, did not create constitutional government, 3, n.
a declaratory statute, 22, 23, 257.
its maxims the interpreters of constitutional grants of power, 175.
provision in, for trial by peers, &c, 351.
MAILS,
inviolability of, 307, n.
MAINE,
judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 414, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 469.
periodical valuations for taxation, 496.
exclusions from suffrage, 599, n.
MAJORITY,
what constitutes two thirds, 141.
what sufficient in elections, 598, n., 614.
MALICE,
presumption of, from falsity of injurious publications, 422, 455.
in refusing to receive legal votes, 616.
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INDEX.
MANDAMUS,
to compel registration of voters, 602.
to compel canvassers to perform duty, 623.
MANDATORY STATUTES,
doctrine of, 74-78.
constitutional provisions always mandatory, 78-83, 140, 150.
but courts cannot always enforce, 129.
MANUFACTURING PURPOSES,
whether dams for, can be established under right of eminent domain,
631-536.
MARKETS,
State power to regulate, 596.
MARRIAGE,
validating invalid, by retrospective legislation, 372.
legislative control of rights springing from, 360, 361.
power of the legislature to annul, 109-114.
statutory regulation of, 319, n.
(See Divorce; Married Women.)
MARRIED WOMEN,
exclusion of, from suffrage, 29, 599.
statutes enlarging rights of, 61, n.
testimony of, in favor of husband, 317, 318, n.
invalid deeds of, may be validated by legislature, 377, 378.
control of, by husband, 339, 340.
(See Divorce; Dower.)
MARSHES,
draining of, and assessments therefor, 510, 511, 533.
MARTIAL LAW,
when may be declared, 309, n., 319, n.
legality of action under, 362, n.
danger from, 615.
MARYLAND,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
title of acts to express the object, 141, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 415, n.
religious liberty in, 468, n., 478, n.
republication of amended statutes, 151, n.
exclusions from suffrage, 599, n.
MASSACHUSETTS,
judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.
divorces in, to be granted by courts, 110, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 131, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 414, n.
periodical valuations for taxation, 496.
exclusions from suffrage, 599, n.
MASTER,
of apprentice, servant, and scholar, power of, 340, 34".
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MAXIMS,
of government, laws in violation of, 169, 170.
of the common law, what they consist in, 22.
gradual growth and expansion of, 54, 55.
for construction of statutes,
a statute is to be construed as prospective, and not retrospective, in
its operation, 62.
such an interpretation shall be put upon a law as to uphold it, and
give effect to the intention of the law-makers, 58.
words in a statute are presumed to be employed in their natural and
ordinary sense, 58, 83, n.
contemporary construction is best and strongest in the law, 67-71.
a statute is to be construed in the light of the mischief it was designed
to remedy, 65.
he who considers the letter merely, goes but skin deep into the
meaning, 84.
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly,
61, n.
an argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in the law, 67-71.
general principles,
no man can be judge in his own cause, 410-418.
consent excuses error, 181, 182, 409.
the law does not concern itself about trifles, 520.
that to which a party assents is not in law an injury, 181, 182.
no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause, 47-54.
every man's house is his castle, 22, 299.
that which was originally void cannot by mere lapse of time become
valid, 866, n.
necessity knows no law, 594.
so enjoy your own as not to injure that of another, 573.
MEANING OF WORDS,
(See Definitions.)
MEASURES AND WEIGHTS,
regulation of, 596.
MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE,
contested seats of, decided by the house, 183.
punishment of, for contempts, &c, 133.
power of the houses to expel, 133, 134.
exemption of, from arrest, 134.
publication of speeches by, 457-460.
privilege of, in debate, &c, 445-448.
MICHIGAN,
right of, to admission to the Union under ordinance of 1787, 28.
repeal of acts of Parliament in, 25, n.
right of married women to property in, 61, n.
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
privilege of legislators from arrest, 134, n.
special legislative sessions in, 155, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
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1
MICHIGAN, — continued.
when statutes of, to take effect, 156.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 416.
religious belief of witness not to be inquired into, 478.
periodical valuation of property for taxation, 496.
MILITARY BOUNTIES,
by municipal corporations, when legal, 219-229.
MILITARY COMMISSIONS,
when not admissible, 319, n.
(See Martial Law.)
MILITIA,
control of, 11, 18, 41, n.
not to be called out on election days, 615.
MILL-DAMS,
construction of, across navigable waters, 594.
abatement of, as nuisances, 595.
MILL-DAM ACTS,
do not confer vested rights, 384.
constitutionality of, 534-536.
MINNESOTA.
divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.
title of acts to express the object, 141, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
protection to property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
religious liberty in, 468, n., 478, n.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.
MINORS,
(See Infants.)
MISCHIEF TO BE REMEDIED,
mav throw light on constitutional clause, 65.
Mississippi,
constitutional provision respecting divorces, 110, n.
privileges of members, 134, n.
when statutes to take effect, 156.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
protection to property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 417, n.
religious test for office, 468, 469.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.
MISSOURI,
legislative licenses for sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.
restrictions upon legislative power in constitution of, 128,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.
privileges of members, 134, n.
special legislative sessions in, 155, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.
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MISSOURI,— continued.
republication of amended statutes, 137, n.
when acts to take effect, 156, n.
protection to property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 416.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.
MONEY,
coinage and regulation of, 10, 15.
legal tender, 15.
punishment of counterfeiting, 10, 18.
bills for raising, to originate in lower house in some States, 131, 132.
cannot be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 527.
MONOPOLIES,
odious nature of, 893.
grant of, not presumed, 895.
in navigable waters, 591.
MORTGAGES,
right to possession under, cannot be taken away by legislature, 290, 291.
MOTIVES,
of legislative body not to be inquired into by courts, 135, 136, 186, 187.
nor those of municipal legislative body, 208.
good, when a defence in libel cases, 464.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
question of formation or division of, may be submitted to people inter-
ested, 118, 119.
powers of local government may be conferred upon, 118-125, 191.
whether they may engage in internal improvements, &c, 119, 213-219.
general view of the system, 189-192.
legislature prescribes extent of powers, 191.
charter of, the measure of their authority, 192.
complete control of, by legislature, 170, n., 191, 193.
whether it may compel them to assume obligations aside from their ordi-
nary functions, 230-235.
charter of, not a contract, 192.
implied powers of, 194, 209, 210.
effect of changes in, 192, n.
charter to be strictly construed, 195.
contracts, ultra vires, void, 196, 211, 212, 215, and n.
negotiable paper issued by, when valid, 212, 215, and n.
may exist by prescription, 197.
powers thereof, 197.
what by-laws they may make, 195, 198.
must not be opposed to constitution of State or nation, 198.
nor to charter, 198.
nor to general laws of the State, 198.
nor be unreasonable, 200.
nor uncertain, 202.
cannot delegate their powers, 204, 205.
nor adopt irrepealable legislation, 206-208.
nor preclude themselves from exercise of police power, 206-208.
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INDEX.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, — continued.
nor grant away use of streets, 207, 208.
incidental injuries in exercise of powers give no right of action, 208.
may indemnify officers, 209, 210.
but not for refusal to perform duty, 212.
may contract to pay for liquors destroyed, 211, n.
powers of, to be construed with reference to the purposes of their cre-
ation, 211.
will not include furnishing entertainments, 211.
or loaning credit or making accommodation paper, 212.
must be confined to territorial limits, 213.
power of, to raise bounty moneys, &c, 219-229.
legislative control of corporate property, 235-239.
towns, counties, &c, how differing from chartered corporations, 240, 247,
248.
judgments against, may be collected of corporators, 241-247.
but only in New England, 246, 247.
not liable for failure of officers to perform duty, 247.
chartered corporations undertake for performance of corporate duty, 247.
liability to persons injured by failure, 247-253.
corporate organization how questioned, 254.
imperfect acts of, may be validated, 373, 374, n., 379.
must tax all property within their limits alike, 502.
cannot tax property not lying within their limits, 500.
bounds of, cannot be arbitrarily enlarged in order to bring in property for
taxation, 500-504.
obtaining water for, under right of eminent domain, 533.
taking of lands for parks for, 533, 534, n.
MUTE,
wilfully standing when arraigned, 311.
N.
NATION,
definition of, 1.
distinguished from State, 1.
(See United States.,
NATURALIZATION,
power of Congress over, 10.
NAVIGABLE WATERS,
made free by ordinance of 1787, 25, n.
right of States to improve and charge toll, 26, n., 592.
what are, and what not, 589.
are for use of all equally, 590.
general control of, is in the States, 591.
Congressional regulations, when made, control, 591.
States cannot grant monopolies of, 591.
States may authorize bridges over, 592.
when bridges become nuisances, 592.
States may establish ferries across, 593.
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NAVIGABLE WATERS, — continued.
States may authorize dams of, 593, 594.
regulation of speed of vessels upon, 594.
rights of fishery in, 524.
frontage upon, is property, 544.
(See Water-Courses.)
NAVIGATION,
right of, pertains to the eminent domain, 524.
(See Navigable Waters.)
NEBRASKA,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
privilege of members of legislature from arrest, &c, 134, n.
title of acts to express the object, 141, n.
republication of amended statutes, 151, n.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 409, n., 478, n.
NECESSITY,
is the basis of the right of eminent domain, 524, 538.
extent of property to be taken is limited by, 539.
destruction of buildings' to prevent spread of fire, 594.
NEGLIGENCE,
as a foundation for rights under betterment laws, 388.
carriers of persons may be made responsible for deaths by, 581.
in the construction of public works may give right of action, 671.
NEGOTIABLE PAPER,
when municipal corporations liable upon, 212, 215, and n.
NEVADA,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.
when acts to take effect, 156, n.
special legislative sessions in, 155, n.
title of acts to express the subject, 142, n.
protection by the law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
religious liberty in, 478, n.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.
NEW ENGLAND CONFEDERACY,
of 1643, why formed, 5.
NEW HAMPSHIRE,
judges of, to give opinions to legislature, &c, 40.
causes of divorce to be heard by courts, 110, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
approval of laws, 153, n.
retrospective laws forbidden in, 370.
protection by the law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 414, n.
religious liberty in, 469, n., 478, n.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.
NEW JERSEY,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
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INDEX.
NEW JERSEY, — continued.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower bouse, 132, n.
liberty of the press in, 415, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.
disqualifications for suffrage, 599, n.
NEWSPAPERS,
publication of privileged communications in, 448-451.
whether they have any privilege in publishing news, 451.
privilege not admitted by the courts, 453-457.
when publisher not liable to vindictive damages, 457.
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
NEW STATES,
admission of, 27-37.
NEW TRIALS,
not to be granted by the legislature, 95, 392.
not granted on application of State in criminal cases, 321.
may be had after verdict set aside on application of defendant, 327, 328.
but not on counts on which he was acquitted, 328.
(See Jeofardy.)
NEW YORK,
divorces only to be granted in judicial proceedings, 110, n.
title of private and local acts to express the subject, 142, n.
amendment of first constitution in, 31.
protection by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 414, n.
witnesses not rendered incompetent from want of religious belief, 478, n.
contested election of governor in, 623, n.
NOBILITY,
titles of, forbidden to be granted, 17.
NOLLE PROSEQUI,
when equivalent to acquittal, 327.
NON COMPOTES MENTIS,
legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106.
excluded from suffrage, 599.
NON-RESIDENT PARTIES,
subjecting to jurisdiction of court by publication, 403-406.
restricted effect of the notice, 404,
discrimination in taxation of, 487.
NORTH CAROLINA,
ratification of Constitution by, 8, 9.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.
protection by the law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 417, n.
infidels disqualified for holding office, 468.
NOTICE,
necessity for, in legal proceedings, 402-406.
bringing in non-resident parties by publication of, 403, 404.
of elections, when essential to their validity, 602, 603.
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INDEX. 799
NUISANCE,
when bridges over navigable waters are, 593.
when dams are, and may be abated, 594, 595. ''
obstructions in navigable streams are, 590, n.
forbidding use of cemeteries which have become, 595.
general power in the States to abate, 596.
created by public, not to be abated at expense of individual, 596, n.
O.
OATH,
of attorneys, 330, 331, n.
test, may be punishment, 263, n.
of voter, when conclusive of his right, 617.
blasphemy and profanity punishable by law, 471-476.
OBJECT OF STATUTE,
in some States required to be stated in title, 141-151.
OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,
States not to pass laws violating, 15, 33, 126, 273.
what is a contract, 273-281.
agreements by States are, 274, 275.
executed contracts, 275.
appointments to office are not, 276. /
municipal charters are not, 192, 193, 276.
franchises granted to municipal corporations are not, 277.
but grants of property in trust are, 277-279.
and grants of property for municipal use, 236.
private charters of incorporation are, 279.
whether an exemption from taxation is, 127, 280-284.
it is if granted for a consideration, 281.
whether right of eminent domain can be relinquished, 281.
or the right to exercise the police power, 282, 283.
change in general laws of the State does not violate, 284.
nor divorce laws, 284.
such laws not to divest rights in property, 284, 285.
what obligation consists in, 285-287.
remedies for enforcement of contracts may be changed, 287-289.
imprisonment for debt may be abolished, 287.
exemptions from execution may be increased,-287.
rules of evidence may be changed, 288.
but all remedy cannot be taken away, 289, 290.
repeal of statute giving remedy cannot destroy contracts, 290.
appraisement laws cannot be made applicable to existing debts, 290.
right to possession under mortgages cannot be taken away, 290.
nor time to redeem lands shortened or extended, 291.
laws staying execution, how far invalid, 292, 293.
when power of municipal taxation may not be taken away, 292.
stockholders liable for corporate debts may not be released by law, 292.
whether a party may release, by contract, a privilege granted for reasons
of Statu policy, 293.
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INDEX.
'OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS, — continued.
when a contract requires new action to its enforcement, changes may be
made as to such action, 293.
new promise to revive a debt may be required to be in writing, 293.
laws validating invalid contracts do not violate Constitution, 293.
nor laws extending corporate franchises, 293.
State insolvent laws, how far valid, 293, 294.
effect of police laws, 574-584.
OBSCENITY,
in legal proceedings, not to be published, 449.
sale of obscene books and papers may be prohibited, 596.
OBSCURITIES,
aids irt interpretation of, 65-73.
(See Construction of State Constitutions.)
OBSTRUCTIONS TO NAVIGATION,
when bridges and dams to be considered such, 592-594.
when channels cut by private parties are private property, 590.
OCEAN,
(See HigH Seas.)
OFFICE,
appointments to, do not constitute contracts, 276.
whether they pertain to the executive, 115, n.
right to, not to be contested on habeas corpus, 348, n.
OFFICER,
protection of dwelling-house against, 22, 299.
general warrants to, are illegal, 300-302.
may break open house to serve criminal warrant, 303.
service of search-warrant by,
(See SearcHes and Seizures.)
privilege of criticism of, 431-441, 455, 456..
constitutional qualifications cannot be added to, by the legislature, 64.
duty of, when doubtful of constitutional construction, 73, 74.
of the legislature, election of, 133.
de jure, who are, 618, n.
municipal, may be indemnified by corporation, 209, 490.
but not for refusal to perform duty, 212. •
election of,
(See Elections.)
OHIO,
legislature not to grant divorces, or exercise judicial power, 111. n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
general laws to be uniform, 63.
appointing power, how exercised, 115.
retrospective laws, what not to be passed, 370, n,
republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.
liberty of the press in, 415, n.
religious tests forbidden, 469, n., 478, n.
impeachment of judges of, 160, n.
OMNIPOTENCE OF PARLIAMENT,
meaning of the term, 3, 4, 86.
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OPINION,
proscription for, is unconstitutional, 390.
on religious subjects to be free, 467-470.
religious tests forbidden in some States, 469, n.
of witnesses on religious subjects not to constitute disqualification in some
States, 478.
judicial, force of, as precedents, 50-54.
ORDINANCE OF 1787,
how far still in force, 25, 26, n.
admission of States to the Union under, 28, n.
ORDINANCES, MUNICIPAL,
(See Bt-Laws.)
OREGON,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
privileges of members, 134, n.
title of acts to express the subject, 141, n.
legislative regulation of pardons, 116.
republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 468, n.
want of religious belief not to render witness incompetent, 478, n.
who excluded from suffrage, 599, n.
OVERRULING DECISIONS,
when should take place, 52.
P.
PAPERS,
private, exempt from seizure, 300, n., 306, n., 307, n.
protected the same as property, 358, n.
PARDON,
power of, to be exercised by governor, 115, n.
constitutional provisions as to rules for, 116, n.
power to, does not include reprieves, 116, n.
PARENT,
right of, to custody of child, 340.
respective rights of father and mother, 348.
PARLIAMENT,
power of, to change the constitution, 3, 4, 86, 175.
acts of, adopted in America, 23, 24.
repeal of acts of, 25, n.
comparison of powers with those of State legislatures, 85, 88, 175, 176.
may exercise judicial authority, 87.
bills of attainder by, 259. •
publication of proceedings of, not formerly allowed, 418.
publication of speeches by members, 457-460.
publication of reports and papers of, 457-460.
51
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INDEX.
PARLIAMENTARY LAW,
influence of, in construction of constitutions, 130, 131.
legislative power in regard to, 133.
power to preserve order, &c, under, 133, 134.
privilege by, of members from arrest, 134.
PARTIAL LEGISLATION,
legislature to govern by equal laws, 392.
special laws for particular individuals not permissible, 892.
suspensions of laws not allowed in special cases, 392, 393.
regulations for special localities or classes, 393.
equality of rights, &c, the aim of the law, 393.
strict construction of special privileges and grants, 393-396.
and of discriminations against individuals and classes, 393, 394.
and of statutes in derogation of the common law, 61, n.
citizens of other States not to be discriminated against, 397.
PARTICULAR INTENT,
control of, by general intent, 58, n.
PARTIES,
defendants in criminal suits, evidence of, 317.
not compellable to testify against themselves, 313, 394.
how subjected to jurisdiction of courts, 402, 403.
estopped by judgment, 48, 49.
PARTITION,
legislature may authorize sale of lands for purposes of, 102.
PASTURAGE,
right of, in public highway, is property, 545, n.
PASSENGERS,
power of States to require report of, from carriers, and to levy tax upon,
587.
making carriers responsible for safety of, 580, 581.
PAUPERS.
exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.
PAVING STREETS,
assessments for, not within constitutional provisions respecting taxation,
497.
special taxing districts for, 505-507.
assessments may be made in proportion to benefits, 505, 506.
or in proportion to street front, 507.
but each separate lot cannot be made a separate district, 508.
PEACE AND WAR,
power over, of the revolutionary Congress, 6.
of Congress under the Constitution, 20.
PENALTIES,
for the same act under State and municipal laws, 199.
given by statute may be taken away, 362, 375, and n., 383.
for violation of police regulations, 596.
PENNSYLVANIA,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
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PENNSYLVANIA, —continued.
protection by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 415, n.
religious tests in, 468, n.
PEOPLE,
reservation of powers to, by national Constitution, 19.
sovereignty vested in, 28, 598.
formation and change of constitutions by, 30.
who are the, 28-30, 599.
exercise of sovereign powers by, 598.
PERSONAL LIBERTY,
gradually acquired by servile classes in Great Britain, 295-299.
constitutional prohibition of slavery in America, 299.
of bills of attainder, 15, 33, 259.
(See Bills of Attainder.)
of ex post facto laws, 15, 33, 264.
(See Ex Post Facto Laws.)
of unreasonable searches and seizures, 299-308.
(See Searches and Seizures.)
of quartering soldiers in private houses, 308, 309.
protection of, in one's dwelling-house, 22, 299, 308.
criminal accusations, how made, 309.
bail for accused parties, 309-311!
unreasonable, not to be demanded, 310.
trials for crimes, 311-338.
(See Crimes.)
meaning of the term, 339, 393.
legal restraints upon, 339-341.
right to, in England, did not depend on any statute, 342.
reason why it was not well protected, 842.
evasions of the writ of habeas corpus, 343.
the habeas corpus act, 23, 344.
did not extend to American Colonies, 345.
general adoption of, 345.
writ of habeas corpus, 345-348.
when national courts may issue, 845, 346.
State courts to issue generally, 346, 347.
return to, when prisoner held under national authority, 347.
not to be employed as a writ of error, 347.
application for, need not be made in person, 347, n.
what the officer to inquire into, 347, 348.
to enforce relative rights, 348.
PETITION,
right of, 349, 433, 434.
PETITION OF RIGHT,
was a declaratory statute, 23, 257.
quartering soldiers upon subjects forbidden by, 308.
PETIT JURY,
trial by,
(See Jury Trial.)
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INDEX.
PICTURES,
libels by, injury presumed from, 423.
indecent, sale of, may be prohibited, 596.
PLURALITY,
sufficient in elections, 630.
POISONS,
regulation of sales of, 595.
POLICE POWER,
pervading nature of, 572, 574.
definition of, 572, n.
the maxim on which it rests, 573.
States no power to relinquish it, 282-284.
power of States to make regulations which affect contracts, 574-581.
how cUartt'rs of private incorporation may be affected by, 575-581.
charters', rannot be amended on pretence of, 577, 578.
nor rigU&s granted by charters taken away, 578, 579.
railroad corporations may be required to fence track, 579.
and made liable for beasts killed on track, 579.
grade of railways and crosS^ngs may be prescribed, 580.
requirement that bell shall beruTHgoi" whistle sounded at crossings, &c, 580.
whether carriers of persons may-noS^e m»Je insurers, 580.
action may be given for death causediltenegligence, 581.
sale of intoxicating drinks may be regulatSHi^y State3> 581.
regulation of, does not interfere with poSper of Congress over com-
merce, 582. .
•ale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage may b\ prohibited by States,
582,583. \
payment of United States license fee does not give ri^1* " ag^^t State
law, 584. >
quarantine and health regulations by States, 584.
harbor regulations by the States, 585. «
line of distinction between police regulations and interfert1108
merce, 686.
police regulations may be established by Congress, 586.
State requirement of license fee from importers illegal, 586.
State regulations to prevent immigrants becoming a public ch*r^e'
State regulations of pilots and pilotage, 587.
Sunday laws as regulations of police, 588.
regulation by States of use of highways, 588.
owners of urban property may be required to build sidewalks,
construction of levees on river fronts, 589. i
control of navigable waters by States, 589, 591.
restrictions on this control, 591. . *
monopolies not to be granted, 591.
States may improve and charge tolls, 592.
may authorize bridges, 592.
when these bridges to be abated, 593.
may establish ferries, 593.
may authorize dams, 593, 594.
when the dams may be abated, 594, 595.
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POLICE POWER, — continued.
may regulate speed of vessels, 594.
other cases of police regulations, 594.
destruction of property to prevent spread of fire, 594.
establishment of fire limits, wharf lines, &c, 595.
regulations respecting gunpowder, poisons, dogs, unwholesome provisions,
&c, 595, 596.
regulations for protection of public morals, 596.
market regulations, 596.
prohibited act or omission may be made criminal, 596.
POLICE REGULATIONS,
power to establish, may be conferred on municipal corporations, 123-125.
(See Police Power.)
POLICE REPORTS,
publication of, 499, and n.
POLITICAL OPINIONS,
citizens not to be proscribed for, S90, n.
POLITICAL RIGHTS,
equality of, 390, 467-470.
POPULAR RIGHTS,
not measured by constitutions, 36, 37.
POPULAR VOTE,
submission of laws to, not generally allowable, 116-125.
(See Elections.)
POPULAR WILL,
expression of, as to amendment of constitutions, 31-33.
must be obtained under forms of law, 598.
(See Elections.)
POSSESSION,
importance of, in limitation laws, 366, n.
POST-OFFICES,
and post-roads, Congress may establish, 10.
inviolability of correspondence through, 807, n.
POWDER,
police regulations concerning storage of, 595.
POWERS,
of government, apportionment of, by State constitutions, 33, 37.
of Congress, 10-12.
of State legislatures, 85-129.
(See Judicial Power; Legislative Powers.)
PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION,
weight to be given to, 67-71.
not to override the Constitution, 71.
PRECEDENTS,
importance of, 50, 51, n.
judicial, how far binding, 50-54.
law made by, 56, 57, n.
only authoritative within country where decided, 51, 52.
when to be overruled, 52.
of executive department, force of, 67-71.
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INDEX.
PRECIOUS METALS,
in the soil belong to sovereign authority, 524.
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS,
of persons accused of crimes. 313.
publication of proceedings on, not privileged, 449.
PRESCRIPTIVE CORPORATIONS,
powers of, 197.
PRESENCE,
of prisoner at his trial, 319.
PRESIDENT,
powers and duties of. 11.
calling out the militia by, 41, n.
PRESS, LIBERTY OF,
(See Liberty of Speech and of the Press.)
PRESUMPTION,
of constitutionality of statutes, 168, 183.
of existence of corporation, 197.
of innocence of accused party, 309, 310.
of correctness of legislative motives, 186, 187, 208.
PRINCIPAL AND BAIL,
custody of principal by bail, 841.
. PRINTED BALLOTS,
answer the requirement of written, 605, n.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
distinguished from public, 279, 280, n.
charters of, are contracts, 279.
PRIVATE PAPERS,
(See Papers.)
PRIVATE PROPERTY,
right to, is before constitutions, 37, 175, n., 354, n.
of municipal corporations, how far under legislative control, 235.
owners cannot be compelled to improve, 885, 532.
appropriating under right of eminent domain, 523.
trial of right to, 309, and n.
(See Eminent Domain; Vested Rights.)
PRIVATE ROADS,
cannot be laid out under right of eminent domain, 530, 531.
PRIVATE STATUTES,
not evidence against third parties, 96.
to authorize sales by guardians, &c, are constitutional, 97-106, 389.
PRIVIES,
estoppel of, by judgment, 48, 49.
PRIVILEGES,
of citizens of the several States, 15, 16, 487.
citizens not to be deprived of, 11, 294.
protection of, rests with the States, 294, n.
of legislators, 134, 185.
special, strict construction of, 389-397.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS,
meaning of the term, 425.
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS, —continued.
when made in answer to inquiries, 425, 426.
between principal and agent, 426.
where parties sustain confidential relations, 426.
discussing measures or principles of government, 426-430.
criticising officers or candidates, 431-441.
made in the course of judicial proceedings, 441, 442.
made by counsel, 442-445.
by legislator to constituents, 457-460.
by client to counsel, 334.
PROCEEDINGS,
of constitutional convention may be.looked to on questions of construction,
66, 67.
of legislative bodies, publication of, 418—420, 457-460.
PROFANITY,
in judicial proceedings, publication of, 449.
punishment of, 471-476.
PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATIONS,
not to be disclosed, 334, and n.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES,
to influence legislation cannot be contracted for, 136, n.
law requiring, without compensation, to be strictly construed, 393, 394.
(See Counsel.)
PROHIBITIONS ON THE STATES,
in the federal Constitution, 15, 18.
in forming or amending constitutions, 33.
PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAWS,
constitutionality of, 582, 583.
PROPERTY,
qualification for suffrage, 599.
protection of, by fourteenth amendment, 11.
of municipal corporations, control of, 235.
(See Eminent Domain; Private Property; Vested Rights.)
PROROGUEMENT,
of the legislature by governor, 132.
PROSCRIPTION,
of persons, for their opinions, 390, 467-470.
PROSECUTING OFFICERS,
duty of, to treat accused parties with judicial fairness, 311, and n.
PROTECTION,
the equivalent for taxation, 559.
PROVISIONS,
regulations to prevent sale of unwholesome, 595.
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS,
(See Municipal Corporations.)
PUBLIC DEBT,
inviolability of, 11.
PUBLIC GOOD,
laws should have reference to, 117, n., 129.
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INDEX.
-
PUBLIC GRANTS,
strict construction of, 394-396.
(See CHarter; FrancHise.)
PUBLIC GROUNDS,
lands dedicated for, not to be put to other uses, 238, n.
PUBLIC MORALS,
regulations for protection of, 596.
{See Religious Liberty.)
PUBLIC OFFICERS,
(See Officer.)
PUBLIC OPINION,
not to affect construction of constitution, 54, 55.
expression of, by elections, 598.
.PUBLIC PURPOSES,
appropriation of property for, 523.
(See Eminent Domain.)
PUBLIC STATUTES,
what are, 390.
PUBLIC TRIAL,
accused parties entitled to, 312.
not essential that everybody be allowed to attend, 312.
PUBLIC USE,
of property, what constitutes, 531.
(See Eminent Domain.)
PUBLICATION,
of statutes, 156-158.
of debates in Parliament formerly not suffered, 418.
of books, &c, censorship of, 417-419.
of debates in American legislative bodies, 419, 420.
of legislative speeches, 457-460.
of notice to non-resident parties, 403, 404.
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
PUBLISHERS OF NEWS,
not privileged in law, 451-457.
PUNISHMENTS,
what changes in, the legislature may make applicable to previous offences,
267-272.
of crimes by servitude, 299.
cruel and unsual, prohibited, 328-330.
must not exceed measure the law has prescribed, 330.
(See Bills of Attainder; Crimes; Ex Post Facto Laws.)
Q.
QUALIFICATIONS,
of officer or voter under constitution cannot be added to by legislature, 64.
of members of legislature to be determined by the two houses, 133.
of voter, inquiring into, on contested election, 627.
QUARANTINE,
regulations by the States, 581.
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QUARTERING SOLDIERS,
in private houses in time of peace forbidden, 308.
QUORUM,
majority of, generally sufficient for passage of laws, 141.
of courts, must act by majorities, 96.
full court generally required on constitutional questions, 161, 162.
R.
RACE,
not to be a disqualification for suffrage, 11.
RAILROADS,
authorizing towns, &c, to subscribe to, is not delegating legislative power,
119.
whether such subscriptions may be made, 213-219.
appropriations of lands for, 633.
and of materials for constructing, 526.
and of lands for depot buildings, &c, 541.
corporations may take, 537, 538.
(See Eminent Domain.)
appropriation of highways for, 645-557.
must be legislative permission, 545.
whether adjoining owner entitled to compensation, 546-557.
police regulations in respect to, 573.
requiring corporations to fence track and pay for beasts killed, 579.
regulation of grade and crossings, 580.
provisions regarding alarms, 580.
responsibility for persons injured or killed, 580, 581.
bridges for, over navigable waters, 592.
READING OF BILLS.
constitutional provisions for, 80, 139, 140.
REAL ESTATE,
not to be taxed out of taxing district, 499, 500.
within taxing district to be taxed uniformly, 502.
taking for public use,
(See Eminent Domain.)
REASONABLENESS,
of municipal by-laws, 200.
of limitation laws, 366.
REBELLIONS,
employment of militia to suppress, 11.
RECITALS,
in statutes, not binding upon third parties, 96.
when they may be evidence, 96.
RECONSTRUCTION OF STATES,
control over, 34, n.
RECORDS,
public, of the States, full faith and credit to be given to, 15, 16.
judicial, not generally to be contradicted, 407.
(See Judicial Proceedings.)
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INDEX.
REDEMPTION,
right of, cannot be shortened .or extended by legislature, 291.
REFUSAL TO PLEAD,
in criminal cases, consequence of, 311.
REGISTRATION,
of voters, may be required, 601.
REGULATION,
of commerce by Congress, 10, 581-587.
of navigable waters by Congress, 591.
police, by the States,
(See Police Power.)
of the right of suffrage, 601, 602.
right of, does not imply a right to prohibit, 202, 203, n.
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
care taken by State constitutions to protect, 467-470.
distinguished from religious toleration, 467, and n.
does not preclude recognition of superintending Providence by public
authorities, 470, 471.
nor appointment of chaplains, thanksgiving and fast days, 471.
nor recognition that the prevailing religion of the State is Christian,
471.
the maxim that Christianity is part of the law of the land, 472-477.
punishment of blasphemy does not invade, 472-474.
or of other forms of profanity, 476.
Sunday laws, how justified, 476, 477.
respect for religious scruples, 477, 478.
religious belief, as affecting the competency or credibility of witnesses,
478.
REMEDIAL STATUTES,
liberal construction of, 61, n.
parties obtaining, are bound by, 96.
REMEDY,
power of legislature over, in criminal cases, 267-273.
in civil cases, 287-294, 361-367.
legislature cannot take away all remedy, 289.
may give new remedies, 361.
may limit resort to remedies, 364-367.
for compensation for property taken by public, 560, 561.
REMOVAL,
. of causes from State to national courts, 12, 13.
REPEAL,
of old English statutes, 25, n., 26, n.
all laws subject to, 125-127.
of statutes at same session of passage, 152.
by implication, not favored, 152.
of a law, terminates right to give judgment under it, 381.
of laws conflicting with unconstitutional law, 186.
question of, not to be referred to the people, 123.
REPORTS,
of public meetings, 435.
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REPORTS, —continued.
of legislative proceedings, publication of, 418-420, 457-460.
of judicial proceedings, publication of, 448-451. ,
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
REPRIEVE,
power of, not included in power to pardon, 116, n.
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT,
guarantee of, by United States to the States, 17, 33.
maxims of, do not constitute limitations on legislative power, 169, 170.
REPUBLICATION,
of amended statutes under certain State constitutions, 151, 152.
RESERVED POWERS,
under United States Constitution in the States and people, 19.
RES AD JUDICATA,
parties and privies estopped by judgments, 48.
force of judgment does not depend on reasons assigned, 49.
strangers not bound by, 49.
parties and privies not bound in new controversy, 49.
RESIDENCE,
gives jurisdiction in divorce suits, 400, 401.
but not unless bona fide, 401.
as affecting right to impose personal taxes, 499.
of voters, what constitutes, 599, 600.
RESTRICTIONS,
on trade by municipal by-laws, 202.
in United States Constitution on powers of the States, 15, 16, 18.
on power of people to amend constitutions, 31, 33.
on powers of legislature,
(See Legislatures of tHe States.)
RESUMPTION OF GRANTS,
by the States is forbidden, 274, 275.
RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION,
when admissible generally, 93, 369-383.
cannot revive demands which are barred, 369.
nor create a demand where none ever equitably existed, 369.
may take away defences based on informalities, 370.
may cure irregularities in legal proceedings, 371.
or in corporate action, &c, 371, 373.
what defects can and what cannot be covered by, 371.
may validate imperfect marriages, 372.
or other imperfect contracts, 374, 376.
or invalid deeds, 376-378.
may take away defence of usury, 375.
bona fide purchasers not to be affected by, 378.
legalizing municipal action, 224, 379.
pendency of suit does not affect power to pass, 381.
cannot make good what the legislature could not originally have permitted,
381, 382.
cannot cure defects of jurisdiction, 382, 383.
forbidden in some States, 370, and notes.
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INDEX.
RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION, — continued.
statutes generally construed to operate prospectively, 370.
prospective construction of constitution, 62, 63.
REVENUE,
in some States bills for, to originate with lower house, 131, 132.
cannot be raised under right of eminent domain, 527.
(See Taxation.)
REVISION,
of State constitutions, 80-37.
of statutes,
(See Statutes.)
REVOLUTION, AMERICAN,
powers of the Crown and Parliament over Colonies before, 5, 6.
Congress of the, its powers, 6, 7.
division of powers of government at time of, 6, n.
REWARDS,
cannot be paid by towns for apprehension of offenders, 212, n.
RHODE ISLAND,
ratification of Constitution by, 8, 9.
impeachment of judges of, 26, n., 160, n.
charter government, 26, n., 30, n.
privilege of members of legislature from arrest, 134, n.
protection by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 414, n.'
periodical valuation of property, 496. *
exclusions from suffrage, 599, n.
RIGHTS,
distinguished from the remedy, 285-287.
vested,
(See Vested RigHts.)
in action,
(See Action.)
ROADS,
appropriation of private property for, 533.
appropriation of materials for constructing. 526.
appropriation of, for railroads, &c, 545-557.
(See Eminent Domain.)
regulation of use of, by States, 588.
action for exclusion from, 543, n.
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,
(See Construction of State Constitutions.)
RULES OF EVIDENCE,
power of the legislature to change, 288, 367-369.
(See Evidence.)
RULES OF LEGISLATIVE ORDER,
are under the control of the legislature, 130-136.
(See Legislatures of tHe States.)
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S.
SABBATH,
laws for observance of, 476, 596.
SALE OF LANDS,
of incompetent persons, &c, special legislative authority for, 97-106.
propriety of judicial action in such cases, 97.
SCHOOL-HOUSES,
exercise of right of eminent domain for sites for, 533.
SCOTLAND,
servitude in, 298.
SEAMEN,
impressment of, 299.
SEARCH-WARRANTS,
(See SearcHes and Seizures.)
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
the maxim that every man's house is his castle, 22, 299.
unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited, 299, 300.
origin of the prohibition, 300.
history of general warrants in England, 300, n.
general warrants in America, 301, 302.
search-warrants, their arbitrary character, 303.
only granted after a showing of cause on oath, 304.
must specify place to be searched and the object, 304.
particularity of description required, 804.
should be served in daytime, 305.
must be directed to proper officer, 305.
must command accused party and property, &c, to be brought before
officer, 305.
cannot give discretionary power to ministerial officer, 805.
not allowed t* obtain evidence of intended crime, 305.
cases in which they are permissible, 305-307.
not to seize correspondence, 307, n.
for libels, illegal at common law, 307, n.
officer following command of, is protected, 307.
and may break open doors, 308.
SEAS,
(See Hior Seas.)
SECRECY,
inviolability of, in correspondence, 307, n.
elector's privilege of, 604, 605.
privilege of, as between counsel and client, 334.
SEDITION LAW,
passage of, and prosecutions under, 427, 428.
SELF-ACCUSATION,
not to be compelled, 313-317.
SELF-DEFENCE,
right to, 308, n.
SELF-GOVERNMENT,
(See Elections; Municipal Corporations.)
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INDEX.
SERMONS,
privilege of criticism of, 441.
SERVANT,
control of, by master, 341.
SERVICES,
laws requiring, without compensation, strictly construed, 393.
to influence legislation cannot be contracted for, 136, n.
of child, right of father to, 340.
SERVITUDE,
(See Slavery.)
SIDEWALKS,
owners of lots may be compelled to build under police power, 588.
SIGNING OF BILLS,
by officers of legislature, 151.
by the governor, 153, 154.
SLANDER,
general rules of liability for, 422-424.
(See Liberty of SpeecH and of tHe Press.)
SLAVERY,
former state of, in England, 295.
causes of its disappearance, 296-298.
in Scotland, 298, 299.
in America, 299.
now prohibited, 11.
servitude in punishment of crime, 299.
SOLDIERS,
quartering of, in private houses prohibited, 308.
municipal bounties to, 219-229.
military suffrage laws, 599.
jealousy of standing armies, 350.
SOUTH CAROLINA, t
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
protection by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 417.
religious liberty in, 468, n.
exclusions rom suffrage, 599, n.
SOVEREIGN POWERS,
cannot be granted away, 125, 206, 280-284.
SOVEREIGN STATE,
what it is, 1.
American States not strictly such, 6-9.
SOVEREIGNTY,
definition of, 1,
territorial and other limits of, 2.
in America, rests in people, 28, 598.
division of powers of, in American system, 2, 47, n.
legislature not to bargain away, 125-127, and n., 280-284.
exercise of, by the people, 598.
(See Elections.)
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
17
 1
4:
04
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/n
yp
.3
34
33
08
17
66
80
4
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
INDEX.
815
SPECIAL JURISDICTION,
courts of, 406.
SPECIAL LAWS,
forbidden in certain States where general can be made applicable, 110,
111, n., 128, 129, n.
due process of law does not a'ways forbid, 389-397.
for sale o lands, &c, 97-106.
SPECIAL PRIVILEGES,
strict construction of, 389-397.
SPECIAL SESSIONS OF LEGISLATURE,
calling of, by the governor, 132, 155.
SPEECH, FREEDOM OF,
(See Liberty of Speech and op the Press.)
SPEECHES,
of legislators, publication of, 457-460.
SPEED,
upon public highways, regulation of, 588, 589, 594.
SPEEDS TRIAL,
right of accused parties to, 311.
SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION,
must be found in the words employed, 72, 73.
laws in supposed violation of, 171, 172.
STALLIONS,
prohibition of standing of, in public places, 596.
STAMP,
defence to contract based on the want of, may be taken away, 378.
cannot be required on process of State courts, 483.'
upon contracts, 484, n.
STAMP ACT CONGRESS,
what led to, 5.
STANDING ARMIES,
jealousy of, 350.
STANDING MUTE,
of accused party, proceeding in case of, 311.
STAR CHAMBER,
court of, 342.
STATE,
definition of, 1.
sovereign, what js, 1.
distinguished from nation, 1.
limits to jurisdiction of, 2.
STATES OF THE UNION,
in what sense sovereign, 6.
always subject to a common government, 9.
suits between, in Federal courts, 11.
division of powers between, and the nation, 2.
not suable by individuals, 12.
powers prohibited to, 15, 16, 18.
faith to be given to public records of, 16, 17.
privileges and immunities of citizens of, 15, 16, 487.
agreements of, are inviolable, 275.
compacts between, are inviolable, 275.
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INDEX.
STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
in existence when United States Constitution was formed, 21.
pre-existing laws, common and statutory, 21-25, 26, n.
ordinance of 1787, 25, n.
colonial charters, 26, 27.
how modified when not containing provisions therefor, 28.
theory that the people are sovereign, 28.
general rules for modification of, 30-37.
right of people of territories to form, 30.
right to amend, rests in people as an orgahized body politic, 31.
will of the people must be expressed under forms of law, 31.
conventions to amend or revise, 32.
limitations by Constitution of the United States on power to amend, 33.
protection of personal rights by, 33, 35, 36.
unjust provisions, &c, must be enforced, 34.
what is generally to be expected in, 34.
are not the origin of individual rights, 36.
are presumed to have been drafted with care, 58.
are successors of English charters of liberty, 59, 60.
construction of, 38.
(See Construction of State Constitutions.)
STATE COURTS,
removal of causes from, to United States courts, 12, 13.
to decide finally questions of State law, 13, 14.
protection to personal liberty by, 294, n., 345.
(See Courts.)
STATE INDEBTEDNESS,
prohibition of, will not prevent indebtedness by municipal corporations,
217-219.
STATEMENT,
of defendant in criminal case, right to make, and effect of, 313-318.
STATUS,
of marriage, control of, by legislature, 109, 110.
(See Divorce.)
STATUTES,
directory and mandatory, 74-78.
enactment of, 130-158.
constitutional requirements must be observed, 130, 131.
common parliamentary law as affecting, 131.
the two houses must act separately, 131.
to proceed in their own way in collecting information, 135.
journals of houses as evidence, 135, 136.
introduction of bills, 137-139.
three several readings of bills, 80, 81, 139, 140.
yeas and nays, entry of, 140.
what sufficient vote on passage, 141.
title of bill, formerly no part of it, 141.
constitutional provisions requiring object to be expressed, 81, 82,
141.
these provisions mandatory, 150.
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STATUTES, — continued.
evil to be remedied thereby, 142-144.
particularity required in stating object, 144.
"other purposes," ineffectual words in, 145.
examples as to what can be held embraced in, 145, 146.
effect if more than one object embraced, 147, 148.
effect where act broader than title, 148-150.
amendatory, 151, 152.
requirement that act amended be set forth at length, 151.
this not applicable to amendments by implication, 152.
repeal of, at same session of their passage, 152.
by unconstitutional act, 186.
approval of, by the governor, 153, 154.
passage of, at special sessions, 155.
when to take effect, 155-158.
publication of, 157, 158.
presumed validity of, 168, 172-177, 182-186.
power of courts to declare their unconstitutionality, 159, 169.
not to be exercised by bare quorum, 161, 162.
nor unless decision on the very point necessary, 163.
nor on complaint of party not interested, 163, 164.
nor solely because of unjust provisions, 164-168.
nor because violating fundamental principles, 169, 170.
nor because opposed to spirit of constitution, 171-177.
nor in any doubtful case, 182-186.
may be unconstitutional in part, 177-181.
instances of, 179-181.
constitutional objection to, may be waived, 181.
motives in passage of, not to be inquired into, 186, 187.
consequence when invalid, 188.
whether jury may pass upon, 336, n.
retrospective, 369-383.
construction of, to be such as to give effect, 184.
presumption against conflict with Constitution, 185, 186.
to be prospective, 370.
contemporary and practical, 67-73.
ex post facto, 264-272.
(See Ex Post Facto Laws.)
violating obligation of contracts, 273-294.
(See Obligation op Contracts.)
unequal and partial, 389-397.
of limitation, 364-367.
of Parliament, how far in force in America, 23, 24.
STATUTORY PRIVILEGES,
are not vested rights, 383.
strict construction of, 389-397.
STAY LAWS,
law taking from mortgagees right to possession invalid as to existing
mortgages, 290.
law extending time of redemption of lands previously sold is void, 291.
4
62
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INDEX.
STAY LAWS,— continued.
law shortening redemption void, 291.
stay of execution on existing demands for unreasonable or indefinite time
is void, 292.
STOCK IN CORPORATIONS,
municipal subscriptions to, 119, 213-219.
when liable for debts cannot be released by legislative act, 292.
STREETS,
power of cities, &c, to change grade of, 207.
special assessments for grading and paving, 505-508.
assessment of labor upon, 512.
exercise of right of eminent domain for, 533.
and for materials for constructing, 526.
when owner of land to receive compensation, 563, 564.
appropriation of, for railways, 545-557.
police regulations for use of, 588, 589.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION,
of laws in derogation of common law, 61, n.
of charters, 195, 894.
of statutes granting special privileges, 389-397.
of statutes requiring gratuitous services, 393, 894.
of statutes taking property for public use, 528, 529.
SUBJECT OF STATUTE,
required in some States to be stated in title, 141-151.
SUBMITTING LAWS TO POPULAR VOTE,
whether it is a delegation of legislative power, 116-125.
authorities generally do not ajlow, 120.
corporate charters, &c, may be submitted, 118.
and questions of divisions of towns, &p., 119.
and questions of local subscriptions to improvements, 119.
SUBSCRIPTIONS,
to internal improvements by municipal corporations, 119, 213-219.
submitting questions of, to corporation is not delegating legislative power,
119.
power of taxation to provide for, cannot be taken away, 292.
SUCCESSION TO THE CROWN,
power of Parliament to change, 86.
SUFFRAGE,
right of, in forming new constitutions, 28, 80, 34.
restrictions upon, to be construed strictly, 394.
constitutional qualifications for, not to be added to by legislature, 64.
who to exercise generally, 599.
regulation of right of, 601, 6021
(See Elections.)
SUIT,
notification of, by publication, 403, 404.
(See Action.)
SUMPTUARY LAWS,
odious character of, 385.
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SUNDAY,
laws to prevent desecration of, how defended, 476, 477.
police regulations regarding, 59C.
SUPPORT,
of children, liability of father for, 340.
lateral, of lands, right to, 543, n.
SUPREMACY OF PARLIAMENT,
extent of, 3, 4, 86-88, 259.
SUPREME LAW,
Constitution, laws, and treaties of United States to be, 12.
of a State, constitution to be, 2, S.
SURRENDER,
of fugitives from justice, 15, n.
SUSPENSION OF LAWS,
when authorized must be general, 391.
for limitation of actions, 365, n.
SWAMPS,
drains for, 533.
special assessments for draining, 510, 511.
T.
TAKING OF PROPERTY,
of individuals for public use, 509, n., 524.
(See Eminent Domain; Taxation.)
TAX LAWS.
directory and mandatory provisions in, 75. 76.
(See Taxation.)
TAX SALES,
curing defective proceedings in, by retrospective legislation, 382, 383.
what defects should avoid, 521.
deeds given upon, may be made evidence of tithe, 367.
conditions to redemption from, 369, n.
(See Taxation.)
TAXATION,
and representation to go together, 24, and n., 59, n., 117, n., 169.
right of, compared with eminent domain, 559.
exemptions from, by the States, when not repealable, 127, 280.
can only be for public purposes, 129, 175, 487-495.
must be by consent of the people, 117, n.
license fees distinguished from, 201, 586, 587.
by municipalities, power of legislature over, 118, n., 230-235.
reassessment of irregular, may be authorized, 209.
irregular may be confirmed by legislature, 379, n , 882.
necessary to the existence of government, 479.
unlimited nature of power of, 479-485.
of agencies of national government by the States impliedly forbidden,
480-483.
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INDEX.
TAXATION, — continued.
of agencies of the States by the national government also forbidden,
488.
of the subjects of commerce by the States, 485, 486, 586.
discriminations in, as between citizens of different States, 487.
legislature the proper authority to determine upon, 488—495.
apportionment essential to, 495.
taxing districts, necessity of, 495, 499.
apportionment not always by values, 496, 501.
license fees and other special taxes, 496.
assessments for local improvements, 497.
benefits from the improvement may be taken into the account, 497,
505, 511.'
general provisions requiring taxation by value do not apply to these
assessments, 498.
taxation of persons or property out of the district is void, 499, 500-504,
516.
must be uniform throughout the district, 502.
local assessments may be made in proportion to frontage, 507.
necessity for apportionment in such case, 508.
special taxing districts for drains, levees, &c, 509, 510.
taxation in labor for repair of roads, &c., 512.
difficulty in making taxation always equal, 513.
hardships of individual cases do not make it void, 513.
legislature must select the objects of taxation, 514.
exemptions of property from, 514, 515.
constitutional provisions which preclude exemptions, 515, 516.
special exemptions void, 515, n., 516.
legislative authority must be shown for each particular tax, 517-520.
excessive taxation, 520.
the maxim de minimis lex non curat not applicable in tax proceedings,
521.
what defects and irregularities render tax sales void, 521, and n.
TEACHER AND SCHOLAR,
control of former over latter, 341.
TECHNICAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,
danger of resorting to, 61, n., 83, 84, and n.
TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE,
right to secrecy in, 307, n.
TEMi'ERANCE LAWS,
right of the States to pass, 581-583.
TENNESSEE,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
title of acts to express the object, 141, n.
republication of amended statutes, 151, n.
when acts to take effect, 156, n.
retrospective laws in, 371, n.
protection by the law of the land, 353, n.
freedom of speech and of the press in, 415, n.
exclusion of religious teachers from office, 468, n.
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TENNESSEE, — continued.
religious tests in, 468, n., 469, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478, n.
TERRITORIAL LIMITATION,
to the powers of sovereignty, 2.
to the exercise of power by the States, 127, 128.
to municipal authority, 213.
to power of taxation, 499, 500-504, 516.
TERRITORIES,
power of eminent domain in, 525.
legislation for, 25, n.
formation of constitutions by people of, 30, 31.
TEST OATHS,
when may constitute a punishment, 263, 264.
forbidden in some States, 469, n.
TEXAS,
admission of, to the Union, 9.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
legislative rules for regulation of pardons, 116, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 853, n.
exclusion of religious teachers from office, 468, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 468, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478, n.
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT,
provisions of, 11, 294.
TIME,
loss of remedy by lapse of, 364-367.
and place are of the essence of election laws, 602, 603.
TITLE TO LEGISLATIVE ACT,
requirement that it shall state subject, &c, is mandatory, 81-83, 141-150.
TITLES OF NOBILITY,
States not to grant, 17, 33.
TOLERATION,
as distinguished from religious liberty, 467, 468.
TOWNSHIPS,
importance of, in the American system, 190, n.
origin of, 189, and n.
distinguished from chartered corporations, 240.
collection from corporators of judgments against, 241-247.
not liable for neglect of duty by officers, 247.
apportionment of debts, &c, on division, 237, 290.
indemnification of officers of, 209, 212.
(See Municipal Corporations.)
TRADE,
by-laws in general restraint of, 202.
TRAVEL,
obstructions to, on navigable waters, 592, 593.
regulating speed of, 588, 594.
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INDEX.
TRAVERSE JURY,
trial of accused parties by, 319-328.
(See Crimes.)
TREASON,
evidence required to convict of, 314, and n.
TREATIES,
of the United States, to be the supreme law, 12.
States forbidden to enter into, 15.
TREATING VOTERS,
laws against, 614.
TRIAL,
of right to property, 369, and a.
new, not to be granted by legislature. 95. 392.
of accused parties to be by jury, 309.'
must be speedy, 311.
must be public, 312.
(See Crimes; Jury Trial.)
TRUST,
the legislative not to be delegated, 116, 20! .
TRUSTEES,
special statutes authorizing sales by, constitutional, 97-106.
rights of eestuis que trust not to be determined by legislature, 105.
municipal corporations as, 192.
TRUTH,
as a defence in libel cases, 424, 438, 464.
necessity of showing good motives for publication of, 464.
TURNPIKES,
exercise of eminent domain for, 533.
appropriation of highways for, 545.
change of, to common highways, 546, n.
TWICE IN JEOPARDY,
punishment of same act under State and national law, 18.
under State law and municipal by-law, 198, 199.
(See Jeofardy.)
TWO-THIRDS OF HOUSE,
what constitutes, 141.
u.
ULTRA VIRES,
contracts of municipal corporations which are, 196, 211, 212, 215, n.
UNANIMITY,
required in jury trials, 320.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
definition of the term, 3, 4.
first declaration of, 160, n.
power of the courts to annul, 159.
whether jury may pass upon, 336, n.
(See Courts; Statutes.)
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UNEQUAL AND PARTIAL LEGISLATION,
special laws of a remedial nature, 389.
local laws, or laws applying to particular classes, 890-393.
proscription of parties for opinions, 390.
suspensions of the laws must be general, 391, 392.
distinctions must be based upon reason, 393.
equality the aim of the law, 393.
strict construction of special burdens and privileges, 393-896.
discrimination against citizens of other States, 15, 397.
UNIFORMITY,
in construction of constitutions, 54.
in taxation, 495, 499.
(See Taxation.)
UNION,
of the Colonies before the Revolution, 5.
UNITED STATES,
- division of powers between the States and Union, 2.
origin of its government, 5.
Revolutionary Congress, and its powers, 6, 7.
Articles of Confederation and their failure, 6-8.
formation of Constitution of, 8.
government of, one of enumerated powers, 9, 10, 173.
general powers of, 10-12.
its laws and treaties the supreme law, 12.
judicial powers of, 12, 19.
removal of causes from State courts to courts of, 12, 13.
prohibition upon exercise of powers by the States, 15, 16.
guaranty of republican government to the States, 17.
implied prohibition of powers to the States, 18.
reservation of powers to States and people, 19.
consent of, to formation of State constitutions, 30, 31.
(See Congress; Constitution of United States; Courts of United
States; President.)
UNJUST PROVISIONS,
in constitutions, must be enforced, 72.
in statutes, do not necessarily avoid them, 164-168.
(See Partial Legislation.)
UNLAWFUL CONTRACTS,
(See Illegal Contracts.)
UNMUZZLED DOGS,
restraining from running at large, 595.
UNREASONABLE BAIL,
not to be required, 310.
UNREASONABLE BY-LAWS,
are void, 200.
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
(See Searches and Seizures.)
UNWHOLSOME PROVISIONS,
prohibiting sale of, 595.'
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824 INDEX.
USAGE AND CUSTOM,
(See Common Law.)
USURY,
right to defence of, may be taken away by legislature retrospectively, 375,
376.
V.
VALIDATING IMPERFECT CONTRACTS,
by retrospective legislation, 293, 371-881.
(See Retrospective Legislation.)
VALUATION,
of property for taxation, 496.
(See Taxation.)
of land taken for public use,
(See Eminent Domain.)
VERDICT,
jury not to be controlled by judge in giving, 320.
judge cannot refuse to receive, 320.
jury may return special, 321.
but cannot be compelled to do so, 321.
general, covers both the law and the facts, 321, 323.
in favor of defendant in criminal case, cannot be set aside, 321, 322, 326".
against accused, may be set aside, 323.
in libel cases, to cover law and fact, 322, 460.
to be a bar to new prosecution, 326.
when defendant not to be deprived of, by nolle prosequi, 327.
not a bar if court bad no jurisdiction, 327.
or if indictment fatally defective, 327.
when jury may be discharged without, 327.
set aside on defendant's motion, may be new trial, 327, 328.
on some of the counts, is bar to new trial thereon, 328.
cannot be received from less than twelve jurors, 319.
VERMONT,
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 142, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 414, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478.
betterment law of, 386.
VESTED RIGHTS,
not conferred by charters of municipal incorporation, 192, 193.
grants of property to corporations not revocable, 236-239, 275.
under the marriage relation, cannot be taken away, 284, 285.
not to be disturbed except by due process of law, 175, and n., 202, n.,
357.
meaning of the term, 358, 370, 378.
subjection of, to general laws, 358.
interests in expectancy are not, 359, 361.'
rights under the marriage relation, when are, 360, 361.
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VESTED RIGHTS, — continued.
in legal remedies, parties do not have, 861, 362.
exceptions, 290-292.
statutory privileges are not, 383.
in rights of action, 362.
forfeitures of, must be judicially declared, 363, 864.
time for enforcing, may be limited, 364-367, 369.
do not exist in rules of evidence, 369.
rights to take advantage of informalities are not, 870-378.
or of defence of usury, 875.
VILLAGES AND CITIES,
(See Municipal Corporations.)
VILLEINAGE,
in England, 295-298.
VINDICTIVE DAMAGES,
when publisher of newspaper not liable to, 457.
VIOLATING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,
(See Obligation of Contracts.)
VIRGINIA,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.
special laws for divorce cases, &c, forbidden, 110, n.
legislative regulation as to pardons, 116, n.
revenue bills in, 131, n.
republication of amendatory statutes, 151, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 417.
religious liberty in, 468.
VOID CONTRACTS,
(See Contracts.)
VOLD STATUTES,
(See Statutes.)
VOLUNTEERS,
in military service, municipal bounties to, 219-229.
VOTERS,
franchise of, cannot be made to depend on impossible condition, 363, n.
constitutional qualifications of, cannot be added to by legislature, 64, n.
privilege of secrecy of, 605.
whether qualifications of, can be inquired into in contesting election, 627.
(See Elections.)
w.
WAGERS,
upon elections, are illegal, 615.
WAIVER,
of constitutional objection, 181, 182.
of irregularities in judicial proceedings, 409.
of objection to interested judge, 413.
of right to full panel of jurors, 319.
of right to compensation for property taken by public, 561.
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WAIVER, —continutd.
in capital cases, 319, n.
of elector's right to secrecy, 606.
WAR AND PEACE,
power of Revolutionary Congress over, 6.
control of questions concerning, by Congress, 10.
WARD,
control of guardian over, 841.
special statutes for sale of lands of, 97-106.
WARRANTS,
general, their illegality, 300-302.
scrvice of, in criminal cases, 803.
search-warrants, 303.
(See Unreasonable SearcHes and Seizures.)
WATER RIGHTS,
right to front on navigable water is property, 544.
right of the States to establish wharf lines, 595.
right to use of, in running stream, 557.
appropriation of streams under right of eminent domain, 526, 533.
(See Navigable Waters; Water-Courses.)
WATER-COURSES,
navigable, and rights therein, 589-594.
dams across, for manufacturing purposes, 534-536, 594, 595.
bridges over, under State authority, 592, 593.
licensing ferries across, 593.
construction of levees upon, 533.
flooding premises by, the liability for, 544.
incidental injury by improvement of, gives no right of action, 592,
(See Navigable Waters; Water RigHts.)
WAYS,
(See HigHways; Private Roads; Roads; Streets.)
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES,
Congress may fix standard of, 10.
regulation of, by the States, 596.
WEST VIRGINIA,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.
special laws for sale of lands of minors, &c, forbidden, 97, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in, 415, n.
who excluded from suffrage, 599, n.
WHARFAGE,
right to, is property, 544.
States may establish wharf lines, 595.
WIDOW,
(See Dower.)
WIFE,
(See Divorce J Dower; Married Women.)
WILL,
imperfect, cannot be validated after tide passed, 93, n.
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WISCONSIN,
special statutes for sale of lands of minors, &c, forbidden, 97, n.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
privileges of members, 134, n.
when statutes to take effect, 157.
title of private and local acts to express the subject, 142, n.
republication of amended statutes, 151, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 416, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.
want of religious belief in witness does not render him incompetent,
478, n.
contested election of governor in, 624, n.
WITNESSES,
power to summon and examine before legislative committees, 135.
accused parties to be confronted with, 318.
not compellable to be against themselves, 317, 394.
evidence by, in their own favor, 317, n.
not liable to civil action for false testimony, 441.
unless the testimony was irrelevant, 441, n.
competency and credibility of, as depending on religious belief, 478,
and n.
testimony of wife on behalf of husband, 317, 318, n.
WORKS OF ART,
liberty of criticism of, 457.
WRITS OF ASSISTANCE,
unconstitutional character of, 301, 302, n.
WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS,
(See Habeas Corpus.)
YEAS AND NAYS,
in some States, on passage of laws to be entered on journals, 140.
Cambridge: Press at John Wilson & Son.
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